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GAO-09-735R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 25, 2009: 

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer:
Majority Leader:
House of Representatives: 

Subject: Defense Logistics: Information on the Test and Evaluation and 
Assignment and Cancellation of National Stock Numbers as It Relates to 
MILITEC-1: 

Dear Mr. Hoyer: 

The purpose of this letter is to respond to your request for 
information regarding the test and evaluation process[Footnote 1] 
conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) of a specific synthetic 
lubricant called MILITEC-1 that is produced by Militec, Inc., and the 
assignment and cancellation of national stock numbers[Footnote 2] (NSN) 
associated with that product. Militec, Inc., has challenged DOD 
decisions not to include MILITEC-1 in the federal supply system. 
Specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which the military services 
have tested and evaluated MILITEC-1 as a small arms lubricant, as a 
metal conditioner, as a general purpose lubricant, and as a lubricant 
additive, and with what results; and (2) the extent to which the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) followed applicable DOD procedures in 
assigning and subsequently canceling national stock numbers to MILITEC- 
1. In addition, we are providing in enclosure I a timeline on the 
efforts to test and evaluate, and assign and cancel, NSNs for MILITEC- 
1. 

MILITEC-1 is a dry, impregnated, synthetic-based metal conditioner 
that, at the time of our review, has been primarily marketed as a small 
arms[Footnote 3] lubricant, although it is also marketed as an 
automotive and transportation lubricant. The product is packaged in 
several container sizes and is available for commercial purchase. 
According to DOD officials, in order for a product to be approved for 
use on small arms it must fulfill DOD's performance specifications by 
meeting a number of laboratory and live fire test requirements 
developed by the Army, which has cognizance across DOD for the 
specification for cleaner, lubricant, and preservative properties in 
small arms lubricants. Once a product has been approved and the 
services have determined that they have sufficient projected demand for 
the product, the services request that DLA assign the product an NSN--a 
label assigned to items that are repeatedly purchased, stocked, stored, 
issued, and used throughout the federal supply system. 

To obtain an understanding of the extent to which DOD and the military 
services have tested and evaluated MILITEC-1 as a small arms lubricant, 
metal conditioner, general purpose lubricant, and a lubricant additive 
and with what results, we obtained and reviewed available DOD 
instructions, manuals and publications, and test and evaluation reports 
on MILITEC-1 and other, similar products. We did not, however, observe 
testing or evaluate test results, given the considerable lapse in time 
since such tests had occurred. We also did not evaluate the validity of 
the military specifications. We met with (1) DOD officials who had 
knowledge of the tests and evaluations conducted, and (2) officials 
from Militec, Inc., to gain their perspective on their product and 
their experiences with DOD. To obtain an understanding of the extent to 
which the DLA followed applicable procedures in assigning and 
subsequently canceling NSNs to MILITEC-1, we obtained and reviewed 
applicable DOD logistics documents and met with DOD officials to 
discuss the procedures that were followed in assigning and canceling 
NSNs. We also met with officials from Militec, Inc., to learn their 
perspective with regard to the assigning and canceling of NSNs for 
their product. Additionally, we reviewed numerous testimonials they 
provided us from deployed servicemembers who used the product and other 
company documents. Enclosure II provides additional detail regarding 
our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through April 2009 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

From 1988 to 2006, the military services tested and evaluated MILITEC- 
1 11 times for various uses, including as a small arms cleaner, 
lubricant, and preservative; a metal conditioner; a general purpose 
lubricant; or a lubricant additive. Although the product passed early 
tests as a lubricant additive in the late 1980s, it did not pass 9 of 
the 11 tests and evaluations. These tests ranged from a limited 
demonstration of performance characteristics to a comprehensive 
assessment of the product with regard to military specifications. The 
product has not passed any tests and evaluations for a small arms 
cleaner, lubricant, and preservative, metal conditioner, or a general 
purpose lubricant. In 1988 and 1989, MILITEC-1 passed Marine Corps and 
Navy tests and evaluations as a lubricant additive, but it did not pass 
a subsequent test and evaluation as a lubricant additive in 1994. 
Militec, Inc., continues to market its product for use as a small arms 
lubricant to DOD, and asserts that DOD's current product specification 
is flawed. The Army disagrees that its military specification is flawed 
and has extended to Militec, Inc., the opportunity either to 
demonstrate how its product has been modified to conform to the current 
military specification for a small arms lubricant or indicate why the 
specification should be modified, according to DOD officials. However, 
Militec, Inc., has not done so. 

DLA did not follow applicable DOD procedures when it assigned NSNs for 
MILITEC-1 in 1993 and again in 1995 in that it did not first obtain 
approval from the military services as required by DLA procedures, 
according to agency officials. However, the agency did follow 
applicable procedures when it subsequently canceled or blocked NSNs in 
1995, 2003, and 2007, according to DLA officials and our review of 
available documentation. DOD officials told us that their procedures 
require DLA to obtain approval from the military services prior to 
assigning NSNs, to ensure that a product meets military specifications. 
The services did not approve the assignment of NSNs for MILITEC-1 in 
the 1990s, yet because of the department's push toward the use of 
commercial off-the-shelf items, the product was assigned NSNs by DLA in 
1993 and did get into the supply system. Soon after, however, in 1994 
DLA initiated action to cancel the NSNs because of a lack of service 
support. In that respect, DLA did correctly follow applicable 
procedures on the occasions when it either canceled the product--that 
is, removed it from the federal supply system--or halted its purchase 
throughout the 1990s and continuing to 2007, according to DLA 
officials. 

Background: 

DOD Small Arms Multipurpose Lubricant Specifications Require Products 
to Have Cleaning, Lubrication, and Preservation Properties: 

In order for a product to be approved for use on small arms it must 
fulfill DOD's performance specifications by meeting a number of 
laboratory and live fire test requirements developed by the Army. The 
Army, which has cognizance across DOD over the specifications for 
cleaning, lubrication, and preservation properties in small arms 
lubricants, provides copies of this performance specification and other 
relevant information to suppliers who wish to qualify their products. 
The supplier usually pays the cost of qualification testing and 
provides samples of its product for the tests. 

In 1971, to improve weapons maintenance and to simplify logistics 
supply, the Army sought to define a military specification for a single 
small arms lubrication product to be used for cleaning, lubrication, 
and preservation for daily user-level maintenance. At that time 
soldiers were using multiple products to perform routine small arms 
maintenance. In July 1979, after several years of testing and 
evaluation, DOD approved a servicewide military performance 
specification for a single cleaner, lubricant, and preservative product 
for small arms. Since then, the military specification has been 
modified 18 times, most recently after the desert lubricant test and 
evaluation was finalized in 2005 for applications in a desert 
environment. DLA officials explained to us that changes to military 
specifications may be initiated by public law, DOD policy, service 
policy, improved test and evaluation processes, changing user needs, or 
industry capability. Currently, the approved cleaning, lubrication, and 
preservation products are applied to more than 1 million DOD small 
arms. The most current version of the requirements for the small arms 
lubricant specification is shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Current DOD Requirements for Small Arms Lubricant 
Specification: 

Laboratory tests: 

Cleaning: 
Residue removal. 

Lubrication: 
Friction and wear-control in sliding contact conditions. 

Preservation: 
Humidity and salt-spray resistance; 
Corrosion protection. 

Other: 
Viscosity; 
Flash point: 150°F minimum.
Pour point: -75°F maximum; 
Metal corrosion protection; 
Water displacement; 
Fluidity at low temperature: -65°F; 
No interference with chemical agent detectors; 
No ozone depleting substances;
User safety and toxicity. 

Live fire tests: 
Cold temperature firing; 
Dynamic dust test; 
Salt fog exposure. 

Source: GAO and DOD data. 

[End of table] 

When a product has been tested and evaluated and has met all the 
performance requirements, the Army will list the product and its 
supplier on a qualified products list.[Footnote 4] According to DLA 
officials, the DLA executes all DOD and other government purchases 
throughout the federal supply system for products with cleaning, 
lubrication, and preservation properties. Only qualified suppliers are 
eligible for government solicitations for such products. Multiple 
commercial formulations for cleaning, lubrication, and preservation 
products have been placed on the qualified products list and are 
available for purchase by the services and other organizations in the 
U.S. government and friendly foreign countries. 

National Stock Numbers Are the Labels of the Federal Supply System: 

NSNs serve as the labels assigned to items that are repeatedly 
purchased, stocked, stored, issued, and used throughout the federal 
supply system. The NSN is officially recognized by the United States 
government, including DOD, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and certain foreign governments around the world. NSNs are 
catalogued in the Federal Logistics Information System, which is 
managed by the Defense Logistics Information Service, a DLA Command. 
The Federal Logistics Information System contains over 7 million NSNs. 

NSNs are 13-digit codes of which the first 4 digits represent the 
Federal Supply Class, a grouping of similar items. For example, engine 
oil, small arms oil, rifle grease, and automotive grease are cataloged 
into one Federal Supply Class--Oils and Greases (Federal Supply Class 
9150). The next two digits signify the country that assigned the NSN. 
For example, the United States is identified by 00 and 01. The last 
seven digits represent the national item identification number and are 
sequentially assigned to make each NSN unique. When items from 
different manufacturers perform the same function, have the same 
characteristics, and are the same size, a single NSN is assigned to 
minimize the number of NSNs in the Federal Logistics Information 
System. Figure 1 shows the structure of an NSN and its component parts 
for a notional lubricant made in the United States. 

Figure 1: Example of an NSN for a Notional Lubricant: 

[Refer to PDF for image: table] 

9150-01-1234567: 

9150: 
Federal Supply Class. 

01: 
Country of origin. 

1234567: 
Unique number. 

Source: GAO and DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

National Stock Numbers Are Assigned and Canceled by DLA at the Request 
of the Military Services: 

DOD procedures call for the DLA to obtain approval from the military 
services prior to assigning NSNs to ensure that a product meets 
established military specifications or requirements. According to DOD 
officials, DOD has no single regulation for either assigning or 
canceling an NSN; although it has an established system for assigning, 
it does not have a comparable system for canceling an NSN.[Footnote 5] 

Within DOD, requests for DOD to assign NSNs are made by the services' 
engineering support activities to the appropriate DLA supply center, 
depending on the particular Federal Supply Class item. According to DOD 
officials, in most cases requests are made after the services test the 
products. For example, a request for an NSN for a small arms lubricant 
for the Army would be made by the Army's Research Development and 
Engineering Command to the Defense Supply Center Richmond, the supply 
center that is responsible for the Federal Supply Class Oils and 
Greases: Cutting, Lubricating and Hydraulic (Federal Supply Code 9150), 
which includes small arms lubricants. In their requests the engineering 
support activities provide technical data, quantities, packaging 
requirements, possible suppliers, special handling and storage 
requirements, and shelf life, among other logistics data, to enable the 
DLA supply center to procure the item (usually competitively, according 
to DLA officials) and provide proper logistical support throughout its 
life cycle. 

The DLA supply center forwards the NSN request and associated technical 
information to the Defense Logistics Information System, which reviews 
the request to ensure that it is complete and accurate data and then 
searches the roster of existing NSNs to prevent duplications. According 
to DLA officials, the Defense Logistics Information System assigns the 
NSN and catalogs the item using the information provided by the DLA 
supply center. The supply center notifies the service engineering 
support activity of the NSN assignment. Prior to 1996, supply centers 
had the authority to assign NSNs, but now only the Defense Information 
Logistics System has this authority. 

DOD procedures call for DLA to cancel an NSN when an engineering 
support activity requests that it does so. DLA officials told us when 
there are multiple registered users, DLA will coordinate with all of 
them to determine whether they want to continue using the product. If a 
NATO country is listed as a user, DLA must also coordinate with NATO on 
the proposed NSN cancellation. DLA will cancel an NSN only when all 
users inform DLA that they wish to discontinue use of the product. 

In some cases DLA blocks, rather than cancels, an NSN--that is, it 
prevents DOD users from purchasing an NSN-assigned item through the 
federal supply system. For example, according to DLA officials, if an 
item meets the needs of a civilian user but does not meet military 
specifications, it retains its NSN listing but is specifically blocked 
from purchase by DOD users. Such specific blocks require concurrence 
from the engineering support activity with oversight for the particular 
item. 

MILITEC-1 Did Not Pass Most Tests and Evaluations for Various Uses: 

The military services have tested and evaluated MILITEC-1 11 times for 
various uses, including as a small arms cleaner, lubricant, and 
preservative; a metal conditioner; a general purpose lubricant; and a 
lubricant additive. These tests ranged from a limited demonstration of 
performance characteristics to a comprehensive assessment of the 
product with regard to military specifications. Although the product 
passed 2 early tests, it did not pass 9 of the 11 tests and 
evaluations. MILITEC-1 did not pass any tests and evaluations for use 
as a small arms cleaner, lubricant, and preservative, nor did it pass 
any tests and evaluations as a metal conditioner or a general purpose 
lubricant. The product exhibited some positive attributes in two early 
Navy and Marine Corps tests and evaluations for use as a lubricant 
additive, but it did not pass a subsequent test and evaluation for use 
as a lubricant additive. Ultimately, according to DOD officials, 
MILITEC-1 has not met DOD specifications.[Footnote 6] 

MILITEC-1 Did Not Pass Any Tests and Evaluations as a Small Arms 
Cleaner, Lubricant, and Preservative: 

The initial assessment of MILITEC-1 as a small arms lubricant began in 
April 1990, when DOD asked the Army to test and evaluate MILITEC-1 
against the cleaning, lubrication, and preservation military 
specification. The Army performed a test and evaluation of MILITEC-1 in 
July 1990 and concluded that MILITEC-1 did not meet military 
specifications and could not qualify to become an approved product. 
Specifically, the Army determined that MILITEC-1 did not have a 
cleaning component and did not meet the cold temperature requirements. 
According to Army test and evaluation documentation, the Army noted 
that MILITEC-1 would need to be reformulated before it could meet the 
military specifications for a small arms lubricant. 

In April 1991, the Navy conducted a live fire study to test and 
evaluate eight commercial gun lubricants for their ability to increase 
the velocity and accuracy of the M-16A1 rifle. These lubricants 
included MILITEC-1 as well as DOD's approved cleaning, lubrication, and 
preservation product. The study found that the advantages in velocity 
and accuracy claimed by Militec, Inc., were not achieved. The study 
also found that MILITEC-1 posed a possible health hazard following both 
acute and chronic overexposure to the skin, and it noted that the 
product should not be recommended for use. 

In July 1992, the Navy conducted a test and evaluation to determine 
which small arms lubricants would perform best in environments of 
airborne dust and fine sand, high temperature, and corrosive airborne 
salts. The Navy tested and evaluated 14 commercial small arms 
lubricants, including MILITEC-1, in these environments. The Navy found 
in the dust tests with various exposure times that although liquid 
lubricants appeared to accumulate more dust than the dry lubricants, 
they were actually more effective in overcoming the friction caused by 
the dust. In addition, the test and evaluation showed that only the 
currently approved cleaning, lubrication, and preservation product and 
one other tested and evaluated lubricant provided adequate corrosion 
protection. The rest of the lubricants, including MILITEC-1, did not 
perform satisfactorily in this area. Therefore, the Navy concluded that 
none of the lubricants provided significant benefits over the approved 
cleaning, lubrication, and preservation product, which it found to be 
adequate for general use in these environments. 

After receiving numerous testimonials on the efficacy of MILITEC-1 from 
servicemembers in Iraq who had been using it as a small arms lubricant, 
[Footnote 7] the Army Materiel Command in October 2003 decided to 
conduct another test and evaluation of small arms lubricants (referred 
to in this report as the desert lubricant test and evaluation). 
[Footnote 8] Concerned about the perception of bias at the testing 
location for small arms lubricants,[Footnote 9] the Army Materiel 
Command decided to conduct the test and evaluation at another Army test 
facility. In addition, the Army focused its test and evaluation on the 
small arms lubrication properties of the military specification in a 
desert environment and issued a solicitation to industry. Twenty-three 
products, including MILITEC-1, along with the 2 qualified cleaning, 
lubrication, and preservation products, were submitted for test and 
evaluation. The effort included live fire testing and used the three 
most frequently issued types of small arms. Final test and evaluation 
results were not determined until October 2005 for a variety of 
reasons--for example, test protocols had to be developed and 
coordinated with industry, and small arms for test and evaluation had 
to be obtained. Field testing with soldiers was considered but not 
performed because of concerns about test repeatability and soldiers' 
respiratory safety in a highly concentrated silica dust environment. 
MILITEC-1, along with 15 other products, did not pass the initial live 
fire test because of excessive firing malfunctions and was therefore 
not considered for further live fire testing. In response to the test 
and evaluation results, the Army issued a safety and maintenance 
message to all Army components in December 2006 emphasizing that only 
the approved cleaning, lubrication, and preservation products should be 
used on small arms, and that small arms reliability could be 
compromised if other products were used.[Footnote 10] In January 2006, 
the Army notified DLA that based on the results of the desert lubricant 
test and evaluation, it would not further consider MILITEC-1 as a small 
arms lubricant. 

MILITEC-1 Did Not Pass Any Tests and Evaluations as a Metal Conditioner 
or a General Purpose Lubricant: 

In July 1995, the Army sought to develop a specification for a metal 
conditioner and issued a call to industry to solicit samples for test 
and evaluation. Militec, Inc., was the only vendor to submit a product. 
A test and evaluation completed in July 1996 by the Army's Tank- 
automotive and Armament Command found that MILITEC-1 had lubricating 
characteristics but was inadequate for corrosion protection. Militec, 
Inc., appealed the finding, but Army officials affirmed the validity of 
the test. They invited Militec, Inc. to reformulate its product to 
address the corrosion issue and then resubmit it for further test and 
evaluation. In December 1995, the Army Missile Command tested and 
evaluated MILITEC-1 for its corrosion resistance properties on steel 
and aluminum alloys. Army officials told us that this test and 
evaluation was intended to determine whether MILITEC-1 performed better 
than metal conditioners already in use for providing corrosion 
resistance. The results indicated that MILITEC-1 did not perform 
better. Therefore, Army officials concluded that they would not further 
consider MILITEC-1 the standard for specifications. In July 1997, the 
Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command conducted a test and 
evaluation of MILITEC-1 as a possible lubricant for weapons seals but 
stopped the test after 1 hour after observing extensive corrosion. 

In April 2006 the Army performed a test and evaluation of MILITEC-1 as 
a general purpose lubricant and informed DLA that MILITEC-1 did not 
meet the requirements of the general purpose lubricant specification. 

MILITEC-1 Demonstrated Some Positive Attributes as a Lubricant Additive 
in Two Early Tests and Evaluations, but Did Not Pass a Subsequent Test 
and Evaluation: 

Before MILITEC-1 was considered for DOD use as a small arms weapons 
system lubricant, it was marketed to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army 
as a friction-reducing lubricant additive. In two early Navy and Marine 
Corps tests and evaluations of the product as a lubricant additive, it 
demonstrated some positive attributes, but the product did not pass a 
subsequent test and evaluation as a lubricant additive. Furthermore, 
DOD has had a standing prohibition against the use of lubricant 
additives containing chlorine since late 1950s--prior to the Navy and 
Marine Corps test and evaluations. MILITEC-1 contains chlorine. DOD and 
Navy officials could not explain why the Navy and Marine Corps 
conducted these tests and evaluations, given that MILITEC-1 has always 
contained chlorine. 

In May 1988 the U.S. Marine Corps Research, Development, and 
Acquisition Command received samples of MILITEC-1 from Militec, Inc., 
and conducted a test and evaluation to determine whether a jeep using 
MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive could operate longer and travel 
farther after losing engine oil.[Footnote 11] In July 1988 the test and 
evaluation was performed--the first time to our knowledge that DOD 
tested and evaluated the product. The test and evaluation showed that a 
jeep for which MILITEC-1 had been added to the engine oil exhibited 
improved engine friction reduction and could be driven for a longer 
time and at greater mileage than a jeep without the product. DOD was 
unable to provide us information regarding whether the Marine Corps 
purchased the product as a result of this test and evaluation. 

In April 1989 the Navy's Atlantic Fleet completed an operational test 
and evaluation of MILITEC-1 lubricant additive in various internal 
combustion engines and gearboxes. Fleet officials reported improved 
friction-reducing attributes and recommended MILITEC-1 for interim use 
in the Navy. Citing these results and those of the Marine Corps test 
and evaluation described above, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 
the Navy for Safety and Survivability approved a limited qualification 
authorizing the use of MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive on mechanical 
equipment for a duration not exceeding 2 years. 

In July 1989, however, the Army Armament Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center, in correspondence with the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics, reported that it had not been 
able to conduct any tests and evaluations of MILITEC-1 as a lubricant 
additive because it had not received specific details from Militec, 
Inc., about preliminary screening test outcomes as called for by a DOD 
guide on the methodology for the test and evaluation of lubricant 
additives. Army officials noted that, while they had received numerous 
queries and proposals from Militec, Inc., on the adoption of MILITEC-1 
as a lubricant additive, Militec, Inc., had not responded to the Army's 
additional request for data and communication of the requirements of 
its regulation. In 1991, the Army Materiel Command again provided 
Militec, Inc., with a written copy of the procedures it needed to 
perform in order to qualify its product as a lubricant additive, 
reiterating that the Army would not authorize the use of the product as 
an additive without an independent lab test and evaluation approved by 
the Army. 

In May 1992, after examining the results of previous tests and 
evaluations and consultations with industry, the Naval Sea Systems 
Command declined to sponsor NSNs for MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive. 
In addition, in June 1992 the Naval Sea Systems Command issued a Fleet 
Advisory to "stop adding MILITEC-1 to all lubricating oils" and to 
"dispose of any unused stock of MILITEC-1" in part because the product 
contains chlorine and the Navy's policy to ban the use of lubricant 
additives that contain chlorine. 

Nevertheless, in July 1994, the Naval Research Lab tested and evaluated 
MILITEC-1 for possible use as a lubricant additive on shipboard 
machinery. This test and evaluation found that MILITEC-1 contained 
chlorine and when combined with machinery manufacturer's oils would 
result in damage to bearings and other machine components. DOD 
officials stated that this was corrosion-related damage. DOD officials 
told us they do not know why the Navy conducted this test and 
evaluation, given the aforementioned prohibition against lubricants 
containing chorine. 

Even though MILITEC-1 has not passed numerous military tests, Militec, 
Inc., continues to market it for use as a small arms lubricant to DOD, 
and it asserts that the current product specification is flawed and 
that MILITEC-1 prevents weapons from jamming. The Army has extended to 
Militec, Inc., the opportunity either to demonstrate how its product 
has been modified to conform to the current military specification for 
a small arms lubricant or indicate why the specification should be 
modified. According to DOD officials, Militec, Inc., has not done so. 
Militec, Inc., officials told us that they agree that their product has 
never met the military specification, but they asserted that the 
specification is not relevant to the current desert environment in 
which the product is intended to function--an assertion which, they 
note, is supported by the numerous laudatory testimonials they have 
received from deployed servicemembers. Militec, Inc., officials 
asserted that these servicemembers used the product as a lubricant on a 
variety of small arms. 

Militec, Inc., officials also assert that their product helps prevent 
weapons from jamming, while the approved lubricant can promote jamming. 
However, they have not provided any support for their claim to DOD. 
Army officials told us that they are unaware of any indications that 
weapons have jammed as a result of servicemembers' using the approved 
lubricant product. Furthermore, we reviewed numerous DOD logistics, 
readiness, and other documents and could find no mention of weapons 
jamming in relation to use of a lubricant product. To address reports 
of episodes of small arms jamming during combat operations in Iraq, in 
June 2003 the Army completed a study that assessed small arms 
performance and the use of many small arms lubricants. One of its key 
findings was that rigorous daily cleaning is required to maintain 
performance, regardless of which lubricant was used. 

DLA Did Not Consistently Follow Applicable DOD Procedures in Assigning 
and Canceling or Blocking National Stock Numbers for MILITEC-1: 

DLA did not follow applicable DOD procedures in 1993 and 1995 when it 
assigned NSNs for MILITEC-1 without having first obtained approval from 
the military services, according to agency officials; however, the 
agency did follow applicable procedures when it subsequently canceled 
or blocked NSNs, according to DLA officials. DLA assigned several NSNs 
for MILITEC-1 in 1993 and 1995, and canceled NSNs in 1994 and 2003. By 
2007, DLA had canceled or blocked for DOD purchase all NSNs associated 
with MILITEC-1. 

DLA Did Not Follow Applicable Procedures When It Assigned National 
Stock Numbers in 1993 and 1995: 

According to DLA officials, the agency did not follow applicable DOD 
procedures when it assigned NSNs to MILITEC-1 in 1993 and 1995. In 
August 1993 DLA assigned five NSNs for MILITEC-1 as a lubricant 
additive, even though it did not have the approval of the services' 
engineering support activities--the designated authorities who have 
technology oversight of products--and the Navy had declined to sponsor 
NSNs for MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive a year earlier, in May 1992. 
DLA officials told us that the 1993 assignment of NSNs violated the 
agency's procedures because it should have obtained the approval of the 
services, and that it occurred because of the agency's push toward the 
use of commercial off-the-shelf products. 

In June 1994, DLA initiated action to cancel the MILITEC-1-associated 
NSNs because of a lack of engineering support activity approval and 
notified Militec, Inc., of its intention. In 1995, 19 members of 
Congress signed and sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense 
requesting that the Militec, Inc., product be made available to the 
military, emphasizing DOD's policy for preferential purchasing of 
commercial off-the-shelf items. Subsequently, according to DOD 
documentation, a meeting was held and a compromise reached between 
Militec, Inc. representatives and officials representing DLA and other 
DOD organizations. According to the compromise, DLA assigned three new 
NSNs for MILITEC-1's use as a small arms lubricant as directed by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. At the same time, DLA blocked the 
five lubricant additive NSNs from DOD purchase. The Navy representative 
opposed this compromise. According to DLA officials, the Army was not 
invited to participate in the meeting, though it is the executive agent 
for oils and lubricants and had previously disapproved MILITEC-1 as a 
small arms lubricant. Neither DLA or Army officials could explain why 
the Army was left out of the meeting. Moreover, it is not clear from 
DOD documents why the Office the Secretary of Defense approved MILITEC-
1's use as a small arms lubricant. 

DLA Followed Applicable Procedures When It Canceled National Stock 
Numbers: 

According to DLA officials, the agency did follow applicable procedures 
when it canceled or blocked NSNs, as requested by the services, from 
the mid-1990s through 2007. 

For example, following the assignment described above of the three NSNs 
for small arms lubricants in 1995, DLA officials contacted the 
engineering support activities in each service to determine their 
positions regarding MILITEC-1's use on small arms. Upon learning that 
none of the services would approve such use, DLA placed a block on the 
three new NSNs, preventing any DOD purchases of MILITEC-1 from the 
federal supply system. 

Over time, however, DLA failed to maintain the block on the three small 
arms lubricant NSNs and the five lubricant additive NSNs. MILITEC-1 
reappeared in DLA's stock system and, in March 2003, DLA officials 
noted and questioned an uptick in requisitions for it. Upon 
investigation, they discovered that the 1995 blocks had been 
inadvertently removed due to computer system updates. DLA canceled all 
associated solicitations and re-established the block on all MILITEC-1 
NSNs. DLA notified the Army engineering support activity, which 
supported the cancellation action. Nonetheless, in April 2003 the Army 
requested that DLA suspend the block and resume issuing MILITEC-1 for a 
trial period of 60 days--from May 1 to July 1, 2003. According to a 
senior Army official, this temporary issuance was granted in order to 
assess wartime demand for the product and to address Militec, Inc., 
officials' concerns that the Army was biased against their product. 

DLA then consolidated all eight existing NSNs for MILITEC-1 into the 
Federal Supply Class that includes small arms lubricants, and it 
proceeded to fill the requisitions until August 2003, at which time the 
Army requested that DLA reinstate the block for DOD users. In addition, 
DLA canceled three NSNs because they corresponded to container sizes 
that did not support Army small arms requirements. Therefore, in August 
2003, there were five blocked NSNs associated with MILITEC-1 for use as 
a small arms lubricant. In October 2003 the Army reversed its position 
and requested that DLA resume filling requisitions for MILITEC-1 while 
it conducted an independent test and evaluation for small arms 
lubricants as discussed previously. In January 2006, following a 
testing process that had to be developed and coordinated with industry, 
the Army advised DLA that it no longer wished to purchase MILITEC-1 as 
a small arms lubricant, because the product had been shown not to meet 
specifications in the desert lubricant test and evaluation. 

In 2007, DLA initiated efforts to cancel the five remaining NSNs 
associated with MILITEC-1 and coordinated with all users according to 
its procedures. NATO, which was listed as a user of the five NSNs 
objected to the cancellation of four NSNs and did not respond regarding 
the fifth. According to DLA officials, NATO routinely does not concur 
with NSN cancellations. However, DLA considers a non-response as 
concurrence and canceled one of the five NSNs. The other four NSNs have 
since 2007 remained blocked from purchase by DOD users but are still 
available for purchase by NATO. 

Agency and Third-Party Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD was given an opportunity to review and comment on a written draft 
of this report, and DOD did not provide any comments other than minor 
technical comments. We incorporated these into the body of the report 
as appropriate. 

Militec, Inc., provided us with oral comments in response to reading a 
draft statement of facts of our report. The company officials said that 
while they agree that the material in our draft is substantially 
correct, they believe the draft contains insufficient references to 
material that they provided to us during the course of our work. 

First, Militec, Inc., officials challenged the Army's testing 
procedures and its specifications, asserting that our report did not 
amply present their objections to both. With regard to testing, they 
repeated their assertions that the Army's testing procedures are not 
performed correctly, and they objected to the fact that Militec, Inc., 
officials were not allowed to be present when a particular test was 
conducted. They asserted that their product is a "performance rather 
than conformance" product, and thus is disadvantaged by Army testing 
procedures that do not enable it to perform as it is meant to perform. 
Without having been present at testing, they contend, they cannot be 
assured that the test was conducted in accordance with the proper usage 
of their product. However, as Militec, Inc., officials themselves 
noted, the Army's testing protocol is part of its specifications. While 
Militec, Inc. believes that these strict specifications disadvantage 
its product in testing, Army officials told us the tests reflect the 
service's focus on critical military requirements. Further, we note 
that the Army did not allow any contractors to be present at the test 
to which Militec, Inc., officials were referring. With regard to Army 
specifications, Militec, Inc., officials contended that the Army 
specifications are flawed because they do not correlate to the real 
world--for example, by testing corrosion resistance in a gun that has 
been fired. However, we note that the Army's tests included live fire 
tests. Further, as noted in our report, Army officials told us that 
their specifications are in part based on real world conditions, as 
experienced by the warfighter. We also reiterate, as we have noted 
above, that we did not evaluate the validity of the military 
specifications, as to do so would exceed the scope of our objectives. 

Second, Militec, Inc., officials expressed their view that our report 
does not amply convey the magnitude of customer testimonials in 
improving the efficacy of their product, noting that they have received 
tens of thousands of unsolicited laudatory testimonial e-mails from 
customers, and noting anecdotal commendations from veterans whom they 
have met. We have reviewed many e-mailed testimonials that Militec, 
Inc., officials shared with us, and we note them in our report. 
However, irrespective of their number, these testimonials are not 
relevant to the testing and evaluation or assigning and canceling of 
national stock numbers for MILITEC-1, the review of which constituted 
our objectives. 

Third, Militec, Inc., officials challenge the Army's rejection of 
MILITEC-1 on the basis of its corrosiveness. Militec, Inc., officials 
asserted that the "concealed carry" conditions characterizing the U.S. 
Secret Service's use of weapons create an environment that is corrosive 
for weapons, and yet this organization uses MILITEC-1. Similarly, they 
asserted that the Coast Guard uses weapons that are exposed to a highly 
corrosive salt atmosphere, and that organization also uses MILITEC-1. 
Militec, Inc., officials asserted that if their product were corrosive, 
these organizations would have reported that fact. Our report notes 
that several nonmilitary government organizations, including the U.S. 
Secret Service, the U.S. Park Service, and the Police Department of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, purchase and use MILITEC-1. However, it is beyond 
the scope of our report to comparatively evaluate the properties of the 
product that cause it to pass the specifications of those 
organizations, while not passing DOD's specifications. 

Fourth, Militec, Inc., officials raised objections to the fact that our 
report addressed their product's performance in categories other than 
small arms lubricant, which is the only category in which they are now 
marketing their product to DOD. We included the information of the 
Army's testing of MILITEC-1 as a metal conditioner, general purpose 
lubricant, and lubricant additive in order to provide a fuller 
perspective of the testing and evaluation of MILITEC-1 and a 
comprehensive history of DOD's assigning and canceling of national 
stock numbers for the product. 

Finally, Militec, Inc., officials commented that the draft did not 
address their concern that in 2005 the Army granted a competitor the 
national stock numbers that had been assigned to MILITEC-1, based upon 
falsified documentation provided by that competitor, and in so doing 
enabled this competitor to obtain a contract that otherwise would have 
gone to Militec, Inc. However, during the course of our work Army and 
DLA officials told us that from their review of this matter they 
considered the allegation of fraud to be unsubstantiated. They said it 
appeared to be a misunderstanding of how the process works. National 
stock numbers are not generally assigned exclusively to a manufacturer; 
rather, a single stock number can apply to one or several manufacturers 
who make products that perform a given, required function. This 
description comports with our understanding of the process, as 
described in the body of our report. DLA officials told us that 
although they assigned the stock number to the second manufacturer in 
2005, they canceled the stock number to both manufacturers in 2006, 
because both manufacturers failed to meet the specifications for either 
small arms lubricant or general purpose lubricant. Because of the 
circumstances concerning the canceled stock number in 2006, we did not 
believe this issue warranted further review or reporting. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Army, and the Director of the Defense Logistics 
Agency. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff has any questions on the information discussed in 
this report, please feel free to contact me at (202) 512-8365 or 
solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are Marilyn 
Wasleski, Assistant Director; William Bates; Colin Chambers; Oscar 
Mardis; Karen Thornton; Cheryl Weissman; and Allen Westheimer. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure: Timeline on the Efforts to Test and Evaluate, and Assign and 
Cancel, National Stock Numbers for MILITEC-1: 

* 1984: Militec, Inc. (at that time known as Giordani Enterprises) 
requested that the Navy consider MILITEC-1 (at that time not yet called 
MILITEC-1) for use as a lubricant additive. The Navy gave Militec, 
Inc., the Department of Defense (DOD) regulations on methodology for 
test and evaluation of lubricant additives, and informed the company 
that the Army was the agency responsible for selecting DOD's lubricant 
additives. The Navy offered to test and evaluate the product against 
ship system requirements once it successfully passed the Army's test 
and evaluation against lubricant additive specifications. 

* May 1988: The U.S. Marine Corps Research, Development, and 
Acquisition Command received samples of MILITEC-1 from Militec, Inc. 
and conducted a test and evaluation to determine whether a jeep using 
MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive could operate longer and travel 
farther after losing engine oil. In July 1988 the test and evaluation 
was performed--the first time to our knowledge that DOD tested and 
evaluated the product. The test and evaluation showed that a jeep for 
which MILITEC-1 had been added to the engine oil exhibited reduced 
engine friction and could be driven for a longer time and at greater 
mileage than a jeep without the product. 

* April 1989: The Navy's Atlantic Fleet completed an operational test 
and evaluation of MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive in various internal 
combustion engines and gearboxes. Fleet officials reported improved 
friction-reducing attributes and recommended MILITEC-1 for interim use 
in the Navy. Citing these results and those of the Marine Corps test 
and evaluation described above, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 
the Navy for Safety and Survivability approved a limited qualification 
authorizing the use of MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive on mechanical 
equipment for a duration not exceeding 2 years. 

* July 1989: The Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center, in correspondence with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Shipbuilding and Logistics, reported that it had not been able to 
conduct any test and evaluations of MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive 
because it had not received specific details of preliminary screening 
test outcomes as called for by a DOD guide on the methodology for the 
test and evaluation of lubricant additives. 

* April 1990: The DOD Standardizations Office asked the Army to 
evaluate MILITEC-1 against the small arms lubricant military 
specification for cleaning, lubrication, and preservation. 

* July 1990: The Army performed a test and evaluation of MILITEC-1 as a 
small arms lubricant. The Army concluded that MILITEC-1 did not meet 
military specifications and could not qualify to become an approved 
product because it did not have a cleaning component and did not meet 
the cold temperature requirements. The Army noted that MILITEC-1 would 
need to be reformulated before it could meet the military 
specifications for a small arms lubricant. 

* April 1991: The Navy conducted a live fire study to test and evaluate 
eight commercial gun lubricants for their ability to increase the 
velocity and accuracy of the M-16A1 rifle. These lubricants included 
MILITEC-1 as well as the approved cleaning, lubrication, and 
preservation product. The study found that the advantages in velocity 
and accuracy claimed by Militec, Inc., were not achieved. The study 
also found that MILITEC-1 posed a possible health hazard following both 
acute and chronic overexposure to the skin, and it noted that the 
product should not be recommended for use. 

* 1991: The Army Materiel Command provided Militec, Inc., with the 
written procedures Militec, Inc., needed to perform in order to qualify 
its product as a lubricant additive, reiterating that the Army would 
not authorize the use of the product as an additive without independent 
lab test and evaluation approved by the Army. 

* May 1992: After examining the results of previous tests and 
evaluations and consultations with industry, the Naval Sea Systems 
Command declined to sponsor national stock numbers (NSN) for MILITEC-1 
as a lubricant additive. 

* June 1992: The Naval Sea Systems Command issued a Fleet Advisory to 
"stop adding MILITEC-1 to all lubricating oils" and to "dispose of any 
unused stock of MILITEC-1," in part because the product contains 
chlorine, and Navy policy bans the use of lubricant additives that 
contain chlorine. 

* July 1992: The Navy conducted a test and evaluation to determine 
which small arms lubricants would perform best in environments of 
airborne dust and fine sand, high temperature and corrosive airborne 
salts. The Navy tested and evaluated 14 commercial small arms 
lubricants, including MILITEC-1, in these environments. The Navy found 
in the dust tests with various exposure times that although more dust 
accumulated on the exposed exterior surfaces of bolt carriers with 
liquid lubricants than on bolt carriers with dry film lubricants, the 
liquid lubricants had more success overcoming friction caused by dust 
intrusion. The Navy also found that during the airborne salts test, one 
dry film lubricant and one liquid lubricant provided the most 
protection from corrosion; all other lubricants (including MILITEC-1) 
provided poor corrosion protection in this test. Therefore, the Navy 
concluded that none of the lubricants provided significant benefits 
over the approved cleaning, lubrication, and preservation product, 
which it found to be adequate for general use in these environments. 
This test was not conducted against a specific military specification. 

* August 1993: In response to DOD's push toward the use of commercial 
off-the-shelf products, MILITEC-1 was assigned its first NSNs. DLA 
assigned five NSNs for MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive, even though 
it did not have the approval of the services' engineering support 
activities. 

* June 1994: DLA initiated action to cancel MILITEC-1-associated NSNs 
as a lubricant additive because of a lack of engineering support 
activity approval and notified Militec, Inc., of its intention. 

* July 1994: The Naval Research Lab tested and evaluated MILITEC-1 for 
possible use as a lubricant additive on shipboard machinery. This test 
and evaluation concluded that MILITEC-1 contained chlorine and, when 
combined with machinery manufacturer's oils, would result in damage to 
bearings and other machine components. DOD officials stated that this 
was corrosion-related damage. The Navy had previously banned the use of 
MILITEC-1 as a lubricant additive because it contained chlorine. 

* March 1995: Nineteen Members of Congress signed and sent a letter to 
the Secretary of Defense requesting that MILITEC-1 be made available to 
the military, emphasizing DOD's policy for preferential purchasing of 
commercial off-the-shelf items. 

* March 1995: A compromise was reached between Militec, Inc., 
representatives and officials representing DLA and other DOD 
organizations. According to the compromise, DLA assigned three new NSNs 
for MILITEC-1's use as a small arms lubricant as directed by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense and DLA blocked the five lubricant additive 
NSNs from DOD purchase. 

* July 1995: The Army sought to develop a specification for a metal 
conditioner and issued a call to industry to solicit samples for test 
and evaluation. Militec, Inc., was the only vendor to submit a product. 
The metal conditioner test and evaluation completed by the Army's Tank- 
automotive and Armament Command in July 1996 found that MILITEC-1 had 
lubricating characteristics but was inadequate for corrosion 
protection. Therefore, Army officials concluded that they would not 
further consider MILITEC-1 the standard for specifications. Militec, 
Inc., appealed the finding, but Army officials affirmed the validity of 
the test. They invited Militec, Inc., to reformulate its product to 
address the corrosion issue and resubmit it for further test and 
evaluation. 

* December 1995: The Army Missile Command tested and evaluated MILITEC- 
1 for its corrosion resistance properties on steel and aluminum alloys. 
Army officials told us that the test and evaluation results indicated 
that MILITEC-1 did not perform better than metal conditioners already 
in use in providing corrosion resistance, and therefore they concluded 
they did not want to purchase the product. 

* July 1997: The Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command conducted a 
test and evaluation of MILITEC-1 as a lubricant for weapons seals but 
stopped the test after 1 hour after observing excessive corrosion. 

* 2003: Alerted by an uptick in Army requisitions for MILITEC-1, DLA 
discovered that the block instituted in 1995 for military requisitions 
of MILITEC-1-associated NSNs was no longer in place, due to computer 
system updates. DLA canceled requisitions for purchases under MILITEC- 
1 NSNs and re-established the block. 

* April 2003: The Army, citing demands associated with the war in Iraq, 
requested that DLA suspend the block on MILITEC-1 and resume issuing 
the product for a trial period of 60 days--from May 1 to July 1, 2003. 
According to a Senior Army official, this temporary issuance was 
granted in order to assess wartime demand for the product and to 
address Militec, Inc., officials' concerns that the Army was biased 
against their product. The action was also undertaken in part in 
response to MILITEC-1 testimonials and to a Program Executive Officer/ 
Soldier report indicating that servicemembers were using the product. 
Army documents show that less than $3,000 worth of the MILITEC-1 was 
purchased. DLA then consolidated all eight existing NSNs for MILITEC-1 
into the Federal Supply Class that includes small arms lubricants and 
canceled three NSNs because they corresponded to container sizes that 
did not support Army small arms requirements. 

* June 2003: The Army completed a study that addressed reported 
episodes of small arms jamming during combat operations in Iraq. The 
study assessed small arms performance and many small arms lubricants. 
One of its key findings was that rigorous daily cleaning is required to 
maintain performance, regardless of which lubricant was used. 

* August 2003: At the end of the 60-day window, the Army requested that 
DLA reinstate the block for DOD users from requisitioning MILITEC-1. 

* September 2003: Following the 60-day window for issuance of MILITEC-
1, Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command and Army Tank- 
Automotive and Armament Command requested that DLA restrict small arms 
lubricant purchases to the approved cleaner, lubricant, and 
preservative. MILITEC-1 requisitions were canceled by DLA. 

* October 2003: The Army Materiel Command, after receiving numerous 
testimonials from servicemembers regarding the efficacy of MILITEC-1 in 
Iraq, made the decision to conduct another test and evaluation of small 
arms lubricants. Concerned about the perception of bias at the test and 
evaluation location for small arms lubricants, the Army Materiel 
Command also decided to conduct the test and evaluation at another Army 
test and evaluation facility. In addition, the Army focused its test 
and evaluation on the small arms lubrication properties of the military 
specification in a desert environment and issued a solicitation to 
industry. A total of 23 products, including MILITEC-1, along with the 2 
qualified cleaning, lubrication, and preservation products, were 
submitted for the desert lubricant test and evaluation. 

* 2003-2005: Over the 2 years of the test and evaluation period, DLA 
purchased about $2.3 million of MILITEC-1. 

* January 2005: Noting the increased demand for the NSNs associated 
with MILITEC-1, DLA issued a solicitation to vendors for long-term 
contracts. 

* July 2005: The Army Infantry Center (users of small arms) requested 
that Army Materiel Command help ensure that only approved small arms 
lubricants were issued NSNs, and that any such product issued an NSN 
without being tested and evaluated against a performance specification 
be labeled "Not approved for small arms use." 

* October 2005: The final results of the desert lubricant test and 
evaluation were determined. MILITEC-1, along with 15 other products, 
did not pass the initial live fire test because of excessive firing 
malfunctions. 

* January 2006: The Army notified DLA that based on the results of the 
desert lubricant test and evaluation, it would not further consider 
MILITEC-1 as a small arms lubricant but instead would test and evaluate 
it against the general purpose lubricant specification. 

* April 2006: The Army informed DLA that MILITEC-1 did not meet the 
requirements of the general purpose lubricant specification and that it 
no longer wanted to be listed as a user of MILITEC-1. 

* December 2006: Informed of the results of the desert lubricant test 
and evaluation, the Army's Tank-Automotive and Armament Command issued 
a ground precautionary message advising Army operational units to use 
only the approved cleaner, lubricant, and preservative for small arms 
lubricants and that small arms reliability could be compromised if 
other products were used. 

* December 2006: The Center for Naval Analysis released an Army-
sponsored study that sought to obtain a broader understanding of 
soldiers' views about their small arms in combat. One of the 
conclusions reached in the report was that soldiers had confidence in 
the reliability of their small arms, irrespective of whether the small 
arms lubricant was approved or not. 

* 2007: DLA initiated efforts to cancel all five remaining NSNs 
associated with MILITEC-1 and coordinated with all users according to 
its procedures. 

* 2007: DLA could not cancel four NSNs because NATO did not concur with 
their cancellation and it did not respond regarding the fifth. As a 
result, DLA canceled one NSN and blocked the other four NSNs to DOD 
users. 

[End of section] 

Enclosure II: Scope and Methodology: 

To obtain an understanding of the extent to which the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the military services have tested and evaluated 
MILITEC-1 as a small arms lubricant, metal conditioner, general purpose 
lubricant, and a lubricant additive and with what results, we obtained 
and reviewed available DOD instructions, manuals and publications, and 
test and evaluation reports on MILITEC-1 and other products. We gained 
an understanding of the test and evaluation efforts by conducting 
extensive interviews with agency officials who either conducted or had 
expertise on the tests and evaluations. We did not, however, observe 
testing or evaluate test results, given the considerable lapse in time 
since such tests had occurred. We also did not evaluate the validity of 
the military specifications. We conducted interviews with officials 
from the Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia; the Army 
Research, Development, and Engineering Command at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland; the Army Armament Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey; the Army Research 
Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; and the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command, Arlington, Virginia. In addition, we interviewed 
officials from the United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, 
Georgia. We also met with officials from Militec, Inc., to gain their 
perspective on their product and their experiences with DOD. We also 
interviewed Army National Guard officials, other servicemembers, 
selected federal and municipal law enforcement organizations, and a 
small arms manufacturer to attain their perspectives with respect to 
small arms lubricant testing and evaluation issues. We also interviewed 
officials from the United States Infantry Center at Fort Benning, 
Georgia. 

To obtain an understanding of the extent to which the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) followed applicable procedures in assigning and 
subsequently canceling national stock numbers (NSN) to MILITEC-1, we 
obtained and reviewed applicable DOD logistics documents and met with 
DOD officials. However, DOD officials were unable to provide complete 
information regarding early DOD policies governing the assigning and 
canceling of NSNs due to the passage of time, as some of the 
responsible officials are no longer employed by DLA. We interviewed 
officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, 
Virginia; DLA, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the Defense Supply Center at 
Richmond, Virginia; the Defense Logistics Information Service, Battle 
Creek, Michigan; and the Army Materiel Command at Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia. In addition, we interviewed officials from the United States 
Marine Corps, 4TH Marine Division, New Orleans, Louisiana. We also met 
with officials from Militec, Inc., to learn their perspective with 
regard to the assigning and canceling of NSNs for their product. 
Additionally, we reviewed numerous testimonials they provided us from 
deployed servicemembers who used the product, and other company 
documents. 

In order to construct our timeline on the efforts of Militec, Inc., to 
market its product to DOD and the services, and DOD's response to those 
efforts, we interviewed and obtained documents from DOD officials at 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Virginia; DLA, Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia; the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, Virginia; the 
Defense Logistics Information Service, Battle Creek, Michigan; the Army 
Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the Army Research, 
Development, and Engineering Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Maryland; the Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey; and the Army Research 
Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, as well as from 
officials at Militec, Inc. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through June 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] According to DOD officials, tests and evaluations can range from a 
limited demonstration of performance characteristics to a comprehensive 
assessment of the product with regard to military specifications. 

[2] National stock numbers serve as the labels applied to items that 
are repeatedly purchased, stocked, stored, issued, and used throughout 
the federal supply system. 

[3] DOD defines small arms as "man-portable individual and crew served 
weapons systems used mainly against personnel and lightly armored or 
unarmored equipment." 

[4] Pursuant to section 2451 of Title 10 of the U.S.Code, the Secretary 
of Defense is required to develop a single catalog system and related 
program of standardizing supplies for the Department of Defense. 

[5] During our review we were guided by DOD officials to several DOD 
publications that contain information on the procedures for assigning 
and canceling an NSN. These publications include DOD 4100.38-M, 
Department of Defense Provisioning and Other Procurement Screening 
Manual, Nov. 1983; DOD 4100.39-M, Federal Logistics Information System, 
FLIS Procedures Manual, Volumes 1-16, (date varies by volume); DOD 
4140.26-M, Defense Integrated Materiel Management Manual for Consumable 
Items, May 1997; DOD 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management 
Regulation, May 2003; DOD 4140.32-M, and the Defense Inactive Item 
Program, August 1992. 

[6] We note that some government agencies (for example, U.S. Park 
Service, Secret Service, and the Police Department of the U.S. Supreme 
Court) purchase MILITEC-1, but according to DOD officials, DOD's 
product specifications for military users are based on its broader 
needs for a product that performs in diverse operational conditions and 
climates. 

[7] Servicemembers obtained MILITEC-1 at various times by purchases 
made through the national stock system, by servicemembers' obtaining 
the product for themselves, and by Militec, Inc.'s providing the 
product to servicemembers free of charge. 

[8] Army Research Laboratory, Evaluation of Small-Arms Weapons 
Lubricants in Desert Environments (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 
October 2005). 

[9] Previously, after the Army's Armament Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, tested MILITEC-1 
and found the product did not meet specifications, Militec, Inc., 
expressed a concern that this facility did not evaluate its product 
fairly and would not evaluate it fairly in any future testing. 

[10] Army officials told us that after the study's completion they 
discovered that one of the participating cleaner, lubricant, and 
preservative vendors had changed its formula but, in violation of Army 
policy, had not informed the Army of the change. The Army consequently 
removed the vendor from the qualified products list for cleaner, 
lubricant, and preservative products. These officials said the vendor 
subsequently resubmitted its product for test and evaluation, and a 
decision is now pending. 

[11] In 1984 Militec, Inc. (then known as Giordani Enterprises) 
requested that the Navy consider MILITEC-1 (at that time not yet called 
MILITEC-1) for use as a lubricant additive. The Navy gave Militec, 
Inc., the DOD regulations on methodology for test and evaluation of 
lubricant additives, and informed the company that the Army was the 
agency responsible for selecting DOD's lubricant additives. The Navy 
offered to test and evaluate the product against ship system 
requirements once it successfully passed the Army's test and evaluation 
against lubricant additive specifications. 

[End of section] 

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U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: