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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Congressional Requesters:
September 2011:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Temporary Emergency Impact Aid Provided Education Support for
Displaced Students:
GAO-11-839:
Contents:
Letter:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Briefing to Congressional Requesters, August 4, 2011:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 7, 2011:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Mary Landrieu:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Lamar Alexander:
United States Senate:
In August and September 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated
large portions of the U.S. Gulf Coast, resulting in nearly 2,000
deaths and severe damage to 305,000 houses and apartments. Thousands
of families relocated to communities throughout the United States and
enrolled their children in local public or private schools. Some
families who remained in the devastated areas enrolled their children
in schools other than their home schools because their home schools
had been seriously damaged or destroyed. Congress appropriated $880
million for the Temporary Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students
(Emergency Impact Aid) program to assist local educational agencies
(school districts) and private schools with the costs of educating
these displaced students.[Footnote 1] Funds were for costs incurred
during the 2005-2006 school year, and could be used for a variety of
purposes, including compensating teachers, purchasing curriculum
materials, leasing portable classrooms, providing counseling services,
and covering reasonable transportation costs.
The U.S. Department of Education (Education) awarded Emergency Impact
Aid funds to 49 states and the District of Columbia based on the count
of displaced students enrolled on quarterly dates selected by each
state, as reported by public and participating private schools.
[Footnote 2] Each quarter, on the basis of these counts, states
received $1,500 per displaced student without disabilities and $1,875
per displaced student with disabilities. States could keep up to 1
percent of funds for administrative expenses, and were required to
disburse the remaining funds to local school districts. Districts were
allowed to spend up to 2 percent of funds for administration and,
similar to states, were required to disburse the remaining funds to
public and participating private schools within their jurisdictions.
Education did not require states or districts to report how funds were
used, but directed districts to maintain records of expenditures.
[Footnote 3] While the program we reviewed has expired, legislation
was introduced in Congress in 2011 that includes provisions that would
require Education to provide emergency impact aid in certain
circumstances involving presidentially declared disasters, and would
give Education discretion to provide such aid in other circumstances
if a state is experiencing a catastrophic incident[Footnote 4].:
On the basis of your request, we answered the following questions: (1)
What is known about how many students were served by the Emergency
Impact Aid program in key states? (2) What challenges, if any, did
districts and private schools face in accessing the program or
obtaining the required student verification? (3) How did states,
districts, and private schools report using the funds and what is
known about whether the funds covered the costs of serving displaced
students?, and (4) How did Education support states in implementing
the program?
To evaluate implementation of the Emergency Impact Aid program, we
selected 4 states for our review--Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas--which received 80 percent of total Emergency Impact Aid
funding. Within these states, we selected a total of 13 school
districts for further review, 12 of which received among the highest
amounts of funding in their respective states, as well as 1 district
that returned a large amount of funding originally awarded to it.
Within areas served by these districts, we selected for further review
a total of seven private schools and private school umbrella
organizations. Five private schools were randomly selected, and two
Louisiana organizations representing multiple Catholic schools were
selected because of the large number of Catholic schools in the area.
[Footnote 5] In each selected state, district, and private school, we
interviewed cognizant officials about their experience with the
program.[Footnote 6] We also analyzed student count data provided by
states and expenditure data provided by districts. The findings from
our selected states, districts, and private schools are not
generalizable nationwide, but provide illustrative examples and
valuable perspectives on the Emergency Impact Aid program's operation
and challenges. To assess Education's role in implementing the
Emergency Impact Aid program, we interviewed officials and reviewed
key documentation, including state applications and records of grant
awards. We also analyzed relevant federal laws, regulations, and
guidance related to the program and reviewed Education Office of
Inspector General (OIG) audits and fiscal year 2006 single audits for
all selected states and 12 out of 13 selected districts.[Footnote 7]
We also took a number of steps to assess the reliability of various
data sources we used. First, to assess the reliability of program data
on the number of students served quarterly, we interviewed Education
and state officials about the steps they took to ensure data
reliability and reviewed relevant documentation, including state-
reported data, for our 4 selected states. We determined these data to
be sufficiently reliable for our purpose of describing when and where
displaced students were served. However, we did not verify the
accuracy of student count data reported by districts to states, and
some students may be included in more than one state count per quarter
because of differences in state-selected count dates and student
mobility.[Footnote 8] We also assessed whether Education data on
authorized grant award and deobligation amounts were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of reporting what percentage of awards
grantees returned to Education by comparing Education and state data
and interviewing Education officials about processes for processing
returned grant funds. Education officials described limitations in its
grants management system that resulted in some returned grant funds
not being originally credited back to states' Emergency Impact Aid
awards.[Footnote 9] We provided information to Education officials on
inconsistencies between Education's data and data from our four
selected states, and Education resolved these differences.[Footnote
10] Education provided us with updated deobligation data for our 4
selected states, and we ultimately determined that data for these
states were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Finally, we
assessed the reliability of expenditure data reported to us by our
selected districts by reviewing submissions for reasonableness and
following up with district officials to resolve inconsistencies. We
determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
describing how selected districts used funds.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 to September
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
On August 4, 2011, we briefed congressional staff on the results of
this study, and this report formally conveys the information provided
during this briefing. (See app. I for the briefing slides.)
Specifically, we found that states reported to Education the number of
displaced students served quarterly, as required, but the total number
of students served is unknown. Displaced student enrollment was at its
highest at about 152,000 in the first quarter, and reached a low of
132,000 in the fourth quarter. The large majority of these students
remained in Gulf Coast states hit by the hurricanes. However, because
students served in more than one quarter were counted more than once,
quarterly counts cannot be used to determine the total number of
students served throughout the 2005-2006 school year.
Additionally, officials from selected districts and private schools
reported few challenges accessing the program, but they found
verifying student eligibility difficult. In particular, some displaced
students and their families lacked documentation that showed they were
from hurricane-affected areas, such as a driver's license or utility
bill. Officials also stated that other student information was
difficult to obtain, such as immunization records and documentation of
special education needs.
We also found that district and private school officials reported
using Emergency Impact Aid primarily to defray instructional costs and
tuition, but most did not believe funds covered all costs of serving
displaced students. Expenditures cited by district officials generally
related to hiring new staff or supporting existing staff, while other
expenditures included paying for modular classrooms and buses.
Officials from 9 out of 13 selected districts did not believe that
Emergency Impact Aid funds covered all of their costs, and some noted
that they were unable to claim funding for some displaced students,
such as those who had left the district prior to the district's first
quarterly enrollment count. However, we were unable to assess whether
funds covered costs because districts were not required to track costs
associated with serving displaced students. Further, districts
returned funds to Education for a variety of reasons, including
revisions in quarterly student counts indicating that districts served
fewer students than originally reported. Some districts also did not
spend all the funds allocated to them because of confusion about
program requirements or concern about potential audit findings.
Last, we found that Education implemented the program quickly and
provided timely technical assistance to states. While some districts
and private schools may not have used all funds available to them, the
Emergency Impact Aid program was designed to support a broad range of
services to meet the needs of displaced students, and Education worked
quickly to help states serve a highly mobile student population in a
challenging environment. Officials from selected states and districts
were generally pleased with the quality of support provided by
Education.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft copy of this report to Education for its review
and comment. Education provided us with technical comments and updated
data which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to relevant congressional
committees, the Secretary of Education, and other interested parties.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7215 or scottg@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
George A. Scott:
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Briefing to Congressional Requesters, August 4, 2011:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Temporary Emergency Impact Aid Provided
Education Support for Displaced Students:
Briefing to Congressional Requesters:
August 4, 2011:
This Briefing Is A Work Of GAO Based On Preliminary Information And Is
Subject To Revision: It Should Not Be Reproduced Or Distributed.
Overview:
* Introduction;
* Key Questions;
* Scope and Methodology;
* Background;
* Summary of Findings;
* Findings.
[End of section]
Introduction:
Temporary Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students (Emergency
Impact Aid) Program:
In December 2005, Congress authorized Emergency Impact Aid to support
students in kindergarten through grade 12 (K-12) displaced from their
schools by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Congress appropriated $880
million for that purpose.[Footnote 11]
States distributed funds to local educational agencies (school
districts) based on the number of displaced students served in public
and participating private schools in areas served by the district.
(see figure 1)
A bill was introduced in Congress in 2011 that would:
* require the Department of Education (Education) to provide emergency
impact aid in certain circumstances involving presidentially declared
disasters, and,
* give Education discretion to provide such aid in other circumstances
if a state is experiencing a catastrophic incident.[Footnote 12]
Figure 1: Emergency Impact Aid Program:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Congress:
$880 million appropriated for services to K-12 students displaced from
their schools by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Department of Education:
Grants awarded to participating states for the 2005-2006 school year.
Grant rates:
$1,500 per quarter per student without disabilities;
$1,875 per quarter per student with disabilities.
Forty-nine states (all except Hawaii) and the District of Columbia
participated in the program.
State educational agency (state):
States distributed funds to local school districts based on the number
of displaced students enrolled in public schools and participating
private schools in areas served by the district.
School district:
School districts distributed a portion of the funding to participating
private schools in areas served by the district based on the number of
displaced students they served.
Source: GAO analysis of program information.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Key Questions:
1. What is known about how many students were served by the Emergency
Impact Aid program in key states?
2. What challenges, if any, did districts and private schools face in
accessing the program or obtaining the required student verification?
3. How did states, districts, and private schools report using the
funds and what is known about whether the funds covered the costs of
serving displaced students?
4. How did Education support states in implementing the program?
[End of section]
Scope and Methodology:
We reviewed activities in the 4 states (Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas) that received 80 percent of program funds.
* We conducted site Visits to Louisiana and Texas and interviewed
officials from Georgia and Mississippi by telephone.
We selected a total of 13 districts within these states for further
review:
* Twelve districts were selected because they received among the
highest amounts of program funds in their states.
* One district was selected because it returned a relatively high
percentage of allocated funds.
Within areas served by selected districts, we selected a total of
seven participating private schools and private school umbrella
organizations for further review:
* Five private schools were randomly selected.
* Two Louisiana organizations representing multiple Catholic schools
were selected due to the large number of Catholic schools in the area.
In each selected state, district, and private school, we interviewed
cognizant officials.
We also analyzed enrollment data in all 50 states and expenditure data
in the selected states for the 2005-2006 school year.
For each state and 12 of the 13 districts we reviewed fiscal year 2006
single audits.[Footnote 13]
Table:
State: Texas;
School districts contacted: 5;
Private schools contacted: 1.
State: Louisiana;
School districts contacted: 4;
Private schools contacted: 3[A].
State: Georgia;
School districts contacted: 2;
Private schools contacted: 2.
State: Mississippi;
School districts contacted: 2;
Private schools contacted: 1.
State: Total;
School districts contacted: 13;
Private schools contacted: 7.
[A] We counted two Louisiana organizations representing multiple
Catholic schools as private schools.
[End of table]
We conducted other interviews with Education officials.
We reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance.
We reviewed Education data and documentation, including the following:
* quarterly counts of displaced students served by the program,
* state applications for program funding and records of grant awards,
and,
* Education's Office of Inspector General (01G) reviews of early
program implementation in 5 states—-Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
We assessed the reliability of quarterly student counts by
interviewing state and federal officials and reviewing relevant
documentation, including state-reported data, for our 4 selected
states.
We determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for describing
when and where students were served.
* However, we did not verify the accuracy of student count data.
[Footnote 14]
* Some students may be included in more than one state's quarterly
count due to differences in state-selected count dates and student
mobility.
We also assessed whether Education data on authorized grant award and
deobligation amounts were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
reporting what percentage of awards grantees returned to Education by:
* comparing Education and state data, and,
* interviewing Education officials about processes for recording
returned grant funds.
Education officials described limitations in its grants management
system that resulted in some returned grant funds not being credited
back to states' Emergency Impact Aid awards.[Footnote 15]
* We provided information to Education officials on inconsistencies
between Education's data and data from our 4 selected states, and
Education resolved these differences.[Footnote 16]
Education provided us with updated deobligation data for our 4
selected states and we ultimately determined that data for these
states were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We also assessed the reliability of expenditure data reported to us by
our selected districts by reviewing submissions for reasonableness and
following up with district officials to resolve inconsistencies.
We determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of describing how selected districts used funds.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 to September
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Background:
Emergency Impact Aid Implementation Timeline:
Aug. 25, 2005:
Hurricane Katrina makes landfall. (See figure 2)
Sept. 24, 2005:
Hurricane Rita makes landfall.
Dec. 30, 2005:
Emergency Impact Aid authorized by Congress.
January 2006:
Education makes funding applications available to states.
February 2006:
State funding applications due.
March 2006:
States begin to receive funds.
Figure 2: Paths of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of the Southeastern U.S.]
Map depicts the approximate paths of hurricanes.
Source: GAO analysis based on National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration graphics.
[End of figure]
Effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Federal disaster areas were declared:
* throughout Louisiana and Texas and,
* in parts of Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi.
Catastrophic impact in lives lost and property damage:
* nearly 2,000 deaths;
* more than 305,000 homes and apartments were severely damaged by
Hurricane Katrina.
Significant effects on schools:
* many Louisiana and Mississippi schools damaged;
* almost all schools in the Orleans Parish school district closed for
the entire 2005-2006 school year.
Significant effects on students:
* thousands of children and youth left homeless;
* increased incidence of depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic
stress disorder symptoms has been reported in studies of the effects
of the hurricanes and other natural disasters on students' mental
health and behavior.
Emergency Impact Aid Supported Public and Private Schools That Served
Students Displaced by Hurricanes:
Participating districts and private schools received funds based on
the number of displaced students they served on a specific date each
quarter.
* States had discretion to choose quarterly count dates used.
* Education specified the dates these counts were required to be
reported.
Displaced students were those:
* from a federally declared disaster area and,
* enrolled in a school other than their home schoo1.[Footnote 17]
Once displaced students returned to their home school, districts were
no longer eligible to obtain funding for those students.
Funding was for expenses incurred during the 2005-2006 school year,
and districts had to obligate funds by September 30, 2006.
Emergency Impact Aid Funds Were Available for a Variety of Purposes:
Funds could be used for:
* personnel compensation,
* curricular material and supplies,
* mobile educational units,
* leasing space,
* reasonable transportation costs,
* health and counseling services,
* education and support services, and,
* basic instructional services, including tutoring.
Program did not require that funds be used solely to serve displaced
students.
* For example funds used to support classroom instruction for
displaced students could benefit regular students as well.
States could retain 1 percent and districts 2 percent of funds for
administrative costs.
States, districts, and private schools were not required to report to
Education how funds were spent; however, at a minimum, they were
required to maintain documentation of:
* funds received and allowable expenditures and,
* auditable enrollment records of displaced students served.
[End of section]
Summary of Findings:
States reported to Education the number of displaced students served
quarterly, as required, but the total number of students served is
unknown.
Selected districts and private schools had few challenges accessing
the program, but officials found verifying student eligibility
difficult.
District and private school officials reported using Emergency Impact
Aid primarily to defray instructional costs and tuition, but most did
not believe funds covered all costs.
Education implemented the program quickly and provided timely
technical assistance to states.
Objective 1: Quarterly Counts Captured the Number of Displaced
Students Served at Points in Time:
Districts were required to report the number of displaced students
enrolled in public and participating private schools on a specific
date each quarter during the 2005-2006 school year.
According to national data from Education:
* enrollment was highest in the first quarter with 152,000 students
served,[Footnote 18] and,
* enrollment dropped to its lowest point in the fourth quarter with
132,000 students served.
Enrollment may have declined throughout the school year as displaced
students re-enrolled in their home schools.
* According to officials in selected districts and private schools,
many displaced students began returning home in winter 2005.[Footnote
19]
Objective 1: Quarterly Counts Do Not Indicate the Total Number of
Students Served throughout the School Year:
Quarterly counts cannot be used to calculate an estimate of the total
number of displaced students served because students were counted for
each quarter they were served, resulting in a duplicated count.
* For example, if a student was served during all four quarters, he or
she would have been counted four times.
States could not track students who relocated across state lines due
to limitations in state student information systems.
* Some displaced students were counted in more than 1 state.
Quarterly counts enabled districts to claim compensation for displaced
students served for part of the school year, as many students moved
often and were served in multiple districts or states.
Objective 1: Most Students Were Served in States Hardest Hit by
Hurricanes:
Most displaced students remained in states near the Gulf Coast (see
figure 3).
Seventy-eight percent of students were served in quarter 1 in states
with federally declared disaster areas (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas).
An additional 7 percent were served in Georgia.
Figure 3: Displaced Students Served in First Quarter of 2005-2006
School Year, by State:
Number of displaced students: less than 100:
Alaska:
Connecticut:
Delaware:
District of Columbia:
Hawaii:
Idaho:
Maine:
Montana:
New Hampshire:
North Dakota:
Oregon:
Rhode Island:
South Dakota:
Vermont:
West Virginia:
Wyoming:
Number of displaced students: 100-400:
Iowa:
Kansas:
Massachusetts:
Minnesota:
Nebraska:
Nevada:
New Jersey:
New Mexico:
New York:
Pennsylvania:
Utah:
Washington:
Wisconsin:
Number of displaced students: 400-1,000:
Arizona:
California:
Colorado:
Illinois:
Indiana:
Kentucky:
Maryland:
Michigan:
Ohio:
South Carolina:
Number of displaced students: 1,000-10,000:
Arkansas:
Florida: 6,288;
Missouri:
North Carolina:
Oklahoma:
Tennessee:
Virginia:
Number of displaced students: 10,000 or more:
Alabama: 7,306;
Georgia: 10,244;
Louisiana: 44,913;
Mississippi: 14,720;
Texas: 45,080;
Sources: GAO analysis of Education data; GAO (map).
[End of figure]
Objective 1: All Selected States and Most Districts Conducted
Outreach to Enroll Displaced Students:
Although not required to do so, officials from all selected states and
most districts said they conducted outreach to displaced students and
their families through one or more of the following:
* Newspapers,
* Billboards,
* TV and radio announcements,
* Hurricane-related websites, or,
* Toll-free call centers.
Officials from 3 of 5 selected Texas districts, which collectively
served nearly 9,000 displaced students in the first quarter, said they
enrolled students on-site at shelters and evacuation centers.
Officials we interviewed from 2 of the 13 selected districts said the
environment was too chaotic to conduct outreach.
* For example, in one Louisiana district that received 10,000
applications from displaced students, officials said minimal outreach
was necessary because students arrived at school doors.
Objective 1: Private Schools Also Served Displaced Students, But
Enrollment Declined over Time:
Private schools served 12 percent of all displaced students in the
first quarter of the 2005-2006 school year, according to Education
data.
* Private school officials said that displaced students originally
enrolled in private schools were generally served by private schools
in other districts and states.
Displaced student enrollment declined by 50 percent among private
schools over the course of the year, compared with a 8 percent decline
in public schools.
Displaced student enrollment in private schools may have declined more
quickly than in public schools because private schools reopened sooner
than other schools in some affected areas, allowing students to re-
enroll in their home schools.
* For example, officials from the Archdiocese of New Orleans told us
the majority of its 86 schools reopened by January 2006, whereas only
5 public schools in New Orleans reopened during the entire school year.
[End of Objective 1]
Objective 2: Selected Districts Did Not Face Significant Challenges
Accessing Emergency Impact Aid Funds:
Most officials from selected districts generally did not report
difficulties participating in the program or accessing funds.
However, officials from 2 states said some districts that served
displaced students chose not to apply for funding in part because of:
* compressed application timelines,
* potential administrative burden, or,
* serving few displaced students.
While districts had 2 weeks to submit Emergency Impact Aid
applications, which included student counts, to their states:
* Education encouraged districts to track displaced students served
prior to program authorization, and;
* promptly provided districts with guidance and funding applications
after authorization of the program.
Objective 2: Selected Private Schools Generally Had Access to the
Program, but Some Schools Chose Not to Participate:
Officials from a majority of selected districts and private schools
reported that private schools were notified about funding.
In many cases, district officials told us most private schools within
their boundaries elected to participate in the program.
However, Education and district officials stated that some private
schools chose not to participate in part due to:
* concerns about reporting requirements and potential for audit,
* general reticence to accept federal funds,
* increased administrative burden.
Objective 2: Verifying Student Eligibility Was Challenging for Districts
because Student Records Were Not Easily Obtained:
District and private school officials told us many displaced students
lacked documents verifying their previous address, such as a driver's
license or utility bill.
* In such cases, some officials said they accepted other types of
verification, such as report cards, or accepted parental affirmation
of eligibility.
Officials from one district also noted frustration over statutory
verification requirements, as many displaced students were originally
enrolled as homeless.
* Under the McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Children and Youth
Program, districts must enroll homeless students immediately, even if
they lack normally required documentation.[Footnote 20]
To help districts address this challenge, Louisiana provided access to
its student information database in mid-September 2005 to states that
enrolled a large number of displaced students.
Objective 2:
Obtaining Student Information from Hurricane-Affected Districts Was
Also Challenging:
Due to damage in displaced students' home districts, officials in
selected districts said they had difficulty obtaining information such
as:
* immunization records,
* grade-level placement, and,
* special education needs.
Officials reported spending significant time and resources obtaining new
immunizations and academic assessments for students without records.
Officials from 2 Texas districts expressed concern about some
displaced students' academic preparedness and ability to meet Texas
academic standards.
* The Texas Education Agency coordinated with the Louisiana Department
of Education to provide graduating students with either a Louisiana or
Texas diploma, depending on which state's graduation requirements were
met.
Objective 2: Districts Served Displaced Students with Disabilities, but
Faced Challenges Accessing Their Records:
Enrollment of displaced students with disabilities peaked in the third
quarter of the 2005-2006 school year, when 13,102 students with
disabilities, or 10 percent of all displaced students, were served.
Officials from 3 selected districts said they faced challenges serving
students with disabilities because their individualized education
program records were not immediately available.[Footnote 21]
One selected district was cited in its fiscal year 2006 single audit
for not providing special education services for some of the sampled
displaced students with disabilities for which it had received funding.
[End of Objective 2]
Objective 3: Selected Districts Reported Using 88 Percent of
Emergency Impact Aid Funds for Instruction:
Our analysis of expenditure data reported to us by 9 of our 13
selected districts indicates that 88 percent of funds was spent on
instruction and about 12 percent was spent on other costs associated
with serving displaced students.[Footnote 22]
Figure 4: Reported Uses of Emergency Impact Aid Funding in 10 Selected
Districts:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Instruction/instruction support services: 87.7%;
Operations and plant maintenance: 5.5%;
Central services: 3.1%;
Student support services: 2.4%;
Student transportation and related services: 1.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of summary expenditure data provided by selected
districts.
[End of figure]
Objective 3: Districts Provided a Variety of Examples of How They Used
Funds:
Officials from selected districts described a range of Emergency
Impact Aid uses, generally related to funding staff salaries and
benefits.
* Four districts specifically reported using funds to hire new staff.
* Three districts reported that they funded existing staff, but did
not hire new staff.
In addition to funding staff salaries, some districts used funds for
other purposes.
* An official from a Louisiana district reported using some funds to
reopen and operate two schools, and to operate 39 modular buildings.
* Officials from a Texas district reported using some funds to replace
desks and textbooks that had been washed-away by Hurricane Rita.
Private schools primarily reported using funds to defray tuition costs.
Objective 3: Some Selected Districts Hired Counselors, while Others
Did Not:
Officials from selected districts and private schools indicated that
many displaced students had counseling needs.
* These observations are consistent with research showing that
students affected by Hurricane Katrina faced issues including
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms.[Footnote 23]
Districts took a variety of approaches to meet these needs.
* Some districts reported hiring additional counselors, while others
did not.
* Two districts and two private schools reported referring students to
outside counseling programs.
Officials from 3 districts and two private schools affected by the
hurricanes noted that there were not sufficient counseling resources
available in the community after the storms to support these students.
Officials from 2 districts stated that they did not have sufficient
Emergency Impact Aid funding to cover counseling costs.
Objective 3: Most District Officials Told Us They Did Not Believe
Program Funding Covered All Costs, and Some Received Funding from
Other Sources:
Officials from 9 out of 13 selected districts told us they did not
believe program funds covered all costs of serving displaced students.
[Footnote 24]
* For instance, an official from 1 district noted that the district
exhausted all of its Emergency Impact Aid funding and expended $1.1
million in funding from an outside source on displaced students.
Districts also may not have received reimbursement for all displaced
students they served, such as those who left prior to the first
quarterly enrollment count.
* An official from one district official reported that it enrolled
6,500 displaced students immediately after Katrina but only claimed
funding for 5,241 students still enrolled on the first official count
date.
However, some officials also noted that funding was available from
other federal grants, state funds, and private donations.
Objective 3: Nearly Five Percent of Emergency Impact Aid Funds Were
Returned to Education:
Education data indicate that, as of August 2011, participating states
and districts returned to Education about $41.1 million (4.7 percent)
of awarded Emergency Impact Aid funds.
According to these data, selected states returned from 2.9 to 8.2
percent of funds allocated to them.[Footnote 25]
Table:
State: Georgia;
Amount Returned: $1.6 million;
Percent Returned: 2.9%.
State: Louisiana;
Amount Returned: $19.6 million;
Percent Returned: 6.7%.
State: Mississippi;
Amount Returned: $8.2 million;
Percent Returned: 8.2%.
State: Texas;
Amount Returned: $8.5 million;
Percent Returned: 3.4%.
Source: GAO analysis of Education deobligation data.
[End of table]
Objective 3:
Some Districts Returned Funds Due to Inaccurate Counts of Displaced
Students:
Some districts returned a portion of allocated funds because of
inaccuracies in their original quarterly counts of displaced students.
Education's OIG conducted program audits in 5 states for the 2005-2006
school year, and recommended that Education require states and
districts to provide supporting documentation or repay nearly $33
million in questionable costs related to potential inaccuracies in
student counts.
* Education officials told us that they plan to make final
determinations about whether states will have to return these funds by
September 30, 2011.
Four selected districts were also cited in their fiscal year 2006
single audits for student count inaccuracies:
* Three districts inadequately documented some students' eligibility.
* Two districts included ineligible students in their enrollment
counts.
* One district included ineligible prekindergarten students in its
counts.[Footnote 26]
Objective 3: Other Districts Returned Unused Funds for Various Reasons:
State officials in Texas and Mississippi told us that some districts
chose not to use a portion of allocated funds in case they were
required to return funds later.
* Officials suggested that such concerns may have been heightened
because of ongoing OIG audits in their states.
Officials from 2 selected districts also stated that they spent funds
cautiously because they were uncertain about what expenditures were
allowable or what documentation was required.
* One district in Texas did not spend the majority of its funding
allocation because of these concerns.
All unused funds were required to be returned to Education after the
September 30, 2006, obligation deadline.
[End of Objective 3]
Objective 4: Education Provided Early Support to States Prior to
Program Authorization:
Soon after Hurricane Katrina, Education officials contacted states and
districts in hurricane-affected areas and sent officials to affected
areas to discuss needs.
Prior to the Emergency Impact Aid program's authorization in December
2005, Education also:
* advised districts that they could enroll and obtain funding for
displaced students through the McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless
Children and Youth Program[Footnote 27] and,
* used existing authorities to grant waivers of federal requirement to
maintain 90 percent of prior year's state and local education spending
to qualify for other Education funding.
Objective 4: Education Moved Quickly to Implement Program Once
Authorized:
Education provided technical assistance to Congress by reviewing draft
legislation.
Education officials reported that they began drafting Emergency Impact
Aid applications and guidance while Congress was formulating
authorizing legislation.
Education sent a letter to states notifying them of the availability
of funds on the same day the program was authorized, and within 15
days of authorization, Education made funding applications available
to states.
Education also quickly reviewed applications, and began disbursing
funds to states about a month after first applications were received.
Objective 4: State Officials Were Generally Pleased with Education's
Guidance and Assistance:
According to officials from selected states, Education was proactive
in providing assistance and was accessible and responsive to requests
for information and help.
Officials from selected states generally reported that Education:
* coordinated closely with states prior to the Emergency Impact Aid
program's authorization and;
* provided ongoing technical assistance during program implementation.
Page 36
[End of section]
Concluding Observations:
Education acted quickly to help states serve highly mobile students in
a challenging environment.
* Education sought to balance the need for expeditious implementation
with ensuring accountability and program integrity.
Emergency Impact Aid supported a broad range of services to meet
student needs; however, some schools and districts:
* did not use some funds because of concerns about potential audit
findings or uncertainty about how funds could be spent and;
* did not use funds for needed counseling services for a variety of
reasons.
[End of section]
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[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
George A. Scott, (202) 512-7215 or scottg@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
The following staff members made key contributions to this report:
Elizabeth Morrison, Assistant Director; Sandra Baxter, Analyst-in-
Charge; Rachel Batkins; Ellen Phelps Ranen; Lara Laufer; Susan
Aschoff; James Bennett; Jessica Botsford; Bryon Gordon; Nagla'a El-
Hodiri; Luann Moy; and Peter del Toro.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This program was created in December 2005 by the Hurricane
Education Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Division B, Title IV, §
107, 119 Stat. 2792, 2798. Six hundred forty-five million dollars was
appropriated in December 2005 by the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119
Stat. 2680, 2768. An additional $235 million was appropriated in June
2006 by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The
Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
234, 120 Stat. 418, 463. For the purposes of the program, displaced
students were defined as those students who on August 22, 2005,
resided in and were enrolled or eligible to enroll in a school in an
area for which a major disaster was declared related to Hurricane
Katrina or Rita and who, as a result of their displacement, enrolled
in a different school.
[2] The state of Hawaii did not accept federal Emergency Impact Aid,
though the state did enroll and serve displaced students.
[3] Minimum record-keeping requirements entailed keeping adequate
records to support payment and allowable expenditure amounts, as well
as auditable records documenting the enrollment and eligibility of
displaced students claimed for program funding.
[4] Child Safety, Care and Education Continuity Act of 2011, S. 263,
112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011). As of August 31, 2011, no further
action has been taken with respect to this bill.
[5] We counted two Louisiana organizations representing multiple
Catholic schools as private schools.
[6] We conducted site visits to Louisiana and Texas and interviewed
officials in Georgia and Mississippi by telephone.
[7] The Single Audit Act, as amended, requires all state, local, and
nonprofit entities that expend at least $500,000 per year in federal
grant awards to obtain an annual single audit. This audit includes an
audit of the entity's financial statements and schedule of
expenditures of federal awards. It also includes a determination of
whether the entity has complied with the provisions of laws,
regulations, and contracts or grants pertaining to federal awards that
have a direct and material effect on each major program, and
procedures related to internal controls over the compliance
requirements for each major program. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7507.
[8] Audits conducted by Education's OIG in Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas revealed some errors in district
student counts. Officials from each of our 4 selected states told us
they subsequently conducted further audits in additional selected
districts and verified the eligibility of a sample of students in each
district. Each selected state submitted final revised student counts
to Education in the fall of 2007, and Education updated its final
student count records with these revisions. While Education requested
final student counts from all participating states at that time, it
did not revise its records to include revisions from states not
audited by the OIG. However, these states only received 16 percent of
total program funding, and most served relatively low numbers of
displaced students.
[9] According to Education officials, refunds made electronically or
by check after a grant award closes can only be credited to a specific
award if departmental officials identify the refund and make the
change manually. Further, refunds made by check may not be credited
back to the appropriate grant award if the check contains insufficient
identifying information.
[10] These four states collectively received 80 percent of grant funds.
[11] Hurricane Education Recovery Act , Pub. L. No. 109-148, Division
B, Title IV, § 107, 119 Stat. 2792, 2798. $645,000,000 was
appropriated in December 2005 by the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119
Stat. 2680, 2768. An additional $235 million was appropriated in June
2006 by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The
Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
234, 120 Stat. 418, 463.
[22] Child Safety, Care, and Education Continuity Act of 2011, S. 263,
112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011). As of August 31, 2011, no further
action has been taken with respect to this bill.
[13] The Single Audit Act, as amended, requires all state, local, and
nonprofit entities that expend at least $500,000 per year in federal
grant awards to obtain an annual single audit. This audit includes an
audit of the entity’s financial statements and schedule of
expenditures of federal awards. It also includes a determination of
whether the entity has complied with the provisions of laws,
regulations, and contracts or grants pertaining to federal awards that
have a direct and material effect on each major program, and
procedures related to internal controls over the compliance
requirements for each major program. 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7507.
[14] Audits conducted by Education’s OIG in Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas revealed some errors in district
student counts. Officials from each of our 4 selected states told us
they conducted further district audits, and verified the eligibility
of a sample of students in each district. Each selected state
submitted final revised student counts to Education in the fall of
2007, and Education updated its records with these revisions. While
Education requested final student counts from all participating states
at that time, it did not revise its records to include revisions from
states not audited by the OIG. However, these states only received 16
percent of program funding, and most served relatively low numbers of
students.
[15] According to Education officials, refunds made electronically or
by check after a grant award closes can only be credited to a specific
award if departmental officials identify the refund and make the
change manually. Further, refunds made by check may not be credited
back to the appropriate grant award if the check contains insufficient
identifying information.
[16] These four states collectively received 80 percent of grant funds.
[17] For the purposes of the program, displaced students were defined
as those students who on August 22, 2005, resided in and were enrolled
or eligible to enroll in a school in an area for which a major
disaster was declared related to Hurricane Katrina or Rita and who, as
a result of their displacement, enrolled in a different school.
[18] Total enrollment in our 4 selected states (Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas) peaked in the second quarter.
[19] Students who returned to their home schools were no longer
eligible to be counted as displaced students.
[20] 42 U.S.C. 11432 (g)(3)(C)(i).
[21] An individualized education program is a written statement
required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for each
child with a disability and should include, among other things, a
description of the special education services and accommodations to be
provided that child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
[22] Two districts did not provide expenditure data, and 2 districts
were unable to provide data that could be used to determine
expenditure categories. One additional district placed Emergency
Impact Aid funds in its general fund and estimated expenditures based
on total general fund expenditure ratios.
[23] See GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Barriers to Mental Health Services
for Children Persist in Greater New Orleans, Although Federal Grants
Are Helping to Address Them, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-935T] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4,
2009).
[24] GAO was unable to assess the accuracy of these statements because
school districts were not required to track costs associated with
serving displaced students.
[25] Grant awards for these states and Alabama are open pending
resolution of OIG audit findings, and returned fund amounts may be
subject to further change.
[26] Pre-kindergarten students were not eligible for service in states
where prekindergarten is not a part of elementary education by law.
[27] McKinney Vento Homeless Assistance Act, as amended, Title VII,
Subtitle B, 42 U.S.C. §§11431-11435.
[End of section]
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