Power Marketing Administrations: Additional Steps Are Needed to Better Manage Climate-Related Risks
Fast Facts
Four "power marketing administrations" sell electricity generated from federal hydropower dams to public utilities, rural cooperatives, and Indian Tribes in over 30 states.
The four entities face a number of climate-related risks to their operations. For example, decreasing water availability that resulted from droughts could reduce the amount of electricity generated from dams—affecting their ability to provide power.
In 2022, two of the administrations identified weaknesses associated with climate change and developed plans to address them. But the other two have not yet done so. We recommended that they develop such plans.
Low Water Levels at Glen Canyon Dam
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Power Marketing Administrations (PMA)—the Bonneville Power Administration, the Southeastern Power Administration, the Southwestern Power Administration, and the Western Area Power Administration—face several climate-related risks to their operations. For example, decreasing water availability resulting from drought could reduce electricity generation from federal hydropower dams, such as the Hoover Dam. Warmer temperatures and drier conditions could lead to more frequent wildfires, which could disrupt operations. For example, in September 2020, 38 of the Bonneville Power Administration's transmission lines were out of service because of wildfires, with some lines out of service momentarily and others for over a week. While it is not possible to attribute an individual event, such as a wildfire, to climate change, such events provide insights into the risks climate change poses to PMA operations.
Low Water Levels at the Hoover Dam in August 2021
The PMAs have taken some steps to manage climate-related risks. For example, through a series of congressionally mandated assessments, all of the PMAs have identified risks that climate change poses to federal hydropower generation. In addition, the Bonneville Power Administration and the Southwestern Power Administration have conducted assessments of critical assets vulnerable to climate change and developed resilience plans to address climate-related risks, as called for by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Planning Guidance. The Southeastern Power Administration and the Western Area Power Administration, however, have not yet done so. Identifying critical assets vulnerable to climate change would help these entities develop resilience measures to address climate-related risks and determine whether mitigating certain risks is worth the investment. As GAO and others have reported, investing in resilience can reduce the need for more costly actions in the future. This, in turn, would help the PMAs fulfill their mission of providing reliable and affordable power to their customers.
Why GAO Did This Study
The four PMAs play a significant role in selling and transmitting electricity to public power utilities, cooperatives, and Indian Tribes, in over 30 states. However, more frequent extreme weather events and other risks associated with climate change could cost utilities and customers billions of dollars from power outages and infrastructure damage. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Infrastructure oversees the PMAs.
GAO was asked to examine U.S. energy infrastructure resilience to climate change. This report examines (1) the risks climate change poses to PMA operations and (2) steps the PMAs have taken to manage climate-related risks and additional steps needed. GAO analyzed relevant reports, including the Fourth National Climate Assessment; and interviewed PMA officials, as well as 18 knowledgeable stakeholders from risk management; consumer, trade association, and environmental groups; and staff from five DOE national laboratories.
Recommendations
GAO is making seven recommendations, including that the Southeastern Power Administration and the Western Area Power Administration develop vulnerability assessments and resilience plans, as directed by DOE. DOE agreed with GAO's recommendations. The Southeastern Power Administration and the Western Area Power Administration plan to develop plans by December 31, 2023.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
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Southeastern Power Administration | The Administrator of the Southeastern Power Administration should direct staff to develop a climate change vulnerability assessment that identifies critical assets, infrastructure systems, and programs vulnerable to climate change. (Recommendation 1) |
DOE agreed with this recommendation. In February 2024, DOE provided a copy of the 2023 Southeastern Power Administration Vulnerability Assessment and Resiliency Plan which identifies vulnerable assets and characterizes the likelihood of climate change hazards such as drought or heatwaves using a risk matrix. We believe Southeastern has addressed this recommendation.
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Southeastern Power Administration | The Administrator of the Southeastern Power Administration should direct staff to develop a resilience plan that identifies and prioritizes climate resilience measures needed to address climate-related risks. (Recommendation 2) |
DOE agreed with this recommendation. In February 2024, DOE provided the 2023 Southeastern Power Administration Vulnerability Assessment and Resiliency Plan. The plan identifies vulnerable assets and characterizes the likelihood of climate change hazards such as drought or heatwaves using a risk matrix. The assessment states that the implemented measures already in place are considered sufficient to avoid regional hazards from strong winds and heat waves identified as likely to increase with climate change. The plan also states that Southeastern will reassess the plan by completing a periodic review or by repeating steps at least every four years to incorporate new information such as updated climate science information from the latest National Climate Assessment. According to the plan, if, upon review, Southeastern finds additional necessary solutions, they will provide an overview of the solution and why it is needed, and the plan outlines the elements of such an assessment and risk responses. These actions meet the intent of our recommendation.
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Southeastern Power Administration | The Administrator of the Southeastern Power Administration should direct staff to establish a plan to routinely reassess its vulnerability assessment and resilience plan to incorporate updated information about climate science and implemented resilience measures. (Recommendation 3) |
DOE agreed with this recommendation. In February 2024, DOE provided the 2023 Southeastern Power Administration Vulnerability Assessment and Resiliency Plan. The plan states that Southeastern will reassess the plan by completing a periodic review or by repeating steps at least every 4 years to incorporate new information such as updated climate science information from the latest National Climate Assessment. The plan also states that Southeastern will incorporate the plan and the climate-related risks identified into its Enterprise Risk Management process, which is reviewed annually. These actions meet the intent of our recommendation.
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Western Area Power Administration | The Administrator of the Western Area Power Administration should direct staff to develop a climate change vulnerability assessment that identifies critical assets, infrastructure systems, and programs vulnerable to climate change. (Recommendation 4) |
DOE agreed with this recommendation. In October 2023 the Western Area Power Administration issued a Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resiliency Plan that identifies vulnerable assets, such as transmission lines and facilities, and characterizes the likelihood of hazards such as wildfires and heatwaves, using a risk matrix. These actions meet the intent of our recommendation.
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Western Area Power Administration | The Administrator of the Western Area Power Administration should direct staff to develop a resilience plan that identifies and prioritizes climate resilience measures needed to address climate-related risks. (Recommendation 5) |
DOE agreed with this recommendation. In October 2023, the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) issued a Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resiliency Plan. In its plan, WAPA identified examples of implemented adaptive measures by hazard, such as heatwaves, flooding, and landslides. For example, WAPA stated that construction and installation of substations and critical assets intentionally avoid areas prone to landslide. The plan also identified examples of current activities that WAPA plans to continue to leverage to increase its resilience to climate change and reduce risk if deemed continually effective. These efforts include vegetation management, transmission line upgrades, and asset management, among others. These actions meet the intent of our recommendation.
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Western Area Power Administration | The Administrator of the Western Area Power Administration should direct staff to establish a plan to routinely reassess its vulnerability assessment and resilience plan to incorporate updated information about climate science and implemented resilience measures. (Recommendation 6) |
DOE agreed with this recommendation. In October 2023, the Western Area Power Administration issued its Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resiliency Plan. The plan states that it will be revised and resubmitted to the Department every 4 years with annual internal reviews and updates as necessary. The plan also states that it will adapt to changing expectations and evidence by completing periodic reviews or by repeating Risk Assessment Tool steps at least every 4 years to incorporate new information such as updated climate science information. These actions meet the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should take steps to determine the need for future assessments of the effects of climate change on federal hydropower and on the marketing of power from federal facilities. (Recommendation 7) |
DOE agreed with GAO's recommendation. In February 2024, DOE stated that SEPA and WAPA submitted their assessments and requested that GAO close this recommendation. However, GAO's recommendation called for DOE to determine whether there was a need to continue its assessments of the effects of climate change on federal hydropower (i.e., the 9505 assessments under the Secure Water Act). In February 2024, DOE stated that SEPA and WAPA each manage hydropower facilities, which are addressed in their respective Vulnerability Assessments and Resilience Plans (VARPs). However, in its October 2023 VARP, WAPA stated that the impact of climate change on assets directly associated with hydropower generation were not evaluated in its VARP because the hydropower generating facilities are not owned or operated by WAPA, rather they are owned by the Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and International Boundary and Water Commission. We continue to believe that DOE needs to determine whether there is a need to continue its assessments of the effects of climate change on federal hydropower, given that the PMAs are not considering this aspect in their VARPs.
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