U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer Benefits, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Prioritize Resources
Fast Facts
The Secret Service is known for protecting the President, but it also investigates high-priority criminal threats such as cyber- and financial crimes.
Do these investigations detract from the agency’s protection mission?
We found Secret Service investigative activities also support its protective operations. Its Office of Investigations staff worked 11.2 million hours on protection in fiscal years 2014–2018.
We found ways to improve how Secret Service prioritizes its investigative resources. For example, it could identify which investigative activities best prepare agents for taking on protective duties. We recommended doing so, and more.
Badge, money
Highlights
What GAO Found
The operations of the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Office of Investigations, which conducts criminal investigations into financial and electronic crimes, generally support Secret Service protective operations in a variety of ways. For example, special agents in the Office of Investigations perform temporary protective assignments, such as during presidential campaigns or augment protective operations by securing a site in advance of a visit by a protectee. GAO found that personnel in the Office of Investigations spent 11.2 million hours supporting protective operations from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Most of the 40 current and former special agents GAO interviewed said that their investigative duties did not negatively affect protection. However, over half identified that they were frequently or sometimes required to work on investigations while assigned to temporary protective operations. Details associated with this topic are sensitive and have been omitted from this report.
Hours Expended Agencywide on Protective Operations by U.S. Secret Service Law Enforcement Personnel, Fiscal Years 2014–2018
In December 2017, the Secret Service developed a plan to align its resources to combat what it identified as priority criminal threats (e.g., criminal activity with significant economic and financial impacts). However, available documentation of efforts taken does not consistently demonstrate synchronized efforts across the agency to counter the priority criminal threats, as envisioned in the plan. Further, the Secret Service does not have a systematic approach for identifying cases that address priority criminal threats. Absent a documented process for aligning resources and identifying cases, Secret Service will continue to lack assurance that its resources are aligned to combat its priority threats.
The Office of Investigations employs a staffing model to determine how many special agents are needed in its field offices. The staffing model takes into account the number of law enforcement premium pay and standard overtime hours special agents are expected to work. However, it does not consider annual caps on federal employee salaries. As a result, the agency may be underestimating the number of staff needed to meet its workload demands.
Why GAO Did This Study
Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also investigates financial and electronic crimes (e.g., counterfeit currency and identity theft). In recent years, Congress and a panel of experts established by the Secretary of Homeland Security have raised concerns that the Secret Service's investigative operations may negatively affect its protective operations.
GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's investigative operations. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which the Secret Service's (1) investigative operations support or negatively affect its protective operations; (2) Office of Investigations has developed a plan to combat its priority criminal threats; and (3) staffing model accounts for federal employee compensation limits. GAO analyzed Secret Service data related to investigation and protection activities from 2014 through 2018; conducted semi-structured interviews with current and former special agents and federal prosecutors; and reviewed Secret Service policies and guidance. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2019. Information that the Secret Service deemed sensitive has been omitted.
Recommendations
GAO is making six recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a documented process to ensure that resources are dedicated to priority criminal threats, identify investigations that address these threats, and ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| United States Secret Service | The Director of the Secret Service should identify which types of investigations and activities best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities. (Recommendation 1) |
In January 2020, we reported on how investigations can help prepare special agents for the protective responsibilities required in the second phase of their career, which includes an assignment to a permanent protective detail or a specialty division. However, we also reported that the agency had not identified which types of investigations and related activities best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities. To help ensure special agents are adequately prepared for carrying out the duties required by protective details, we recommended that the Secret Service identify which types of investigations and activities best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities. In response, Secret Service developed lists of activities special agents should undertake as part of on-the-job training. By identifying these activities, the Secret Service is better able to prepare their special agents for the protective responsibilities.
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| United States Secret Service | The Director of the Secret Service should develop a framework to help ensure special agents have an opportunity to work, to the extent possible, investigations and activities that best prepare them for protection. (Recommendation 2) |
In January 2020, we reported on how investigations can help prepare special agents for the protective responsibilities required in the second phase of their career, which includes an assignment to a permanent protective detail or a specialty division. However, we also reported that the agency had not established a framework to ensure that agents receive the opportunity to work on investigations and other activities that best prepare them for protective duties. We therefore recommended that the Secret Service establish a framework to help ensure special agents have an opportunity to work on investigations and activities that prepare them for these duties. In response, Secret Service updated its training guidance to include on-the-job training in its learning management system and requires training coordinators to create or use core checklists of experiences secret agents should have to prepare them for the second phase of their careers. The revised guidance is consistent with the intent of the recommendation. If it continues to be implemented at the field office level, it will support the Secret Service's protective operations by focusing training on building skills needed for successfully executing protective responsibilities. It could also help make special agents more readily available to assist the agency when faced with a surge in protective responsibilities.
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| United States Secret Service | The Director of the Secret Service should establish a documented process to ensure that Office of Investigations resources are aligned with priority criminal threats. The process should outline key information to be included in plans for addressing priority threats. (Recommendation 3) |
As of March 2024, Secret Service has provided strategic plans related to investigative priorities and staffing management and has held discussions with GAO regarding actions needed. The agency has disseminated high-level investigative priorities to field offices. The agency also develops investigative plans when they determine that an investigation will require resources from outside the initiating field office. However, there is no process for documenting key information regarding how resources are aligned with priority threats. Based on actions taken, the recommendation therefore remains open as partially addressed, and actions taken remain under review.
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| United States Secret Service | The Director of the Secret Service should identify investigations that address priority criminal threats agencywide and collect data on the resources expended to investigate the threats. (Recommendation 4) |
As of August 2024, Secret Service has developed investigative categories based on statute and now collects information on personnel hours dedicated to each category. They have further identified how each category aligns to overall agency priorities. While Secret Service's approach does not allow the agency to fully account for all resources expended by investigations that address priority criminal threats as recommended, it does allow the agency to capture information about the time agency personnel have dedicated to each category. Secret Service noted that it is not feasible for them to fully account for all resources used because many cases involve other federal or international agency resources, into which the agency does not have insight. Overall, we believe that their efforts are in line with the intent of our recommendation and the data will provide management with important information to inform their decisions on the allocation of resources. GAO considers this recommendation to be closed as implemented.
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| United States Secret Service | The Director of the Secret Service should revise its special agent staffing model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. (Recommendation 5) |
In January 2020, we reported on how the U.S. Secret Service's Office of Investigations contributes to fulfilling the agency's investigative and protective responsibilities (GAO-20-239). During the course of our review, we found that the staffing model employed by the Office of Investigations to determine how many special agents are needed in its field office did not take into account annual caps on federal employee salaries. As a result, some special agents worked some time without compensation, which resulted in over $1 million in lost wages. In addition, without adjusting its staffing model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs, certain Secret Service special agents would continue to be under-compensated for their work. Consequently, we recommended that the Secret Service revise its special agent staffing model to ensure that compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. In March 2020, the Secret Service reported that it had completed the calculation and analytical work to revise the special agent staffing model to account for compensation limits, in addition to other factors. To support this statement, Secret Service provided a description of the revised staffing model that included the variables and assumptions used. As a result, this recommendation is closed as implemented.
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| United States Secret Service | The Director of the Secret Service should, after revising the special agent staffing model, use the revised model to recalculate and estimate staffing needs. (Recommendation 6) |
In January 2020, we reported on how the U.S. Secret Service's Office of Investigations contributes to fulfilling the agency's investigative and protective responsibilities (GAO-20-239). During the course of our review, we found that the staffing model employed by the Office of Investigations to determine how many special agents are needed in its field offices did not take into account annual caps on federal employee salaries. As a result, the Secret Service was underestimating the number of staff needed to meet its workload demands. Consequently, we recommended that the Secret Service revise its special agent staffing model and use the revised model to recalculate and estimate staffing needs. In March 2020, the Secret Service reported that it had used the revised staffing model to develop updated staffing numbers and used them to inform the revision of the agency's Human Capital Strategic Plan. In July 2020, the Secret Service provided the results of the revised staffing model to GAO, along with previous calculations to demonstrate that, as a result of the revisions, the estimated number of special agents across the agency increased from 3,708 in fiscal year 2019 under the previous staffing model, to 5,256 for fiscal year 2020 under the revised model. The estimated number of special agents required in field offices increased from 1,986 to 2,592 for the same time period. As a result, this recommendation is closed as implemented.
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