Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened
Highlights
The State Department and two components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard, are responsible for preventing illegal immigration at U.S. seaports and identifying individuals who are potential security risks. The International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (ILO 185) to establish an international framework of seafarer identification documents and reduce their vulnerability to fraud and exploitation. GAO was asked to examine (1) measures federal agencies take to address risks posed by foreign seafarers and the challenges, if any, DHS faces; (2) the challenges, if any, DHS faces in tracking illegal entries by foreign seafarers and how it enforces penalties; and (3) the implementation status of ILO 185. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, interviewed federal and industry officials, and visited seven seaports based on volume of seafarer arrivals. The visits provided insights, but were not projectable to all seaports.
Federal agencies use a layered security strategy to address foreign seafarer risks, but opportunities exist to enhance DHS seafarer inspection methods. Federal actions include: (1) State Department screening of seafarer non-immigrant visa applicants overseas and (2) DHS advance screening of commercial vessels' seafarer manifests and admissibility inspections of all arriving seafarers. CBP conducts cargo vessel admissibility inspections on board the vessel without the benefit of tools to electronically verify a seafarer's identity or immigration status because of a lack of available connectivity to network communications in the maritime environment. DHS has prioritized the acquisition of a mobile version of this technology capability but expects it to take several years before the technology is developed and available. CBP agrees that obtaining this capability is important but has not assessed the risks of not having it. Until CBP obtains the capability, identifying the risks and options to address them could better position CBP in preventing illegal immigration at seaports. DHS faces challenges in ensuring it has reliable data on illegal entries by foreign seafarers at U.S. seaports and has not adjusted related civil monetary penalties. First, both CBP and Coast Guard track the frequency of absconder (a seafarer CBP has ordered detained on board a vessel in port, but who departs a vessel without permission) and deserter (a seafarer CBP grants permission to leave a vessel, but who does not return when required) incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably. The Coast Guard reported 73 percent more absconders and almost double the deserters compared to CBP for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. As a result, the data DHS uses to inform its strategic and tactical plans are of undetermined reliability. Second, CBP is responsible for imposing civil monetary penalties on vessel operators whose seafarers illegally enter the United States; however, as of December 2010, CBP and DOJ had not met legal requirements for adjusting the penalties for inflation. Officials reported taking steps to meet these requirements, but have not developed a plan with timelines for doing so. Such a plan would better position CBP and DOJ to demonstrate progress to comply with legal requirements. International implementation of ILO 185 has been limited--18 countries, representing 30 percent of the global seafarer supply, have ratified ILO 185--and key ILO mechanisms to promote compliance are not expected to be in place until later this year. As of January 2011, the United States had not ratified ILO 185 largely due to concerns over a provision for facilitating visa-free shore leave for foreign seafarers. Perspectives varied among the four federal agencies GAO interviewed within DHS and the departments of State, Transportation, and Labor. Within DHS, the Coast Guard reported that it supported U.S. ratification, while CBP stated that ILO 185's lack of oversight did not serve U.S. law enforcement interests. The U.S. has recently undertaken an interagency review to consider ratification but has no timeline for completion. GAO recommends that DHS assess risks of not electronically verifying cargo vessel seafarers for admissibility, identify reasons for absconder and deserter data variances, and, with the Department of Justice (DOJ), develop a plan with timelines to adjust civil monetary penalties for inflation. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Homeland Security | To facilitate better agency understanding of the potential need and feasibility of expanding electronic verification of seafarers, to improve data collection and sharing, and to comply with the Inflation Adjustment Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess the national-security and other risks faced by CBP in the absence of technology to provide electronic verification as part of CBP's admissibility inspections for cargo vessel seafarers and identify options for addressing these risks and their costs. |
In January 2011, we reported that opportunities exist for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance its seafarer inspection methods. We found that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was conducting on-board cargo vessel admissibility inspections without the benefit of tools to electronically verify a seafarer's identity or immigration status because of a lack of available connectivity to network communications in the maritime environment. Specifically, we found that CBP headquarters and officials from seven of eight CBP field units we visited reported that having mobile or portable technology to electronically verify the identity of seafarers would enhance their efforts to identify fraudulent documents and confirm immigration status. Three of these CBP field units had reported trying, generally without success, to use mobile technology with access to CBP data as a way to verify the identity of seafarers on-board cargo vessels. Moreover, according to guidance DHS issued in 2006 and 2008, DHS components should electronically verify all immigration status determinations, and in 2009 DHS prioritized the acquisition of a mobile version of this technology capability. However, DHS expected that it would take several years before the technology was developed and available for use by DHS agencies, such as CBP. CBP agreed that obtaining this capability was important but had not assessed the risks of not having it as part of its admissibility inspections for cargo vessel seafarers. We reported that until CBP obtained the capability, identifying the risks and options to address them could better position CBP to prevent illegal immigration at seaports. We recommended that DHS direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess the national-security and other risks faced by CBP in the absence of technology to provide electronic identification verification as part of CBP's admissibility inspections for cargo vessel seafarers and identify options for addressing these risks and their costs. DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that CBP would work in conjunction with the DHS Screening Coordination Office to determine parameters to measure and assess risks associated with the absence of technology for onboard vessel inspection of seafarers. On July 1, 2015, CBP requested that GAO close the recommendation and provided information describing the results of its assessment. According to a CBP issue paper outlining CBP's assessment of national security and risks faced by CBP in the absence of technology, CBP identified several risks, including a higher absconder rate and challenges in its ability to disseminate critical data about seafarers among CBP offices, the Coast Guard, and other law enforcement agencies. CBP also identified options to address these risks and found that using mobile technology was a feasible corrective action. CBP reported that it had made enhancements to its web-based, automated targeting system to accommodate CBP officers' use of mobile devices during on-board seafarer admissibility inspections. Among other things, CBP reported that these enhancements have allowed CBP officers to monitor the seafarer's temporary landing and detain on board status and share the information with the Coast Guard. CBP also reported testing and deploying mobile devices with secured remote access capabilities for on-board vessel processing. In a pilot program, CBP reported that it had deployed 32 ruggedized mobile tablets to CBP officers for use across 16 domestic seaports to test the new capabilities. Based on the success of this pilot, CBP reports that it may deploy the tablets across all domestic seaport locations in fiscal years 2016 and 2017. This action is consistent with the intent of our recommendation.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To facilitate better agency understanding of the potential need and feasibility of expanding electronic verification of seafarers, to improve data collection and sharing, and to comply with the Inflation Adjustment Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard and Commissioner of CBP to determine the reasons that absconder and deserter data varies between headquarters and field units, and between the Coast Guard and CBP and determine any actions necessary to address any variance. |
In our January 2011 maritime security report, we reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faced challenges in ensuring it had reliable data on illegal entries by foreign seafarers at U.S. seaports. In particular, two DHS agencies, CBP and the Coast Guard, track the frequency of absconder (a seafarer CBP has ordered on board a vessel in port, but who departs a vessel without permission) and deserter (a seafarer CBP grants permission to leave a vessel, but who does not return when required) incidents at U.S. seaports. However, we found that the two agency's records of these incidents varied considerably. For example, the Coast Guard reported 73 percent more absconders and almost double the deserters compared to CBP for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. Agency officials were unable to fully explain why their respective data varied so considerably. As a result, we found the data DHS uses to inform its strategic and tactical plans for seafarer security were of undetermined reliability. In accordance with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, we recommended DHS direct CBP and the Coast Guard to determine the reasons that absconder and deserter data varies between headquarters and field units, and between the Coast Guard and CBP. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that CBP and the Coast Guard would begin to assess the appropriate offices within each component involved in the review and to establish a working group to evaluate the current reporting process within each component, and between CBP and the Coast Guard. In December 2012, CBP and Coast Guard officials requested GAO close this recommendation, reporting that they had taken action to determine the causes for the absconder and deserter data variances and determined actions necessary to address them. For example, according to a CBP memorandum dated April 2011, CBP requested that each of its field offices with seaport operations provide their respective data on absconder and deserter counts for fiscal years 2009 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. The officials developed an excel table to analyze the data collected from the field offices, and in May 2012, CBP and Coast Guard subject matter experts reportedly began collaborating to analyze their data. CBP reported that CBP and Coast Guard subject matter experts reported that they had identified multiple variables that could lend to the discrepancy in reporting data including differences in the geographic boundaries for a particular region, a difference in definitions for absconders/deserters both internal to CBP and between CBP and USCG, and the method in which the data was recorded and subsequently pulled for reporting purposes. Officials reported that CBP and the Coast Guard determined that the best approach to address the cause of the absconder and deserter variances was to develop and issue a joint CBP/Coast Guard Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to field units. In August 2013, CBP and Coast Guard officials reported that efforts to develop this MOA were underway. This action is consistent with the intent of our recommendation.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To facilitate better agency understanding of the potential need and feasibility of expanding electronic verification of seafarers, to improve data collection and sharing, and to comply with the Inflation Adjustment Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard and Commissioner of CBP to jointly establish an interagency process for sharing and reconciling records of absconder and deserter incidents occurring at U.S. seaports. |
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with the recommendation and noted that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard would each begin to assess the appropriate offices to be involved and establish a working group to evaluate the reporting process within each component, and between CBP and Coast Guard. Further, DHS noted that it was working to collocate the Coast Guard's ICC Coastwatch and CBP's National Targeting Center-Passenger in an effort to eliminate the absconder-and deserter- reporting inconsistencies GAO identified. In January 2013, CBP and Coast Guard officials reported they found that multiple factors had likely contributed to the data variances, including differences in definitions for absconders/deserters and the methods used by field units for reporting absconder and deserter incidents. CBP and Coast Guard officials stated they planned to develop an interagency memorandum of agreement (MOA) for reporting absconder and deserter incidents, to be implemented by November 30, 2013. Then, in July 2014, CBP described a new process in place for interagency data reconciliation in lieu of the interagency MOA with the Coast Guard. In December 2015, CBP reported that it expected to complete the effort by March 2016 and then later changed the completion date to September 2016. CBP officials reported that the Coast Guard and CBP determined that the absconder data variances were caused by the agencies using different reporting criteria. CBP and the Coast Guard began to prepare a memo and guidance for field units to be implemented by the end of December 2016. In December 2016, CBP reported it had drafted a memo to coincide with new Coast Guard procedure for conducting asymmetric migration vetting and deconfliction. CBP was also working to require all ports of entry to report all maritime asymmetric migration events directly to Coastwatch. However, on October 18, 2016, the DHS Deputy Secretary issued Department Policy Regarding Investigative Data and Event Deconfliction Policy Directive 045-04 that sets forth DHS policy for investigative data and event deconfliction in the course of certain law enforcement activity. As a result of the Directive, CBP was to develop and implement related policy, by January 17, 2017. The policy was to focus on more effective coordination of investigative activity to ensure officer safety by identifying links between ongoing criminal investigations. The Policy also requires that CBP components, at a minimum, conduct deconfliction thru the Deconfliction and Information Coordination Endeavor, Regional Information Sharing Systems Officer Safety Event Deconfliction System, Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network or Case Explorer systems. CBP and the Coast Guard are considering a directive which makes it a port responsibility to deconflict case related information. The timeline for drafting and finalizing that directive was to be early 2017. The timeline changed several times. In September 2017, CBP reported that it had not completed the effort, but aimed to do so in the coming months. On March 8, 2018, CBP and Coast Guard officials reported CBP and the Coast Guard were unable to implement the recommendation and requested GAO close it as not-implemented. As a result, and given the passage of time, this recommendation is closed as not implemented.
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| Department of Justice | To facilitate better agency understanding of the potential need and feasibility of expanding electronic verification of seafarers, to improve data collection and sharing, and to comply with the Inflation Adjustment Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States should develop a plan with timelines for issuing regulations, as required by the Inflation Adjustment Act, to adjust civil monetary penalties associated with violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act involving foreign seafarers gaining illegal entry into the United States and provide this plan to Congress. |
On December 1, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a joint final rule: Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment. Effective January 3, 2012, this final rule amended DHS regulations to adjust for inflation certain civil monetary penalties assessed under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including those involving foreign seafarers. This action is consistent with the intent of our recommendation.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To facilitate better agency understanding of the potential need and feasibility of expanding electronic verification of seafarers, to improve data collection and sharing, and to comply with the Inflation Adjustment Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States should develop a plan with timelines for issuing regulations, as required by the Inflation Adjustment Act, to adjust civil monetary penalties associated with violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act involving foreign seafarers gaining illegal entry into the United States and provide this plan to Congress. |
We found that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had not met legal requirements for adjusting civil monetary penalties associated with violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) involving foreign seafarers gaining illegal entry into the United States. We reported that because CBP had not raised its penalties in over a decade, it had not exercised the full scope of its enforcement authority with respect to civil monetary penalties. CBP and DOJ share responsibility for issuing regulations pertaining to these civil penalties--with DHS responsible for drafting and initiating development of the regulation, enforcing the law, and imposing civil penalties. We recommended that DHS and DOJ develop a plan with timelines for issuing regulations, as required by the Inflation Adjustment Act, to adjust civil monetary penalties associated with violations of the INA involving foreign seafarers. In response, on December 1, 2011, DHS and DOJ issued a joint final rule: Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment. Effective January 3, 2012, this final rule amended DHS regulations to adjust for inflation certain civil monetary penalties assessed under the INA, including those involving foreign seafarers. This action is consistent with the intent of our recommendation.
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