Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused
NSIAD-00-97
Published: May 26, 2000. Publicly Released: May 26, 2000.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, focusing on: (1) DOD actions to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its organization, activities, and functions; (2) other actions DOD can take to improve implementation of the Initiative; and (3) the actions of the interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to coordinate the research and development programs of DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. intelligence community to identify and eliminate unnecessary duplication.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | To more clearly determine DOD's progress in implementing its Counterproliferation Initiative, provide additional tools to guide and oversee its efforts, and ensure greater accountability to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should take actions to develop: (1) a departmentwide strategy that takes a long-term, comprehensive view of the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat and links ends, ways, and means to better integrate DOD's policies and programs for counterproliferation; and (2) a military strategy for integrating U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities. |
DOD believes that the intent of a department-wide strategy is satisfied by key planning and management documents and various DOD directives and instructions. This collection of documents does not fully satisfy this recommendation. On February 22, 2001, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the "Counterproliferation Strategy", which establishes basic principles, operational concepts and strategic guidance to provide a common understanding of counterproliferation. The Chairman is also making revisions to CJCS CONPLAN 0400-00, which is in final review.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should develop: (1) a management plan that clearly delineates responsibilities, explicit and outcome-oriented goals, a process for reporting, evaluating, and validating its progress, and a resource strategy for ensuring funding of its efforts; and (2) quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be used to assess progress toward goal achievement. |
DOD, in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act, completed its first annual DOD Chemical-Biological Defense program performance plan in February 2001. While this action partially addresses GAO's recommendation, GAO's intent was for DOD to develop a comprehensive management and performance plan that includes all areas of counterproliferation.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the Department's organization for counterproliferation to determine if adjustments can be made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management and integration of the Department's initiatives. |
DOD did not include an examination of the Department's organization for counterproliferation to determine if adjustments can be made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management and integration of the Department's initiatives in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
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| Department of Defense | To provide assurance that the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat is being given sufficient attention in the body of military doctrine, the Secretary of Defense should have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine publication that encompasses all elements of counterproliferation. |
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved the joint doctrine publication 3-40, "Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations", which was published on July 8, 2004. The overarching joint publication covers the three major elements of counterproliferation: non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and consequence management. This publication satisfies GAO's recommendation.
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| Department of Defense | To improve the attention given to nuclear, biological, and chemical survivability in DOD and service acquisition processes, the Secretary of Defense should devise and implement a systematic approach that identifies the systems and equipment that need to be capable of operating in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate features are incorporated into the designs of these systems. |
DOD believes current acquisition regulations sufficiently address the survivability of weapon systems in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. GAO disagrees. A DOD study team concluded in January 1999, that survivability provisions in acquisition regulations need to be strengthened and that there is a lack of uniform standards among the military services to ensure survivability in systems and equipment being acquired. It developed a plan, which has not yet been implemented. The thrust of GAO's recommendation is to take actions consistent with the study team's recommendations. As of September 2004, discussions with DOD officials and on-line research indicates that there has not been any change in status since the last update.
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| Department of Defense | To strengthen the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee in identifying and eliminating any unnecessary redundant programs, the Secretary of Defense, as Committee Chairman, should direct the Committee to devise and implement a procedural mechanism that establishes clear criteria, procedures, and a process for making such decisions. |
DOD agrees that there may be opportunities for the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to do more to identify and eliminate any unnecessary redundant programs. However, DOD has not yet decided whether the mechanism GAO recommends is necessary at this time. As of September 2004, discussions with DOD and on-line research indicated that the status of this action has not changed.
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Biological warfareChemical warfareChemical weaponsDefense capabilitiesHomeland securityInteragency relationsNuclear proliferationNuclear warfarePerformance measuresRedundancyWeapons research and developmentWeapons systemsWeapons of mass destruction