Issue Summary
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has caused a devastating loss of life, widespread humanitarian crisis, and other global effects. In response, as of April 2024, Congress has appropriated more than $174 billion to assist Ukraine. For instance, the Department of Defense (DOD) has obligated funds for security assistance, such as for procuring missiles, ammunition, and combat vehicles for Ukraine, as well as to replace U.S. stocks. Other federal agencies have worked to address the economic and humanitarian needs of people affected by the invasion—including direct budget support to the government, humanitarian assistance within Ukraine and to Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries, efforts to prevent and address human trafficking, and recovery assistance (such as repairing the energy grid and improving the country’s health sector).
Examples of Non-Security Assistance Provided to Ukraine
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However, there are a number of ways in which federal agencies could bolster oversight requirements, improve the monitoring of weapons’ use, and better track how funding is being used in Ukraine.
For example:
- Tracking equipment. Since February 2022, the U.S. has provided an unprecedented amount of equipment to Ukraine. DOD has been delivering this equipment rapidly, sometimes taking days to complete deliveries that typically take weeks. DOD has made several guidance updates to improve efforts to deliver and track defense equipment, including updating its definition of “delivery” to help ensure data consistency. But DOD doesn't have clear processes to ensure that its delivery data is accurate. Also, DOD modified its monitoring approach during the ongoing conflict but has not assessed whether this approach sufficiently guards against equipment loss or misuse.
- Training. DOD prioritized a quick start to the training for Ukrainian personnel without fully identifying and planning for training needs. As a result, the training was inefficient for the first few months. Beyond DOD’s own efforts, over 30 countries have helped train more than 115,000 Ukrainians.
- Tracking and evaluating use of funding. The State Department doesn't have a systematic, comprehensive approach to specifically track funding that federal agencies have provided for economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. For example, State provided assistance to other countries affected by the crisis but didn't consistently include this assistance when tracking Ukraine-related funding. In addition, State has a monitoring and evaluation contract to help it oversee over $4 billion of nonhumanitarian, nonmilitary U.S. assistance to Ukraine—such as training border guards and ensuring safe nuclear facilities. While challenges, such as data access and the difficulty of monitoring during wartime, have limited the data available to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of these funds, State has taken steps to improve the usability of available data.
Examples of Weapons Delivered to Ukraine
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- Effective resource use. DOD's European Defense Initiative helps boost the military readiness of European allies and deter Russian aggression. Since 2015, the U.S. has spent $35 billion through this initiative on activities like supporting American troop deployments in Europe. Historically, the military services have used their own criteria to decide which activities are funded under the initiative. DOD has recently issued guidance to standardize the services' budget requests and improve accountability for these funds. DOD has also worked to document roles and responsibilities for the delivery process and established a formal process with the State Department to verify deliveries of U.S.-origin defense equipment transferred to Ukraine by foreign donors. However, DOD has not established performance goals and measures to determine if these resources are being used effectively. In addition, the Presidential Drawdown Authority has been used beyond its statutory $100 million annual ceiling to provide billions of dollars in defense items to Ukraine, but DOD hasn't updated its guidance to reflect potential risks of sending more equipment from DOD's inventory to foreign partners. Specifically, some equipment may not be replaceable in a timely manner.
- Asset valuation. Presidential Drawdown Authority allows the President to provide defense items (such as ammunition and missiles) from DOD's inventories to respond to foreign crises. In 2023, DOD notified Congress that it had misvalued items given to Ukraine under this authority in FY 2022 and FY 2023 by about $6.2 billion. The law that includes this authority doesn't clearly define "value" as it relates to the authority. Also, DOD and the services did not all have valuation guidance specific to this authority, so they can’t be sure that they are valuing these items accurately. However, in July 2025, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency did issue standard operating procedures (including steps for recording, updating, reconciling, and sharing valuation data) that the Navy- -has now used to develop its own procedures for calculating the values of equipment.
- Managing fraud risks. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has standard processes to manage risks to its delivery of assistance in countries worldwide. But in countries affected by violent conflict, such as Ukraine, dangerous conditions can limit USAID's ability to directly oversee its assistance—increasing the risk of fraud or corruption. Despite this, USAID does not comprehensively assess and document relevant fraud risks, including for Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Energy could also do a better job of considering the fraud risk environment for its nuclear and radiological security and safety efforts in Ukraine, and appropriately tailoring its fraud risk assessments.
- Supporting Ukraine’s government. The U.S. government has provided $45 billion for direct budget support for Ukraine’s government, largely to reimburse the government for eligible expenses, such as salaries for teachers, civil servants, and healthcare workers. USAID has used a layered approach to oversee this funding, with the World Bank, U.S. agencies, and their contractors responsible for providing different types of oversight—such as identifying gaps in Ukrainian government processes and conducting financial audits. However, USAID didn't use important spending data when overseeing this funding. Analysis of this data identified some unusual increases that warrant review. Also, contractors found weaknesses in Ukraine’s management of funds that USAID hadn't prioritized before the State Department absorbed USAID's related responsibilities in July 2025.
- Supporting humanitarian and development needs. The State Department and USAID had 111 implementing partners carrying out humanitarian and development assistance in Ukraine, as of September 30, 2023. The majority of these partners were U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations. When selecting these partners, State and USAID followed their own selection requirements, but some of these requirements could be bolstered to strengthen the processes for screening potential partners.
- Recovery assistance. Through 2024, the U.S. and other donors were providing funds to help Ukraine’s economic and social recovery. Early recovery efforts were aimed at improving governance and the economy and advancing Ukraine's integration into the European Union. The State Department led U.S. agencies in planning for these assistance efforts but has not estimated costs for achieving early recovery goals or determined how to measure progress toward them.
- Donor coordination. At least 30 countries have pledged over $148 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in 2022, which the U.S. has helped to coordinate. This includes $2 billion worth of defense items of U.S. origin—such as missiles and ammunition—that foreign donors requested to transfer to Ukraine. The State Department approves these transfers, and DOD is required to monitor the items. However, State hasn’t consistently shared approval information with DOD and neither DOD nor State verify the delivery of these transfers, which hampers monitoring.
- Sanctions and export controls on Russia. The U.S. and its allies have frozen billions in Russian assets and controlled exports of important technologies to Russia in response to the war in Ukraine. However, Russia has taken actions to mitigate the impact of these restrictions. Russia’s economy declined after the invasion and sanctions in 2022 but recovered somewhat afterward. Moreover, export restrictions have hindered but not completely prevented Russia from obtaining technologies critical to its war effort. U.S. agencies should set targets to help measure the effectiveness of their sanctions and export controls on Russia.
Members of Congress, congressional staff, and federal government employees who have the appropriate clearances and an official need-to-know may also request access to the following restricted reports at https://www.gao.gov/reports-testimonies/restricted:
- European Logistics: DOD Should Identify Army and Air Force Units Needed for Theater Opening and Army Should Reassess Its Sustainment Force Capabilities, GAO-24-105585C. Published June 6, 2024.
- Cyberspace Operations: DOD Should Take Steps to Improve Coordination with Foreign Partners, GAO-24-103716C. Published July 25, 2024.
- UKRAINE: DOD Could Strengthen International Miliary Training Coordination by Improving Data Quality, GAO-24-106964SU. Published July 30, 2024.
- UKRAINE FUNDING: DOD Needs to Improve Its Reporting, Guidance, and Evaluation Efforts, GAO-24-106763SU. Published September 30, 2024.
- UKRAINE: DOD Can Take Additional Steps to Improve Its Security Assistance Training, GAO-25-106773SU. Published November 7, 2024.
- Ukraine: Readiness Implications of U.S. Military Assistance, GAO-25-107190C. Published: March 19, 2025.
- Ukraine: DOE Could Better Assess Fraud Risks and Formalize Its Transition Plans for Nuclear Security and Safety Efforts, GAO-25-107015SU. Published: Apr 16, 2025.
- Classified Annex for GAO-25-107015SU: Additional Details on Nuclear and Radiological Security and Safety Risks in Ukraine, GAO-25-107768C. Published: Apr 16, 2025.
- European Logistics: DOD is Pursuing Logistics Efforts with NATO but Actions Needed to Address Significant Gaps, GAO-25-106999C. Published: Aug 25, 2025.
GAO’s oversight of Ukrainian assistance is being coordinated with federal inspectors general offices and other oversight agencies. Learn more about the work and findings of the federal Ukraine Interagency Oversight Working Group:
UkraineOversight.gov
