Defense Nuclear Enterprise: DOD Can Improve Processes for Monitoring Long-Standing Issues
Fast Facts
DOD conducted several reviews of its nuclear forces in 2014-2015, leading to hundreds of recommendations to improve leadership, morale, and more.
We found that DOD has made headway implementing recommended changes. However, some of its measures of progress need reassessment. For example, we found that a measure of the work environment—its command climate survey—contained unreliable data.
Additionally, DOD created a new nuclear oversight organization but has not defined specific roles and responsibilities for it or how it will communicate with key organizations.
Our recommendations address these and other issues.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to make progress implementing the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015 nuclear command, control, and communications enterprise review. From the 2014 reviews, DOD identified 175 recommendations. From these 175, DOD identified 247 actions it referred to as sub-recommendations, meaning that a recommendation made to multiple DOD components would be counted as one sub-recommendation for each of those components. Since GAO's March 2020 report, DOD has closed an additional nine of these sub-recommendations, and recommended 11 sub-recommendations for final closure. DOD has also closed one additional recommendation from the 13 made in its 2015 review, with four of the remaining five recommended for final closure.
Regarding the 2014 recommendations related to nuclear security forces, DOD identified initial metrics and milestones for tracking the progress addressing the identified challenges, but GAO found that a key measure for many of the recommendations contained unreliable data. Additionally, more recent reviews of security forces have identified additional metrics and milestones that could help DOD in assessing the progress of recommendation implementation. However, DOD has not reassessed these measures to determine if they are appropriate. As a result, DOD is not in a position to effectively measure progress or assess whether the actions taken have addressed the underlying issues.
In November 2018, GAO found that DOD had taken steps to improve nuclear enterprise oversight in response to the 2014 reviews. However, GAO found a key organization lacked clear roles, responsibilities, and methods to collaborate with other nuclear oversight organizations. Subsequently, in January 2021, DOD created a new entity, the Secretary of Defense Nuclear Transition Review, to take over responsibility for oversight of the defense nuclear enterprise (see figure). However, DOD has not defined specific roles and responsibilities for this organization or how it will communicate internally and with other organizations.
Selected Oversight Groups in the Nuclear Enterprise
In addition, DOD and the military services have made some progress in identifying areas for monitoring the health of the nuclear enterprise, but DOD has not identified the means by which it will monitor long-standing issues related to the long-term health of the enterprise.
Why GAO Did This Study
In 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed two reviews of DOD's nuclear enterprise. The reviews made recommendations to address long-standing issues with leadership, investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other shortcomings adversely affecting the nuclear deterrence mission. In 2015, DOD conducted a review focused on nuclear command, control, and communications systems, resulting in additional recommendations.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes for addressing these recommendations. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) made progress implementing the recommendations; (2) evaluated the metrics and milestones for implementing the 2014 nuclear enterprise review recommendations related to nuclear security forces; and (3) implemented oversight mechanisms, including developing an approach for monitoring long-standing issues. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed DOD officials on the recommendations' status and DOD's oversight.
Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations for DOD to provide guidance to require its components to assess implementation metrics and milestones; and document roles, responsibilities, and communication methods for the new oversight group, as well as a means to monitor long-standing nuclear enterprise issues. DOD concurred with all of the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of CAPE—as the office responsible for providing analytic guidance and overseeing the analysis of the recommendations—in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, and the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Strategic Stability, as other co-chairs of the Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group, provide guidance that the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group members periodically assess the process and outcome metrics and milestones for the remaining 2014 nuclear enterprise review recommendations to determine whether they are the most appropriate for evaluating implementation progress and whether the actions, once implemented, address the underlying problems. (Recommendation 1) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters will draft updated guidance for the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group members to periodically assess the process and outcome metrics and milestones for the remaining open 2014 nuclear enterprise review recommendations . In October 2022, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters issued a memorandum requesting that all DOD Components with open recommendations from the 2014 reviews assess the process and outcome metrics and milestones to determine whether they are appropriate for evaluating the implementation progress and address the underlying problems identified in the 2014 reviews. The memorandum directed that the components complete these assessments by February 1, 2023, and annually by February 1 of each year thereafter. By periodically assessing the metrics and milestones used to track and evaluate the progress implementing the 2014 recommendations, DOD is positioned to effectively assess its progress and determine when its recommendations can be closed. These actions meet the intent of GAO's recommendation.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, as co-chairs of SNTR's Nuclear Transition Steering Committee, document the roles and responsibilities of the SNTR and its supporting organizations. (Recommendation 2) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it is working to define and document roles and responsibilities for the SNTR membership. Subsequently, the SNTR has been replaced by a nuclear-focused Deputy's Management Action Group (nuclear DMAG). A Deputy Secretary of Defense-approved "action memo package"-which accompanied a 2022 memo signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters-included guidance on DMAG roles and responsibilities. Specifically, the action package defined high-level roles and responsibilities for the nuclear DMAG and primary supporting offices. We agree that DOD has sufficiently documented the roles and responsibilities of the nuclear DMAG and associated supporting organizations and is thus better positioned to provide oversight of key issues affecting the defense nuclear enterprise. DOD's actions have met the intent of our recommendation.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, as co-chairs of SNTR's Nuclear Transition Steering Committee, document how the SNTR will communicate with other organizations that have oversight responsibilities for portions of the nuclear enterprise. (Recommendation 3) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it is working to formalize the lines of communication between the SNTR, its Steering Committee, and other existing nuclear oversight bodies. Subsequently, the SNTR has been replaced by a nuclear-focused Deputy's Management Action Group (nuclear DMAG). A Deputy Secretary of Defense-approved "action memo package"-which accompanied a June 2022 memo signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters-included guidance on the nuclear DMAG's methods of communication. Specifically, the action package defined-at a high level-the processes for communication and coordination among the nuclear DMAG, other defense nuclear oversight groups, and primary supporting offices. We agree DOD has sufficiently defined methods of communication among the nuclear DMAG, other nuclear oversight organizations, and associated supporting organizations. DOD is thus better positioned to effectively oversee the defense nuclear enterprise in a coordinated, holistic manner that would address problems identified by the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews or other issues it may need to address in the future. We believe DOD's actions have met the intent of our original recommendation.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, as co-chairs of SNTR's Nuclear Transition Steering Committee, document guidance that identifies the means for monitoring long-standing issues including the associated metrics and information sources. (Recommendation 4) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it is working to determine how the SNTR and its Nuclear Transition Steering Committee will monitor and receive data on metrics related to the enduring recommendations for the nuclear enterprise. Subsequently, according to DOD officials, the SNTR has been replaced by a nuclear-focused Deputy's Management Action Group (nuclear DMAG). An October 2022 memo signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters includes guidance on the means by which components will support the nuclear DMAG's ability to monitor long-standing issues. For example, the memo directs DOD components to annually evaluate the metrics and milestones used to monitor implementation progress for the remaining open 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review recommendations. According to DOD officials, most of these open recommendations are related to long-term sustainment and acquisition programs for the nuclear enterprise or are designed to be closed only after progress in addressing the issues can be meaningfully evaluated. In November 2023, DOD officials told GAO that they believe that the 2022 guidance is sufficient to support the DMAG effectively monitor long-standing issues and does not intend to take additional action. We agree that DOD has taken concrete steps to monitor long-standing issues affecting the nuclear enterprise and is thus better positioned to proactively identify and address challenges as they arise. DOD has met the intent of our recommendation.
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