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entitled 'Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage 
Sites to Future Operations Planning' which was released on March 22, 
2007. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

March 2007: 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over 
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning: 

GAO-07-444: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-444, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003—known as Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF)—concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense 
(DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and 
after major combat operations. Because of the broad interest in this 
issue, GAO conducted this work under the Comptroller General’s 
authority to conduct evaluations. This report examines (1) the security 
provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites 
and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary’s 
conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis 
of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF 
war plans, joint doctrine and policy, and intelligence reports, and 
interviewed senior-level DOD officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage 
sites in Iraq, combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that 
proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing 
these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons 
learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq’s 
conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate 
being five times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional 
munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and 
some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons 
learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting 
occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure 
conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning 
priorities and assumptions. DOD’s OIF planning priorities included 
quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an 
overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army 
units would “capitulate and provide internal security.” GAO analysis 
showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation 
strategies—such as branch plans as recommended by joint planning 
doctrine—in case assumptions were proven wrong. Not securing these 
conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government 
reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many 
people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the 
region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated 
that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose 
any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. However, DOD 
does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessment 
of the current risk unsecured conventional munitions represent to U.S. 
forces and others. 

DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, such as 
setting up the Joint IED Defeat Organization to develop a more 
strategic approach to countering IEDs, which typically are made using 
looted munitions. However, our review of DOD doctrine, policy, 
guidance, and procedures used to guide operational planning and 
execution found little evidence of guidance on the security of 
conventional munitions storage sites. DOD’s actions generally have 
emphasized countering the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-
hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face 
increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary 
uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. For 
example, one potential adversary is also estimated to have a 
significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower 
to secure or destroy. GAO also concludes that this situation shows both 
that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that 
information on the amount and location of an adversary’s munitions can 
represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations. 
However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons 
learned about the security of an adversary’s conventional munitions 
storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and 
execution. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide survey and risk 
assessment on unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq, (2) report 
related risk mitigation strategies and results to Congress, and (3) 
incorporate conventional munitions storage site security as a strategic 
planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance. DOD 
partially concurred with our recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-444]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 
512-5431or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional 
Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting: 

DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on 
Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance Contained in 17 DOD 
Publications: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Table: 

Table 1: Extent Existing Joint and Multiservice Doctrine Addressed the 
Security of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

CRS; Congressional Research Service: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EOD: Explosive ordnance disposal: 

IED: Improvised explosive device: 

JIEDDO: Joint IED Defeat Organization: 

JOPES: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System: 

MNC-I: Multi-National Coalition-Iraq: 

MNF-I: Multinational Forces in Iraq: 

OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

TTP: Tactics, techniques, and procedures: 

WMD: Weapons of mass destruction: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 22, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

In March 2003, citing the failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons 
inspectors and other concerns, the United States and its coalition 
allies invaded Iraq in an operation known as Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF). The commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was 
primarily responsible for developing and executing the war plan for 
OIF.[Footnote 1] The strategic goals of this plan included (1) 
establishing a stable Iraqi nation and a broad-based government that 
renounces weapons of mass destruction (WMD), does not support 
terrorism, and is not a threat to its neighbors; and (2) leveraging 
success in Iraq to convince or compel other countries to cease support 
to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD. The plan's military 
priorities included overthrowing the Iraqi regime by rapidly capturing 
Baghdad and disarming Iraq of its WMD. Although WMD stockpiles were not 
found, Iraq had dispersed hundreds of thousands of tons of conventional 
munitions throughout the country at various storage sites.[Footnote 2] 
During the rapid march to Baghdad, U.S. commanders were faced with the 
dilemma of bypassing conventional munitions storage sites or diverting 
troops from the war plan's top priorities to provide security at those 
sites. Baghdad was a top planning priority because the city represented 
a key concept, the "strategic center of gravity" for the regime. As the 
strategic center of gravity, if Baghdad were attacked and neutralized 
or destroyed, CENTCOM believed that the regime's control over the 
remaining military and security forces and the population would be 
severed. 

The widespread looting of some Iraqi conventional munitions storage 
sites during OIF has been the subject of media reports. We previously 
reported on the looting and dispersal of radiological sources from a 
number of sites in Iraq after the invasion and the Department of 
Defense's (DOD) efforts to collect and secure those sources.[Footnote 
3] Because of the broad congressional interest in this issue, we 
conducted this work under the Comptroller General's authority to 
conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This report examines (1) the 
security provided by U.S. forces over conventional munitions storage 
sites in Iraq and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an 
adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations 
on the basis of OIF lessons learned. We are issuing this report to you 
because of your oversight responsibilities. 

To examine the security over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites 
provided by U.S. forces, we reviewed field unit reporting and 
intelligence products and interviewed DOD officials. We also collected 
and analyzed the various iterations of OIF plans, doctrine, and 
concepts of operations for coverage of the security of conventional 
munitions storage sites. To examine DOD's actions to learn from its 
experience with securing conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq 
and apply these lessons learned to mitigate risks during future 
operations, we interviewed DOD officials about their efforts to 
identify and document lessons learned and examined documents on 
operations in Iraq. We also developed a data collection instrument to 
use in analyzing draft and published joint doctrine; Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) instructions and manuals; multiservice 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and the joint improvised 
explosive device (IED) defeat handbook to determine to what extent 
those documents addressed the security of conventional munitions 
storage sites. We performed our work from November 2005 through October 
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology can 
be found in appendix I. 

This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated 
December 14, 2006.[Footnote 4] That report provided additional details 
on the estimated amounts of prewar Iraqi conventional munitions and the 
security over former Iraqi conventional munitions sites at the time of 
our review. 

Results in Brief: 

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage 
sites in Iraq, combined with prewar planning priorities and certain 
prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. 
forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, 
according to DOD sources. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional 
munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being five 
times greater than the low estimate. Although the amount looted is 
unknown, field unit reports, numerous intelligence reports, and imagery 
products showed that many conventional munitions storage sites were 
looted after major combat operations and some may remain vulnerable. 
Moreover, in October 2006, we could not verify that all sites had been 
physically secured. However, DOD does not appear to have conducted a 
theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional 
munitions in Iraq, despite the strategic risk posed by IEDs made from 
those munitions. According to lessons learned reports and knowledgeable 
senior-level DOD officials, including field commanders, the widespread 
looting occurred during and immediately after major combat operations 
because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional 
munitions storage sites because of several OIF planning priorities and 
assumptions. DOD's OIF priorities, set forth in the February 2003 war 
plan, included taking Baghdad as quickly as possible on the basis of 
surprise and speed rather than using an overwhelming force, such as 
that used in 1991 during the first Gulf War. The OIF war plan also 
assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide 
internal security." Knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials stated 
that these Iraqi army units would have been used to secure conventional 
munitions storage sites. Our analysis of the various iterations of the 
war plan found that the OIF war plan did not document risk mitigation 
strategies--such as branch plans as recommended by joint planning 
doctrine--in case planning assumptions were proven wrong. According to 
a 2006 Joint Staff assessment developed as part of the lessons learned 
process, these priorities and assumptions resulted in a force structure 
plan that did not consider several missions requiring troops, including 
the security of conventional munitions storage sites.[Footnote 5] 
Furthermore, the Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I) stated that DOD 
did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy 
munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already 
occurred because, according to knowledgeable senior-level DOD 
officials, the OIF war plan's assumptions did not lead DOD to consider 
conventional munitions storage sites as a risk, as DOD planned to use 
the Iraqi army to secure the country. However, not securing these 
conventional munitions storage sites has been costly. For example, 
looted munitions are being used to (1) construct IEDs that have killed 
or maimed many people and (2) maintain the level of violence against 
U.S. and coalition forces and their Iraqi partners, sustaining the 
conditions necessary to hamper reconstruction and economic 
stabilization efforts. Moreover, estimates indicate that the looted 
munitions will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout 
the region. Finally, DOD spent about $4.9 billion from fiscal years 
2004 through 2006 on countering the IED campaign in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, 
because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, DOD has 
given little focus to mitigating the risk to U.S. forces posed by an 
adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations 
planning. Instead, the department's actions in response to OIF lessons 
learned generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an 
insurgency or terrorists during posthostility operations. For example, 
the Army and the Marine Corps have developed an interim handbook on IED 
defeat, and DOD has conducted a joint assessment of the explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) function to determine the sufficiency of EOD 
assets for future operations. Although these actions are good first 
steps, our review of DOD publications--such as doctrine, policy, 
guidance, and procedures issued by the CJCS--which are used to guide 
operational planning and execution found little evidence of guidance 
concerning the security of conventional munitions storage sites. We 
believe that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging 
asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to 
counter U.S. military strengths, or where the disintegration of a 
hostile regime is likely to lead to civil disorder, armed resistance, 
or civil war during a U.S. occupation. For example, one potential 
adversary is also estimated to have significant amounts of munitions; 
this would require an occupying force to dedicate significant manpower 
to secure or destroy the contents of conventional munitions storage 
sites. We also believe that this situation indicates both that Iraqi 
stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on 
the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent an 
important strategic planning and prioritizing consideration for future 
operations. However, without appropriate joint doctrine, policy, 
guidance, and procedures, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned 
regarding the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage 
sites will be a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration 
that is integrated into future operations planning and execution, 
including development of appropriate force levels. 

In this report, we are making three recommendations. We recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of 
Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding 
unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq; (2) report ensuing risk 
mitigation strategies and results to Congress; and (3) incorporate 
consideration of conventional munitions storage sites security into all 
levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, 
instructions, manuals, and other directives. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 
our recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III of 
this report. 

Background: 

On March 17, 2003, citing the failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons 
inspectors and other concerns, the United States and its coalition 
allies invaded Iraq. Three days later, on March 19, 2003, offensive 
operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. 
By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in 
relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and 
military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush 
declared an end to major combat operations. 

When the invasion began and the Iraqi government no longer functioned, 
many areas experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public 
services, such as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and 
coalition forces were then confronted with the challenges of restoring 
public order and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. 
Given the extensive looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not 
assume that facilities and items within the facilities would remain 
intact or in place for later collection without being secured.[Footnote 
6] Many facilities, such as abandoned government research facilities 
and industrial complexes, were no longer under the control of Iraqis 
and had been looted. For example, hundreds of tons of explosive 
materials that had been documented by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa explosives and munitions 
facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003, through the theft and 
looting of the government installations resulting from lack of 
security. We also reported that regarding radiological sources in Iraq, 
DOD was not ready to collect and secure radiological sources when the 
war began in March 2003 and for about 6 months thereafter.[Footnote 7] 
Until radiological sources could be collected, some sources were looted 
and scattered, and some troops were diverted from their regular combat 
duties to guard sources in diverse places. 

U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional 
Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting: 

According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons 
learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition 
forces were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage 
sites in Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These DOD 
sources indicated that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by 
the number and size of these sites, and DOD had insufficient troop 
levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites because of prewar 
planning priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. 
Despite war plan and intelligence estimates of large quantities of 
munitions in Iraq, knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did 
not plan for or set up a program to centrally manage and destroy enemy 
munitions until August 2003, well after the completion of major combat 
operations in May 2003. The costs of not securing these conventional 
munitions storage sites have been high, as explosives and ammunition 
from these sites used in the construction of IEDs that have killed and 
maimed people. Furthermore, estimates indicate such munitions are 
likely to continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. 

U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional 
Munitions Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting: 

U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional 
munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure 
these sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat 
operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit 
reports, lessons learned reports, and intelligence information. Pre-OIF 
estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly with 
the higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. 
The commander of CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Appropriations on September 24, 2003, that "there is more ammunition in 
Iraq than any place I've ever been in my life, and it is all not 
securable."[Footnote 8] 

Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the 
time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April 
2003 through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons 
associated with Iraq's former republican guard had been extensively 
looted and vandalized after the military campaign phase of OIF ended. 
It concluded that the most prized areas for looting were the depots or 
storage areas. The assessment further concluded that the thorough 
nature of the looting and the seemingly targeted concentration on 
storage areas suggested that much of the looting was conducted by 
organized elements that were likely aided or spearheaded by Iraqi 
military personnel. 

Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites--including fixed garrisons, 
field sites, and ammunition production facilities--were reviewed to 
assess their vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces 
were obtaining munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small 
number of sites were considered highly vulnerable because of the large 
quantity of munitions, inadequate security, and a high level of 
looting. The majority of the sites were assessed as having low 
vulnerability--not because they had been secured, but because they had 
been abandoned or totally looted. The review considered virtually all 
the sites to be partially secured at best and concluded that U.S. and 
coalition troops were able to guard only a very small percentage of the 
sites. 

Furthermore, since late 2004, insurgents and militia have continued to 
exploit former regime depots. Insurgents appear to have had continuing 
access to some sites over extended periods, even sites earmarked for 
demolition. For example, government information showed that insurgents, 
residents, and local officials looted weapons from a former regime 
military depot over a 6-month period despite a contract for local 
Iraqis to dispose of the facility's munitions. In addition, in April 
2005, an Iraqi police officer found unsecured munitions at a former 
regime depot that the officer concluded had not been destroyed by 
coalition forces after they seized the depot in 2003. Moreover, in 
early 2006, local Iraqis stole rockets and mortars from an old storage 
area after rumors began to circulate that the site was to be cleaned 
up. 

U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security 
Because of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions: 

DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S. 
forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate 
security for conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of 
OIF planning priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be 
invalid. According to DOD officials, ground commanders had two top 
priorities during major combat operations that were set forth in the 
February 2003 OIF war plan. First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned 
for and successfully executed a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on 
surprise and speed rather than massive troop buildup, such as was used 
in 1991 during the first Gulf War. This rapid march to Baghdad 
successfully resulted in the removal of the regime. Another critical 
planning priority was finding and securing the regime's stockpiles of 
WMD, which the administration believed were a threat to coalition 
forces and other countries in the region. The OIF war plan assumed that 
there was a high probability that the regime would use WMD against U.S. 
and coalition forces in a final effort to survive when those forces 
reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM planner for OIF stated that 
ground commanders had to prioritize limited available resources against 
the volume of tasks, both stated and implied, contained in the war 
plan. 

Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF 
war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being 
insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage 
sites, including the following: 

* The Iraqi regular army would "capitulate and provide security." The 
OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and security 
forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual surrender or 
desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S. Commander, CENTCOM, 
intended to preserve, as much as possible, the Iraqi military to 
maintain internal security and protect Iraq's borders during and after 
major combat operations. According to a study prepared by the Center 
for Army Lessons Learned, this assumption was central to the decision 
to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq.[Footnote 9] 
Several knowledgeable senior-level and command DOD officials and a 
joint lessons learned report pointed out that if this planning 
assumption had reflected actual conditions in Iraq, those Iraqi 
military units would have provided security over conventional munitions 
storage sites on their bases as well as other Iraqi military 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the 
civilian authority established by the administration to oversee the 
reconstruction of Iraq, dissolved the Iraqi Army on May 23, 2003--the 
same army that the CENTCOM commander assumed would provide internal 
security. 

* Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid out the 
probability of several courses of action that the regime might take in 
response to an invasion, the plan did not consider the possibility of 
protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S. and coalition forces 
after the conclusion of major combat operations. As a result, DOD 
officials stated that the regime's conventional munitions storage sites 
were not considered a significant risk. 

* Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The OIF war 
planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons learned report, 
was based on the assumption that the bulk of the Iraqi government would 
remain in place after major combat operations and therefore civil 
functions, including rebuilding and humanitarian assistance, could be 
shifted from military forces to U.S. and international organizations 
and, ultimately, the Iraqis, within about 18 months after the end of 
major combat operations.[Footnote 10] Therefore, DOD initially did not 
plan for an extended occupation of the country or the level of troops 
that would be needed to secure conventional munitions storage sites in 
particular or the country in general. 

Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions 
contributed to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report 
by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not 
examine the consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further 
contributing to insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of 
civil order in Iraq.[Footnote 11] The Joint Staff strategic-level 
lessons learned report also discussed the effect inaccurate planning 
assumptions had on force levels. According to this report, overemphasis 
on planning assumptions that could not be validated prior to critical 
decision points resulted in a force structure plan that did not 
consider several missions requiring troops, such as providing security 
for enemy conventional munitions storage sites. 

Our analysis of various iterations of the OIF war plan, which was 
confirmed by a CENTCOM OIF planner and lessons learned reports, 
indicated that the OIF war plan did not document risk mitigation 
strategies if the planning assumptions were proven wrong. One approach 
to mitigating risks associated with planning assumptions is to develop 
branch plans. According to joint doctrine,[Footnote 12] branch plans 
are options built into the basic war plan to anticipate shifting 
priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or 
changes to the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branch plans 
anticipate situations that could alter the basic plan, including those 
situations resulting from an adversary's action or availability of 
friendly capabilities or resources. However, we were told by a CENTCOM 
OIF planner and other senior-level DOD officials that the OIF war plan 
did not develop a branch plan for an insurgency or otherwise document 
risk mitigation strategies. The Joint Center for Operational Analysis 
reported in January 2006 that difficulties and challenges after major 
combat operations had ended in Iraq resulted from poor planning and 
resources that did not meet the full range of possible 
situations.[Footnote 13] The report also noted that (1) neither CENTCOM 
nor the Joint Staff took strong action to mitigate risk if assumptions 
were wrong and (2) the coalition began the postcombat phase without an 
effective and integrated plan that coordinated the military war 
planning with civilian planning for the reconstruction of Iraq. Lacking 
effective branch plans and an integrated postconflict plan, the U.S. 
government faced several critical problems, including widespread 
looting of conventional munitions storage sites. 

DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy Iraqi 
Munitions until after the Completion of Major Combat Operations: 

Despite prewar intelligence estimates of large amounts of conventional 
munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did not set up a 
central office until July 2003 or set up a program to centrally manage 
and destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003, well after major 
combat operations were completed in May 2003, because it did not 
perceive these sites as a threat. The office was set up to address 
operational problems found during an assessment of nine Iraqi sites. 
This assessment found that DOD lacked priorities for securing the sites 
and uniform procedures and practices for securing and disposing of 
munitions. It also uncovered serious safety problems in the handling, 
transportation, storage, and disposal of munitions. For example, unsafe 
handling and storage of conventional munitions resulted in a fire at an 
Iraqi storage site that injured six soldiers and killed one Iraqi 
civilian. 

In July 2003, the office turned to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' 
Engineering and Support Center and private sector contractors to 
administer a centrally managed program for the destruction of enemy 
munitions--called the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program. The Corps' 
center has personnel experienced in removing and destroying ordnance 
and explosives and also had contracts in place that could be used to 
procure services from private sector firms. The Corps and contractor 
support were needed, according to DOD, because the requirement to 
secure the large stockpiles would have diverted military personnel from 
the primary mission of fighting anticoalition forces. Furthermore, 
military units in theater were unable to destroy the large amounts of 
enemy munitions. 

In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center also awarded 
contracts for the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first 
demolition of munitions under the program was conducted in September 
2003. The program's initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six 
depots and to have all enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or 
transported to the depots. The program also was tasked with assisting 
in the establishment, management, and transfer of depots to the new 
Iraqi army. 

According to the Engineering and Support Center, at the time of our 
review the program had received more than $1 billion and has destroyed 
or secured more than 324,000 tons of munitions. This number, combined 
with military disposal operations, had accounted for more than 417,000 
tons of munitions, leaving an unknown quantity of conventional 
munitions in the hands of resistance groups or unsecured. The amount of 
unaccounted conventional munitions could range significantly from 
thousands to millions of tons. 

Unsecured Conventional Munitions from the Former Regime Continue to 
Pose a Risk to U.S. Forces and Others: 

According to MNC-I officials, unsecured conventional munitions from the 
former regime continue to pose a risk to U.S. forces and others. For 
example, some conventional munitions storage sites in remote locations 
have not been assessed recently to verify whether they pose any 
residual risk. Smaller caches of weapons, munitions, and equipment as 
well as remaining unexploded ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent 
a more pressing and continuing risk, according to the MNC-I officials. 
These officials said that the coalition is working to reduce this risk 
by searching for and finding a growing number of caches, but it will be 
some time before it can clean up all the munitions in Iraq. The extent 
of the threat from smaller caches, however, is difficult to quantify 
because the location or amount of munitions hidden or scattered around 
the country is unknown. 

Despite the problems associated with IEDs, DOD does not appear to have 
conducted a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured 
munitions in Iraq--the source of explosives for IEDs. In our judgment, 
given the risk posed by IEDs and looted munitions to the achievement of 
OIF strategic goals, the Joint Staff needs to determine the theaterwide 
risk to U.S. forces and others represented by unsecured conventional 
munitions from the former regime. One risk mitigation strategy, for 
example, might be to provide more forces for securing conventional 
munitions storage sites and caches. Such an assessment, as stated in 
joint doctrine, would assist DOD in conserving lives and resources and 
avoiding or mitigating unnecessary risk. Furthermore, we believe that 
DOD should report the risk mitigation strategies and the results of 
implementing these strategies to Congress to enhance congressional 
oversight. 

Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites Have Been 
High: 

As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic, 
and financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage 
sites have been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and 
explosives looted from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites 
will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout the 
region. Government agencies also assessed that looted munitions are 
being used in the construction of IEDs. IEDs have proven to be an 
effective tactic because they are inexpensive, relatively simple to 
employ, deadly, anonymous, and have great strategic value.[Footnote 14] 
To illustrate, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported in 
2005 that IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and 
casualties in Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis. Earlier this 
year, MNF-I reported that most IED attacks target convoys and patrols. 
Moreover, MNF-I reported that the attacks against the coalition and its 
Iraqi partners have continued to increase through July 2006, 
representing at least 40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces. 
The deliberate targeting of civilians with IEDs has also increased, 
although coalition forces remain the primary focus of IED attack. 

In addition to the human costs, IEDs have been an effective weapon 
against the achievement of OIF's strategic goal--establishing a stable 
Iraqi nation. By maintaining the level of violence against the 
coalition forces and its Iraqi partners, insurgent groups have 
sustained the conditions necessary for a nonpermissive environment, 
adversely affecting reconstruction and economic stabilization efforts 
and undermining popular support for the Iraqi government and tolerance 
for the coalition presence. The State Department also reported in July 
2006 that the upturn in violence has prevented it from fully engaging 
its Iraqi partners, noting that a baseline of security is a necessary 
prerequisite for moving forward on political and economic tasks. As we 
reported in July 2006,[Footnote 15] poor security conditions have 
impinged on U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to revitalize Iraq's 
economy and restore essential services in the oil and electricity 
sectors. A task force for the Defense Science Board also stated that 
the continued injuries and loss of life among Iraqi civilians--because 
of IEDs--will diminish the viability and political acceptance of the 
new Iraqi government and will have a negative effect on the U.S. 
ability to shift the burden of responsibility for security and 
operations to the Iraqi Security Force.[Footnote 16] 

Furthermore, DOD has spent about $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2004 
through 2006 on countering an IED campaign in Iraq that continually 
evolves, making DOD's countermeasures less effective. For example, the 
Defense Science Board reported in April 2006 that to date, the bulk of 
the counter-IED efforts have been based on technical means, which are 
defensive and reactive, such as jammers and up-armor, to which the 
enemy quickly adapts, making these efforts less effective.[Footnote 17] 
The report's principle theme is that the IED battle cannot be won by 
playing defense at the tactical level--that is, the employment of units 
in combat--but rather by offensive operations at a higher level 
strategic campaign. In addition, the Joint Forces Command in a recent 
handbook recognizes that a focus on technology can lead to an "evolving 
dialectic contest between the IED bomber and the target."[Footnote 18] 
For example, the handbook noted that when U.S. forces began looking for 
wires, the bombers began using garage door openers, cell phones, or toy 
car remote controls to detonate the devices. The enemy is devising IEDs 
that can penetrate armor. Furthermore, if U.S. countermeasures are 
effective, then the enemy's first response will be to change the target 
to go after other coalition forces or the Iraqi military and civilians. 

To develop a more strategic approach to countering IEDs, DOD 
established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in February 
2006. JIEDDO is to combine the best technology solutions for combating 
IEDs with relevant intelligence and innovative operational methods. The 
Defense Science Board's task force reviewed the blueprint for JIEDDO 
and stated that the JIEDDO is a step in the right direction. However, 
the task force expressed concerns that JIEDDO still appeared to be 
almost entirely focused on defense. GAO has been asked to review JIEDDO 
and its efforts to counter IEDs in a separate congressional request. 

DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on 
Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations: 

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we 
found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security 
of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic 
planning and priority-setting consideration during planning for future 
operations. Despite the strategic implications, military policy and 
guidance, such as joint doctrine, have not been revised to address the 
security of these sites. Instead, DOD is revising joint doctrine on the 
basis of OIF lessons learned on countering IEDs, but DOD has been 
understandably focused on current rather than future operations. A 
critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured conventional munitions 
storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces. For example, 
one potential adversary has considerable munitions stockpiles that 
would require a sizable occupying force to secure or destroy. 

Despite the Strategic Implications, Securing Conventional Munitions 
Storage Sites Is Not Explicitly Addressed in Military Policy and 
Guidance: 

Despite the strategic implications regarding unsecured conventional 
munitions storage sites, our analysis shows that securing those sites 
generally is not explicitly addressed in military policy and guidance, 
particularly at the joint level. We reviewed 17 DOD publications--which 
Joint Staff officials told us were relevant to our review--to determine 
the extent to which each of those publications contained guidance on 
the security of conventional munitions storage sites. A list of these 
publications can be found in appendix II. Of these 17 DOD publications, 
5 are either in development or in the process of being updated. The DOD 
publications we reviewed included the following: 

* Three CJCS publications, which provide standardization to the joint 
planning system used for the execution of complex multiservice 
exercises, campaigns, and operations. For example, the CJCS manual, 
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 
I,[Footnote 19] provides military guidance for the exercise of 
authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and 
prescribes doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military 
guidance for use by the armed forces in preparing their appropriate 
plans. More specifically, JOPES is a DOD-wide management information 
process that is used for planning and executing force deployments. 

* Ten joint doctrine publications that guide U.S. military forces 
toward a common objective and represent what is taught, believed, and 
advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best). Joint doctrine 
serves to make U.S. policy and strategy effective in the application of 
U.S. military power. 

* Two multiservice TTPs that are to provide tactical guidance on the 
actions and methods that implement doctrine agreed to by two or more 
services. 

* One service TTP that is to provide tactical guidance on the actions 
and methods that implement service-level doctrine. 

* The draft joint IED defeat handbook that will be used to test and 
validate counter-IED approaches. 

In reviewing these documents, we found little evidence of guidance 
regarding conventional munitions storage site security. Although 
several publications addressed defeating IEDs during an insurgency 
after major combat operations have ended or provided tactical-level 
guidance on how to dispose of explosive hazards, including munitions, 
or rending those hazards safe, none explicitly addressed the security 
of conventional munitions storage sites during or after major combat 
operations as a tactical, operational, or strategic risk. For example, 
the joint publication, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare (Draft, 
Feb. 28, 2006), was updated to include a section on IEDs, but the 
guidance does not discuss securing conventional munitions storage sites 
as a way to limit the availability of supplies needed to make 
IEDs.[Footnote 20] Moreover, conventional munitions storage sites, if 
mentioned at all, were not specifically addressed in the military 
guidance we reviewed. For example, the TTP for sensitive sites provides 
tactical-level guidance for Army forces conducting operations in a 
combat zone known or suspected to contain highly sensitive enemy 
facilities. In the case of OIF, we were told that this guidance applied 
to the search of Iraqi military facilities, which included any 
conventional munitions storage sites that the United States thought 
contained WMD.[Footnote 21] However, the Army's TTPs did not require 
the security of conventional munitions storage sites that were searched 
and found not to contain WMD. In addition, the IED defeat handbook 
recognizes that conventional munitions storage sites are likely to be 
the primary source of explosives for IEDs, but the handbook does not 
directly address the importance of securing those sites during or after 
major combat operations as part of a strategic campaign to counter IED 
use by adversaries. Finally, although the multiservice TTPs for the EOD 
function include a tactical planning checklist that suggests performing 
an intelligence estimate of information necessary to counter the IED 
threat, this checklist does not mention conventional munitions storage 
sites. 

Since DOD states that joint doctrine is to present fundamental 
principles that guide the employment of forces, we believe that it is 
important that DOD clearly and explicitly address the security of 
conventional munitions storage sites in revisions to joint doctrine. We 
also believe that the security of those storage sites should be 
addressed in the CJCS policy, guidance, and procedures in planning for 
future operations because of the strategic implications of unsecured 
sites. To illustrate the strategic implications, Iraqi conventional 
munitions storages sites have been a major source of explosives for 
IEDs and consequently have contributed to the sustained operations of 
Saddam Hussein loyalists, internal factions, and external terrorists. 
This ability to sustain operations, in turn, has adversely affected the 
ability of U.S. and coalition forces to achieve the OIF strategic goal 
to create a stable, democratic government in Iraq. Without appropriate 
joint policy, doctrine, guidance, and procedures, DOD cannot ensure 
that OIF lessons learned regarding the security of an adversary's 
conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into all levels 
of future operations planning and execution. 

DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Emphasized 
Countering IED Campaigns during an Insurgency: 

Because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, the 
department's actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have 
emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists 
during posthostility operations. Among the actions that DOD has taken 
are the following: 

* Army safety policy for captured enemy ammunition: In response to 
accidents resulting in 26 fatalities and 70 injuries, the Army issued a 
safety policy in 2004 on how commanders were to handle enemy munitions 
at the tactical level. This policy primarily emphasized the protection 
of U.S. personnel and assets from accidental detonations. However, it 
also stated that during wartime operations the commander must 
determine--based on safety, security, and intelligence considerations-
-whether enemy munitions will be destroyed, moved, or held in place. 
The policy also holds the commander responsible for securing enemy 
munitions until their final disposition, but as tactical-level guidance 
it does not ensure that appropriate force levels or other resources are 
provided to the commanders to secure those sites. 

* Interim Army and Marine Corps manual on IED defeat:[Footnote 22] The 
manual incorporates OIF lessons learned to provide commanders, leaders, 
and staff with fundamental principles and TTPs for the defeat of an 
adversary's IED operations. The manual also articulates an IED defeat 
framework that provides guidance on proactive and reactive actions U.S. 
forces can take to predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and 
protect against IED events. One of those actions is to target adversary 
supplies, including munitions caches. Another action is to keep 
friendly forces from IEDs when prevention activities are not possible 
or have failed--in other words, after an adversary has begun an IED 
campaign against U.S. forces. 

* Joint assessment of the EOD capability: The Joint Staff assessed the 
EOD capability of the U.S. armed forces to identify recommendations for 
change to move toward the establishment of a more joint and integrated 
EOD force. An OIF lesson learned is that U.S. forces did not have 
enough EOD support to deal with the massive quantities of Iraqi 
munitions. Knowledgeable DOD officials said that EOD planning for OIF 
occurred as an afterthought, with the deployment of EOD personnel into 
Iraq being a low priority at the beginning of the invasion. To address 
this issue, the Joint Staff is recommending that DOD establish a single 
organization, a Joint EOD support element, at the Joint Forces Command 
that would not only review combatant commanders' operational plans and 
requests for EOD forces, but would also provide, on demand, additional 
personnel to assist during operational planning, thereby ensuring 
necessary involvement and consideration of EOD throughout the planning 
process.[Footnote 23] The report also noted that EOD personnel 
reiterated that a lack of dedicated transportation and adequate 
security for responding EOD forces was a recurring problem and caused a 
lag between incident reporting and EOD response. Therefore, the Joint 
Staff is recommending that joint EOD forces be issued common 
"warfighting" equipment, such as communications and vehicles, and 
"dedicated security support." 

* Joint systems approach to counter IEDs as an emerging threat to U.S. 
forces: DOD has developed a joint "enemy IED activity model" in 
response to criticisms that its IED defeat efforts have been too 
centered on technological solutions, such as jammers and up-armor, 
which are defensive and reactive. The activity model is to provide a 
thorough understanding of the enemy and the common activities, such as 
material procurement and bomb making, associated with an IED attack. By 
attacking or isolating one or more of the model's key activities, DOD 
believes that commanders can mount an offensive campaign to prevent the 
adversary from achieving its goals through the use of IEDs. 

These actions are good first steps toward broadening DOD's focus beyond 
the ongoing tactical and operational counter-IED efforts used against 
Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or external terrorist groups in Iraq 
to planning and executing strategic counter-IED campaigns for future 
operations. However, the actions do not directly address the strategic 
importance of securing conventional munitions storage sites during 
major combat operations so that they do not become the source of 
materials for making IEDs during an occupation or become used for other 
forms of armed resistance. For example, while the Army's safety policy 
holds units responsible for securing enemy munitions, it does not 
provide guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage 
sites during major combat operations. As tactical guidance, the policy 
also does not provide the commander with direct guidance on how to 
balance the requirement to provide security of enemy munitions with 
DOD's emphasis on rapid tempo during major combat operations. Without 
strategic and joint guidance, the forces or other resources needed to 
secure conventional munitions sites are unlikely to be considered in 
planning for future operations. Additionally, the joint EOD assessment 
discusses the importance of EOD units having dedicated security forces 
but does not include those forces as a component of EOD units. Instead, 
DOD officials told us that the units are to rely on combat units for 
personnel as well as site security. 

A Critical OIF Lesson Learned Is That Unsecured Conventional Munitions 
Storage Sites Can Be an Asymmetric Threat to U.S. Forces: 

Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured: 

conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat 
to U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential 
adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States' 
experiences in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S. 
invading forces. We believe these potential adversaries will likely 
develop military doctrine to avoid direct military confrontation with 
the United States if possible and try to undermine the United States' 
political commitment with unconventional warfare. Therefore, the 
number, size, and geographic separation of an adversary's munitions 
storage sites could pose a significant security challenge during an 
occupying force's follow-on operations. A large amount of munitions in 
such an adversary's country could require an occupying force to 
dedicate significant manpower to secure or destroy the contents of the 
major munitions storage sites. Furthermore, the remnants of an 
adversary's forces, insurgents, or terrorists could draw from any large 
conventional munitions storage network left unsecured by an occupying 
force. 

Conclusions: 

A fundamental gap existed between the OIF war plan assumptions and the 
experiences of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, contributing to 
insufficient troops being on the ground to prevent widespread looting 
of conventional munitions storage sites and resulting in looted 
munitions being a continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and coalition 
forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs of this failure to 
provide sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs made with looted 
munitions causing about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and 
casualties in Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis. The United States 
may be facing even higher costs as the continuing violence in Iraq, 
fueled by munitions used in IEDs, threatens achievement of OIF war 
plan's strategic goal to create a stable Iraqi nation. DOD does not 
appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessment of the 
risk associated with unsecured conventional munitions storage sites to 
U.S. forces and others. Such a survey and assessment combined with 
associated risk mitigation strategies--such as providing more troops or 
other security measures--could assist DOD in conserving lives and in 
meeting its strategic goal to leave a stable nation behind when U.S. 
forces ultimately leave Iraq. Moreover, Congress has expressed its 
concern over looted munitions and their use against U.S. forces and 
others. Given the seriousness of this issue, DOD should facilitate 
congressional oversight by reporting on the results of the theaterwide 
survey and risk assessment as well as the related mitigation 
strategies. 

Prospectively, DOD's actions in response to OIF lessons learned 
primarily have focused on countering IEDs and not on the security of 
conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning and 
priority-setting consideration for future operations. Although good 
first steps, these actions do not address what we believe is a critical 
OIF lesson learned, the strategic importance of securing conventional 
munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. As 
illustrated by DOD's experience in Iraq and assessments regarding a 
potential adversary, the widespread looting of unsecured conventional 
munitions storage sites in Iraq is not likely to be an anomaly or only 
a tactical-level issue. Instead, unsecured conventional munitions 
storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that 
would require significant manpower or other resources during and after 
major combat operations to secure. Therefore, since joint doctrine is 
to present fundamental principles as well as contemporary lessons that 
guide the employment of forces, we believe that it is important that 
DOD clearly and explicitly address the security of conventional 
munitions storage sites in revisions to joint doctrine. We also believe 
that the security of those storage sites should be addressed in the 
CJCS policy, guidance, and procedures in planning for future operations 
because of the strategic implications of unsecured sites. Until joint 
policy, guidance, and procedures are revised to incorporate fundamental 
principles and lessons learned about the strategic and operational 
implications of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites, 
DOD's planning for future operations may not set priorities or 
establish assumptions that address this critical lesson learned, 
potentially increasing the operational risk for U.S. forces and the 
achievement of U.S. strategic goals and military objectives. 
Furthermore, if revised as recommended, joint policy, guidance, and 
procedures should result in an integrated approach that includes 
securing conventional munitions storage sites as a risk mitigation 
strategy in planning and executing future operations. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making the following three recommendations to DOD. To develop 
risk mitigation strategies for the current threat in Iraq posed by 
looted munitions and enhance congressional oversight, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of 
Staff to: 

* conduct theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured 
conventional munitions in Iraq, and: 

* report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of those 
strategies to Congress. 

To better mitigate the asymmetric risk associated with an adversary's 
conventional munitions storage sites for future operations, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the CJCS to incorporate 
conventional munitions storage site security as a strategic planning 
factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint 
doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other directives. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our three recommendations. DOD's written comments are reprinted in 
their entirety in appendix III. 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the 
department conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding 
unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is 
imperative that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional 
munitions storage sites be conducted, military commanders in theater 
are aware of the significant risk posed by the sites, and similar 
studies and assessments have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD 
also stated that from a manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide 
survey is not feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts 
in Iraq and the region. As the evidence in our report clearly supports, 
we made this recommendation because we did not see any evidence of a 
strategic-level survey or an effective, theaterwide risk mitigation 
strategy to address the commanders' awareness of this significant risk 
or the findings of the studies and assessments regarding security of 
conventional munitions storage sites. Accordingly, the intent behind 
our recommendation is to have DOD assess the risks associated with 
unsecured conventional munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide 
basis to develop an effective risk mitigation strategy. In developing 
courses of action for this risk mitigation strategy, if DOD determines 
that additional U.S. forces are needed to adequately secure Iraqi 
conventional munitions storage sites while also conducting the ongoing 
warfighting mission, then those troops should be requested and 
provided. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the 
department report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of 
those strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation, DOD 
stated that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the 
department and Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress 
remain at the strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was 
not our intention to detract tactical units from the current 
warfighting mission or to suggest congressional oversight is needed for 
each tactical unit. Instead, we are recommending that DOD alert 
Congress of its assessment and the actions being taken to mitigate the 
strategic risk associated with unsecured conventional munitions in 
Iraq. 

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the 
department incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage 
sites as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy 
and guidance and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the 
appropriate language in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD 
also stated that the security and demolition of captured conventional 
munitions must be properly resourced. Finally, DOD stated that (1) Iraq 
is a separate case and should not be considered the standard for all 
future operations and (2) war plans must reflect proper prioritization 
based on desired operational effects and resources available, as it may 
not always be possible or desirable in a resource-and time-constrained 
environment to secure all sites or destroy all munitions. We agree with 
these statements. The purpose of this report was not to suggest that 
Iraq be the standard for all future conflicts or to restrict 
commanders' planning prerogatives. Instead, the report suggests that as 
DOD incorporates OIF lessons learned into joint doctrine, it includes 
what is a key OIF lesson learned--an adversary's stockpile of 
conventional munitions can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces. 
Therefore, the security of conventional munitions storage sites should 
be considered as one of the many factors involved in planning major 
combat operations. Furthermore, the risk associated with not having 
enough time or troops to secure those sites should be made explicit 
during the planning process so that mitigation strategies can be 
developed. As DOD's own comments indicate, the manpower resources 
needed to address conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq may not 
be available. Incorporating the security of conventional munitions 
storage sites as a strategic planning factor in planning for future 
conflicts would help ensure that future planners consider the manpower 
needed to secure and destroy an adversary's conventional munitions 
storage sites during major combat operations. 

Lastly, we did not assess or report on the adequacy of intelligence 
resources to monitor or track conventional munitions storage sites. 
Instead, our objectives were to examine (1) the security provided by 
U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) 
DOD's actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's 
conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis 
of OIF lessons learned. While we acknowledge that DOD relies on 
intelligence resources to assist the department in assessing risks, 
monitoring potential adversaries, and planning operations, the focus of 
our report was on the physical security of conventional munitions 
storage sites captured from the former regime during OIF--a task that 
was not the responsibility of intelligence resources. 

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5491 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Office's of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report were 
Michael Kennedy, Assistant Director; Renee Brown; Donna Byers; Brian 
Pegram; and Nicole Volchko. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the security provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) over 
conventional munitions storage sites captured in Iraq, we reviewed DOD, 
Joint Staff, and service policies, guidance, procedures, and plans. We 
obtained documentation from and interviewed officials from the U.S. 
Joint Forces Command; the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); U.S. Army 
Forces Command; Third Army, which is also the U.S. Army Central and 
Coalition Forces Land Component Command; Joint IED Defeat Task Force; 
Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
National Ground Intelligence Center; and Central Intelligence Agency. 
We also obtained documentation from and interviewed officials from the 
Joint Staff, including the J-3 Operations Directorate; J-7 Operational 
Plans and Joint Force Development; and J-8 Force Structure, Resources, 
and Assessment Directorate. In addition, we interviewed previous 
command officers and active duty personnel who served as operational 
war planners prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). We also 
interviewed field commanders and explosive ordnance disposal 
specialists on the challenges faced by U.S. troops during OIF. 
Moreover, we asked to meet with the former CENTCOM commander, General 
Tommy Franks, who was responsible for the OIF war planning, but he 
declined to meet with us. To assist in determining the type of security 
provided by U.S. forces for conventional munitions storage sites 
captured in Iraq, we reviewed various iterations of operational plans 
and stability plans prepared by CENTCOM and the Coalition Forces Land 
Component Command. We also analyzed briefings, reports, and 
intelligence assessments from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central 
Intelligence Agency, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, National Geospatial- 
Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Central Command, and U.S. Army National 
Ground Intelligence Center. 

To assess DOD's actions to mitigate risks associated with an 
adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations 
on the basis of OIF lessons learned, we examined joint staff and 
service-specific lessons learned from OIF on the securing of munitions 
storage sites in Iraq. We also reviewed joint and multiservice 
doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and the Joint IED 
Defeat handbook to determine how those documents address the security 
of conventional munitions storage sites. Through structured coding and 
analysis of the documents, we consistently verified the information 
from the doctrine. We discussed with CENTCOM operational planners and 
other officials, as well as brigade commanders, intelligence provided 
to field commanders prior to the invasion, as well as the challenges 
encountered once combat began in Iraq. We also discussed DOD's efforts 
to identify and document lessons learned with officials from U.S. Joint 
Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, CENTCOM Lessons 
Learned, Center for Army Lessons Learned, and Marine Corps Center for 
Lessons Learned and reviewed service after-action reports and 
fragmentary orders. 

We performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance Contained in 17 DOD 
Publications: 

We reviewed 17 Department of Defense (DOD) publications--which Joint 
Staff officials told us were relevant to our review--to determine the 
extent to which each of those publications contained guidance on the 
security of conventional munitions storage sites. To determine to what 
extent OIF lessons learned concerning the security of conventional 
munitions storage sites are being incorporated into military guidance, 
we reviewed 15 DOD publications that have been published since May 
2003, the end of major combat operations in Iraq, and 5 joint 
publications currently under revision. We also reviewed military 
guidance that was applicable during the OIF war planning to determine 
to what extent the security of conventional munitions storage sites was 
explicitly addressed. Of the 17, only 1 publication, Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive 
Sites (ST 3-90.15), December 2002, provides tactical-level guidance on 
the security of sensitive military facilities in general, which could 
be interpreted to include conventional munitions storage sites. DOD 
officials told us that this guidance was used in OIF during the search 
and exploitation for intelligence purposes of sensitive sites thought 
to contain WMD. 

As shown in table 1, to assess these publications for the applicability 
of securing conventional munitions storage sites, we systematically 
reviewed them. We analyzed each document and also conducted a word 
search using key terms[Footnote 24] and then coded the information in 
the data collection instrument and verified the interpretation of the 
coding to ensure accuracy. We selected these terms to provide a broad 
search of all topics that might address the security of conventional 
munitions storage sites. 

Table 1: Extent Existing Joint and Multiservice Doctrine Addressed the 
Security of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites: 

Publication: Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual; 
Description: Provides (1) planning policies and procedures to govern 
the joint activities and performance of the armed forces of the United 
States; (2) military guidance for the exercise of authority by 
combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and doctrine and 
selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations 
and training; and (3) military guidance for use by the armed forces in 
preparing their appropriate plans; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: [Empty]. 

Publication: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I, 
Planning Policies and Procedures, October 22, 2004; 
Description: Provides the policy guidance and procedures for the 
development, coordination, review, approval, and implementation of 
joint operational plans and operational orders; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, 
Planning Formats, February 28, 2006; 
Description: Provides instructions for preparing operations plans, and 
is functionally oriented and provides directional, procedural, and 
planning guidance key to certain plan annexes; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume III, 
Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and 
Deployment Execution, July 19, 2006; 
Description: Provides the procedures for the development of time-phased 
force and deployment data and for the deployment and redeployment of 
forces within the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System in support of joint military operations, force rotations, and 
exercises; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: Joint doctrine; 
Description: Provides the fundamental principles that guide the 
employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a 
common objective and is authoritative, but requires judgment in 
application; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: [Empty]. 

Publication: JP3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, August 1, 
2006; 
Description: Provides military guidance for the exercise of authority 
for combatant commanders and other Joint Force Commands and prescribes 
joint doctrine for operations and training; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 3-0, Joint Operations, December 23, 2005; 
Description: Provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental 
principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in conduct 
of joint operations across the range of military operations; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, April 14, 2006; 
Description: Provides doctrine on how to organize, plan, train for, and 
conduct joint antiterrorism operations; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint 
Operations, February 28, 2006 (Revision First Draft); 
Description: Provides doctrinal guidance for planning and executing 
barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare for joint operations as they relate 
to strategic operational and tactical mobility and countermobility 
across the range of military operations; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 
March 23, 2004; 
Description: Provides guidance for the planning and conduct of land 
operations by joint forces under the command and control of a joint 
force land component commander in an area of operation; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, May 14, 2006 
(Revision); 
Description: Provides the joint doctrine necessary to plan, coordinate, 
and conduct timely and tailored joint engineer operations across the 
range of military operations; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, July 8, 2004; 
Description: Provides the principles to plan for and conduct operations 
for combating weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 3-54, Operations Security, August 11, 2005 (Revision); 
Description: Provides (1) fundamental principles and doctrine for 
planning, preparation, and execution of operations security in joint 
operations; and (2) procedures for conducting operations security 
assessments; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, July 21, 2006 (Draft); 
Description: Provides the military's contribution to national strategic 
planning consisting of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: 
security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force 
planning; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, January 
25, 2002; 
Description: Provides overarching guidance and principles governing the 
planning of campaigns at the combatant command and subordinate joint 
force levels; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: Joint handbook; 
Description: Provides approaches and strategic, operational, and 
tactical guidance to U.S. forces; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: [Empty]. 

Publication: Joint IED Defeat Handbook, February 23, 2006; 
Description: Provides validation of lessons learned, documents current 
best practices, and provides a model needed to conduct future 
Improvised Explosive Device defeat operations; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: Multiservice Publication; 
Description: Provides principles; terms; and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures used by the forces of two or more services to perform a 
common military function. It may include differing perspectives on 
operational employment and is authoritative to the same extent as other 
service publications but requires judgment in application. It also must 
be consistent with approved joint publications; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: [Empty]. 

Publication: Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO): Multiservice TTP for 
Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations, August 2005; 
Description: Provides descriptions of UXO threats and provides 
guidelines to minimize the impact of UXO hazards. It provides 
warfighting personnel at the operational and tactical levels with 
information to optimize UXO safety and to increase efficiency, while 
reducing or eliminating losses of personnel and equipment to UXO 
hazards; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: EOD Multiservice TTP for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a 
Joint Environment, October 2005; 
Description: Provides guidance and procedures for the employment of a 
joint explosives ordnance disposal force. It assists commanders and 
planners in understanding the Explosive Ordnance Device capabilities of 
each service; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: X. 

Publication: Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); 
Description: Provides doctrine and TTP that have been published and 
contain references to publications where users may obtain more detail; 
Generally addresses[A]: [Empty]; 
Does not address[B]: [Empty]. 

Publication: ST 3-90.15, TTP for Tactical Operations Involving 
Sensitive Sites, December 2002; 
Description: Provides definitions of sensitive sites and develops the 
tactical context in which Army forces may be required to deal with 
them. The capture and subsequent exploitation of sensitive sites may be 
crucial to the outcome of a campaign; 
Generally addresses[A]: X; 
Does not address[B]: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of military guidance, including Joint Chiefs of 
Staff manuals; joint and service doctrine; handbooks; and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. 

[A] Generally addresses: Document addresses the security of key terms 
searched in the document. 

[B] Does not address: Document does not address the security of key 
terms searched in the document. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Washington DC 20301-2400: 
Defense Reconstruction Support Office: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dec - 1 2006: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino, 

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage 
Sites to Future Operations Planning," dated November 8, 2006 (GAO Code 
350770/GAO-07-71C). The Department partially concurs with all three 
recommendations with comment. 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct theater-wide 
survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions 
in Iraq. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur: The report highlights the significant 
risk posed by unsecured, conventional munitions sites in Iraq. While it 
is imperative that a complete and thorough assessment of ammunition 
sites be conducted, these findings are not new and military commanders 
in theater are aware of this issue. The Iraqi Survey Group and other 
Coalition entities over the past 3 years have conducted similar studies 
and assessments, and those findings were reported and recorded to 
commanders who have appropriately prioritized securing these sites and 
conducted demolition of these munitions across the country. The need 
for yet another survey would have to be balanced against the manpower 
requirement currently dedicated to combat and training operations 
essential to our efforts to stabilize Iraq and provide a security force 
which can provide for Iraqi self-reliance. The Joint Staff will be 
requesting additional comment from USCENTCOM and its component 
headquarters to comment more fully on this matter and determine the 
feasibility of the proposed recommendation. 

From an intelligence resourcing perspective, an in-depth, theater-wide 
survey to identify unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq is not 
feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts in Iraq or the 
region. Commanders are clearly aware of the danger these munitions pose 
to operations, strategic or otherwise, and are mitigating that threat 
as they are able. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to report ensuing risk 
mitigation strategies and the results of those strategies to Congress. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. Recommendation 2 is directly related to 
the first. The risk mitigation strategies and results would be reported 
to Congress following the theater-wide survey and risk assessments. 

Risk mitigation is doctrinally sound and is incorporated into all 
planning at every echelon. However, the Department and Joint Staff 
recommend that these briefings to Congress remain at the strategic 
level. If tactical units are obliged to devote time to maintaining a 
constant congressional-level feed to build these products, it will 
detract from the current war-fighting missions. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to incorporate conventional 
munitions storage sites security as a strategic planning factor into 
all levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, 
instructions, manuals, and other directives. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Joint Staff will incorporate the 
appropriate language in joint doctrine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff manuals, and instructions during the normal revision process with 
the caveat that Iraq is a separate case and should not be considered as 
the standard for all future conflicts when it comes to the level of 
ordnance distributed across a country. 

Conventional weapons and/or munitions storage sites' control and 
security should be. incorporated into plans but securing and demolition 
must be properly resourced. This should be one of many factors already 
addressed in operational preparation of the environment. 

One should not dictate that intelligence resources must be dedicated to 
monitoring one target versus another, which restricts commanders' 
prerogatives and stifles planning operations. These plans must also 
reflect proper prioritization based on desired operational effects and 
resources available as it may not always be possible or desirable in a 
resource-and time-constrained environment to secure all sites or 
destroy all munitions. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact 
the undersigned at 703-692-5161 or victor.rostow@wso.whs.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Victor A.D. Rostow: 
Director (A): 
Defense Reconstruction Support Office: 

[End of section] 

(350969) 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] CENTCOM is one of five geographic combatant commands. A combatant 
command is a unified command established by the President of the United 
States with a broad continuing mission under a single commander. 

[2] Conventional munitions are complete devices charged with 
explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition that 
are not nuclear, biological, or chemical for use in military 
operations. 

[3] GAO, Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source 
Recovery Effort and Apply Lessons Learned to Further Recovery Missions, 
GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). 

[4] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage 
Sites to Future Operations Planning, GAO-07-71C (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
20, 2006). 

[5] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two) 
(Norfolk, Va.: January 2006). 

[6] GAO-05-672. 

[7] GAO-05-672. 

[8] Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq 
and Afghanistan: Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, 
United States Senate, 108th Cong. 133 (2003). 

[9] Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, On Point: U.S. Army in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

[10] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One) 
(Norfolk, Va.: January 2006). 

[11] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two). 

[12] Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint 
Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2001). 
(An updated version of this publication was published on Sept. 17, 
2006.) 

[13] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One). 

[14] Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive Devices in 
Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures, RS22330 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 
2005). 

[15] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed 
to Help Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges, GAO-06-953T 
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006). 

[16] Defense Science Board, Task Force on Improvised Explosive Devices 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006). 

[17] Defense Science Board, April 2006. 

[18] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Organizing 
for IED Defeat at the Operational Level (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 
2006 ). 

[19] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,, Joint Operation Planning 
and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and 
Procedures), CJCSM 3122.01 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 22, 2004). 

[20] Joint Staff, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint 
Operations, JP 3-15 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2006). 

[21] U.S. Army, Futures Development and Integration Center, U.S. Army 
Combined Arms Center, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical 
Operations Involving Sensitive Sites, Version 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
December 2002). 

[22] Department of Defense, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat, FMI 3- 
34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 

[23] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Final Report of Assessment for 
Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006). 

[24] Key terms include Depot, Ammunition Supply Point, Ammunition 
Storage Point, ASP, Caches, Captured Enemy Ammunition, CEA, Explosive 
Remnants of War, ERW, Improvised Explosive Device, and IED/IEDs. 

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