Electronic Warfare: Radar Jammer Proliferation Continues
NSIAD-92-83
Published: Feb 28, 1992. Publicly Released: Mar 10, 1992.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether Navy and Air Force radar jammer programs were consistent with the congressional goal of reducing electronic warfare system proliferation.
Recommendations
Matter for Congressional Consideration
| Matter | Status | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| Despite long-standing congressional committee emphasis and more recent legislation aimed at promoting commonality, none has been achieved. The potential for commonality that existed in the mid-1980s has since deteriorated. Thus, Congress may wish to consider restricting or denying funds to procure new systems or upgrade existing jammers until DOD has done an acceptable analysis consistent with the GAO recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and then fund only those programs that are consistent with the analysis. | Congress took no action on this recommendation. | |
| Despite long-standing congressional committee emphasis and more recent legislation aimed at promoting commonality, none has been achieved. The potential for commonality that existed in the mid-1980s has since deteriorated. Thus, Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to establish a joint jammer program office and centrally control all jammer funding to promote commonality. | Congress took no action on this recommendation. | |
| Congress should also recognize that the scope of GAO work excluded any jammers that could be under development for future generation aircraft, such as the Advanced Tactical Fighter. Thus, Congress may wish to consider monitoring those programs to ensure that they do not lead to further jammer proliferation. | Congress took no action on this recommendation. |
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should perform an analysis to determine the most cost-effective self-protection jammer for maximum common use on existing Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft. This analysis should weigh each jammer against all other jammers to identify the jammer that provides the highest level of aircraft protection for the funds invested. Costs considered in the analysis should include all future costs applicable to each jammer's life cycle. |
DOD believes its analysis of self-protection jammers conducted in March 1991 meets the intent of this recommendation and, therefore, plans no further action. GAO is currently reviewing the DOD report.
|
| Department of Defense | Until commonality is achieved across all self-protection jammers for maximum common use on existing Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft, the Secretary of Defense should establish controls over the services' jammer programs, such as DOD review and approval authority, to achieve commonality whenever feasible. |
DOD maintains that it has already established the necessary controls and, therefore, plans no further action.
|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should require the Air Force and the Navy to merge the separate ALQ-99 upgrade programs into one program to improve commonality. |
DOD maintains that the maximum practical commonality is being achieved on the Air Force's and Navy's systems and plans no further action.
|
| Department of Defense | After the best jammer is selected, the Secretary of Defense should restructure the electronic warfare master plan to prescribe guidance, including timetables, for installing the jammer on the maximum practical number of Air Force and Navy aircraft. This approach should minimize upgrading of the numerous existing jammers. |
DOD disagrees with this recommendation and plans no action.
|
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