Air Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated with Program Costs and Schedules Could Hinder NextGen Implementation
Highlights
What GAO Found
In a review of 30 major ATC acquisition programs, all of which will contribute to the transition to NextGen, GAO found that costs for 11 of the 30 programs have increased from their initial estimates by a total of $4.2 billion and 15 programs experienced delays. The 11 acquisitions that experienced cost increases account for over 60 percent of FAA’s total acquisition costs ($11 billion of $17.7 billion) for the 30 programs. The 15 acquisitions that experienced schedule delays, of which 10 also had cost increases, ranged from 2 months to more than 14 years and averaged 48 months.
Cost increases and schedule delays occurred due to several factors, many of which have been longstanding challenges for FAA. Specifically, these have involved (1) additional or unanticipated system requirements; (2) insufficient stakeholder involvement (such as controllers’ input) throughout system development; (3) underestimating the complexity of software development; and (4) unanticipated events including funding shortfalls or work toppages. These challenges, if they persist, will impede the implementation of NextGen, especially in light of the interdependencies among many acquisition programs, where cost increases or delays in one program can affect the costs and schedules of other programs.
For the four programs GAO selected to analyze in depth, FAA is not consistently following the characteristics of high-quality cost estimates and scheduling best practices that GAO previously identified. Regarding cost estimates, GAO found that although all four of the programs generally provided well documented and comprehensive estimates, which are two of the four characteristics, no program fully met the two other characteristics. Specifically, each program estimate was not credible because each lacked an independent cost estimate, which provides a check against FAA’s estimate and three programs lacked risk or uncertainty analysis. The estimates also lacked accuracy because they were not updated regularly or based on comparable programs. Regarding scheduling practices, most programs did not substantially or fully meet the majority of the 9 best practices GAO previously identified including developing a fully integrated master schedule of all program activities and performing a schedule risk analysis. For example, without a schedule risk analysis, FAA is unable to predict, with any degree of confidence, if the estimated completion dates are realistic. FAA is implementing new processes and organizational changes to better manage acquisitions. However, by not consistently following the characteristics of highquality cost estimate and scheduling best practices, FAA cannot provide reasonable assurance to Congress and other stakeholders that NextGen and other ATC programs will avoid additional cost increases or schedule delays.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), partnering with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new satellite-based air traffic management system that will replace the current radar-based system and is expected to enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system by 2025. Concurrently, FAA continues to maintain and upgrade existing air traffic control (ATC) systems that will also be needed for NextGen. This involves acquiring and implementing new software and hardware.
GAO was asked to determine (1) how, if at all, costs and schedules of FAA ATC acquisitions programs, including those related to NextGen, have changed since they were first submitted to Congress, (2) the reasons for any such changes, and (3) the extent that selected ATC programs adhere to cost and schedule best practices. To do its work, GAO reviewed 30 programs and conducted cost and schedule analysis on four programs that had an approved baseline and were NextGen related. GAO reviewed acquisition documents and interviewed FAA officials.
Recommendations
To better estimate the cost and completion dates for major acquisitions, FAA should, among other things, require cost and schedule risk analysis, independent cost estimates and integrated master schedules. FAA did not comment on whether or not it agreed with the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
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Department of Transportation | To improve cost estimates and schedules for NextGen and other major air traffic control acquisition programs, the Secretary of Transportation should direct FAA, when appropriate for major acquisition programs based on a program's cost, schedule, complexity, and risk, to conduct independent cost estimates and schedule risk analysis for major acquisition programs. | The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new satellite-based air traffic management system that will replace the current radar-based system. This involves acquiring and implementing new software and hardware. In 2012, GAO reviewed four major ATC acquisition programs in depth and found that FAA was not consistently following the characteristics of scheduling best practices and high-quality cost estimates that GAO previously identified. Regarding scheduling practices, most programs did not substantially or fully meet the majority of the 9 best practices GAO previously identified, including performing schedule risk... analysis for major acquisition programs. Without a schedule risk analysis, FAA was unable to predict, with any degree of confidence, if the estimated completion dates were realistic. Concerning cost estimates for the four programs it analyzed, GAO determined that each program estimate was not credible because each lacked an independent cost estimate, which provides a check against FAA's estimate and three programs lacked risk and uncertainty analysis. An independent cost estimate can improve the accuracy and credibility of cost estimates and better ensures that programs will be completed within budget. However, by not consistently following the characteristics of high-quality cost estimates and scheduling best practices, FAA cannot provide these assurances to Congress and other stakeholders that NextGen programs will avoid additional cost increases or schedule delays. Therefore, GAO recommended that when appropriate for major acquisition programs based on a program's cost, schedule, complexity, and risk, FAA conduct independent cost estimates and schedule risk analysis for major acquisition programs. In 2019, GAO confirmed that FAA's revised guidance generally adopted GAO's (1) Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and (2) Schedule Assessment Guide, which included incorporating GAO's related best practices. The guidance outlines requirements for conducting cost and schedule analysis for acquisition programs in order to meet GAO's best practices. FAA applied its revised guidance to the agency's major acquisition of the Data Communications program, which allows an air traffic controller to send flight instruction to aircraft electronically. Adhering to the revised guidance, FAA said that they identified all applicable risks, uncertainties and variability. The integrated master schedule for the program was adjusted and appropriate risk buffers were calculated to absorb the schedule impact of risks and uncertainties. These risk buffers were then added as activities in the schedule and were linked to the critical milestones they impact. The revised guidance also specifies that a contract specific Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE) is required for all procurements of $10 million or more. The revised guidance notes that FAA does not develop a formal independent cost estimate (ICE) for large acquisition programs as specified by GAO's best practices because of staffing limitations. However, the revised guidance states that independent validation of the cost estimate developed by the acquisitions program offices is achieved through the IGCE by the separate Investment Planning and Analysis (IP&A) office. FAA applied the revised guidance to its major acquisition of the Terminal Flight Data Manager (TFDM) program, which improves air traffic controllers' situational awareness. Following its revised guidance, FAA's IGCE cost estimate was about $3.2 million lower than the cost estimate developed by the TFDM program staff. By conducting independent cost estimates, schedule risk analyses, and other analyses called for in GAO's best practices FAA can not only help minimize the risk of cost overruns and schedule delays, but also provide FAA, congressional decision makers, and other stakeholders with important information about these critical acquisitions.
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Department of Transportation | To improve cost estimates and schedules for NextGen and other major air traffic control acquisition programs, the Secretary of Transportation should direct FAA, when appropriate for major acquisition programs based on a program's cost, schedule, complexity, and risk, to require a fully integrated master schedule for each major acquisition program, including those that are components of NextGen. An integrated master schedule should horizontally and vertically link all program activities and milestones, including government and contractor schedules and program segments. | The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), partnering with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new satellite-based air traffic management system that will replace the current radar-based system and is expected to enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system by 2025. Concurrently, FAA continues to maintain and upgrade existing air traffic control (ATC) systems that will also be needed for NextGen. This involves acquiring and implementing new software and hardware. In 2012, GAO reviewed four major ATC acquisition programs in depth and found that FAA was not consistently following the...
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Department of Transportation | To improve cost estimates and schedules for NextGen and other major air traffic control acquisition programs, the Secretary of Transportation should direct FAA, when appropriate for major acquisition programs based on a program's cost, schedule, complexity, and risk, to conduct an assessment of major acquisition programs to ensure theymeet all of the established best practices for cost estimates andschedules contained in GAO guidance. | The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), partnering with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new satellite-based air traffic management system that will replace the current radar-based system and is expected to enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system by 2025. Concurrently, FAA continues to maintain and upgrade existing air traffic control (ATC) systems that will also be needed for NextGen. This involves acquiring and implementing new software and hardware. In 2012, GAO reviewed four major ATC programs in depth and found that FAA had not consistently followed the characteristics...
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Federal Aviation Administration | Given constrained budgets, FAA should determine which programs should be subject to these recommendations, such as those that are particularly costly, complex, or on a compressed schedule. | The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), partnering with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new satellite-based air traffic management system that will replace the current radar-based system and is expected to enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system by 2025. Concurrently, FAA continues to maintain and upgrade existing air traffic control (ATC) systems that will also be needed for NextGen. This involves acquiring and implementing new software and hardware. In 2012, GAO reviewed four major ATC programs in depth and found that FAA was not consistently following the characteristics...
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