Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges
GAO-10-128
Published: Oct 07, 2009. Publicly Released: Oct 29, 2009.
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Highlights
Since fiscal year 2002, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have invested over $795 million in technologies to screen passengers at airport checkpoints. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is responsible, with TSA, for researching and developing technologies, and TSA deploys them. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which (1) TSA used a risk-based strategy to prioritize technology investments; (2) DHS researched, developed, and deployed new technologies, and why deployment of the explosives trace portal (ETP) was halted; and (3) DHS coordinated research and development efforts with key stakeholders. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed DHS and TSA plans and documents, conducted site visits to research laboratories and nine airports, and interviewed agency officials, airport operators, and technology vendors.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should conduct a complete risk assessment, including threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, which would apply to the Passenger Screening Program (PSP). | In October 2009, we reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had completed a strategic plan to guide research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies; however, the plan was not risk-based. Specifically, the strategic plan and its underlying strategy for the Passenger Screening Program (PSP) were developed using risk information, such as threat information, but were not based on the three elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence. We recommended that TSA conduct a complete risk assessment, including threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, which would apply to the PSP. TSA concurred and, in response,... initiated approaches to identify risks at both the strategic and detailed level. At the strategic level, in March 2010, TSA updated its Aviation Modal Risk Assessment (AMRA), previously called the Aviation Domain Risk Assessment, which includes a comprehensive threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment of the risk of a terrorist attack on the international and domestic aviation system. TSA has indicated that it will use AMRA to inform its PSP. At a more detailed level, TSA developed a simulation model that can be used to model specific risk scenarios and risk-reduction potential of specific technologies or other countermeasures. According to TSA, the tool will allow the agency to perform analysis at a level not previously available while not disrupting real world checkpoint operations. TSA indicated that the outputs of this tool are being used to inform the strategic planning and research and development processes. This recommendation is closed as implemented.
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| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should develop cost-benefit analyses to assist in prioritizing investments in new checkpoint screening technologies. | In October 2009, we reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had not completed a cost-benefit analysis to prioritize and fund the Passenger Screening Program's (PSP) priorities for investing in checkpoint technologies, as required by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan's (NIPP) risk management framework. At the time of our report, TSA had not developed life-cycle cost estimates of each screening technology the PSP is developing, procuring, or deploying, and could not provide us with information on their priorities for the research and development of checkpoint screening technologies or the processes they followed to develop these priorities. We recommended...
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| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should develop quantifiable performance measures to assess the extent to which investments in research, development, and deployment of checkpoint screening technologies achieve performance goals for enhancing security at airport passenger checkpoints. | We reported in October 2009 that the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) strategy for the Passenger Screening Program (PSP) did not have a mechanism - such as performance measures or other evaluation methods - to monitor, assess, or test the extent to which investments in new checkpoint technologies reduce or mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks. We recommended that TSA develop quantifiable performance measures to assess the extent to which investments in research, development, and deployment of checkpoint screening technologies achieve performance goals for enhancing security at airport passenger checkpoints. TSA concurred and, in March 2011, told us that all major...
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| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should, after conducting a complete risk assessment and completing cost-benefit analyses and quantifiable performance measures for the PSP, incorporate the results of these efforts into the PSP strategy as determined appropriate. | We reported in October 2009 that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) completed a strategic plan to guide research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies; however, the plan was not risk-based. According to TSA officials, the strategic plan and its underlying strategy for the Passenger Screening Program (PSP) were developed using risk information, such as threat information. However, the strategic plan and its underlying strategy did not reflect some of the key risk management principles set forth in DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), such as conducting a risk assessment based on the three elements of risk--threat,...
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| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should, to the extent feasible, ensure that operational tests and evaluations have been successfully completed before deploying checkpoint screening technologies to airport checkpoints. | In October 2009, we reported that although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had tested earlier models of the explosives trace portal (ETP), the models ultimately chosen were not operationally tested before they were deployed to ensure they demonstrated effective performance in an operational environment. We recommended that TSA, to the extent feasible, ensure that technologies have completed operational tests and evaluations before they are deployed. TSA concurred with the recommendation and has taken actions to address it. For example, TSA implemented a test and evaluation process for all of its technology procurements in accordance with the Department of Homeland...
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| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should evaluate whether TSA's current passenger screening procedures should be revised to require the use of appropriate screening procedures until it is determined that existing emerging technologies meet their functional requirements in an operational environment. | In October 2009, we reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had relied on technologies in day-to-day airport operations that had not been demonstrated to meet their functional requirements in an operational environment. For example, TSA substituted existing screening procedures with screening by the Whole Body Imager (later known as Advanced Imaging Technology) even though its performance had not yet been validated by testing in an operational environment. We recommended that TSA evaluate whether current passenger screening procedures should be revised to require the use of appropriate screening procedures until TSA determined that existing emerging technologies...
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| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should, in the future, prior to testing or using all checkpoint screening technologies at airports, determine whether TSA's passenger screening procedures should be revised to require the use of appropriate screening procedures until the performance of the technologies has been validated through successful testing and evaluation. | In October 2009, we reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had relied on technologies in day-to-day airport operations that had not been demonstrated to meet their functional requirements in an operational environment. For example, TSA substituted existing screening procedures with screening by the Whole Body Imager (now known as Advanced Imaging Technology) even though its performance had not yet been validated by testing in an operational environment. We recommended that TSA should, in the future, prior to testing or using all checkpoint screening technologies at airports, determine whether TSA's passenger screening procedures should be revised to require the...
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| Transportation Security Administration | To help ensure that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk-informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA should valuate the benefits of the Explosives Trace Portals that are being used in airports, and compare the benefits to the costs to operate and maintain this technology to determine whether it is cost-effective to continue to use the machines in airports. | In October 2009, we reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) procured and deployed explosives trace portal equipment even though TSA officials were aware that earlier tests did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. We recommended that TSA conduct an evaluation and determine whether it was cost effective to continue to use these machines. TSA concurred with this recommendation and later halted further deployment of these machines due to performance, maintenance, and installation problems. As of April 2011, TSA reported and provided documented evidence that it had removed from airports all 101 machines that it had deployed. This...
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AirlinesAirport securityAirportsAviationAviation securityCommercial aviationCost analysisExplosivesExplosives detection systemsExplosives trace detectionHomeland securityPassenger screeningPerformance measuresProcurementResearch and developmentRisk assessmentRisk managementStrategic planningTechnologyTransportation security