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Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Addressees: 

September 2011: 

Iraq Drawdown: 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor 
Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role: 

GAO-11-774: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-774, a report to congressional addressees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and the transition from a U.S. 
military to a civilian-led presence after December 2011 continue amid 
an uncertain security and political environment. This report is one in 
a series of reviews regarding the planning and execution of the 
drawdown. Specifically, this report assesses the extent to which DOD 
has planned for, begun to execute, and mitigated risk associated with 
(1) transferring and removing personnel and equipment from remaining 
bases in Iraq; (2) curtailing unneeded contract services, 
transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate contract 
oversight; and (3) facilitating and supporting the transition to a 
civilian-led presence in Iraq. GAO examined relevant DOD planning 
documents, attended drawdown-related conferences, interviewed State 
officials and DOD officials throughout the chain of command in the 
United States, Kuwait, and Iraq, and visited several locations in 
Kuwait and Iraq to observe drawdown operations. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of 
actions and associated resources necessary to achieve the drawdown 
from Iraq, which is well underway with a significant amount of 
equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other 
things. However, several factors contribute to making this phase more 
challenging than the previous drawdown phase. First, DOD will have 
less operational flexibility in this phase of the drawdown, yet will 
need to move a greater amount of equipment than in prior drawdown 
phases. Second, DOD is closing the largest bases with fewer available 
resources left on site, which creates a set of challenges and risks 
greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. Although 
DOD's plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, it has 
limited visibility over some equipment remaining in Iraq and does not 
track equipment found on transitioning bases that is not listed on any 
property accountability record. Without addressing these issues, DOD 
may miss opportunities to make the drawdown more efficient. 

DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq, 
such as enhancing contract oversight and assigning Contracting 
Officer's Representative responsibilities as a primary duty, although 
concerns, such as lack of experience among contract oversight 
personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may face further 
challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without gaps in 
key services. To ensure the continuity of key services while 
continuing to reduce these services, some units are exploring the 
option of using local contractors to provide certain services since 
local contractors do not require extensive support, such as housing, 
and will not have to be repatriated to their country of origin at the 
end of the contract, although GAO has previously reported on 
challenges associated with hiring such firms resulting in the need for 
greater oversight. Some units also intend to replace contractor 
personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity of certain 
services, such as guard security and generator maintenance. Despite 
various steps to ease contractor demobilization, DOD faces challenges 
in demobilizing its contractors, including operational security-driven 
limits on exchanging information such as base closure dates and 
ensuring accurate contractor planning. Without taking additional steps 
to address these challenges, DOD may be unable to effectively 
implement its demobilization guidance and ensure the effective 
reduction of contract services to appropriate levels and ultimate 
demobilization of all its contractors. 

As the U.S. presence in Iraq transitions to a civilian-led presence, 
although DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition 
began late, both agencies have now coordinated extensively and begun 
to execute the transfer or loan to State of a wide range of DOD 
equipment, while DOD has taken steps to minimize any impact on unit 
readiness of such transfers. DOD also has agreed to potentially 
provide State with extensive contracted services, including base and 
life support, food and fuel, and maintenance, but State may not have 
the capacity to fund and oversee these services. Further, DOD plans a 
robust post-2011 presence as part of an Office of Security Cooperation 
operating under Chief of Mission authority. However, the scope of DOD’
s activities in post-2011 Iraq and associated issues, including 
privileges and immunities to be afforded DOD personnel, may not be 
well understood by various DOD officials and organizations, thereby 
risking an uncoordinated approach. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD take further action to (1) acquire and 
maintain real-time visibility over contractor-managed government- 
owned equipment; (2) collect data on unaccounted-for equipment found 
during base transitions; (3) work with contractors to gather and 
distribute information needed to demobilize their workforces; and (4) 
officially clarify the scope of DOD’s role in post-2011 Iraq, to 
include the privileges and immunities to be afforded all DOD 
government personnel. DOD concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-774] or key 
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD Has Conducted Robust Planning for the Current Drawdown Phase and 
Execution Is Under Way, but Visibility and Tracking of Some Equipment 
Remain a Challenge: 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract Management and Oversight in 
Iraq, but Challenges Remain: 

DOD and State Are Coordinating to Establish and Support the Post-2011 
U.S. Government Presence in Iraq, but Key Elements of This Presence 
May Not Be Well Understood throughout DOD: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments7: 

Figure: 

Figure 1. Drawdown Progress Since May 2009 and What Remains to Be 
Drawn Down through December 31, 2011: 

Abbreviations: 

ARCENT: U.S. Army Central: 

CAP: Contractor Acquired Property: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

CMGO: Contractor-Managed Government-Owned: 

COR: Contracting Officer's Representative: 

DCAA: Defense Contract Audit Agency: 

DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency: 

DFARS: Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation: 

LOGCAP: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program: 

MRAP: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected: 

OPORD: Operations Order: 

OSC-I: Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq: 

RPAT: Redistribution Property Assistance Team: 

SCO-I: Senior Contracting Official - Iraq: 

SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement: 

State: Department of State: 

USF-I: U.S. Forces - Iraq: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 16, 2011: 

Congressional Addressees: 

The drawdown of all military forces and equipment from Iraq, which DOD 
must complete by December 31, 2011 in accordance with the Security 
Agreement between the United States and the Government of Iraq, 
[Footnote 1] is an operation of unprecedented magnitude. Over the 
course of several months, DOD must redeploy from Iraq about 46,000 
military and at least 57,000 contractor personnel, remove or transfer 
at least four times as much theater provided equipment as it has 
during prior drawdown phases,[Footnote 2] and transition to the 
Government of Iraq all remaining bases in Iraq,[Footnote 3] including 
every large installation. This will be the culmination of a logistics 
operation that, according to senior DOD officials, is the largest in 
scope since the Second World War. In preparing for the current phase 
of the drawdown, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) reduced the number of U.S. 
forces in Iraq from about 82,000 in June 2010 to 50,000 ahead of the 
August 31 timetable established by the President.[Footnote 4] In 
addition, USF-I formally ended its combat mission and transitioned to 
Operation New Dawn on September 1, 2010. Under Operation New Dawn, the 
mission of U.S. forces includes advising, assisting, and training 
Iraqi security forces, partnering with Iraqi forces to conduct counter-
terrorism operations, executing the current phase of USF-I's drawdown 
plan, and supporting the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. 

The drawdown of U.S. forces, the execution of Operation New Dawn, and 
the transition from a U.S. military to a civilian-led presence 
continue amidst an uncertain security and political environment. In 
particular, although DOD reported that attack levels have decreased 
since the height of the violence in June 2007, enemy attacks persist 
and insurgents and terrorists continue to operate in Iraq. During the 
past months, al Qaeda in Iraq has conducted numerous high-profile 
attacks against Iraqi government targets throughout the country. In 
addition, according to the Department of State (State), a number of 
other groups have attacked U.S. government personnel, including 
several Shia extremist groups responsible for the recent and frequent 
attacks on the U.S. Embassy, and in June 2011, 15 U.S. troops were 
killed in Iraq, the highest number in 2 years, according to DOD. 
Further, senior U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the Iraqi 
government's ability to provide for its internal security and external 
defense, citing weaknesses in its logistics, intelligence, and air 
defense capabilities. Should the Government of Iraq request that some 
U.S. forces stay after December 2011, this would dramatically alter 
current plans; senior U.S. officials continue to state the U.S. 
government would be willing to entertain such a request. 

This report is a continuation of our efforts to review the planning 
and execution of the drawdown of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq, 
and builds upon our prior reports and testimony. Specifically, this 
report evaluates the execution of the current phase of the U.S. 
military withdrawal from Iraq, which began on September 1, 2010, and 
will end on December 31, 2011. Our specific objectives were to 
determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute, 
and mitigated risk associated with (1) transferring and removing 
personnel and equipment from remaining bases in Iraq; (2) curtailing 
unneeded contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and 
providing adequate contract oversight; and (3) facilitating and 
supporting the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. To meet 
our objectives, we examined relevant DOD planning documents, including 
USF-I and U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) operations orders, attended 
drawdown-related conferences, spoke with DOD officials throughout the 
chain of command in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq, and visited 
several locations in Kuwait and Iraq to observe drawdown operations. 
In the U.S. and Iraq, we also spoke with Department of State officials 
involved with the Iraq transition. A more detailed discussion of our 
scope and methodology is included in appendix I. We conducted this 
performance audit from April 2010 through September 2011 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The Security Agreement between the United States and the Government of 
Iraq clearly states the objectives for the drawdown from Iraq, and DOD 
has further defined the conditions necessary to achieve these 
objectives. Time lines for the drawdown were established by the 
Security Agreement and further defined by the President of the United 
States. The Security Agreement provides that all U.S. forces,[Footnote 
5] a term that includes personnel and equipment, shall withdraw from 
Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.[Footnote 6] In 
addition, the U.S. government must transition all remaining bases 
where it maintains a presence to the Government of Iraq upon 
withdrawal. In regards to the retrograde[Footnote 7] of equipment and 
base transitions, the high-level conditions DOD has identified as 
important to the achievement of these objectives include the orderly 
and efficient movement or transfer, as appropriate, of equipment out 
of Iraq by the time lines established by the Security Agreement. 
Further conditions include the establishment of a mission capable 
[Footnote 8] civilian-led presence in Iraq by October 1, 2011, which 
is necessary to enable DOD to focus on achieving the redeployment of 
personnel, retrograde of equipment, and base transition goals by the 
end of the year. 

DOD anticipates that after December 31, 2011, all U.S. personnel 
remaining in Iraq, including DOD military personnel and civilians, 
will operate under the authority of the Chief of Mission for execution 
of security assistance activities.[Footnote 9] The United States 
government intends to stand up a regional diplomatic presence, a large-
scale police training program, and an office of security cooperation 
(under the Chief of Mission's authority) to continue training and 
equipping the Iraqi security forces.[Footnote 10] According to the 
State Department Iraq Transition Coordinator, as of June 2011, the 
plans for the U.S. government presence in Iraq after 2011 include 
about 16,000 personnel. This official stated that these personnel will 
perform a wide range of functions in addition to diplomacy and 
security assistance/cooperation, with the majority of personnel likely 
comprised of contractor personnel responsible for security and life 
support (such as facility operation, food service, laundry, etc.). 
Besides meeting requirements for security and life support, other 
major aspects of the transition include acquiring the use of property 
through land use agreements, repurposing or constructing new 
facilities, and defining requirements for and implementing solutions 
in the areas of logistics, aviation, equipment, information 
technology, and contracting/contract oversight. 

The logistics infrastructure supporting the redeployment and 
retrograde effort in the Iraqi theater of operations is large and 
complex, consisting of military organizations operating in both Iraq 
and Kuwait. It is through Kuwait's three seaports and two airports 
that the majority of U.S. forces and all of DOD's sensitive equipment, 
such as combat vehicles, flow from the theater of operations. DOD also 
uses commercial shipping firms to retrograde units' nonsensitive 
material and equipment, such as individual equipment and spare parts, 
through ports in Jordan and Iraq, and uses an airport in Iraq in 
addition to airports in Kuwait to facilitate the redeployment of 
military personnel. Myriad logistics organizations in both Iraq and 
Kuwait support these operations, including elements of U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM), USF-I, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT), U.S. 
Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, the Defense 
Logistics Agency, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, Army Materiel 
Command, and U.S. Air Forces Central Command. Many of these 
organizations have command relationships with each other, and their 
activities are synchronized through the issuance of written orders 
that define each organization's drawdown tasks, among many other 
things. In the case of the drawdown from Iraq, such orders and 
associated activities comprise DOD's plans. 

U.S. forces in Iraq rely on contractor personnel to provide a wide 
range of services including managing dining facilities, repairing 
military vehicles, providing trucks and drivers for transporting 
supplies, and maintaining airfields. Military units, such as the 
"mayors" who oversee base operations, communicate their needs for 
contracted services to the appropriate contracting personnel, who in 
turn seek to fulfill these "requirements" through contracting vehicles 
such as orders, modifications, or new contracts. According to DOD 
data, as of May 30, 2011, there were approximately 61,000 contractor 
personnel in Iraq. Approximately 52 percent of these contractor 
personnel are working under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP), the largest single contract supporting operations in Iraq 
and Kuwait.[Footnote 11] The day-to-day activities of LOGCAP 
contractor personnel in Iraq are overseen by contracting officers' 
representatives (COR) managed by the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA), which administers the contract in Iraq on behalf of the 
LOGCAP Program Office, U.S. Army. The remainder of the contractor 
personnel primarily work under contracts awarded by CENTCOM-Joint 
Theater Support Contracting Command and perform a range of services. 
Although contracting officers are responsible for providing contract 
oversight, day-to-day oversight of contractors is generally the 
responsibility of CORs, who ensure that the government receives the 
agreed-upon services at the agreed-upon quality, avoids poor outcomes, 
and minimizes fraudulent practices.[Footnote 12] CORs typically come 
from military units and perform their duties as an added 
responsibility. 

Prior GAO Work: 

GAO has issued several reports over the past 3 years addressing the 
drawdown of forces and equipment from Iraq. In September 2008, we 
reported on the progress of drawdown planning, and concluded that DOD 
had not adequately defined roles and responsibilities for executing 
the drawdown, resulting in multiple teams engaged in retrograde 
operations without a unified or coordinated chain of command.[Footnote 
13] We recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
CENTCOM and the military departments, take steps to clarify the chain 
of command over logistical operations in support of the retrograde 
effort. Since that time, a number of DOD organizations have issued 
plans outlining a phased drawdown from Iraq that meet time frames set 
forth in the Security Agreement and presidential guidance while being 
responsive to security conditions on the ground. Furthermore, 
partially in response to our recommendation, DOD has created several 
organizations to achieve unity of effort over retrograde operations. 

After the publication of our September 2008 report, we continued to 
monitor DOD's progress in planning for and executing the drawdown. In 
November 2009, we testified before the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan outlining several unresolved 
issues that had the potential to impede the effective execution of the 
drawdown.[Footnote 14] Following that testimony, we issued a report in 
April 2010 that went into greater detail on the progress of the 
drawdown and identified challenges that could impact its efficient 
execution.[Footnote 15] We recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the appropriate authorities to take action in regards to 
planning for achieving unity of effort in operational contract 
support, mitigating the risks of contract transitions[Footnote 16] and 
insufficient contract oversight personnel, and clarifying the capacity 
of Kuwait as a temporary staging location for equipment. DOD concurred 
with all of our recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to 
address each one. For example, since our April 2010 report, DOD 
conducted an analysis of the benefits and costs of a prior planned 
transition to a new LOGCAP contract and decided not to make the 
transition based on its findings. 

DOD Has Conducted Robust Planning for the Current Drawdown Phase and 
Execution Is Under Way, but Visibility and Tracking of Some Equipment 
Remain a Challenge: 

DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of 
actions and associated resources necessary to achieve its objectives 
for the drawdown from Iraq. The current phase of the drawdown is well 
under way with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and 
bases transitioned, among other things. Further, DOD successfully 
completed the previous drawdown phase, demonstrating the ability to 
plan and execute complex drawdown operations. However, several 
factors, including limited operational flexibility and the need to 
move a greater amount of equipment and close the largest bases with 
fewer available resources create a set of challenges and risks greater 
than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. DOD's existing 
plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, but DOD 
continues to face challenges maintaining real-time visibility over 
some equipment and tracking unaccounted for equipment remaining after 
bases undergo the transition process. 

DOD's Planning Processes Facilitated the Successful Execution of the 
Previous Drawdown Phase, but Completing the Current Phase Will Be More 
Challenging: 

Successful Execution of Previous Drawdown Phase: 

The completion of the prior drawdown phase, conducted between June and 
August 2010, demonstrated DOD's ability to plan and execute complex 
drawdown operations. Several contributing factors enabled the 
successful reduction of military forces to 50,000 in accordance with 
the August 31, 2010 time line and removal of non-mission-essential 
equipment from Iraq. 

* Use of modeling tools and metrics. The models and projections run by 
the Army's Responsible Reset Task Force,[Footnote 17] ARCENT 
Comptroller staff, and the CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations 
Center helped to more accurately predict the personnel and cargo flows 
out of Iraq, enabling the positioning of necessary resources and as a 
whole ensuring that sufficient capacity was in place to meet logistics 
requirements. Based on the known amount of equipment in Iraq, USF-I, 
in conjunction with other DOD organizations, set monthly targets for 
the reduction of rolling and containerized nonrolling stock,[Footnote 
18] and DOD organizations in Kuwait created and refined a set of tools 
to track the activities conducted to meet these targets and provide 
the visibility necessary to make adjustments. For example, Army field 
support brigade and Responsible Reset Task Force personnel worked 
together to refine the flow chart used to track the movement of 
equipment through the critical nodes associated with the retrograde of 
equipment through Kuwait, such as wash racks, that could become 
limiting factors if stressed beyond capacity. 

* Emphasis on end-to-end equipment movements. DOD took steps to ensure 
that non-mission-essential equipment removed from Iraq to Kuwait 
received rapid disposition. When we visited Kuwait soon after the 
completion of this prior phase, the equipment lots were orderly and 
largely empty because equipment had been shipped to its final 
destination, such as Afghanistan or the United States, with the 
exception of the lot dedicated to the storage of Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected vehicles. Further, ARCENT was actively reducing the backlog 
of containers at the lot reserved for unserviceable equipment 
unloading and sorting. Further, by the time of our visit in March 
2011, DOD had resolved the problems that had resulted in nearly 60 
frustrated[Footnote 19] containers languishing in one lot we found 
during our visit to Kuwait in September 2010. The frustration was 
primarily due to lack of customs documentation and poor container 
packing practices associated with a pilot program to send 
unserviceable equipment directly to a depot in the United States. 

* Employment of commercial shipping and alternative air ports for the 
removal of equipment and redeployment of personnel. DOD's use of 
commercial "door-to-door"[Footnote 20] shipping through Jordan and, to 
a lesser extent, Iraq itself, for the majority of nonsensitive unit 
equipment, and the use of Al Asad Air Base in Iraq for unit 
redeployments directly to the United States successfully alleviated 
pressure on the Kuwait-based redeployment and retrograde 
infrastructure. For example, DOD officials we spoke with in September 
2010 after the previous phase of the drawdown noted that approximately 
30 percent of containerized cargo went through the Jordanian port of 
Aqaba, while 20 percent went through the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. 

* Successful pilot of the partial self-redeployment concept. Partial 
self-redeployment of equipment and personnel consists of a military 
unit "road marching" from its location in Iraq to camps in Kuwait. 
During the road march, which is conducted as a military operation, the 
unit drives its own vehicles and provides for its own security, rather 
than scheduling movements for these vehicles via contracted 
transportation. As usual, the unit arranges for the shipment of its 
non-sensitive equipment via door-to-door moves through ports in Jordan 
and Iraq. DOD employed this concept with the 4th Stryker Brigade, 2nd 
Infantry Division, which departed Iraq in August 2010, just prior to 
the change of mission. According to DOD officials, partial self- 
redeployment reduces demand on critical transportation assets and will 
be employed during the current drawdown of forces. 

Current Drawdown Plans and Execution Status: 

DOD has conducted robust planning for the sequence of actions 
necessary to achieve its objectives for the drawdown. As they have for 
prior drawdown phases, the major commands involved in conducting the 
drawdown have issued extensive written plans. In particular, USF-I 
issued its Operations Order (OPORD) 11-01 and ARCENT issued its 
supporting OPORD 11-01. These plans include many annexes, appendixes, 
and tabs that provide a high level of detail. For the first time USF-
I's operations order includes an annex W that addresses the 
operational contract support issues specific to the drawdown, such as 
contract descoping and contractor demobilization.[Footnote 21] Among 
many other things, these plans include detailed roles, 
responsibilities, and tasks for military units and logistics staffs 
that pertain to completing the retrograde and transfer of equipment 
and necessary base transitions by the established dates. For example, 
these plans and their supporting documentation set forth the order of 
base closures and time lines that must be met to achieve operational 
objectives. Other planning materials go into further details on the 
ways DOD plans to achieve its objectives for the drawdown. For 
example, USF-I's "Base Closure Smart Book" provides a series of 
templates, instructions, and operating procedures that cover the 
entire base transition process. 

DOD continues to use the war-gaming process to further refine the 
sequence of drawdown actions and to identify and mitigate associated 
resource shortfalls. In particular, DOD employs "rehearsal of concept" 
drills, synchronization conferences, and focused "deep dive" analyses 
to round out its drawdown planning activities. For example, DOD has 
held several rehearsal of concept drills in Kuwait and Iraq that focus 
on the logistics aspects of the current drawdown phase, which are 
attended by senior leadership and planning officials from USF-I, 
ARCENT, other Army staff and components, as well as various elements 
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and State Department 
personnel, among others. During these conferences, attendees study all 
the steps the various commands will have to take to meet the drawdown 
objectives to reveal any outstanding issues and unmitigated risks and 
determine solutions. For example, during the ARCENT-hosted rehearsal 
of concept drill held in March 2011, participants analyzed the amount 
of equipment that will have to be moved every week between March and 
December 2011 and matched these requirements with available capacity. 
Such conferences provide a process by which planners are able to 
reschedule equipment movements to less demanding periods should 
requirements exceed available resources and capacity at a particular 
time and set the stage for ongoing monitoring of key indicators such 
as Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT) capacity.[Footnote 
22] Under the process, should key resources such as transportation 
assets still be deemed insufficient, participants can set decision 
points for acquiring additional capacity. In addition, participants 
can take steps to synchronize key activities, including ensuring that 
services like those provided by Defense Logistics Agency-Disposition 
Services, which conducts disposal, demilitarization, and re-
utilization of unserviceable equipment, do not end before or while 
they are still needed to facilitate the drawdown. 

DOD has made substantial progress in executing the drawdown since our 
April 2010 report and the current phase of the drawdown is well under 
way. In terms of military personnel and contractors, 46,000 and 61,000 
continue to conduct operations or work under DOD contracts out of pre- 
drawdown levels of 134,100 and 125,163 respectively, as of June 2011. 
In regards to equipment, as of May 2011 DOD had retrograded 2.36 
million pieces since May 2009, or approximately 69 percent of the 
amount of equipment that was in Iraq in May 2009. Of the total number 
of bases, DOD had closed or transitioned 452, leaving 53. According to 
senior DOD officials, base transition activities are proceeding ahead 
of schedule and U.S. forces are proactively removing nonmission 
essential equipment and materiel such as excess ammunition, although 
the level of effort required to complete the transition of the 
remaining bases will be higher than it has been for the smaller bases 
that have closed to date. In addition to the retrograde of equipment, 
DOD continues to make progress in transferring equipment to the 
Government of Iraq, with over 38 percent of about 48,000 items of 
equipment provided to Iraq as of May 2011 under the United States 
Equipment Transfer to Iraq program.[Footnote 23] DOD intends to 
complete all of its planned transfers, excluding Foreign Excess 
Personal Property, by December 2011. For the category of non-excess 
equipment for which DOD obtained special statutory authority to 
transfer, on which we have previously reported,[Footnote 24] senior 
DOD officials state that the department has requested an extension of 
the relevant authority as part of its fiscal year 2012 legislative 
proposals, which they state will help ensure the completion of these 
transfers as planned. Figure 1 shows the personnel and equipment that 
has been retrograded during all prior drawdown phases, as well as what 
remains for DOD to redeploy, retrograde, or transfer, as appropriate, 
prior to December 31, 2011. 

Figure 1. Drawdown Progress Since May 2009 and What Remains to Be 
Drawn Down through December 31, 2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Bases[A]: 
Drawn down since May 2009: 288 (84%); 
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 53 (16%). 

Non-rolling stock[B]: 
Drawn down since May 2009: 2,376.125 (70%); 
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 1,023,875 (30%). 

Rolling Stock[C]: 
Drawn down since May 2009: 24,663 (60%); 
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 16,125 (40%). 

DOD Contractor Personnel[D]: 
Drawn down since May 2009: 64,163 (51%); 
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 57,000 (49%). 

U.S. Forces[E]: 
Drawn down since May 2009: 88,100 (66%); 
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 46,000 (34%). 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data. 

[A] Assumes that all USF-I run bases will transition by December 31, 
2011. Data current as of July 2011. (Note: While plans for the post-
2011 U.S. Government presence in Iraq call for DOD and State personnel 
to continue operating at some of the current USF-I base locations, 
these bases will still need to transition to the Government of Iraq.) 

[B] Assumes that all non-rolling stock intended for retrograde will be 
removed from Iraq by December 31, 2011. Data current as of March 2011. 

[C] Assumes that all military rolling stock will be removed from Iraq 
by December 31, 2011. Data current as of March 2011. (Note: Military 
rolling stock that State is planning to use in support of its post-
2011 Iraq presence, such as MRAPs, are not included.) 

[D] Assumes that the number of contractor personnel supporting DOD 
contracts in Iraq will reduce to approximately 4,000 by December 31, 
2011. Data current as of June 2011. 

[E] Assumes that all military personnel, excluding the number 
identified by DOD as intended to remain to fulfill Office of Security 
Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) tasks, will leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. 
Data current as of June 2011. 

[End of figure] 

Logistical Challenges Characteristic of the Current Drawdown Phase: 

Beyond the uncertain security environment and potential for increased 
violence as indicated earlier, which could affect DOD's retrograde 
operations and base transitions, DOD will face greater risks and 
challenges to its ability to complete the current drawdown phase than 
it faced earlier at least in part due to three primary factors: 

* DOD will have less operational flexibility. Like the prior drawdown 
phase, the current phase will peak during the final months before DOD 
intends to achieve its operational objectives. During the prior 
drawdown phase, DOD set monthly equipment retrograde targets to 
achieve a notional goal for amount of equipment remaining in Iraq by 
August 31, 2010, but had the ability to address any unanticipated 
requirements after that date. However, in this final phase, DOD must 
now achieve its equipment retrograde goals by a specific date and, as 
a result, cannot leave United States forces' equipment in Iraq to be 
dealt with after December 31, 2011. DOD therefore lacks the 
flexibility it was able to draw upon in retrograding equipment during 
the prior drawdown phase in case unexpected challenges arise. 

* Equipment retrograde and base transition requirements are greater 
than during prior drawdown phases. DOD will need to move and transfer 
a larger amount of equipment during the current phase of the drawdown 
than in the prior drawdown phase. For example, the unit responsible 
for processing theater-provided equipment for retrograde estimated 
that it will have to process an amount of this equipment four times 
greater than the amount associated with the prior drawdown phase. 
Further, DOD has yet to complete the transition of any of its large 
bases.[Footnote 25] Of the 53 bases remaining to be transferred in 
Iraq, 11 are considered large bases. All of these transitions are 
projected to occur prior to December 31, 2011, after which the current 
Security Agreement ends. According to DOD officials, each of these 
remaining base transitions will be more complex, time consuming, and 
likely ripe for unanticipated challenges than such transitions have 
been to date due to the scope of activities necessary to complete the 
transitions. 

* DOD will have fewer available resources. DOD's infrastructure in 
Iraq that supports its equipment retrograde and base transition 
efforts, such as materiel handling equipment and military personnel, 
will simultaneously decrease as USF-I exits Iraq. Base-level personnel 
with whom we met expressed serious concerns with the sufficiency of 
military, civilian, and contractor personnel to set the conditions for 
transitioning the base according to the schedules required by USF-I's 
plan. For example, officials were concerned that as living standards 
decrease on bases in Iraq and new job opportunities open elsewhere, 
contractors will be unable to remain fully staffed and thus less 
likely to complete their work and demobilize by the required date. In 
addition, DOD officials cite the collapsing support infrastructure in 
Iraq as a challenge for the current phase, noting concerns regarding 
the availability of key transportation resources, such as aviation 
assets, flatbed trucks, and heavy equipment transporters. 

DOD's Drawdown Plans and Processes Reduce Risk, but DOD Faces 
Challenges Associated with Limited Visibility and Data Pertaining to 
Some Equipment: 

Because DOD has fewer resources with which to meet a higher level of 
requirements amidst less operational flexibility, existing challenges 
associated with unanticipated requirements may be magnified. However, 
according to DOD officials, flexibility inherent to the plans and 
planning processes discussed earlier in this report mitigate the lack 
of operational flexibility and challenges inherent to doing more with 
less. For example, according to these officials, written modifications 
to plans through fragmentary orders and an adjustable requirements 
projection process allow for continual updates and adjustments 
necessary as conditions change. In addition, USF-I officials cite 
further risk mitigation built into current planning, such as 30 days 
of additional time added to each of the remaining bases' transition 
schedules to account for unanticipated delays. In addition, senior DOD 
officials cite as risk mitigation the raising of the dollar value 
limit, from $15 million to $30 million per installation,[Footnote 26] 
of certain equipment that can be transferred to the Government of Iraq 
as Foreign Excess Personal Property in conjunction with a base closure 
or return, in accordance with DOD's prioritized excess equipment 
disposition process.[Footnote 27] In these ways, DOD accounts for the 
fluid nature of the operational environment and unforeseen operational 
requirements associated with the current drawdown phase. Notably, 
however, last-minute adjustments, such as those made in response to 
initially unanticipated retrograde requirements and associated 
transportation needs, may increase costs since buying contracted 
transportation could be more expensive in the short-term. On the 
whole, DOD officials assert the department will meet its objectives 
for removing or transferring all equipment by December 31, 2011. 

DOD also has been responsive to risks identified via our continued 
oversight. For example, during the course of our work, we found that 
Army guidance did not make clear whether units can turn unserviceable 
equipment in to RPAT yards as opposed to Defense Logistics Agency- 
Disposition Services sites. Because redeploying units are typically 
very busy, especially if they are leaving a transitioning base, we 
found that they were turning such equipment in to RPAT yards because 
it is more convenient, according to RPAT officials. However, officials 
noted that because units sometimes turn in such equipment without 
paperwork and have even removed identifying markings such as serial 
numbers to avoid retribution, determining disposition for these items 
has been a time consuming and unanticipated challenge for the RPAT 
yards. In response to our findings, the Army rapidly issued guidance 
to clarify and reinforce the equipment disposition processes for the 
drawdown from Iraq, including the turn-in of unserviceable equipment. 
[Footnote 28] In addition, according to the Defense Logistics Agency, 
Expeditionary Disposal Remediation Teams were established in April 
2011 and started traveling with RPAT teams to process unserviceable 
assets and train the Army on filling out paperwork for unserviceable 
turn-ins. In regards to containers, which is a category of equipment 
for which we have previously reported DOD lacked full 
visibility,[Footnote 29] USF-I reports that a recent audit in Iraq 
found that the container system of record was significantly more 
accurate than previously reported to us. Given the reasons for the 
poor initial accuracy, including lack of discipline in recording 
containers' status as they changed locations, the challenge for USF-I 
will be to maintain this level of accuracy as the pace of the drawdown 
increases. 

Additional Risk Factors: 

DOD has taken numerous and robust actions to mitigate the risk to 
completing an efficient and orderly drawdown of forces, but continues 
to lack real time visibility over contractor-managed, government-owned 
(CMGO) equipment[Footnote 30] and does not collect complete data on 
the amount of previously unaccounted-for equipment being found as 
bases transition, which may increase the likelihood that unanticipated 
requirements for retrograding or transferring this equipment will 
emerge. Joint doctrine[Footnote 31] cites the importance of joint 
logistics environmentwide visibility over logistics resources 
(including equipment), describing that visibility as a desired 
attribute of logistics information systems, in part, because it 
provides the knowledge necessary to make effective decisions. In this 
vein, DOD drawdown-related orders highlight such visibility as a 
priority for effectively and efficiently achieving drawdown 
objectives. For example, one drawdown order identifies the maintenance 
of asset visibility as a key task to ensure accountability and to help 
reduce cases of fraud, waste, and abuse.[Footnote 32] 

Limited Real-Time Visibility over Contractor-Managed Government-Owned 
Equipment: 

As we previously reported, over time DOD has improved accountability 
and visibility for much of its equipment in Iraq but, as of April 
2010, continued to face challenges with CMGO equipment.[Footnote 33] 
Specifically, officials responsible for property accountability cited 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirement that contractors 
track equipment through their own systems as a limiting factor to 
these officials' ability to maintain real-time visibility.[Footnote 
34] Because these systems are not linked to government systems, 
government personnel have been required to periodically request 
contractor-tracked information and rely on regular government-
conducted physical inventories to ensure accurate visibility, which 
limits such visibility to points in time. Subsequent to our April 2010 
review, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Logistics continued to 
raise this as a challenge from a drawdown planning and execution 
perspective. However, according to officials in the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
responsible for DOD equipment accountability policy, allowing 
contractors to track CMGO equipment using government systems as well 
as their own systems would remove critical checks and balances, thus 
heightening the potential for fraud, and a DOD memorandum suggests 
that the establishment of separate accountable property records by DOD 
components for contractor-acquired property could increase the 
likelihood of double-counting.[Footnote 35] As a result, CMGO 
equipment can still only be tracked in real time by government 
personnel, such as those responsible for executing the drawdown, after 
the equipment has been "delivered" to the government, which often may 
not occur until contract performance ends. Therefore, real-time 
visibility over this category of equipment during the drawdown remains 
an issue.[Footnote 36] For example, USF-I estimated that its 
confidence in its total equipment visibility was only 80 percent as of 
June 2011, primarily due to shortfalls in its visibility over CMGO 
equipment, according to DOD officials. According to Army data, such 
equipment comprises over a third of the Army equipment remaining in 
Iraq. 

To facilitate the drawdown, DOD has taken near-term actions to 
mitigate the lack of real-time visibility over CGMO equipment and 
improve the management of this property.[Footnote 37] First, USF-I 
coordinated with contractors to conduct full property inventories and 
submit a property re-allocation plan at least 120 days prior to the 
end of the contract performance period. According to senior DOD 
officials, all contractors overseen by DCMA have submitted these 
plans. These officials stated that the plans provide a starting point 
inventory by location and contract of all CMGO property and, according 
to DOD, illustrate DOD's ongoing efforts to address CMGO issues. 
However, the information on equipment provided by the re-allocation 
plans still represents a "point in time" and does not provide real-
time visibility while the assets are re-allocated. Similarly, while 
senior DOD officials expect that the results of the latest USF-I-
performed wall-to-wall property inventory, scheduled to complete by 
the end of June 2011, will increase the level of confidence in CMGO 
visibility beyond the current 80 percent primarily by ensuring that 
all similar items, such as fire trucks, are consistently recorded, 
such visibility will only be an accurate snapshot as of that date--
before much of this equipment will be leaving Iraq. Second, USF-I's 
Contracting Fusion Cell, which was established in March 2011 to 
centralize the reporting of contractor demobilization milestones from 
all bases within Iraq, manages a new database that tracks contractor 
personnel and equipment. According to USF-I officials, the intent is 
for the database to provide real-time data so that USF-I can track 
over time how much CMGO equipment needs to leave Iraq. However, DOD 
officials have expressed concern that the new database faces similar 
data reliability and completeness challenges as other systems being 
used in Iraq to track contractor information face, as discussed in 
more detail later in this report. 

DOD's continued need to rely on the results of physical inventories to 
obtain accurate planning data may increase the likelihood that 
unanticipated requirements associated with the retrograde or transfer 
of CMGO equipment will emerge. In particular, as the CMGO equipment re-
allocation, transfer, and retrograde processes continue, previously 
unaccounted-for property may be brought to record in a contractor's 
accountability system--yet remain invisible to the government unless 
it conducts further inventories. According to a senior DOD official, 
officials in Iraq recently discovered that one contractor had been 
using 200 CMGO trucks it had obtained from another contractor, yet had 
never transferred these vehicles to its own property record. Because 
these trucks were not on the contractor's list of equipment, they had 
not been included in prior inventories. As a result, these trucks were 
not factored into DOD's drawdown plans until they were properly added 
to the contractor's equipment tracking system and checked by USF-I. 
According to DOD officials, USF-I is developing a standard operating 
procedure to address abandoned property that contractors might leave 
behind and decrease the time to obtain disposition instructions for 
such property from months to days, which may help mitigate the risk 
posed by unanticipated requirements. Nevertheless, as the number of 
forces in Iraq continues to decline, USF-I's ability to conduct 
regular equipment inventories may become more limited, and, as a 
result, this kind of property may not become visible to drawdown 
planners until late in the drawdown process. Senior Army officials 
responsible for property accountability expressed concerns that CMGO 
equipment that contractors may deliver to the government and abandoned 
contractor equipment will comprise the greatest proportion of 
unaccounted equipment DOD will need to rapidly address during the 
drawdown, likely at the last minute. Some common CMGO items, such as 
materiel handling equipment, are expensive, in high demand in 
Afghanistan, and take a relatively large amount of resources, such as 
transportation assets, to move. DOD officials acknowledge that 
accountability and visibility of CMGO equipment needs to be re-
examined and have noted that additional steps, likely in the form of 
policy and training, will be required. Without developing a means to 
achieve and maintain real-time visibility over critical CMGO property 
that retains the important checks and balances inherent to DOD's 
current accountability processes, DOD will continue to face challenges 
ensuring the efficient retrograde and transfer of such property as it 
completes the drawdown in Iraq and begins the drawdown in Afghanistan. 

Lack of Complete Data for Found-on-Installation Equipment: 

The transition of large bases in Iraq will likely exacerbate the 
challenges posed by the lack of real time visibility over CMGO 
property. In particular, DOD officials in Iraq remain concerned that 
the total amount of previously unaccounted-for equipment that DOD will 
need to address will likely increase. For example, after the 
completion of one of the largest base transitions to date, USF-I 
officials said that they were surprised at the amount of unaccounted-
for equipment that was left over at the end of the transition process. 
Beyond CMGO equipment, Army data demonstrates that the increase over 
the past 2 years apparent in "found-on-installation"[Footnote 38] 
equipment rates is at least partially attributable to base closures in 
Iraq, but other factors, including the implementation of the Army's 
Property Accountability Campaign,[Footnote 39] have also likely 
contributed, according to Army officials. Although Army officials view 
this increase positively because the Army can now account for this 
equipment, they also told us that Army-tracked found-on-installation 
data cannot be used as the sole indicator for leftover unaccounted-for 
equipment because such property may also represent equipment that was 
not properly entered into the Army's property accountability system of 
record due to a lack of proper accompanying documentation. According 
to Army officials, USF-I has in the past tracked the amount of 
unaccounted-for equipment that was found remaining on bases that 
closed. For example, these officials previously identified such 
equipment as amounting to between 3 percent and 5 percent of all 
equipment on a base. However, based on their communication with USF-I, 
these officials now say that USF-I no longer tracks these data. As a 
result, DOD drawdown planners may lack an accurate planning factor for 
unaccounted-for government equipment and abandoned contractor 
equipment left over after the remaining bases in Iraq transition. 
Without continuing to track these data, DOD may therefore miss an 
opportunity to enhance the fidelity of its drawdown projections and 
improve its processes to reduce the amount of such property. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract Management and Oversight in 
Iraq, but Challenges Remain: 

DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq, 
such as enhancing contract oversight through command emphasis and 
assigning COR responsibilities as a primary duty in certain instances. 
However, other concerns, such as lack of experience among contract 
oversight personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may face 
further challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without 
gaps in key services, and in effectively implementing its guidance for 
descoping contracts and demobilizing contractor personnel and 
infrastructure. Specific challenges for DOD include providing certain 
information, such as base closure dates, to contractors, obtaining 
information from contractors such as accurate personnel headcounts, 
and ensuring sufficient resources to facilitate full contractor 
demobilization. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract Management and Oversight but 
Some Concerns Remain: 

Contract Requirements Management: 

DOD has taken steps to address several of our findings related to 
issues affecting contract management for the drawdown.[Footnote 40] 
For example, we reported in April 2010 that USF-I guidance may not 
allow sufficient time for all contracted services needed during the 
drawdown to be put on contract in a responsible manner, which could 
lead to potential waste and service delays.[Footnote 41] Specifically, 
we found that standard operating procedures for requirements 
validation in Iraq only stated that personnel should submit 
requirements for contracted services at least 90 days prior to the 
date that funding is needed. However, this may not allow for 
sufficient time to obtain new contracted services and could lead to 
inefficient contracting practices. In March 2011, USF-I revised its 
financial management guidance to clarify time lines for submitting 
packages to the command's requirement validation process.[Footnote 42] 
Specifically, the guidance informs units that, for requirements over a 
certain dollar threshold, they should consider the time it could take 
to obtain bids for new contracts, mobilize contractors, and perform 
other tasks associated with validating requirements, and adjust their 
submittal plans to USF-I accordingly, potentially 150 to 180 days 
before the start of the contract's period of performance. In addition, 
USF-I issued an order that informed units to submit requirements to 
the Contract Review Board at least 90 days prior to the end of the 
contract's period of performance for units with existing contract 
options or 120 to 135 days prior to the start of the period of 
performance for new contracts.[Footnote 43] Further, by requiring 
paperwork for late submissions explaining failure to comply, the order 
provides an additional incentive for units to submit their 
requirements for contracted services within the specified time frames. 
As a result, DOD has taken steps that could reduce the risks of poor 
outcomes that may follow from a lack of timely planning for contracted 
services, such as undefinitized contract actions,[Footnote 44] 
increased costs, lengthened schedules, underperformance, and service 
delays. 

In addition, we reported in April 2010 that USF-I's predecessor, 
Multinational Force-Iraq, had in its drawdown plans delegated the 
responsibility for determining contract support requirements to 
contracting agencies, such as Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/ 
Afghanistan (CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command's 
predecessor), rather than to operational personnel such as combat 
force commanders, base commanders, and logistics personnel, among 
others.[Footnote 45] Further, we reported that, in accordance with 
joint doctrine and Army guidance,[Footnote 46] when planning for 
contractor support, planners must be aware of the operational 
principle of centralized contracting management to achieve unity of 
effort. We reported that centralized management can be achieved 
through means intended to synchronize and coordinate all contracting 
support actions being planned and executed in the operational area. 
USF-I has taken steps to ensure inclusion and coordination in 
determining contract support requirements for contract descoping and 
contractor demobilization between contracting support organizations 
and operational units. For example, USF-I, in preparation for the 
drawdown, issued an order requiring the senior tactical commander at 
each base to control and manage the accountability and drawdown of 
contracted support on their base.[Footnote 47] The order requires that 
these commanders, in conjunction with requiring activities and in 
coordination with contracting organizations, identify every service 
contract, task order, or service function operating within their base 
and determine a cessation date for each service and establish 
demobilization milestones. In a different order, USF-I instructed 
units to work with contracting organizations to identify and eliminate 
duplicate contracted services and to work with the Regional 
Contracting Center chief and other contract support organizations to 
determine the best contracting approach going forward.[Footnote 48] 
Such steps may help DOD improve its unity of effort in contract 
management as the drawdown progresses and ultimately concludes. 

Contract Oversight: 

DOD has also taken steps to improve contract oversight for the 
drawdown. For example, DOD has taken some steps to provide a 
sufficient number of trained contract oversight personnel to oversee 
contracts supporting the drawdown. We previously reported that DOD has 
had difficulties providing enough contract oversight personnel to 
deployed locations and training military personnel on how to work 
effectively with contractors in operations.[Footnote 49] In Iraq, we 
spoke with contracting officials from CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support 
Contracting Command and several Regional Contracting Centers, as well 
as officials from DCMA, LOGCAP, and the Air Force Contract 
Augmentation Program, and none reported experiencing contract 
oversight personnel shortfalls. DCMA employs a risk-based approach to 
contract oversight, allocating oversight personnel, such as CORs, and 
more frequent audits for contracts depending on the risk of mission 
failure and contractor problems. For example, according to DOD 
officials, DCMA has required monthly audits and assigned oversight 
personnel to contracts deemed medium to high risk, and depending on 
the contract, may conduct an audit every other month for those deemed 
low risk. Further, according to senior contracting officials, USF-I 
has taken steps to ensure that commanders and other senior leaders 
within the chain of command understand the importance of having CORs 
available and sufficiently trained to provide oversight during the 
drawdown. Several contracting officials said that they have seen an 
overall improvement in the following areas: 

* Assignment of oversight functions as a primary duty: According to 
contracting officials in Iraq, many units recognize the need to have 
CORs perform their oversight duties in a full-time capacity.[Footnote 
50] For instance, contracting officers responsible for contracts at 
Victory Base Complex and Joint Base Balad, a major air base north of 
Baghdad, said that units have CORs who work full time on overseeing 
contracts, such as the contract to provide bottled water to U.S. bases 
in Iraq. We also met with CORs from Air Force and Army units who 
stated that their primary roles were to provide contract oversight. 

* Command emphasis on oversight: Several contracting officials 
attributed improvements in contract oversight to efforts by senior 
leaders to place a greater focus on issues involving operational 
contract support.[Footnote 51] For example, in October 2010, the USF-I 
Commanding General issued a memorandum describing the importance of 
the COR's oversight function and the need to ensure that CORs have the 
necessary training, time, and experience to perform their duties, 
citing our prior work.[Footnote 52] 

* Improved training: CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command 
(through Regional Contracting Centers) has held regularly scheduled 
training in Iraq and Kuwait to ensure that CORs and other contracting 
personnel have the training and certification necessary to perform 
their contract-related responsibilities. Several CORs told us that 
they received a combination of classroom and online instruction, while 
others only received online instruction. However, several CORs told us 
that they did not find the online instruction to be effective in 
preparing them to perform their oversight responsibilities[Footnote 
53]. Some were also provided training before they deployed to Iraq. 
Senior contracting officials said that they have a surplus of 
personnel trained as CORs in Kuwait and Iraq in case additional 
oversight personnel are necessary. 

* Contractor demobilization preparation: In February 2011, the 
Regional Contracting Centers began holding demobilization 
orientations, developed by CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting 
Command in conjunction with DCMA, during which contract oversight 
personnel can discuss issues affecting contract demobilization, such 
as the need to obtain decisions from commanders on which contracts to 
descope and when to conduct such actions. 

Nevertheless, DOD continues to experience some challenges ensuring 
full contract oversight. Army guidance states that CORs usually serve 
in their position as an extra duty, depending upon the circumstances, 
[Footnote 54] and senior DOD officials told us that assigning COR 
responsibilities as an extra duty is desirable because the government 
can take advantage of the individual COR's expertise associated with 
his or her primary duties. However, Army guidance also recognizes that 
it is a key duty that cannot be ignored without creating risk to the 
government.[Footnote 55] In addition, USF-I's drawdown guidance states 
that units should make every effort to ensure that contracts 
considered critical to their mission, or contracts with exceptionally 
large footprints, have dedicated COR oversight and, accordingly, 
requires units to provide full-time COR support for such 
contracts.[Footnote 56] In Iraq during the drawdown, contract 
oversight has been hindered in at least some instances in which CORs' 
primary duties have limited their ability to concentrate fully on 
their contract oversight duties. For example, contractors have 
reported to contracting officials instances in which CORs were not 
available on site during some of the previous base closures, and their 
absence hindered the resolution of certain contractor demobilization 
issues. According to an October 2010 Center for Army Lessons Learned 
document,[Footnote 57] the quality of inputs from CORs declined during 
the previous drawdown as CORs refocused on their primary duties. 
However, senior DOD officials noted that the other duties CORs 
typically perform, such as force protection, may at times trump their 
COR duties. 

DOD Faces Challenges in Conducting Major Contract Transitions and 
Ensuring Orderly Contractor Demobilization: 

Ensuring Continuity of Services during Upcoming Major Contract 
Transitions May Be Challenging: 

As the drawdown progresses, units may encounter challenges when 
transitioning one contract to another. We have previously reported on 
contract transition issues as challenges, and one of the major lessons 
learned from the prior drawdown phase is the need to synchronize such 
transitions with ongoing operations to mitigate the risk of service 
disruption.[Footnote 58] In 2010 an Army battalion stationed in 
Kuwait, responsible for providing theater sustainment-level 
maintenance, experienced a labor strike, service disruptions, 
accidents that resulted in deaths, and other challenges that unit 
leadership attributed in large part to the transition of a major 
maintenance contract. Also contributing to these challenges was the 
intensity of operational activities at the time, which included the 
peak of efforts needed to complete the prior drawdown phase, the build-
up of forces in Afghanistan, and the reconstitution of the Army's 
prepositioned equipment in Kuwait. These challenges added to the unit 
missing some required delivery dates for equipment intended for use in 
Afghanistan. The extent to which the unit meets required delivery 
dates is a key measure of mission success, according to unit 
personnel. During our March 2011 visit, several senior military 
officials in Kuwait expressed concerns with the transition of the 
major line haul (trucking) contract in Kuwait. According to these 
officials and DOD data, this contract, which is critical for 
transporting equipment between Iraq and Kuwait, is expected to 
complete its transition during a period of heightened operational 
activity. 

The LOGCAP transition in Iraq will also be challenging. In April 2010 
we recommended that DOD analyze the benefits, costs, and risks of 
transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other service contracts 
in Iraq to determine the most effective and efficient means for 
providing essential services during the drawdown, recognizing that the 
department was not required to make the transition.[Footnote 59] DOD 
concurred with our recommendation, conducted the analysis, and decided 
not to conduct the transition to LOGCAP IV. Unlike during the prior 
drawdown phase, however, DOD's only option for maintaining LOGCAP 
services in Iraq after December 2011 is to transition to LOGCAP IV and 
DOD has approved an internal Action Memorandum to potentially allow 
State to use LOGCAP at its sites after 2011 as appropriate and 
feasible. Altogether, LOGCAP IV support is planned for 12 sites that 
are currently LOGCAP-supported and seven sites, including locations in 
Erbil and Basrah, that do not currently have LOGCAP services. After a 
projected task order award date of July 31, 2011, the transition will 
occur in two phases, with base and life support functions, such as 
dining facilities and laundry services, expected to transition first 
during a projected 100-day period, followed by transportation and 
materiel handling functions.[Footnote 60] The Army projects LOGCAP IV 
to have initial operating capability (base and life support) by 
October 1, 2011, and full operating capability by December 31, 2011. 

Although the circumstances are different, like we found in our April 
2010 report, the transition will carry risks. For example, a base in 
Iraq is expected to lose its bulk fuel and airfield operations 
capabilities needed during the transition until the new LOGCAP 
services are in place due to the length of time needed to complete 
transition tasks. In addition, because of the amount of work necessary 
to prepare sites DOD and State anticipate to be used after December 
31, 2011, the existing contractor risks not completing its 
construction projects before the transition, according to senior 
LOGCAP program management officials. The transition will be made even 
more complex by the need to maintain base life support and 
transportation services to within days of base closures, according to 
LOGCAP program management documentation. Transitioning the 
transportation component of LOGCAP will have its own unique 
challenges, including a complex and time-consuming property 
disposition process and uncertain requirements to support State. To 
mitigate such risks, LOGCAP program management is taking steps, such 
as working with CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command and 
the Contracting Fusion Cell to validate property and material 
requirements on a location-by-location basis, according to LOGCAP 
program officials. In addition, according to LOGCAP documentation and 
a senior DOD official, LOGCAP is projected to transition first at the 
seven post-2011 locations where its services are currently not 
provided to account for additional complexity associated with standing 
up LOGCAP at the new sites. Finally, according to DOD officials, 
contractual actions such as period of performance extensions, where 
feasible, may help mitigate any potential service gaps. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Descope Contracts and Plan for Contractor 
Demobilization, but May Face Challenges in Implementing Its Guidance: 

Steps to Plan for Contract Descoping and Contractor Demobilization: 

To facilitate the drawdown, DOD has taken steps to plan contract 
"descoping," which, for the purposes of this report, we define as a 
reduction in services commensurate with declining needs, and 
contractor demobilization, which, in the context of the drawdown, we 
define as the contractor's actions to reduce and ultimately end its 
presence and footprint if not needed to support the U.S. government's 
presence in Iraq after 2011. At the theater level, CENTCOM-Joint 
Theater Support Contracting Command, under the direction of USF-I, 
established the "Contracting Fusion Cell" in March 2011, and USF-I 
issued a fragmentary order directing the Cell to centralize the 
reporting of contractor demobilization milestones from all bases 
within Iraq; measure, assess, and report contractor demobilization 
milestones; and provide guidance and assistance to units, staff 
elements, and contracting activities as required. Since its 
establishment, the Contracting Fusion Cell has participated in a 
Rehearsal of Concept drill and a contracting summit to review and 
analyze issues affecting contractor demobilization. We attended the 
contracting summit and observed USF-I staff, units from across Iraq, 
and other stakeholders review major issues concerning contract 
requirements and demobilization for participating units and bases. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the Contracting Fusion Cell also 
employs a database in which division commanders input data on each of 
their active contracts, including counts of contractor personnel and 
equipment. Several senior military officials said that this database 
has been useful in providing data to plan the movements of personnel 
and equipment for the drawdown. However, some contracting officials 
noted that the same issues that have affected other efforts to capture 
accurate and reliable data on the contractor population in Iraq, such 
as the general lack of available data for personnel on firm fixed 
price contracts and challenges counting contractors that are on leave 
or out of the country on emergencies, are likely to affect the 
Contracting Fusion Cell's database as well. 

Steps to Plan for Contractor Demobilization: 

DOD has also improved contractor demobilization planning based on 
lessons learned from the prior drawdown phase. According to an October 
2010 Center for Army Lessons Learned document, one lesson learned from 
the Senior Contracting Official-Iraq was that contractors needed more 
guidance regarding closing contractor camps (referred to as 
"mancamps") during the prior drawdown phase.[Footnote 61] This 
document stated that there were occasions when contractors left Iraq 
mancamps and associated facilities without proper close out, abandoned 
equipment, failed to repatriate personnel (especially third country 
nationals), failed to obtain proper Iraq exit visas, did not return 
government furnished equipment, did not close out in the appropriate 
contractor accountability system, and did not return badges. Since at 
least November 2010, CENTCOM has required all contracts and 
solicitations in Iraq to include a templated contractor demobilization 
clause that addresses the above-listed issues. CENTCOM-Joint Theater 
Support Contracting Command has also developed a template for CORs to 
ensure that contractor demobilization plans adhere to certain time 
frames. Moreover, USF-I has included in its guidance examples of 
cessation of services and contract demobilization schedules and a 
demobilization worksheet. However, according to senior contracting 
officials, there is no standard demobilization plan that contractors 
can submit. To address this shortfall, a senior contracting official 
stated in April 2011 that the office of the Senior Contracting 
Official-Iraq planned to develop a demobilization plan template for 
contractors. 

At the unit level, mayor cells[Footnote 62] are working with units, 
DOD contracting activities (such as Regional Contracting Centers, 
LOGCAP, and DCMA), and contractors performing work on their respective 
bases to identify and determine when certain contract requirements can 
be reduced and ultimately terminated. For example, the mayor cell for 
Joint Base Balad has established a set of milestones and time lines to 
descope contracts and demobilize contractors performing work on the 
base. One contract planned for descoping involves airfield sweepers. 
Joint Base Balad officials said that they plan on reducing the number 
of contracted airfield sweepers after the base's fighter (F-16 
squadron) mission ends and have also identified a date after which the 
services will no longer be needed. Additionally, senior officials in 
charge of Contingency Operating Base Marez, a U.S. base in northern 
Iraq, are planning to end their contract for security personnel to 
coincide with their base transition plans. The Contracting Fusion 
Cell, DCMA, and Regional Contracting Centers monitor the progress of 
contract descoping and demobilization through tools that track 
milestones and time lines for each of their respective contracts. For 
instance, these organizations are tracking the submission of 
contractor demobilization plans, which are required by a CENTCOM-Joint 
Theater Support Contracting Command clause. 

Units are taking further steps to ensure the continuity of key 
services while continuing to descope contracts. For example, as bases 
begin descoping contracts and demobilizing contractor personnel in 
preparation for base transition, some units are exploring the option 
of using local contractors to provide certain services. According to 
senior military officials, since local contractors do not require 
extensive base life support, such as housing, and will not have to be 
repatriated to their country of origin at the end of the contract, 
they can be employed to provide certain services that would otherwise 
have to be discontinued. However, we have previously reported on 
challenges hiring local national contractors, including the need for 
greater oversight due to Iraqi firms' relative lack of experience, 
limited capacity and capability, unfamiliarity with U.S. quality 
standards and expectations, and lack of quality control processes that 
U.S. firms have in place.[Footnote 63] Some units also intend to 
replace contractor personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity 
of certain services, such as guard security, airfield vegetation 
removal, and generator maintenance and are conducting "troop-to-task" 
analysis to determine which servicemembers will perform these tasks 
and how many will be needed. For example, the mayor cell at Joint Base 
Balad has developed plans to reduce contractor personnel for the 
base's incinerator operations and eventually replace them with 
servicemembers. Officials from one mayor cell noted that these 
additional tasks may further tax unit personnel who are in short 
supply and busy meeting other priorities. 

Challenges Implementing Contractor Demobilization Guidance: 

Although major contractor demobilizations have yet to occur, early 
indications suggest that DOD faces several challenges as it implements 
its contractor drawdown guidance. DOD has guidance in place to 
facilitate the descoping of contract services and contractor 
demobilization. In particular, USF-I's drawdown guidance states that 
contracting organizations in Iraq are to work with the requiring 
activities (typically military units) and base leadership to ensure 
all contracts and task orders are adequately scoped to meet mission 
requirements and are scheduled to cease or terminate when no longer 
required. It also provides time frames by which contractors must be 
notified to complete key tasks and cease providing services.[Footnote 
64] However, without taking additional steps to address the challenges 
discussed below, DOD may be unable to effectively implement its 
guidance and ensure the effective reduction of contract services to 
appropriate levels and ultimate demobilization of all its contractors. 

* Providing information to contractors. Guidance in a USF-I 
fragmentary order requires senior tactical commanders at each base to 
notify all contractors with the base closure or transition date no 
later than 180 days prior to the base closure or transition so the 
contractors can start preparing their personnel and equipment for 
redeployment. However, LOGCAP program officials were unable to provide 
base transition dates to subcontractors because base closure dates and 
other information relevant to demobilization are classified, which 
limited the contractors' ability to plan their demobilization tasks 
such as replacing third country national personnel with local national 
personnel to ensure continuity of service while downsizing their 
infrastructure. An annex to USF-I's drawdown guidance also states that 
in most cases contractors must be notified in writing 45 to 120 days 
in advance of the service cessation date. Nevertheless, according to 
senior contracting officials, contractors have expressed concerns 
about the lack of clarity on when to reduce services and which 
contracted services will be needed as USF-I proceeds with the 
drawdown. According to senior contracting officials, some contractors 
reported instances in which they were notified only a few weeks in 
advance to transition to a new location, affecting their ability to 
plan. Fluid base transition dates may exacerbate this challenge. For 
example, according to a senior contracting official, the date for the 
transfer of a U.S. base to the Government of Iraq changed eight times 
within 3 weeks, which made it difficult to plan for the termination of 
contracts at the base and contractor demobilization. 

* Obtaining accurate and sufficient information from contractors. 
According to DOD officials, as part of demobilization planning, 
contractors submit property re-allocation plans that list property in- 
use and excess to the contractors' needs as well as contractors' plans 
for re-allocating the property, among other things. Contractors submit 
these plans in conjunction with joint government/contractor 
inventories conducted 120 days prior to base transition. However, 
according to several contracting officials, some contractors had 
provided mayor cells with draft or incomplete plans, some of which 
contained inaccurate information and incorrect assumptions, on how 
they intend to redistribute their property in preparation for base 
transitions. USF-I drawdown guidance also requires senior tactical 
commanders at every base in Iraq to account for all task orders, 
contracts, and service functions on their bases, to include contractor 
employee headcount data and report such information on a regular basis 
to the Contracting Fusion Cell.[Footnote 65] However, several base 
management officials told us that because they do not have direct 
contact with or visibility over subcontractors, they cannot ensure 
that contractor personnel are not being undercounted during contractor 
headcounts, which may hinder planning for the resources needed to 
complete contractor demobilization.[Footnote 66] 

* Sufficiency of resources to complete contractor demobilization. 
According to USF-I guidance, in addition to preparing a demobilization 
plan, key tasks that contractors need to perform to complete 
demobilization include participating in joint property inventories of 
CMGO property at least 120 days prior to base transition, as well as 
scheduling and coordinating transportation, among other things. 
[Footnote 67] In regards to coordinating transportation, USF-I is 
working to include contractor personnel requirements in its planning 
but, according to senior contracting officials, contractors have 
expressed concerns about the availability of resources to redeploy 
their personnel and move their equipment as the drawdown progresses. 
Contractors have also expressed concern about their ability to 
communicate with government personnel during demobilization, according 
to these officials. 

DOD and State Are Coordinating to Establish and Support the Post-2011 
U.S. Government Presence in Iraq, but Key Elements of This Presence 
May Not Be Well Understood throughout DOD: 

DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition began late, 
but both agencies have now coordinated extensively to plan for the 
transfer or loan to State of a wide range of DOD equipment, and DOD 
has taken steps to minimize any impact on unit readiness of such 
transfers. DOD also has approved an internal Action Memorandum to 
potentially allow State to use DOD contracts to obtain services such 
as base and life support, food and fuel, and maintenance, as 
appropriate and feasible within funding constraints, but agreements 
between State and DOD have not been finalized and State may not have 
sufficient funding or capacity to oversee these contracted services. 
Further, State is taking steps to replace services that DOD will no 
longer provide, but these services will be different because State's 
mission in Iraq will be different than DOD's mission. In terms of 
scope, DOD plans a robust post-2011 presence as part of an Office of 
Security Cooperation operating under Chief of Mission authority. 
However, the extent to which DOD's personnel would receive status 
protections such as privileges and immunities and the limited nature 
of the anticipated engagement model with Iraq may not be fully 
understood throughout the department. 

DOD Has Coordinated Extensively with State to Plan for the Provision 
of Equipment and Contracted Services to Support the Post-2011 U.S. 
Government Presence in Iraq: 

DOD and State Have Conducted Extensive Interagency Coordination for 
the Transition, Although Such Coordination Occurred Late: 

In addition to redeploying its military personnel and retrograding or 
transferring its remaining equipment, during the drawdown DOD aims to 
facilitate the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, and, to 
that end, has engaged in formal interagency coordination with State at 
various levels within the two departments. One of the principle 
objectives of this coordination has been to define State's needs for 
external support and determine how DOD can best meet those needs. For 
example, DOD and State established the "Ad Hoc Senior Executive 
Steering Group on the DOD to State Transition" in September 2010 to 
assess State's needs in the logistics and sustainment areas, define 
requirements, and manage solutions, in particular those anticipated to 
be provided by DOD. Co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Program Support and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Logistics Management, this group meets biweekly. According 
to these two officials, the meetings greatly facilitated State's 
ability to develop its requirements for DOD support, including 
equipment. In addition, both State and, according to DOD officials, 
DOD, have designated a senior-level official responsible for the 
transition. For example, the State Department Iraq Transition 
Coordinator coordinates State's aspects of the transition from 
military to civilian operations in Iraq. On the ground in Iraq, 
multiple USF-I personnel, including planners and logisticians, are 
embedded as liaisons within Embassy Baghdad's Management Cell for 
Transition, and interagency transition cells are in place at all sites 
that are anticipated to transition to State throughout Iraq. Finally, 
USF-I stood up separate working groups for transitioning operations 
and base-level sustainment, which include State participation. 
Coordination at these multiple levels helped facilitate, for example, 
the identification and planning for the 310 out of the more than 1,000 
Joint USF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan-specified tasks 
DOD currently performs in Iraq that State anticipates assuming after 
the transition.[Footnote 68] 

The coordination outlined here occurred late in the process and the 
delays have made the transition more challenging than it otherwise 
could have been, compounding State's relatively limited capacity to 
plan, as noted by senior DOD officials and acknowledged by senior 
State officials. As a result, for example, State's Inspector General 
found that the initial lack of senior level DOD and State officials in 
Washington, D.C. dedicated to the Iraq transition process contributed 
to the inability of operational level DOD and State officials to 
obtain timely decisions on key transition issues.[Footnote 69] During 
our travel to Iraq, numerous officials at numerous levels cited the 
critical importance of planning early to minimize challenges in 
conducting future similar transitions, such as will be necessary in 
Afghanistan. 

DOD Plans to Provide Military Equipment to State and Has Taken Steps 
to Mitigate Impact on Readiness: 

DOD and State interagency coordination has facilitated the 
identification of State's requirements for DOD equipment and 
identified efficient solutions to meet these needs. In an April 2010 
memo to DOD, State presented its assessment that it lacked the 
resources and capability to provide technology, vehicles, and aircraft 
to adequately meet the extreme security challenges in Iraq. The 
justification for DOD equipment transfer accompanying the memo 
suggested that, without the transfer of DOD military equipment, the 
security of State personnel in Iraq would be degraded significantly 
and one could expect increased casualties. To that end, according to 
State officials, State initially requested about 23,000 individual 
pieces of equipment encompassing a wide range of items. To meet these 
needs, DOD established an "Equipping Board" with members from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and military 
services. According to Equipping Board participants, State's initial 
request did not fully reflect the actual capabilities State needed. 
These officials said that DOD subject matter experts in areas such as 
medical and airfield logistics assisted State officials in defining 
State's requirements in these areas, reducing the request to around 
3,800 individual pieces of mostly standard military equipment worth 
approximately $209 million. In addition to cutting potential costs to 
State by reducing the overall number of items requested, the board 
also created efficiencies by, for example, substituting requests for 
expensive equipment such as new CT scan machines and night vision 
goggles for older versions already in Iraq that, while less capable, 
will nevertheless meet State's needs, according to DOD officials. 
[Footnote 70] In addition to DOD military equipment, State has also 
expressed needs for nonstandard[Footnote 71] equipment in Iraq. Aside 
from 60 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, this 
equipment includes mainly low-value items, such as containerized 
housing units, desk chairs and other office equipment, which USF-I 
plans to transfer after screening the items for USF-I, CENTCOM, and 
service requirements. In terms of the number of total items, the scope 
of non-standard equipment transfers is projected to be much larger 
than the transfer of standard DOD military equipment. 

DOD plans to provide military equipment to State through various 
means, and for non-excess equipment has taken steps to mitigate any 
impact on readiness. According to DOD documentation, 32 percent of the 
total State request will be comprised of excess defense articles 
provided at no cost, such as collapsible fabric fuel tanks, 7.5-ton 
cranes, and speakers; and about 6 percent will be items loaned, 
including the MRAPs and biometric equipment; and about 62 percent will 
be non-excess equipment provided to State through sales from stock, 
including items such as aircraft flares, radios, and medical 
equipment. According to DOD officials involved in the process, the non-
excess equipment items for State were assigned a risk level to 
determine their potential impact on readiness if transferred. For 
example, 101 out of 185 medical item types were deemed to be at high 
risk of affecting readiness. According to DOD officials, for the high-
risk items, State intends to pay full acquisition value to facilitate 
rapid replacement, versus the low-risk items, for which State plans to 
pay depreciated value. In addition, according to DOD officials, DOD 
has taken steps to accelerate the procurement of some of the high-risk 
items to be transferred to State. Finally, the MRAPs DOD intends to 
loan to State are coming out of requirements for Army Prepositioned 
Stocks[Footnote 72] rather than unit stocks. According to DOD, these 
factors will minimize any impact on unit readiness of transferring or 
loaning equipment to State. Remaining issues to be resolved include 
determining how to replace loaned equipment that is destroyed or 
severely damaged during the course of its use, since, according to DOD 
officials, State will likely have to request additional procurement 
funding if it determines that a replacement is necessary. 

DOD Plans to Provide Contracted Services to State Amidst Concerns 
about State's Capacity to Fund and Oversee Them: 

In addition to equipment transfers and loans, through the interagency 
coordination process, DOD has approved an internal Action Memorandum 
to potentially support State's post-2011 presence in Iraq by allowing 
State to use DOD contracts to obtain needed services as appropriate 
and feasible, but agreements between State and DOD have not been 
finalized. First, State anticipates obtaining base and life support 
such as dining facility and laundry operations through an order on the 
Army's LOGCAP contract. The Army projects that between 4,500 and 5,500 
contractor personnel will be necessary to provide these services to 
State. Second, State anticipates relying on a DOD contract to provide 
100 DOD contractor personnel to maintain some of the equipment 
transferred and loaned by DOD, including major items such as vehicles, 
under a contract DOD already plans to have in place to support its own 
personnel in Iraq. Third, State anticipates obtaining food and fuel 
through Defense Logistics Agency contractors. Finally, DOD intends to 
provide various capabilities such as information technology support 
and the contracted capability to detect incoming rocket or mortar fire 
and provide warnings. According to DOD and State officials, using 
DOD's existing contracting mechanisms for these services would be more 
efficient than if State were to award its own contracts. Documentation 
including DOD's initial estimates valued the support requested by 
State at about $575 million per year, for which, under the proposed 
terms of a draft interagency agreement, State would reimburse DOD. 
However, DOD's documentation raised concerns about State's ability to 
fund these services, given the amounts designated for these purposes 
in State's budget requests.[Footnote 73] According to State, the time 
frame for LOGCAP support is subject to negotiation with DOD, after 
which it may either award its own contract or use local supply options 
if conditions permit.[Footnote 74] 

According to State documentation, State currently faces shortfalls in 
personnel with sufficient experience and expertise to perform 
necessary contract oversight. As a result, State plans to use DOD 
support for certain contract management and oversight functions. 
[Footnote 75] In particular, the Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) intend to provide 
contract pricing, administration, and audit services for the LOGCAP 
contract, and, according to DOD officials, Army Materiel Command has 
agreed to provide management functions for the maintenance contract. 
Projected requirements for these functions include 47 DCMA personnel 
supporting State operations, as well as 3 DCAA and 3 Army Materiel 
Command civilians. State would provide CORs to oversee the DOD 
contractors. According to State, the COR function is one that is 
normally part of the duties of a Foreign Service officer or specialist 
position at embassies abroad and CORs are identified as part of the 
normal assignment cycle. As of early July 2011, State documentation 
identified 35 individuals to perform COR duties associated with 136 
LOGCAP oversight areas across locations in Iraq, such as dining 
facilities operation and firefighting services. COR positions for 31 
oversight areas remained to be filled, including air operations 
throughout Iraq. 

In addition to receiving contract support through DOD, in some cases 
State intends to directly contract for services that it currently 
receives through DOD, particularly in the medical, aviation, 
information technology, and security areas. For example, State 
recently awarded a contract that State documentation indicates will 
provide for seven health units, one large Diplomatic Support Hospital, 
and three small Diplomatic Support Hospitals in large part to replace 
medical services that DOD has provided to date in Iraq. In addition, 
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security will conduct static security 
activities at U.S. facilities with only a State presence remaining in 
Iraq past December 31, 2011. According to DOD and State officials, 
DOD, through CENTCOM, would be responsible for security on the Office 
of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) sites under the proposed terms of 
a draft Memorandum of Understanding between DOD and State.[Footnote 
76] According to testimony from the Under Secretary of State for 
Management before the Wartime Contracting Commission, static and 
movement security for State's Embassy in Baghdad alone will cost 
nearly $2.5 billion over the next 5 years. Even with the increase in 
such capacity, the drawdown of military forces will result in lost 
protective security capabilities for State because State's mission in 
Iraq is significantly different than DOD's mission. As a result, State 
will rely to a greater extent on the Government of Iraq for certain 
types of security activities. For example, State will deploy a "sense 
and warn" platform that will allow for advance warning in case of 
incoming fire such as rockets and mortars, but will not include the 
capability to fire back at the attackers, as DOD currently fields at 
its bases--which will become an Iraqi responsibility. 

DOD Is Currently Negotiating for Authority for Its Continued Presence 
in Iraq, but the Scope of the Proposed Mission and Protections for DOD 
Personnel Are Not Well Understood within DOD: 

According to DOD and State officials, the scale of the combined DOD 
and State presence in Iraq after December 2011 will be unprecedented. 
A June 2011 DOD report to congressional committees projected nearly 
20,000 DOD contractor personnel to be spread across all post-December 
2011 sites in Iraq. However, DOD and State now expect this number to 
be lower, and state that current plans call for an estimated total 
number of U.S. government direct hires and contractors in the range of 
16,000 to 17,000 personnel. As stated recently by a Department of 
State official before the House Armed Services Committee, about 14,000 
of those personnel will likely be contractor personnel operating under 
both DOD and State. According to DOD and State, the expected number of 
personnel has changed from the earlier projection due to the fact that 
plans are continually being refined and because contracts have since 
been awarded. DOD and State expect that the exact number of personnel 
in Iraq after December 2011 will continue to change as contracts are 
put in place and requirements are further refined. In addition to 
providing contract support services to State as discussed earlier, DOD 
personnel intend to operate an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq 
(OSC-I), which would be funded by both DOD and State. As of June 2011, 
DOD planning documents called for DOD personnel to remain at 10 sites 
countrywide.[Footnote 77] Six of these sites would be OSC-I only sites 
staffed by DOD personnel and contractors. DOD and State personnel, 
including those implementing the police training program under State's 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, would 
be colocated at the four remaining sites. DOD's activities under OSC-I 
will include the fielding, administration, and oversight of an 
estimated 157 military or civilian personnel and Security Assistance 
Teams comprised of 763 military, civilian, or contractor personnel. 
According to a report from the State Department's Office of Inspector 
General[Footnote 78] and senior DOD officials, OSC-I's mission would 
include advising, training, and equipping Iraqi forces, supporting 
professional military education; planning joint military exercises; 
and managing foreign military sales programs involving $6.1 billion in 
Iraqi funds and $2 billion in U.S. funds through the Iraqi Security 
Forces Fund. Under this mission, DOD's planned activities include 
Security Force Assistance, which is a new subset of security 
cooperation described in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review as 
encompassing activities to train, equip, advise, and assist host 
countries' forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to 
their populations and protecting their resources and 
territories.[Footnote 79] DOD also intends to provide for the 
management, security, and sustainment of its sites and some 
construction DOD officials refer to as "site improvements" to enhance 
the sites' suitability. According to senior DOD officials, with the 
exception of one site near the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the OSC-I 
presence in Iraq will not remain longer than 3 years. 

According to senior DOD officials, in the absence of an Iraqi request 
for an extended U.S. military presence, the U.S. government is not 
attempting to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement[Footnote 80] with 
the Government of Iraq in regards to the post-December 2011 U.S. 
presence. Rather than negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement, DOD is 
preparing to stand up OSC-I, though it does not yet have final 
approval from the Government of Iraq to establish such a presence. 
According to State officials, this leaves the Strategic Framework 
Agreement as the overarching basis for OSC-I's activities.[Footnote 
81] Nevertheless, DOD is proceeding with preparations for the OSC-I 
sites, including construction, absent land use agreements with the 
Government of Iraq with the assumption that these agreements will be 
forthcoming. This carries some risk; for example, State officials 
noted that approximately $18 million was obligated to prepare an 
Embassy Branch Office in Mosul that was subsequently "indefinitely 
postponed" as an enduring site due in part to a lack of buy-in from 
the Iraqi government. According to State officials, while State is 
working to recoup some of those funds from the contractor, State 
officials stated that they expected to recoup only about $8 to $10 
million, although the exact amount had not yet been determined. 
According to State documentation and senior State officials, as of 
June 2011, the Government of Iraq had not formally signed any 
agreements for the OSC-I-only sites. According to DOD and State 
officials, delays associated with forming a government after Iraq's 
March 2010 parliamentary elections have hindered the negotiation of 
these agreements. In particular, Iraq continues to lack both a 
Minister of Defense and a Minister of Interior with whom to negotiate 
these agreements and others. 

The scope of DOD's proposed mission in Iraq after 2011 and the extent 
to which DOD personnel conducting these activities will be ensured 
protections may not be not well understood throughout the department. 
According to senior DOD officials and State officials, without a 
request from the Government of Iraq for a follow-on U.S. military 
presence, all U.S. government activities in Iraq, including those 
performed by DOD military, civilian, and contractor personnel, will 
occur under Chief of Mission authority, as approved by the National 
Security Deputies Committee in May 2010. Additionally, according to 
senior DOD and State officials and DOD documentation, DOD and State 
anticipate that direct-hire, full-time DOD military and civilian 
personnel working under OSC-I can be accredited to the diplomatic 
mission as administrative and technical staff, with some status 
protections such as privileges and immunities provided under the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.[Footnote 82] 
Notwithstanding DOD's intent to operate under Chief of Mission 
authority, a CENTCOM information paper dated February 2011, 
coordinated with DOD's Office of the General Counsel, makes the 
assumption that, absent clarification from the Secretary of Defense, 
the 157 DOD personnel would operate under the direction of the CENTCOM 
commander, rather than the Chief of Mission. The information paper 
also raised some questions regarding the feasibility of notifying OSC-
I personnel to the Government of Iraq as part of the administrative 
and technical staff. This apparent incongruity has contributed to a 
lack of understanding within the Department of the precise scope of 
DOD's mission in post-2011 Iraq and the status protections that will 
be afforded to DOD personnel. For example, senior DOD officials stated 
that a variety of organizations within DOD continue to push for a role 
in post-2011 Iraq even though these organizations' activities are not 
part of the anticipated engagement model based on Chief of Mission 
authority, which, according to those officials, could limit the range 
of activities DOD can perform in Iraq. Similarly, due to uncertainty 
regarding status protections, Army officials expressed concern that 
DOD would be unable to prevent one of its military or civilian 
personnel from languishing in an Iraqi jail if, for example, he or she 
were to be involved in an accident in which an Iraqi dies. Further, 
senior USF-I officials have expressed frustration with differing legal 
opinions on such issues. Without officially clarifying these issues or 
without a status of forces or other agreement that includes such 
details, DOD personnel may lack clarity as to the scope of DOD's 
mission in Iraq after December 31, 2011, and the department may be 
less able to ensure unity of effort[Footnote 83] among its 
organizations and with State in completing the transition to a 
civilian-led presence in Iraq. DOD may therefore risk an uncoordinated 
approach in defining and implementing the range of activities its OSC-
I personnel will perform. 

Conclusions: 

The drawdown of U.S. military forces and equipment from Iraq, an 
operation governed by the time line set forth in the Security 
Agreement, is an operation of unprecedented magnitude, and will occur 
amidst an uncertain political and security environment as well as the 
ongoing transition to a civilian-led U.S. government presence in Iraq. 
Much has been done to facilitate the drawdown. DOD has conducted 
detailed planning for the sequence of actions and associated resources 
necessary to mitigate risk and to achieve its goals of transferring 
and removing personnel and equipment from the remaining bases in Iraq. 
In addition, DOD has taken steps to improve its management and 
oversight of contracts in Iraq by issuing new guidance, developing 
metrics and milestones for tracking key dates and progress, 
establishing a cell to provide a common operating picture for all 
contracts in Iraq, and working to ensure a sufficient number of CORs 
are available to conduct oversight. To help facilitate the transition 
to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, DOD has engaged in interagency 
coordination with State at various levels, and both agencies are 
working closely to coordinate the provision of equipment and services 
needed to support the transition. However, without taking further 
action in regards to its visibility over CMGO equipment and in 
tracking equipment that is brought to record during the completion of 
base transitions, DOD may not be able to take advantage of further 
opportunities to reduce the likelihood of unanticipated requirements 
and to refine its drawdown projections. Further, challenges DOD faces 
in implementing its contractor demobilization guidance, including 
providing key information to contractors and ensuring robust 
contractor demobilization planning, may hinder the base transition 
process if contractors miss key dates or demobilize in a less than 
orderly fashion. Finally, DOD and State's ability to ensure a timely, 
coordinated approach to defining and implementing OSC-I may suffer 
absent an official clarification on the scope of DOD's activities in 
post-2011 Iraq in accordance with the anticipated engagement model and 
the extent to which all DOD government personnel will receive status 
protections such as privileges and immunities, since DOD may lack a 
status of forces or other agreement after December 31, 2011. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 
actions. 

To help ensure that DOD will be able to complete the orderly and 
efficient retrograde and transfer of its equipment and transition of 
its bases in Iraq by minimizing unanticipated requirements, 

* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army and the 
Commander, U.S. Central Command, to approve and implement, as 
appropriate, a process, to include associated policy and training, for 
acquiring and maintaining real-time visibility of CMGO equipment 
before it is delivered to the U.S. government that meets the needs of 
operational forces while retaining oversight features inherent to 
DOD's current accountability processes; and: 

* direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq take steps to collect 
accurate data on equipment that is found during the large base closure 
process but not recorded in any property book, and, as appropriate, 
refine the projection for equipment needing to be retrograded and 
transferred based on these data. 

To maximize its ability to achieve an orderly and efficient drawdown 
of contracted services in Iraq, direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-
Iraq, to (1) assess the risk of providing all contractors, including 
their subcontractors, with the information--such as base transition 
dates--required to descope services and demobilize their workforces, 
against the risk of contractors' inability to meet milestones without 
it and take the appropriate actions based on this assessment; (2) take 
appropriate measures, such as enforcement of guidance laid out in the 
template to be developed by the office of the Senior Contracting 
Official-Iraq, to ensure robust contractor planning associated with 
demobilization; and (3) engage contractors to ensure that total 
personnel headcounts accurately reflect all personnel, including those 
working under subcontracts. 

To ensure that the U.S. government activities in Iraq after December 
2011 reflect the appropriate unity of effort and focus DOD and State's 
efforts on implementing a coordinated approach to defining and 
implementing the activities to be undertaken by OSC-I, issue a 
memorandum clarifying the command structure of any DOD elements 
remaining in Iraq post-2011 and the scope of DOD activities authorized 
in post-2011 Iraq in accordance with an approved engagement model, 
including guidance regarding actions or decisions that will be taken 
in the event adequate privileges, exemptions, and immunities are not 
obtained for such DOD elements. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
four recommendations listed above, but asked that our last 
recommendation be reworded to clarify the timing of our 
recommendation. We agreed to modify the recommendation to specify that 
the guidance should be completed once the engagement model is 
finalized. The Department of State also provided a number of informal 
technical comments that we considered and incorporated, as 
appropriate. The Department of State did not provide formal written 
comments. 

In its comments regarding our first recommendation, DOD stated that it 
agrees that accountability of contractor-managed government-owned 
equipment is important. DOD further commented that USF-I has developed 
a Base Transition Smart Book that defines CMGO procedures and provides 
a series of templates, instructions, and operating procedures that 
cover the entire base transition process. While the Base Transition 
Smart Book may define CMGO procedures, as we note in our report, these 
procedures do not provide real-time visibility over this category of 
equipment and we continue to believe that DOD needs to develop a 
process which will allow real-time visibility of CMGO equipment before 
it is delivered to the U.S. government. Regarding our second 
recommendation, DOD commented that it agrees that the collection of 
accurate data of found equipment is necessary to refine projections 
for equipment retrograde, and noted that the Base Transition Smart 
Book provides guidance on how to manage found equipment and update 
projections for closure. However, as we note in our report, USF-I no 
longer tracks unaccounted-for equipment that was found remaining on 
bases that closed. As a result, DOD drawdown planners may lack an 
accurate planning factor for unaccounted-for government equipment and 
abandoned contractor equipment left over after the remaining bases in 
Iraq transition. Therefore we continue to believe that USF-I should 
take additional steps to collect data on equipment that is found 
during the base closure process, and use this data to refine the 
projection for equipment needing to be retrograded and transferred. In 
response to our third recommendation, DOD commented that it 
acknowledges the risks associated with providing any contractor 
critical transition information about base closures and timelines. DOD 
said that it will address this risk using a vigorous vetting process 
and security background checks. DOD also commented that it will make 
certain that demobilization planning captures the associated 
requirements concerning contractors and their materiel and it further 
noted that the accountability of all contractor personnel, both prime 
contractors and their subcontractors, will be maintained through 
continued Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker (SPOT) 
compliance and the periodic contractor census conducted under the 
purview of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq. As we have noted in 
previous reports, however, agency-reported data in SPOT and the census 
should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about the 
number of contractor personnel due to limitations such as incomplete 
and inaccurate data.[Footnote 84] As a result, DOD cannot ensure that 
contractor personnel are not being undercounted during contractor 
headcounts, and we continue to believe that additional action to 
engage with contractors is necessary. Regarding our last 
recommendation, DOD concurred with the intent of our recommendation 
but asked that we modify the wording of the recommendation to clarify 
that the guidance should be developed after the engagement model has 
been finalized. We agree with DOD's suggested change and therefore 
modified our recommendation accordingly. 

The department also provided an informal technical comment that we 
considered and incorporated, as appropriate. A complete copy of DOD's 
written comments is included in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretary of the Army. 
This report also is available at no charge on our Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Addressees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John Tierney: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign 
Operations: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
planned for, begun to execute, and identified and mitigated risks 
associated with transferring and removing personnel and equipment from 
the bases remaining open past August 31, 2010, we reviewed and 
analyzed the major plans that guide the execution of the drawdown, 
including those published by U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) and U.S. Army 
Central (ARCENT). We also reviewed other relevant documents, including 
command briefings, the Security Agreement between the United States 
and the Republic of Iraq, as well as DOD joint doctrine. Additionally, 
we obtained data and documentation and spoke with officials at many 
organizations and levels involved in the preparation and execution of 
drawdown plans to include: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USF-
I, and ARCENT. We also spoke with officials and obtained data and 
documentation from a range of supporting commands, including 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Logistics; Army Materiel 
Command; Army Sustainment Command; Defense Logistics Agency; Surface 
Deployment and Distribution Command; CENTCOM Deployment Distribution 
Operations Center; CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command; 
Defense Contract Management Agency; Air Force Contract Augmentation 
Program; and the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Office. In 
support of this effort, we traveled to Kuwait in September 2010 and 
March 2011. We also traveled to Iraq in April 2011. During these trips 
we spoke with officials, attended planning conferences, obtained data 
and documentation, and observed the processes instituted to facilitate 
the drawdown. We also traveled to Sierra Army Depot to observe the 
culmination of retrograde operations, as well as to U.S. Army Combined 
Arms Support Command to discuss the institutionalization of lessons 
learned from the drawdown. To address Department of State issues 
impacting the drawdown of forces from Iraq, we obtained documentation 
and spoke with officials at the U.S. Department of State as well as 
Embassy Baghdad. Throughout the engagement, the team relied upon staff 
working from our Baghdad Field Office to conduct interviews with 
officials in theater, attend planning conferences, and to periodically 
refresh key information. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to 
execute, and identified and mitigated risks associated with curtailing 
unneeded contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and 
providing adequate contract oversight, we reviewed contracting-
specific planning documents, memoranda, and other sources of guidance 
issued by DOD and subordinate organizations. We also met with 
contracting officials in Kuwait and Iraq to discuss how military units 
in Iraq intended to terminate contracted services and demobilize the 
contractor workforce, while maintaining sufficient oversight on 
contracts supporting military operations in theater. In addition, we 
visited three military bases in Iraq and met with the mayor cells to 
obtain information on contract descoping and demobilization issues 
specific to those bases and the impact those issues have on the base 
transition process. We selected these locations because they are all 
large bases and because travel was possible during the time frame of 
our visit. We also met with contracting officers' representatives 
(COR) from one base to discuss the challenges that they have 
encountered in the performance of their contract oversight duties. To 
supplement our analysis, we observed several contracted services, such 
as debris removal from Camp Victory and incinerator management at 
Joint Base Balad, and reviewed plans on how bases intended to end 
contracted services and demobilize the contractor work force in 
keeping with base transition plans. Further, we observed ARCENT and 
USF-I rehearsal of concept drills, a contracting summit organized by 
USF-I and CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, and a 
demobilization orientation session to collect information on 
contracting issues relevant to the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq 
and the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq after December 
2011. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to 
execute, and mitigated risk associated with facilitating and 
supporting the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, we 
reviewed transition-specific planning documents, briefings, and 
memoranda. We also met with DOD and State officials involved in 
transition efforts to discuss how DOD and State were coordinating 
efforts, as well as to discuss the status of activities underway in 
support of the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. For 
example, we met with a team of State officials and military liaisons 
at the Embassy in Baghdad responsible for managing the transition. We 
also held meetings with the DOD team of officials responsible for 
coordinating the provision of DOD equipment to State. In addition, we 
discussed transition efforts during our meetings with officials from a 
myriad of military commands and DOD organizations, including USF-I, 
ARCENT, Army Sustainment Command, Defense Logistics Agency, CENTCOM-
Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, Defense Contract Management 
Agency, and the LOGCAP Program Office, among others. To supplement our 
analysis, we also met with DOD and State officials involved with 
transition work at a large base in Iraq to observe construction status 
and to discuss issues associated with the transition. We selected this 
location based on its status as a large base and because travel was 
possible during the timeframe of our visit. The team also relied on 
staff working from the Baghdad Field Office to conduct interviews with 
officials in theater involved in transition efforts, as well as to 
attend periodic update meetings, and to regularly update key 
information. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Logistics And Materiel Readiness: 
3500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3500: 

September 2, 2011: 

Mr. William J. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report 11-774, "Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-
2011 DoD Role," dated August 2011 (GAO Code 351476). 

We concur with all recommendations subject to enclosed comments.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft 
report and we look forward to working with you to ensure an efficient 
drawdown in Iraq. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. 
Kevin Doxey, Kevin.doxey@osd.mil, (703) 693-1685. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Alan F. Estevez: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 2011: 
GAO-11-774 (GAO Code 351476): 

"Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist To Improve Equipment Visibility, 
Contractor Demobilization, And Clarity Of Post-2011 DOD Role" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

To help ensure that DOD will be able to complete the orderly and 
efficient retrograde and transfer of its equipment and transition of 
its bases in Iraq by minimizing unanticipated requirements. 

RECOMMENDATION 1: Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the 
Army and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to approve and 
implement, as appropriate, a process, to include associated policy and 
training, for acquiring and maintaining real-time visibility of CMGO 
equipment before it is delivered to the U.S. government that meets the 
needs of operational forces while retaining oversight features 
inherent to DOD's current accountability processes. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense agrees that 
accountability of Contractor-Managed Government-Owned (CMGO) equipment 
is important. USF-I has developed the Base Transition Smart Book that 
defines CMGO procedures and provides a series of templates, 
instructions, and operating procedures that cover the entire base 
transition process. 

Recommendation 2: Direct the Commander, U.S Forces-Iraq take steps to
collect accurate data on equipment that is found during the large base 
closure process but not recorded in the property book, and, as 
appropriate, refine the projection for equipment needing to be 
retrograded and transferred based on these data. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense agrees that the 
collection of accurate data of found equipment is necessary to refine 
projections for equipment retrograde. The Base Transition Smart Book 
provides guidance on how to manage found equipment and update 
projections for closure. 

Recommendation 3: To maximize its ability to achieve an orderly and 
efficient drawdown of contracted services in Iraq, direct the 
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, to (1) assess the risk of providing all 
contractors, including their subcontractors, with the information—such 
as base transition dates—required to descope services and demobilize 
their workforces, against the risk of contractors' inability to meet 
milestones without it and take the appropriate actions based on this 
assessment; (2) take appropriate measures, such as enforcement of 
guidance laid out in the template to be developed by the office of the 
Senior Contracting Official-Iraq, to ensure robust contractor planning 
associated with demobilization; and (3) engage contractors to ensure 
that total personnel headcounts accurately reflect all personnel, 
including those working under subcontracts. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense acknowledges the risks
associated with providing any contractor critical transition 
information about base closures and timelines. The Department of 
Defense will address this risk using a vigorous vetting process and 
security background checks. Furthermore, the Department of Defense 
will make certain that demobilization planning captures the associated 
requirements concerning contractors and their materiel. Lastly, the 
accountability of all contractor personnel, both prime contractors and 
their subcontractors, will be maintained through continued 
Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker (SPOT) compliance and 
the periodic contractor census conducted under the purview of the 
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq. 

Recommendation 4: To ensure that the U.S. government activities in 
Iraq after December 2011 reflect the appropriate unity of effort and 
focus DOD and State's efforts on implementing a coordinated approach 
to defining and implementing the activities to be undertaken by OSC-I, 
issue a memorandum clarifying the scope of DOD activities permitted in 
post-2011 Iraq in accordance with the approved engagement model, to 
include a statement on any limitations on these activities absent a 
Status of Forces Agreement and an opinion form DOD's Office of General 
Counsel on the extent to which all DOD government personnel will 
receive status protections such as privileges and immunities. 

DOD Response: Concur. Provided the inclusion of the following 
substitution (in quotations): To ensure that the U.S. Government 
activities in Iraq after December 2011 reflect the appropriate unity 
of effort and focus DOD and State's efforts on implementing a 
coordinated approach to defining and implementing the activities to be 
undertaken by
OSC-I, "... issue a memorandum clarifying the command structure of DoD 
elements remaining in Iraq post-2011, and the scope of DoD activities 
authorized in post-2011 Iraq in accordance with the approved 
engagement model, including guidance regarding actions or decisions 
that will be taken in the event adequate privileges, exemptions, and 
immunities are not obtained for such DoD elements." 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO contact: 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key 
contributions to this report include Carole F. Coffey, Grace A. 
Coleman, Gilbert H. Kim, Anne M. McDonough-Hughes, Jason M. Pogacnik, 
David A. Schmitt, Michael Shaughnessy, Michael Willems, and Matthew R. 
Young. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See Agreement on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq 
and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary 
Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, art. 24, ¶ 1, Nov. 17, 2008, Temp. State 
Dep't No. 09-6. (Hereinafter Security Agreement.) The Security 
Agreement was signed on November 17, 2008 and entered into force on 
January 1, 2009. The agreement includes a basic timeline and 
requirements for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. Sometimes 
referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Security 
Agreement is referenced in the Strategic Framework Agreement between 
the United States and the Republic of Iraq. See Strategic Framework 
Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation, U.S.-Iraq, 
§ III, Nov. 17, 2008, Temp. State Dep't No. 09-7. 

[2] To date, theater provided equipment has referred to a pool of stay-
behind equipment that has accumulated in Iraq since combat operations 
began in 2003. This equipment will need to be removed from Iraq or 
transferred before December 31, 2011, like all other DOD equipment. 

[3] We use the term "transition" to refer to all activities associated 
with turning facilities previously occupied by U.S. forces over to the 
Government of Iraq. 

[4] On February 27, 2009, President Obama announced that by August 31, 
2010, the U.S. mission in Iraq would change from combat to supporting 
the Iraqi government and its security forces. 

[5] The Security Agreement defines "United States forces" as the 
"entity comprising the members of the United States Armed Forces, 
their associated civilian component, and all property, equipment, and 
materiel of the United States Armed Forces present in the territory of 
Iraq." See Security Agreement, art. 2, ¶ 2. 

[6] See Security Agreement, art. 24, ¶ 1. Current DOD plans do, 
however, anticipate a limited number of military personnel in Iraq 
beyond 2011 as part of the planned Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq 
(OSC-I). According to DOD officials, these personnel would operate 
under the authority of the Chief of Mission pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 
3927, rather than the CENTCOM combatant commander. 

[7] We use the term "retrograde" to indicate the removal of military 
equipment from Iraq. 

[8] Mission capable, as defined by the Department of State, includes 
ensuring that all enduring Consulates, International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement sites, and aviation and logistics hubs in Iraq have the 
following: secure and protected facilities; secure ground and air 
movement; quick reaction capability; communications (to include secure 
and unsecure voice and data); access to medical facilities and medical 
evacuation; and basic infrastructure and life support. 

[9] Section 3927 of Title 22 of the United States Code provides that 
the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have full 
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all 
government executive branch employees in the country, except for 
certain employees, including those under the command of a U.S. area 
military commander. See 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a). The USF-I Operations 
Order relating to OSC-I provides for execution of certain functions 
pursuant to chief of mission authority for security assistance 
activities and command direction from CENTCOM in matters that are not 
functions or responsibilities of the ambassador. USF-I Operations 
Order No. 11-01, Annex V, Appendix 4 (Jan. 6, 2011). 

[10] We are currently conducting a separate assessment of the 
transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, the scope of which will 
include some of these activities. 

[11] LOGCAP is a program that provides worldwide logistics and base 
and life support services in contingency environments, and is 
currently providing most base and life support in Iraq. 

[12] Contracting officers' representatives assist in the technical 
monitoring or administration of a contract, performing duties 
authorized by the contracting officer. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.604. However, 
they have no authority to make any commitments or changes that affect 
price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of 
the contract. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-2(d)(5); § 201.602-2(2)(iv). 

[13] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD 
Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930] (Washington, D.C.: Sep.10, 
2008). 

[14] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD 
Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-179] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2, 
2009). 

[15] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the 
Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 
2010). 

[16] Contract transition is a general term we use to describe the 
process in which the contractor or contract vehicle for a given 
contracted service or capability is replaced by another contractor 
and/or contract vehicle. For example, contract transition might occur 
when contracted services are still needed, but the existing contract 
expires and is not extended; the transition might be to a new contract 
with the same contractor or a new contract with a different contractor. 

[17] The Responsible Reset Task Force assists with the provision of 
disposition instructions for materiel retrograding out of Iraq and 
synchronizes those instructions with the reset of Army equipment. 
Reset refers to the repair, recapitalization, and replacement of 
military equipment in order to restore units' equipment to a desired 
level of combat capability commensurate with mission requirements and 
availability of resources. 

[18] Rolling stock is a subset of major end items (Class VII 
equipment) and includes wheeled vehicles, tracked combat vehicles, 
wheeled/tracked construction equipment, trailers, semi-trailers, and 
standard trailer-mounted equipment such as generators. 

[19] Frustration, with respect to equipment, refers to a delay in 
movement which can be a result of plan changes, missing paperwork, or 
a lack of disposition instructions, among other causes. 

[20] A door-to-door movement in international transport logistics is 
commonly understood to mean the movement of cargo from its point of 
origin to its destination. Door-to-door movements involve the intact 
movement of a particular cargo and are often associated with a single 
transaction in which a commercial logistics service provider 
transports the cargo for the whole journey. 

[21] Contract "descoping" refers to a reduction in services 
commensurate with declining needs. Contractor demobilization, in the 
context of the drawdown, refers to a contractor reducing and 
ultimately ending its presence and footprint if not needed to support 
any U.S. government enduring presence in Iraq. 

[22] The Redistribution Property Assistance Team mission is to 
facilitate the expedient turn-in of all excess major end items 
(theater provided equipment), improve property accountability, and 
enable asset visibility of the received equipment. 

[23] Under this program DOD transfers equipment to the Government of 
Iraq using four authorities; Foreign Excess Personal Property (such as 
generators and mattresses), excess equipment (such as older versions 
of weapons, vehicles, and body armor), sales from stock (such as spare 
parts and ammunition), and non-excess equipment provided under special 
statutory authority (811 pieces of equipment such as High Mobility 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and trailers). 

[24] Among other things, section 1234 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 authorized the Secretary of 
Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide 
non-excess equipment to the Government of Iraq in certain 
circumstances and following notification to certain congressional 
committees. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1234 (2009). This authority was 
extended in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011. See Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1214(a) (2011). 

[25] DOD defines its largest bases in Iraq, referred to as Contingency 
Operating Bases, as follows. A Contingency Operating Base is usually 
occupied by an element larger than Brigade Combat Team size, from a 
single service or joint services, and is generally a command and 
control hub or a regional logistics hub; characterized by advanced 
infrastructure for facilities and communications for the expected 
duration of the operations. A Contingency Operating Base may include 
an airfield that is C-130 capable or larger. However, according to USF-
I, not all of the bases it considers to be large bases are Contingency 
Operating Bases. According to USF-I, they are simply large in relation 
to other bases in Iraq. 

[26] Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, Authority to Transfer Foreign Excess 
Personal Property In Iraq (Oct. 9, 2009). The authority applies to 
property transfers at Forward Operating Bases. 

[27] Personal property excess to unit requirements is to be screened 
through the chain of command for redistribution opportunities. USF-I 
then screens the property across all military organizations, U.S. 
contractors supporting the military in Iraq, other U.S. government 
organizations in Iraq, CENTCOM requirements, the Department of State, 
and the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property. 
Requirements for property are prioritized in accordance with CENTCOM 
priorities as follows: 1. U.S. Forces in support of Iraq; 2. U.S. 
Forces in support of Afghanistan; 3. U.S. Department of State in Iraq; 
4. National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property; 5. 
U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq. Property is not eligible for transfer 
to the Government of Iraq as Foreign Excess Personal Property unless 
it is excess to all U.S. government requirements, U.S. military 
requirements in the CENTCOM area of operations, and any specific 
requirements identified by the military services. If there is no U.S. 
requirement, then the property is eligible for transfer as Foreign 
Excess Personal Property to Iraqi recipients as approved by the 
Department of State. 

[28] Headquarters Department of the Army Message, Reinforcement and 
Clarification of Disposition Instructions in Support of the Iraq 
Responsible Drawdown, June 24, 2011. 

[29] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376]. 

[30] For simplicity, we use the term "contractor-managed government- 
owned (CMGO) equipment" to include all items owned or leased by the 
government that the contractor manages expressly to perform the 
contract, including items given to the contractor by the U.S. 
government for performance (government furnished property) and items 
acquired, fabricated, or otherwise provided by the contractor for 
performance and to which the government has title (contractor acquired 
property). 

[31] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 
18, 2008). 

[32] United States Army Central Operation Order No. 11-01 (Feb. 8, 
2011). 

[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376]. 

[34] Under FAR clause 52.245-1, where included in the contract, the 
contractor must have a system to manage (control, use, preserve, 
protect, repair, and maintain) government property in its possession. 
See 48 C.F.R. § 52.245-1(b). Generally, the contractor must initiate 
and maintain the processes, systems, procedures, records, and 
methodologies necessary for effective control of the property, 
consistent with voluntary consensus standards and/or industry-leading 
practices and standards. See id. The clause specifies a number of 
descriptors to be used in its systems and information to be collected. 
See § 52.245-1(f). A related provision in the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) suggests a role for the 
contracting officer in determining the acceptability of the system and 
approving or disapproving of it. See 48 C.F.R. § 245.105(b). However, 
according to officials, there is no standardized process for 
contractors to maintain accountability over government-owned property. 

[35] Memorandum from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Contractor Acquired Property 
(CAP) under Cost Reimbursement Contracts and Line Items (Jan. 11, 
2010). 

[36] CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command asserted that 
USF-I has addressed CMGO property accountability issues by requiring 
vendors to conduct a 100 percent inventory of CMGO property. However, 
physical inventories do not provide real-time visibility over CMGO 
property, as discussed above. 

[37] USF-I's Base Closure Smart Book contains guidance on conducting 
property inventories of CMGO equipment and the use of property 
reallocation plans. 

[38] Found-on-installation equipment refers to nonexpendable equipment 
that is on-hand and that is not on an accountable record. 

[39] The intent of the Property Accountability Campaign is to account 
for all Army property and to recover and reintegrate excess equipment 
back into the Army supply system for disposition or redistribution. It 
includes initiatives such as the fielding of a Property Accountability 
Task Force to identify and fill gaps in policy, training, and 
resources; command inspections; and the establishment of excess 
equipment turn-in programs at Army installations. It also requires 
deployed units to accurately record equipment and supplies in their 
property books and prevent the return of unauthorized excess property 
to home station, and institutes a compliance reporting mechanism for 
unit commanders, among other things. 

[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376]. We have 
reported extensively on the use of contractor personnel for combat and 
logistics support and the need for improving various aspects of 
contract management and oversight. See GAO, Military Operations: High-
Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with 
Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 18, 2006); and Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital 
Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD 
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003). 

[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376]. 

[42] USF-I, Money As A Weapons System Theater Financial Management 
Policy (Baghdad, Iraq: March 1, 2011). 

[43] The Contract Review Board is a USF-I organization that is 
intended to review contracts up for renewal with annualized costs 
greater than $3 million, new requirements with annualized costs over 
$1 million, and construction requirements greater than $750,000. 
According to USF-I guidance, this board complements the Joint 
Facilities and Acquisition Review Board by providing additional 
scrutiny and reporting requirements. 

[44] Undefinitized contract actions, where permitted, allow 
contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on 
contract terms and conditions, including price. 

[45] As we reported, in Iraq and Kuwait these operational personnel 
are responsible for determining the best approach to accomplish their 
assigned tasks and, if the approach includes contractors, identifying 
the types and levels of contracted support needed. 

[46] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 4-10, Operational Contract 
Support (Oct. 17, 2008); Army Field Manual 3-100.21, Contractors on 
the Battlefield (Jan. 3, 2003). The field manual has since been deemed 
obsolete and has been replaced with Army Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures No. 4-10 (FM 3-100.21), Operational Contract Support 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (June 2011). 

[47] USF-I Fragmentary Order No. 2676, Contractor Drawdown Operational 
Controls (Feb. 4, 2011). 

[48] USF-I Fragmentary Order No. 1056, Contract Right Sizing for RDOF 
(Apr. 23, 2010). Although this fragmentary order implemented the 
previous drawdown guidance, DOD officials indicated that it was still 
in effect. 

[49] For more details, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376] and GAO, Warfighter Support: 
Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve Contractor Support in 
Contingency Operations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-551T] (Washington, D.C.: March 17, 
2010). 

[50] We previously reported that contract oversight personnel often 
had difficulties performing their contract-related duties because of 
competing duties. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-551T]. 

[51] DOD defines operational contract support as the process of 
planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from 
commercial sources in support of joint operations along with the 
associated contractor management functions. 

[52] Memorandum from the USF-I Commanding General, Contracting 
Officer's Representatives (COR) Vigilance During Operation New Dawn 
(Oct. 18, 2010). 

[53] For additional information on COR training, please see GAO, 
Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Address Contract 
Oversight and Vetting of Non-U.S. Vendors in Afghanistan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-771T] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2011). 

[54] See Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures No. 4-10 (FM 3- 
100.21), Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures (June 20, 2011). 

[55] Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures No. 4-10. 

[56] See USF-I Operations Order No. 11-01, Annex W: Operational 
Contract Support (May 15, 2011). 

[57] Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL Lesson of the Day: Senior 
Contracting Official-Iraq (SCO-I), CENTCOM Contracting Command Lessons 
Learned, October 16, 2010. 

[58] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376] for 
information on the challenges we found associated with transitioning 
major contracts during ongoing operations and our recommendations. 

[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376]. 

[60] While a draft copy of this report was at DOD and State for 
comment, a task order was awarded under LOGCAP, but the award was 
protested and has yet to be resolved, as of September 1, 2011. 

[61] CALL, CALL Lesson of the Day: Senior Contracting Official-Iraq 
(SCO-I), CENTCOM Contracting Command Lessons Learned (Oct. 16, 2010). 

[62] Mayor cells are comprised of military unit personnel with the 
responsibility for managing and maintaining installations. 

[63] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376]. 

[64] USF-I OPORD 11-01 Annex W, Operational Contract Support (Jan. 6, 
2011). 

[65] USF-I FRAGO 2676; USF-I OPORD 11-01 Annex W, Operational Contract 
Support (Jan. 6, 2011). 

[66] As a further example of the challenge of accounting for 
contractor personnel, when closing Forward Operating Base Sykes, a 
medium-sized base in Iraq, CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting 
Command said that it found 392 third country nationals when they were 
only expecting to find 381. According to CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support 
Contracting Command, this was due to a database not being updated by 
vendors when they reassigned their workers to other locations during 
the course of employment. CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting 
Command said that this issue was being addressed with a new 
demobilization clause that was being inserted in contracts with its 
vendors. CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command also stated 
that it was conducting face-to-face interviews with all of its 
contractors to help them understand what is expected with respect to 
accounting for contractor personnel. 

[67] USF-I FRAGO 2676. 

[68] The 2010 Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq is a classified strategic 
document composed and approved by top DOD and State officials in Iraq. 
The plan includes short-term and longer term objectives in four 
specific areas--political, security, economic and energy, and rule-of- 
law--and is updated periodically to reflect changes in the environment 
in Iraq. GAO has reviewed this plan and its previous versions since 
2005, issuing several classified reports. 

[69] United States Department of State Middle East Regional Office, 
Department of State Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led 
Mission in Iraq, MERO-I-11-08 (Washington, D.C.: May 2011). 

[70] According to congressional testimony, the substitution of the 
older CT machines saved State $8 million. 

[71] Standard equipment refers to those items authorized on a military 
unit's modified table of organization and equipment, which documents 
the specific types and amounts of equipment Army units are authorized 
to have. Nonstandard equipment refers to equipment issued to units 
that is not authorized on their modified table of organization and 
equipment, and includes a wide range of items such as construction 
equipment, materiel handling equipment, flat screen televisions, 
certain types of radios, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. 

[72] Through their individual programs, each of the military services 
maintains preconfigured groups of combat and logistics equipment on 
ships and ashore at locations around the world. These equipment "sets" 
are intended to speed response times of U.S. forces to operating 
locations and reduce the strain on scarce airlift or slower sealift 
assets. The Army stores sets of combat brigade equipment, supporting 
supplies, and other stocks at land sites in several countries and 
aboard prepositioning ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 

[73] In the documentation, DOD suggested that if State is unable to 
obtain the necessary funding to reimburse DOD for the requested 
support, DOD would need to seek new statutory authority and associated 
funds. 

[74] The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
expressed concerns about State's capacity to effectively manage the 
acquisition of services in Iraq moving forward. In our ongoing work 
GAO is assessing State's capacity for acquiring services in conflict 
environments, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, where it has a 
sustained presence. 

[75] As discussed later in this report, according to DOD and State 
officials, the scale of the proposed combined DOD and State presence 
in Iraq after December 2011 would be unprecedented. In light of this 
unprecedented challenge, in a justification and request accompanying 
an April 2010 memorandum, State noted that without life support 
provided through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
managed by the Army Sustainment Command, State would be forced to 
redirect its resources towards developing, implementing, and 
overseeing a massive new life support infrastructure in Iraq. Thus, 
recognizing the expertise of DOD, State requested to continue to 
receive contract management and oversight support from DOD and to 
remain on LOGCAP for the short term, until either local conditions 
improved to permit supply and support through more traditional means, 
or until State could establish its own life support infrastructure 
through its own contractors. 

[76] According to State officials, this Memorandum of Understanding 
has not yet been finalized. 

[77] As acknowledged in DOD documents, operations after 2011 would 
require consent from the Government of Iraq. 

[78] MERO-I-11-08. 

[79] According to DOD documentation, the department may currently lack 
authority to fund these activities, as well as those of the 763 
contractor personnel comprising the Security Assistance Teams. 

[80] Although individual Status of Forces Agreements may differ 
greatly, such an agreement generally provides for the status of U.S. 
forces in a foreign state. Status of Forces Agreements often describe 
the rights and privileges of covered individuals, addressing issues 
such as the applicability of the foreign state's criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over U.S. armed forces personnel, DOD civilian employees, 
and/or contractor personnel working for the DOD. These agreements may 
also cover a variety of other topics including entry and exit, arming, 
customs, and the applicability of taxes and duties. According to a 
Congressional Research Service report, the U.S. Government has 
agreements that may be considered status of forces agreements with 126 
countries in the world. See Congressional Research Service, Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 5, 2011). 

[81] The Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of 
Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and 
the Republic of Iraq contains general agreements between the two 
countries on a variety of issues, broadly establishing the course of 
the future relationship between Iraq and the United States. The 
preamble to the agreement affirmed the desire of the two countries to 
establish a long-term relationship of cooperation and friendship. See 
Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and 
Cooperation, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, Temp. State Dep't No. 09-7. 
With respect to defense and security cooperation, the Strategic 
Framework provides that such cooperation shall be undertaken pursuant 
to the Security Agreement. See id. at § III. The Strategic Framework 
is not a status of forces agreement, and unlike the Security 
Agreement, it does not address topics such as the applicability of 
criminal and civil jurisdiction to U.S. armed forces or the 
application of Iraqi law. 

[82] Generally, the Vienna Convention addresses the operation of 
diplomatic missions within receiving states, including the privileges 
and immunities afforded various classes of members of the mission 
staff. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 
22 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force with respect to 
the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972). Under the Vienna Convention, administrative 
and technical staff of the mission enjoy several privileges and 
immunities, including: freedom from arrest or detention; inviolability 
of person, papers, and property; immunity from the receiving State's 
criminal jurisdiction; immunity from the receiving State's civil and 
administrative jurisdiction, except for acts performed outside the 
course of their duties; and exemption from certain dues and taxes. See 
id., art. 37, ¶ 2, arts. 29-35. Under article 10, the receiving state 
must be notified of the appointment of members of the mission. See 
id., art. 10. Senior DOD officials suggested that the only thing the 
Vienna Convention does not guarantee is the right of military 
personnel to carry a gun or wear their uniforms. State maintained 
that, if permitted by Iraqi law, OSC-I personnel may wear uniforms 
and, as appropriate, carry weapons. 

[83] Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all 
forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not 
necessarily part of the same command structure. Joint Publication 1, 
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar. 20, 2009). 

[84] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully 
Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated 
Personnel, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-886] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sep. 15, 2011). 

[End of section] 

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