FEBRUARY 7, 1924, 3 COMP. GEN. 479

FEBRUARY 7, 1924, 3 COMP. GEN. 479

U.S.S.'CONESTOGA" - JURISDICTION OF GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE THE PROVISION IN SECTION 287, REVISED STATUTES, AUTHORIZING THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS OF THE TREASURY, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, TO FIX A DAY WHEN THE WRECK, DESTRUCTION, OR LOSS OF A VESSEL SHALL HAVE OCCURRED, DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO FIX SUCH DATE INDEPENDENT OF AND CONTRARY TO THE DATE DETERMINED BY THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS TO HAVE BEEN THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOSS OF THE VESSEL IS PRESUMED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THE PROVISION IN SECTION 287, REVISED STATUTES, AUTHORIZING THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS,"UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY," TO FIX A DATE WHEN THE WRECK, DESTRUCTION, OR LOSS OF A VESSEL SHALL HAVE OCCURRED, IS IN CONFLICT WITH SECTION 304 OF THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT, 42 STAT. 24, AUTHORIZING THE EXERCISE OF DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE "WITHOUT DIRECTION FROM ANY OTHER OFFICER," AND IS ACCORDINGLY REPEALED BY SAID ACT.

DECISION BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL MCCARL, FEBRUARY 7, 1924:

ALBERT M. ALLEN REQUESTED OCTOBER 12, 1923, REVIEW OF SETTLEMENT NO. M- 238756-N, DATED OCTOBER 9, 1923, DISALLOWING HIS CLAIM AS FATHER OF JOSEPH H. ALLEN, LATE SEAMAN, UNITED STATES NAVY, FOR PAY FOR SAID SON FOR THE PERIOD FROM MAY 1 TO JUNE 30, 1921. THE CLAIM WAS DISALLOWED ON THE GROUND THAT IN SETTLEMENT NO. N-42720 DATED OCTOBER 29, 1921, PAY WAS ALLOWED TO INCLUDE APRIL 30, 1921, AND THAT NO PAY ACCRUED FOR ANY PERIOD SUBSEQUENT TO THAT DATE.

THE SEAMAN WAS A MEMBER OF THE CREW OF THE U.S.S. CONESTOGA WHICH LEFT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., ON MARCH 25, 1921, FOR PEARL HARBOR, T.H., EN ROUTE TO SAMOA. THE VESSEL DID NOT REACH EITHER PEARL HARBOR OR SAMOA AND NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED BY THIS OFFICE, AND NONE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN OBTAINED BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, EITHER AS TO THE VESSEL OR ANY OF THE CREW, SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF SAILING FROM SAN FRANCISCO. THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION UNDER DATE OF JULY 6, 1921, ADVISED THIS OFFICE THAT THE CONESTOGA WAS CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN LOST WITH ALL ON BOARD AND WAS STRICKEN FROM THE NAVY LIST AS OF JUNE 30, 1921. IT APPEARS THAT HAD THE CONESTOGA MET WITH NO MISFORTUNE SHE WOULD HAVE ARRIVED AT PEARL HARBOR ABOUT APRIL 5, 1921. THE TIME NECESSARY FOR A SEARCHING VESSEL TO HAVE MADE A ROUND TRIP BETWEEN THE TWO PORTS WOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT 24 DAYS AND THIS OFFICE ADDED THE 24 DAYS NECESSARY FOR SUCH A SEARCH TO THE DATE OF THE ANTICIPATED ARRIVAL AT PEARL HARBOR AND FIXED APRIL 30, 1921, AS THE TIME WHEN THE VESSEL WOULD HAVE BEEN UNHEARD OF FOR SO LONG THAT A WRECK COULD BE PRESUMED. THE ACCOUNTS OF THE CREW WERE ADJUSTED FROM THE DATE OF LAST PAYMENT TO APRIL 30, 1921, AS THE PRESUMED DATE OF DEATH.

SUBSEQUENTLY THE HEIRS OF ONE HARRY P. QUINN, WHO WAS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CREW OF THE CONESTOGA, BROUGHT SUIT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS FOR PAY FOR THE PERIOD FROM APRIL 30, 1921, THE DATE FIXED AS AFORESAID BY THIS OFFICE AS THE DATE OF LOSS OF THE VESSEL AND HER CREW, TO JUNE 30, 1921, THE DATE SUGGESTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR ACCEPTANCE AS THE DATE OF LOSS, AND IN A MEMORANDUM OPINION DATED JULY 9, 1923, THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE DATE OF LOSS OF A VESSEL OF THE NAVY WAS TO BE FIXED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, AND THAT THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS WERE WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO FIX ANY OTHER DATE THAN THAT REPORTED BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AS THE DATE OF LOSS. THERE ARE NOTED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM:

THE INFORMATION AS TO THE LOSS AND THE DATE OF IT SHOULD COME FROM THE SOURCE BEST QUALIFIED TO FURNISH IT. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY THROUGH THOSE CONNECTED WITH THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IS IN POSITION TO KNOW THE STATUS OF NAVAL VESSELS.

THE PERTINENCE OF THESE TWO STATEMENTS IS NOT APPARENT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE CASE UNDER CONSIDERATION INVOLVED A VESSEL WHICH HAD "BEEN UNHEARD FROM SO LONG THAT HER WRECK MAY BE PRESUMED.' IT IS NOT UNDERSTOOD HOW, IN SUCH A CASE, THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OR ANYONE ELSE CONNECTED WITH THE NAVY DEPARTMENT WOULD BE BETTER QUALIFIED OR IN A BETTER POSITION THAN WOULD THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, TO FIX, BY A LEGAL PRESUMPTION, THE DATE OF THE DISASTER.

THE ACT OF JULY 4, 1864, 13 STAT., 389, ENACTED SHORTLY AFTER OF JULY 4, 1864, 13 STAT., 389, ENACTED SHORTLY AFTER THE PERIOD OF GREATEST ACTIVITY OF ENEMY RAIDERS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND ENTITLED "AN ACT FOR THE RELIEF OF SEAMEN AND OTHERS BORNE ON BOOKS OF VESSELS WRECKED OR LOST IN THE NAVAL SERVICE," WAS CARRIED INTO THE REVISED STATUTES AS SECTIONS 286 AND 287. SECTION 287 CONCERNED THE SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS OF PETTY OFFICERS, SEAMEN, AND OTHERS, NOT OFFICERS, ON BOARD ANY VESSEL IN THE EMPLOY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PRESCRIBED THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING AMOUNTS DUE FROM DATE OF LAST SETTLEMENT TO DATE OF LOSS OF THE VESSEL, WHILE SECTION 286, WHICH IS HERE MATERIAL, PROVIDED THAT:

THE PROPER ACCOUNTING OFFICERS OF THE TREASURY ARE AUTHORIZED, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, IN SETTLING THE ACCOUNTS OF SEAMEN, AND OTHERS, NOT OFFICERS, BORNE ON THE BOOKS OF ANY VESSEL IN THE NAVY WHICH SHALL HAVE BEEN WRECKED, OR WHICH SHALL HAVE BEEN UNHEARD FROM SO LONG THAT HER WRECK MAY BE PRESUMED, OR WHICH SHALL HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR LOST WITH THE ROLLS AND PAPERS NECESSARY TO A REGULAR AND EXACT SETTLEMENT OF SUCH ACCOUNTS, TO FIX A DAY WHEN SUCH WRECK, DESTRUCTION, OR LOSS SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE OCCURRED.

THE QUESTION OF WHEN A MAN IS PRESUMED TO HAVE DIED WHEN HE IS A MEMBER OF A CREW OF A VESSEL WHICH SAILS FROM ONE PORT TO ANOTHER AND THERE ARE NO SUBSEQUENT TIDINGS OF EITHER THE VESSEL OR THE CREW AND ALL ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN LOST IN A DISASTER AT SEA HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION. SEE GERRY V. POST, 13 HOW. PRAC. (N.Y.) 118. OPPENHEIMER V. WOLFE, 3 SANDF., C.H. (N.Y.) 571. IN THE LATTER CASE THE RULE IS STATED AS FOLLOWS:

WHEN THE EXPECTATION OF TIDINGS OF SHIP AND PASSENGERS IS ENTIRELY EXHAUSTED AND THE UNDERWRITERS AND SURROGATE ACT UPON THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF THE LOSS OF BOTH; THAT PRESUMPTION RELATES BACK TO A TIME FAR ANTERIOR TO THE PERIOD WHEN SUCH ACTION TAKES PLACE. IT IS A PRESUMPTION FOUNDED UPON COMMON SENSE AND EXPERIENCE AND LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE LOSS OCCURRED WITHIN THE LONGEST DURATION OF THE VOYAGE FROM THE PORT OF DEPARTURE TO THAT OF THE SHIP'S DESTINATION, BECAUSE A LOSS WITHIN THAT TIME IS FAR MORE PROBABLE THAN THAT THE VESSEL SHOULD HAVE DRIFTED ABOUT FOR ANY CONSIDERABLE PERIOD AT THE MERCY OF THE WAVES WITHOUT ENCOUNTERING SOME OTHER VESSEL OR ULTIMATELY REACHING LAND.

THE RULE ADOPTED BY THE THEN COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY IN 26 COMP. DEC., 336, AND FOLLOWED BY THIS OFFICE IN DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1921, WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONESTOGA, IS MORE LIBERAL THAN THAT ADOPTED BY THE COURTS AND IS THAT A VESSEL IS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN LOST WHEN SHE HAS BEEN UNHEARD OF FOR A PERIOD OF TIME EQUIVALENT TO THE LONGEST DURATION OF THE VOYAGE FROM PORT OF DEPARTURE TO DESTINATION, PLUS THE TIME REQUIRED FOR A SEARCHING VESSEL TO MAKE A TRIP FROM THE PORT OF DEPARTURE TO THE PORT OF DESTINATION AND RETURN, FOR INSTANCE, IN THE INSTANT CASE THE CONESTOGA SHOULD HAVE REACHED PEARL HARBOR, HER FIRST PORT, ON APRIL 5, 1921; IT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED 24 DAYS FOR A SEARCHING VESSEL TO MAKE THE ROUND TRIP FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO PEARL HARBOR, AND THE DATE OF THE LOSS OF THE VESSEL WAS FIXED AS APRIL 30, 1921. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SUGGESTED THE DATE OF THE LOSS AT JUNE 30, 1921, THUS IN EFFECT ALLOWING THE HEIRS OR NEXT OF KIN OF THE CREW A BONUS OF TWO MONTHS' PAY IN ADDITION TO THE DEATH GRATUITY OF SIX MONTHS' PAY ALLOWED BY THE ACT OF JUNE 4, 1920, 41 STAT., 824. A STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN THE MATTER, THE JUDICIAL RULE AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DATE OF LOSS, AND THE LIBERAL RULE AS ADOPTED BY THIS OFFICE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE CLAIM IN THIS CASE FOR PAY FROM APRIL 30 TO JUNE 30, 1921, IS WHOLLY LACKING IN MERIT.

THE FURTHER QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY IN REPORTING JULY 5, 1921, THAT THE VESSEL WAS CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN LOST JUNE 30, 1921, PRECLUDED THIS OFFICE FROM FIXING A DATE OF LOSS MORE IN KEEPING WITH THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE LOSS AND MORE IN HARMONY WITH THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF DATE OF LOSS. SECTION 286, REVISED STATUTES, HEREINBEFORE QUOTED, IS THE SOLE PROVISION OF LAW RELIED UPON BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AND THE COURT OF CLAIMS AS AUTHORITY FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO FIX THE DATE OF WRECK, DESTRUCTION, OR LOSS. IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THIS SECTION PROVIDES FOR NOTHING MORE THAN THE FIXING "OF A DAY WHEN SUCH WRECK, DESTRUCTION, OR LOSS SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE OCCURRED.' THEREFORE, IF IT HAD BEEN THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO VEST IN THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY THE AUTHORITY TO FIX THE DATE, IT IS BUT REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE LAW WOULD HAVE SO PROVIDED IN PLAIN, UNMISTAKABLE TERMS. IF SUCH HAD BEEN THE INTENT THERE WAS NEITHER NECESSITY NOR REASON FOR MENTIONING THE ACCOUNT OFFICERS OF THE TREASURY IN SAID SECTION. THE FOLLOWING SECTION, TO WIT: SECTION 287, REVISED STATUTES, PROVIDED FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ACCOUNTS BY THE PROPER ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, AND IN SAID SECTION ONLY WAS THERE REASON OR NECESSITY TO MENTION THE "PROPER ACCOUNTING OFFICERS" IF IT HAD NOT BEEN THE INTENT TO VEST IN THEM PRIMARILY THE AUTHORITY TO FIX A DAY TO BE DEEMED TO BE THE DATE OF LOSS. NOT ONLY DOES SECTION 286 MENTION THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, BUT IT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT THEY "ARE AUTHORIZED," UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,"TO FIX A DAY.' NOTWITHSTANDING THIS PLAIN PROVISION OF THE LAW, THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY PROCEEDED TO FIX THE DATE OF LOSS OF THE CONESTOGA INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, AND IN REPORTING THE DATE SO FIXED DID NOT EVEN ADVISE THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS AS TO HIS METHOD OF ARRIVING AT THE DATE FIXED, OR HIS REASON FOR DECIDING UPON THE PARTICULAR DATE FIXED. WOULD SEEM THAT THE PHRASE "UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY" AS USED IN SAID SECTION CONTEMPLATED NOTHING MORE THAN THE REPORTING OF THE KNOWN FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS WITH A DIRECTION TO FIX A DAY TO BE DEEMED THE DATE OF LOSS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTLING ACCOUNTS. SUCH WAS THE OPINION OF THE THEN COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, AS INDICATED IN HIS DECISION OF OCTOBER 30, 1919, 26 COMP. DEC., 336.

HOWEVER, SECTIONS 286 AND 287, REVISED STATUTES, ARE NOT THE ONLY LAWS FOR CONSIDERATION IN THIS CASE; AND REGARDLESS OF WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF SECTION 286, AS ORIGINALLY ENACTED, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT THE PROVISION THEREIN REQUIRING THAT THE FIXING BY THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS OF THE DATE OF LOSS BE "UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY" HAS BEEN REPEALED OR SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, AS WILL BE SHOWN HEREINAFTER.

WHEN THE ACT OF JULY 4, 1864, 13 STAT., 389, WAS ENACTED CONTAINING THE REQUIREMENT THAT DATE OF LOSS OF A VESSEL BE FIXED UNDER THE DIRECTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS THAT FIXED BY THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1817, 3 STAT., 366, AS AMENDED, AND CONSISTED OF FIRST AND SECOND COMPTROLLERS, SIX AUDITORS, AND A COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS. THE PROVISION IN THE ACT OF JULY 4, 1864, THAT THE DATE OF LOSS BE FIXED BY THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS ,UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY" WAS NOT A NOVEL ONE IN THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE GOVERNMENT AS THEN ORGANIZED. THE ACTS OF JANUARY 18, 1837, 5 STAT., 143, AND MARCH 3, 1849, 9 STAT., 415, REQUIRED THE THIRD AUDITOR TO ADJUST CLAIMS FOR HORSES AND OTHER PROPERTY LOST IN THE MILITARY SERVICE "UNDER SUCH RULES AS SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR" AND UNDER THE ,DIRECTION OR WITH THE ASSENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; " THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1845, 5 STAT., 762, REQUIRED THE FIFTH AUDITOR TO SUPERINTEND THE SEVERAL MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE "UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY; " AND THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1847, 9 STAT., 173, REQUIRED THE ACCOUNT OFFICERS OF THE TREASURY,"UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY," TO CREDIT THE PURSERS OF NAVY VESSELS LOST OR CAPTURED WITH SUCH PORTION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE PROPERTY AND MONEY WITH WHICH CHARGED "AS THEY SHALL BE SATISFIED WAS INEVITABLY LOST" WITH THE VESSELS. IT COULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY CONTENDED THAT THIS PROVISION OF THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1847, AUTHORIZED THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO FIX THE AMOUNT TO BE CREDITED; AND THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN HIM UNDER SAID PROVISION IS VESTED IN THE IDENTICAL WORDS THEREAFTER USED IN SECTION 286, REVISED STATUTES, WITH REFERENCE TO THE FIXING OF THE DATE OF LOSS.

IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE ACT OF MARCH 30, 1868, 15 STAT., 54, CARRIED INTO THE REVISED STATUTES AS SECTION 191, THAT STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNTS MADE BY THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS WERE MADE CONCLUSIVE ON THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS, AND EVEN THEN THE HEADS OF THE DEPARTMENTS CONCERNED, WHO WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN THE WARRANTS FOR AMOUNTS FOUND DUE BY THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS AND ACCOUNTS ARISING IN THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENTS, COULD REFUSE TO SIGN A WARRANT UNTIL THEY HAD SUBMITTED TO AND OBTAINED FROM THE APPLICABLE COMPTROLLER CONSIDERATION OF ANY FACTS WHICH, IN THEIR JUDGMENT, AFFECTED THE BALANCE FOUND DUE. IT REQUIRED THE SIGNATURES OF THE FOURTH AUDITOR AND THE SECOND COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS AND CLAIMS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. SEE MCKNIGHT V. UNITED STATES, 13 CT.CLS., 292, FOR A PARTIAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM AS IT THEN EXISTED.

THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES WAS REORGANIZED BY THE ACT OF JULY 31, 1894, 28 AT., 205-211, WITH ONE COMPTROLLER AND SIX AUDITORS, WHOSE OFFICE CONSTITUTED BUREAUS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND WHOSE SETTLEMENTS WERE MADE CONCLUSIVE ON THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS WITH INDEPENDENCE FROM THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS EXCEPT THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, IN THE MATTER OF ISSUING WARRANTS FOR PAYMENTS OF THE BALANCES FOUND DUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS AND CLAIMS. UNDER THIS LAW THE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY AND THE AUDITOR FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT BECAME ,THE PROPER ACCOUNTING OFFICERS OF THE TREASURY" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 286, REVISED STATUTES. THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM WAS AGAIN REORGANIZED BY THE ACT OF JUNE 10 1921, 42 STAT., 24-27. THE OFFICES OF THE COMPTROLLER AND SIX AUDITORS OF THE TREASURY WERE ABOLISHED AND THERE WAS CREATED THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,"INDEPENDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND UNDER THE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES," WHO WAS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED TO EXERCISE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES "WITHOUT DIRECTION FROM ANY OTHER OFFICER.' SEC. 304, 42 STAT., 24.

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MISUNDERSTAND SUCH LANGUAGE OR MISS THE CLEAR INTENT THAT THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE IS TO FUNCTION IN THE DISCHARGE OF ITS DUTIES WITHOUT "DIRECTION" FROM ANY OTHER OFFICER. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ROOM FOR REASONABLE DOUBT, WHEN THE HISTORY OF THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1921, THAT THE INTENT OF CONGRESS WAS THAT ALL CLAIMS AND ACCOUNTS WHATEVER IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, EITHER AS DEBTOR OR CREDITOR,SHALL BE SETTLED AND ADJUSTED IN THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE ON THE FACTS AND LAW APPLICABLE THERETO WITHOUT DIRECTION FROM ANY OTHER OFFICER THAN THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. THE REQUIREMENT OF THE ACT OF JULY 4, 1864, THAT THE DATE OF LOSS OF VESSELS BE FIXED BY THE ACCOUNTING OFFICER, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, AND THE REQUIREMENT IN THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1921, THAT THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE SHALL FUNCTION UNDER THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, WITHOUT DIRECTION FROM ANY OTHER OFFICER, ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT BOTH AS TO THE LETTER OF THE LAW AND THE PURPOSES TO BE SERVED BY AN INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTING SYSTEM. WHETHER THE REQUIREMENT IN THE ACT OF JULY 4, 1864, REENACTED AS SECTION 286, REVISED STATUTES, WAS IMPLIEDLY REPEALED BY THE ACT OF JULY 31, 1894, AS WAS HELD BY THE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, IS IMMATERIAL, FOR IT IS CLEAR THAT IT WAS REPEALED OR SUPERSEDED BY THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1921.

THE OPINION OF THE COURT IN THE QUINN CASE, SUPRA, DOES NOT PRESENT ANY FACT OR ARGUMENT THAT WAS NOT BEFORE THIS OFFICE WHEN THE CASE WAS FIRST CONSIDERED, DOES NOT PASS UPON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND HOLDS- - WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE HISTORY OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE ACCOUNTING OFFICES UP TO AND INCLUDING THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1921, 42 STAT., 23-27--- THAT UNDER SECTION 286, REVISED STATUTES, THE DETERMINATION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY AS TO DATE OF LOSS IS CONCLUSIVE ON THIS OFFICE. THE COURT ARGUMENTATIVELY REFERRED TO THE ARMY LOST PROPERTY ACT OF MARCH 3, 1885, 23 STAT., 350; ADVERTED TO THE DUTY THEREIN IMPOSED ON THE SECRETARY OF WAR; AND SUGGESTED THAT UNDER SAID ACT IT WOULD NOT BE CONTENDED "THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS CAN IGNORE THE SECRETARY'S FINDINGS.' IN THIS CONNECTION IT MAY BE STATED THAT IN UNITED STATES V. BABCOCK, 250 U. S., 328, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECIDED THE COURT OF CLAIMS HAD NO JURISDICTION TO REVISE OR REVIEW THE ACTION OF THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS ON CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE 1885 ACT, AND THIS AFTER AN ASSERTION BY THAT COURT OF JURISDICTION UNDER SAID ACT IN NEWCOMBER V. UNITED STATES, 51 CT.CLS., 408, CITED IN THE QUINN CASE.

UNDER THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1921, RESPONSIBILITY TO SETTLE AND ADJUST CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND TO DETERMINE THE AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THEIR PAYMENT IS UPON THIS OFFICE AND WHILE OPINIONS OF THE COURT ARE GIVEN MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, ESPECIALLY WHERE IT APPEARS THAT THE MERITS OR LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED HAVE BEEN FAIRLY PRESENTED TO AND FULLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THIS OFFICE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN APPLYING THE DECISION IN THE QUINN CASE TO THE CASE HERE UNDER CONSIDERATION. SEE 6 LAWRENCE COMP. DEC., 233; 3 COMP. GEN., 316.