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Open Recommendations

Information Environment: DOD Needs to Address Security Risks of Publicly Accessible Information
GAO-26-107492
Nov 17, 2025
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12 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Security Enterprise Executive Committee assesses existing departmental security policies and guidance to identify gaps associated with risks in the digital environment; and makes recommendations on updating policy and guidance to reduce the risks of digital information about DOD and its personnel being publicly accessible. In conducting this assessment, the executive committee should include all OSD offices that oversee security areas and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Security Enterprise Executive Committee improves collaboration across the department to reduce the risks of information about DOD and its personnel being publicly accessible. Collaboration should include all OSD offices that oversee security areas and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. (Recommendation 2)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Security Enterprise Executive Committee reviews and assesses security training to ensure that digital profile issues are considered in all security areas—counterintelligence, force protection, insider threat, mission assurance, OPSEC, and program protection—and makes any appropriate recommendations for action to improve the representation of digital profile threats in security training across the department. (Recommendation 3)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that U.S. Cyber Command provides security training to its workforce on threats in the security areas of counterintelligence, insider threat, and OPSEC. (Recommendation 4)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Air Force is conducting required assessments in the security areas of force protection, insider threat, and mission assurance. (Recommendation 5)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Army The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Army is conducting required assessments in the security areas of force protection, insider threat, and mission assurance. (Recommendation 6)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Opportunities Exist to Better Prepare for Delay in New Uranium Processing Facility
GAO-25-107330
Sep 18, 2025
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
National Nuclear Security Administration The NNSA Administrator should direct the Office of Defense Programs to establish a comprehensive plan with relevant stakeholders on actions and related costs to maintain safe operations in Building 9212 until 2035 or when the program operations in the building cease. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Military Moves: DOD Needs Better Information to Effectively Oversee Relocation Program Reforms
GAO-25-107771
Sep 11, 2025
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should—as the department develops its path forward for DP3—ensure that the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with TRANSCOM Defense Personal Property Management Office, obtain comprehensive information needed on capacity, performance, and costs to effectively oversee and manage risks to DOD's personal property program. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

ICBM Modernization: Air Force Actions Needed to Expeditiously Address Critical Risks to Sentinel Transition
GAO-25-108466
Sep 10, 2025
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6 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of the Air Force The Secretary of the Air Force should develop a transition risk management plan for the transition from Minuteman III to Sentinel ICBM. The plan should include a transition risk report and a risk register in future Programming Plan updates. (Recommendation 1)
Open
The Air Force concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2025, according to Air Force officials, the service has started the process of developing a transition risk management plan with a goal to complete the plan in 2026. In its Corrective Action Plan, the Air Force stated that the service established a transition risk management plan working group in June 2025. When we confirm actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force The Secretary of the Air Force should establish a detailed, logical, and sequenced schedule for completion of the Physical Security System Test Facility that aligns with Sentinel restructuring plans and reflects scheduling best practices. (Recommendation 2)
Open
The Air Force concurred with our recommendation in its response to our classified report. Subsequently, the Air Force provided new information about its plans for the test facility. Officials told us that the Air Force plans to explore alternatives to the test facility that would achieve test and evaluation requirements faster and at lower cost. As of August 2025, officials plan to address these alternatives as part of an updated Sentinel test and evaluation master plan. When we confirm the extent to which these alternatives address the intent of our recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force The Secretary of the Air Force should complete an assessment of personnel needs for the transition, including potential Reserve Component support for the transition. (Recommendation 3)
Open
The Air Force concurred with our recommendation. In its Corrective Action Plan, officials stated the service plans to develop a new Manpower Estimate Report as part of the Sentinel restructuring. Officials said the service plans to complete an assessment of personnel needs for the transition as part of the Manpower Estimate Report, estimated to be completed in 2027. In addition, officials stated that Air Force Global Strike Command plans to establish a reserve missile squadron at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, which could alleviate operator needs during the transition. When we confirm the extent to which these actions are complete and address the intent of our recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force The Secretary of the Air Force should expeditiously develop a post-2030 Minuteman III operational test launch plan that is aligned with a Sentinel fielding plan and coordinated with the Department of Energy. (Recommendation 4)
Open
The Air Force concurred with our recommendation. In its Corrective Action Plan, the service stated that as of June 2025, Air Force Global Strike Command is actively working a post-2030 Minuteman III operational test launch plan with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center and the Department of Energy. When we confirm actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force The Secretary of the Air Force should specifically address Minuteman III sustainment risks in the overall transition risk management plan. (Recommendation 5)
Open
The Air Force concurred with our recommendation. In its Corrective Action Plan, officials stated that Air Force Global Strike Command and the Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center continuously track Minuteman III sustainment risks. As of June 2025, officials stated that as the service builds the transition risk management plan, they plan to track Minuteman III sustainment risks in a risk report and risk registers. When we confirm actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force The Secretary of the Air Force should specifically address the personnel and materiel implications of a decision to re-MIRV ICBMs as part of the overall transition risk management plan. (Recommendation 6)
Open
The Air Force concurred with our recommendation. In its Corrective Action Plan, the Air Force stated that the service intends to address the implications of a decision to re-MIRV ICBMs as part its transition risk management plan estimated for completion in 2026. When we confirm actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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