National Nuclear Security Administration: Reporting on Industrial Base Risks Needs Improvement
Fast Facts
The National Nuclear Security Administration relies on contractors for thousands of parts for the nuclear weapons stockpile. However, NNSA faces risks to its industrial baseāthe supply chain, facilities, transportation, and workforce that combine to maintain the stockpile.
NNSA uses its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan to communicate required information about these risks to Congress. However, we found that this plan does not clearly communicate what NNSA needs or its priorities for ensuring that the nation has a robust nuclear stockpile.
We recommended that NNSA provide more information in its reporting on industrial base risks.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) uses a coordinated but decentralized approach to manage risks to the nuclear security enterprise (NSE) industrial base. The NSE industrial base includes four elements—supply chain, operations and facilities, logistics and transportation, and workforce. The Office of Systems Engineering and Integration, within NNSA's Office of Defense Programs, serves as the focal point for managing NSE industrial base risks at the enterprise level, including by attending working group meetings and participating in interagency processes. Contractors and working groups across the NSE are primarily responsible for managing industrial base risks. They use a variety of tools and processes that are often interlinked and cross-cutting. For example, some working groups use third-party software to identify, assess, and monitor risks.
Figure: Elements of the Nuclear Security Enterprise Industrial Base
NNSA has identified several key risks and taken steps to address some of them. For example, to address the insufficient supply of specialized equipment, NNSA established a working group that created two initiatives to expand capacity and increase supply. However, NNSA's primary method of communicating NSE industrial base risks to external stakeholders—the annual Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan—does not completely and clearly communicate risk priorities or resource needs. For example,
- The Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires NNSA to report on identified risks and how they are prioritized. However, GAO found that the plan discusses some key risks in limited detail and did not describe any as priorities.
- The FY 2022 NDAA also requires NNSA to report its resource needs to mitigate industrial base risks. NNSA officials said that additional resources or tools would be useful to address some risks. However, the plan did not identify such resources.
Complete and clear information about industrial base risks and resource needs would help inform stakeholders and decision-makers about the status of the NSE industrial base.
Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA relies on contractors to produce or procure thousands of parts and components for the nuclear weapons stockpile. These contractors operate the laboratories and production facilities comprising the NSE. However, NNSA faces risks to its NSE industrial base such as human capital gaps, eroding infrastructure, constrained markets and suppliers, and global events. The FY 2022 NDAA requires NNSA to report on NSE industrial base risks.
A Senate report accompanying a bill for the FY 2023 NDAA includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA's plans for addressing NSE industrial base risks. This report (1) examines NNSA's approach to managing risks to the NSE industrial base and (2) assesses the extent to which NNSA has identified NSE industrial base risks and communicated these risks to external stakeholders.
To do this work, GAO reviewed NNSA documentation and interviewed NNSA officials and selected contractor and working group representatives. GAO compared NNSA's risk reporting to enterprise risk management good practices.
Recommendations
GAO is making two recommendations to NNSA to provide complete and clear information about NSE industrial base risks and resource needs. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
---|---|---|
National Nuclear Security Administration | The NNSA Administrator should ensure that the agency's reporting on risks to the NSE industrial base includes complete and clear information on key industrial base risks. (Recommendation 1) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
National Nuclear Security Administration | The NNSA Administrator should ensure that the agency's reporting on risks to the NSE industrial base includes an assessment of whether additional resources, tools, or legislative proposals are needed to address these risks. (Recommendation 2) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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