Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Planning
Fast Facts
Forces trained in explosive ordnance disposal are critical to DOD military operations. From 2002–2012, DOD added more than 70% more of these forces to meet increasing demand.
When not deployed, these forces are also used to protect U.S. and foreign dignitaries. From 2007–2017 their use for such “VIP” missions more than doubled. DOD said that routine VIP missions affect these forces’ preparation for deployment. But DOD doesn’t consider the requirements of both types of missions when determining how many explosive ordnance disposal forces it needs.
We recommended that DOD consider VIP missions when determining how many personnel it needs.
Cache of Munitions Awaiting Disposal
A pile of munitions on dirt
Highlights
What GAO Found
The military services' processes for determining the necessary number of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel are based on combat-related missions. However, these processes do not fully consider some defense support of civil authority (DSCA) missions that EOD forces conduct. Demand for EOD forces for DSCA missions can be manpower-intensive and frequent. For example, EOD forces' workload for protecting U.S. and foreign dignitaries—also referred to as Very Important Person (VIP) support missions—increased from about 248,000 to over 690,000 man-hours in fiscal years 2007 to 2017 (figure). However, according to officials, the services do not consider DSCA missions in determining the number of EOD personnel needed, instead focusing on combat-related missions. Unless the Department of Defense (DOD) ensures that the services update guidance to consider the total EOD force required to support both missions, decision makers cannot accurately assess the EOD forces' sufficiency.
Total Explosive Ordnance Disposal Man-hours Spent on Very Important Person Support Missions, Fiscal Years 2007-2017
DOD guidance specific to VIP support missions does not include a requirement for the services to report on the effect of VIP support missions on military preparedness. According to officials, military preparedness is degraded when the services' EOD forces are unable to concurrently complete predeployment tasks such as training for combat. Per DOD guidance, Secret Service support requests are to be evaluated based on their effects on military preparedness. Without this information, decision makers are precluded from understanding the risk to EOD forces' military preparedness resulting from the routine VIP support missions. Decision makers need this information to ensure efficient and effective accomplishment of both VIP support missions and preparation for combat-related missions for affected combatant commands.
Why GAO Did This Study
EOD forces are a high demand, critical asset that support DOD's ability to execute military operations. DOD increased the number of EOD forces by more than 70 percent from 2002 to 2012 because of increased demand. When not deployed, EOD forces provide support to civil authorities. One of these missions is protecting U.S. and foreign dignitaries—also referred to as VIP support missions.
House Report 115-200 included a provision for GAO to review matters related to EOD capabilities and requirements. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the military services consider all combatant command EOD requirements, including DSCA, in determining the number of EOD personnel needed, and (2) DOD evaluates the effect of VIP support missions on the military preparedness of EOD forces. GAO reviewed relevant guidance, analyzed EOD data, and interviewed EOD and manpower officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2019. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted.
Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations including that DOD (1) update the appropriate service guidance to ensure that all EOD missions, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces, and (2) incorporate into appropriate guidance a requirement for the military services to notify the Joint Staff and combatant commands when VIP support missions negatively affect the military preparedness of EOD units. DOD did not provide comments on the draft of this report.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of the Army should update Army manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 1) |
The Department of the Army had neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation. at the time this report was published In September 2019, GAO published this report and recommendation after DOD informed GAO that there would be no agency comment forthcoming. DOD's Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) confirmed on 14 July 2020 that they were continuing to pursue resolution and were seeking a new Department point of contact. On 10 February 2021, DOD WHS again confirmed that they were continuing to pursue resolution but had no new information. As of November 2021, DOD (via WHS) communicated that the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy would first complete the ongoing federally funded research and development center study on the EOD program and then formally respond to GAO's recommendations. In August 2022, DOD (via WHS) provided a written response stating that the federally funded research and development center study agreed with this recommendation. However, DOD further stated that "sufficient guidance exists among the Military Departments to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces." As of August 2022, DOD plans no additional action and considers the recommendation closed. GAO continues to believe that by updating appropriate Army guidance to ensure that the Army considers the total EOD force required to support combat-related and DSCA missions, decision makers would be better able to accurately assess the sufficiency of EOD forces to meet both missions and the associated risks. DOD's position on this recommendation changed to partially concur as of May 2023. We reached out to DOD in June 2023 and again in August 2023 to request an update on the status of this recommendation, but as of November 2023 we have not heard back from DOD. We will keep this recommendation open and continue to monitor whether the Army takes relevant implementation actions.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of the Air Force should update Air Force manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 2) |
The Department of the Air Force had neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation at the time this report was published. In September 2019, GAO published this report and recommendation after DOD informed GAO that there would be no agency comment forthcoming. DOD's Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) confirmed on 14 July 2020 that they were continuing to pursue resolution and were seeking a new Department point of contact. On 10 February 2021, DOD WHS again confirmed that they were continuing to pursue resolution but had no new information. As of November 2021, DOD (via WHS) communicated that the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy would first complete the ongoing federally funded research and development center study on the EOD program and then formally respond to GAO's recommendations. In August 2022, DOD (via WHS) provided a written response stating that the federally funded research and development center study agreed with this recommendation. However, DOD further stated that "sufficient guidance exists among the Military Departments to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces." As of August 2022, DOD plans no additional action and considers the recommendation closed. GAO continues to believe that by updating appropriate Air Force guidance to ensure that the Air Force considers the total EOD force required to support combat-related and DSCA missions, decision makers would be better able to accurately assess the sufficiency of EOD forces to meet both missions and the associated risks. DOD's position on this recommendation changed to non concur as of May 2023. We reached out to DOD in June 2023 and again in August 2023 to request an update on the status of this recommendation, but as of November 2023 we have not heard back from DOD. We will keep this recommendation open and continue to monitor whether the Air Force takes relevant implementation actions.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of the Navy should update Navy and Marine Corps manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 3) |
The Department of the Navy had neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation at the time this report was published. In September 2019, GAO published this report and recommendation after DOD informed GAO that there would be no agency comment forthcoming. DOD's Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) confirmed on 14 July 2020 that they were continuing to pursue resolution and were seeking a new Department point of contact. On 10 February 2021, DOD WHS again confirmed that they were continuing to pursue resolution but had no new information. As of November 2021, DOD (via WHS) communicated that the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy would first complete the ongoing federally funded research and development center study on the EOD program and then formally respond to GAO's recommendations. In August 2022, DOD (via WHS) provided a written response stating that the federally funded research and development center study agreed with this recommendation. However, DOD further stated that "sufficient guidance exists among the Military Departments to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces." As of August 2022, DOD plans no additional action and considers the recommendation closed. GAO continues to believe that by updating appropriate Navy and Marine Corps guidance to ensure that they consider the total EOD force required to support combat-related and DSCA missions, decision makers would be better able to accurately assess the sufficiency of EOD forces to meet both missions and the associated risks. DOD's position on this recommendation changed to partially concur as of May 2023. We reached out to DOD in June 2023 and again in August 2023 to request an update on the status of this recommendation, but as of November 2023 we have not heard back from DOD. We will keep this recommendation open and continue to monitor whether the Navy takes relevant implementation actions.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the combatant commands, incorporate into the appropriate guidance a requirement that the military services notify the Joint Staff and the affected combatant commands when the execution of VIP support missions negatively affects the preparedness of EOD units for combat-related missions. (Recommendation 4) |
The Department of Defense has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation. In September 2019, GAO published this report and recommendation after DOD informed GAO that there would be no agency comment forthcoming. DOD's Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) confirmed on 14 July 2020 that they were continuing to pursue resolution and were seeking a new Department point of contact. On 10 February 2021, DOD WHS again confirmed that they were continuing to pursue resolution but had no new information. As of November 2021, DOD (via WHS) communicated that the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy would first complete the ongoing federally funded research and development center study on the EOD program and then formally respond to GAO's recommendations. In August 2022, DOD (via WHS) provided a written response indicating that the federally funded research and development center study was complete. Additionally, DOD asserted that an existing DOD Directive about defense support of civil authorities already fully implements this recommendation. As of August 2022, DOD plans no additional action and considers the recommendation closed. GAO continues to believe that DOD lacks a requirement in guidance specific to the VIP support mission to notify stakeholders regarding the effects of such missions on military preparedness for combat-related missions. Consequently, DOD may not be fully considering risks associated with the use of EOD forces for VIP support on the preparation and training of those forces for combat-related missions. We reached out to DOD in June 2023 and again in August 2023 to request an update on the status of this recommendation, but as of November 2023 we have not heard back from DOD. We will keep this recommendation open and continue to monitor whether the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff takes relevant implementation actions.
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