Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning
Highlights
Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. Because of the broad interest in this issue, GAO conducted this work under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations. This report examines (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, and intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
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Department of Defense | To develop risk mitigation strategies for the current threat in Iraq posed by looted munitions and enhance congressional oversight, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to conduct theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. |
In 2007 DOD stated that the commanding general, Multi-National Forces, Iraq (MNF-I) had placed a high intelligence and operational priority on locating and securing hidden conventional weapons caches with the Iraqi theater. However, DOD also stated that an in-depth, theater-wide survey to identity hidden, unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq was not feasible and therefore, the department did not concur with this recommendation nor did it intend to implement it.
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Department of Defense | To develop risk mitigation strategies for the current threat in Iraq posed by looted munitions and enhance congressional oversight, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of those strategies to Congress. |
In response to this recommendation, DOD and the Joint Staff recommended that any requested briefings on this topic to Congress exclude any tactical reporting that could detract from the current war-fighting efforts. Congress subsequently requested that GAO undertake a body of work reviewing DOD's approach to addressing improvised explosive devices.
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Department of Defense | To better mitigate the asymmetric risk associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations, that the Secretary of Defense should direct the CJCS to incorporate conventional munitions storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other directives. |
CFCSM 3122.03C, dated 8/17/07, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats specifies in appendix 7 to annex D that combatant command will determine the availability and reliability of in-country ammunition storage, support equipment unloading facilities for ammunition ships and aircraft, and the system for distributing ammunition to include the safety aspect of handling ammunition, captured enemy ammunition, unexploded ordnance, pyrotechnics devices, and other combustibles. The Joint Staff will continue to incorporate the appropriate language for conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance to the combatant commands, including joint doctrine, CFCSMs and instructions, and current operational war plan guidance.
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