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GAO-11-181R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 26, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Defense Business Transformation: DOD Needs to Take Additional 
Actions to Further Define Key Management Roles, Develop Measurable 
Goals, and Align Planning Efforts: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars each year 
to maintain key business operations intended to support the 
warfighter, including systems and processes related to the management 
of contracts, finances, the supply chain, support infrastructure, and 
weapon systems acquisition. We have designated a number of these areas 
as high risk because of their vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, 
and mismanagement and because of opportunities to achieve greater 
efficiencies and free up resources for higher-priority needs.[Footnote 
1] 

In 2005, we identified DOD's approach to business transformation as a 
high-risk area because (1) DOD had not established clear and specific 
management responsibility, accountability and control over business 
transformation-related activities and applicable resources; and (2) 
DOD lacked a clear strategic and integrated plan for business 
transformation with specific goals, measures and accountability 
mechanisms to monitor progress.[Footnote 2] Because of the complexity 
and magnitude of the challenges facing DOD in improving business 
operations, we have reported the need for a chief management officer 
(CMO) with significant authority and experience to focus the necessary 
attention and sustain progress. We also recommended that DOD develop a 
comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide transformation plan, 
supported by a strategic planning process. Moreover, we recommended 
that DOD institutionalize in directives the roles, responsibilities, 
and relationships among the various business-related entities and 
committees that comprise its management framework and expand that 
framework beyond business systems modernization to all business 
transformation efforts.[Footnote 3] 

Both DOD and Congress have taken actions to address DOD's management 
of business transformation efforts. For example, DOD designated the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense as the CMO for DOD in May 2007. In the 
National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year 2008[Footnote 4] 
and Fiscal Year 2009,[Footnote 5] Congress took steps that included: 

* designating the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the CMO for DOD; 

* creating a deputy chief management officer (DCMO) position; 

* requiring the secretaries of the military departments to designate 
the department under secretaries as CMOs; 

* requiring DOD to develop a strategic management plan (SMP); and: 

* requiring the secretary of each military department to establish a 
business transformation office and to develop business transformation 
plans. 

In January 2009, we reported on DOD's progress in implementing its 
management framework and developing a strategic plan for business 
transformation.[Footnote 6] For example, DOD had issued directives 
broadly defining the responsibilities of the CMO and DCMO, established 
an office of the DCMO, designated an Assistant DCMO, established 
governance entities,[Footnote 7] and named CMOs or acting CMOs in the 
military departments. However, DOD had not clearly defined the 
authority, roles, and relationships for some positions and entities, 
including decision-making authority for the DCMO, the relationship 
between DOD's DCMO and the military department CMOs, and the 
responsibilities of various governance entities. Further, the military 
departments were in the early stages of responding to legislative 
requirements, and DOD's first SMP, issued in July 2008, did not 
identify specific business areas, strategic goals, objectives, or 
performance measures. 

Since we last reported, a DCMO has been confirmed by the Senate, DOD 
has updated its SMP, and DOD and the military departments have 
continued to refine their management approach to business 
transformation. This report, which consists of this letter and the 
enclosed slides, addresses their progress since January 2009. We 
performed this review under the authority of the Comptroller General 
to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our objectives were to 
assess the extent to which DOD and the military departments have taken 
additional steps to (1) implement management frameworks for business 
transformation and (2) develop business transformation plans, 
supported by a strategic planning process, that enable them to align 
goals and planning efforts and to measure progress. 

To assess progress in implementing management frameworks for business 
transformation, we compared DOD and military departments' actions to 
best practices for implementing CMO positions[Footnote 8] and related 
statutory requirements in the National Defense Authorization Acts for 
Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. We also reviewed DOD and military 
department guidance related to these positions and entities. To assess 
progress in developing business transformation plans supported by 
strategic planning process, we assessed DOD's updated 2009 SMP and the 
Air Force's 2008 strategic plan by comparing them to results-oriented 
management best practices and key elements of a strategic plan, which 
we identified by reviewing prior GAO work[Footnote 9] and the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.[Footnote 10] We also 
met with Army and Navy officials to determine the status of their 
planning efforts. For both objectives, we interviewed DOD officials, 
including the DCMO; the Director of the Business Transformation 
Agency; the Under Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy in 
their capacities as CMOs; and the Director of Business Transformation 
for each military department. To determine the involvement of the CMO, 
DCMO, and military department CMOs in the Secretary of Defense's 
recent efficiency initiative and selected GAO high-risk areas, we met 
with these officials and reviewed relevant documents and our prior and 
ongoing work on the high-risk areas. We conducted this performance 
audit from July 2009 through January 2011 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

DOD and the military departments have taken additional steps to 
strengthen their management approach to business transformation. 
Opportunities exist, however, for the CMO and DCMO to take on a 
greater leadership role in implementing a departmentwide effort to 
achieve more efficiencies in its operations and to ensure results in 
individual business areas. Since January 2009, DOD has filled key 
positions, such as the DCMO and military department CMOs; established 
entities, such as a governance board to identify business process 
improvements; and undertaken various activities. For example, in July 
2009, the CMO issued an updated SMP which identifies business 
priorities and related reform initiatives. In May 2010, the Secretary 
of Defense announced a major initiative to reduce overhead costs, 
intended to find more efficient and effective ways of doing business. 
Our work shows that key strategies for successful implementation of 
the CMO position include defining roles, responsibilities, structures, 
processes, reporting relationships, and ensuring a high level of 
authority. The CMO and DCMO have responsibilities, under statutes and 
department guidance, related to improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of business operations, but they have not been assigned 
specific roles for integrating, monitoring or otherwise 
institutionalizing the ongoing efficiency initiative in the long term. 
The military department CMOs are leading efforts to implement the 
initiative in their organizations. 

Without assigning a specific role for the CMO and DCMO, it is not 
clear how DOD will establish accountability and leverage those 
positions to provide the leadership necessary to implement, integrate, 
and otherwise institutionalize the Secretary of Defense's recent 
efficiency initiative and sustain momentum and progress in the long 
term. Further, while DOD continues to take some actions to address 
weaknesses in individual business areas, we continue to see 
opportunities for the CMO and DCMO to provide the leadership needed to 
implement reforms and achieve goals reflected in the SMP, including 
those in areas we have identified as high risk. For example, DOD has 
significantly improved the timeliness of processing personnel security 
clearances but has yet to clearly define the specific roles and 
responsibilities of the CMO, DCMO, and military department CMOs for 
financial management improvement efforts, and to include clear 
performance measurement information and resource needs in its 
Logistics Strategic Plan, which guides efforts to improve supply chain 
management and other logistics processes. 

DOD and the military departments have made limited progress in 
developing business transformation plans, supported by a strategic 
planning process, which enable them to align goals and planning 
efforts and to measure progress. We have previously reported that 
agencies that are successful in achieving business transformation 
strive to undertake strategic planning and establish a plan that 
includes goals and measures that align at all levels and that links 
resource needs to performance.[Footnote 11] DOD's 2009 SMP identifies 
priorities and reform initiatives but lacks some key elements, such as 
a description of the problems to be addressed, measurable goals, and 
funding priorities. The military departments are in varying stages of 
their planning efforts--the Army issued its plan in October 2010 and 
the Navy issued its plan in November 2010. The Air Force has a 2008 
strategic plan that according to Air Force officials covers business 
transformation, but the plan does not define transformation or related 
goals. Air Force officials expect to develop specific business 
priorities and issue a separate plan in March 2011. DOD is in the 
early stages of measuring progress. While the 2009 SMP describes a 
strategic planning process, DOD has not set up internal mechanisms, 
such as procedures and milestones, by which it can reach consensus 
with the military departments and others on priorities, synchronize 
the development of plans with each other and the budget process, and 
guide efforts to monitor progress and take corrective action. Without 
a strategic plan containing measurable goals and funding priorities, 
supported by a clearly defined planning process, the department will 
not have the tools it needs to set strategic direction for business 
transformation efforts, fully align efforts to develop plans and 
budget requests that reflect business priorities, measure progress in 
implementing reform initiatives, and institutionalize its strategic 
planning efforts across administrations. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To establish ongoing accountability and better leverage the unique 
positions of the CMO and DCMO to provide the leadership necessary to 
follow up the Secretary's recent efficiency initiative for the long 
term, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 
action: 

* Assign specific roles and responsibilities to the CMO and DCMO for 
integrating the Secretary's efficiency initiative with ongoing reform 
efforts, overseeing its implementation, and otherwise 
institutionalizing the effort for the long term. 

To enhance DOD's ability to set strategic direction for its business 
transformation efforts, and better align and institutionalize its 
efforts to develop and implement plans and measure progress against 
established goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the CMO to take the following two actions: 

* Ensure that DOD's revised SMP contains measurable goals and funding 
priorities linked to those goals. 

* Issue guidance to establish a strategic planning process with 
mechanisms--such as procedures and milestones--for routinely updating 
the SMP and military department business transformation plans. In 
particular, this guidance should include elements such as how DOD and 
the military departments--including the CMO, DCMO, and military 
department CMOs--will reach consensus on business priorities, 
coordinate review and approval of updates to plans, synchronize the 
development of plans with the budget process, and monitor the 
implementation of reform initiatives, and report progress, on a 
periodic basis, towards achieving established goals. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two of our 
recommendations and partially concurred with one. DOD's comments are 
reprinted in their entirety in Enclosure II. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 
assign specific roles and responsibilities to the CMO and DCMO for 
integrating the Secretary's efficiency initiative with ongoing reform 
efforts, overseeing its implementation, and otherwise 
institutionalizing the effort for the long term. While DOD did not 
specify the action it planned to take to implement our recommendation, 
we would expect that once the Secretary determines the roles and 
responsibilities to be assigned to the CMO and DCMO, these would be 
clearly communicated within the department. 

DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary direct 
the CMO to ensure that DOD's revised SMP contains measurable goals and 
funding priorities linked to those goals. DOD agreed that the SMP 
should contain measurable goals linked to the budget, and stated that 
the draft fiscal year 2011 SMP accomplishes this goal. DOD also stated 
that the fiscal year 2011 SMP is tightly integrated with the fiscal 
year 2011 Performance Budget and directly links performance measures 
to the budget through Forces and Infrastructure Category codes. DOD 
further noted that each goal in the fiscal year 2011 SMP is supported 
by quantifiable performance measures and that results against these 
measures will be briefed on a quarterly basis to the DBSMC. On 
December 30, 2010, DOD issued an updated plan, which covers fiscal 
year 2011. We plan to evaluate the updated plan to assess whether it 
contains key elements, such as measurable goals, funding priorities, 
and resource needs. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary 
direct the CMO to issue guidance to establish a strategic planning 
process with mechanisms--such as procedures and milestones--for 
routinely updating the SMP and military department business 
transformation plans. DOD agreed that it is important for its 
strategic planning process to ensure alignment between the various 
documents that comprise the department's "family of plans" and the 
officials that are responsible for those plans. DOD identified this 
"family of plans" to include the SMP, Performance Budget, Financial 
Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan, DOD Logistics Strategic Plan, 
individual GAO High Risk Area Remediation Plans, and Military 
Department Business Transformation and Transition Plans. DOD, however, 
stated that it is focused on using its existing governance bodies and 
natural planning cycles associated with these documents to ensure 
alignment while maintaining the ability to respond to changing 
circumstances in an agile way that the establishment of formal policy 
would not allow. It noted these governance bodies include the DBSMC, 
the Performance Budget Senior Review Group, and a variety of 
functional and organizational boards throughout the department. 

We recognize that DOD relies on existing governance bodies and 
planning cycles to develop and align the SMP and other related plans, 
and agree it is important for DOD to be able to respond to changing 
circumstances. However, we do not believe that establishing formal 
policy to govern its strategic planning efforts would hinder the 
department in any manner. Rather, we believe that issuing formal 
guidance to clearly define the planning process will help the 
department achieve a common understanding and approach among the 
various planning entities and therefore enhance its overall ability to 
set strategic direction, better align and institutionalize its 
planning efforts, and measure progress against established goals. Over 
the past few years, the department and military departments have 
gained momentum in achieving consensus on business priorities and 
maturing their planning efforts. To sustain this momentum and to 
ensure continuity for the long term, we believe it is important that 
the CMO clearly outline the process that will guide strategic planning 
efforts, including elements such as how DOD and the military 
departments--including the CMO, DCMO, and military department CMOs--
will reach consensus on business priorities, coordinate review and 
approval of updates to plans, synchronize the development of plans 
with the budget process, and monitor the implementation of reform 
initiatives, and report progress, on a periodic basis, towards 
achieving established goals. Given DOD's statements about the need to 
maintain the ability to respond to changing circumstances, the CMO 
could also include specific provisions to allow for the flexibility 
needed to make adjustments as circumstances dictate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DOD Deputy Chief Management 
Officer, and the Under Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. 
This report will also be available on our Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. Should you or your staff have any questions 
concerning this product, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or 
pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. 

Key contributors to this report were Donna Evans, Assistant Director; 
Joseph Capuano; Gabrielle Carrington; Tom Gosling; Nicole Harms; 
Evelyn Logue; Elizabeth McNally; Suzanne Perkins; Richard Powelson; 
Terry Richardson; Rebecca Rygg; and Darby Smith. 

Signed by: 

Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

Enclosures: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
The Honorable John McCain:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure I: 

Defense Business Transformation: 

DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Further Define Key Management 
Roles, Develop Measurable Goals, and Align Planning Efforts: 

Briefing for Congressional Committees: 

January 26, 2011: 

Overview: 
* Background:
* Objectives:
* Scope and Methodology:
* Summary of Findings:
* Objective 1: Management Framework:
* Objective 2: Strategic Planning:
* Conclusions:
* Recommendations for Executive Action:
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
* Related GAO Products: 

Background: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars each year to 
maintain key business operations intended to support the warfighter, 
including systems and processes related to the management of contracts, 
finances, the supply chain, support infrastructure, and weapon systems 
acquisition. 

We have designated a number of these areas as high risk because of 
their vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement and 
because of opportunities to achieve greater efficiencies and free up 
resources for higher-priority needs.[Footnote 12] 

In 2005, we identified DOD's management approach to overall business 
transformation as a high-risk area because: 

* DOD had not established clear and specific management responsibility, 
accountability and control over business transformation-related 
activities and applicable resources; and: 

* DOD lacked a clear strategic and integrated plan for business 
transformation with specific goals, measures and accountability 
mechanisms to monitor progress.[Footnote 13] 

In prior reports and testimonies, we recommended the following: 

* That Congress consider enacting legislation to establish a separate, 
full-time chief management officer (CMO) position with the authority 
and experience and a sufficient term to provide focused and sustained 
leadership over DOD's business transformation efforts. 

* That DOD institutionalize in directives the roles, responsibilities, 
and relationships among the various business-related entities and 
committees that have a role in implementing business transformation 
efforts. 

* That DOD develop a strategic planning process for business 
transformation that results in a comprehensive, integrated, and 
enterprisewide plan or set of plans that covers all key business areas 
and provides a clear strategic direction, prioritizes initiatives, and 
monitors progress across the department. 

Both DOD and Congress have taken actions to address DOD's management of 
business transformation efforts. Specifically: 

* In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense designated the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense as the CMO for DOD. 

* Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008,[Footnote 14] which: 

- designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense position as the CMO for 
DOD; 

- created a deputy chief management officer (DCMO) position to assist 
the CMO; 

- required the secretaries of the military departments to designate the 
department under secretaries as CMOs with primary management 
responsibility for business operations; and: 

- required the Secretary of Defense, acting through the DOD CMO, to 
develop a strategic management plan (SMP) that contains certain 
elements, such as performance goals and measures and key initiatives to 
achieve performance goals together with resource needs. 

* Congress enacted the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2009,[Footnote 15] which required the secretary of each 
military department to establish a business transformation office no 
later than 180 days after enactment of the act and, acting through the 
department CMOs, to develop comprehensive business transformation 
plans. 

Our prior work has shown that key strategies for successful 
implementation of the CMO position include defining roles, 
responsibilities, structures, processes, and reporting relationships 
and ensuring a high level of authority.[Footnote 16] 

In addition, agencies that are successful in achieving business 
management transformation undertake strategic planning and strive to 
establish a plan that contains key elements such as measurable goals 
and quantifiable measures that align at all levels of the agency. A 
strategic plan should: 

* align goals and measures with departmentwide goals and cascade goals 
and measures to lower organizational levels, 

* assign accountability for achieving results, 

* demonstrate results, 

* provide a comprehensive view of performance, and link resource needs 
to performance. 

In January 2009,[Footnote 17] we reported on DOD's progress in 
implementing its business transformation management framework and 
developing a strategic plan for business transformation, including the 
following: 

* DOD's senior leadership has shown a commitment to transforming 
business operations and taken steps to strengthen its management 
approach. For example, DOD did the following: 

- Issued a directive broadly defining the responsibilities of the CMO. 

- Established or designated governance entities, such as the Defense 
Business Systems Management Committee, the Deputy's Advisory Working 
Group, and the Business Transformation Agency.[Footnote 18] 

- Established an office of the DCMO, designated an Assistant DCMO, and 
issued a directive broadly defining the responsibilities of the DCMO. 

- Issued its first SMP in July 2008. 

- Named CMOs or acting CMOs in the military departments and DCMOs in 
the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy. 

DOD nevertheless had not completed implementation of its management 
framework for business transformation because authority, roles, and 
relationships for some positions and entities had not been clearly 
defined, including: 

* clearly defined decision-making authority for the DCMO, 

* a clearly defined relationship between DOD's DCMO and the CMOs of the 
military departments, and: 

* clearly defined unique and shared responsibilities of various 
governance entities, such as the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee and the Deputy's Advisory Working Group. 

DOD's first SMP, issued in July 2008, did not identify any strategic 
goals, objectives, or performance measures and did not provide detailed 
information about business operations. 

The military departments were in the early stages of responding to the 
requirements in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal 
Years 2008 and 2009. 

Objectives: 

This briefing report addresses the progress DOD and the military 
departments have made since January 2009 to strengthen their management 
approach to business transformation. 

Our specific objectives were to assess the extent to which DOD and the 
military departments have taken additional steps to: 

* implement management frameworks for business transformation, and: 

* develop business transformation plans, supported by a strategic 
planning process, that enable them to align goals and planning efforts 
and to measure progress. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To assess progress in implementing management frameworks for business 
transformation, we compared DOD and military departments' actions to 
best practices for implementing CMO positions[Footnote 19] and related 
statutory requirements in the National Defense Authorization Acts for 
Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. We also reviewed DOD and military 
department guidance related to these positions and entities. 

To assess progress in developing business transformation plans 
supported by a strategic planning process, we assessed DOD's 2009 SMP 
and the Air Force's strategic plan by comparing them to results-
oriented management best practices and key elements of a strategic 
plan, which we identified by reviewing prior GAO work[Footnote 20] and 
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.[Footnote 21] We 
also met with Army and Navy officials to determine the status of their 
planning efforts. 

For both objectives, we interviewed DOD officials, including the DCMO; 
the Director of the Business Transformation Agency; the Under 
Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy in their capacities as 
CMOs; and the Director of Business Transformation for each military 
department. 

To determine the CMO, DCMO, and military department CMO involvement in 
the Secretary of Defense's recent efficiency initiative and selected 
GAO high-risk areas, we met with these officials and reviewed relevant 
documents and our prior and ongoing work on the high-risk areas. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through January 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary of Findings: Objective 1: Management Framework: 

DOD and the military departments have taken additional steps to 
strengthen their management approach to business transformation. 
Opportunities exist, however, for the CMO and DCMO to take on a greater 
leadership role in implementing a departmentwide effort to achieve more 
efficiencies in its operations and to ensure results in individual 
business areas. 

* DOD has filled key positions, such as the DOD DCMO and military 
department CMOs, and established entities and undertaken activities to 
address business transformation, including creating a new governance 
board, coordinating efforts among senior leaders to establish top-level 
priorities, updating its SMP, and initiating a departmentwide effort to 
achieve greater efficiencies, including in business operations. 

* The CMO and DCMO have responsibilities, under statutes and department 
guidance, related to the improvement of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of business operations, but they have not been assigned 
specific roles for integrating, monitoring or otherwise 
institutionalizing the ongoing Secretary of Defense efficiency 
initiative. In contrast, the military departments CMOs are leading 
efforts to implement the initiative in their organizations. 

* Without assigning a specific role for the CMO and DCMO, it is not 
clear 
how DOD will establish accountability and leverage those positions to 
provide the leadership needed to implement, integrate, and otherwise 
institutionalize the Secretary of Defense's recent efficiency 
initiative and sustain momentum and progress in the long term. 
Furthermore, without a continuous focus on identifying and implementing 
efficiencies, DOD may be challenged in funding its highest-priority 
programs in light of DOD's fiscal challenges. 

* DOD continues to take some actions to address weaknesses in 
individual business areas; however, we continue to see opportunities 
for the CMO and DCMO to provide the leadership needed to implement 
reforms and achieve goals reflected in the SMP, including those in 
areas we have identified as high risk. 

* For example, DOD has significantly improved the timeliness of 
processing personnel security clearances but has yet to clearly define 
the specific roles and responsibilities of the CMO, DCMO, and military 
department CMOs for financial management improvement efforts, and to 
include clear performance measurement information and resource needs in 
its Logistics Strategic Plan, which guides efforts to improve supply 
chain management and other logistics processes. 

Summary of Findings: Objective 2: Strategic Planning: 

DOD and the military departments have made limited progress in 
developing business transformation plans, supported by a strategic 
planning process, which enable them to align goals and planning efforts 
and to measure progress. 

DOD's 2009 SMP identifies priorities but lacks some key strategic plan 
elements. Specifically, some of the goals are not measurable, and it 
does not include funding priorities or a description of the problems 
and gaps the plan is trying to address.[Footnote 22] 

The military departments are in varying stages of their planning 
efforts. 

* The Army issued its business transformation plan in October 2010. The 
Navy issued its business transformation plan in November 2010. Army and 
Navy officials stated that they used the SMP's priorities as the 
starting point for developing their individual business transformation 
plans. 

* The Air Force has an overarching 2008 strategic plan that it states 
covers business transformation; however, this Air Force plan does not 
define business transformation and does not identify which of its goals 
are related to business transformation. Air Force officials stated that 
they planned to update their strategic plan and establish business-
related priorities by December 2010 and to formally issue their 
business transformation plan in March 2011. 

Although the 2009 SMP describes a strategic planning process, DOD has 
not set up internal mechanisms, including procedures and milestones, by 
which it can reach consensus with the military departments and others 
on priorities, synchronize the development of plans with each other and 
the budget process, and guide efforts to monitor progress and take 
corrective action. 

Without a strategic plan containing measurable goals and funding 
priorities, supported by a clearly defined planning process, the 
department will not have the tools it needs to set strategic direction 
for business transformation efforts, fully align efforts to develop 
plans and budget requests that reflect business priorities, measure 
progress in implementing reform initiatives, and institutionalize its 
strategic planning efforts across administrations. 

Objective 1: Management Framework: 

DOD and the military departments have taken additional steps to 
strengthen their management approach to business transformation. 
Opportunities exist, however, for the CMO and DCMO to take on a greater 
leadership role in implementing a departmentwide effort to achieve more 
efficiencies in its operations and in ensuring results in individual 
business areas: 

* Key strategies for successful implementation of the CMO position 
include defining roles, responsibilities, structures, processes, and 
reporting relationships and ensuring a high level of authority. 
[Footnote 23] 

* Since our January 2009 report, DOD has filled key positions, 
established entities, and undertaken activities to address business 
transformation: 

Positions and Entities: 

- In July 2009, the CMO authorized the Assistant DCMO to perform the 
duties of the DCMO until the DCMO position was filled. In July 2010, 
the Assistant DCMO was confirmed as the DCMO. In October 2010, DOD 
appointed a new Assistant DCMO. 

- In addition, the DCMO is currently serving as DOD's Performance 
Improvement Officer, in which capacity she supervises DOD's performance 
management activities and leads the department's personnel security 
clearance reform efforts. 

- In June 2010, the DCMO created the End-to-End Process Governance 
Board,[Footnote 24] whose role is to advise the DBSMC on opportunities 
to enhance the management and execution of the end-to-end business 
processes across DOD. The board includes the military department DCMOs 
and representatives from various DOD offices such as the Offices of the 
Under Secretaries for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; 
Comptroller; and Personnel and Readiness. 

* All of the military departments have CMOs in place and have issued 
related guidance to incorporate the CMO into existing governance 
structures. 

* The Navy Under Secretary was confirmed in May 2009. 

- The Navy has issued an instruction stating that the Navy Under 
Secretary is the CMO, and creating a Deputy Under Secretary position to 
serve as the DCMO, to supervise the Office of Business Transformation, 
and to oversee and coordinate Navy business processes. 

* The Army Under Secretary was confirmed in September 2009.[Footnote 
25] 

- The Army has issued an order stating that the CMO is a senior advisor 
to the Secretary of the Army and plans to issue additional guidance. 

* The Air Force Under Secretary was confirmed in March 2010. 

- The Air Force has issued a directive for the CMO stating that the CMO 
is to direct and oversee the activities of the DCMO and that the DCMO 
exercises the CMO's responsibilities by effectively and efficiently 
organizing the Air Force's business operations and providing relevant 
information to DOD's CMO and DCMO. 

- According to officials, the Air Force is in the process of updating 
other guidance to clarify that the CMO and DCMO are now co-chairs of 
entities within the Air Force's existing governance structure.[Footnote 
26] 

It is unclear whether this guidance will further define the CMO's 
roles, responsibilities, and relationships to other key Air Force 
leaders, such as the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for 
Acquisition and for Financial Management and Comptroller. 

* Each of the military departments has established an Office of 
Business Transformation. 

* The Navy established its Office of Business Transformation in 
December 2008. This office's Director serves as both the Navy DCMO and 
the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Business Operations and 
Transformation. 

* The Air Force established its Office of Business Transformation in 
June 2009. Its Director also serves as the Air Force DCMO. 

* The Army established its Office of Business Transformation in April 
2009. This office has an Acting Director who is also the Army's Acting 
DCMO. 

Activities: 

* On behalf of the CMO, the Assistant DCMO coordinated with the Under 
Secretaries of Defense to achieve consensus on top-level business 
priorities and with the military departments to obtain input on their 
respective priorities. The CMO formalized these priorities in the July 
2009 update to the SMP. 

* As discussed later, the DCMO is working with various DOD offices to 
collect data needed to assess progress against business-related 
measures. In January 2010, DOD began quarterly reporting to the DBSMC 
on progress against these business-related measures. 

The CMO chairs the DBSMC, which also includes the DCMO (Vice Chair), 
several Under Secretaries of Defense, and the military department CMOs. 
The DBSMC meets periodically to discuss issues related to business 
transformation, such as audit readiness, acquisition, and performance 
management. The DBSMC also reviews quarterly performance reports on 
progress in meeting performance measures for both business and 
nonbusiness priorities. It also serves as an investment review and 
decision-making body for business systems modernization activities. 

* DOD has stated that the DBSMC is considered the primary forum for 
addressing business transformation issues, although the 2005 charter 
for the DBSMC has not yet been revised to fully reflect this role. We 
have previously recommended that DOD institutionalize the roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships among various business-related 
entities, including the DBSMC.[Footnote 27] DOD stated that it is 
currently in the process of updating the DBSMC charter. 

According to the DCMO, she meets regularly with key DOD personnel, 
including representatives from various offices in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the CMOs and DCMOs of the military 
departments, to discuss business operations, including progress in 
addressing problems identified in GAO's high-risk areas. She stated 
that she also regularly briefs the CMO on business-related topics, both 
individually and as part of the DBSMC. The DCMO views herself as an 
integrator and as a facilitator of discussions to identify solutions, 
such as addressing weaknesses in business operations identified in 
GAO's high-risk areas. 

* In addition, the military department CMOs and DCMOs meet with each 
other on a regular basis to share information and ideas on business 
reform. 

CMO, DCMO, and Military Department CMO Role in DOD Efficiency 
Initiative: 

In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced the need for DOD to 
reduce overhead costs and subsequently called for a 5-year effort to 
cut $100 billion from the department's budget in order to finance 
sustainment of the current force and modernize its weapons portfolio. 
As part of this effort, the Secretary has stated that the department 
must "take a hard look" at every aspect of how it does business. 
[Footnote 28] 

* Since then, DOD has embarked on a four-track approach intended to 
achieve a more efficient, effective, and cost-conscious way of doing 
business. One of these tracks addresses specific areas where DOD could 
take immediate action to reduce inefficiencies and overhead, in 
particular, initiatives to reduce headquarters and support 
bureaucracies and to instill a culture of cost-consciousness and 
restraint in the department.[Footnote 29] To see these initiatives 
through to action and to produce measurable results in the near term, 
the Secretary established a task force chaired by his Chief of Staff. 
This task force has chartered study groups to develop action plans and 
is overseeing the implementation of these plans and their eventual 
transition to the appropriate department leadership. The Secretary of 
Defense intends to personally approve all action plans. 

According to the DCMO, the DOD CMO and DCMO are involved in the 
Secretary of Defense's ongoing efficiency initiative. For example: 

* The CMO recently testified before Congress to provide information on 
the department's efficiency efforts, and the DCMO has been given 
specific responsibilities to evaluate options for eliminating the 
Business Transformation Agency and transferring its functions to other 
organizations. 

* According to the DCMO, the CMO accompanies the Secretary of Defense 
to all meetings on the status of efforts related to the efficiency 
initiative. 

* However, notwithstanding their responsibilities related to improving 
the efficiency and effectiveness of business operations, neither the 
CMO nor DCMO has been assigned any specific role for integrating, 
monitoring or otherwise institutionalizing the ongoing efficiency 
initiative. 

Without assigning a specific role for the CMO and DCMO for the 
efficiency initiative, it is not clear how DOD will establish 
accountability and leverage those positions to provide the leadership 
necessary to implement, integrate, and otherwise institutionalize the 
initiative and sustain momentum and progress in the long term. 
Furthermore, without a continuous focus on identifying and implementing 
efficiencies, DOD may be challenged in funding its highest-priority 
programs in light of DOD's fiscal challenges. 

According to the military department CMOs, they were tasked to lead the 
Secretary of Defense's efficiency initiative within their respective 
departments. For example: 

* The Army CMO has issued guidance to implement this initiative that 
provides specific efforts, goals, milestones, and responsibilities to 
ensure that the Army synchronizes and integrates its adjustments to the 
budget. 

* The Air Force has also issued guidance on how to implement efficiency 
initiatives within the service and is using its existing governance 
structure--including entities co-chaired by the Air Force CMO and 
DCMO--to monitor progress in implementing these initiatives. 

* The Navy CMO and DCMO are overseeing working groups to implement DOD 
efficiency-related initiatives and are identifying additional military 
department-specific efficiency initiatives. 

* Each military department has identified areas for savings in its 
respective budget submission as part of efforts to meet the Secretary 
of Defense's goal for each military department to shift $28.3 billion 
over the next 5 years (fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016) in 
overhead costs to force structure and future modernization. 

In addition, the three military department CMOs meet with both the DOD 
DCMO and each other on a regular basis to discuss implementation of the 
efficiency initiatives and overall business issues. 

CMO and DCMO Role in Selected High-Risk Areas: 

DOD has had a CMO since 2007. While the CMO and DCMO, along with 
others, have taken additional actions in the past few years--including 
developing a strategic plan, implementing reform initiatives, and 
measuring progress--our work indicates that additional opportunities 
exist for the CMO, assisted by the DCMO, to provide the leadership 
needed to ensure that actions to implement reforms are completed and to 
achieve goals reflected in the SMP, including those in areas we have 
identified as high risk. 

* With respect to specific business areas, we focused on a few high-
risk areas--personnel security clearances, financial management, and 
supply chain management--to illustrate the involvement of the CMO and 
DCMO and additional actions needed to address long-standing challenges 
in these areas. 

Personnel Security Clearances: 

In 2005, we placed DOD's personnel security clearance program on our 
high-risk list and continued that designation in 2007 because of 
problems such as processing delays and incomplete documentation. 
[Footnote 30] In response to our recommendations and to 
congressional concerns, DOD has taken steps to implement specific 
reforms to its processes for granting personnel security clearances to 
address timeliness and quality issues. For example: 

* The DCMO has been an active member of the Joint Security Clearance 
Process Reform Team, which was formed to improve the security clearance 
process governmentwide, and the Suitability and Security Clearance 
Performance Accountability Council, which guides governmentwide 
personnel security clearance reform efforts. The DOD DCMO stated that 
she is the Vice Chair of the Performance Accountability Council. 

* In 2007, we reported that a sample of initial clearances for DOD 
industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete.[Footnote 
31] In 2008, we reported that DOD had made significant improvements in 
reducing delays, with the average of the fastest 80 percent of initial 
clearances taking 87 days to complete, well below the statutory 
requirements in effect at that time.[Footnote 32] 

* In 2009, we recommended that the Performance Accountability Council 
establish a strategic framework that includes outcome-focused 
performance measures.[Footnote 33] In response, the DCMO played a key 
role in developing both the Performance Accountability Council's 
Strategic Framework for Congress in February 2010 that articulated the 
goals of the reform efforts and participated in the Performance 
Accountability Council's proposed quality measures for the Subcommittee 
on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the 
District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. 

Financial Management: 

Based on our review of the process for developing the SMP and 
discussions with the DCMO, the CMO and DCMO have interacted with the 
DOD Comptroller on issues related to improving financial management. 
For example: 

* The Secretary of Defense, acting through the CMO, has statutory 
responsibility for developing the SMP. The 2008 SMP identified the need 
to modernize and integrate critical financial management and internal 
control systems as one of several departmentwide improvement areas 
within the DOD transformation priorities established by the plan. 

* To develop the 2009 SMP update, the DOD Comptroller provided 
financial management goals to the DCMO. The DCMO ultimately included 
these goals in the plan, which was then approved by the CMO. 

* The DCMO has been involved in discussions with other senior leaders 
at DBSMC meetings to discuss efforts to improve financial management. 

* The CMO and DCMO reviewed and provided comments on DOD's May 2010 
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan Status Report, a 
key plan for transforming the department's financial management 
operations and achieving audit readiness. 

In May 2009, based on our review of the FIAR Plan, we reported that the 
plan did not identify and describe the oversight roles and 
responsibilities of DOD's CMO and military service CMOs over the 
financial improvement efforts occurring within the department. 
[Footnote 34] In particular, we noted that integration of 
the CMO and other senior leaders into the FIAR Plan's efforts to 
transform DOD financial management operations is critical in enabling a 
process by which DOD can more timely identify and address cross-
functional issues and ensure that other business functions, such as 
acquisition and logistics, fully acknowledge and are held accountable 
for their roles and responsibilities in achieving DOD's financial 
management improvement goals and audit readiness.[Footnote 35] We made 
several recommendations to increase the FIAR Plan's effectiveness as a 
strategic and management tool for guiding, monitoring, and reporting on 
financial management improvement efforts and increasing the likelihood 
of meeting the department's goal of financial statement auditability, 
which were incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010. 

* In response to our recommendations, DOD has taken several actions to 
improve its FIAR Plan as a strategic and management tool for guiding, 
monitoring, and reporting on the department's financial management 
improvements. For example, DOD took steps to improve its governance 
framework for monitoring and overseeing financial management 
improvement efforts by expanding its FIAR governance board participants 
to include the DOD DCMO and the military department CMOs. 

* However, as we testified in September 2010,[Footnote 36] DOD still 
needs to define the specific roles and responsibilities for these 
individuals, including when and how they and other leaders are expected 
to become involved in problem resolution or efforts to (1) ensure 
cross-functional area commitment and support for financial management 
improvement efforts, (2) effectively execute its plans, (3) gauge 
actual progress against goals, (4) strengthen accountability, and (5) 
make adjustments as needed. 

Supply Chain Management: 

We have previously identified problems related to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of DOD supply chain management. Key aspects of supply chain 
management include inventory management, requirements forecasting, 
asset visibility, and materiel distribution, as well as logistics-
related strategic planning efforts. 

* In 2008 and 2009, we reported that the Army and Navy had billions of 
dollars of spare parts inventories that were not needed to meet current 
requirements.[Footnote 37] We noted at the time of our reports that 
both the Army and Navy had an opportunity to enhance oversight of 
inventory management as well as gauge the effectiveness of inventory 
improvement efforts as they developed the roles and responsibilities of 
the newly designated CMOs. We recommended that the Army and Navy CMOs 
exercise appropriate oversight of inventory management to align these 
efforts with overall business transformation and to reduce support 
costs. We also recommended that the Army and Navy identify and correct 
any systemic weakness in demand forecasting procedures; the services 
concurred with this recommendation. According to DOD, the department 
began a two-phased evaluation of life cycle forecasting approaches in 
June 2009 and included the issue as a key initiative in its 2009 SMP. 
DOD has developed a plan to improve inventory management practices, 
including the forecasting of demand for inventory items. The DOD DCMO 
stated that she was not involved in developing or reviewing this plan. 

In July 2010, we reported that DOD issued a new Logistics Strategic 
Plan to provide a framework for logistics improvement efforts, 
including supply chain management.[Footnote 38] The Logistics Strategic 
Plan is intended to support strategic planning efforts such as the SMP 
and includes two of the SMP's business priorities: support contingency 
business operations to enhance support to the deployed warfighter and 
reform the department's acquisition and support processes. We also have 
reported that DOD needs to sustain top leadership commitment and long-
term institutional support for its strategic planning efforts for 
supply chain management. Such a leadership commitment is needed to 
successfully resolve ongoing supply chain management problems. The DOD 
DCMO stated that she reviewed the draft Logistics Strategic Plan to 
ensure that it was aligned with the SMP. However, the plan lacks clear 
performance measurement information, definition of key concepts, 
identification of problems and capability gaps, and discussion of 
resources needed to achieve goals. 

Objective 2: Strategic Planning: 

DOD and the military departments have made limited progress in 
developing business transformation plans, supported by a strategic 
planning process, that enable them to align goals and planning efforts 
and to measure progress. 

Our prior work has shown that implementing significant organizational 
change--such as DOD is attempting to do with business transformation--
requires a comprehensive, integrated strategic plan that sets a clear 
direction and contains key elements, such as measurable performance 
goals and objectives, funding priorities that are linked to goals, and 
aligning of goals and measures with departmentwide goals and cascading 
goals and measures to lower organizational levels.[Footnote 39] 

DOD's July 2009 Strategic Management Plan identifies priorities but 
still does not contain some key strategic plan elements. Specifically, 
it does not include funding priorities and some of the goals were not 
measurable. 

The 2009 SMP, an update to the original SMP issued in 2008, represents 
an improvement in that the plan identifies five business priorities 
with associated outcomes, goals, measures, and initiatives. Those five 
business priorities are as follows: 

* Support the All-Volunteer Force: 

* Support Contingency Business Operations: 

* Reform the DOD Acquisition and Support Processes: 

* Enhance the Civilian Workforce: 

* Strengthen DOD Financial Management: 

Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the 2009 SMP: 

* Contains some goals that are difficult to measure. 

- Our prior work has shown that a performance goal should be expressed 
in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form.[Footnote 40] 

- Of the 43 goals in the 2009 SMP, 15 are not expressed in a measurable 
form, for example, 

-- "improve business process internal controls in Afghanistan." 

* Contains some measures that do not allow for assessment of progress 
toward overall goals. 

- Our prior work has shown that a performance measure should have 
quantifiable, numerical targets or other measurable values to 
facilitate future assessments of whether overall goals and objectives 
were achieved.[Footnote 41] 

- Of the 76 measures in the 2009 SMP, 56 lack information--
specifically, baseline or target data--that would enable DOD to assess 
progress in achieving SMP goals. For example: 

-- "increase contract oversight" and: 

-- "apply lessons learned in Iraq to Afghanistan." 

* Does not identify time frames for completing key initiatives or 
funding priorities or resources needed to achieve goals. 

* On December 30, 2010, DOD issued an updated plan, which covers fiscal 
year 2011. We plan to evaluate the updated plan to assess whether it 
contains key elements, such as measurable goals, funding priorities, 
and resource needs. 

In addition, the 2009 SMP does not include a discussion about overall 
departmentwide or DOD component-specific business transformation 
problems or challenges, nor does it indicate the extent or severity of 
any identified capability gaps. Such information is necessary to 
establish a clear and common understanding of what problems and gaps 
the plan is trying to address. 

Although the 2009 SMP does not specifically refer to GAO's high-risk 
areas, it does include outcomes, goals, measures, or initiatives that 
relate to aspects of the high-risk areas that we have identified as 
needing improvement. 

Moreover, it is unclear how the goals in the 2009 SMP relate to other 
DOD business-related plans, in particular the Business Enterprise 
Architecture (BEA) and Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP). 

* For example, the fiscal year 2010 ETP, which is an element of the 
BEA, contains six business enterprise priorities, but these are not 
clearly aligned with the SMP's five business priorities. According to 
DOD officials, they are working to better align the ETP, BEA, and SMP 
in future updates. 

Although some performance goals and measures could be improved, DOD has 
begun using performance measures to monitor progress against business-
related goals. 

Best practices for successfully implementing strategic plans include 
collecting data to measure performance and using that information to 
continuously improve organizational processes.[Footnote 42] 

DOD has begun to collect and use performance data to measure progress 
against business-related goals. 

- DOD initially used the performance measures developed for its fiscal 
year 2010 performance plan,[Footnote 32] rather than the measures 
included in the 2009 SMP, to monitor progress against business goals. 

- In October 2009, DOD revised the fiscal year 2010 performance plan 
measures to align them with the priorities and goals contained in the 
July 2009 SMP.[Footnote 33] 

- In January 2010, DOD began reporting quarterly to the DBSMC on 
progress on the fiscal year 2010 performance plan measures, which it 
can track according to GAO's high-risk areas. 

- In October 2010, DOD continued this quarterly reporting using the 
fiscal year 2011 performance plan measures. 

The military departments are in varying stages of their planning 
efforts. 

Army and Navy officials stated that they used the SMP's priorities as 
the starting point for developing their respective business 
transformation plans. The Army issued its business transformation plan 
in October 2010. The Navy issued its plan in November 2010. 

The Air Force has an overarching 2008 strategic plan that it states 
covers business transformation; however, this Air Force plan does not 
define business transformation and does not identify which of its goals 
are related to business transformation. 

* For example, one goal in the Air Force 2008 strategic plan is to 
"ensure an accountable, credible, and transparent institution." Because 
this goal is stated in broad terms, it is unclear whether this goal is 
related to any of the business priorities identified in DOD's July 2009 
SMP. 

* Air Force officials stated that they planned to update their 
strategic plan and establish business-related priorities by December 
2010 and then formally issue their business transformation plan in 
March 2011. 

Prior work on results-oriented management best practices has shown that 
a key attribute of success is that performance goals and measures--such 
as those in the military departments' business transformation plans--
should align with higher-level departmentwide priorities, with the 
relationship clearly articulated.[Footnote 45] 

* Such linkage is important in ensuring that agency efforts are 
properly aligned with goals (and thus contribute to their 
accomplishment) and in assessing progress toward achieving goals. 

Although the 2009 SMP describes a strategic planning process, DOD has 
not established mechanisms, including procedures and milestones, by 
which DOD is to reach consensus with the military departments on 
priorities, synchronize development of the respective plans with each 
other and with the budget process, obtain review and approval by senior 
leaders, and guide efforts to monitor progress and take corrective 
action. 

* Therefore, it is unclear to what extent the business transformation 
priorities for the military departments will be aligned with the 
priorities identified in DOD's SMP or how these business transformation 
priorities will influence the department's budget requests. 

Without a strategic plan containing measurable goals and funding 
priorities, supported by a clearly defined planning process, the 
department will not have the tools it needs to set strategic direction 
for business transformation efforts, fully align efforts to develop 
plans and budget requests that reflect business priorities, measure 
progress in implementing reform initiatives, and institutionalize its 
strategic planning efforts across administrations. 

Conclusions: 

Since January 2009, DOD and the military departments have taken some 
positive steps toward further developing and implementing a management 
approach to business transformation. Clearly, filling key positions, 
establishing governance entities, and developing business plans at the 
departmentwide and military department levels will enhance the 
department's ability to achieve successful and sustainable 
transformation. However, in order to establish accountability and fully 
leverage the potential of the CMO and DCMO positions and supporting 
governance entities to provide the leadership necessary to guide reform 
efforts, roles and responsibilities must be clear. 

Given their responsibilities, under statute and department guidance, 
related to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of business 
operations, the CMO and DCMO are uniquely positioned to monitor, 
integrate, and otherwise institutionalize the Secretary of Defense's 
ongoing efficiency initiative. In the absence of specifically defining 
their roles and responsibilities related to this initiative, it is 
unclear how DOD will establish accountability and leverage those 
positions to provide the leadership necessary to sustain momentum and 
progress in achieving reforms in the long term. 

DOD has now identified business priorities in its updated strategic 
plan, which is clearly an improvement over its initial plan, but it 
still lacks certain elements, such as a complete set of measurable 
goals linked to funding priorities. Furthermore, it has not yet set up 
mechanisms necessary to guide and align its strategic planning efforts. 
Without a comprehensive strategic plan, supported by a clearly defined 
planning process, DOD will not have the tools it needs to set strategic 
direction, fully align plans and budgets that reflect business 
priorities, measure progress against goals, and institutionalize its 
strategic planning efforts across administrations. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To establish ongoing accountability and better leverage the unique 
positions of the CMO and DCMO to provide the leadership necessary to 
follow up the Secretary's recent efficiency initiative in the long 
term, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 
action: 

* Assign specific roles and responsibilities to the CMO and DCMO for 
integrating the Secretary's initiative with ongoing reform efforts, 
overseeing its implementation, and otherwise institutionalizing the 
effort for the long term. 

To enhance DOD's ability to set strategic direction for its business 
transformation efforts, and better align and institutionalize its 
efforts to develop and implement plans and measure progress against 
established goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the CMO to take the following two actions: 

* Ensure that DOD's revised SMP contains measurable goals and funding 
priorities linked to those goals. 

* Issue guidance to establish a strategic planning process with 
mechanisms--such as procedures and milestones--for routinely updating 
the SMP and military department business transformation plans. In 
particular, this guidance should include elements such as how DOD and 
the military departments--including the CMO, DCMO, and military 
department CMOs--will reach consensus on business priorities, 
coordinate review and approval of updates to plans, synchronize the 
development of plans with the budget process, and monitor 
implementation of reform initiatives, and report on progress, on a 
periodic basis, towards achieving established goals. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In its written comments, DOD concurred with two of our recommendations 
and partially concurred with one. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 
assign specific roles and responsibilities to the CMO and DCMO for 
integrating the Secretary's efficiency initiative with ongoing reform 
efforts, overseeing its implementation, and otherwise 
institutionalizing the effort for the long term. While DOD did not 
specify the action it planned to take to implement our recommendation, 
we would expect that once the Secretary determines the roles and 
responsibilities to be assigned to the CMO and DCMO, these would be 
clearly communicated within the department. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary direct the 
CMO to ensure that DOD's revised SMP contains measurable goals and 
funding priorities linked to those goals. DOD agreed that the SMP 
should contain measurable goals linked to the budget, and stated that 
the draft fiscal year 2011 SMP accomplishes this goal. DOD also stated 
that the fiscal year 2011 SMP is tightly integrated with the fiscal 
year 2011 Performance Budget and directly links performance measures to 
the budget through Forces and Infrastructure Category codes. DOD 
further noted that each goal in the fiscal year 2011 SMP is supported 
by quantifiable performance measures and that results against these 
measures will be briefed on a quarterly basis to the DBSMC. On December 
30, 2010, DOD issued an updated plan, which covers fiscal year 2011. We 
plan to evaluate the updated plan to assess whether it contains key 
elements, such as measurable goals, funding priorities, and resource 
needs. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary 
direct the CMO to issue guidance to establish a strategic planning 
process with mechanisms--such as procedures and milestones--for 
routinely updating the SMP and military department business 
transformation plans. DOD agreed that it is important for its strategic 
planning process to ensure alignment between the various documents that 
comprise the department's "family of plans" and the officials that are 
responsible for those plans. DOD identified this "family of plans" to 
include the SMP, Performance Budget, Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness Plan, DOD Logistics Strategic Plan, individual GAO High Risk 
Area Remediation Plans, and Military Department Business Transformation 
and Transition Plans. DOD, however, stated that it is focused on using 
its existing governance bodies and natural planning cycles associated 
with these documents to ensure alignment while maintaining the ability 
to respond to changing circumstances in an agile way that the 
establishment of formal policy would not allow. It noted that these 
governance bodies include the DBSMC, the Performance Budget Senior 
Review Group, and a variety of functional and organizational boards 
throughout the department. 

We recognize that DOD relies on existing governance bodies and planning 
cycles to develop and align the SMP and other related plans, and agree 
that it is important for DOD to be able to respond to changing 
circumstances. However, we do not believe that establishing formal 
policy to govern its strategic planning efforts would hinder the 
department in any manner. Rather, we believe that issuing formal 
guidance to clearly define the planning process will help the 
department achieve a common understanding and approach among the 
various planning entities and therefore enhance its overall ability to 
set strategic direction, better align and institutionalize its planning 
efforts, and measure progress against established goals. Over the past 
few years, the department and military departments have gained momentum 
in achieving consensus on business priorities and maturing their 
planning efforts. To sustain this momentum and to ensure continuity for 
the long term, we believe it is important that the CMO clearly outline 
the process that will guide strategic planning efforts, including 
elements such as how DOD and the military departments--including the 
CMO, DCMO, and military department CMOs--will reach consensus on 
business priorities, coordinate review and approval of updates to 
plans, synchronize the development of plans with the budget process, 
and monitor implementation of reform initiatives, and report progress, 
on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals. Given DOD's 
statements about the need to maintain the ability to respond to 
changing circumstances, the CMO could also include specific provisions 
to allow for the flexibility needed to make adjustments as 
circumstances dictate. 

Related GAO Products: 

DOD Business Transformation: Improved Management Oversight of Business 
System Modernization Efforts Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-53]. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 
2010. 

Department of Defense: Financial Management Improvement and Audit 
Readiness Efforts Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1059T]. Washington, D.C.: September 
29, 2010. 

DOD's High-Risk Areas: Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in 
Strategic Planning for Supply Chain Management. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-929T]. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 
2010. 

Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal Control. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-660]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 1, 2010. 

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using 
Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-472]. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 
2010. 

Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and 
Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]. Washington, D.C.: 
October 29, 2009. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete 
Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further 
Improve the Clearance Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400]. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 
2009. 

DOD Business Systems Modernization: Recent Slowdown in 
Institutionalizing Key Management Controls Needs to Be Addressed. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-586]. Washington, D.C.: 
May 18, 2009. 

Financial Management: Achieving Financial Statement Auditability in the 
Department of Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-373]. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2009. 

DOD's High-Risk Areas: Actions Needed to Reduce Vulnerabilities and 
Improve Business Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-460T]. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 
2009. 

Defense Inventory: Army Needs to Evaluate Impact of Recent Actions to 
Improve Demand Forecasts for Spare Parts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-199]. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 
2009. 

Defense Business Transformation: Status of Department of Defense 
Efforts to Develop a Management Approach to Guide Business 
Transformation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-272R]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2009. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January 
2009. 

Defense Inventory: Management Actions Needed to Improve the Cost 
Efficiency of the Navy's Spare Parts Inventory. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-103]. Washington, D.C.: December 
12, 2008. 

DOD Business Transformation: Air Force's Current Approach Increases 
Risk That Asset Visibility Goals and Transformation Priorities Will Not 
Be Achieved. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-866]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2008. 

DOD Business Systems Modernization: Progress in Establishing Corporate 
Management Controls Needs to Be Replicated Within Military Departments. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-705]. Washington, D.C.: 
May 15, 2008. 

Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and 
Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device 
Defeat Organization. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-
342]. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008. 

Defense Business Transformation: Sustaining Progress Requires 
Continuity of Leadership and an Integrated Approach. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-462T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
7, 2008. 

Organizational Transformation: Implementing Chief Operating Officer/
Chief Management Officer Positions in Federal Agencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-322T]. Washington, D.C.: December 
13, 2007. 

Organizational Transformation: Implementing Chief Operating Officer/
Chief Management Officer Positions in Federal Agencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-34]. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 
2007. 

Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief 
Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1072]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 5, 2007. 

DOD Business Transformation: Lack of an Integrated Strategy Puts the 
Army's Asset Visibility System Investments at Risk. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-860]. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 
2007. 

Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support 
for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated 
Management Approach. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-807]. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2007. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310]. Washington, D.C.: January 
2007. 

[End of section] 

Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Deputy Chief Management Officer: 
9010 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-9010: 

December 21, 2010: 

Ms. Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Pickup: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office draft report GAO-11-181R, "Defense Business 
Transformation: DoD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Further Define 
Key Management Roles, Develop Measurable Goals, and Align Planning 
Efforts," dated November 17, 2010 (GAO Code 351377). The Department 
acknowledges receipt of the draft report and appreciates the 
opportunity to review your findings. The Department's detailed 
comments on the recommendations are attached. 

Signed by: 

Elizabeth A. McGrath: 

Attachment: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated November 17, 2010: 
GAO-11-181R (GAO Code 351377): 

"Defense Business Transformation: DOD Needs To Take Additional Actions 
To Further Define Key Management Roles, Develop Measurable Goals, And 
Align Planning Efforts" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
assign specific roles and responsibilities to the CMO and DCMO for 
integrating the Secretary's efficiency initiative with ongoing reform 
efforts, overseeing its implementation, and otherwise 
institutionalizing the effort for the long term. (See pages 4-5/GAO 
Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the CMO to ensure that DoD's revised SMP contains measurable 
goals and funding priorities linked to those goals. (See page 5/GAO 
Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. 

The Department agrees the Strategic Management Plan (SMP) should 
contain measurable goals linked to the budget. The draft Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2011 SMP, now in formal coordination within the Department, 
accomplishes this goal. The FY 2011 SMP is tightly integrated with the 
FY 2011 Performance Budget and directly links performance measures to 
the budget through the use of Forces and Infrastructure Category 
("FIC") codes. Additionally, each goal in the FY 2011 is supported by 
quantifiable performance measures. Results against these measures will 
be briefed on a quarterly basis to the Defense Business Systems 
Management Committee (DBSMC). 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the CMO to issue guidance to establish a strategic planning 
process with mechanisms — such as procedures and milestones — for 
routinely updating the SMP and military department business 
transformation plans. In particular, this guidance should include 
elements such as how DoD and the military departments — including the 
CMO, DCMO, and military department CMOs — will reach consensus on 
business priorities, coordinate review and approval of updates to 
plans, synchronize the development of plans with the budget process, 
and monitor and report progress in implementing reform initiatives and 
achieving established goals. (See page 5/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Partially concur. 

The Department agrees that it is important for the Department's 
strategic planning process to ensure alignment between the various 
documents that comprise the Department's "family of plans" and the 
officials that are responsible for those plans. The Department's 
"family of plans" includes the SMP, Performance Budget, Financial 
Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan. DoD Logistics Strategic 
Plan, individual GAO High Risk Area Remediation Plans and Military 
Department Business Transformation and Transition Plans. However, DoD 
is focused on using its existing governance bodies and the natural 
planning cycles associated with these documents to ensure alignment 
while maintaining the ability to respond to changing circumstances in 
an agile way that the establishment of formal policy would not allow. 
These governance bodies include the DBSMC, the Performance Budget 
Senior Review Group, and a variety of functional and organizational 
boards throughout the Department. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See for example, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, DC.: Jan. 2009). 

[2] GAO, GAO's 2005 High-Risk Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-350T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 
2005). 

[3] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a 
Chief Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1072] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 5, 2007). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 904 (2008). 

[5] Pub. L. No. 110-417, §§ 904, 908 (2008). 

[6] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: Status of Department of 
Defense Efforts to Develop a Management Approach to Guide Business 
Transformation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-272R] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2009). 

[7] For example, DOD established the Defense Business Systems 
Management Committee, the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, and the 
Business Transformation Agency. 

[8] GAO, Organizational Transformation: Implementing Chief Operating 
Officer/Chief Management Officer Positions in Federal Agencies. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-34] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov.1, 2007). 

[9] See for example, GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Full-time 
Chief Management Officer with a Term Appointment Is Needed at DOD to 
Maintain Continuity of Effort and Achieve Sustainable Success, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-132T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 16, 2007); [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-272R]; and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1072]. 

[10] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-272R]. 

[12] The DOD high-risk areas are: DOD approach to business 
transformation, DOD personnel security clearance program, DOD support 
infrastructure management, DOD business systems modernization, DOD 
financial management, DOD contract management, DOD supply chain 
management, and DOD weapons system acquisition. 

[13] For a list of related GAO products, see the list at the end of 
this briefing. 

[14] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-181, § 904 (2008). 

[15] Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, §§ 904, 908 (2008). 

[16] For key strategies for establishing and implementing CMO or chief 
operating officer positions, see GAO, Organizational Transformation: 
Implementing Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer 
Positions in Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-34] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 
2007). 

[17] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: Status of Department of 
Defense Efforts to Develop a Management Approach to Guide Business 
Transformation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-272R] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2009). 

[18] The Business Transformation Agency supports the DCMO in leading 
and coordinating business transformation efforts across the department, 
including maintaining and updating the department's enterprise 
architecture for its business mission area. 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-34]. 

[20] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Full-time Chief Management 
Officer with a Term Appointment Is Needed at DOD to Maintain Continuity 
of Effort and Achieve Sustainable Success, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-132T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16, 
2007); Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a 
Chief Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1072] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 5, 2007); and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-272R]. 

[21] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

[22] On December 30, 2010, DOD issued an updated plan, which covers 
fiscal year 2011. We plan to evaluate the updated plan to assess 
whether it contains key elements, such as measurable goals, funding 
priorities, and resource needs. 

[23] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-34]. 

[24] This board was originally the Procure-to-Pay Governance Board and 
was established in October 2009. The DCMO expanded the scope of this 
board to include all business processes, renamed it the End-to-End 
Business Process Governance Board, and drafted a charter in June 2010. 

[25] The previous Under Secretary of the Army, who served from July 
2008 to December 2008, was also the Army CMO. 

[26] The CMO co-chairs the Air Force Council and the DCMO co-chairs the 
Air Force Board. Both of these entities are part of the governance 
structure by which the Air Force makes servicewide decisions about all 
matters, including business transformation. 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1072]. 

[28] Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 
Abilene, Kansas, May 8, 2010. 

[29] The other three tracks are as follows: (1) the Secretary directed 
that the military services find more than $100 billion in overhead 
savings over the next 5 years; (2) the department is seeking ideas, 
suggestions, and proposals regarding efficiencies from outside experts 
and industry; and (3) the department is conducting a broad review of 
how it is organized and operated to inform the President's 2012 budget 
process. 

[30] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2009). 

[31] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2007). 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. 

[33] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, 
Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to 
Further Improve the Clearance Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400] (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 
2009). 

[34] GAO, Financial Management: Achieving Financial Statement 
Auditability in the Department of Defense, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-373] (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 
2009). 

[35] GAO, Department of Defense: Financial Management Improvement and 
Audit Readiness Efforts Continue to Evolve, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1059T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 
2010). 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1059T]. 

[37] GAO, Defense Inventory: Management Actions Needed to Improve the 
Cost Efficiency of the Navy's Spare Parts Inventory, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-103] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 
2008), and Defense Inventory: Army Needs to Evaluate Impact of Recent 
Actions to Improve Demand Forecasts for Spare Parts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-199] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 
2009). 

[38] GAO, DOD's High-Risk Areas: Observations on DOD's Progress and 
Challenges in Strategic Planning for Supply Chain Management, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-929T] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 27, 2010). 

[39] GAO, Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better 
Inventory and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills 
and Regional Proficiency, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-568] (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 
2009), and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-272R]. 

[40] GAO, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency 
Annual Performance Plans, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.20] (Washington, D.C.: April 
1998), and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-568]. 

[41] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax 
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
22, 2002). 

[42] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[43] Under 31 U.S.C. § 1115, DOD is required to issue an annual 
performance plan, in which performance indicators to be used in 
measuring or assessing relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes 
of each program activity are established. 

[44] We did not assess the quality of the fiscal year 2010 performance 
plan measures. 

[45] GAO, Defense Management: Tools for Measuring and Managing Defense 
Agency Performance Could Be Strengthened, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-919] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 
2004). 

[End of section] 

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