Columbia Class Submarine: Overcoming Persistent Challenges Requires Yet Undemonstrated Performance and Better-Informed Supplier Investments
Fast Facts
The Navy plans to spend $130 billion to acquire 12 Columbia class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Timely delivery of these submarines is critical for the nation's nuclear deterrence. But the first submarine is estimated to be delivered over a year late and cost hundreds of millions of dollars more than planned.
Design and construction challenges persist despite longstanding efforts to address them. With difficult construction work ahead, delays and cost growth will likely continue and get worse.
We recommended that the Navy take steps to better understand the risks to its cost and schedule estimates, and more.
Rendering of the Columbia Class Submarine
Highlights
What GAO Found
Based on current construction performance, the Navy reported in April 2024 that the first (lead) Columbia class submarine is estimated to be delivered 12 to 16 months after its originally planned date. This would result in delivery between October 2028 and February 2029. A late delivery could ultimately jeopardize the lead submarine's planned availability for operations in 2030.
According to GAO's analysis of program data from January 2022 through May 2023, cost and schedule performance for lead submarine construction has consistently fallen short of targets. Through early 2024, those trends had not improved, and future risks will likely add to current cost and schedule growth. The program has reported that the shipbuilder needs to take swift and significant actions to address the causes of poor construction performance. However, as GAO has previously reported, the program has tried to mitigate some of these causes—such as late materials and detailed design products—for years.
Lead Columbia Class Submarine Stern during Transport between Shipyards
Based on data through May 2023, GAO estimated that lead submarine construction costs at completion could be hundreds of millions of dollars more than the Navy's planned costs. Although the shipbuilder is also expecting cost increases, its estimated overrun is smaller and assumes significant future improvement that GAO's past work suggests is unrealistic. Further, program reporting on submarine construction progress did not always include a thorough analysis of why the program missed cost and schedule goals. Without realistic cost estimates and adequate analysis, the program will struggle to address continuing and future risks that could further degrade construction performance.
The Navy has not consistently defined information needed to determine whether investments made in the supplier base have increased supplier production or generated cost savings and how those results support the program's goals. Since 2018, the Navy reported receiving more than $2.6 billion to invest in the submarine supplier base and help achieve Columbia class construction goals. Without identifying consistent information, the Navy is not well positioned to ensure that these investments will effectively spur their intended benefits for the program.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy plans to invest almost $130 billion to acquire 12 Columbia class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, the sea-based leg of the nation's air, land, and sea nuclear deterrent. Congress included a provision in statute for the Navy to provide updates on the Columbia class program's design and construction goals and for GAO to assess this information.
This report assesses (1) the extent to which submarines are on track to meet cost and schedule targets and how risks could affect construction progress; and (2) the extent to which actions in the Columbia class supplier base are helping to achieve construction goals and mitigate risks.
GAO reviewed Navy and shipbuilder documents to identify construction status and costs; assessed the program's performance data against selected best practices to understand progress and challenges; and interviewed Navy, shipbuilder, and supplier officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that issued in July 2024. Information deemed sensitive has been omitted.
Recommendations
GAO is making five recommendations, including that the Navy require the shipbuilder to revise its estimated cost at completion and include thorough analysis in its reporting; and that the program identify information it needs to determine whether investments in the supplier base support Columbia class construction goals. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations and cited actions that it will take to address them.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Deputy Commander for SUPSHIP has Electric Boat revise its cost estimate at completion to incorporate all remaining identified program risks and reflect likely levels of program performance based on historical trends. (Recommendation 1) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Deputy Commander for SUPSHIP, in conjunction with the Columbia class submarine program office, has Electric Boat produce EVM reporting that includes key elements of variance analysis needed to better address future risks, such as an explanation of root cause, impacts to cost and schedule, and corrective actions. (Recommendation 2) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Columbia class submarine program, in conjunction with Electric Boat and Newport News, consistently identifies the information needed to determine whether production improvements and cost savings from supplier development funding are sufficiently supporting Columbia class construction goals. (Recommendation 3) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Deputy Commander for SUPSHIP has the SUPSHIPs Groton and Newport News update planning to ensure they have adequate resources and staffing needed to conduct quality assurance oversight of outsourced work at Electric Boat and Newport News strategic supplier facilities. (Recommendation 4) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Columbia class submarine program, in conjunction with the Deputy Commander for SUPSHIP, has Electric Boat update planning for submarine outsourcing, including expected hours and locations of outsourced work, to help SUPSHIP identify quality assurance oversight risks and request necessary resources. (Recommendation 5) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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