Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges
GAO-04-385
Published: Feb 13, 2004. Publicly Released: Feb 13, 2004.
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Highlights
The security of U.S. commercial aviation is a long-standing concern, and substantial efforts have been undertaken to strengthen it. One of these efforts is the development of a new Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) to identify passengers requiring additional security attention. The development of CAPPS II has raised a number of issues, including whether individuals may be inappropriately targeted for additional screening, and whether data accessed by the system may compromise passengers' privacy. GAO was asked to determine (1) the development status and plans for CAPPS II; (2) the status of CAPPS II in addressing key developmental, operational, and public acceptance issues; and (3) other challenges that could impede the successful implementation of the system.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Transportation Security Administration | To address the challenges associated with the development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to develop plans identifying the specific functionality that will be delivered during each increment of CAPPS II, the specific milestones for delivering this functionality, and expected costs for each increment. |
TSA terminated the CAPPS II program in August 2005 due, in part, to GAO's work highlighting critical deficiencies in the program. In September 2005, TSA announced a successor program, Secure Fight, that is more narrowly focused on developing a system to match the names of passengers on domestic flights against the No Fly and Selectee Lists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. As part of implementing Secure Flight, TSA is in the process of defining the specific requirements for the name matching system, establishing a schedule for developing and implementing the program, and projecting program costs.
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| Transportation Security Administration | To address the challenges associated with the development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to use established plans to track development progress to ensure that promised functionality is being delivered on time and within established cost estimates. |
TSA terminated the CAPPS II program in August 2005 due, in part, to GAO's work highlighting critical deficiencies in the program. In September 2005, TSA announced a successor program, Secure Fight, that is more narrowly focused on developing a system to match the names of passengers on domestic flights against the No Fly and Selectee Lists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. As part of implementing Secure Flight, TSA has established plans to track the development of the name-matching system to help ensure that it is delivered in a timely manner within its cost constraints.
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| Transportation Security Administration | To address the challenges associated with the development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to develop a schedule for critical security activities, including finalizing the security policy, the security risk assessment, and system certification and accreditation. |
TSA terminated the CAPPS II program in August 2005 due, in part, to GAO's work highlighting critical deficiencies in the program. In September 2005, TSA announced a successor program, Secure Fight, that is more narrowly focused on developing a system to match the names of passengers on domestic flights against the No Fly and Selectee Lists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. As part of Secure Flight's development, TSA has taken action to establish a security policy, a security risk assessment, and other steps to prepare for system security certification and accreditation.
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| Transportation Security Administration | To address the challenges associated with the development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to develop a strategy for mitigating the high risk associated with system and database testing that ensures (1) accuracy testing of commercial and government databases is conducted prior to the database being used and (2) appropriate stress testing is conducted to demonstrate the system can meet peak load requirements. |
TSA terminated the CAPPS II program in August 2005 due, in part, to GAO's work highlighting critical deficiencies in the program. In September 2005, TSA announced a successor program, Secure Fight, that is more narrowly focused on developing a system to match the names of passengers on domestic flights against the No Fly and Selectee Lists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. As part of developing Secure Flight, TSA has developed plans to test the accuracy of the system and to conduct stress testing to demonstrate that the system can meet peak load requirements.
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| Transportation Security Administration | To address the challenges associated with the development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to develop results-oriented performance goals and measures to evaluate the program's effectiveness, including measures to assess performance of the system in generating reliable risk scores. |
TSA terminated the CAPPS II program in August 2005 due, in part, to GAO's work highlighting critical deficiencies in the program. In September 2005, TSA announced a successor program, Secure Fight, that is more narrowly focused on developing a system to match the names of passengers on domestic flights against the No Fly and Selectee Lists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. As part of developing Secure Flight and defining the requirements for the name-matching system, TSA is in the process of developing performance goals and measures.
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| Transportation Security Administration | To address the challenges associated with the development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to develop policies and procedures detailing CAPPS II oversight mechanisms, including offices responsible for providing oversight, and reporting requirements for oversight information. |
TSA terminated the CAPPS II program in August 2005 due, in part, to GAO's work highlighting critical deficiencies in the program. In September 2005, TSA announced a successor program, Secure Fight, that is more narrowly focused on developing a system to match the names of passengers on domestic flights against the No Fly and Selectee Lists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. As part of developing Secure Flight, TSA has developed policies and procedures to ensure that oversight is in place, including the use of the Department of Homeland Security's Investment Review Board.
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| Transportation Security Administration | To address the challenges associated with the development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to develop policies and procedures outlining the CAPPS II passenger redress process that include defining the appeal rights of passengers and their ability to access and correct personal data. |
TSA terminated the CAPPS II program in August 2005 due, in part, to GAO's work highlighting critical deficiencies in the program. In September 2005, TSA announced a successor program, Secure Fight, that is more narrowly focused on developing a system to match the names of passengers on domestic flights against the No Fly and Selectee Lists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. As part of developing Secure Flight, TSA has developed a process to provide for passenger redress. In addition, TSA has embedded privacy specialists into its system development teams to help ensure that the program complies with privacy laws.
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Airport securityAviation securityCommercial aviationComputer-assisted passenger prescreening systemCounterterrorismHomeland securityIdentity theftSchedule slippagesSystems evaluationTransportation securityPassenger reservation systems