Close Air Support: Actions Needed to Enhance Friendly Force Tracking Capabilities and Fully Evaluate Training
Fast Facts
"Close air support"—airborne attacks on enemies located near friendly forces on the ground—requires detailed planning, seamless communications, and effective training. Mistakes can be dangerous to U.S. and allied forces.
The DOD has faced challenges with the technology initiatives and training efforts it relies on to mitigate risk. For example, it has identified changes to improve its digital communications systems but gaps in existing guidance and management oversight have stalled implementation.
We recommended the DOD further implement and assess close air support technology initiatives and evaluate its training programs, among other things.
The key steps during a close air support mission
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress implementing initiatives to enhance capabilities that are used to identify friendly force locations during close air support (CAS) missions, but GAO identified additional actions that are needed to strengthen these efforts. Specifically,
- DOD has made limited progress in implementing 10 changes the department approved to address gaps in the interoperability of digital communications systems used to conduct CAS, hindering efforts to improve the speed and accuracy of information exchanges.
- DOD's efforts to assess the interoperability of digital systems used to perform CAS have been limited in scope. GAO found that DOD had formally assessed two out of 10 approved changes during joint service and multinational events, and these assessments were not conducted in a training environment that replicated capabilities of near-peer adversaries.
- DOD implemented a new capability in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility to help identify the positions of friendly forces during CAS missions. However, GAO found that DOD did not provide adequate training for personnel who operate it or conduct an evaluation to resolve implementation challenges that have hampered its performance.
DOD conducts evaluations of training programs for forces that participate in CAS missions, but GAO identified two areas where DOD can improve its efforts. First, the Army and Marine Corps have not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of periodic training for ground observers providing targeting information due to a lack of centralized systems for tracking training data and the absence of designated entities to monitor service-wide training. Second, the use of contract aircraft for training increased substantially between 2017 and 2019, but DOD has not fully evaluated the use of non-military contract aircraft to train air controllers for CAS (see fig.). GAO found that differences between U.S. military aircraft and contract aircraft (e.g., airspeed) can result in a misalignment of aircraft capabilities for certain types of training events. Without evaluating CAS training fully, DOD cannot have assurance that its forces are prepared to conduct CAS missions safely and effectively.
Number of Hours Non-Military Aircraft Were Used to Train for Close Air Support for Fiscal Years 2017 through 2019
Why GAO Did This Study
The use of ordnance delivered by aircraft to support U.S. military forces that are in close proximity to enemy forces on the ground requires detailed planning, seamless communications, and effective training. Mistakes in communications or procedures used to identify and maintain an awareness of the positions of friendly forces on the battlefield during CAS can result in the loss of U.S. military personnel.
Senate Report 116-48 and House Report 116-120, accompanying bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, included provisions for GAO to evaluate issues related to friendly-force identification capabilities in CAS missions. Among other things, this report evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1) implemented initiatives to enhance friendly-force identification capabilities during CAS, and (2) evaluated training for forces that participate in CAS. GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed officials regarding DOD efforts to develop and implement friendly force tracking capabilities for CAS; reviewed CAS training programs; and analyzed training data, including the number of hours that DOD used non-military contract aircraft for CAS training from 2017 through 2019.
Recommendations
GAO is making 11 recommendations to DOD, including that DOD implement and assess initiatives to improve the interoperability of digital systems used in CAS and take additional steps to evaluate the training for certain forces that participate in CAS missions. DOD concurred with the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure the Joint Staff updates the Joint Fire Support Coordinated Implementation Change Control Board Charter roles and responsibilities to include relevant DOD components and offices with acquisition authority and the ability to implement changes. (Recommendation 1) |
The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, the Joint Fire Support Coordinated Implementation Change Control Board Charter was revised and updated with a new tri-chair configuration which includes Joint Staff J6, DOD Chief Information Officer, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. The charter was signed and in effect on March 10, 2022. By updating the charter DOD will be better positioned to ensure that digitally-aided close air support capabilities are interoperable across the joint force and available as a means to execute close air support, as we recommended in January 2021.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure the Joint Staff develops a detailed plan for ECP implementation, to include timeframes for developing, approving, and implementing ECPs intended to address interoperability gaps for DACAS, and establishes a process to periodically review approved ECPs for relevance and compliance with ECPs as programs update DACAS capabilities. (Recommendation 2) |
The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, the Joint Fire Support Coordinated Implementation Change Control Board provides oversight for the Digitally-Aided Close Air Support (DACAS) Coordinated Implementation Working Group. The working group published an Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) Development Plan in May 2022 to address DACAS interoperability gaps. The plan includes information on who is responsible for identifying and confirming capability gaps, methods for documenting issues identified during ECP development, and the process for ECP approval, implementation, and periodic review timelines. By developing a detailed plan for implementing ECPs and a periodic review process, DOD is better positioned to ensure that service DACAS capabilities are interoperable across the joint force and available as a means to execute CAS, as we recommended in January 2021.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure the Joint Staff updates the DACAS ECP process to include senior level review of ECP implementation beyond the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee. (Recommendation 3) |
The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, the Chair of the Digitally-Aided Close Air Support (DACAS) Change Control Board published a report detailing the implementation status of each DACAS Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). The report included the current and forecasted status of relevant programs and systems and was provided to the C4/Cyber Functional Capabilities Board in April 2022, a senior leader oversight body within DOD. DOD stated they would provide subsequent implementation reports annually to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Structure. By implementing a documented review structure for service-level implementation of ECPs, DOD will be better positioned to ensure that service DACAS capabilities are interoperable across the joint force and available as a means to execute close air support, as we recommended in January 2021.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure the Joint Staff, in coordination with the services, develops a plan to formally assess ECPs during future Bold Quest events or other military service exercises or events, to include demonstrating DACAS capabilities in a contested environment. (Recommendation 4) |
DOD concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, Joint Staff J6 Joint Assessment Division developed an ECP test plan for future Bold Quest events. The current plan prioritized testing of various ECPs at the November 2021 and 2022 Bold Quest Events. Joint Staff J6 will develop test plans annually and subsequent annual plans will be due in May to facilitate future Bold Quest event planning. By developing a test plan for Bold Quest events, DOD will be better positioned to assess whether DACAS capabilities are interoperable across the joint force under various operating environments, as we recommended in January 2021. Therefore, we have closed this recommendation as implemented as of January 2022.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure that the military services and Joint Staff develop and provide training to relevant personnel that will use SAS-E. (Recommendation 5) |
DOD concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, Joint Staff developed a SAS-E instructor training guide and in March 2021 provided the training guide to relevant personnel that will use SAS-E. By developing and providing the training guide, users of the SAS-E will have an improved understanding to properly configure and operate the system, as we recommended in January 2021. Therefore, we have closed this recommendation as implemented as of January 2022.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure the appropriate official(s) conduct a post implementation review of SAS-E to identify the root causes of any outstanding problems, ensure the system is operating as intended, and address any identified deficiencies. (Recommendation 6) |
DOD concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it . Specifically, Joint Staff and the Defense Information Systems Agency's Global Command and Control System-Joint Program Management Office conducted a post implementation review of SAS-E in November 2021. The review found that the SAS-E capability was running in the background unmonitored and assigned personnel lacked the knowledge to adequately support SAS-E. While the review found that system was functioning properly, personnel had no knowledge regarding aircrew utilization of the system or the ability to assess its effectiveness in the cockpit. The study team identified several recommendations to address these deficiencies and to improve SAS-E operations. By conducting a post implementation review, DOD was able to identify several deficiencies with SAS-E as well as make recommendations to improve the operational functionality of the system, as we recommended in January 2021. We have closed this recommendation as implemented as of April 2022.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should update guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities for service-level JFO program oversight, including those related to the standardization and evaluation of training. (Recommendation 7) |
The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, in May 2023, the Army developed and provided documentation of guidance it published for a service level JFO program to include roles and responsibilities, including establishing service level managers to ensure compliance through standardization and evaluation procedures. The May 2023 guidance also revised related JFO oversight to improve service level assessment of JFO programs and units. By establishing service-level guidance to clarify JFO program management responsibilities, the Army is better positioned to systematically evaluate JFO training and identify shortfalls, as we recommended in January 2021.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should identify a database to maintain JFO training data. (Recommendation 8) |
The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, in September 2022, the Army identified the Army Training Information System as the database to maintain JFO training data. The Army developed and provided documentation of the statement of work outlining Army requirements for a JFO digital tracking system that will allow unit and service oversight of JFOs . The system is estimated to be complete by 2029. In the interim, the Army identified an interim solution to track JFO training data. In addition, in May 2023 the Army published doctrine and policy mandating the use of this digital tracker for Army JFOs. By identifying a database to collect service-wide JFO training data, the Army is better positioned to systematically evaluate JFO training at the service level or identify shortfalls in training programs, as we recommended in January 2021.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the Marine Corps updates guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities for service-level JFO program oversight, including those related to standardization and evaluation of training. (Recommendation 9) |
The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, the Marine Corps updated the Marine Corps Order governing the Marine Corps Tactical Air Control Party Program, to include clarifying Joint Fires Observer (JFO) Program Management roles and responsibilities. The order was published in June 2022. By establishing service-level guidance to clarify JFO program management responsibilities, the Marine Corps is better positioned to systematically evaluate JFO training and identify shortfalls, as we recommended in January 2021.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the Marine Corps identifies a database to maintain JFO training data. (Recommendation 10) |
The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, in June 2022 the Marine Corps issued a memorandum to create and implement a Joint Fires Observer (JFO) module as part of the Tactical Control Air Party module in the Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS). By identifying a database to collect service-wide JFO training data, the Marine Corps is better positioned to systematically evaluate JFO training at the service level or identify shortfalls in training programs, as we recommended in January 2021.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure the Joint Staff, in coordination with the military services and U.S. Special Operations Command, evaluates the use of contract aircraft for meeting minimum JTAC training requirements and revise the existing MOA based on the results of such an evaluation, as appropriate and feasible. (Recommendation 11) |
DOD concurred with this recommendation and has taken actions to address it . Specifically, Joint Staff J6, as the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee secretariat, conducted an evaluation of the use of contract aircraft for meeting minimum JTAC and forward air controllers (airborne) requirements. As part of this review, Joint Staff J6 officials reviewed the MOAs and the associated service and Special Operations Command directives. The review resulted in changes to the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee standard operating procedures to address the use of contract aircraft for JTAC training. Similar statements from the standard operating procedures will be added to the MOAs during the next scheduled MOA review as well as being made available to service and Special Operations Command to include in their program directives. By fully evaluating the increased use of non-military contract aircraft to meet JTAC training requirements, DOD had a sound basis to adjust the standard operating procedures for JTAC training, which meets the intent of our January 2021 recommendation. We have closed this recommendation as implemented as of April 2022.
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