Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its Safety Reform Effort
Highlights
What GAO Found
Under its safety reform effort, the Department of Energy (DOE) reduced the number of safety directives by eliminating or combining requirements it determined were unclear, duplicative, or too prescriptive and by encouraging the use of industry standards. DOE reduced the number of its safety directives from 80 to 42, and for some of the directives DOE retained, it made extensive revisions. For example, DOE deleted requirements from its quality assurance directive addressing a corrective action program because another safety directive adequately covered these requirements. DOE obtained comments on its proposed revisions from DOE and contractor staff and from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board).
The benefits of DOEs reform effort are not clear. DOE intended to enhance productivity and reduce costs while maintaining safety, but DOE did not determine how the original requirements contained in safety directives impaired productivity or added costs before undertaking the reform effort. Moreover, DOE did not assess whether the cost to implement the revised directives would exceed the benefits, but officials said they had launched an initial study to determine, among other things, the costs associated with implementing selected safety requirements. DOE also did not develop performance measures in order to assess how the reform effort will lead to improved productivity or lower costs while maintaining safety. Instead, DOE is measuring success by using output-oriented measures, such as the number of directives eliminated, and not outcome measures, such as specific productivity improvements or cost savings. In the absence of clear measures linking the reform effort to productivity and safety improvements, DOE is not well positioned to know that its reform effort will achieve the intended benefits.
DOEs reform effort did not fully address safety concerns GAO and others have identified in three key areas: (1) quality assurance, (2) safety culture, and (3) federal oversight. Regarding quality assurance, DOE strengthened its quality assurance directive by clarifying that contractors must follow specific industry quality assurance standards, but quality assurance problems persist. For example, DOE proposed a nearly $250,000 fine against a contractor in July 2011 after identifying quality assurance problems in an incident where a worker punctured his hand with a sharp object contaminated with plutonium. With regard to safety culture, DOE revised its Integrated Safety Management directives to attempt to strengthen the safety culture at its sites, but DOE removed requirements for contractors to follow the directives because contractors already had to comply with safety management requirements in federal regulation. Safety Board officials raised concerns that the requirements in federal regulation are less detailed and, as a result, contractors may not implement safety practices as rigorously as if they were subject to the more specific requirements in DOEs directives. Finally, regarding federal oversight, DOE revised its approach to place greater emphasis on having its independent oversight staff review safety design documents before facilities are constructed, rather than after they are built. Other changes, however, such as requiring oversight staff to coordinate their assessment activities with DOE site office and contractor staff, raise concerns about the oversight staffs ability to provide a critical review of safety at DOEs sites that is independent from DOE site office and contractor staff.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOE carries out many of the nations most critical missions, including stewardship of the nations nuclear weapons stockpile and the environmental remediation of radioactive and hazardous legacy waste left over from the Cold War. DOE uses a system of regulations and internal directives that lay out requirements and guidance for ensuring the safety of staff and contractors, the public, and the environment. Over the past 10 years, GAO and others have repeatedly made recommendations for DOE to improve safety performance. In March 2010, DOE announced a reform effort to revise safety-related directives to increase productivity and reduce costs while maintaining safety.
This report examines (1) how DOE revised safety directives under its reform effort, (2) the costs of the reform effort and the benefits DOE hoped to achieve, and (3) the extent to which its reform effort addresses safety concerns GAO and others have identified. GAO reviewed relevant DOE reform effort documents, visited selected DOE sites to interview site office and contractor officials, and analyzed past GAO and other reports on DOEs safety problems.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that DOE analyze the costs and benefits of its safety reform effort and identify how the effort will help address safety concerns. DOE agreed with the recommendations but commented that it had significant concerns about the accuracy of the reports findings and conclusions. GAO stands by its findings and conclusions for the reasons discussed in the report.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
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Department of Energy | To help ensure that DOE's reform of its safety directives results in improved productivity and safety at its sites, and, prior to fully implementing revisions to its directives across all of the department's sites, the Secretary of Energy should systematically analyze the costs and benefits associated with implementing the revised safety directives to ensure that the costs do not exceed the benefits that the department expects to achieve. |
At the end of our review, in February 2012, the DOE Associate Deputy Secretary issued a memo tasking the DOE Field Management Council and National Laboratories Directors Council Chief Operating Officers to assess the effectiveness of 5 revised safety and security directives. The resulting report, issued July 2012, found that, in general, streamlined requirements didn't significantly change the manner in which the requirements were carried out. In addition, the report found, based on anecdotal evidence, that neither cost, time nor manpower benefits were realized.
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Department of Energy | To help ensure that DOE's reform of its safety directives results in improved productivity and safety at its sites, and, prior to fully implementing revisions to its directives across all of the department's sites, the Secretary of Energy should provide DOE's sites and contractors with a plan that details (1) the reform effort's goals, (2) the effort's long-term implementation strategy, (3) results-oriented outcome measures, and (4) how DOE will use results-oriented data to evaluate the reform's effectiveness and to determine whether additional changes are needed. |
Although DOE concurred with GAO's recommendation, the Department believes it already has in place a well-defined, effective process for implementing directive changes. The Department believes the goals of its Safety Reform effort were clearly defined and communicated. As we noted in our report, DOE did not follow key practices in implementing its Safety Reform effort, including establishing clear and measureable goals and results-oriented outcome measures. Thus without development and issuance of a plan that lays out these steps for the Safety Reform effort, this recommendation is considered closed but not implemented.
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Department of Energy | To help ensure that DOE's reform of its safety directives results in improved productivity and safety at its sites, and, prior to fully implementing revisions to its directives across all of the department's sites, the Secretary of Energy should ensure that the plan developed for DOE's sites and contractors identifies how the reform effort will help address past and recurring safety concerns with quality assurance, safety culture, and federal oversight of contractor activities. |
Although DOE concurred with GAO's recommendation, the Department believes it already has in place a well-defined, effective process for implementing directive changes. The Department believes the goals of its Safety Reform effort were clearly defined and communicated. As we noted in our report, DOE did not follow key practices in implementing its Safety Reform effort, including establishing clear and measureable goals and results-oriented outcome measures. Thus without development and issuance of a plan that lays out these steps for the Safety Reform effort, this recommendation is considered closed but not implemented.
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Department of Energy | To help ensure that DOE's reform of its safety directives results in improved productivity and safety at its sites, and, prior to fully implementing revisions to its directives across all of the department's sites, the Secretary of Energy should clearly define the oversight roles and responsibilities of DOE's Office of Independent Oversight staff to ensure that their work is sufficiently independent from the activities of DOE site office and contractor staff. |
On February 12, 2014 Energy Secretary Moniz issued a Secretarial memorandum re-emphasizing the Department's commitment to nuclear safety, to include the role of the DOE Office of Independent Oversight. In this memo, the Secretary announced an organizational change that included reorganizing safety and security functions to better align with the new organizational structure and enhance safety and security functions within the Department. A similar February 12, 2014 memo from the Deputy Secretary of Energy outlined a strategy of reforms to better enhance security, independent assessments and safety and security functions.
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