Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are Needed
Highlights
Explosives represent a continuing threat to aviation security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), seeks to ensure through the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) that checked-baggage-screening technology is capable of detecting explosives. Generally, the explosives detection system (EDS) is used in conjunction with explosives trace detection (ETD) machines to identify and resolve threats in checked baggage. As requested, GAO assessed the extent to which: (1) TSA revised explosives detection requirements and deployed technology to meet those requirements, and (2) TSA's approach to the current EDS acquisition meets best practices for schedules and cost estimates and includes plans for potential upgrades of deployed EDSs. GAO analyzed EDS requirements, compared the EDS acquisition schedule against GAO best practices, and interviewed DHS officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2011.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
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Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that TSA takes a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to the procurement and deployment of EDSs that meet the 2010 EDS requirements and any subsequent revisions, the Assistant Secretary for TSA should develop a plan to ensure that screening devices or protocols are in place to resolve EDS alarms if EDSs are deployed that detect a broader set of explosives than existing ETD machines used to resolve EDS screening alarms. | We found that TSA had not developed new screening protocols or deployed additional equipment to address the potential gap in screening capability between explosive detection systems (EDS) and explosive trace detection (ETD) if new EDSs with different requirements were deployed. Because TSA decided to revise the explosives detection requirements for EDS's prior to revising the ETD requirements, the differences in the requirements may affect TSA's capability to detect the 2010-required levels until TSA identifies technologies or protocols needed to address the potential gap. Without a plan to ensure that secondary-screening devices or protocols are in place to resolve EDS alarms if EDSs... are deployed with additional capability, it will be difficult for TSA to provide assurances that the potential capability gap has been resolved. As a result, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to ensure that screening devices or protocols are in place to resolve EDS alarms if EDS are deployed that detect a broader set of explosives than existing ETD machines used to resolve EDS screening alarms. In April 2012, TSA reported that it had convened a working group to assess capability gaps for secondary screening technology, evaluate current technology capabilities against the capabilities of future EDS, and prepare a plan to procure any additional technology required to ensure alarms can be resolved. In March 2013, TSA reported that it was in the process of revising its Checked Baggage Alarm Resolution Plan and that the final plan will outline a strategy to procure technologies and implement procedures for enhanced detection at all levels of checked baggage screening, which TSA reported that it planned to finalize by the end of April 2013. To fully address this recommendation, TSA needed to finish developing the plan to ensure that devices or protocols are in place to resolve EDS alarms, and provide a copy of this plan to GAO for independent review. In November 2013, TSA issued an approved Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program. This document outlines a strategy designed to ensure that ETDs are capable of providing alarm resolutions for EDSs for threat detection levels through 2015 and discusses EDS alarm resolution approaches beyond 2015. The information in the LCCE satisfies the intent of the recommendation, which is now closed as implemented.
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Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that TSA takes a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to the procurement and deployment of EDSs that meet the 2010 EDS requirements and any subsequent revisions, the Assistant Secretary for TSA should develop a plan to ensure that TSA has the explosives data needed for each of the planned phases of the 2010 EDS requirements before starting the procurement process for new EDSs or upgrades included in each applicable phase. | We found that TSA has experienced a number of challenges related to collecting some explosives data needed to procure and deploy EDS's that meet the 2010 requirements. These data are needed both by vendors to develop EDS detection software and by the Transportation Security Laboratory for the certification testing process and includes such information as the physical and chemical properties of explosives. As a result, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to ensure that TSA has the explosives data needed for each of the planned phases of the 2010 EDS requirements before starting the procurement process for new EDS or upgrades included in each applicable phase. In April 2012, TSA...
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Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that TSA takes a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to the procurement and deployment of EDSs that meet the 2010 EDS requirements and any subsequent revisions, the Assistant Secretary for TSA should establish a process to communicate information to EDS vendors in a timely manner regarding TSA's EDS acquisition, including information such as changes to the schedule. | We found that vendors of Explosive Detection Systems (EDS's) reported concerns about the extent to which TSA is communicating effectively about the current procurement. Specifically, vendors expressed concerns about the timeliness in which TSA responded to their questions or the manner in which TSA communicated important schedule changes. As a result, we recommended that TSA establish a process to communicate information to EDS vendors in a timely manner regarding TSA's EDS acquisition process, including information such as changes to the schedule. In April 2012, TSA provided information on a number of actions it had taken to improve communication with EDS vendors. For example, TSA...
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Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that TSA takes a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to the procurement and deployment of EDSs that meet the 2010 EDS requirements and any subsequent revisions, the Assistant Secretary for TSA should develop and maintain an integrated master schedule for the entire Electronic Baggage Screening Program in accordance with the nine best practices identified by GAO for preparing a schedule. | We found that TSA did not have a schedule in place for the Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) and had not established a reliable schedule for the current Explosive Detection System (EDS) acquisition. While there is not an integrated master schedule (IMS) for the entire EBSP, TSA has established a schedule for the current EDS acquisition. However, this schedule did not fully comply with the nine best practices identified by GAO for preparing a schedule because, for example, TSA officials did not complete a schedule risk analysis. As a result, we recommended that TSA develop and maintain an integrated master schedule for the entire EBSP in accordance with the nine best practices identified...
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Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that TSA takes a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to the procurement and deployment of EDSs that meet the 2010 EDS requirements and any subsequent revisions, the Assistant Secretary for TSA should ensure that key elements of the program's final cost estimate reflect critical issues, such as the potential cost impacts resulting from schedule slippage identified once an integrated master schedule for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program has been developed in accordance with the nine best practices identified by GAO for preparing a schedule. | We found that TSA's Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) current life cycle cost estimate did not reflect anticipated costs for purchasing Explosive Detection Systems (EDS's) that met 2010 requirements. Specifically, the EBSP did not yet have an up-to-date approved life-cycle cost estimate in place, and as a result, DHS had no reliable basis for understanding how much the program will cost. As a result, we recommended that TSA ensure that key elements of the program's final cost estimate reflect critical issues, such as the potential cost impacts resulting from schedule slippage identified once an integrated master schedule for the EBSP has been developed in accordance with the nine best...
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Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that TSA takes a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to the procurement and deployment of EDSs that meet the 2010 EDS requirements and any subsequent revisions, the Assistant Secretary for TSA should develop a plan to deploy EDSs that meet the most recent EDS explosives-detection requirements and ensure that new machines, as well as machines deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels established in those requirements. This plan should include the estimated costs for new machines and upgrading deployed machines, and the time frames for procuring and deploying new machines and upgrading deployed machines. | We found that TSA did not have a plan in place outlining how it will upgrade deployed Explosive Detection Systems (EDS's) to fully meet the 2010 requirements. As noted in our report, not all deployed EDS units met these requirements. As a result, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to deploy EDS's that meets the most recent EDS explosives detection requirements and ensure that new machines, as well as machines deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels established in the 2010 requirements. Further, this plan should include the estimated costs for new machines and upgrading deployed machines, and the timeframes for procuring and deploying new machines and upgrading deployed...
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