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Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List

GAO-08-110 Published: Oct 11, 2007. Publicly Released: Oct 24, 2007.
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Highlights

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. Because the list is an important tool for combating terrorism, GAO examined (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Homeland Security In order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening processes, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the FBI should assess to what extent there are vulnerabilities in the current screening processes that arise when screening agencies do not accept relevant records due to the designs of their computer systems, the extent to which these vulnerabilities pose a security risk, and what actions, if any, should be taken in response.
Closed – Implemented
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses portions of the watchlist to screen the names of passengers to identify those who may pose threats to aviation. In our October 2007 terrorist watchlist report, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assess to what extent security risks exist by not screening airline passengers against more watchlist records and what actions, if any, should be taken in response. DHS generally agreed with...
Federal Bureau of Investigation In order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening processes, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the FBI should assess to what extent there are vulnerabilities in the current screening processes that arise when screening agencies do not accept relevant records due to the designs of their computer systems, the extent to which these vulnerabilities pose a security risk, and what actions, if any, should be taken in response.
Closed – Implemented
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. Screening against applicable watchlist records can occur anywhere in the nation when, for example, state or local law enforcement officers stop individuals for traffic violations or other offenses. We reported that screening agencies do not check against all watchlist records because certain records (1) may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission, (2) may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals...
Department of Homeland Security To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness the Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private sector entities, develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to support private sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security, as called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6.
Closed – Implemented
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop guidelines to govern the use of terrorist watchlist records to support private sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security. We reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had made progress in using watchlist records to screen employees in some critical infrastructure components of the private sector, but many critical infrastructure components were not using watchlist records. The intent of the guidelines to support private sector screening was to establish basic mechanisms and rules for voluntary screening of individuals in the private sector...
Department of Homeland Security To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness the Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening as called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-11 (HSPD-11), which among other things, (a) identifies all appropriate screening opportunities to use watch list records to detect, identify, track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to homeland security and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties.
Closed – Implemented
In our October 2007 watchlist report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of appropriate federal departments and agencies, develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening. Among other things, the report was to (a) identify all appropriate screening opportunities to use watchlist records to detect, identify, track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to homeland security and (b) safeguard legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties. We noted that such a...
Department of Homeland Security To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness the Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation plan that describes the scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary for implementing a terrorist-related screening strategy, as called for in HSPD-11.
Closed – Implemented
In our 2007 watchlist report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation plan that describes the scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary for implementing a terrorist-related screening strategy. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently led an interagency effort to provide the president with this implementation plan, which was included as part of its...
Homeland Security Council To help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have the oversight, accountability, and guidance necessary to achieve the Administration's vision of a comprehensive and coordinated approach, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism should ensure that the governance structure proposed by the plan affords clear and adequate responsibility and authority to (a) provide monitoring and analysis of watch list screening efforts governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward intended outcomes.
Closed – Implemented
We recommended that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the governance structure for terrorism-related screening proposed by DHS affords clear and adequate responsibility and authority to (a) provide monitoring and analysis of watchlist screening efforts governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward intended outcomes. This recommendation was intended to help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have the oversight, accountability, and guidance necessary to achieve the Administration's vision of a comprehensive and coordinated approach. Subsequently, DHS proposed a...

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CounterterrorismEmergency preparednessFederal agenciesFederal intelligence agenciesHomeland securityInteragency relationsInvestigations by federal agenciesLaw enforcement agenciesPassenger screeningRecordsRecords managementRisk assessmentStandardsStrategic planningTerrorism