Future Vertical Lift Aircraft: Army Should Implement Leading Practices to Mitigate Acquisition Risk
Fast Facts
The U.S. Army's fleet of helicopters is aging. The Army is planning to supplement and replace three aircraft with new ones capable of vertical take-off and landing. These aircraft will perform attack, transport, and reconnaissance missions.
While the new aircraft are still in early stages, we found that the Army didn't always meet leading practices in acquiring them. For example, the Army developed cost estimates for the aircraft that were not credible. Because the Army didn't follow leading practices, it is in danger of not meeting its goals to deliver these aircraft.
Our seven recommendations address this and other issues.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Army is developing several aircraft systems to supplement and replace its aging fleet of helicopters. Aircraft in this portfolio, known as Future Vertical Lift, are to perform attack, transport, and reconnaissance missions, and are designed to have upgraded capabilities—for example, increased payload and range.
Army Future Vertical Lift Prototype Designs and Aircraft Demonstrators
The Army is currently developing two crewed and one uncrewed aircraft systems.
- Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft is intended to address the Army's capability gap for a dedicated, armed aerial reconnaissance platform, and plans to deliver aircraft in 2030. Acquisition officials are currently conducting an analysis of alternatives and developing two prototypes.
- Future Long Range Assault Aircraft is intended to conduct long-range assault missions and serve as a multi-role aircraft to transport personnel and equipment. In fiscal year 2023, the Army reported awarding a contract to a single vendor to complete preliminary design, deliver a virtual prototype, and deliver a physical prototype for flight tests.
- Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System involves acquiring uncrewed vehicles in phases. The first phase is to meet urgent battlefield needs within 2 years; the next is to develop a new vehicle to conduct reconnaissance missions.
The cost and schedule estimates for these aircraft development efforts did not always meet leading practices. For example, the assault and uncrewed aircraft systems minimally met the threshold for a credible cost estimate. In addition, the business cases for these aircraft systems did not meet leading practices because they did not fully identify schedule risks.
In addition, the plans for the three aircraft systems do not meet leading practices for maturing and assessing technologies. GAO's leading practices recommend demonstrating critical technologies in an operational environment prior to system development. However, the crewed systems plan to demonstrate technologies after that point. Further, the Army is developing the new uncrewed system without first conducting a technology risk assessment.
Without credible cost estimates, operationally demonstrated technologies, and knowledge of associated risks, the Army is in danger of not meeting its goals for fielding these capabilities.
Why GAO Did This Study
Aircraft capable of vertical take-off and landing—primarily helicopters—support vital Army missions. The Army has been working for decades to develop new capabilities in this area. However, prior efforts were canceled due to cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls.
A House report included a provision for GAO to review the Army's Future Vertical Lift portfolio. GAO's report addresses (1) planned acquisition approaches, (2) the extent to which cost and schedule estimates align with leading practices, and (3) the extent to which technical risk mitigation aligns with leading practices.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed acquisition documentation, analyzed cost estimates and schedules, and compared them to leading practices. GAO also interviewed officials from Future Vertical Lift, the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Recommendations
GAO is making seven recommendations to the Army, including that the Future Vertical Lift portfolio improve cost estimates, demonstrate critical technologies prior to starting system development, and conduct a technology risk assessment, as appropriate. The Army concurred with one recommendation, and concurred with the intent of the remaining six.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft effort updates its life cycle cost estimate to align with all four elements of the credible characteristic as identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. (Recommendation 1) |
The Army concurred with the intent of this recommendation. In June 2024, Army officials completed an Army Cost Position for the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) in support of the start of its system development. We requested the supporting data and information the Army used to develop the FLRAA cost estimate, but the Army has not yet provided it. Until the Army provides us with this information, we are unable to determine whether it aligns with all four elements of the credible characteristic as identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. We will continue to follow up with the Army in order to receive and review this information.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System effort updates its life cycle cost estimate to align with all four elements of the credible characteristic as identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. (Recommendation 2) |
The Army concurred with the intent of this recommendation. In August 2024, Army officials stated that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics is still developing a life cycle cost estimate for the Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System. We will continue to monitor the Army's progress in implementing this recommendation and provide updates as it takes action.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft effort identifies and analyzes schedule risks prior to major events, such as its annual budget request. (Recommendation 3) |
The Army concurred with the recommendation. In August 2024, Army officials stated that they conducted schedule risk analysis for the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) in support of the start of its system development. They subsequently noted that the Army's Cost Analysis Brief included schedule risk analysis. However, the discussion of risk in this document primarily focused on how changes in schedule could affect cost. This document did not include an identification and analysis of potential risks for the FLRAA schedule. We will continue to follow up with the Army in order to receive and review a schedule risk analysis.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System effort identifies and analyzes schedule risks prior to major events, such as its contract award for Increment 2. (Recommendation 4) |
The Army concurred with the intent of this recommendation. In April 2024, the Army reported selecting two vendors to move forward with flight demonstrations for the Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System. Army officials stated that the Army will identify and analyze schedule risks as the program continues to move forward. We will continue to monitor the Army's progress in implementing this recommendation and provide updates as it takes action.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft effort plans to demonstrate all of its critical technologies in an operational environment by the start of system development. (Recommendation 5) |
The Army concurred with the intent of this recommendation. In July 2024, the Army terminated the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft program.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft effort plans to demonstrate all of its critical technologies in an operational environment by the start of system development. (Recommendation 6) |
The Army concurred with the intent of this recommendation. The Army acknowledged the importance of maturing technologies but stated it would address these concerns in accordance with existing Department of Defense (DOD) policy. In July 2024, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology approved the start of the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) system development without the program demonstrating its critical technologies in an operational environment. By starting system development without demonstrating all of its critical technologies in an operational environment, the Army did not meet the intent of this recommendation.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System effort conducts a technology risk assessment prior to contract award for Increment 2. (Recommendation 7) |
The Army concurred with the intent of this recommendation. The Army acknowledged the importance of conducting technology risk assessments but stated it would address these concerns in accordance with existing Department of Defense (DOD) policy. The leading practices that form the basis of our recommendation are in keeping with DOD policy, but also exceed it in some areas. We found that DOD could do more to implement these practices, and, in doing so, can further reduce risk for acquisition programs. During our review, Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (FTUAS) officials stated that they would conduct technology risk assessments as part of their vendor selection. As of November 2024, the Army had not awarded a contract for FTUAS. We will continue to monitor the Army's progress in implementing this recommendation and provide updates as it takes action.
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