Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat

In its February 2004 comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would consider each of GAO's recommendations as part of the Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. In addition, in its specific comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would explore procedures to incorporate the evaluation of increased Security Condition (SECON) levels into its vulnerability assessments. Subsequently,in his April 27, 2004, testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform, the Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance stated that DOE sites were now engaging in employing DOE's rigorous vulnerability assessment methodology to evaluate every aspect of their protective systems, including the the additional measures required to implement enhanced Security Conditions (SECONs). Subsequently, DOE issued a congressionally mandated report in June 2006, that described the actions DOE was taking to implement the Design Basis Threat and to improve security through the deployment of technology and improved protective forces. DOE's new Vulnerability Assessment methodology, which was fully implemented in 2006, takes into account and assesses probability of detection and neutralization for each of the multiple layers of security at DOE nuclear sites. This new methodology captures the effects of SECONs, most of which are implemented in the outer layers (perimeter) of security.

In its February 2004 comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would consider each of GAO's recommendations as part of the Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. More specifically, in his April 27, 2004, testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform, the Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance stated that while he believed the rationale used to develop the DBT was sound and the appropriate approach, he was directing that DOE review this process to determine if this is still the best approach and if there was more DOE should be doing in this area. Since the report was issued, DOE has issued revised DBTs in 2004 and 2005 as well as issued updated implementation guidance in 2004, 2005, and 2007. After determining that DOE's policy-making approach was ill-suited to the post 9/11 security environment, new DBTs and associated guidance have been issued as directives by the Deputy Secretary of Energy instead of going through DOE's arduous policy making process.

In its February 2004 comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would consider each of GAO's recommendations as part of the Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. More recently, the Secretary of Energy directed the NNSA Administrator and the Directors of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and the Office of Intelligence to reexamine the Design Basis Threat. In his April 27, 2004, testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform, the Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance stated that this action was being taken as the result of GAO's report. In a June 22, 2004, testimony before the same subcommittee, the Director stated that the review was evaluating protection strategies for special nuclear material that may be of improvised nuclear device concerns. The work was completed by August 6, 2004.

In its February 2004 comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would consider each of GAO's recommendations as part of the Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. More recently, the Secretary of Energy directed the NNSA Administrator and the Directors of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and the Office of Intelligence to reexamine the Design Basis Threat. In his April 27, 2004, testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform, the Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance stated that this action was being taken as the result of GAO's report. In a June 22, 2004, testimony before the same subcommittee, the Director stated that the review was evaluating radiological, chemical and biological sabotage criteria. The work is expected to be completed by August 6, 2004.

In its February 2004 comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would consider each of GAO's recommendations as part of the Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. DOE has now implemented its vulnerability assessment (VA) methodology. DOE has incorporated this methodology in its 470 series of Order and Manuals and has also developed a variety of technical documents and guides. In addition, DOE's National Training Center, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, has developed and currently teaches six VA training classes for VA analysts as well as two VA orientation classes for security managers. DOE completed its review of improvised nuclear device (IND) concerns in early 2004, and as a result, in April 2004 issued far-reaching and immediate orders to enhance the security at its sites with Category I SNM. This guidance was later codified its DOE's 2004 and 2005 Design Basis Threat (DBT) policies. DOE's National labs have continued to study and refine their knowledge of the IND issue and additional clarifying guidance is expected to be issued in DOE's new 2008 DBT.

In its February 2004 comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would consider each of GAO's recommendations as part of the Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. DOE has substantially implemented this recommendation through a series of actions, including: (1) requiring each of its sites to develop DBT implementation plans that include funding requirements; (2) requiring sites and program offices to deliver quarterly progress reports on progress against these plans to the Deputy Secretary of Energy; (3) managing DBT implementation plans on project basis; (4) issuing new guidance on protective force policies in 2006 (DOE Policy Manual, 470.3-4, Protective Force) that creates a framework for a new tactical response force that can be tailored to individual DOE sites; (5) creating, funding, and sustaining a security technology deployment program that is recognized by DOE program offices and NNSA as valuable; (6) In 2005, DOE chartered the Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee to study and plan for the consolidation of DOE's inventory of special nuclear material at fewer sites and the permanent disposition of material it no longer needs. The committee developed a draft strategic plan that will serve as a high level out-year planning document for DOE's program offices to follow in their budgeting ad project planning. The committee is also developing implementation plans will analyze viable alternatives and cost estimates associated with consolidating and disposing of special nuclear material. The implementation plans were completed by December 31, 2008. Committee minutes identify the Office of Secure Transportation as the entity responsible for transporting special nuclear materials during DOE's consolidation and disposal efforts. Although these efforts have never been fully brought together into a single, integrated plan, they have brought much greater transparency to DBT implementation efforts, so that any mismatches between budgets, plans, and policies are often readily apparent. Taken together, they fulfill the intent of our recommendation.

In its February 2004 comments on GAO's report, DOE stated that it would consider each of GAO's recommendations as part of the Departmental Management Challenges for 2004. As part of the revised 2004 DBT, DOE required that all sites submit detailed quarterly DBT implementation plans and progress reports to the Deputy Secretary of Energy for review and approval. PL 109-1163, required DOE to submit a report to Congress detailing DBT implementation schedules, costs, and levels of risk, among other things. DOE submitted this report in June 2006, and GAO completed its review of this report in June 2007. In this report, DOE sites not meeting DBT implementation deadlines, and listed incremental annual reductions in risk until the DBT was fully implemented. Deviations from the DBT implementation also require the approval of the Secretary of Energy.