Navy Ship Defense: Concerns About the Strategy for Procuring the Rolling Airframe Missile
NSIAD-90-208
Published: Aug 27, 1990. Publicly Released: Aug 27, 1990.
Skip to Highlights
Highlights
GAO and the German Federal Court of Audit (BRH) reviewed the U.S.-German Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) program.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
---|---|---|
Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to postpone the full-rate production decision until the basic RAM operational capabilities have been fully evaluated, the actual costs of producing the initial 850 missiles are known, and the feasibility of upgrading RAM to counter the emerging antiship missile threat has been determined. |
The program has been terminated at the direction of Congress.
|
Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy and the German Minister of Defense should direct the RAM Program Office to limit procurement of basic RAM during low-rate initial production to the number needed to meet U.S. and German known minimum requirements. |
The program has been terminated at the direction of Congress.
|
Other | The Secretary of the Navy and the German Minister of Defense should direct the RAM Program Office to limit procurement of basic RAM during low-rate initial production to the number needed to meet U.S. and German known minimum requirements. |
This is not a U.S. issue.
|
Other | The Secretary of the Navy and the German Minister of Defense should direct the RAM Program Office to assess separately the longer-term requirement, cost, and schedule for developing and producing an advanced configuration of the missile system. |
This is not a U.S. issue.
|
Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy and the German Minister of Defense should direct the RAM Program Office to assess separately the longer-term requirement, cost, and schedule for developing and producing an advanced configuration of the missile system. |
The program was terminated at the direction of Congress.
|
Other | The Secretary of the Navy and the German Minister of Defense should direct the RAM Program Office to assess the cost and benefit of continuing the dual-source procurement procedure by: (1) considering the experience of the low-rate initial production of 850 missiles and changes in defense priorities; (2) combining production quantities authorized in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 to achieve greater economies of scale; (3) soliciting a full range of offers without establishing a minimum sustaining quantity; and (4) determining the sole-source producer or production split that minimizes costs for both governments. |
The program was terminated at the direction of Congress.
|
Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy and the German Minister of Defense should direct the RAM Program Office to assess the cost and benefit of continuing the dual-source procurement procedure by: (1) considering the experience of the low-rate initial production of 850 missiles and changes in defense priorities; (2) combining production quantities authorized in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 to achieve greater economies of scale; (3) soliciting a full range of offers without establishing a minimum sustaining quantity; and (4) determining the sole-source producer or production split that minimizes costs for both governments. |
This is not a U.S. issue.
|
Full Report
Public Inquiries
Topics
Cost overrunsDual source procurementForeign governmentsInternational relationsMilitary coproduction agreementsMilitary vesselsMissilesNaval procurementOperational testingRadar equipmentWeapons research and development