2010 Resubmission of the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Further Actions Needed by State and Other Agencies to Improve the Review of the Classified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Highlights
On May 10, 2010, the President resubmitted to Congress a proposed Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (henceforth referred to as the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement or the agreement) in accordance with the review requirements established under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended. The proposed agreement with Russia would, among other things, establish the legal basis for the Department of Energy (DOE) to work with Russia on large-scale development of nuclear energy. The United States has 25 agreements in force for peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Taiwan. Such agreements provide the framework and authorization for civilian nuclear cooperation but do not guarantee that cooperation will take place or that nuclear material or technology transfers will occur. On May 13, 2008, President Bush originally submitted the agreement to Congress with the statutorily required presidential determination that this agreement would promote, and would not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. President Bush determined on September 8, 2008 that his May 13, 2008 determination was no longer effective--essentially ending further congressional consideration of the agreement at that time--in response to Russian military actions against Georgia. In 2010, President Obama concluded that the situation in Georgia no longer prevented proceeding with the agreement and that the level and scope of U.S.-Russia cooperation on Iran justified resubmitting the agreement. Section 123 of the AEA identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement, with the technical assistance and concurrence of DOE. State must consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is State's consistent practice to send the proposed agreement and accompanying documents to the Department of Defense (DOD) for review. This report responds to congressional request that we assess the review process for the 2010 submission of the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement. Our objectives were to assess the extent to which (1) agencies reported having adequate time to review the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and classified annexes, (2) State implemented our recommendations to develop written procedures and clarify agency roles for the 2010 review process, and (3) additional actions may be required to strengthen the review process for future nuclear cooperation agreements.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
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Office of the Director of National Intelligence | The Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence should ensure adequate time for consultation (to be determined by State and its partner agencies) with all parties that participate in the review of a nuclear cooperation agreement prior to its submission to the President and Congress. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy (DOE). State must consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is State's consistent practice to send the proposed agreement and accompanying documents to the Department of Defense (DOD) for review. State ensured adequate time for consultations with DOE, NRC, and DOD for the two nuclear cooperation agreements [Vietnam and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] submitted since the 2010 U.S.-Russia agreement. Specifically: (1) DOE officials said that the AEA's requirement that the Secretary of Energy sign every nuclear cooperation agreement before it is provided to the President ensures adequate time. DOE's interpretation of the AEA meets the intent of our recommendation; (2) DOD officials said that they had no negative issues/involvement with the Vietnam and IAEA agreements but have no data on whether adequate time was provided. Given that DOD officials did not identify lack of consultation time as a problem during the interagency review process, State provided DOD with adequate time for consultation; (3) Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said that State provided them with adequate time for consultation during the review process for the Vietnam and IAEA agreements. Section 123 of the AEA also requires that State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to ensure the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) had adequate time during the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of Energy | The Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence should ensure adequate time for consultation (to be determined by State and its partner agencies) with all parties that participate in the review of a nuclear cooperation agreement prior to its submission to the President and Congress. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy (DOE). State must consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is State's consistent practice to send the proposed agreement and accompanying documents to the Department of Defense (DOD) for review. State ensured adequate time for consultations with DOE, NRC, and DOD for the two nuclear cooperation agreements [Vietnam and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] submitted since the 2010 U.S.-Russia agreement. Specifically: (1) DOE officials said that the AEA's requirement that the Secretary of Energy sign every nuclear cooperation agreement before it is provided to the President ensures adequate time. DOE's interpretation of the AEA meets the intent of our recommendation; (2) DOD officials said that they had no negative issues/involvement with the Vietnam and IAEA agreements but have no data on whether adequate time was provided. Given that DOD officials did not identify lack of consultation time as a problem during the interagency review process, State provided DOD with adequate time for consultation; (3) Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said that State provided them with adequate time for consultation during the review process for the Vietnam and IAEA agreements. Section 123 of the AEA also requires that State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to ensure the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) had adequate time during the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of State | The Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence should ensure adequate time for consultation (to be determined by State and its partner agencies) with all parties that participate in the review of a nuclear cooperation agreement prior to its submission to the President and Congress. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy (DOE). State must consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is State's consistent practice to send the proposed agreement and accompanying documents to the Department of Defense (DOD) for review. State ensured adequate time for consultations with DOE, NRC, and DOD for the two nuclear cooperation agreements [Vietnam and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] submitted since the 2010 U.S.-Russia agreement. Specifically: (1) DOE officials said that the AEA's requirement that the Secretary of Energy sign every nuclear cooperation agreement before it is provided to the President ensures adequate time. DOE's interpretation of the AEA meets the intent of our recommendation; (2) DOD officials said that they had no negative issues/involvement with the Vietnam and IAEA agreements but have no data on whether adequate time was provided. Given that DOD officials did not identify lack of consultation time as a problem during the interagency review process, State provided DOD with adequate time for consultation; (3) Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said that State provided them with adequate time for consultation during the review process for the Vietnam and IAEA agreements. Section 123 of the AEA also requires that State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to ensure the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) had adequate time during the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission | The Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence should ensure adequate time for consultation (to be determined by State and its partner agencies) with all parties that participate in the review of a nuclear cooperation agreement prior to its submission to the President and Congress. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy (DOE). State must consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is State's consistent practice to send the proposed agreement and accompanying documents to the Department of Defense (DOD) for review. State ensured adequate time for consultations with DOE, NRC, and DOD for the two nuclear cooperation agreements [Vietnam and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] submitted since the 2010 U.S.-Russia agreement. Specifically: (1) DOE officials said that the AEA's requirement that the Secretary of Energy sign every nuclear cooperation agreement before it is provided to the President ensures adequate time. DOE's interpretation of the AEA meets the intent of our recommendation; (2) DOD officials said that they had no negative issues/involvement with the Vietnam and IAEA agreements but have no data on whether adequate time was provided. Given that DOD officials did not identify lack of consultation time as a problem during the interagency review process, State provided DOD with adequate time for consultation; (3) Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said that State provided them with adequate time for consultation during the review process for the Vietnam and IAEA agreements. Section 123 of the AEA also requires that State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to ensure the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) had adequate time during the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of State | The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that ensure appropriate consideration of any conflicting views from interagency partners about the proposed agreement and its accompanying documents prior to the submission to the President. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement. In August 2010, State developed procedures to manage the interagency process by which nuclear cooperation agreements and accompanying documentation are developed, reviewed, and transmitted. As of August 2014, State had not updated the existing August 2010 procedures because, according to State officials, the existing procedures and interagency review process are sufficient to address any potential conflicting views about a proposed agreement.
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Department of Energy | The the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that ensure appropriate consideration of any conflicting views from interagency partners about the proposed agreement and its accompanying documents prior to the submission to the President. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement. In August 2010, State developed procedures to manage the interagency process by which nuclear cooperation agreements and accompanying documentation are developed, reviewed, and transmitted. As of August 2014, State had not updated the existing August 2010 procedures because, according to State officials, the existing procedures and interagency review process are sufficient to address any potential conflicting views about a proposed agreement.
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Office of the Director of National Intelligence | The the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that ensure appropriate consideration of any conflicting views from interagency partners about the proposed agreement and its accompanying documents prior to the submission to the President. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement. In August 2010, State developed procedures to manage the interagency process by which nuclear cooperation agreements and accompanying documentation are developed, reviewed, and transmitted. As of August 2014, State had not updated the existing August 2010 procedures because, according to State officials, the existing procedures and interagency review process are sufficient to address any potential conflicting views about a proposed agreement.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission | The the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that ensure appropriate consideration of any conflicting views from interagency partners about the proposed agreement and its accompanying documents prior to the submission to the President. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement. In August 2010, State developed procedures to manage the interagency process by which nuclear cooperation agreements and accompanying documentation are developed, reviewed, and transmitted. As of August 2014, State had not updated the existing August 2010 procedures because, according to State officials, the existing procedures and interagency review process are sufficient to address any potential conflicting views about a proposed agreement.
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Department of Defense | The the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that ensure appropriate consideration of any conflicting views from interagency partners about the proposed agreement and its accompanying documents prior to the submission to the President. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement. In August 2010, State developed procedures to manage the interagency process by which nuclear cooperation agreements and accompanying documentation are developed, reviewed, and transmitted. As of August 2014, State had not updated the existing August 2010 procedures because, according to State officials, the existing procedures and interagency review process are sufficient to address any potential conflicting views about a proposed agreement.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission | The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that clarify the role and responsibilities of ODNI and the intelligence agencies involved in reviewing every future NPAS and its classified annex(es) and provide that the relevant members of the intelligence community review the final NPAS and its classified annex(es) prior to any agreement's submission to the President and Congress, unless the members of the intelligence community determine that such a review is not needed. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that the Department of State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to clarify the role and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the intelligence agencies involved in the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of State | The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that clarify the role and responsibilities of ODNI and the intelligence agencies involved in reviewing every future NPAS and its classified annex(es) and provide that the relevant members of the intelligence community review the final NPAS and its classified annex(es) prior to any agreement's submission to the President and Congress, unless the members of the intelligence community determine that such a review is not needed. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that the Department of State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to clarify the role and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the intelligence agencies involved in the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of Defense | The the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that clarify the role and responsibilities of ODNI and the intelligence agencies involved in reviewing every future NPAS and its classified annex(es) and provide that the relevant members of the intelligence community review the final NPAS and its classified annex(es) prior to any agreement's submission to the President and Congress, unless the members of the intelligence community determine that such a review is not needed. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that the Department of State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to clarify the role and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the intelligence agencies involved in the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Office of the Director of National Intelligence | The the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that clarify the role and responsibilities of ODNI and the intelligence agencies involved in reviewing every future NPAS and its classified annex(es) and provide that the relevant members of the intelligence community review the final NPAS and its classified annex(es) prior to any agreement's submission to the President and Congress, unless the members of the intelligence community determine that such a review is not needed. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that the Department of State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to clarify the role and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the intelligence agencies involved in the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of Defense | The Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence should ensure adequate time for consultation (to be determined by State and its partner agencies) with all parties that participate in the review of a nuclear cooperation agreement prior to its submission to the President and Congress. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) identifies the key U.S. government agencies and procedures involved in negotiating, proposing, and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy (DOE). State must consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is State's consistent practice to send the proposed agreement and accompanying documents to the Department of Defense (DOD) for review. State ensured adequate time for consultations with DOE, NRC, and DOD for the two nuclear cooperation agreements [Vietnam and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] submitted since the 2010 U.S.-Russia agreement. Specifically: (1) DOE officials said that the AEA's requirement that the Secretary of Energy sign every nuclear cooperation agreement before it is provided to the President ensures adequate time. DOE's interpretation of the AEA meets the intent of our recommendation; (2) DOD officials said that they had no negative issues/involvement with the Vietnam and IAEA agreements but have no data on whether adequate time was provided. Given that DOD officials did not identify lack of consultation time as a problem during the interagency review process, State provided DOD with adequate time for consultation; (3) Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said that State provided them with adequate time for consultation during the review process for the Vietnam and IAEA agreements. Section 123 of the AEA also requires that State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to ensure the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) had adequate time during the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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Department of Energy | The the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National Intelligence, should take steps to strengthen the written procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements. Specifically, these procedures should contain provisions that clarify the role and responsibilities of ODNI and the intelligence agencies involved in reviewing every future NPAS and its classified annex(es) and provide that the relevant members of the intelligence community review the final NPAS and its classified annex(es) prior to any agreement's submission to the President and Congress, unless the members of the intelligence community determine that such a review is not needed. |
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that the Department of State supply the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) for each proposed agreement, accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS explains how the agreement meets the AEA's nonproliferation requirements. Congress took action to clarify the role and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the intelligence agencies involved in the NPAS review process. Specifically, Section 305 of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into law in January 2012) requires that ODNI prepare an Intelligence Community Addendum to each NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters. The Senate report accompanying the act said that the new role for ODNI is an effort to mitigate the GAO-identified problems and ensure that Intelligence Community concerns are more fully incorporated into each NPAS. This congressional action meets the intent of our recommendation.
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