GAO-11-920, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Limited Ability to Account for, Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear Material Overseas


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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives: 

September 2011: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

U.S. Agencies Have Limited Ability to Account for, Monitor, and 
Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear Material Overseas: 

GAO-11-920: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-920, a report to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The United States has exported special nuclear material, including 
enriched uranium, and source material such as natural uranium under 
nuclear cooperation agreements. The United States has 27 nuclear 
cooperation agreements for peaceful civilian cooperation. Under the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, partners are 
required to guarantee the physical protection of U.S. nuclear 
material. GAO was asked to (1) assess U.S. agency efforts to account 
for U.S. nuclear material overseas, (2) assess the Department of 
Energy’s (DOE) and U.S. agencies’ efforts to evaluate the security of 
U.S. material overseas, and (3) describe DOE’s activities to secure or 
remove potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear material at partner 
facilities. GAO analyzed agency records and interviewed DOE, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of State (State), and partner 
country officials. This report summarizes GAO’s classified report 
issued in June 2011. 

What GAO Found: 

DOE, NRC, and State are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear 
material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreement 
terms because the agreements do not stipulate systematic reporting of 
such information, and there is no U.S. policy to pursue or obtain such 
information. U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements generally require 
that partners report inventory information upon request, however, DOE 
and NRC have not systematically sought such data. DOE and NRC do not 
have a comprehensive, detailed, current inventory of U.S. nuclear 
material—-including weapon-usable material such as highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium-—overseas that includes the 
country, facility, and quantity of material. In addition, NRC and DOE 
could not fully account for the current location and disposition of 
U.S. HEU overseas in response to a 1992 congressional mandate. U.S. 
agencies, in a 1993 report produced in response to the mandate, were 
able to verify the location of 1,160 kilograms out of 17,500 kilograms 
of U.S. HEU estimated to have been exported. DOE, NRC, and State have 
established annual inventory reconciliations with five U.S. partners, 
but not the others it has transferred material to or trades with. 

Nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights 
that enable DOE, NRC, or State to monitor and evaluate the physical 
security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the United States 
relies on its partners to maintain adequate security. In the absence 
of access rights, DOE’s Office of Nonproliferation and International 
Security, NRC, and State have conducted physical protection visits to 
monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material at 
facilities overseas when permitted. However, the agencies have not 
systematically visited countries believed to be holding the highest 
proliferation risk quantities of U.S. nuclear material, or 
systematically revisited facilities not meeting international physical 
security guidelines in a timely manner. Of the 55 visits made from 
1994 through 2010, U.S. teams found that countries met international 
security guidelines approximately 50 percent of the time. 

DOE has taken steps to improve security at a number of facilities 
overseas that hold U.S. nuclear material but faces constraints. DOE’s 
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) removes U.S. nuclear 
material from vulnerable facilities overseas but can only bring back 
materials that have an approved disposition pathway and meet the 
program’s eligibility criteria. GTRI officials told GAO that, of the 
approximately 17,500 kilograms of HEU exported from the United States, 
12,400 kilograms are currently not eligible for return to the United 
States. Specifically, GTRI reported that over 10,000 kilograms of U.S. 
HEU are believed to be in fuels from reactors in Germany, France, and 
Japan that have no disposition pathways in the United States and are 
adequately protected. In addition, according to GTRI, 2,000 kilograms 
of transferred U.S. HEU are located primarily in European Atomic 
Energy Community countries and are currently in use or adequately 
protected. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO suggests, among other things, that Congress consider directing DOE 
and NRC to compile an inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas. 
DOE, NRC, and State generally disagreed with GAO’s recommendations, 
including that they conduct annual inventory reconciliations with all 
partners, stating they were unnecessary. GAO continues to believe that 
its recommendations could help improve the accountability of U.S. 
nuclear material in foreign countries. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-920]. For more 
information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOE, NRC, and State Are Not Able to Fully Account for U.S. Nuclear 
Material Located at Foreign Facilities: 

DOE, NRC, and State Do Not Have Access Rights to Monitor and Evaluate 
That U.S. Nuclear Material Located at Foreign Facilities Is Adequately 
Protected: 

DOE Seeks to Increase Security or Remove Vulnerable U.S. Nuclear 
Material at Partner Facilities but Faces Challenges: 

Conclusions: 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Current and Previous U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
Partners: 

Appendix III: International Guidelines for the Categorization of 
Nuclear Material: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Categorization of Nuclear Material According to IAEA Security 
Guidelines: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Cooperating Partners with Which the United States Currently 
Has or Previously Had a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: 

Abbreviations: 

AEA: Atomic Energy Act: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community: 

GTRI: Global Threat Reduction Initiative: 

HEU: highly enriched uranium: 

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency: 

IPPAS: International Physical Protection Advisory Service: 

LEU: low enriched uranium: 

NMMSS: Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System: 

NNPA: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

NSC National Security Council: 

NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group: 

SILEX: Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation: 

TRIGA: Training Research Isotope General Atomics: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 8, 2011: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The United States has 27 nuclear cooperation agreements in force for 
peaceful civilian cooperation with partners including foreign 
countries, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Taiwan.[Footnote 1] A 
nuclear cooperation agreement is a bilateral agreement that 
establishes the legal framework for significant civilian nuclear 
cooperation between the United States and other parties, including the 
transfer of certain nuclear material, including special nuclear 
material such as enriched uranium,[Footnote 2] and source material 
such as natural uranium, nuclear reactors, and certain components of 
nuclear reactors.[Footnote 3] The agreements are reciprocal, with both 
parties generally agreeing to all conditions specified in them. Under 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, these agreements 
must contain certain obligations that govern, among other things, the 
U.S. rights of approval over the transfer, retransfer, enrichment, and 
reprocessing of certain kinds of nuclear material transferred from the 
United States and, in some cases produced overseas. A list of current 
and former U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement partners can be found in 
appendix II. 

Thousands of kilograms of U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU) and tens 
of thousands of kilograms of U.S. plutonium in spent fuel have 
accumulated overseas, as a result of foreign nuclear research and 
commercial nuclear power activities, which are subject to the terms in 
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. Inventories of U.S. nuclear 
material overseas could continue to grow as the result of reprocessing 
or recovery activities.[Footnote 4] As we have previously reported, 
tracking and accounting for nuclear materials are important to (1) 
ensure that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes, (2) 
comply with international treaty obligations, and (3) provide data to 
policymakers and other government officials. According to DOE and NRC 
officials, the United States obtains written assurances from partners 
in advance of each transfer of U.S.-obligated nuclear material that 
commits the partner to treat the transferred nuclear material 
according to the terms of its nuclear cooperation agreement with the 
United States. Nuclear material transferred from the United States, as 
well as special nuclear material produced overseas through the use of 
U.S.-supplied nuclear material or reactors, is known as "U.S.-
obligated" material. 

As the technology to design and create nuclear weapons has spread, one 
of the most serious threats facing the United States and other 
countries is the possibility that a nation or terrorist organization 
could steal weapon-usable nuclear materials from poorly secured 
stockpiles in various locations around the world.[Footnote 5] In April 
2009, President Obama made securing all vulnerable nuclear material 
worldwide within the next 4 years a key U.S. nonproliferation goal, 
[Footnote 6] and the Department of Energy (DOE) has stated that doing 
so will require greater security cooperation with key countries; 
pursuing new partnerships to secure nuclear material; and 
strengthening nuclear security standards, practices, and international 
safeguards. 

Securing nuclear material worldwide is a priority for DOE, through its 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),[Footnote 7] which, as 
one of its core mission areas, aims to keep dangerous nuclear 
materials out of the hands of terrorists by securing nuclear weapons 
and nuclear materials at their source and by improving security 
practices around the world. In particular, two key DOE NNSA offices 
work with U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement partners to strengthen 
nuclear security practices and identify and secure vulnerable nuclear 
materials. First, DOE's Office of Nonproliferation and International 
Security works with countries to ensure that provisions in the 
agreements are met by, among other things, providing physical 
protection training, assessment, and guidance on a bilateral basis, 
and leading U.S. interagency physical protection visits to countries 
with U.S. nuclear material. Second, DOE's Office of Global Threat 
Reduction implements the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 
and, among other things, identifies, secures, removes, and/or 
facilitates the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable nuclear and 
radiological material at civilian sites around the world that pose a 
threat. 

In November 2010, we reported on the export benefits facilitated by 
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements.[Footnote 8] In light of the 
quantities of nuclear material exported overseas under the framework 
of U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements, you asked us to also report on 
how U.S. agencies account for nuclear material overseas and monitor 
and evaluate the materials' physical security. Specifically, our 
objectives were to: (1) assess U.S. agency efforts to account for U.S. 
nuclear material overseas, (2) assess DOE's and other U.S. agencies' 
efforts to monitor and evaluate the physical security conditions of 
U.S. nuclear material subject to the terms of nuclear cooperation 
agreements, and (3) describe DOE's activities to secure or remove 
potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear material at partner facilities. In 
June 2011, we reported to you on the results of our work in a 
classified report. This report summarizes certain aspects of our 
classified report. 

To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant statutes, including the 
AEA, as amended, and the texts of all current U.S. nuclear cooperation 
agreements. We obtained data from the Nuclear Materials Management and 
Safeguards System (NMMSS), a database jointly operated by DOE and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This database, among other 
things, maintains data on U.S. peaceful use exports and retransfers of 
enriched uranium and plutonium that have occurred since 1950. To 
assess the reliability of data in NMMSS, we interviewed officials from 
DOE and NRC and a former DOE contractor to identify any limitations in 
NMMSS's data on the location and status of U.S. material overseas and 
found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
accounting for U.S. exports of nuclear material. We also compared 
NMMSS data with other sources of information regarding U.S. nuclear 
material transfers, including DOE data on nuclear material returns. We 
reviewed DOE, NRC, and Department of State (State) records and 
interviewed officials at those agencies to determine the extent to 
which DOE, NRC, and State are able to identify where U.S. nuclear 
material was exported, retransferred, and is currently held. We 
selected a non-probability sample of partners based on, among other 
considerations, quantities of U.S. special nuclear material 
transferred to them.[Footnote 9] We conducted site visits in four 
countries that currently hold U.S.-obligated nuclear material and 
interviewed governmental officials and nuclear facility operators in 
these countries to discuss material accounting procedures and observe 
physical protection measures. Further, we interviewed officials from 
several other partners regarding their observations about working with 
the U.S. government to account for material subject to the terms of 
nuclear cooperation agreements. We reviewed IAEA's security 
guidelines, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 
Facilities," INFCIRC/225/Rev.4,[Footnote 10] and relevant 
international treaties. We also obtained and analyzed available 
records of U.S. physical protection visits to partner facilities from 
1974 through 2010. We reviewed agency documents and interviewed 
officials from DOE, NRC, and State to determine the process used for 
conducting physical protection visits at partner facilities. We 
obtained information from GTRI regarding its program's activities. We 
interviewed IAEA officials and reviewed relevant documents to better 
understand IAEA's role in maintaining safeguards and evaluating 
physical security measures. Additional details on our scope and 
methodology can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The AEA, as amended, sets forth the procedures and requirements for 
the U.S. government's negotiating, proposing, and entering into 
nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign partners. The AEA, as 
amended, requires that U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements 
contain the following nine provisions:[Footnote 11] 

1. Safeguards: Safeguards, as agreed to by the parties, are to be 
maintained over all nuclear material and equipment transferred, and 
all special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of 
such nuclear material and equipment, as long as the material or 
equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating 
party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the 
agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any 
reason. Such safeguards are known as "safeguards in perpetuity." 

2. Full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply: In the case of 
non-nuclear weapons states, continued U.S. nuclear supply is to be 
conditioned on the maintenance of IAEA "full-scope" safeguards over 
all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within the 
territory, under the jurisdiction, or subject to the control of the 
cooperating party.[Footnote 12] 

3. Peaceful use guaranty: The cooperating party must guarantee that it 
will not use the transferred nuclear materials, equipment, or 
sensitive nuclear technology, or any special nuclear material produced 
through the use of such, for any nuclear explosive device, for 
research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any 
other military purpose. 

4. Right to require return: An agreement with a non-nuclear weapon 
state must stipulate that the United States has the right to require 
the return of any transferred nuclear materials and equipment, and any 
special nuclear material produced through the use thereof, if the 
cooperating party detonates a nuclear device, or terminates or 
abrogates an agreement providing for IAEA safeguards. 

5. Physical security: The cooperating party must guarantee that it 
will maintain adequate physical security for transferred nuclear 
material and any special nuclear material used in or produced through 
the use of any material, or production or utilization facilities 
transferred pursuant to the agreement.[Footnote 13] 

6. Retransfer rights: The cooperating party must guarantee that it 
will not transfer any material, Restricted Data, or any production or 
utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement, or any 
special nuclear material subsequently produced through the use of any 
such transferred material, or facilities, to unauthorized persons or 
beyond its jurisdiction or control, without the consent of the United 
States. 

7. Restrictions on enrichment or reprocessing of U.S.-obligated 
material: The cooperating party must guarantee that no material 
transferred, or used in, or produced through the use of transferred 
material or production or utilization facilities, will be reprocessed 
or enriched, or with respect to plutonium, uranium-233, HEU, or 
irradiated nuclear materials, otherwise altered in form or content 
without the prior approval of the United States. 

8. Storage facility approval: The cooperating party must guarantee not 
to store any plutonium, uranium-233, or HEU that was transferred 
pursuant to a cooperation agreement, or recovered from any source or 
special nuclear material transferred, or from any source or special 
nuclear material used in a production facility or utilization facility 
transferred pursuant to the cooperation agreement, in a facility that 
has not been approved in advance by the United States. 

9. Additional restrictions: The cooperating party must guarantee that 
any special nuclear material, production facility, or utilization 
facility produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the 
cooperating party by or through the use of transferred sensitive 
nuclear technology, will be subject to all the requirements listed 
above. 

In addition, the United States is a party to the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT binds each of the 
treaty's signatory states that had not manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 
1967 (referred to as non-nuclear weapon states) to accept safeguards 
as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA. Under the 
safeguards system, IAEA, among other things, inspects facilities and 
locations containing nuclear material, as declared by each country, to 
verify its peaceful use. IAEA standards for safeguards agreements 
provide that the agreements should commit parties to establish and 
maintain a system of accounting for nuclear material, with a view to 
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses, and 
reporting certain data to IAEA. 

IAEA's security guidelines provide the basis by which the United 
States and other countries generally classify the categories of 
protection that should be afforded nuclear material, based on the 
type, quantity, and enrichment of the nuclear material. For example, 
Category I material is defined as 2 kilograms or more of unirradiated 
or "separated" plutonium or 5 kilograms of uranium-235 contained in 
unirradiated or "fresh" HEU and has the most stringent set of 
recommended physical protection measures. The recommended physical 
protection measures for Category II and Category III nuclear materials 
are less stringent. Appendix III contains further details on the 
categorization of nuclear material. 

DOE, NRC, and State Are Not Able to Fully Account for U.S. Nuclear 
Material Located at Foreign Facilities: 

DOE, NRC, and State are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear 
material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreement 
terms because the agreements do not stipulate systematic reporting of 
such information, and there is no U.S. policy to pursue or obtain such 
information. Section 123 of the AEA, as amended, does not require 
nuclear cooperation agreements to contain provisions stipulating that 
partners report information on the amount, status, or location 
(facility) of special nuclear material subject to the agreement terms. 
However, U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements generally require that 
partners report inventory information upon request, although DOE and 
NRC have not systematically sought such data. We requested from 
multiple offices at DOE and NRC a current and comprehensive inventory 
of U.S. nuclear material overseas, to include country, site, or 
facility, and whether the quantity of material was rated as Category I 
or Category II material. However, neither agency has provided such an 
inventory. NMMSS does not contain the data necessary to maintain an 
inventory of U.S. special nuclear material overseas. DOE, NRC, and 
State have not pursued annual inventory reconciliations of nuclear 
material subject to U.S. cooperation agreement terms with all foreign 
partners that would provide the U.S. government with better 
information about where such material is held. Furthermore, according 
to DOE, NRC, and State officials, no U.S. law or policy directs U.S. 
agencies to obtain information regarding the location and disposition 
of U.S. nuclear material at foreign facilities. 

U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Generally Require That Partners 
Report Inventory Information upon Request, but DOE and NRC Have Not 
Systematically Sought Such Data: 

Section 123 of the AEA, as amended, does not require nuclear 
cooperation agreements to contain provisions stipulating that partners 
report information on the amount, status, or location (facility) of 
special nuclear material subject to the agreement terms. However, the 
texts of most U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements contain a provision 
calling for each partner to maintain a system of material accounting 
and control and to do so consistent with IAEA safeguards standards or 
agreements.[Footnote 14] In addition, we found that all agreements, 
except three negotiated prior to 1978 and the U.S.-China agreement, 
contain a provision that the other party shall report, or shall 
authorize the IAEA to report, inventory information upon request. 
However, according to DOE and NRC officials, with the exception of the 
administrative arrangements with five partners, the United States has 
not requested such information from all partners on an annual or 
systematic basis. 

Nonetheless, the AEA requires U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements to 
include terms that, among other things, obligate partners to obtain 
U.S. approval for the transfer, retransfer, enrichment and 
reprocessing, and the storage of U.S.-obligated uranium-233, HEU, or 
other nuclear materials that have been irradiated. In addition, 
according to DOE and NRC officials, the United States obtains written 
assurances from partners in advance of each transfer of U.S. nuclear 
material that commits them to maintain the transferred nuclear 
material according to the terms of its nuclear cooperation agreement 
with the United States. DOE and NRC officials told us these assurances 
help the United States ensure that partner countries comply with the 
terms of the nuclear cooperation agreement. 

In addition, IAEA, DOE, NRC, and State officials told us that IAEA's 
safeguards activities provide a level of assurance that nuclear 
material is accounted for at partner facilities. The safeguards 
system, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent 
nuclear proliferation, allows IAEA to independently verify that non-
nuclear weapons states that signed the NPT are complying with its 
requirements. Under the safeguards system, IAEA, among other things, 
inspects facilities and locations containing nuclear material declared 
by countries to verify its peaceful use. Inspectors from IAEA's 
Department of Safeguards verify that the quantities of nuclear 
material that these non-nuclear weapons states declared to IAEA are 
not diverted for other uses. IAEA considers such information 
confidential and does not share it with its member states, including 
the United States, unless the parties have agreed that IAEA can share 
the information. 

IAEA's inspectors do not verify nuclear material by country of origin 
or associated obligation. DOE, State, and IAEA officials told us that, 
because IAEA does not track the obligation of the material under 
safeguards, IAEA may notice discrepancies in nuclear material balances 
through periodic reviews of countries' shipping records. However, 
these officials said that IAEA does not have the ability to identify 
whether and what volume of nuclear material at partner country 
facilities is U.S.-obligated and therefore subject to the terms of 
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. 

DOE and NRC Do Not Have a Current Comprehensive Inventory of U.S. 
Material Overseas: 

DOE and NRC do not have a comprehensive, detailed, current inventory 
of U.S. nuclear material overseas that would enable the United States 
to identify material subject to U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement 
terms. We requested from multiple offices at DOE and NRC a current and 
comprehensive inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas, to include 
country, site, or facility, and whether the quantity of material was 
Category I or Category II. However, the agencies have not provided 
such a list. DOE officials from the Office of Nonproliferation and 
International Security told us that they have multiple mechanisms to 
account for the amount of U.S.-obligated nuclear material at foreign 
facilities. They stated that they use NMMSS records to obtain 
information regarding U.S. nuclear material inventories held in other 
countries. However, NMMSS officials told us that NMMSS was an accurate 
record of material exports from the United States, but that it should 
not be used to estimate current inventories. In addition, NMMSS 
officials stated that DOE's GTRI program has good data regarding the 
location of U.S. nuclear material overseas and that this information 
should be reconciled with NMMSS data. However, when we requested 
information regarding the amount of U.S. material at partner 
facilities, GTRI stated that they could not report on the amount of 
U.S. nuclear material remaining at facilities unless it was scheduled 
for GTRI to return. In addition, in February 2011 written comments to 
us, GTRI stated it was not responsible for acquiring or maintaining 
inventory information regarding U.S. nuclear material overseas. A long-
time contract employee for DOE's Office of Nonproliferation and 
International Security stated he has tried to collect information 
regarding U.S. nuclear material overseas from various sources 
including a list of countries eligible for GTRI's fuel return program, 
NMMSS, and other sources, but it is not possible to reconcile 
information from the various lists and sources and consequently there 
is no list of U.S. inventories overseas. 

According to public information, the United States has additional 
measures known as administrative arrangements with five of its trading 
partners to conduct annual reconciliations of nuclear material 
amounts. In addition, for all partners, DOE and NRC officials told us 
that an exchange of diplomatic notes is sent prior to any transfer to 
ensure that U.S. nuclear material is not diverted for non-peaceful 
purposes, and which binds the partner to comply with the terms of the 
nuclear cooperation agreement. However, the measures cited by DOE are 
not comprehensive or sufficiently detailed to provide the specific 
location of U.S. nuclear material overseas. 

NRC and DOE could not fully account for U.S. exports of HEU in 
response to a congressional mandate that the agencies report on the 
current location and disposition of U.S. HEU overseas. In 1992, 
Congress mandated that NRC,[Footnote 15] in consultation with other 
relevant agencies, submit to Congress a report detailing the current 
status of previous U.S. exports of HEU, including its location, 
disposition (status), and how it had been used. The January 1993 
report that NRC produced in response to the mandate stated it was not 
possible to reconcile this information from available U.S. sources of 
data with all foreign holders of U.S. HEU within the 90-day period 
specified in the act.[Footnote 16] The report further states that a 
thorough reconciliation of U.S and foreign records with respect to end 
use could require several months of additional effort, assuming that 
EURATOM would agree to participate. According to DOE and NRC 
officials, no further update to the report was issued, and the U.S. 
government has not subsequently attempted to develop such a 
comprehensive estimate of the location and status of U.S. HEU overseas. 

The 1993 report provided estimated material balances based on the 
transfer, receipt, or other adjustments reported to the NMMSS and 
other U.S. agencies. The report stated that the estimated material 
balances should match partners' reported inventories. However, the 
report did not compare the balances or explain the differences. 

Our analysis of other documentation associated with the report shows 
that NRC, in consultation with U.S. agencies, was able to verify the 
location of 1,160 kilograms out of an estimated 17,500 kilograms of 
U.S. HEU remaining overseas as of January 1993. NRC's estimates 
matched partner estimates in 22 cases; did not match partner estimates 
in 6 cases; and, in 8 cases, partners did not respond in time to NRC's 
request. 

The 1993 report noted that, in cases where U.S. estimates did not 
match partners' inventory reports, "reconciliation efforts are 
underway." However, DOE, NRC, and NMMSS officials told us that no 
further report was issued. In addition, NMMSS officials told us that 
they were unaware of any subsequent efforts to reconcile U.S. 
estimates with partners' reports, or update the January 1993 report. 
In addition, we found no indication that DOE, NMMSS, or NRC officials 
have updated the January 1993 report, or undertaken a comprehensive 
accounting of U.S. nuclear material overseas. 

NMMSS Does Not Contain Data Necessary to Identify Where U.S. Material 
Is Located Overseas: 

We found that NMMSS does not contain the data necessary to maintain an 
inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas subject to U.S. nuclear 
cooperation agreements. According to NRC documents, NMMSS is part of 
an overall program to help satisfy the United States' accounting, 
controlling, and reporting obligations to IAEA and its nuclear trading 
partners. NMMSS, the official central repository of information on 
domestic inventories and exports of U.S. nuclear material, contains 
current and historic data on the possession, use, and shipment of 
nuclear material. It includes data on U.S.-supplied nuclear material 
transactions with other countries and international organizations, 
foreign contracts, import/export licenses, government-to-government 
approvals, and other DOE authorizations such as authorizations to 
retransfer U.S. nuclear material between foreign countries.[Footnote 
17] DOE and NRC officials told us that NMMSS contains the best 
available information regarding U.S. exports and retransfers of 
special nuclear material. 

DOE and NRC do not collect data necessary for NMMSS to keep an 
accurate inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas. According to NRC 
officials, NMMSS cannot track U.S. nuclear material overseas because 
data regarding the current location and status of U.S. nuclear 
material, such as irradiation, decay, burn up, or production, are not 
collected. NMMSS only contains data on domestic inventories and 
transaction receipts from imports and exports reported by domestic 
nuclear facilities and some retransfers reported by partners to the 
United States and added to the system by DOE. Therefore, while the 
1995 Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement accompanying the U.S.- 
EURATOM agreement estimated 250 tons of U.S.-obligated plutonium are 
planned to be separated from spent power reactor fuel in Europe and 
Japan for use in civilian energy programs in the next 10 to 20 years, 
our review indicates that the United States would not be able to 
identify the European countries or facilities where such U.S.-
obligated material is located. 

DOE, NRC, and State Have Not Pursued Annual Reconciliations of 
Inventories of Nuclear Material Subject to U.S. Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement Terms with All Partners: 

DOE, NRC, and State have not pursued annual inventory reconciliations 
of nuclear material subject to U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement 
terms with all partners that would provide the U.S. government with 
better information about where such material is held overseas. 
Specifically, once a nuclear cooperation agreement is concluded, U.S. 
government officials--generally led by DOE--and partner country 
officials may negotiate an administrative arrangement for an annual 
inventory reconciliation to exchange information regarding each 
country's nuclear material accounting balances. Inventory 
reconciliations typically compare the countries' data and material 
transfer and retransfer records, and can help account for material 
consumed or irradiated by reactors. 

Government officials from several leading nuclear material exporting 
and importing countries told us that they have negotiated with all 
their other partners to exchange annual inventory reconciliations to 
provide a common understanding of the amount of their special material 
held by another country or within their country. For example, 
Australia, which exports about 13 percent of the world's uranium each 
year, conducts annual reconciliations with each of its partners, and 
reports annually to the Australian Parliament regarding the location 
and disposition of all Australian nuclear material. NRC officials told 
us that Australia has some of the strictest reporting requirements for 
its nuclear material. 

The United States conducts annual inventory reconciliations with five 
partners but does not conduct inventory reconciliations with the other 
partners it has transferred material to or trades with.[Footnote 18] 
According to DOE officials, for the five reconciliations currently 
conducted, NMMSS data are compared with the partner's records and, if 
warranted, each country's records are adjusted, where necessary, to 
reflect the current status of U.S special nuclear material. As of 
February 2011, the United States conducted bilateral annual exchanges 
of total material balances for special nuclear materials with five 
partners. Of these partners, the United States exchanges detailed 
information regarding inventories at each specific facility only with 
one partner. DOE officials noted that they exchange information with 
particular trading partners on a transactional basis during the 
reporting year and work with the partners at that time to resolve any 
potential discrepancies that may arise. In the case of EURATOM, 
material information is reported as the cumulative total of all 27 
EURATOM members. For the purposes of nuclear cooperation with the 
United States, EURATOM is treated as one entity rather than its 27 
constituent parts. None of the 27 EURATOM member states have bilateral 
nuclear cooperation agreements in force with the United States. 

According to a 2010 DOE presentation for NMMSS users, the difference 
in reporting requirements results in a 69-page report for Japan and a 
1-page report for EURATOM. In addition, information exchanged with 
other trading partners also is not reported by facility. DOE and NRC 
officials told us that the United States may not have accurate 
information regarding the inventories of U.S. nuclear material held by 
its 21 other partners. 

DOE officials told us that, in addition to benefits, there were costs 
to pursuing facility-by-facility reconciliations and reporting. In 
particular, DOE officials told us they have not pursued facility-by- 
facility accounting in annual reconciliations with other partners 
because it would be difficult for the United States to supply such 
detailed information regarding partner material held in U.S. 
facilities. DOE and NRC officials told us this would also create an 
administrative burden for the United States. According to DOE 
officials, the relative burden with which the United States can 
perform facility-by-facility accounting by foreign trading partner 
varies greatly based on the amount of material in the United States 
that is obligated to such partners. For example, the United States can 
perform facility-by-facility accounting with one country, because U.S. 
officials told us there is not much of that country's nuclear material 
in the United States. However, if the United States were to conduct 
facility-by-facility accounting with Australia, it would create 
burdensome reporting requirements. Specifically, according to DOE 
officials, Australia would have to report to the United States on the 
status of a few facilities holding U.S. nuclear material, but the 
United States would be required to report on hundreds of U.S. 
facilities holding Australian nuclear material. Without information on 
foreign facilities, however, it may be difficult to track U.S. nuclear 
materials for accounting and control purposes. 

No U.S. Law or Policy Directs U.S. Agencies to Obtain Information 
Regarding the Location and Disposition of U.S. Nuclear Material at 
Foreign Facilities: 

DOE, NRC, and State officials told us neither U.S. law nor U.S. policy 
explicitly requires the United States to track U.S. special nuclear 
material overseas. Moreover, U.S. law does not require peaceful 
nuclear cooperation agreements to require cooperating parties to 
provide reports to the United States of nuclear material on a facility-
by-facility basis. A March 2002 DOE Inspector General's audit raised 
concerns about the U.S. government's ability to track sealed sources, 
which could contain nuclear or radioactive material.[Footnote 19] In 
response to the audit's findings, NNSA's Associate Administrator for 
Management and Administration wrote that "While it is a good idea to 
be aware of the locations and conditions of any [U.S.] material, it is 
not the current policy of the U.S. government." Furthermore, the 
Associate Administrator asserted that various U.S. government 
agencies, including State, DOE, and NRC, would need to be involved 
should DOE change its policy and undertake an initiative to track the 
location and condition of U.S. sealed sources in foreign countries. 
Similarly, DOE, NRC, and State officials told us that if it became the 
policy of the U.S. government to track nuclear material overseas--and 
in particular, by facility--then requirements would have to be 
negotiated into the nuclear cooperation agreements or the associated 
administrative arrangements. 

NMMSS officials told us that NMMSS is currently capable of maintaining 
information regarding inventories of U.S. nuclear material overseas. 
However, as we reported in 1982,[Footnote 20] NMMSS information is not 
designed to track the location (facility) or the status--such as 
whether the material is irradiated or unirradiated, fabricated into 
fuel, burned up, or reprocessed. As a result, NMMSS neither identifies 
where U.S. material is located overseas nor maintains a comprehensive 
inventory of U.S.-obligated material. In addition, NMMSS officials 
emphasized that this information would need to be systematically 
reported. According to these officials, such reporting is not done on 
a regular basis by other DOE offices and State. In some instances, 
State receives a written notice of a material transfer at its 
embassies and then transmits this notice to DOE. Officials from DOE's 
Office of Nonproliferation and International Security told us that, 
while they could attempt to account for U.S. material overseas on a 
case-by-case basis, obtaining the information to systematically track 
this material would require renegotiating the terms of nuclear 
cooperation agreements. 

DOE has recently issued proposed guidance clarifying the role of DOE 
offices for maintaining and controlling U.S. nuclear material. An 
October 2010 draft DOE order states that DOE "Manages the development 
and maintenance of NMMSS by: (a) collecting data relative to nuclear 
materials including those for which the United States has a safeguards 
interest both domestically and abroad; (b) processing the data; and 
(c) issuing reports to support the safeguards and management needs of 
DOE and NRC, and other government organizations, including those 
associated with international treaties and organizations."[Footnote 
21] However, we did not find any evidence that DOE will be able to 
meet those responsibilities in the current configuration of NMMSS 
without obtaining additional information from partners and additional 
and systematic data sharing among DOE offices. 

DOE, NRC, and State Do Not Have Access Rights to Monitor and Evaluate 
That U.S. Nuclear Material Located at Foreign Facilities Is Adequately 
Protected: 

Nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights 
that enable DOE, NRC, or State to monitor and evaluate the physical 
security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the United States 
relies on partners to maintain adequate security. In the absence of 
specific access rights, DOE, NRC, and State have jointly conducted 
interagency physical protection visits to monitor and evaluate the 
physical security of nuclear material when given permission by the 
partner country. However, the interagency physical protection teams 
have neither systematically visited countries believed to be holding 
Category I quantities of U.S. nuclear material, nor have they 
systematically revisited facilities determined to not be meeting IAEA 
security guidelines in a timely manner. 

U.S. Agencies' Ability to Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear 
Material Overseas Is Limited by Lack of Access Rights, and the United 
States Relies on Partners to Maintain Adequate Security: 

DOE's, NRC's, and State's ability to monitor and evaluate whether 
material subject to U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement terms is 
physically secure is contingent on partners granting access to 
facilities where such material is stored. Countries, including the 
United States, believe that the physical protection of nuclear 
materials is a national responsibility. This principle is reflected 
both in IAEA's guidelines on the "Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material and Nuclear Facilities" and in pending amendments to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Our review 
of section 123 of the AEA and all U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements 
currently in force found that they do not explicitly include a 
provision granting the United States access to verify the physical 
protection of facilities or sites holding material subject to U.S. 
nuclear cooperation agreement terms. However, in accordance with the 
AEA, as amended, all nuclear cooperation agreements, excepting three 
negotiated prior to 1978, contain provisions requiring both partners 
to maintain adequate physical security over transferred material. 

The AEA, as amended, requires that the cooperating party must 
guarantee that it will maintain adequate physical security for 
transferred nuclear material and any special nuclear material used in 
or produced through the use of any material, or production, or 
utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement. However, 
it does not specify that State, in cooperation with other U.S. 
agencies, negotiates agreement terms that must include rights of 
access or other measures for the United States to verify whether a 
partner is maintaining adequate physical security over U.S. material. 
Our review of the texts of all 27 U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements 
in force found that most of them contain a provision providing that 
the adequacy of physical protection measures shall be subject to 
review and consultations by the parties. However, none of the 
agreements include specific provisions stipulating that the United 
States has the right to verify whether a partner is adequately 
securing U.S. nuclear material.[Footnote 22] As a result, several DOE 
and State officials told us the United States' ability to monitor and 
evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material overseas is 
contingent on partners' cooperation and access to facilities where 
U.S. material is stored. 

State, DOE, and NRC officials told us that they rely on partners to 
comply with IAEA's security guidelines for physical protection. 
However, the guidelines, which are voluntary, do not provide for 
access rights for other states to verify whether physical protection 
measures for nuclear material are adequate. IAEA's security guideline 
document states that the "responsibility for establishing and 
operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear 
materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the 
Government of that State." In addition, according to the guidelines, 
member states should ensure that their national laws provide for the 
proper implementation of physical protection and verify continued 
compliance with physical protection regulations. For example, 
according to IAEA's security guidelines, a comprehensive physical 
protection system to secure nuclear material should include, among 
other things, 

* technical measures such as vaults, perimeter barriers, intrusion 
sensors, and alarms; 

* material control procedures; and: 

* adequately equipped and appropriately trained guard and emergency 
response forces. 

In addition, according to DOE and State officials, key international 
treaties, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material--which calls for signatory states to provide adequate 
physical protection of nuclear material while in international 
transit--do not provide states the right to verify the adequacy of 
physical protection measures. A senior official from IAEA's Office of 
Nuclear Security told us that physical security is a national 
responsibility and that governments may choose to organize their 
various physical security components differently, as long as the 
components add up to an effective regime. 

Despite these constraints on access, the U.S. government can take 
certain actions to protect U.S. nuclear material located at foreign 
facilities. For example, NRC licensing for the export of nuclear 
equipment and material is conditioned on partner maintenance of 
adequate physical security. NRC officials stated that, when an export 
license application for nuclear materials or equipment is submitted, 
the U.S. government seeks confirmation, in the form of peaceful use 
assurances, from the foreign government that the material and 
equipment, if exported, will be subject to the terms and conditions of 
that government's nuclear cooperation agreement with the United 
States. In addition, NRC officials stated that this government-to-
government reconfirmation of the terms and conditions of the agreement 
meets the "letter and spirit" of the AEA and Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Act of 1978 (NNPA) and underscores that the partner is aware of and 
accepts the terms and conditions of the agreement. 

NRC officials also noted that the NNPA amendments to the AEA were 
designed and intended to encourage foreign governments to agree to 
U.S. nonproliferation criteria in exchange for nuclear commodities. 
However, the AEA does not empower the U.S. government through 
inspections or other means to enforce foreign government compliance 
with nuclear cooperation agreements once U.S. nuclear commodities are 
in a foreign country. Importantly, according to NRC, the onus is on 
the receiving country as a sovereign right and responsibility and 
consistent with its national laws and international commitments, to 
adequately secure the nuclear material. 

According to DOE and State, as well as foreign government officials, 
the United States and the partner share a strong common interest in 
deterring and preventing the misuse of nuclear material, as well as an 
interest in maintaining the rights afforded to sovereign countries. 
The partner's interest in applying adequate security measures, for 
instance, is particularly strong because the nuclear material is 
located within its territory. Moreover, specific physical security 
needs may often depend on unique circumstances and sensitive 
intelligence information known only to the partner. 

In addition, the AEA requires that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements 
with non-nuclear weapon states contain a stipulation that the United 
States shall have the right to require the return of certain nuclear 
material, as well as equipment, should the partner detonate a nuclear 
device or terminate or abrogate its safeguards agreements with IAEA. 
However, DOE, NRC, and State officials told us that the U.S. 
government has never exercised the "right to require return" 
provisions in its nuclear cooperation agreements. In addition, the 
United States typically includes "fall-back safeguards"--contingency 
plans for the application of alternative safeguards should IAEA 
safeguards become inapplicable for any other reason. DOE and State 
officials told us, however, that the United States has not exercised 
its fall-back safeguards provisions, because the United States has not 
identified a situation where IAEA was unable to perform its safeguards 
duties. 

U.S. Agencies Have Visited Foreign Sites to Monitor and Evaluate the 
Physical Security of U.S. Nuclear Material: 

U.S. agencies have, over time, made arrangements with partners to 
visit certain facilities where U.S. nuclear material is stored. As we 
reported in August 1982 and in December 1994,[Footnote 23] U.S. 
interagency physical protection teams visit partner country facilities 
to monitor and evaluate whether the physical protection provided to 
U.S. nuclear material meets IAEA physical security guidelines. In 
1974, DOE's predecessor, the Energy Research and Development 
Administration, began leading teams composed of State, NRC, and DOE 
national laboratory officials to review the partner's legal and 
regulatory basis for physical protection and to ensure that U.S. 
nuclear material was adequately protected. In 1988, the Department of 
Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency began to participate in 
these visits, and officials from other agencies and offices, such as 
GTRI, have participated. The visits have generally focused on research 
reactors containing HEU but have also included assessments, when 
partners voluntarily grant access, of other facilities' physical 
security, including nuclear power plants, reprocessing facilities, and 
research and development facilities containing U.S. nuclear material. 

According to DOE documents and DOE, NRC, and State officials, the 
primary factors for selecting countries for visits are the type, 
quantity, and form of nuclear material, with priority given to 
countries with U.S. HEU or plutonium in Category I amounts. In 
addition, in 1987, NRC recommended that countries possessing U.S. 
Category I nuclear material be revisited at least every 5 years. DOE 
and NRC officials told us this has become an official goal for 
prioritizing visits. According to DOE, interagency physical protection 
visits are also made whenever the country has had or expects to have a 
significant change in its U.S. nuclear material inventory, along with 
other factors, such as previous findings that physical protection was 
not adequate. These criteria and other factors are used to help U.S. 
agencies prioritize visits on a countrywide basis and also supplement 
other information that is known about a partner's physical protection 
system and the current threat environment. Moreover, while the U.S. 
physical protection program assesses physical security conditions on a 
site-specific basis, NRC's regulations permit the determination of 
adequacy of foreign physical protection systems on a countrywide 
basis.[Footnote 24] Therefore, DOE, NRC, and State officials told us 
that the results of the interagency physical protection visits, 
combined with other sources of information such as country threat 
assessments, are used as a measure of the physical security system 
countrywide. 

The U.S. teams visit certain facilities where U.S. nuclear material is 
used or stored to observe physical protection measures after 
discussing the relevant nuclear security regulatory framework with the 
partner government. DOE and State officials told us these physical 
protection visits help U.S. officials develop relationships with 
partner officials, share best practices and, in some cases, recommend 
physical security improvements. 

We visited four facilities that hold U.S.-obligated nuclear material. 
The partner officials and facility operators we met shared their 
observations regarding the U.S. physical protection visits. 
Representatives from one site characterized a recent interagency 
physical protection visit as a "tour." These officials told us the 
U.S. government officials had shared some high-level observations 
regarding their visit with government officials and nuclear reactor 
site operators but did not provide the government or site operators 
with written observations or recommendations. On the other hand, 
government officials from another country we visited told us that a 
recent interagency physical protection visit had resulted in a useful 
and detailed exchange of information about physical security 
procedures. These government officials told us they had learned "quite 
a lot" from the interagency physical protection visit and that they 
hoped the dialog would continue, since security could always be 
improved. In February 2011, DOE officials told us they had begun to 
distribute the briefing slides they use at the conclusion of a 
physical protection visit to foreign officials. State officials told 
us that the briefings are considered government-to-government 
activities, and it is the partner government's choice on whether to 
include facility operators in the briefings. 

In addition, we reviewed U.S. agencies' records of these and other 
physical protection visits and found that, over the 17-year period 
from 1994 through 2010, U.S. interagency physical protection teams 
made 55 visits. Of the 55 visits, interagency physical protection 
teams found the sites met IAEA security guidelines on 27 visits, did 
not meet IAEA security guidelines on 21 visits, and the results of 7 
visits are unknown because the physical protection team was unable to 
assess the sites, or agency documentation was missing. 

According to DOE, State, and NRC officials, the visits are used to 
encourage security improvements by the partner. For example, based on 
the circumstances of one particular facility visited in the last 5 
years, the physical protection team made several recommendations to 
improve security, including installing (1) fences around the site's 
perimeter, (2) sensors between fences, (3) video assessment systems 
for those sensors, and (4) vehicle barriers. According to DOE 
officials, these observations were taken seriously by the country, 
which subsequently made the improvements. 

When we visited the site as part of our review, government officials 
from that country told us the U.S. interagency team had provided 
useful advice and, as a result, the government had approved a new 
physical protection plan. These government officials characterized 
their interactions with DOE and other U.S. agency officials as 
positive and told us that the government's new physical protection 
plan had been partly implemented. Moreover, although we were not 
granted access to the building, we observed several physical 
protection upgrades already implemented or in progress, including: (1) 
the stationing of an armed guard outside the facility holding U.S. 
Category I material; (2) ongoing construction of a 12-foot perimeter 
fence around the facility; and (3) construction of a fence equipped 
with barbed wire and motion detectors around the entire research 
complex. We were also told that, among other things, remote monitoring 
equipment had been installed in key areas in response to the 
interagency visit. The Central Alarm Station was hardened, and the 
entrance to the complex was controlled by turnstiles and a specially 
issued badge, which entrants received after supplying a passport or 
other government-issued identification. Private automobiles were not 
allowed in the facility. 

Not all U.S. physical protection visits proceed smoothly. In some 
cases, U.S. agencies have attempted repeatedly to convince partner 
officials of the seriousness of meeting IAEA security guidelines and 
to fund improvements. For example, a U.S. interagency physical 
protection team in the early 2000s found numerous security problems at 
a certain country's research reactor. The site supervisor objected to 
the interagency team's assessment because physical security was a 
matter of national sovereignty, and IAEA security guidelines were 
subject to interpretation. The site supervisor also objected to some 
of the U.S. team's recommendations. In some instances, under U.S. 
pressure, countries have agreed to make necessary improvements with 
DOE technical and material assistance. 

Our review of agency records indicates that, in recent years, as the 
number of countries relying on U.S. HEU to fuel research reactors has 
continued to decline, U.S. agencies have succeeded in using a 
partner's pending export license for U.S. HEU or expected change in 
inventory of U.S. special nuclear material as leverage for a U.S. 
interagency physical protection visit. For example, we identified two 
cases since 2000 where a partner country applied for a license to 
transfer U.S. HEU, and a U.S. interagency team subsequently visited 
those two sites. In addition, we identified a recent situation where a 
partner country's inventory of U.S. plutonium at a certain site was 
expected to significantly increase, and a U.S. interagency team 
visited the site to determine whether the site could adequately 
protect these additional inventories. 

According to DOE officials, requests for U.S. low enriched uranium 
(LEU) export licenses have increased in recent years.[Footnote 25] In 
response, DOE officials told us that U.S. agencies have begun to 
prioritize visits to countries making such requests, and our review of 
agency documentation corroborates this. For example, physical 
protection visit records we reviewed state that recent interagency 
physical protection visits were made to two sites to evaluate the 
facilities' physical security in advance of pending U.S. LEU license 
applications. In addition, a DOE contractor and State official told us 
that a U.S. team planned to visit another partner country site in late 
2011 in order to verify the adequacy of physical protection for U.S.-
obligated LEU. 

U.S. Agencies Do Not Have a Formal Process for Coordinating and 
Prioritizing U.S. Physical Protection Visits: 

DOE, NRC, and State do not have a formal process for coordinating and 
prioritizing U.S. interagency physical protection visits. In 
particular, DOE, which has the technical lead and is the agency lead 
on most visits has neither (1) worked with NRC and State to establish 
a plan and prioritize interagency physical protection visits, nor (2) 
measured performance in a systematic way. Specifically: 

* Establishing a plan and prioritizing and coordinating efforts. A 
U.S. agency formal plan for which countries or facilities to visit has 
not been established, nor have goals for the monitoring and evaluation 
activities been formalized. In October 2009, DOE reported to us that 
it had formulated a list of countries that contained U.S. nuclear 
material and were priorities for U.S. teams to visit. However, in a 
subsequent written communication to us, a senior DOE official stated 
that DOE had not yet discussed this list with State, NRC, or other 
agency officials.[Footnote 26] As a result, the list of countries had 
not been properly vetted at that time and did not represent an 
interagency agreed-upon list. In February 2011, DOE officials told us 
that U.S. agencies will be considering a revised methodology for 
prioritizing physical protection visits. NRC officials told us they 
thought the interagency coordination and prioritization of the visit 
process could be improved. A State official, who regularly 
participates in the U.S. physical protection visits, told us that 
interagency coordination had improved in the past 6 months, in 
response to a recognized need by U.S. agencies to be prepared for an 
expected increase in requests for exports of U.S. LEU. 

* Measuring performance. The agencies have not developed performance 
metrics to gauge progress in achieving stated goals related to 
physical protection visits. Specifically, DOE, NRC, and State have not 
performed an analysis to determine whether the stated interagency goal 
of visiting countries containing U.S. Category I nuclear material 
within 5 years has been met. In addition, although DOE has stated U.S. 
physical protection teams revisit sites whenever there is an 
indication that security does not meet IAEA security guidelines, DOE 
has not quantified its efforts in a meaningful way. In response to our 
questions about metrics, DOE officials stated that there is no U.S. 
law regarding the frequency of visits or revisits and that the 
agency's internal goals are not requirements. These officials told us 
that DOE, NRC, and State recognize that the "number one goal" is to 
ensure the physical security of U.S. nuclear material abroad. DOE 
officials stated that the best measure of the U.S. physical protection 
visits' effectiveness is that there has not been a theft of U.S. 
nuclear material from a foreign facility since the 1970s, when two LEU 
fuel rods were stolen from a certain country. However, officials 
reported to us that, in 1990, the facility was determined to be well 
below IAEA security guidelines. Our review of DOE documentation shows 
that other U.S. LEU transferred to the facility remains at the site. 

In July 2011, in conjunction with the classification review for this 
report, DOE officials stated that while DOE, NRC, and State work 
together on coordinating U.S. government positions regarding 
priorities and procedures for the interagency physical protection 
program, no updated document exists that formalizes the process for 
planning, coordinating, and prioritizing U.S. interagency physical 
protection visits. We note that the documents that DOE refers to are 
internal DOE documents presented to us in 2008 and 2009 in response to 
questions regarding nuclear cooperation agreements. These documents 
are not an interagency agreed-upon document, but reflect DOE's views 
on determining which countries and facilities interagency physical 
protection teams should visit. Further, DOE officials in July 2011 
stated that DOE, NRC, and State do not have an agreed-upon way to 
measure performance in a systematic way, and that while the goals for 
the monitoring and evaluation activities have not yet been formalized 
through necessary updated documents, a prioritized list of countries 
to visit does exist. These officials noted that the U.S. government is 
working to update its planning documents and is examining its 
methodology for prioritizing physical protection visits. Any changes 
will be included in these updated documents. 

DOE and U.S. agencies' activities for prioritizing and coordinating 
U.S. interagency physical protection visits and measuring performance 
do not meet our best practices for agency performance or DOE's 
standards for internal control. We have reported that defining the 
mission and desired outcomes, measuring performance, and using 
performance information to identify performance gaps are critical if 
agencies are to be accountable for achieving intended results. 
[Footnote 27] In addition, DOE's own standards for internal control 
call for "processes for planning, organizing, directing, and 
controlling operations designed to reasonably assure that programs 
achieve intended results… and decisions are based on reliable data." 
[Footnote 28] However, DOE, NRC, and State have neither established a 
plan nor measured performance to determine whether they are meeting 
internal goals and whether U.S. agencies' activities are systematic. 

DOE and U.S. Agencies Do Not Systematically Visit Countries with 
Category I U.S. Nuclear Material or Revisit Foreign Facilities Not 
Meeting Security Guidelines: 

U.S. agencies have not systematically evaluated the security of 
foreign facilities holding U.S. nuclear material in two key ways. 
First, U.S. interagency physical protection teams have not 
systematically visited countries holding Category I quantities of U.S. 
nuclear material. Second, interagency teams have not revisited sites 
that did not meet IAEA security guidelines in a timely manner. 

U.S. Physical Protection Teams Have Not Systematically Visited 
Countries Holding Category I Quantities of Nuclear Material: 

U.S. interagency physical protection teams have not systematically 
visited countries believed to be holding Category I quantities of U.S. 
special nuclear material at least once every 5 years--a key 
programmatic goal. In a December 2008 document, DOE officials noted 
that, in 1987, NRC recommended that countries possessing Category I 
nuclear material be revisited at least once every 5 years. This 
recommendation was adopted as a goal for determining the frequency of 
follow-on visits. In addition, DOE, NRC, and State officials told us 
that they aim to conduct physical protection visits at each country 
holding Category I quantities of U.S. nuclear material at least once 
every 5 years. We evaluated U.S. agencies' performance at meeting this 
goal by reviewing records of U.S. physical protection visits and other 
information.[Footnote 29] We found that the United States had met this 
goal with respect to two countries by conducting physical protection 
visits at least once every 5 years since 1987 while they held Category 
I quantities of U.S. nuclear material. However, we estimated that 21 
countries held Category I amounts of U.S. nuclear material during the 
period from 1987 through 2010 but were not visited once every 5 years 
while they held such quantities of U.S. nuclear material. 

In addition, U.S. interagency physical protection teams have not 
visited all partner facilities believed to contain Category I 
quantities of U.S. special nuclear material to determine whether the 
security measures in place meet IAEA security guidelines. 
Specifically, we reviewed physical protection visit records and NMMSS 
data and identified 12 facilities that NMMSS records indicate received 
Category I quantities of U.S. HEU that interagency physical protection 
teams have never visited. 

We identified four additional facilities that GTRI officials told us 
currently hold, and will continue to hold, Category I quantities of 
U.S. special nuclear material for which there is no acceptable 
disposition path in the United States. In addition, these facilities 
have not been visited by a U.S. interagency physical protection team, 
according to our review of available documentation.[Footnote 30] 

Moreover, U.S. interagency physical protection teams have not 
systematically visited partner storage facilities for U.S. nuclear 
material. The AEA, as amended, requires that U.S. nuclear cooperation 
agreements contain a stipulation giving the United States approval 
rights over any storage facility containing U.S. unirradiated or 
"separated" plutonium or HEU. DOE and NRC officials told us there is 
no list of such storage facilities besides those listed in a U.S. 
nuclear cooperation agreement with a certain partner. They stated--and 
our review of available documents corroborated--that a number of the 
U.S. physical protection visits have included assessments of overseas 
storage sites for U.S. nuclear material, since such sites are often 
collocated with research reactors. However, our review also found two 
instances where partner storage areas containing U.S. HEU or separated 
plutonium did not meet IAEA guidelines or were identified as 
potentially vulnerable. 

U.S. Teams Have Not Revisited Facilities That Did Not Meet IAEA 
Security Guidelines in a Timely Manner: 

DOE and U.S. agencies do not have a systematic process to revisit or 
monitor security improvements at facilities that do not meet IAEA 
security guidelines. Based on our analysis of available documentation, 
we found that, since 1994, U.S. interagency physical protection teams 
determined that partner country sites did not meet IAEA security 
guidelines on 21 visits. We then examined how long it took for a U.S. 
team to revisit the sites that did not meet IAEA security guidelines 
and found that, in 13 of 21 cases, U.S. interagency teams took 5 years 
or longer to revisit the facilities.[Footnote 31] 

According to DOE, NRC, and State officials, the interagency physical 
protection visits are not the only way to determine whether partner 
facilities are meeting IAEA security guidelines. For example, the 
United States is able to rely on information provided by other visits 
and U.S. embassy staff to monitor physical security practices. These 
visits include DOE-only trips and trips by DOE national laboratory 
staff and NRC physical protection experts who worked with the host 
country to improve physical security at the sites. NRC officials also 
stated that, in some cases, the partner's corrective actions at the 
site are verified by U.S. officials stationed in the country, and a 
repeat physical protection visit is not always required. 

IAEA officials told us that U.S. technical experts often participate 
in voluntary IAEA physical security assessments at IAEA member states' 
facilities. Specifically, IAEA created the International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) to assist IAEA member states in 
strengthening their national security regime. At the request of a 
member state, IAEA assembles a team of international experts who 
assess the member state's system of physical protection in accordance 
with IAEA security guidelines. As of December 2010, 49 IPPAS missions 
spanning about 30 countries had been completed. 

DOE Seeks to Increase Security or Remove Vulnerable U.S. Nuclear 
Material at Partner Facilities but Faces Challenges: 

DOE has taken steps to improve security at a number of facilities 
overseas that hold U.S. nuclear material. DOE's GTRI program removes 
nuclear material from vulnerable facilities overseas and has achieved 
a number of successes. However, DOE faces a number of constraints. 
Specifically, GTRI can only bring certain types of nuclear material 
back to the United States that have an approved disposition pathway 
and meet the program's eligibility criteria. In addition, obtaining 
access to the partner facilities to make physical security 
improvements may be difficult. There are a few countries that are 
special cases where the likelihood of returning the U.S. nuclear 
material to the United States is considered doubtful. 

DOE's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security and GTRI 
officials told us that when a foreign facility with U.S.-obligated 
nuclear material does not meet IAEA security guidelines, the U.S. 
government's first response is to work with the partner country to 
encourage physical security improvements. In addition, the GTRI 
program was established in 2004 to identify, secure, and remove 
vulnerable nuclear material at civilian sites around the world and to 
provide physical protection upgrades at nuclear facilities that are 
(1) outside the former Soviet Union, (2) in non-weapon states, and (3) 
not in high-income countries. According to GTRI officials, the U.S. 
government's strategy for working with partner countries to improve 
physical security includes: (1) encouraging high-income countries to 
fund their own physical protection upgrades with recommendations by 
the U.S. government and (2) working with other-than-high-income 
countries to provide technical expertise and funding to implement 
physical protection upgrades. If the material is excess to the 
country's needs and can be returned to the United States under an 
approved disposition pathway, GTRI will work with the country to 
repatriate the material. 

According to GTRI officials, GTRI was originally authorized to remove 
to the United States, under its U.S. fuel return program, only U.S.- 
obligated fresh and spent HEU in Material Test Reactor fuel, and 
Training Research Isotope General Atomics (TRIGA) fuel rod form. 
According to GTRI officials, GTRI has also obtained the authorization 
to return additional forms of U.S. fresh and spent HEU, as well as 
U.S. plutonium from foreign countries, so long as there is no 
alternative disposition path. The material must (1) pose a threat to 
national security, (2) be usable for an improvised nuclear device, (3) 
present a high-risk of terrorist theft, and (4) meet U.S. acceptance 
criteria. 

To date, GTRI has removed more than 1,240 kilograms of U.S. HEU from 
Australia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.[Footnote 32] It has also 
performed security upgrades at reactors containing U.S. nuclear 
material that were not meeting IAEA security guidelines in 10 partner 
countries. As we reported in September 2009,[Footnote 33] GTRI has 
improved the security of research reactors, and GTRI officials told us 
in April 2011 that they plan to continue to engage other countries to 
upgrade security. 

In a separate report published in December 2010, we noted that GTRI 
has assisted in the conversion from the use of HEU to LEU or verified 
the shutdown of 72 HEU research reactors around the world,[Footnote 
34] 52 of which previously used U.S. HEU. GTRI prioritizes its 
schedule for upgrading the security of research reactors and removing 
nuclear material based on the amount and type of nuclear material at 
the reactor and other threat factors, such as the vulnerability of 
facilities, country-level threat, and proximity to strategic assets. 
Our review identified several situations where GTRI or its predecessor 
program removed vulnerable U.S. nuclear material. 

Notwithstanding these successes, the GTRI program has some 
limitations. GTRI cannot remove all potentially vulnerable nuclear 
material worldwide because the program's scope is limited to only 
certain types of material that meet the eligibility criteria. GTRI 
officials told us that, of the approximately 17,500 kilograms of HEU 
it estimates was exported from the United States, the majority--12,400 
kilograms--is currently not eligible for return to the United States. 
According to GTRI officials, over 10,000 kilograms is contained in 
fuels from "special purpose" reactors that are not included in GTRI's 
nuclear material return program because they were not traditional 
aluminum-based fuels, TRIGA fuels, or target material. As a result, 
this material does not have an acceptable disposition pathway in the 
United States, according to GTRI officials. GTRI officials stated that 
these reactors are in Germany, France, and Japan, and that the 
material has been deemed to be adequately protected. GTRI reported 
that the other approximately 2,000 kilograms of transferred U.S. 
nuclear material is located primarily in EURATOM member countries and 
is either currently in use or adequately protected. 

In addition, the potential vulnerability of nuclear material at 
certain high-income facilities was raised to us by officials at the 
National Security Council (NSC)--the President's principal forum for 
considering national security and foreign policy matters--and included 
in a prior report. Specifically, we reported that, there may be 
security vulnerabilities in certain high-income countries, including 
three specific high-income countries named by the NSC officials. For 
sites in these countries, GTRI officials told us the U.S. government's 
strategy is to work bilaterally with the countries and to provide 
recommendations to improve physical protection, and follow up as 
needed. 

Our analysis of available agency physical protection visit documents 
also raises concerns regarding the physical security conditions in 
these countries, including facilities that did not meet IAEA security 
guidelines and interagency physical protection teams' lack of access 
issues. 

DOE also works with countries to remove material if it is in excess of 
the country's needs and meets DOE acceptance criteria. The ability of 
DOE to return U.S. nuclear material depends, however, on the 
willingness of the foreign country to cooperate. As we reported in 
September 2009, because GTRI's program for physical security upgrades 
and nuclear material returns is voluntary, DOE faces some challenges 
in obtaining consistent and timely cooperation from other countries to 
address security weaknesses. Our report further noted that DOE has 
experienced situations where a foreign government has refused its 
assistance to make security upgrades. For example, we reported that 
one country had refused offers of DOE physical security upgrades at a 
research reactor for 9 years. However, this situation was subsequently 
resolved when all HEU was removed from this country, according to GTRI 
officials. In addition, we reported that DOE had experienced two other 
situations where the partner country would not accept security 
assistance until agreements with the United States were reached on 
other issues related to nuclear energy and security. 

There are several countries that have U.S. nuclear material that are 
particularly problematic and represent special cases. Specifically, 
U.S. nuclear material has remained at sites in three countries where 
physical protection measures are unknown or have not been visited by 
an interagency physical protection team in decades. GTRI removed a 
large quantity of U.S. spent HEU recently from one of these countries. 

According to NRC and State officials, U.S. transfers to these three 
countries were made prior to 1978, when the physical protection 
requirements were added to the AEA. Therefore, these countries have 
not made the same commitments regarding physical security of U.S.- 
transferred material. Finally, we identified another country that 
poses special challenges. All U.S-obligated HEU has been removed from 
this country, which was one of the GTRI program's highest priorities. 
Previous U.S. interagency physical protection visits found a site in 
this country did not meet IAEA security guidelines. 

Conclusions: 

The world today is dramatically different than when most U.S. nuclear 
cooperation agreements were negotiated. Many new threats have emerged, 
and nuclear proliferation risks have increased significantly. We 
recognize that the United States and its partners share a strong 
common interest in deterring and preventing the misuse of U.S. nuclear 
material--or any nuclear material--and that flexibility in the 
agreements is necessary to forge strong and cooperative working 
relationships with our partners. The fundamental question, in our 
view, is whether nuclear cooperation agreements and their underlying 
legislative underpinnings need to be reassessed given the weaknesses 
in inventory management and physical security that we identified. 

Specifically, we found these agreements may not be sufficiently robust 
in two areas--inventories and physical security. Without an accurate 
inventory of U.S. nuclear materials--in particular, weapon-usable HEU 
and separated plutonium--the United States does not have sufficient 
assurances regarding the location of materials. As a result, the 
United States may not be able to monitor whether the partner country 
is appropriately notifying the United States and whether the United 
States is appropriately and fully exercising its rights of approval 
regarding the transfer, retransfer, enrichment and reprocessing and, 
in some cases, storage of nuclear materials subject to the agreement 
terms. NRC and multiple offices within DOE could not provide us with 
an authoritative list of the amount, location, and disposition of U.S. 
HEU or separated plutonium overseas. We are particularly concerned 
that NRC and DOE could not account, in response to a 1992 mandate by 
Congress, on the location and disposition of U.S. nuclear material 
overseas--and that they have not developed such an inventory in the 
almost two decades since that mandate. 

We recognize that physical security is a national responsibility. We 
also recognize that neither the AEA, as amended, nor the U.S. nuclear 
cooperation agreements in force require that State negotiate new or 
renewed nuclear cooperation agreement terms that include specific 
access rights for the United States to verify whether a partner is 
maintaining adequate physical security of U.S. nuclear material. 
Without such rights, it may be difficult for the United States to have 
access to critical facilities overseas--especially those believed to 
be holding weapon-usable materials--to better ensure that U.S. 
material is in fact adequately protected while the material remains in 
the partner's custody. We note the agreements are reciprocal, with 
both parties generally agreeing to all conditions specified in them. 
We acknowledge that any change to the nuclear cooperation framework or 
authorizing legislation will be very sensitive. Careful consideration 
should be given to the impact of any reciprocity clauses on U.S. 
national security when negotiating or reviewing these agreements. 
However, it may be possible to do so in a way that includes greater 
access to critical facilities where weapon-usable U.S. nuclear 
material is stored, without infringing on the sovereign rights of our 
partners or hampering the ability of the U.S. nuclear industry to 
remain competitive. 

In the course of our work, we identified several weaknesses in DOE, 
NRC, and State's efforts to develop and manage activities that ensure 
that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements are properly implemented. 
Specifically, the lack of a baseline inventory of U.S. nuclear 
materials--in particular, weapon-usable materials--and annual 
inventory reconciliations with all partners limits the ability of the 
U.S. government to identify where the material is located. Currently, 
annual reconciliations with five partners are undertaken. However, the 
information, with the exception of one country, is aggregated and not 
provided on a facility-by-facility basis. Without such information on 
facilities, it may be difficult to track U.S. material for accounting 
and control purposes. No annual reconciliations currently exist for 
the United States' other partners that it has transferred material to 
or trades with. The NMMSS database could be the official central 
repository of data regarding U.S. inventories of nuclear material 
overseas if DOE and NRC are able to collect better data. 

We are concerned that DOE has not worked with NRC and State to develop 
a systematic process for monitoring and evaluating the physical 
security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, including which foreign 
facilities to visit for future physical protection visits. In 
particular, U.S. interagency physical protection teams have neither 
met a key programmatic goal for visiting countries containing Category 
I quantities of U.S. special nuclear material every 5 years, nor have 
they visited all partner facilities believed to be holding Category I 
quantities of U.S. nuclear material, nor revisited facilities that 
were found to not meet IAEA security guidelines in a timely manner. 
Moreover, relying on reported thefts of U.S. nuclear material as a 
gauge of security is not the best measure of program effectiveness 
when accounting processes for inventory of U.S. material at foreign 
facilities are limited. Improving the U.S. government's management of 
nuclear cooperation agreements could contribute to the administration 
achieving its goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material 
worldwide in 4 years. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

* Congress may wish to consider directing DOE and NRC to complete a 
full accounting of U.S. weapon-usable nuclear materials--in 
particular, HEU and separated plutonium--with its nuclear cooperation 
agreement partners and other countries that may possess such U.S. 
nuclear material. 

* In addition, Congress may wish to consider amending the AEA if 
State, working with other U.S. agencies, does not include enhanced 
measures regarding physical protection access rights in future 
agreements and renewed agreements, so that U.S. interagency physical 
protection teams may obtain access when necessary to verify that U.S. 
nuclear materials have adequate physical protection. The amendment 
could provide that the U.S. government may not enter into nuclear 
cooperation agreements unless such agreements contain provisions 
allowing the United States to verify that adequate physical security 
is exercised over nuclear material subject to the terms of these 
agreements. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making seven recommendations to enable agencies to better 
account for, and ensure the physical protection of, U.S. nuclear 
material overseas. 

To help federal agencies better understand where U.S. nuclear material 
is currently located overseas, we recommend that the Secretary of 
State, working with the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, take the following four actions to 
strengthen controls over U.S. nuclear material subject to these 
agreements: 

* determine, for those partners with which the United States has 
transferred material but does not have annual inventory 
reconciliation, a baseline inventory of weapon-usable U.S. nuclear 
material, and establish a process for conducting annual 
reconciliations of inventories of nuclear material on a facility-by-
facility basis; 

* establish for those partners with which the United States has an 
annual inventory reconciliation, reporting on a facility-by-facility 
basis for weapon-usable material where possible; 

* facilitate visits to sites that U.S. physical protection teams have 
not visited that are believed to be holding U.S. Category I nuclear 
material; and: 

* seek to include measures that provide for physical protection access 
rights in new or renewed nuclear cooperation agreements so that U.S. 
interagency physical protection teams may in the future obtain access 
when necessary to verify that U.S. nuclear materials are adequately 
protected. Careful consideration should be given to the impact of any 
reciprocity clauses on U.S. national security when negotiating or 
reviewing these agreements. 

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with 
the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission take the following three actions: 

* develop an official central repository to maintain data regarding 
U.S. inventories of nuclear material overseas. This repository could 
be the NMMSS database, or if the U.S. agencies so determine, some 
other official database; 

* develop formal goals for and a systematic process to determine which 
foreign facilities to visit for future interagency physical protection 
visits. The goals and process should be formalized and agreed to by 
all relevant agencies; and: 

* periodically review performance in meeting key programmatic goals 
for the physical protection program, including determining which 
countries containing Category I U.S. nuclear material have been 
visited within the last 5 years, as well as determining whether 
partner facilities previously found to not meet IAEA security 
guidelines were revisited in a timely manner. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Energy and 
State, and the Chairman of the NRC for their review and comment. Each 
agency provided written comments on the draft report, which are 
presented in appendixes IV, VI, and V, respectively. All three 
agencies generally disagreed with our conclusions and recommendations. 
DOE, NRC, and State disagreed with GAO in three general areas of the 
report. Specifically, all the agencies (1) disagree with our 
recommendations to establish annual inventory reconciliations with all 
trading partners and establish a system to comprehensively track and 
account for U.S. nuclear material overseas, because the agencies 
believe this is impractical and unwarranted; (2) maintain that IAEA 
safeguards are sufficient or an important tool to account for U.S. 
nuclear material overseas; and (3) assert that any requirement in 
future nuclear cooperation agreements calling for enhanced physical 
protection access rights is unnecessary and could hamper sensitive 
relationships. 

With regard to the three general areas of disagreement, our response 
is as follows: 

* DOE, NRC, and State assert that it is not necessary to implement 
GAO's recommendation that agencies undertake an annual inventory 
reconciliation and report on a facility-by-facility basis for weapon- 
usable material where possible for all countries that hold U.S.- 
obligated nuclear material. We stand by this recommendation for 
numerous reasons. First, as stated in the report, we found--and none 
of the agencies refuted--that the U.S. government does not have an 
inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas and, in particular, is not 
able to identify where weapon-usable materials such as HEU and 
separated plutonium that can be used for a nuclear weapon may reside. 
In fact, NRC commented that "inventory knowledge is very important for 
high-consequence materials, e.g., high enriched uranium and separated 
plutonium." Because DOE, NRC, and State do not have comprehensive 
knowledge of where U.S.-obligated material is located at foreign 
facilities, it is unknown whether the United States is appropriately 
and fully exercising its rights of approval regarding the transfer, 
retransfer, enrichment, and reprocessing and, in some cases, storage 
of nuclear materials subject to the agreements' terms. In addition, 
the lack of inventory information hampers U.S. agencies in identifying 
priorities for interagency physical protection visits. We are 
particularly concerned that NRC and DOE, in response to a 1992 mandate 
by Congress, could only account for the location and disposition of 
about 1,160 kilograms out of an estimated 17,500 kilograms of U.S.- 
exported HEU. Furthermore, the agencies have not developed such an 
inventory or performed an additional comprehensive review in the 
almost two decades since that mandate. We believe it is important that 
DOE, NRC, and State pursue all means possible to better identify where 
U.S.-obligated material is located overseas--and for weapon-usable HEU 
and separated plutonium, seek to do so on a facility-by-facility 
basis. Annual inventory reconciliations with all partners provide one 
way to do that. The United States has demonstrated it has the ability 
to conduct such exchanges, which none of the agencies disputed. Our 
report notes that the United States conducts annual inventory 
reconciliations with five partners, including one where facility-level 
information is annually exchanged. We believe the recent signing of 
nuclear cooperation agreements with India and Russia, as well as the 
situation where current partners whose agreements are set to expire in 
coming years must be renegotiated--including Peru and South Korea--
provide a convenient and timely opportunity for DOE, NRC, and State to 
pursue such enhanced material accountancy measures. 

* DOE, NRC, and State commented that IAEA's comprehensive safeguards 
program is another tool to maintain the knowledge of locations of 
nuclear material in a country, including U.S.-obligated material, and 
that IAEA inspection, surveillance, and reporting processes are 
effective tools for material tracking and accounting. We agree that 
IAEA safeguards are an important nuclear nonproliferation mechanism. 
However, our report found IAEA's safeguards have a limited ability to 
identify, track, and account for U.S.-obligated material. 
Specifically, as our report notes, and as confirmed to us by senior 
IAEA officials, IAEA does not track the obligation of the nuclear 
material under safeguards and, therefore, IAEA may not have the 
ability to identify whether and what volume of nuclear material at 
partner country facilities is U.S.-obligated and subject to the terms 
of U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. In addition, our report notes 
that IAEA considers member country nuclear material inventory 
information confidential and does not share it with its member 
countries, including the United States. Therefore, IAEA has a limited 
ability to account for nuclear material subject to the terms of U.S. 
nuclear cooperation agreements. Importantly, safeguards are not a 
substitute for physical security and serve a different function. As 
our report notes, safeguards are primarily a way to detect diversion 
of nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes but do not 
ensure that facilities are physically secure to prevent theft or 
sabotage of such material. 

* DOE, NRC, and State disagreed with our recommendation that State, 
working with DOE and NRC, should seek to negotiate terms that include 
enhanced measures regarding physical protection access rights in 
future and renewed agreements. They also raised concerns with our 
Matter for Congressional Consideration to amend the AEA should State 
not implement our recommendation. We do not agree with agencies' 
comments that our recommendation that agencies "seek to include" such 
measures is impractical. As we note in our report, an enhanced measure 
for access rights is in place in the recently negotiated U.S.-India 
arrangements and procedures document. Further, while partner countries 
pledge at the outset of an agreement that they will physically protect 
U.S.-obligated material, the results of our work show that they have 
not always adequately done so. Specifically, our report noted that, of 
the 55 interagency physical protection visits made from 1994 through 
2010, interagency teams found that countries met IAEA security 
guidelines on only 27 visits; did not meet IAEA security guidelines on 
21 visits, and the results of 7 visits are unknown because the U.S. 
team was unable to assess the sites or agency documentation of the 
physical protection visits was missing. In addition, we identified 12 
facilities that are believed to have or previously had Category I U.S. 
nuclear material that have not been visited by an interagency physical 
protection team. We agree with the agencies' comments that the 
licensing process for U.S. nuclear material offers some assurances 
that physical security will be maintained and that an exchange of 
diplomatic notes at the time of a transfer is designed to ensure the 
partners maintain the material according to the terms of the 
agreements. However, these measures are implemented at the time of 
licensing or material transfer, and insight into the physical security 
arrangements of the nuclear material over the longer-term, often 30-
year duration of these agreements is by no means guaranteed. Ensuring 
that the United States has the tools it needs to visit facilities in 
the future--even after an initial transfer of material is made per a 
conditional export license--is important to supporting U.S. nuclear 
nonproliferation objectives. We continue to believe that our 
recommendation and Matter for Congressional Consideration are 
consistent with the report's findings and would enhance the security 
of U.S.-obligated nuclear material in other countries. 

In addition, DOE and NRC commented that (1) our report contained 
errors in fact and judgment, (2) our report's recommendations could 
result in foreign partners requiring reciprocal access rights to U.S. 
facilities that contain nuclear material that they transferred to the 
United States, which could have national security implications, and 
(3) our recommendation that agencies establish a process for 
conducting annual reconciliations of inventories of nuclear material 
and develop a repository to maintain data regarding U.S. inventories 
of nuclear material overseas would be costly to implement. Our 
response to these comments is as follows: 

* None of the agencies' comments caused us to change any factual 
statement we made in the report. DOE provided a limited number of 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Importantly, 
some of the facts that agencies did not dispute included: (1) our 
analysis that found U.S. agencies made only a single attempt to 
comprehensively account for transferred U.S. HEU almost 20 years ago 
and, at that time, were only able to verify the amount and location of 
less than one-tenth of transferred U.S. HEU; and (2) partner countries 
did not meet IAEA physical security guidelines for protecting U.S. 
nuclear material in about half of the cases we reviewed from 1994 
through 2010. In our view, these security weaknesses place U.S.- 
obligated nuclear material at risk and raise potential proliferation 
concerns. These agreements for nuclear cooperation are long-term in 
scope and are often in force for 30 years or more. As we noted in our 
report, the world today is dramatically different than the time when 
most of the agreements were negotiated. New threats have emerged, and 
nuclear proliferation risks have increased significantly. NRC 
commented that countries may not want to change the "status quo" as it 
pertains to nuclear cooperation agreement terms, including those 
regarding the physical protection of U.S.-obligated nuclear material. 
In our view, the status quo, or business-as-usual approach should not 
apply to matters related to the security of U.S.-obligated nuclear 
material located at partner facilities throughout the world. Moreover, 
implementing a more robust security regime is consistent with and 
complements the administration's goal of securing all vulnerable 
nuclear material worldwide within a 4-year period. 

* DOE and NRC's comment that the United States may be asked to 
demonstrate reciprocity by nuclear cooperation agreement partners to 
verify that adequate physical protection is being provided to their 
nuclear material while in U.S. custody has merit and needs to be taken 
into consideration when developing or reviewing nuclear cooperation 
agreements. As a result, we added language to the conclusions and 
recommendation sections to additionally state that "careful 
consideration should be given to the impact of any reciprocity clauses 
on U.S. national security when negotiating or reviewing these 
agreements." 

* In addition, DOE and NRC commented that we are suggesting a costly 
new effort in recommending that agencies account for and track U.S.- 
obligated nuclear material overseas. However, we noted in our report 
that NMMSS officials told us that NMMSS is currently capable of 
maintaining information regarding inventories of U.S. nuclear material 
overseas. Moreover, DOE and NRC did not conduct an analysis to support 
their assertion that such a system would be costly. Although we did 
not perform a cost-benefit analysis, based on our conversations with 
NMMSS staff and the lack of a DOE cost-benefit analysis, to the 
contrary, there is no evidence to suggest that adding additional 
information to the NMMSS database would necessarily entail significant 
incremental costs or administrative overhead. We are sensitive to 
suggesting or recommending new requirements on federal agencies that 
may impose additional costs. However, it is important to note that the 
U.S. government has already spent billions of dollars to secure 
nuclear materials overseas, as well as radiation detection equipment 
to detect possible smuggled nuclear material at our borders and the 
border crossings of other countries. The administration intends to 
spend hundreds of millions more to support the president's 4-year goal 
to secure all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide. If necessary, an 
expenditure of some resources to account for U.S. nuclear material 
overseas is worthy of consideration. We stand by our recommendations 
that State work with nuclear cooperation agreement partners that the 
United States has transferred material to, to develop a baseline 
inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and that DOE work with 
other federal agencies to develop a central repository to maintain 
data regarding U.S. inventories of nuclear material overseas. 

DOE disagreed with our findings that the U.S. interagency physical 
protection visit program (1) lacked formal goals, and that (2) U.S. 
agencies have not established a formal process for coordinating and 
prioritizing interagency physical protection visits, in addition to 
the three areas of general disagreement. During the course of our 
work, we found no evidence of an interagency agreed-upon list of 
program goals. In its comments, DOE stated that the formal goal of the 
program is to determine whether U.S.-obligated nuclear material at the 
partner country facility is being protected according to the intent of 
IAEA security guidelines. This is the first time the goal has been 
articulated to us as such. Moreover, we disagree with DOE's second 
assertion that it has established a formal process for coordinating 
and prioritizing visits. Our report notes that we found DOE has not 
(1) worked with NRC and State to establish a plan and prioritize U.S. 
physical protection visits or (2) measured performance in a systematic 
way. In particular, our report notes that, in October 2009, a DOE 
Office of Nonproliferation and International Security official 
reported to us that it had formulated a list of 10 countries that 
contained U.S. nuclear material and were priorities for physical 
protection teams to visit. However, a senior-level DOE 
nonproliferation official told us that DOE had not discussed this list 
with State or NRC, or other agency officials, and it could not be 
considered an interagency agreed-upon list. In addition, NRC Office of 
International Program officials told us they thought interagency 
coordination could be improved, and a State Bureau of International 
Security and Nonproliferation official told us that agency 
coordination has improved in the past 6 months. Moreover, as we 
further state in the report, in February 2011, DOE officials told us 
that the department is conducting a study of its methodology for 
prioritizing physical protection visits. 

In addition, in July 2011, in conjunction with the classification 
review for this report, DOE officials stated that while DOE, NRC, and 
State work together on coordinating U.S. government positions 
regarding priorities and procedures for the interagency physical 
protection program, no updated document exists that formalizes the 
process for planning, coordinating, and prioritizing U.S. interagency 
physical protection visits. We note that the documents that DOE refers 
to are internal DOE documents presented to GAO in 2008 and 2009 in 
response to questions regarding nuclear cooperation agreements. These 
documents are not an interagency agreed upon document, but reflects 
DOE's views on determining which countries and facilities interagency 
physical protection teams should visit. Further, DOE officials in July 
2011 stated that DOE, NRC, and State do not have an agreed-upon way to 
measure performance in a systematic way, and that while the goals for 
the monitoring and evaluation activities have not yet been formalized 
through necessary updated documents, a prioritized list of countries 
to visit does exist. These officials noted that the U.S. government is 
working to update its planning documents and examining its methodology 
for prioritizing physical protection visits. Any changes will be 
included in these updated documents. Therefore, we continue to believe 
that DOE should work with the other agencies to develop formal goals 
for and a systematic process for determining which foreign facilities 
to visit for future physical protection visits, and that the process 
should be formalized and agreed to by all agencies. 

NRC commented that in order to demonstrate that U.S. nuclear material 
located abroad is potentially insecure, GAO made an assessment based 
on U.S. agencies not conducting activities which are, according to 
NRC, neither authorized nor required by U.S. law or by agreements 
negotiated under Section 123 of the AEA. In fact, we acknowledge that 
U.S. agencies are not required to conduct certain activities or 
collect certain information. Moreover, we do not suggest that agencies 
undertake activities that are not authorized by law. We recommend that 
the agencies either expand upon and refine outreach they are already 
conducting, contingent on the willingness of our cooperation agreement 
partners, or negotiate new terms in nuclear cooperation agreements as 
necessary. If the agencies find that they are unable to negotiate new 
terms we recommend that Congress consider amending the AEA to require 
such terms. 

State commented that determining annual inventories and 
reconciliations of nuclear material, as well as establishing enhanced 
facility-by-facility reporting for those partners with which the 
United States already has an annual inventory reconciliation is a DOE 
function, not a State function. We agree that DOE plays a vital role 
in carrying out these activities--once such bilaterally agreed upon 
measures are in place. However, we believe it is appropriate to 
recommend that the Department of State--as the agency with the lead 
role in any negotiation regarding the terms and conditions of U.S. 
nuclear cooperation agreements--work with DOE and NRC to secure these 
measures with all U.S. partners. State also commented that there is a 
cost to the U.S. nuclear industry in terms of lost competitiveness 
should the requirements in U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements be 
strengthened to include better access to critical facilities for U.S. 
interagency physical protection teams. State provided no further 
information to support this point. Our report acknowledges that any 
change to the nuclear cooperation framework or authorizing legislation 
will be very sensitive and that flexibility in the agreements is 
necessary. We also stated that it may be possible to change the 
framework of agreements in a way that does not hamper the ability of 
the U.S. nuclear industry to remain competitive. While we would not 
want to alter these agreements in such a way that our nuclear industry 
is put at a competitive disadvantage, in our view, the security of 
U.S. nuclear material overseas should never be compromised to achieve 
a commercial goal. 

Finally, State asserted that interagency physical protection teams 
have been granted access to every site they have requested under the 
consultation terms of U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. As a 
result, State believes the provisions of the current agreements are 
adequate. As we note in our report, access to partner facilities is 
not explicitly spelled out in the agreements and, in our view, this is 
a limitation for the U.S. agencies in obtaining timely and systematic 
access to partner nuclear facilities. While State may be technically 
correct that access has been granted, our report clearly shows that 
many sites believed to contain Category I quantities of U.S. nuclear 
material have been visited only after lengthy periods of time, or have 
not been visited at all. We continue to believe that enhanced physical 
protection access measures could help interagency teams ensure that 
they are able to visit sites containing U.S. nuclear material in a 
timely, systematic, and comprehensive fashion. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretaries of Energy and State, the Chairman of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other interested parties. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

We addressed the following questions during our review: (1) assess 
U.S. agency efforts to account for U.S. nuclear material overseas, (2) 
assess the Department of Energy's (DOE) and other U.S. agencies' 
efforts to monitor and evaluate the physical security conditions of 
U.S. nuclear material subject to the terms of nuclear cooperation 
agreements, and (3) describe DOE's activities to secure or remove 
potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear material at partner facilities. 

To assess U.S. agency efforts to account for U.S. nuclear material 
overseas, we reviewed relevant statutes, including the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, as well as the texts of all current 
nuclear cooperation agreements. We obtained data from the Nuclear 
Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), a database jointly 
run by DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which, among 
other things, maintains data on U.S. peaceful use exports and 
retransfers of enriched uranium and plutonium that have occurred since 
1950, and reviewed DOE and GAO reviews of the NMMSS database. To 
assess the reliability of data in the NMMSS database, we interviewed 
officials from DOE and NRC and a former DOE contractor to identify any 
limitations in NMMSS's data on the location and status of U.S. 
material overseas and found these data to be sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of accounting for U.S. exports of nuclear material. We 
compared NMMSS data with other official and unofficial DOE sources of 
information regarding U.S. nuclear material transfers, including DOE 
data on nuclear material returns, to determine the reliability of 
DOE's inventory data for U.S. nuclear material transferred overseas. 
We reviewed DOE, NRC, and other U.S. agency records and interviewed 
officials at those agencies to determine the extent to which DOE, NRC, 
and State are able to identify where U.S. nuclear material was 
exported, retransferred, and is currently held. We selected a non-
probability sample of partners based on, among other considerations, 
quantities of U.S. special nuclear material transferred to them. 
Results of interviews of non-probability samples are not 
generalizeable to all partners but provide an understanding of those 
partners' views of the U.S. government's efforts to account for its 
nuclear material inventories overseas subject to nuclear cooperation 
agreement terms. We conducted site visits in four countries holding 
U.S.-obligated material and interviewed governmental officials and 
nuclear facility operators in these countries to discuss material 
accounting procedures. Further, we interviewed officials from five 
partners regarding their observations about working with the U.S. 
government to account for material subject to the terms of nuclear 
cooperation agreements. We analyzed the texts of administrative 
arrangements with key countries to determine the extent to which DOE 
conducts inventory reconciliations of inventory transferred between 
the United States and a partner country. 

To assess DOE's and other U.S. agencies' efforts to monitor and 
evaluate the physical security conditions of U.S. nuclear material 
overseas subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms and describe
DOE's activities to secure or remove potentially vulnerable U.S. 
nuclear material at partner facilities, we reviewed all U.S. nuclear 
cooperation agreements in force, as well as other U.S. statutes, and 
IAEA's security guidelines, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material and Nuclear Facilities," INFCIRC/225/Rev.4,[Footnote 36] and 
other relevant international conventions to determine the extent to 
which such laws and international conventions provide for DOE and U.S. 
agencies to monitor and evaluate the physical security of transferred 
U.S. nuclear material subject to U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement 
terms. We interviewed officials from DOE, NRC, and the Department of 
State (State) to gain insights into how effective their efforts are, 
and how their efforts might be improved. We selected a nonprobability 
sample of partners based on, among other considerations, quantities of 
U.S. special nuclear material transferred to them and interviewed 
officials to determine how DOE and other U.S. agencies work with 
partner countries to exchange views on physical security and the 
process by which U.S. nuclear material is returned to the United 
States. Results of interviews of non-probability samples are not 
generalizeable to all partners but provide an understanding of those 
partners' views of the U.S. government's efforts to monitor and 
evaluate the physical security conditions of U.S. nuclear material 
overseas subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms. We also 
obtained and analyzed the records of all available U.S. physical 
protection visits to partner facilities from 1974 through 2010. We 
reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials from DOE, NRC, and 
State regarding the policies and procedures for determining which 
partners to visit, how they conducted physical protection visits at 
partner facilities, and mechanisms for following up on the results of 
these visits. In particular, we compared the sites visited with NMMSS 
records of U.S. material exported and retransferred, and other 
information to evaluate the extent to which U.S. physical protection 
visits were made to all sites overseas containing U.S. special nuclear 
material. We obtained written responses from Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI), and reviewed other information regarding their 
program activities. To better understand IAEA's role in maintaining 
safeguards and evaluating physical security measures, we interviewed 
IAEA officials and reviewed relevant documents. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Current and Previous U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
Partners: 

The United States currently has 27 agreements in force for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
and Taiwan. Figure 1 shows the partner countries with which the United 
States currently has or previously had a nuclear cooperation agreement 
with. 

Figure 1: Cooperating Partners with Which the United States Currently 
Has or Previously Had a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated world map] 

The following categories are depicted on the map: 

Countries with which the United States has a nuclear cooperation 
agreement: 
Countries with which the United States previously had a nuclear 
cooperation agreement: 
Countries with which the United States has not had a nuclear 
cooperation agreement: 
Countries with which the United States has or has had a trilateral 
project and supply agreement. 
				
Sources: GAO analysis of Department of State data; Map Resources 
(map).	 

[End of figure] 

As indicated in figure 1, the United States has nuclear cooperation 
agreements in force with Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil,
Canada, China, Colombia, EURATOM, Egypt, India, Indonesia, IAEA,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Norway, Peru, Russia, South Africa, South
Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Arab
Emirates.[Footnote 27] In addition, the United States previously had 
nuclear cooperation agreements with Chile, Dominican Republic, Iran, 
Israel, Lebanon, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam.[Footnote 38] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: International Guidelines for the Categorization of 
Nuclear Material: 

IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 security guideline document establishes the 
standard by which the United States and other countries generally 
classify the categories of physical protection that should be afforded 
nuclear material, based on the type, volume, and disposition of the 
nuclear material. Table 1 lists the material category according to 
IAEA's security guidelines, INFCIRC/225/Rev4. Specifically: 

Table 1: Categorization of Nuclear Material According to IAEA Security 
Guidelines: 

Material: 1.	Plutonium[A]; 	
Form: Unirradiated[B]; 	
Category I: 2 kilograms or more	
Category II: Less than 2 kilograms	but more than 500 g; 
Category III[C]: 500 g	or less but more than 15 g. 

Material: 2.	Uranium-235; 	
Form: Unirradiated[B]; 	
- uranium enriched to 20% 235U or more; 
Category I: 5 kilograms or more;	
Category II: Less than 5 kilograms	but more than 1	kilogram; 
Category III[C]: 1 kilogram or less but more than 15g; 

- uranium enriched to	10 10% 235U but less than	20% 235U; 
Category II: 10 kilograms or more; 	
Category III[C]: Less than 10 kilograms but more than 1 kilogram; 

- uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% 235U; 
Category III[C]: 10 kilograms or more. 

Material: 3.	Uranium-233; 
Form: Unirradiated[B];	
Category I: 2 kilograms or more; 	
Category II: Less than 2 kilograms	but more than 500 g; 
Category III[C]: 500 g or less but more	than 15 g. 

Material: 4.	Irradiated fuel (The	categorization of irradiated fuel in 
the table is based on international transport considerations. The 
State may assign a different category for domestic use, storage, and 
transport taking all relevant factors into account.) 
Form: 
Category I: 
Category II: Depleted or natural	uranium, thorium, or	low-enriched 
fuel (less	than 10% fissile	content)[D,E]. 

Source: IAEA INFCIRC225r4. 

[A] All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 
80% in plutonium-238. 

[B] Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a 
reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 Gy/hr (100 
rad/hr) at 1 meter unshielded. 

[C] Quantities not falling in Category Ill and natural uranium, 
depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in 
accordance with prudent management practice. 

[D] Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open 
to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a 
different category of physical protection. 

[E] Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material 
content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be 
reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel 
exceeds 1 Gy/hr (100 rad/hr) at 1 meter unshielded. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy: 
		
NNSA: 
Department of Energy:	
National Nuclear Security Administration:	
Washington, DC 20585:	 

August 5, 2011: 

Mr. Gene Aloise:	
Director:	
National Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548	 

Dear Mr. Aloise:	 

The National Nuclear Security Administration appreciates the 
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
draft report, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Limited 
Ability to Account for, Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. 
Nuclear Material Overseas, GA0-11-920. I understand that the GAO was 
asked to: (1) assess U.S. agency efforts to account for U.S. nuclear 
material overseas; (2) assess the Department of Energy's (DOE) and 
U.S. agencies' efforts to monitor and evaluate the physical security 
of U.S. material overseas; and (3) describe DOES activities to secure 
or remove potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear material at partner 
facilities.	 

Overall, NNSA is concerned with the errors in fact and judgment that 
appear in the Congressional Considerations and recommendations for 
U.S. Government agencies. NNSA is working with other partners to 
secure weapons-usable nuclear materials in additional parts of the 
world and to strengthen security at civil nuclear and radiological 
facilities. We recognize that further work is needed and we are 
working with our partners to improve international security. Below arc 
comments to clarify points in the draft report.	 

Comments Related to GAO Report Contents:	 

	1.	The GAO report asserts on pages 26 and 37 that the U.S. 
interagency has not "formalized its goals for ... monitoring and 
evaluation activities." This is incorrect. The U.S. interagency has 
developed and formalized goals for monitoring and evaluating 
activities to use during assessment visits. Specifically, during 
bilateral physical protection assessment visits, the adequacy of 
physical protection provided to U.S.-obligated nuclear material in 
another state is determined based on whether a site meets the intent 
of the		recommendations contained in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 
document on "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear 
Facilities," Information Circular 225 (INFCIRC/225). This fact is 
displayed in a table, found in Appendix VI, that reviews the physical 
protection visits conducted since 1994.	 
	
2.	The GAO report asserts that "DOE, which has the technical lead and 
is the agency lead on most visas has not ...worked with NRC and State 
to establish a plan and prioritize US physical protection visit" and 
states that the U.S. interagency has not established a formal process 
for coordinating and prioritizing such visits. This statement is 
inaccurate and	contrary to the information contained in the report. 
Specifically, the GAO report acknowledges on page 27-28 that DOE, the 
NRC, and State Department work together on coordinating U.S. 
Government positions regarding the priorities for the physical 
protection visits; and the U.S. interagency is working to update its 
planning documents and methodology.	As part of the preparation for all 
physical protection assessment visits, we work with other U.S. 
agencies, including the NRC and State Department, to prioritize and 
plan visits to countries based on criteria that were developed by all 
three agencies. Although visits to countries with highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) or plutonium in Category I amounts are priorities, 
visits also are scheduled whenever a country has had or expects to 
have a change in inventory of U.S.-obligated nuclear material, along 
with other factors, such as a finding of inadequate physical 
protection. Finally, the list of priorities may change from time to 
time, based on other factors such as a country's readiness for a 
visit, or the urgency of pending license requests for the provision of 
U.S. obligated nuclear material to a partner. 

3. The GAO report asserts on pages 18, 28 and 37 that the U.S. 
interagency has not "systematically visited countries believed to be 
holding Category I quantities of U.S. nuclear material." We disagree 
with this assessment. The U.S. interagency has a specific methodology 
for prioritizing visits that includes consideration of, among other 
things, the following variables: the type, and quantity of U.S.-
obligated nuclear material at a facility; whether a country is making 
recommended improvements; pending NRC licenses; information from 
previous physical protection assessments; and concerns raised through 
other available information. The current system for planning and 
prioritizing bilateral assessment visits is being updated, as 
necessary, to take into account the following changes: the increasing 
repatriation of a large amount of U.S.-obligated HEU; a shift to 
greater use of low enriched uranium (LEU); and the recent revision of 
INFCIRC/225. 

4. We also disagree with the GAO assessment that "DOE and US. agencies 
do not have a systematic process to revisit or monitor security 
improvements at facilities that do not meet IAEA security guidelines." 
While the U.S. interagency does hold follow-up visits, these 
subsequent visits are not the only manner of ensuring that necessary 
improvements are made. NNSA and the National Laboratories also have 
used informal visits and other arrangements to work with countries to 
make needed improvements that were revealed as a result of a visit. 
Unfortunately, the GAO report has not integrated site visits and 
improvements into its analysis, and thus implied that nothing was done 
in between visits to improve the security of facilities. 

5. On page 23, we disagree with GAO's characterization of the April 
2008 U.S. physical protection assessment of a country's facilities as 
"as a 'tour'." Of particular concern is their comment, later on this 
page, that "officials told us the U.S. government had shared some high-
level observations regarding its visit with the country's government 
officials and the site operators but did not provide the government or 
site operators with written observations or recommendations."Asa 
result of the high-level observations the U.S. Government verbally 
shared with the government officials regarding its physical protection 
visit, those officials were well aware of the in-depth U.S. 
assessment. In years past, the U.S. interagency did not always provide 
the host country a copy of the slides its presents, but now does so on 
a routine basis. 

Comments Related to GAO Report Recommendations: 

While NNSA appreciates the GAO's effort with the review, it has 
concerns with the recommendation to institute an "annual inventory 
reconciliation, reporting on a facility-by-facility basis for weapon-
usable material where possible ..." for all states that hold 
U.S.obligated nuclear material. We do not believe that this is 
necessary, particularly since the GAO's interviews with foreign 
governments mirror the U.S. interagency view that nuclear material can 
be accounted for at the overall State-level, as required pursuant to 
Section 123(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act. In addition, the IAEA's 
comprehensive safeguards program is another important tool that helps 
maintain the continuity of knowledge of the location of nuclear 
materials in a country, including U.S.-obligated nuclear material. We 
believe that IAEA inspection, surveillance, and reporting processes 
serve as an effective, internationally sanctioned and U.S.-supported 
tracking and accounting mechanism. 

With the existence of a system that has long proved its worth, we also 
are concerned that the GAO is suggesting a costly new system without 
addressing the inherent costs and benefits of either its 
recommendations or issues raised for Congressional consideration. In 
addition to the fact that maintaining a comprehensive inventory of 
U.S.-obligated nuclear material is neither practical nor always 
necessary to the mission of protecting U.S.-obligated nuclear material 
in all cases, such a new system would be highly costly. Should changes 
be made to the U.S. Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System 
(NMMSS) to accommodate the GAO's recommendations, there would be 
significant increase in costs, due to an increase in staff and 
equipment needed to accomplish this new objective. 

In addition to the obvious economic costs, there are potential 
security concerns related to the new system the GAO is proposing. 
There is a significant possibility that other states may respond to a 
request for tracking information by asking for the same information 
from the United States. Should the U.S. Government decide to act on 
the GAO recommendation to "amend the AEA ... [to include] enhanced 
measures regarding physical protection access rights in future 
agreements and renewed agreements, so that U.S. physical protection 
teams may obtain access when necessary to verify that US. nuclear 
materials have adequate physical protection," it is likely that the 
United States would be asked to demonstrate the physical protection of 
nuclear material in the United States. This, in turn, raises the 
question of whether this U.S. sensitive information would be 
adequately protected, an issue that never was raised in the GAO report. 

While NNSA appreciates the GAO's recognition that the United States 
and its partners share a strong common interest in deterring and 
preventing the misuse of U.S. nuclear material or any other nuclear 
material, we caution against requiring physical protection access in 
future bilateral agreements. Physical protection assessment visits 
provide an important opportunity to exchange information and best 
practices to enhance controls in the host country and, as relevant, in 
the U.S. The United States has the option of placing conditions on 
licenses to further control U.S.obligated nuclear material, if 
necessary. This is preferable, to the GAO recommendation to disallow 
"nuclear cooperation agreements ... [that do not] contain provisions 
allowing the United States to verify that adequate physical security 
is exercised over nuclear material subject to the terms of these 
agreements." since in the former, the United States would still have 
the opportunity to provide assistance and conduct follow-up visits to 
facilities to ensure that upgrades have been implemented to adhere to 
international physical protection standards. Should the United States 
press other states, there is a chance that the security of nuclear 
materials and facilities would decrease, if states chose not to pursue 
such agreements with the United States. Although the current system is 
not perfect, we recognize that it does allow for formal and informal 
follow-up visits that help improve the security of nuclear materials 
in another country. 

If you have any questions related to this response, please contact 
JoAnne Parker, Director, Office of Internal Controls at 202-586-1913. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Kenneth W. Powers: 
Associate Administrator for Management and Budget: 

cc:	Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear	Regulatory Commission: 

United States	Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

July 27, 2011: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am 
providing the NRC's views of the U. S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) draft report, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies 
Have Limited Ability to Account far, Monitor, and Evaluate the 
Security of U S. Nuclear Materials Overseas." 

The NRC appreciates the opportunity to comment on this report. As is 
reflected in the report, the NRC conducts licensing activities for 
exports of special nuclear material (SNM), equipment and components, 
and works closely with other U.S. Government agencies to implement 
other aspects of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). In 
the staff-level discussions on March 2, 2011, concerning the Statement 
of Facts which preceded the final report. and in response to this 
draft, NRC notes its belief that GAO's study contains serious errors 
in fact and in judgment that undermine the Congressional 
Considerations and the recommendations for U.S. Government agencies. 

The overarching thesis of the report is that, although U.S Government 
agencies, including NRC, are complying with applicable national laws, 
the United States is not informed about locations and inventories of 
U.S.-origin SNM located abroad, and that this material is potentially 
insecure. To demonstrate this thesis, the GAO made an "assessment" 
based on U.S. agencies not conducting activities which are, in fact, 
neither authorized nor required by U.S. law or by agreements 
negotiated under Section 123 of the AEA. The AEA establishes clear 
criteria for authorizing exports and imports of nuclear materials, 
equipment and components. The countries which have entered into an 
Agreement for Cooperation with the United States pursuant to AEA 
Section 123 have been evaluated using those criteria, and, among other 
things, have agreed to verify peaceful end use and to implement 
internationally-accepted standards for physically securing the U.S.-
origin exports. The GAO report clearly states that the AEA does not 
require Section 123 Agreements to stipulate that partners report 
information on the quantity or location of SNM subject to the 
Agreement. However, at the conclusion of this report the GAO indicates 
that the lack of this information, which is not authorized or required 
by U.S. law, or agreed to by the importing country, is a weakness of 
the Section 123 Agreements. 

The GAO acknowledges the existence of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards program, but does not view it 
as an additional important tool to safeguard the SNM. The NRC believes 
that IAEA safeguards maintain the continuity of knowledge of the 
location of nuclear material in countries, including U.S.-origin SNM.	
For	example, in the case of spent power reactor fuel, representing a 
significant fraction of the U.S.obligated SNM located outside the 
United States, the IAEA inspection, surveillance, and reporting 
process serves as an effective internationally-sanctioned and U.S.-
supported tracking and accounting mechanism. 

Further, the NRC believes the GAO report does not give sufficient 
weight to foreign sovereign responsibilities for ensuring physical 
protection of imports within their borders consistent with national 
law and international obligations. Countries must report to the United 
States any changes in chemical or physical form of the exported SNM 
unless prior approval is granted in a Section 123 Agreement. All 
locations of U.S.-origin Category I material must be reported to and
approved by the U.S. Government prior to the exports of the SNM. In 
GAO's interviews with foreign governments, the latter do not suggest 
that additional intrusive measures be taken bilaterally by the United 
States to account for the U.S.-origin material, nor do the foreign
governments indicate that they would be willing to have their current 
Section 123 Agreements altered for that purpose.	Instead, they do 
agree that overall State-level reconciliation could be undertaken 
between countries. 

The GAO report maintains that the legally binding agreement to 
physically protect U.S.-origin SNM, equipment and components which is 
framed in the Section 123 Agreement text and implemented through the 
bilateral physical protection program has not been adequately 
implemented. We disagree with this view. The Executive Branch develops 
a nonproliferation assessment of each country before entering into a 
Section 123 Agreement which, inter alia, assesses the country's 
ability to protect and account for any material which may be 
transferred pursuant to the Agreement. The NRC independently reviews 
that assessment and relays its findings to the President and Congress. 
Physical protection and safeguards practices are part of a wider 
network of relationships between the agencies of the United States and 
its corresponding partners in which the country's practices as a whole 
are taken into account. For each SNM export, government-to-government 
peaceful use assurances are received which reinforce these 
requirements. Prior to issuing an export license, NRC staff conducts a 
review of all available foreign physical protection and threat 
information.	Physical protection bilateral visits are used to exchange 
information and best practices to enhance controls in the host country 
and, as relevant, in the United States. 

The NRC has the option of placing conditions on licenses to further 
control SNM, if that is deemed prudent. Where appropriate, the United
States, with active NRC participation, has worked closely with 
partners to provide assistance and has revisited facilities to ensure 
that upgrades have been implemented. The NRC does not believe that the 
GAO's assessment is based on risk-informed approach nor dos it posit 
the cost-benefit basis for the Congressional Considerations or the
recommendations. It is NRC's view that obtaining and maintaining a 
comprehensive and current inventory of U.S.-origin SNM is neither 
practical nor critical to the mission of security of U.S.-origin 
materials in all cases. For example, the inventory knowledge is very 
important for high-consequence materials, e.g., high enriched uranium 
and separated plutonium, while the precise amount of plutonium in 
spent fuel is less risk significant. Knowing that reactor fuel has 
been irradiated and is in storage under IAEA safeguards is sufficient 
and consistent with the requirements established under the AEA and the 
1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Were the U.S. Government's 
database tasked with tracking U.S.-origin SNM after export, the Nuclear
Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS. which is jointly 
funded by NRC and DOE) would need changes to the database and 
software, and additional staff and funding resources. Although the GAO 
emphasizes the current inventory reconciliation with five partners as 
a best practice, the NRC notes that these reconciliations are not 
facility-specific but at a State level and do not indicate if the 
material is irradiated or non-irradiated.	In addition, the foreign 
government declared holding of nuclear material is not entered into 
NMMSS. Furthermore, the outcome of the necessary sustained diplomatic 
effort to engage foreign governments to discuss inclusion of facility-
specific physical protection visits would hinge on foreign government 
consideration of whether a change to the status quo is in their national
interest. Should the outcome be favorable, and that cannot be assumed, 
its implementation would be costly, requiring additional staff and 
funding at multiple agencies, including the NRC. The GAO makes no 
estimate of the cost, nor of the time, effort, or possible success of 
its recommendations. 

Finally, we believe alterations in the current Section 123 Agreement 
and/or AEA language would need to take into account reciprocity. The 
GAO's report is silent with regard to the information security aspect 
of sharing detailed facility-specific location of nuclear materials.	In
the United States facility-specific information on the quantity and 
form of high-enriched uranium and separated plutonium would be 
considered "Safeguards Information" or classified as "Confidential 
National Security Information." Most of the Section 123 Agreements are 
reciprocal in nature and the trend in negotiating new or renewals of 
such agreements is to emphasize reciprocal responsibilities. The 
implementation of some of the GAO recommendations may require the 
United States to share facility-specific sensitive information with 
dozens of countries, most of which are not currently authorized to 
have such access. If the United States seeks to further impose on 
sovereign responsibilities for its exports, it must be willing to 
accept foreign imposition of reciprocal rights on imports. It should 
be noted that the NRC anticipates licensing greater numbers of imports 
if nuclear energy new builds increases. The GAO recommendations would 
need a thorough assessment of whether the physical protection of the 
material is, in fact, enhanced by the recommended changes, and whether 
the United States' sensitive information can be protected 
appropriately. 

In short, we believe the study does not persuasively demonstrate that 
the AEA is insufficient as a framework for ensuring U.S.-origin SNM is 
protected; that there is a physical protection problem with exported 
SNM that is not addressed through existing agreements or ongoing 
bilateral exchanges; that any country with a Section 123 Agreement has 
or is likely to divert U.S.-origin SNM to weapons programs; that 
unilateral changes to existing agreements will be accepted by foreign 
partners; or that there is a clear cost-benefit basis for suggesting 
these changes based on a risk-informed approach. 

The NRC takes its export and import licensing responsibility very 
seriously, and welcomes the GAO's study of the existing system to 
protect U.S.-origin material. It should be noted that the NRC has 
actively participated in the U.S. governments efforts to urge the 
world to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, and in revising IAEA security guidance documents in order to 
establish more stringent internationally accepted norms that obligate 
all countries equally. The NRC continuously reviews the effectiveness 
and efficiency of its relevant processes. It has worked closely with 
appropriate federal agencies to improve and document the process used 
to determine the periodicity of bilateral physical protection visits,
focusing on new exports of SNM, and reflecting changes made in the 
IAEA security guidance documents. 

If needed, I would be glad to discuss the NRC's comments with you or 
have a member of the NRC staff discuss our comments with your staff. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

R.W. Borchardt: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:	 

United States Department of State: 
Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

August 1, 2011: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: Agencies Have Limited Ability to Account for, 
Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear Material Overseas," 
GAO Job Code 361315. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Jake Mentz, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of International Security 
and Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security at 
(202) 647-3342. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette 

cc:	GAO — Gene Aloise: 
ISN — Eliot Kang: 
State/OIG — Evelyn Klemstine: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: Agencies Have Limited Ability to Account 
for, Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear Material 
Overseas (GAO-11-920, GAO Code 361315): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on 
GAO's draft report, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Agencies Have Limited 
Ability to Account for, Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. 
Nuclear Material Overseas." 

The GAO report outlined four recommendations for the Secretary of 
State, working with the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The first recommendation is "to 
determine, for those partners with which the United States has 
transferred material but does not have annual inventory 
reconciliation, a baseline inventory of weapon-usable U.S. nuclear 
material, and establish a process for conducting annual 
reconciliations of inventories of nuclear material on a facility-by-
facility basis." Determining annual inventories and reconciliations of 
nuclear material is a Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 
Agency (DOE/NNSA) function, not a Department of State function. 

The second recommendation is "to establish for those partners with 
which the United States has an annual inventory reconciliation, 
reporting on a facility-by-facility basis for weapon-usable material 
where possible." Establishing annual inventory reconciliations is a 
DOE/NNSA function, not a State Department function. 

As we noted to the authors of this report, we do not believe that the 
recommendations noted in the preceding two paragraphs are necessary. 
Moreover, with IAEA Safeguards declarations, U.S. export license 
applications and U.S. physical protection visits, we believe that we 
have sufficient data to confirm adequately the quantities of U.S.-
obligated nuclear material in other countries. 

The third recommendation is "to facilitate visits to sites that U.S. 
physical protection teams have not visited that are believed to be 
holding U.S. Category I nuclear material." Facilitating physical 
protection visits requested by the Department of Energy is the 
Department of State's current practice. 

The fourth recommendation is "to seek to include measures that provide 
for physical protection access rights in new or renewed nuclear 
cooperation agreements so that U.S. interagency physical protection 
teams may in the future obtain access when necessary to verify that 
U.S. nuclear materials are adequately protected." The U.S. must take 
into account the fact that physical protection of nuclear material is 
considered a sovereignty issue by all States and by international 
treaty. Therefore, the Department of State believes that careful 
consideration should be given to the potential impact on our bilateral 
relationships, on U.S. national security and U.S. commercial 
competitiveness in the nuclear arena of including new explicit rights 
for physical protection access. U.S. physical protection teams have 
been granted access to every site that they have requested access to 
under the consultation provisions of our nuclear cooperation 
agreements currently in force, and we therefore believe that the 
provisions of the current agreements adequately facilitate the 
accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives. 

The Department of State believes that the implementing these GAO 
recommendations would adversely impact U.S. commercial competitiveness 
in overseas markets, diminish U.S. influence overseas to advance our 
national nonproliferation objectives and cost jobs at home. There are 
multiple suppliers for nuclear material and equipment and little 
reason why a country, when given a choice to purchase from the United 
States under the regime recommended by the GAO or from another country 
without the more onerous conditions, would not chose the latter. In 
that regard, we note the following quote in the GAO report: "However, 
it may be possible to do so [i.e., add access requirements to nuclear 
cooperation agreements] in a way that includes greater access to 
critical facilities where weapon-usable U.S. nuclear material is 
stored, without infringing on the sovereign rights of our partners or 
hampering the ability of the U.S. nuclear industry to remain 
competitive." Based upon our decades of experience working with our 
partner governments on these issues, the Department of State does not 
believe this would be possible. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact:	 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Staff	Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Glen Levis, Assistant 
Director; Antoinette Capaccio; Julia Coulter; Michelle Munn; and 
Alison O'Neill 	made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For the purposes of this report, we refer to all countries, 
EURATOM, IAEA, and Taiwan as partners. EURATOM is composed of the 27 
countries of the European Union. IAEA, an independent international 
organization based in Vienna, Austria, is affiliated with the United 
Nations and has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear materials intended for 
peaceful purposes are not diverted to military purposes. IAEA had 151 
member states as of November 2010. Governmental relations between the 
United States and Taiwan were terminated on January 1, 1979. All 
agreements concluded with the authorities on Taiwan prior to January 
1, 1979, are administered for the United States by the American 
Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation based in Washington, D.C. 
The United States has two nuclear cooperation agreements with 
Australia, including one for Separation of Uranium Isotopes by Laser
Excitation (SILEX) technology, bringing the number of agreements to 27. 

[2] Special nuclear material includes uranium enriched in the isotope 
of uranium-235, uranium-233, and plutonium. 

[3] U.S. companies can obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to export certain small quantities of nuclear 
material and minor reactor components to foreign countries without a 
nuclear cooperation agreement in place. Dual-use items––items that can 
be used for both civilian and military applications—can be exported 
without a nuclear cooperation agreement. 

[4] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With the U.S. 
International Nuclear Materials Tracking System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-96-91] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 28, 1996). 

[5] Weapon-usable nuclear materials are HEU—uranium enriched in the 
isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater; uranium-233; and any 
plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-
238. Such materials are also often referred to as fissile materials or 
strategic special nuclear materials. In addition, weapon-grade HEU is
generally defined as HEU enriched in the isotope of uranium-235 at 90 
percent or greater. 

[6] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and 
Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear 
Materials Worldwide, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-227] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 
2010). 

[7] NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate 
semiautonomous agency within DOE, with responsibility for the nation’s 
nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. 

[8] GAO, Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy Could Help Increase 
Commercial Benefits from U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with 
Other Countries, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-36] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2010). 

[9] Results of interviews of non-probability samples are not 
generalizeable to all partners but provide an understanding of those 
partners’ views of the U.S. government’s efforts to account for its 
nuclear material inventories and monitor and evaluate the physical 
security conditions of U.S. nuclear material overseas subject to 
nuclear cooperation agreement terms. 

[10] In January 2011, IAEA issued an updated revision of its security 
guideline document, IAEA, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” (IAEA 
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 (2011). 

[11] The President may exempt proposed agreements for peaceful nuclear 
cooperation from any of these requirements if he determines that the 
requirement would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense 
and security. 

[12] Section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful 
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 authorized the President to 
exempt India from the full-scope safeguards requirement if the 
President made a determination that India had taken certain specified 
actions and that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had decided by 
consensus to permit the supply to India of nuclear items covered by 
the NSG Guidelines. On September 10, 2008, the President made the 
requisite determination, the agreement was approved by legislation 
enacted on October 8, 2008, and that agreement with India entered into 
force on December 6, 2008. 

[13] A production facility is any equipment or device, or any 
important component of such equipment or device, capable of the 
production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of 
significance to the common defense and security or in such a manner as 
to affect the health and safety of the public. A utilization facility 
is any equipment or device, or any important component of such 
equipment or device, other than an atomic weapon, capable of using 
such material. 

[14] The U.S.-China agreement states that parties shall exchange views 
on their national material accounting systems. 

[15] Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 903(b), 106 
Stat. 2776, 2945-46. 

[16] NRC, The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Report to 
Congress on the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Previously 
Exported from the United States, Washington, D.C. (January 1993). 

[17] NMMSS has been used to account for U.S. imports and exports of 
nuclear material since 1967 and has been upgraded several times, most 
recently in 2009, though some of its information dates to 1950. 

[18] The United States has two agreements with Australia. One 
agreement concerns broadbased nuclear cooperation; the second is 
limited to collaboration in SILEX technology. 

[19] According to DOE, a sealed source may contain nuclear or 
radiological material, and is packaged to be environmentally safe and 
are generally used for calibration of radiation measuring and 
monitoring instruments in nuclear research and development. 

[20] See GAO, Obstacles To U.S. Ability to Control And Track Weapons-
Grade Uranium Supplied Abroad, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/ID-82-91] (Washington, D.C. Aug. 2, 
1982). 

[21] DOE Draft Order O 470.6 Nuclear Material Control and 
Accountability, issued Oct. 6, 2010. 

[22] An arrangements and procedures document negotiated pursuant to 
the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement contains a provision 
providing for consultation visits at two reprocessing facilities 
established to reprocess material including U.S.-obligated material. 
In addition, the 1988 U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement 
provides for what is known as “advance consent rights” by the United 
States to Japan to reprocess its U.S.-obligated spent nuclear fuel. 
Specifically, a provision in the nuclear cooperation agreement allows 
for either party to “have access to all places and data, and any
equipment or facility…necessary to account for the nuclear material... 
and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary 
by the safeguarded party to account for such nuclear material” if 
either party becomes aware that the IAEA is not applying safeguards as 
required by the agreement. 

[23] We reported in August 1982 and December 1994 that the United 
States evaluates foreign countries physical protection systems under 
what was then known as the U.S. Bilateral Physical Protection Program. 
For a list of countries visited, number of facilities visited, and 
date of visits from 1974 through 1981, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/ID-82-81]. In 1994, we reported that 
the United States had conducted bilateral physical security 
consultations with approximately 46 nations, including site visits to 
review the physical protection at fixed sites and during transport. 
For a list of the countries visited by U.S. physical protection teams 
from 1974 through 1994, including country, number of visits, and date 
of last visit, see appendix II of that report, GAO, Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking 
Capabilities Are Limited, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5] (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 27, 1994). 

[24] NRC’s regulations pertaining to the review of license 
applications for exports of nuclear equipment, material including 
exports of material subject to nuclear cooperation agreements, permit 
the determination of adequacy of foreign protection systems on a 
countrywide basis. See 10 C.F.R. §110.44 (2011). 

[25] LEU is uranium that contains less than 20 percent of the isotope 
uranium-235. 

[26] Our analysis shows three countries were visited between October 
2009 and April 2010, one more in early 2011, and DOE and State 
officials reported they expect to visit one other in late 2011. 

[27] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[28] DOE Order O 413.1B. 

[29] Because DOE and NRC did not have a comprehensive inventory of 
U.S. material located overseas or any comprehensive analyses of the 
U.S. interagency physical protection visits’ results-—as described 
elsewhere in this report-—we obtained and analyzed NMMSS records of 
U.S. nuclear material exports and retransfers, GTRI records of fuel 
returns and, where available, information from U.S. physical 
protection visits records indicating the volumes and disposition of 
U.S. nuclear material overseas at the time of the U.S. interagency 
visit. We developed an estimate of which partner countries held 
Category I quantities of U.S. nuclear material during the review 
period, and for how long. We used the IAEA security document 
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 to categorize material. We shared the results of 
this analysis with DOE and NRC officials and made adjustments based on 
agency officials’ comments on where they believe nuclear material 
subject to U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement terms resides. 

[30] GTRI reported to us that these sites are not a physical security 
priority as, compared with other facilities around the world, their 
physical protection is adequate. 

[31] In three cases, GTRI, or its predecessor organization, returned 
the material determined to be vulnerable within 5 years from the date 
of assessment by the U.S. interagency physical protection team. In two 
cases, a U.S. physical protection team made a revisit in less than 5 
years. In the most recent two cases, 5 years have not elapsed to make a
determination on whether the team visited within 5 years or not. We 
chose 5 years to evaluate because U.S. agencies have a goal of 
visiting countries with Category I nuclear material at least once 
every 5 years. 

[32] GTRI has removed all U.S.-obligated HEU from Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. 

[33] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Security Administration 
Has Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global Research Reactor 
Program, but Action is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-949] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 17, 2009). 

[34] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-227]. 

[35] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-949]. 

[36] In January 2011, IAEA issued an updated revision of its security 
guideline document, IAEA, "Nuclear Security Recommendations on 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (IAEA 
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 (2011). 

[37] The United States has a set of trilateral project and supply 
agreements with Mexico and IAEA. We included these agreements because 
they were entered into pursuant to the United State's nuclear 
cooperation agreement with IAEA. The United States has two nuclear 
cooperation agreements with Australia, including one for Separation of 
Uranium Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX) technology, bringing the 
number of agreements to 27. 

[38] The United States also previously had trilateral project and 
supply agreements with Malaysia, Yugoslavia, and IAEA. 

[End of section] 

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