Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve the Accuracy of Its Excess Capacity Estimates
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2017 infrastructure capacity report addressed four of five required elements from section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016. Specifically, DOD's report addressed the elements requiring it to submit
a force-structure plan,
a categorical inventory of worldwide military installations,
a discussion of categories of excess infrastructure, and
an assessment of the value of retaining certain excess infrastructure.
DOD's report partially addressed the element to include a description of the infrastructure capacity required to support the force structure. Specifically, DOD's report did not provide a complete picture of the infrastructure needed. For example, infrastructure at Air Force large aircraft installations was described by square yards of apron space, but did not include other infrastructure needs such as aircraft hangars and maintenance facilities.
DOD's excess capacity methodology and analysis has three key limitations that affect the accuracy and analytical sufficiency of the estimate. Specifically:
DOD used a 1989 baseline for excess capacity that may lead to inaccurate results. This 1989 baseline does not reflect updates in DOD facility standards and requirements or requirements associated with new weapon systems.
DOD's excess capacity methodology includes assumptions, such as not accounting for potential shortfalls—not having enough infrastructure to support the mission—that may not be reasonable. Specifically, when DOD's calculation identifies shortfall in capacity, DOD concludes that no excess capacity exists. As a result, DOD's analysis identifies no excess capacity in nearly half (14 of 32) mission categories. However, most installations support more than one mission and have more infrastructure present than the installation category metric measures. Thus, including potential capacity shortfalls could provide DOD and Congress with a more accurate estimate of excess capacity upon which to base decisions concerning the management of base infrastructure and excess capacity.
DOD's method for estimating excess capacity is not always sufficient because the installation selection process does not result in a generalizable sample. Furthermore, DOD's method is not always implemented effectively because the military departments did not follow a consistent approach.
According to DOD officials, specific department-wide guidance concerning DOD's methods for selecting installations in its analysis does not exist. Moreover, without developing guidance, the estimate of excess capacity may not be based on consistent methods across the department, resulting in inaccurate estimates. Furthermore, neither DOD nor Congress will have the necessary information to make decisions concerning the management of excess infrastructure capacity across the department.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has used the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process primarily to reduce excess infrastructure capacity, transform the force, and produce cost savings. DOD completed hundreds of base closures and realignments in previous BRAC rounds and intends to work with Congress to address remaining excess capacity. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 required DOD to submit, among other things, a force structure plan and a categorical infrastructure inventory of worldwide military installations. In response, DOD submitted its infrastructure capacity report to Congress in October 2017.
The NDAA included a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD's report for accuracy and analytical sufficiency. In this report, GAO evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD's report included the required elements, and (2) DOD's methodology and analysis result in accurate and analytically sufficient information on excess capacity. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD's 2017 report and compared it with the statutory requirements and generally accepted research standards. GAO also interviewed DOD and military service officials.
Recommendations
GAO is making three recommendations to DOD to update the baseline; use reasonable assumptions; and develop guidance to improve its methods for estimating excess capacity. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one recommendation, partially concurred with two recommendations, and plans to incorporate them in any future capacity analysis.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment reliably updates the baseline used for estimating excess infrastructure capacity. (Recommendation 1) |
DOD concurred with the original recommendation when the report was issued. Further, in an October 2019 memorandum, DOD agreed to implement all recommendations with which it had concurred or partially concurred should Congress authorize a future BRAC and provided that implementation of this specific recommendation would be permissible under the authorization; be consistent with the objectives of the BRAC and the National Defense Strategy; and would not subvert the selection criteria. In addition, DOD agrees that the baseline should be updated for any future capacity analysis and will review methods to do so. As of May 2020, Congress had not authorized another round of BRAC; nevertheless, this formal commitment meets the intent of our recommendation.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment uses assumptions in estimating excess capacity that are considered reasonable (i.e., realistic, credible, and accompanied by a statement of their rationale). (Recommendation 2) |
DOD partially concurred with the original recommendation when the report was issued. The department agreed that its capacity report should lay out any assumptions made and the rationale for each assumption and will ensure that any future capacity report includes that information, but did not agree that the assumptions used in its 2017 infrastructure capacity report were anything other than reasonable, realistic, or credible. However, in an October 2019 memorandum, DOD agreed to implement all recommendations with which it had concurred or partially concurred should Congress authorize a future BRAC and provided that implementation of this specific recommendation would be permissible under the authorization; be consistent with the objectives of the BRAC and the National Defense Strategy; and not subvert the selection criteria. As of May 2020, Congress had not authorized another round of BRAC. Nevertheless, this formal commitment meets the intent of our recommendation.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment develops guidance to improve the methods used in the analysis and ensure consistent implementation of DOD's methodology to produce reliable estimates of excess capacity across the department. The guidance, at a minimum, should clearly define "major installations," identify whether and when it is appropriate to include a facility in more than one category to take into account multiple missions at the facilities, and provide protocols for assessing excess capacity at joint bases. (Recommendation 3) |
DOD partially concurred with the original recommendation when the report was issued. DOD agreed that guidance should precede any future infrastructure capacity review and that such guidance should include definitions and implementation instructions, but the three items identified would not necessarily be applicable for a future analysis. Provided that future DOD guidance addresses all appropriate characteristics for analysis, such guidance would meet the intent of our recommendation. In March 2019, DOD stated that in the event of any future capacity assessment or full capacity analysis, it will develop appropriate guidance, definitions, and implementing instructions to ensure consistency while maintaining the necessary flexibility required for the services to account for unique operational requirements and priorities. Specifically, DOD defined a "major installation" as one with a plant replacement value exceeding $100 million. Further, DOD stated that each selected operational facility type will be accounted for at all assessed locations regardless of the number/type of missions at the location. DOD also stated that supporting and supported services at the joint bases will each account separately for the operational infrastructure designated by their service headquarters. In an October 2019 memorandum, DOD agreed to implement all recommendations with which it had concurred or partially concurred should Congress authorize a future BRAC and provided that implementation of this specific recommendation would be permissible under the authorization; be consistent with the objectives of the BRAC and the National Defense Strategy; and not subvert the selection criteria. In addition, DOD has taken action to review major cost drivers associated with the relocation of personnel, such as IT cost estimates, which will be improved to account for a variety of factors within its cost tool. As of May 2020, Congress had not authorized another round of BRAC. Nevertheless, together, these actions meet the intent of our recommendation.
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