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entitled 'Bureau of Prisons: Improved Evaluations and Increased 
Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone Detection' which was released on 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

September 2011: 

Bureau of Prisons: 

Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell 
Phone Detection: 

GAO-11-893: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-893, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The rates Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmates pay to make phone calls 
generate revenue that funds inmate wages and other amenities; however, 
inmates’ contraband cell phone use is growing. The Cell Phone 
Contraband Act of 2010 criminalized cell phone possession in federal 
prisons and mandated that GAO study related issues. In response to the 
mandate, this report addresses (1) how telephone rates for BOP inmates 
compare with other correctional systems and the implications of 
lowering rates; (2) the number of cell phones confiscated in BOP and 
selected states, and any reported impact; and (3) the extent to which 
BOP and selected states have taken actions to minimize cell phone 
smuggling, these actions’ effectiveness, and how BOP has coordinated 
internal and state information sharing. GAO reviewed BOP’s policies, 
procedures, and cell phone confiscation data (2008–2010). GAO also 
interviewed BOP officials within BOP’s 6 regions and 4 of its 116 
institutions-—as well as officials from 8 state correctional 
departments-—selected for their cell phone detection efforts or 
challenges faced. The results are not generalizable, but provide 
insights. 

What GAO Found: 

BOP’s rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than 
selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone 
revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have 
several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make 
cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and 
lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages 
and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates 
have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, 
and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. 

BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, 
and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens 
institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP 
officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state 
departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a 
major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for 
inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal 
activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. 

BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell 
phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better 
evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. 
BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also 
tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has 
not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the 
effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests 
generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. 
Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state 
agencies to some extent, BOP’s regional offices have only had limited 
interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge 
sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being 
used. 

This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified – law 
enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information 
that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted. 

Figure: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and 
Adjacent Camp: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that BOP’s Director formulate evaluation plans for cell 
phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of 
these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The 
Department of Justice concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-893]. For more 
information, contact David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov 
or Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

BOP Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Other Correctional 
Systems' Rates and Fund Inmate Wages and Recreation; Lowering Rates 
Would Decrease Costs for Inmate Calls but Could Reduce Revenue: 

BOP and Selected States Confiscated Thousands of Cell Phones in 2010 
and Believe That Rising Inmate Cell Phone Usage Threatens 
Institutional Safety and Expands Criminal Activity: 

BOP and Selected States Have Implemented Cell Phone Search and 
Detection Technologies, but BOP Could Evaluate Technologies Better and 
Increase Coordination: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) Observations on Technologies to Combat Contraband Cell Phones: 

Appendix II: BOP's Policy Memorandums and Program Statements Governing 
Entrance-Screening Protocols at Prison Institutions: 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Comparing the Cost of a 15-Minute Call, by Call Type, across 
BOP and Selected Correctional Systems That Use Revenues to Provide 
Inmate Amenities: 

Table 2: Inmate Amenities Funded by Profits from BOP's Trust Fund for 
Fiscal Year 2010: 

Table 3: Number of Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated in 
Institutions and Camps, 2008-2010: 

Table 4: Number of Cell Phones That Selected State Correctional 
Departments Have Confiscated: 

Table 5: NTIA Observations on Technologies Designed to Reduce or 
Eliminate Contraband Cell Phone Use: 

Table 6: BOP Guidance on Entrance-Screening Procedures and Their 
Relation to Cell Phone Detection: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Comparison of Local and Long Distance Minutes Used and 
Telephone System Revenue, from First Quarter 2009 through First 
Quarter 2011: 

Figure 2: Sources of Trust Fund Profits in Fiscal Year 2010: 

Figure 3: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and 
Adjacent Camp: 

Figure 4: BOP Screening Equipment: 

Abbreviations: 

ASCA: Association of State Correctional Administrators: 

BOP: Bureau of Prisons: 

BOSS: Body Orifice Security Scanner: 

DOC: department of correction: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FCC: Federal Communications Commission: 

GORT: Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter: 

ITS: Inmate Telephone System: 

NIJ: National Institute of Justice: 

NLECTC: National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center: 

NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information Administration: 

OST: Office of Security Technology: 

RF: radio frequency: 

TRULINCS: Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System: 

TWG: technology working group: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 6, 2011: 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Charles Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Lamar Smith:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives: 

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides 
telephone service to federal inmates to facilitate their contact with 
family and friends and to help maintain inmates' ties to the 
community. Research has shown that such contact reduces the likelihood 
of inmates' return to prison once they complete their sentences. BOP 
records inmates' calls and charges inmates rates for telephone use. In 
recent years, there have been rising incidents of federal and state 
inmates using contraband cell phones to circumvent correctional 
institutions' telephone systems.[Footnote 1] Some prisoner advocates 
believe that inmates are increasingly using contraband cell phones 
because of the rates correctional institutions charge for telephone 
service. However, by circumventing the correctional institutions' 
telephone systems, inmates also avoid the monitoring of their calls, 
and a number of reports have demonstrated that inmates are smuggling 
in cell phones to coordinate criminal activity, such as drug sales, 
assault, and murder. Various federal entities and state departments of 
corrections (DOC) have voiced concerns over the increasing number of 
contraband cell phones in correctional institutions, stressing the 
potential for these devices to facilitate further criminal misconduct. 
To help address this issue, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 
criminalized possession of cell phones in federal prisons by defining 
them as a "prohibited object" punishable by a fine or imprisonment for 
not more than 1 year or both.[Footnote 2] 

The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 also mandated that we study both 
telephone rates and contraband cell phones in prisons.[Footnote 3] 
Thus, this report addresses the following questions: 

1. How do BOP's inmate telephone rates compare to those charged by 
other correctional systems; how does BOP use the revenues generated by 
its telephone charges; and what are the implications of lowering its 
rates? 

2. How many cell phones have been confiscated within BOP and selected 
state institutions, and what is the reported impact, if any, of cell 
phone use on overall prison security and criminal activity? 

3. To what extent have BOP and selected state prisons taken actions to 
prevent or minimize cell phone smuggling and use; what is known about 
the actions' effectiveness; and how has BOP coordinated information 
sharing internally and with states? 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 
provided to you. DOJ deemed some of the information in the prior 
report as sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive, 
which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report 
omits sensitive information about methods by which cell phones are 
smuggled into prisons. In addition, at DOJ's request, we have omitted 
information regarding BOP conclusions on strategies tested and 
implemented by BOP to address cell phone smuggling and use. Although 
the information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it 
addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the 
overall methodology used for both reports is the same. 

To determine how BOP's prison telephone rates compare to those charged 
by other correctional systems, BOP's use of telephone revenues, and 
the implications of lowering rates, we reviewed BOP's policies and 
procedures related to its inmate telephone system, the costs and 
revenues of this system, the rates BOP charges inmates, inmate 
amenities funded through the system, and data on phone services from 
2008 through 2010. We also interviewed and gathered data from BOP 
management--including officials with the BOP Trust Fund, which manages 
the finances of the inmate telephone system--as well as officials with 
the Department of Defense, which also provides phone services to 
inmates, in order to determine how their rates compare with those 
charged by BOP. In addition, from March through June 2011, we gathered 
and analyzed data on inmate telephone rates from eight selected state 
DOCs.[Footnote 4] 

To learn more about the level of prison cell phone confiscations, and 
inmates' cell phone use and implications, we collected data on cell 
phone confiscations for all BOP institutions and the same eight 
selected state correctional systems for 2008 through 2010. We obtained 
information from relevant officials about the steps taken to ensure 
the accuracy of all of the above data and found the data to be 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed BOP 
officials in the Correctional Programs Division, which is responsible 
for ensuring a safe institutional environment; BOP's Office of 
Security Technology (OST), which identifies and evaluates security 
technology equipment within BOP, among other things; and each of BOP's 
six regions and four of its institutions.[Footnote 5] We selected 
these institutions based on specific technologies adopted to defeat 
cell phones, as well as other challenges posed by inmate 
communications. In addition, we interviewed officials from eight state 
DOCs. The views of the officials from these BOP institutions and state 
departments are not generalizable to other BOP institutions or states, 
but do provide valuable insights into issues surrounding cell phones 
in prisons.[Footnote 6] We also researched state laws to gain an 
understanding of the types of state statutory provisions that have 
been adopted to penalize possession or smuggling of contraband cell 
phones. 

To determine actions being taken to prevent or minimize cell phone 
smuggling, the effectiveness of these actions, and BOP's coordination 
of information sharing, we interviewed and gathered documents from 
officials in BOP's OST, regional offices, and our selected 
institutions to learn about agency efforts in testing and evaluating 
cell phone detection equipment and how it shares such information 
internally.[Footnote 7] We then compared these efforts with BOP's 
program statements governing technology evaluations, as well as GAO's 
internal control standards and GAO criteria on evaluation plans for 
new technology tests and collaboration with other agencies.[Footnote 
8] We also interviewed state correctional department officials and met 
with a nonprobability sample of officials from DOJ's National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ); NIJ's National Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) system; the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC); the Department of Commerce's National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA); the 
Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA); CTIA-the 
Wireless Association; and two companies that make cell phone detection 
and defeat equipment.[Footnote 9] We identified these agencies and 
organizations based on their involvement in combating contraband cell 
phones, such as taking part in public forums to discuss the issue. The 
views of those representing these agencies are not generalizable, but 
they provide valuable insights. 

We conducted this work from August 2010 to September 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

As a component of DOJ, BOP's mission, in part, is to protect society 
by confining federal offenders in the controlled environments of 
prisons and community-based institutions that are safe, humane, cost-
effective, and appropriately secure. In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw 
more than 209,000 inmates, housing more than 170,000 of these inmates 
in its 116 institutions and relying on privately managed secure 
institutions; residential reentry centers, also known as halfway 
houses; bed space secured through agreements with state and local 
entities; and home confinement to secure the rest.[Footnote 10] In 
fiscal year 2011, approximately $6.4 billion was appropriated for BOP 
to carry out its mission.[Footnote 11] 

Features of BOP's Inmate Telephone System: 

While there is no specific statutory provision requiring BOP to 
provide inmates with telephone services or privileges,[Footnote 12] 
BOP extends telephone privileges to inmates and asserts that telephone 
privileges help inmates maintain family and community ties and 
facilitate the reintegration of inmates into society upon release from 
prison.[Footnote 13] However, limitations and conditions may be 
imposed upon an inmate's telephone privileges to ensure that these are 
consistent with other aspects of BOP's correctional management 
responsibilities. For example, the length of telephone calls is 
generally limited to 15 minutes, and the warden may restrict or 
suspend temporarily an inmate's regular telephone privilege when there 
is reasonable suspicion that the inmate has acted in a way that 
threatens the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or 
the protection of the public. For many years, BOP provided inmates 
with collect-call service only--whereby the receiving party, and not 
the inmate, bore the cost of the call. In 1988, BOP began to shift to 
its current Inmate Telephone System (ITS), which provides both a 
collect call and a direct-dial option, emphasizing inmates' financial 
responsibility and reducing the burden on others of inmates' calls. 
[Footnote 14] 

BOP personnel within the individual prisons maintain the ITS. 
Specifically, BOP staff are responsible for installing, maintaining, 
and repairing the telephone system. Vendors provide the hardware and 
software that enable ITS, also known as TRUFONE, to perform the 
following: 

* use voice recognition to identify inmates placing calls; 

* provide each inmate with a "personal access code," which allows 
inmates' TRUFONE accounts to be debited for the cost of their calls; 
[Footnote 15] 

* check the inmate's TRUFONE account to make sure the inmate has 
sufficient funds for a one-minute phone call; 

* record all calls automatically; 

* restrict inmates' calls to numbers on the inmates' contact lists; 

* require placement of calls only from specific telephones; 

* deny particular inmates access to telephones as warranted; and: 

* terminate all prison telephone service if security needs dictate. 

In addition to direct-dial telephone service, BOP has recently made e- 
mail available to inmates in all of its institutions through an 
electronic-messaging system. Through this electronic-messaging system, 
inmates can communicate with a list of contacts, but they cannot 
access the Internet. Both inmates and persons in the community with 
whom they correspond must consent to having all incoming and outgoing 
electronic messages monitored and retained by staff.[Footnote 16] 

BOP's Trust Fund and the Inmate Amenities It Supports: 

BOP established commissaries to allow inmates to purchase items not 
issued by prisons. Inmates purchase commissary items with funds 
available in individual inmate accounts managed by BOP. Funds are 
placed into these accounts by friends and family members (through 
BOP), or may be earned as wages through work performed in Federal 
Prison Industries or other on-site work at an institution (e.g., food 
service, laundry).[Footnote 17] In 1998, the Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 provided BOP with 
the authority to accept revenues and make expenditures from the 
Commissary Fund of the Federal Prison System in order to pay for ITS 
as well as other prisoner amenities.[Footnote 18] This authorized 
trust fund is a self-sustaining revolving fund account in which BOP 
deposits revenues generated by inmate telephone charges through ITS 
and pays the expenses of ITS operations--rather than through 
appropriations. BOP uses the profits (the amount of revenue that 
exceeds expenses) from operating the inmate telephone service, as well 
as those from the commissary and other services, to provide inmate 
amenities, such as employment opportunities and educational and 
recreational activities, that are not currently supported through 
appropriations. By providing amenities like these through telephone 
system profits, BOP is similar to other federal correctional 
institutions like those within the Department of Defense. In 
particular, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps all charge 
inmates rates above cost for telephone service. The Navy uses the 
profits to provide items or activities, such as movies and sports 
contests, for the benefit of the inmates exclusively, while the Army 
and the Marine Corps use the funds to provide amenities to all persons 
on the base. 

The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 and BOP's Process for Addressing 
Cell Phone Possession: 

In August 2010, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 was passed and 
amended 18 U.S.C. § 1791 to prohibit an inmate of a prison from 
possessing, obtaining, or attempting to obtain a cell phone.[Footnote 
19] The Cell Phone Contraband Act also provided for punishing such 
possession with a fine or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or 
both. BOP stated that cell phones are considered hazardous tools, as 
defined by BOP policy as tools most likely to be used in an escape 
attempt or to serve as weapons capable of doing serious bodily harm to 
others; or those hazardous to institutional security or personal 
safety. According to officials in BOP's Correctional Programs 
Division, when an inmate is caught with a cell phone, an incident 
report is filed and the inmate is subject to BOP's disciplinary 
process, which involves an administrative hearing[Footnote 20]. The 
inmate ultimately could face a range of sanctions from transfer to a 
higher-security institution to loss of "good time" or other 
privileges.[Footnote 21] BOP may refer the case to a law enforcement 
agency with criminal investigative authority for investigation, and/or 
to the local U.S. Attorney's Office, which maintains discretion for 
prosecution. 

Other Federal Agencies' Roles in Exploring and Addressing Contraband 
Cell Phone Issue: 

In addition to BOP, various federal agencies serve as key stakeholders 
in exploring and addressing the illicit use of cell phones in federal 
and state prisons. For example, DOJ's National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) coordinates subject matter experts into three technical working 
groups to address, among other topics, illicit cell phone use. 
[Footnote 22] Further, at its 2010 National Conference, NIJ convened a 
plenary panel to discuss the detection and defeat of cell phone use in 
prisons. NIJ also funds the National Law Enforcement and Corrections 
Technology Center (NLECTC) system, which assists state, local, tribal, 
and federal correctional agencies, as well as law enforcement and 
criminal justice agencies, in addressing technology needs and 
challenges, such as contraband cell phones. 

NIJ also hopes to soon establish an interagency working group with 
representatives from BOP, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA), to continue working on solutions to overcome illicit cell 
phone use in prisons, subject to the availability of funds.[Footnote 
23] In particular, the FCC maintains an important role in combating 
illicit cell phone use in prisons because the FCC, in general, 
executes and enforces the provisions of the Communications Act of 
1934, which prohibits nonfederal entities--such as state correctional 
institutions--from intentionally interfering with or blocking radio 
communications signals, which include cell phone transmissions. In 
addition, NTIA is a critical partner for the research capacity it 
possesses. Specifically, in December 2009, Congress directed NTIA, in 
coordination with BOP, FCC, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate 
and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies 
might be used for corrections applications in federal and state prison 
institutions.[Footnote 24] In response to this congressional 
direction, in May 2010, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry seeking public 
comment on "technologies that would significantly reduce or eliminate 
contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting commercial 
wireless and public safety services ... in areas surrounding 
prisons."[Footnote 25] These technologies include the following: 

* Jammers: Devices that transmit on the same radio frequencies as cell 
phones, disrupting the communication link between the phone and the 
cell phone tower, essentially rendering the cell phone unusable until 
the jamming stops. 

* Managed access systems: Those that intercept, or re-route, certain 
cell phone calls (i.e., unauthorized calls that inmates attempt) away 
from carrier networks, preventing them from reaching towers and 
completing the call. 

* Detection systems/devices: Those that locate, track, or identify 
unauthorized cell phones by, for example, scanning frequencies within 
correctional institutions to detect the location of a caller. 

After analyzing the comments it received, NTIA issued observations on 
advantages and disadvantages of each of these strategies, as detailed 
in appendix I.[Footnote 26] NTIA also reported that prison officials 
should be able to use technology for combating prison cell phone use 
while not disrupting public safety and federal government entities' 
use of spectrum or citizens' use of airwaves for cell phone 
communications. 

States and Nonfederal Entities' Roles: 

A number of states have expressed concerns over threats posed by 
contraband cell phones in their correctional institutions and sought 
out both independent solutions and federal assistance. In particular, 
during 2009, officials from 31 state and 2 regional (i.e., city-based) 
prison systems requested that the FCC initiate rulemaking to permit 
jamming of commercial mobile radio services (which would include cell 
phone signals) within correctional institutions.[Footnote 27] Also, 
officials from Texas and Maryland correctional departments have 
testified before Congress about the dangers posed by cell phones in 
prisons and to support passage of a bill known as the Safe Prisons 
Communications Act of 2009.[Footnote 28] 

States have implemented different means to define the legality of cell 
phone possession in prisons. Some states have specific statutory 
provisions making it illegal for inmates to possess cell phones while 
incarcerated in a state prison institution,[Footnote 29] while other 
states have statutorily defined cell phones to be contraband that is 
prohibited within a state prison institution.[Footnote 30] In 
addition, there are other states that have general statutory 
provisions banning contraband and allow the department of corrections 
to define what items are contraband administratively.[Footnote 31] 

In addition, the Association of State Correctional Administrators 
(ASCA)--an organization comprised of both BOP and state correctional 
officials that seeks to improve correctional services and practices-- 
has been active in studying the issue of cell phones in prisons. For 
example, in July 2010, ASCA hosted a symposium to discuss the problem 
of cell phone smuggling and potential solutions to address the issue. 

BOP Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Other Correctional 
Systems' Rates and Fund Inmate Wages and Recreation; Lowering Rates 
Would Decrease Costs for Inmate Calls but Could Reduce Revenue: 

BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than 
selected states' and military branch systems that also use inmate 
telephone revenue to support inmate amenities, and lowering rates 
would have several implications. BOP charges inmates $0.06 per minute 
for local calls and $0.23 per minute for long distance calls, with no 
connection charge. BOP sets its rates to cover the cost of operating 
the telephone system and to generate profits, which BOP uses to 
provide the majority of funding for inmate amenities--the most 
significant of which are wages for inmate employment and expenses 
associated with inmate recreational activities. If BOP reduced inmate 
telephone rates, inmates would benefit from the ability to make less 
expensive phone calls. However, lower rates also could result in less 
revenue, lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate 
wages and other amenities, unless BOP recovers these funds through 
other sources. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer 
opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases and the risk 
of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. 

BOP's Inmate Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Those Charged by 
Other Correctional Systems That Also Fund Inmate Amenities: 

Currently, for direct dial calls, BOP charges inmates per minute rates 
of $0.06 for local calls and $0.23 for long distance calls with no 
connection charge. For collect calls, both local and long distance, 
BOP charges a connection fee and per minute charge.[Footnote 32] The 
rates that BOP charges inmates for a 15-minute direct-dial local call 
typically are lower than rates charged by most other correctional 
systems, such as state systems and Department of Defense military 
prisons that also use telephone system revenue to help finance 
prisoner amenities.[Footnote 33] As illustrated by table 1, a direct 
dial long distance call lasting 15 minutes would cost a BOP inmate 
significantly less than if he or she made that call in most other 
selected comparable correctional systems. 

Table 1: Comparing the Cost of a 15-Minute Call, by Call Type, across 
BOP and Selected Correctional Systems That Use Revenues to Provide 
Inmate Amenities: 

Correctional system: Bureau of Prisons; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: $0.90; 
Local - collect: $0.95 - $5.70[A]; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $3.45; 
Long distance/collect: $8.45. 

Correctional system: Department of Defense - Army; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: $3.75; 
Local - collect: $6.00; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $3.75; 
Long distance/collect: $6.00. 

Correctional system: Department of Defense - Navy; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: $6.00; 
Local - collect: $16.08; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $6.00; 
Long distance/collect: $16.08. 

Correctional system: Department of Defense - Marines; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: $6.00; 
Local - collect: $16.08; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $6.00; 
Long distance/collect: $16.08. 

Correctional system: Maryland Division of Correction; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: $0.50; 
Local - collect: $0.85; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $4.50; 
Long distance/collect: $7.20. 

Correctional system: Mississippi Department of Corrections; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: State does not offer direct dial; 
Local - collect: $2.85; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: State does not offer direct 
dial; 
Long distance/collect: $14.55. 

Correctional system: New Jersey Department of Corrections; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: $4.95; 
Local - collect: $4.95; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $4.95; 
Long distance/collect: $4.95. 

Correctional system: Texas Department of Criminal Justice[B]; 
Local - direct dial/debit card: $3.90; 
Local - collect: $3.90; 
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $6.45; 
Long distance/collect: $6.45. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP, Department of Defense, and state data. 

[A] State utility commissions have jurisdiction over local collect 
call rates so they vary depending on the state in which the prison is 
located. 

[B] Although Texas does not use telephone revenues to provide prisoner 
amenities, it does require the telephone service provider to pay the 
state 40 percent of gross revenues; the first $10 million goes to the 
Victims Services Crime Fund. 

[End of table] 

Revenues, Costs, and Profits of BOP's Telephone System: 

In fiscal year 2010, BOP's inmate telephone system generated 
approximately $74 million in revenue, cost approximately $39 million 
to operate, and showed a profit of approximately $34 million. Records 
provided by BOP for the first quarters of 2009, 2010 and 2011 
indicated that inmates' long distance calls generated more than 90 
percent of BOP's telephone revenues.[Footnote 34] According to BOP 
officials, over the past 12-18 months, the inmate telephone service 
has generated significantly less revenue as inmates purchased more 
local minutes and fewer long distance minutes. Figure 1--which shows 
the local and long distance phone minutes used and phone-system 
revenues for the first quarters of 2009, 2010, and 2011--illustrates 
this trend. 

Figure 1: Comparison of Local and Long Distance Minutes Used and 
Telephone System Revenue, from First Quarter 2009 through First 
Quarter 2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Quarter: FY 09 1st Quarter; 
Local minutes: 11.1 million; 
Long distance minutes: 76.3 million; 
Quarterly revenue: $20.4 million. 

Quarter: FY 10 1st Quarter; 
Local minutes: 15.0 million; 
Long distance minutes: 76.4 million; 
Quarterly revenue: $20.3 million. 

Quarter: FY 11 1st Quarter; 
Local minutes: 18.1 million; 
Long distance minutes: 71.8 million; 
Quarterly revenue: $18.9 million. 

Source: BOP. 

[End of figure] 

BOP officials attribute this shift from long distance to local minute 
calls to the emergence of technology that allows inmates' friends and 
family who do not live within the inmates' local calling area to 
acquire telephone numbers local to the inmates' prison locations. As a 
result, long distance calls that previously cost inmates $0.23 per 
minute can now be made for the local rate of $0.06 per minute--a 
savings of more than 70 percent on a 15-minute call. BOP officials 
told us that this trend has prompted them to consider eliminating the 
distinction between local and long distance call rates and instead set 
a uniform price for calls of either type that would fall somewhere 
between the current local and long distance rates. According to 
officials, this would lower rates for approximately 84 percent of the 
calls made by inmates that are long distance. BOP officials told us 
that while they anticipate losing some of the revenue generated by 
long distance minutes, they believe the sale of access minutes for 
their electronic messaging system, which has recently become available 
in all federal prisons, will compensate for some lost revenue. 
[Footnote 35] BOP officials told us that the number of electronic 
message minutes sold in 2010, at $0.05 per minute, was more than twice 
the number sold in 2009, and they expect even more minutes to be sold 
in 2011. 

With respect to telephone system costs, in fiscal year 2010, BOP spent 
approximately $39 million to operate the telephone system. About $9.7 
million of this amount covered the costs of the telephone system's 
physical resources, including hardware and software, which were 
purchased through competitively bid, governmentwide contracts. Just 
over $22 million covered labor costs, including technical, 
operational, and administrative costs of the inmate telephone system 
at each of the institutions. Another $7.5 million covered personnel 
salaries and benefits of headquarters staff, who provide 
administration and program management, including policy and procedures 
development, and training. 

BOP's telephone system generated more than $34 million in profits in 
fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 36] Since BOP both receives and disburses 
money to pay for telephone service operations through its Trust Fund, 
profits from telephone service are also retained therein. In fiscal 
year 2010, BOP's Trust Fund had total revenues, which included 
collections from BOP's commissary services, of $331 million. After 
paying all related costs for phones and commissary provisions, there 
were Trust Fund revenues in excess of expenses of over $46 million and 
BOP's phone service was responsible for $34 million, or 74 percent of 
this amount, while Trust Fund profits from all other sources amounted 
to almost $12 million, as shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Sources of Trust Fund Profits in Fiscal Year 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Profits from inmate telephone systems: $34,235,528 (74%); 
Trust fund profits from all other sources: $11,995,839 (26%). 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. 

[End of figure] 

BOP officials told us that BOP uses revenue from its Trust Fund to pay 
for various inmate amenities, such as wages to inmates and 
recreational materials--as illustrated by table 2. However, by law, 
there are some specific inmate amenities, among other items, that 
cannot be purchased with Trust Fund revenues.[Footnote 37] BOP 
officials told us that all aspects of BOP's work are audited annually 
by an independent auditing and accounting firm, including BOP's 
financial records; officials told us that BOP has been certified as in 
compliance since 1999.[Footnote 38] 

Table 2: Inmate Amenities Funded by Profits from BOP's Trust Fund for 
Fiscal Year 2010: 

Amenity type: Inmate wages; 
Description: Funds income inmates earn from work within the 
institution, working in areas such as food service, commissaries, 
facilities (electrical, plumbing, welding, painting, landscaping) 
laundry, and as barbers, tutors, law library clerks, and warehouse 
workers; 
Amount: $34,978,786. 

Amenity type: Recreational activities; 
Description: Board games, movies, educational books, and cable 
television. There is no funding of administrative costs such as 
salaries for staff; 
Amount: $8,555,291. 

Amenity type: Distribution of profits to institutions; 
Description: Items purchased with these funds include holiday packages 
for the inmates, microwave ovens, washers and dryers, seasonal 
programs, holiday decorations, children's items, and programs for 
children of inmates; 
Amount: $1,249,896. 

Amenity type: Completion awards; 
Description: Small monetary awards for inmates' completion of 
psychological treatment programs; 
Amount: $1,099,332. 

Amenity type: Psychology program; 
Description: Drug abuse programs, group and individual psychotherapy, 
social skill building, mental health counseling, etc., for inmates; 
Amount: $223,381. 

Amenity type: "Artist in Residence" program; 
Description: An interagency agreement with the National Endowment for 
the Arts provides and funds this program for the inmate population; 
currently, there is a creative writing program provided at five 
locations; 
Amount: $80,000. 

Amenity type: "Reading Is Fundamental;" 
Description: Provides for inmates to participate in a national reading 
program; 
Amount: $44,681. 

Source: BOP. 

[End of table] 

Lowering Phone Rates Would Reduce the Cost of Inmate Calls but Could 
Leave Fewer Funds Available for Inmate Activities: 

Lowering the rates it charges inmates for phone calls would have 
several implications for BOP and inmates. The primary advantage would 
be that inmates would incur lower costs for making calls. This could 
possibly encourage greater communication between inmates and their 
families, which BOP has stated facilitates the reintegration of 
inmates into society upon release from prison.[Footnote 39] In 
contrast, reducing inmate telephone rates could also have some 
disadvantages. BOP officials told us that lowered rates would likely 
result in lower revenues for the Trust Fund and therefore less profit, 
unless some provision was made to replace the lost revenue. With fewer 
profits, BOP would have less Trust Fund money to spend on inmate 
amenities. As a result, unless BOP recouped these revenues from other 
sources, BOP would have to reduce the wages it pays inmates for their 
labor and/or scale back the number and type of other educational and 
recreational activities it currently offers using revenue from the 
Trust Fund. According to BOP officials, such reductions could make 
prisons more dangerous to manage and more expensive to operate. For 
example, BOP officials said that inmates perform electrical work, 
which keeps prisons well lighted, as well as janitorial services, 
which preserve order and cleanliness--both of which contribute to 
institutional safety and reduce inmate idleness. According to BOP 
officials, inmate idleness increases the risk of violence, escapes, 
and other disruptions. BOP officials also reported that inmate work 
programs--which teach inmates, many of whom have never held a 
traditional job before, work skills and a work ethic (e.g., coming to 
work on time, taking directions from a supervisor, working effectively 
with co-workers)--can help inmates assimilate back into society upon 
completion of their prison sentence. This helps to reduce recidivism 
and thus contributes to public safety. 

If BOP wanted to lower inmate telephone rates while maintaining the 
current level of inmate services, BOP could explore one of two 
approaches: (1) recoup lost revenue resulting from lowered telephone 
rates by increasing prices inmates pay for other services, such as 
commissary items or electronic messaging system access, or (2) seek 
authorization allowing BOP's general appropriation to be available for 
inmate amenities in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund. 
Regarding the first approach, BOP officials told us that they already 
receive inmate complaints related to current commissary prices, and as 
a result, the officials indicated reluctance to choose this option. In 
addition, raising commissary prices could result in inmates purchasing 
fewer items, and coupled with decreased telephone rates, overall Trust 
Fund revenues could decline, resulting in less funding available for 
inmate amenities, including wages. With respect to the second 
approach, if BOP reduced rates for telephone service and was given 
authority to replace the lost revenue with its appropriations, BOP 
could maintain both the inmate wage rate and the type and variation of 
inmate activity, and keep the prices inmates pay for other services 
from increasing. However, to accomplish this, BOP would have to seek 
authorization allowing BOP's general appropriation to be available for 
inmate amenities, in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund. 
[Footnote 40] BOP officials told us they did not think this option was 
a realistic possibility, as they do not believe Congress would 
appropriate money for prisoner amenities. 

BOP and Selected States Confiscated Thousands of Cell Phones in 2010 
and Believe That Rising Inmate Cell Phone Usage Threatens 
Institutional Safety and Expands Criminal Activity: 

BOP and officials from most of the selected states we contacted 
reported increases in the numbers of cell phones confiscated at 
prisons over the last 3 to 4 years and cite cell phone use as a 
security concern. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from 
all eight of the states' DOCs with whom we spoke, cited cell phones as 
a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for 
inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal 
activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. 

BOP's and Selected States' Cell Phone Confiscations Have Increased in 
the Last 2 Years: 

BOP has tracked the number of cell phones confiscated at its 
institutions, by prison camp and secure institutions, since 2008. 
Table 3 shows that the number of cell phones confiscated has increased 
each of the last 2 years. As the data also illustrate, over three-
fourths (77 percent) of all cell phones confiscated at BOP 
institutions are found at prison camps, or "minimum security" 
institutions--this despite the fact that prison camps have accounted 
for only about 13 percent of BOP's inmate population from fiscal years 
2008-2010. Prison camps typically are located adjacent to larger, 
higher-security institutions but are usually not surrounded by 
perimeter fencing. In some instances, camps are located very near 
local roads or wooded areas. 

Table 3: Number of Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated in 
Institutions and Camps, 2008-2010: 

Type of BOP institution: High, medium, low security institutions; 
2008: 255 (14%); 
2009: 591 (18%); 
2010: 1,161 (32%); 
Total: 2,007 (23%). 

Type of BOP institution: Minimum security institutions (prison camps); 
2008: 1,519 (86%); 
2009: 2,607 (82%); 
2010: 2,523 (68%); 
Total: 6,649 (77%). 

Type of BOP institution: Total; 
2008: 1,774 (100%); 
2009: 3,198 (100%); 
2010: 3,684 (100%); 
Total: 8,656 (100%). 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. 

[End of table] 

To illustrate the extent of the problem at one federal correctional 
complex, figure 3 shows cell phones confiscated by BOP from a federal 
prison and its adjacent work camp over a 1-year period. 

Figure 3: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and 
Adjacent Camp: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Officials from BOP's Correctional Programs Division and three of the 
six regions that we spoke with attribute the rise in confiscated cell 
phones to the ease of availability of small, low cost cell phones that 
allow inmates to carry on unmonitored conversations with the desired 
contacts. In addition, officials we interviewed from two of the six 
regions also cited increasingly stringent search procedures by staff 
at some prisons resulting in a greater number of cell phone 
confiscations. Correctional Programs Division officials added that a 
combination of easier access to cheaper cell phones, better awareness 
by staff conducting contraband searches, and better collection of 
intelligence have all contributed to these increases, but it is 
difficult to determine how much each factor has resulted in increased 
cell phone confiscations. 

We selected and obtained information from eight states during the 
course of our review, and these selected states in general are also 
dealing with increasing numbers of contraband cell phones, as shown in 
table 4. Some of these selected states maintain cell phone 
confiscations in the aggregate and have not broken it out by camps as 
compared to secure institutions. 

Table 4: Number of Cell Phones That Selected State Correctional 
Departments Have Confiscated: 

State: California[A]; 
2007: 900; 
2008: 2,800; 
2009: 6,900; 
2010: 10,700. 

State: Florida[B]; 
2007: n/a; 
2008: 242; 
2009: 1,026; 
2010: 1,509. 

State: Maryland[C]; 
2007: 741; 
2008: 1,236; 
2009: 1,658; 
2010: 1,128. 

State: Mississippi; 
2007: n/a; 
2008: 2,200; 
2009: 3,600; 
2010: 4,300. 

State: New Jersey[D]; 
2007: n/a; 
2008: n/a; 
2009: n/a; 
2010: 249. 

State: New York; 
2007: 55; 
2008: 75; 
2009: 93; 
2010: 85. 

State: South Carolina[E]; 
2007: n/a; 
2008: 2,015; 
2009: 2,594; 
2010: 3,241. 

State: Texas[F]; 
2007: n/a; 
2008: 1,226; 
2009: 1,480; 
2010: 1,193. 

Source: Correctional departments from the states listed. 

[A] In 2009, California began to include cell phone confiscation data 
from its community correctional facilities (private or publicly run 
contracted facilities for low level offenders) and California out-of- 
state correctional facilities (private facilities in several states 
that California has contracted with to house inmates). California 
officials stated that these types of facilities house approximately 
five to six percent of all state inmates. 

[B] Florida did not begin keeping counts of contraband cell phones 
until October 2008. 

[C] Maryland data was provided by fiscal year, not calendar year. 

[D] New Jersey began capturing data on contraband cell phones in mid- 
2010; the data shown covers the time period July 2010 through February 
2011. 

[E] South Carolina includes cell phone parts and accessories, such as 
batteries and chargers, in its count of cell phone confiscations. One 
official estimated that the cell phones themselves account for about 
70 percent of these totals. 

[F] Texas' 2008 data represents the number of "incidents" of cell 
phone confiscations; there could have been multiple cell phones found 
in one incident. In 2009 and 2010, Texas also separated the data 
gathered by cell phones confiscated before and after introduction to 
the inmate population. For 2009, 370 of the 1,480 cell phones were 
confiscated before entering the inmate population (e.g., inside of 
mailrooms, outside prison perimeter). For 2010, 402 of the 1,193 cell 
phones were confiscated before entering the inmate population. 

[End of table] 

The types of institutions in which most cell phones are found varied 
among the states we contacted. For example, officials we interviewed 
from two of the eight states indicated that based on their experience, 
most phones were found in prison camps, while officials from five 
other states said that their states have confiscated greater numbers 
of cell phones in more secure institutions. Officials from the eighth 
state said the number of cell phones found in camps and secure 
institutions was about equal. Three states also attribute the increase 
in cell phone confiscations to the availability of smaller, cheaper 
cell phones and additional search and detection efforts they have 
employed to identify cell phones. 

BOP and Officials from Selected States Reported That Contraband Cell 
Phones Can Threaten the Safety within Institutions and Expand Criminal 
Activity: 

Officials we contacted from BOP's Correctional Programs Division, six 
regional offices, and four institutions--as well as from each of the 
eight states we selected for our review--all cited contraband cell 
phones as an issue of serious concern. According to BOP officials in 
particular, inmates with cell phones are able to circumvent the 
approved prison telephone system and thus are able to hold unmonitored 
conversations. This, the BOP officials reported, could lead to several 
actions that threaten the security of prisons and expand criminal 
activity both inside and outside of a prison institution. For example, 
inmates could use cell phones to arrange the delivery of contraband 
drugs or other goods, transmit information on prison staff to or from 
noninmates, harass witnesses or other individuals, or potentially 
coordinate an escape. 

BOP management does not currently compile any specific data or prepare 
comprehensive reports of situations where contraband cell phones were 
used to conduct criminal activity in federal prisons--nor do DOJ or 
the Cell Phone Contraband Act require that these things be done. 
However, BOP officials we interviewed from two of the regions provided 
examples of criminal activity linked to cell phones. In one case, in 
January 2011, an inmate at a federal institution was sentenced to an 
additional 14 years in prison for running an identity-theft ring using 
a contraband cell phone. This inmate and his accomplices obtained 
personal information on credit card holders at various retailers and 
impersonated these account holders to fraudulently purchase over 
$254,000 worth of merchandise. 

In addition, officials from seven of our selected eight states 
provided examples of specific criminal actions that occurred as a 
result of inmate cell phone use. For example, in October 2008, a death 
row inmate in a Texas state prison used a smuggled cell phone to 
threaten a state Senator and his family. This same phone was also used 
by a number of other inmates within the prison. In addition, in 2007, 
an inmate in a Maryland detention center ordered the murder of a state 
witness via a cell phone. In 2005, an inmate in a New Jersey state 
prison--serving time for previously shooting at two police officers--
used a contraband cell phone to order the murder of his girlfriend, 
who had previously testified against him during a trial. 

BOP and officials in selected states acknowledged that definitively 
linking the possession of a contraband cell phone to an individual can 
be challenging. For example, officials we interviewed from BOP's 
Correctional Programs Division, and two of the four BOP institutions 
that we interviewed say that cell phones are often found on the 
grounds of an institution or in "common areas" such as bathrooms or 
television rooms rather than in the possession of an inmate directly. 
Cell phones are also frequently passed around and used by several 
different inmates, making it difficult to link the ownership of a cell 
phone to a particular inmate. 

In order to gain useful information--such as phone numbers or text 
messages--that could link a cell phone to an individual inmate or 
related criminal activity, BOP conducts forensic investigations of the 
cell phones it confiscates. 

BOP and Selected States Have Implemented Cell Phone Search and 
Detection Technologies, but BOP Could Evaluate Technologies Better and 
Increase Coordination: 

BOP and the eight selected states we contacted have taken steps to 
address growing contraband cell phone smuggling and use in their 
correctional institutions, but BOP could evaluate existing 
technologies better to maximize its investment decisions. BOP has 
tested multiple cell phone detection technologies; however, it has not 
developed evaluation plans to measure the effectiveness of these 
tests. Moreover, BOP has shared information with state agencies to 
some extent on strategies for combating contraband cell phones, but 
BOP's regional offices could pursue more direct connections with 
states in accordance with relevant BOP policy that encourages them to 
do so. By enhancing information sharing, BOP could gain knowledge from 
states' practices and lessons learned and likewise, states' practices 
could be better informed by learning more about BOP's efforts related 
to cell phone detection. 

BOP and Selected States Have Implemented a Variety of Strategies to 
Prevent and Minimize Cell Phone Smuggling and Use: 

BOP and officials from all eight selected state correctional 
departments we contacted have developed multiple methods for 
preventing cell phones from entering prison institutions and being 
used by inmates. These include search procedures for visitors and 
correctional staff as well as cell phone detection technologies, which 
identify the use of cell phones once they have reached the inmate 
population. 

Through policy memorandums and program statements that govern its 
protocols, BOP has implemented agencywide screening procedures for all 
visitors, contractors, and staff for detecting contraband items. These 
procedures include the use of x-ray screening machines, walk-through 
metal detectors, and hand-held metal detectors. Though these 
procedures are not cell phone specific, BOP officials told us they 
represent a concerted effort in keeping contraband out of prisons in 
general. See appendix II for more information on the direction that 
BOP provides for screening of visitors, staff, and inmates. 

In addition to its search procedures, BOP has employed technology to 
stem the rise in cell phone smuggling. In particular, BOP has 
implemented two large-scale sensor-based cell phone detection systems 
at two of its prison institutions, a technology BOP officials 
described as being the only effective solution at this time. The Radio 
Frequency (RF) sensor based system detects the presence of cell phones 
and displays their approximate location using a monitored computer 
screen. 

In April 2007, BOP installed the original prototype sensor system in 
three housing units within one building, which included the purchase 
of a server, computer work station, and switches. According to BOP 
officials, the manufacturer provided the actual sensors and software 
at minimal costs in order to assist in research and development for 
the project, while other fiber and wiring were obtained from surplus 
supplies at no cost to BOP. Additionally, BOP officials told us that 
BOP staff installed the sensor system, helping cut costs that an 
outside party might have otherwise charged for installation.[Footnote 
41] Because of these factors, BOP officials said a similar system 
installed by a contractor at other prison institutions would be more 
expensive. For example, BOP officials told us that it cost them 
approximately seven times more than the original system to install 
equipment for a newer-generation version of BOP's prototype RF sensor 
system at a second prison institution in December 2010, even though 
BOP officials were able to install it themselves as they had in the 
first location. According to BOP officials, the second system covers 
11 housing units in both an institution and prison camp, and is also 
configured so that officials throughout the prison can view areas of 
cell phone detection, which BOP officials said accounted for a higher 
installation cost.[Footnote 42] 

We found that all eight of the selected state officials we interviewed 
cited using entrance screening practices such as use of walk-through 
metal detectors or x-ray machines at their secure institutions; and, 
six of these states are using different cell phone detection 
techniques that BOP has not yet employed, such as canines[Footnote 43] 
and managed access.[Footnote 44] 

Additional information on cell phone detection strategies tested or 
deployed by BOP and selected state DOCs--as well as these officials' 
perspectives on their utility--is deemed law enforcement sensitive and 
not included in this report. 

BOP Has Steps in Place to Identify Promising Cell Phone Detection 
Technologies, but Lacks Sound Evaluation Plans: 

BOP takes several steps to determine which cell phone detection 
technologies to test. BOP's OST is tasked with identifying promising 
technology in the area of cell phone detection, and all five OST staff 
share responsibility for testing and evaluating technology security 
initiatives throughout BOP. To make determinations about which 
technology BOP should test, OST officials told us that they 
familiarize themselves through working groups with other federal and 
state organizations and discussions with all interested product 
vendors with equipment that other federal or state correctional 
entities use. OST officials also explained that they have developed 
criteria over several years that they believe should be met before 
they will test any given approach.[Footnote 45] These four criteria 
are: 

1. The equipment must work without affecting or collecting information 
from the general public located outside the correctional facilities' 
secure perimeter. 

2. The solution should have no legal restrictions.[Footnote 46] 

3. The equipment must work with all cellular phone protocols.[Footnote 
47] 

4. The overall cost of equipment and installation must be fair and 
reasonable.[Footnote 48] 

Once OST is satisfied that the technology meets most of these 
criteria, OST tests the equipment at BOP headquarters and then sends 
it out to one or more prison institutions for testing by staff in a 
prison environment. Once tested, institutional staff then provide OST 
with a brief written response or phone call regarding their views of 
the equipment's effectiveness. Once OST receives feedback from the 
prison institution, OST may then send the equipment to another 
institution for further testing by prison staff. 

[Side bar: Photograph: Example of hand-held RF cell phone detector 
tested by BOP. Source: BOP. End of sidebar] 

While BOP has put the above criteria in place, it does not have a 
sound evaluation plan that includes, among other dimensions, criteria 
or standards for determining how well the technology works. OST 
officials told us that they rely on the process discussed above to 
make decisions regarding the effectiveness of cell phone detection 
equipment, but they acknowledged that the tests each institution 
conducts may vary in scope and rigor and that they have no evaluation 
plan to govern this process. OST officials told us they previously 
attempted to distribute consistent evaluation questions to 
institutional staff testing each technology, using an "Initial 
Technology Assessment" form, but that OST abandoned this practice 
because it rarely received the form back from prison institutions. 
Further, officials told us that when institutions do respond with 
technology test results, OST receives very little feedback. OST 
officials told us that institutional staff have limited time and 
resources for assisting them with cell phone detection technology 
evaluations because such testing is in addition to their normal 
duties. Also, OST has stated that some institutions are more eager 
than others for the opportunity to test new technology; thus, some 
institutions may not have the interest or expertise to contribute 
information to a technology assessment. In addition, according to OST, 
the role of the individual conducting the test can vary by 
institution. Specifically, equipment could be tested by a correctional 
officer, a lieutenant, or a computer specialist, a situation that OST 
officials said results in inconsistent testing methods because these 
individuals have different skills and knowledge levels. In addition, 
the OST official tasked with addressing contraband cell phone 
detection issues told us that BOP regions and local prison 
institutions regularly test cell phone detection devices and 
approaches, as well as other types of equipment, without OST's 
knowledge and most often do not inform OST of their findings. For 
example, the official explained that in some instances, vendors notify 
OST of technology tests conducted at local prison institutions that 
OST was unaware of at the time. GAO's internal control standards 
require that an agency's organizational structure clearly define key 
areas of authority and responsibility, and establish appropriate lines 
of reporting.[Footnote 49] Thus, while OST applies its criteria to 
screen new technologies before sending them to prison institutions for 
testing, it lacks clearly defined responsibilities for the individuals 
conducting tests and sound evaluation methods to fully evaluate such 
technologies once institutional testing has been completed. As a 
result, BOP has implemented--and discarded--some technologies without 
fully evaluating them and documenting results as discussed below. 

We have previously reported that for tests of new technology, a sound, 
well-developed and documented evaluation plan should include: 

1. well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives; 

2. criteria or standards for determining program performance; 

3. clearly articulated methodology, including sound sampling methods, 
determination of appropriate sample size for the evaluation design, 
and a strategy for comparing the pilot results with other efforts; 

4. a clear plan that details the type and source of data necessary to 
evaluate the pilot, methods for data collection, and the timing and 
frequency of data collection; and: 

5. a detailed data analysis plan to track the program's performance 
and evaluate the final results of the project.[Footnote 50] 

Certain details on the tests OST has conducted and the conclusions it 
has drawn have not been included here due to law enforcement 
sensitivities. 

OST officials explained that BOP has a policy, called Pilot 
Initiatives, Approval and Evaluation, that identifies numerous 
criteria that should be followed when implementing and evaluating 
pilot programs[Footnote 51]. The policy includes practices such as 
defining goals and objectives, developing an evaluation plan, 
describing costs for the program, and identifying advantages and 
disadvantages related to a broader implementation of the technology, 
all of which align with established best practices. According to OST 
officials, however, they have not designated the testing phase of any 
cell phone technologies as "a pilot" by the definition included in 
their policy, and OST does not apply the policy to any of their 
testing.[Footnote 52] In our view, BOP could benefit by using its 
pilot initiative-evaluation criteria as a best practice when 
evaluating cell phone detection tests to better inform decisions about 
whether investments on a larger scale are warranted. 

[Side bar: Photograph: Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter 
(GORT) in use at one BOP facility to detect movement of contraband 
over security fence. Source: GAO. End of sidebar] 

When we requested reports and documentation--including evaluation 
plans and reports--resulting from tests of the technologies that OST 
explained to us, officials sometimes provided us with brief overviews 
of testing methods that did not meet best practices. For example, OST 
told us it has not subjected its RF sensor system--currently deployed 
in two institutions--to any final assessment or evaluation outlining 
when and how BOP would determine whether adopting this system on a 
wider scale would be feasible and effective. On the other hand, in one 
instance, OST officials told us BOP did adhere to more rigorous 
evaluation procedures. Specifically, with assistance from OST, one 
prison institution has deployed the Ground Observation Reconnaissance 
Transmitter (GORT) in one of its institutions. When testing the GORT 
system, officials identified system goals and objectives; identified 
criteria for determining program performance; completed a final 
product evaluation that documented advantages and disadvantages of the 
system; and concluded that GORT successfully reduced smuggling of 
contraband including cell phones at the test location. OST officials 
told us the assessment of the GORT differed from assessments of its 
other technologies because the level of evaluation performed was at 
the discretion of the local prison institution implementing the 
system. OST officials agree that developing a sound evaluation 
approach that could be used by prison institution staff for testing 
cell phone detection technologies would strengthen BOP's approach for 
combating the issue of contraband cell phones in prisons. Having an 
evaluation plan for selected cell phone detection technology that 
follows BOP pilot evaluation criteria or other best practices could 
help BOP more effectively measure how well each piece of equipment 
functions. Moreover, these steps could better allow OST to better 
inform BOP leadership's decisions regarding the adoption of such 
technology and the associated resource allocations. 

BOP Could Take Steps to Enhance Information Sharing with States: 

BOP reports that OST collaborates with various state-level agencies, 
but has opportunities to improve coordination between its regional 
offices and states in identifying effective strategies and 
technologies for combating contraband cell phones in prisons.[Footnote 
53] BOP recognizes the importance of outreach with state and local 
entities and has developed a policy statement governing such 
interaction.[Footnote 54] This policy notes that "communication and 
understanding among [BOP] institutions and regional offices and their 
local communities will be enhanced by formal and informal contacts 
between [BOP] staff and local agencies and organizations." It further 
states that "Regional Directors and Wardens shall include in their 
lists of annual accomplishments a summary of all organizations with 
which their institutions or regional offices are formally associated, 
including a general statement about any significant contribution to 
[BOP] operations or criminal justice relationships that have resulted 
from those associations." Further, we have previously reported on the 
importance of interagency coordination and information sharing across 
federal, regional, state, and local government entities.[Footnote 55] 
We also previously reported that making efficient use of security 
technology to supplement and reinforce other security measures is a 
key practice for protecting federal institutions, but that the type of 
technology to use should be carefully analyzed.[Footnote 56] 

OST, located at BOP headquarters in Washington, D.C., reported 
coordination with state-level agencies through direct information 
sharing, professional organizations, and established working groups. 
In particular, ASCA officials told us BOP coordinates with their group 
through panels, demonstrations, and briefings. For example, OST also 
participates in multiple NIJ/NLECTC technology working groups (TWG) 
involving cell phone detection.[Footnote 57] OST also coordinates with 
representatives from multiple state DOCs on an individual basis after 
establishing relationships as members of professional organizations, 
committees, and working groups. For example, OST provided the New York 
correctional department with 30-day access to a cell phone detection 
device after the state demonstrated interest in the technology. 
According to OST, BOP has also shared information on its practices for 
detecting contraband cell phones with states such as Pennsylvania, 
Texas, and Florida. 

We corroborated BOP headquarters' level of coordination with these 
groups and multiple state DOCs. At the regional level, we found that 
BOP's regional offices had limited coordination with states regarding 
contraband cell phone issues. For example, one BOP regional director 
stated that his region coordinated with officials from ASCA, but said 
he has not coordinated with state entities because such coordination 
occurs through BOP officials in headquarters. Another regional 
director concurred, reporting that nobody in his region participates 
in any task forces, working groups, or other collaborative efforts 
with federal or state entities concerning cell phone detection issues 
because this should be occurring through headquarters' outreach. As 
discussed earlier, some states have taken efforts that BOP does not 
currently use to combat contraband cell phones, such as canine 
detection units. Thus, enhanced coordination could allow BOP to better 
leverage information on potentially employing these state efforts to 
combat contraband cell phones. Likewise, while BOP has shared 
practices with states in the past, OST officials agreed that BOP could 
improve coordination efforts by its regional offices as well. 

In addition, while BOP policy states that "over the years, formal and 
informal employee relationships with organizations, such as advisory 
committees, law enforcement coordinating councils, criminal justice 
councils, and state and local planning organizations, have enhanced 
[BOP] operations," we found limited BOP regional-office interaction 
with state and local government agencies concerning contraband cell- 
phone smuggling and use.[Footnote 58] For example, according to BOP 
officials, Regional Directors and Wardens annually prepare a 
Performance Work Plan that lists, among other things, efforts made in 
establishing relations and collaborating with other state and local 
correctional and law enforcement entities in their communities. 
However, BOP officials have informed us that these plans do not 
provide a level of detail--such as including lessons learned on cell-
phone-smuggling approaches and the technologies to address them--to 
inform BOP's central office of the nature of issues discussed. Our 
review of the three work plans with which BOP provided us confirmed 
the limitations in the information they contained. As we have 
previously reported, by having a process in place to obtain and share 
information on potential threats, agencies can better understand the 
risk they face and more effectively determine what preventive measures 
should be implemented.[Footnote 59] Regularly reaching out to 
coordinate with key stakeholders, particularly at the state level, to 
learn about their cell phone-combating efforts could help improve 
BOP's ability to address cell phone smuggling and use in prisons. 
Conversely, BOP's outreach and coordination with states at the 
regional level--to highlight practices BOP believes are useful--could 
help inform state practices as well. Further, keeping records of these 
exchanges, through Performance Work Plans for example, could help the 
regional offices provide BOP with greater problem-solving information 
by leveraging states' experience in addressing contraband cell phones. 

Conclusions: 

BOP provides a variety of options to its inmates for making phone 
calls to friends and families--at rates that compare favorably to 
correctional institutions operated by states and other federal 
agencies. Nevertheless, the number of contraband cell phones in 
prisons is rising. As documented in our discussions with federal and 
state officials, the illicit use of cell phones can pose a danger to 
staff and inmates, as well as to the public at large. BOP has reviewed 
a number of technologies and adopted large-scale sensor detection 
systems at two of its institutions in an attempt to combat this 
problem. BOP does have opportunities, however, to enhance assessments 
of how well these technologies can work. For example, if BOP 
formulated well-developed and well-documented plans for testing and 
evaluating cell phone detection and defeat technologies--including the 
establishment of goals, objectives, and criteria--and defined 
evaluation-related responsibilities for individuals performing the 
tests, it would be better positioned to make decisions before adopting 
these technologies. BOP also has opportunities to better leverage what 
states are learning in their attempts to better detect and prevent 
cell phone smuggling. In particular, if BOP encouraged its regional 
offices to improve coordination with its local counterparts, BOP could 
be better positioned to track and monitor what states were 
experimenting with and what their evaluation results have been. By 
taking these steps, BOP could make more well-informed decisions as it 
moves forward in addressing the growing safety and security threats 
posed by contraband cell phones in its prisons. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help BOP respond more effectively to contraband cell phone 
challenges, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the BOP 
Director to take the following three actions: 

* Direct OST to formulate evaluation plans that both support a 
consistent approach to testing cell phone detection technologies and 
strengthen decisions about deploying cell phone detection projects. 
Such plans should include key characteristics of successful evaluation 
methods, such as defining measurable objectives and including a 
detailed data analysis plan. The plans should also clearly define 
evaluation-related responsibilities for the individuals conducting the 
test at each institution. 

* Develop a policy to require that regions and institutions apply 
OST's evaluation plans when testing the technology that OST believes 
may be viable for detecting or combating contraband cell phones. This 
policy should also require OST to provide the results of these 
evaluations to BOP leadership to better inform BOP-wide decisions 
regarding the adoption of such technology. 

* Enhance regional office collaboration with other federal, state, and 
local organizations; document what is learned; and share it throughout 
BOP to enhance agencywide knowledge of key efforts to prevent or 
minimize cell phone smuggling in prisons. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DOJ, 
and also requested comments from the Department of Commerce, FCC, and 
Department of Defense on nonsensitive draft excerpts related to these 
agencies. The agencies did not provide written comments. However, in 
an e-mail received July 12, 2011, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ 
concurred with our recommendations. DOJ, FCC, and Department of 
Defense provided written technical comments, which we incorporated 
into the report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, 
Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission. In addition, this report will also be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov or Mark 
Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

David C. Maurer: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

Signed by: 

Mark L. Goldstein: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) Observations on Technologies to Combat Contraband Cell Phones: 

In 2010, NTIA sought out and received public comments on "technologies 
that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use 
without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety 
services ... in areas surrounding prisons."[Footnote 60] NTIA analyzed 
the comments received and reported its observations on advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these technologies, as illustrated in table 5. 

Table 5: NTIA Observations on Technologies Designed to Reduce or 
Eliminate Contraband Cell Phone Use: 

Technology: Jamming; 
NTIA observations: 
* Jamming could potentially cause interference to cell phone signals 
outside of a prison institution, unless properly designed; 
* Jamming interferes with 911 and authorized calls and violates the 
Communications Act of 1934 when performed by nonfederal entities[A]; 
* Implementation costs vary with the complexity of the prison site. 

Technology: Managed access; 
NTIA observations: 
* Managed access systems have the potential to cause interference 
outside of the prison or to adjacent bands unless properly designed; 
* These systems permit 911 and known authorized calls, but require FCC 
approval and carrier consent; 
* Costs can vary based on the complexity of the prison site. 

Technology: Detection; 
NTIA observations: 
* Detection systems are "passive" in that they do not transmit 
signals, and thus do not cause interference to phone calls; 
* Such systems protect 911 and authorized calls and, unless used for 
data gathering for law enforcement intelligence, raise no regulatory 
or legal issues; 
* Costs can vary based on the complexity of the prison site and 
sophistication of the technology used (e.g., simple hand-held devices 
would involve a lower cost than a prison-wide sensor-based detection 
system). 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce information. 

Note: Information was taken from U.S. Department of Commerce report, 
Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless Technology 
Solutions (December 2010). 

[A] Specifically, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, provides 
that "no person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause 
interference to any radio communications of any station licensed or 
authorized by or under this Act or operated by the United States 
Government." 47 U.S.C. § 333. This particular prohibition related to 
interference does not apply directly to U.S. Government agencies. 
Nonfederal spectrum use is managed by the Federal Communications 
Commission while spectrum use by U.S. Government agencies is managed 
by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA). As a general matter, NTIA's policy reflects the limitation 
with respect to the prevention of intentional harmful interference to 
licensed or authorized users of radio communications. See Manual of 
Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management, § 
2.3.6. In light of this, NTIA has authorized spectrum use by U.S. 
Government agencies that results in intentional harmful interference 
only in limited national security instances, such as by DOJ for an 
electronic countermeasure in response to threats of radio-controlled 
improvised explosive devices. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: BOP's Policy Memorandums and Program Statements Governing 
Entrance-Screening Protocols at Prison Institutions: 

Table 6 describes BOP memorandums or program statements related to 
entrance-screening procedures for staff and visitors at BOP 
institutions. 

Table 6: BOP Guidance on Entrance-Screening Procedures and Their 
Relation to Cell Phone Detection: 

BOP memorandum or program statement: Program Statement P5510.12: 
Searching, Detaining, or Arresting Visitors to Bureau Ground and 
Facilities (January 2008); 
Purpose: Provides BOP staff procedures and guidance for searching 
visitors at federal prison institutions; 
Relation to cell phone detection: This policy identifies telephones as 
a prohibited item and outlines how to conduct screening for 
identifying metallic contraband items such as cell phones. BOP 
officials said federal prisons generally experience fewer cell phone 
confiscations than state prisons in part because of BOP's standardized 
screening procedures. 

BOP memorandum or program statement: Memorandum: Electronic Searches 
of Bureau of Prisons Staff (November 2007); 
BOP memorandum or program statement: Memorandum: Staff Entrance 
Procedures Additional Guidance (January 2008); 
Purpose: Describes the entrance-screening requirements for all BOP 
staff entering a prison. BOP told us prior to this, BOP staff members 
were not screened for contraband; 
Relation to cell phone detection: BOP's policy change for screening 
staff was first agreed to and signed on November 8, 2007. Additional 
screening guidance was then provided on January 28, 2008, as part of 
this memorandum. BOP staff must be screened using electronic equipment 
such as walk-through metal detectors, which are used for detecting 
metallic contraband items like cell phones. The policy also details 
the secure storage procedures for employees who commute via public 
transportation and carry a cell phone. 

BOP memorandum or program statement: Memorandum: Screening with Walk- 
Through Metal Detectors - Staff, Visitors, and Inmates (January 9, 
2008); 
Purpose: Provides BOP standardization on the use of walk-through metal 
detectors for screening; 
Relation to cell phone detection: BOP's Office of Security Technology 
provided standardized screening equipment guidance to all BOP 
institutions with this memorandum. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. 

[End of table] 

Figure 4 provides examples of the types of equipment BOP uses to 
screen staff and visitors entering BOP institutions, as well as 
inmates on institution grounds. 

Figure 4: BOP Screening Equipment: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs] 

X-ray screening machine; 
Walk-thru metal detector; 
Hand-held metal detector; 
BOSS Chair[A]. 

Sources: BOP (X-ray machine, walk-thru metal detector, and hand-held 
metal detector); and GAO (BOSS chair). 

[A] A BOSS Chair is a Body Orifice Security Scanner that detects metal 
objects inside inmates' body cavities. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

David Maurer, (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov Mark Goldstein, (202) 
512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contacts named above, Mike Clements and Joy Booth, 
Assistant Directors, and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed 
this assignment. Raymond Griffith and Nancy Zearfoss made significant 
contributions to the work. David Alexander, Madhav Panwar, and Ramon 
Rodriguez assisted with design and methodology. Willie Commons III 
provided legal support and Katherine Davis provided assistance in 
report preparation. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For the purposes of this report, we will use the term "cell phone" 
to represent not only cell phones but also any other wireless 
communications devices. 

[2] Cell Phone Contraband Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-225, 124 Stat. 
2387. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1791, the term "prohibited object" includes, 
but is not limited to, a firearm, ammunition, a phone or other device 
used by a user of commercial mobile service, controlled substance, 
narcotic drug, any United States or foreign currency, or any other 
object that threatens the order, discipline, or security of a prison, 
or the life, health, or safety of an individual. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 111-225, § 3, 124 Stat. 2387, 2387-88. 

[4] Specifically, we interviewed and gathered data from officials in 
California, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, 
South Carolina, and Texas. We selected these state correctional 
departments based on the level of their efforts to combat contraband 
cell phones, as identified by BOP officials and records of 
congressional testimony. In conducting our analysis we did not, 
ultimately, include rate information from four of these states--
California, Florida, New York or South Carolina--because these states 
do not fund prisoner amenities from telephone revenues in a manner 
consistent with BOP. This was due to either (a) these states not 
receiving monies from the companies providing inmate telephone service 
or (b) laws requiring them to send any monies they do receive to the 
state's general fund. The views of officials from the states whose 
rates we did include are not generalizable to other states, but do 
provide valuable insights into issues surrounding cell phones in 
prisons. 

[5] OST officials told us they do not consider their office a testing 
lab or research and development facility. Instead, OST's task is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of new technology in the federal prison 
environment. 

[6] In addition, we observed specific cell phone detection efforts at 
a state prison in Virginia while conducting work on another review of 
correctional officer safety (see GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Evaluating 
the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-410] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 8, 2011)), even though Virginia was not one of the states 
selected for our review. 

[7] In the context of this report, we define testing as BOP's effort 
to determine if cell phone detection technology will be effective in 
the federal prison environment. 

[8] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999); Tax Administration: IRS Needs to 
Strengthen Its Approach for Evaluation the SFFMI Data-Sharing Pilot 
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2008); GAO, Aviation Security: A National 
Strategy and Other Actions Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure 
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2009); and GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to 
Coordinate Federal Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote 
Key Practices, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004). 

[9] ASCA is an organization consisting of state and BOP officials 
focusing on improving correctional practices. CTIA-the Wireless 
Association is a nonprofit organization that represents the wireless- 
communications industry and advocates at all levels of government on 
behalf of its members. 

[10] BOP's 116 institutions generally have one of four security level 
designations: minimum, low, medium, and high. The designations depend 
on the level of security and staff supervision the institution is able 
to provide, such as the presence of security towers; perimeter 
barriers; the type of inmate housing, including dormitory, cubicle, or 
cell-type housing; and the staff-to-inmate ratio. 

[11] We previously reported on BOP's Budget Process. See GAO, Bureau 
of Prisons: Methods for Cost Estimation Largely Reflect Best 
Practices, but Quantifying Risks Would Enhance Decision Making, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-94] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 10, 2009). 

[12] Certain federal courts have held that inmates have a First 
Amendment right to some level of telephone access, but this right is 
subject to reasonable restrictions related to prison administration 
and security. Johnson v. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev. 1984); 
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994). 

[13] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program 
Statement, No. P5264.08, Inmate Telephone Regulations, provides 
national policy and procedure regarding inmate telephone privileges 
within BOP institutions and contract facilities. 

[14] Generally, BOP allows each inmate to designate up to 30 phone 
numbers on his or her "contact" list. 

[15] BOP provides every inmate with a bank-type account into which 
money can be deposited and withdrawn for purchases such as snacks, 
telephone calls, or laundry. 

[16] The pilot of the electronic messaging program began April 14, 
2005, and was completely implemented on January 30, 2011. BOP issued 
Program Statement P5265.13, Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System 
(TRULINCS). 

[17] Federal Prison Industries is a federal government corporation 
established by Congress in 1934 to, among other things, employ and 
provide job skills training to a number of federal inmates, and 
produce goods and services for sale to the federal government. 

[18] Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 108, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-67 (Oct. 21, 
1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4043 note). 

[19] Cell phones are low-powered radio transceivers (a combination 
radio transmitter and receiver) that use radio waves (spectrum) to 
communicate with base stations. Electromagnetic spectrum is the medium 
that enables wireless communications of all kinds, including cell 
phone and paging services, radio and television broadcasting, radar, 
and satellite-based services. 

[20] The Correctional Programs Division oversees BOP's efforts to 
ensure safe, secure institutions for inmates and staff. 

[21] Good conduct time is a credit (measured in days) that an inmate 
may earn based on adherence to prison rules and lack of punishment 
received that is deducted from the inmate's sentence. 

[22] NIJ funds research, development, and evaluation related to crime 
and criminal justice issues and programs, including research, 
development, and evaluation related to criminal justice tools and 
technologies. 

[23] FCC is an independent federal agency that regulates interstate 
and international communications by radio, television, wire, 
satellite, and cable--as such, FCC has oversight over the use of 
spectrum for states, localities, and the private sector. NTIA, an 
agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce, has principal 
responsibility for advising the President on telecommunications and 
information policies and has oversight of the use of spectrum by 
federal agencies, such as BOP. 

[24] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-366, at 619 (2009). 

[25] Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons, 75 Fed. Reg. 
26733-01 (May 12, 2010). 

[26] U.S. Department of Commerce, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: 
Possible Wireless Technology Solutions (December 2010). 

[27] See Petition for Rulemaking of South Carolina Department of 
Corrections before the Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket 
No. 09-30 (Aug. 6, 2009). 

[28] The Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, S. 251, 111TH Cong. 
(2009), passed the U.S. Senate in October of that year but was not 
enacted. The bill would have amended the Communications Act of 1934 to 
allow the FCC to authorize non-federal entities, such as state 
correctional facilities, to operate systems that would prevent, jam, 
or otherwise interfere with wireless communications from inmates held 
in those facilities. This act was referred to the House of 
Representatives that same month, and no further action was taken. 

[29] For example, Maryland has a specific statutory provision with 
regard to cell phones in prison. A person detained or confined in a 
place of confinement may not knowingly possess or receive a 
telecommunications device. A person who violates this provision is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment 
not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. Md. Code 
Ann., Crim. Law § 9-417. 

[30] For example, Arizona has a statutory provision that specifically 
includes a "wireless communication device" within the meaning of 
"contraband" in the correctional facility context. Generally, a 
person, not otherwise authorized by law, commits the felony of 
promoting prison contraband by knowingly taking contraband into a 
correctional facility or the grounds of a correctional facility; or 
conveying contraband to any person confined in a correctional 
facility; or making, obtaining or possessing contraband while being 
confined in a correctional facility or while being lawfully 
transported or moved incident to correctional facility confinement. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-2501, 13-2505. 

[31] For example, Alabama has a general contraband statute. The 
statute defines contraband as any article or thing which a person 
confined in a detention facility is legally prohibited from obtaining 
or possessing by statute, rule, regulation, or order. A person 
confined in a detention facility that intentionally and unlawfully 
makes, obtains or possesses any deadly weapon, instrument, tool or 
other thing which may be useful for escape is guilty of promoting 
prison contraband in the first degree which is a Class C felony. 
Further, a person confined in a detention facility that intentionally 
and unlawfully makes, obtains, or possesses any contraband is guilty 
of promoting contraband in the third degree which is a Class B 
misdemeanor. Cell phones could be covered by statute, rule, 
regulation, or order. Ala. Code §§ 13A-10-30, 13A-10-36, 13A-10-38. 

[32] Direct dial calls allow the inmate to dial the call and pay for 
it using their TRUFONE account; collect calls are calls that require 
the recipient to pay. 

[33] According to BOP officials, inmate telephone rates are set in 
order to generate sufficient revenue to pay the costs of the inmate 
telephone system and support specific inmate amenities. 

[34] BOP officials told us this is an estimate. According to BOP 
officials, they generate a consolidated audited financial statement 
for the entire Inmate Trust Fund Program rather than a separate 
audited profit and loss statement for the Inmate Telephone System. 

[35] BOP began a pilot electronic messaging program in April 2005 and 
concluded Bureau-wide implementation in January 2011. Inmates are only 
permitted to exchange electronic messages with persons who have 
accepted the inmate's request to communicate. BOP issued Program 
Statement P5265.13 on February 19, 2009, describing the operation of 
the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS)--Electronic 
Messaging. 

[36] BOP officials told us this is only an estimate. According to BOP 
officials, they generate a consolidated audited financial statement 
for the entire Inmate Trust Fund Program rather than a separate 
audited Profit and Loss statement for the Inmate Telephone System. 

[37] None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to 
BOP, including Trust Fund revenues, may be used to provide the 
following amenities or personal comforts in the federal prison system: 
(a) televisions in cells except for prisoners who are segregated from 
the general prison population for their own safety; (b) the viewing of 
R, X, and NC-17 rated movies, through whatever medium presented; (c) 
any instruction (live or through broadcasts) or training equipment for 
boxing, wrestling, judo, karate, or other martial art, or any 
bodybuilding or weightlifting equipment of any sort; (d) possession of 
in-cell coffee pots, hot plates, or heating elements; or (e) the use 
or possession of any electric or electronic musical instrument. See 
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 611, 
115 Stat. 748, 800 (Nov. 28, 2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4042 note). 

[38] In 2001-2002, there was some criticism by the auditing agency 
regarding insufficient security for information system controls. That 
issue has since been remedied. In addition, GAO reviewed the audited 
financial statements of BOP for fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 and agreed with the auditors that the audits for these fiscal 
years were presented fairly and were in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles. 

[39] Approximately 25 percent of inmates use all of their allotment of 
300 minutes per month, so these inmates would not be able to make 
additional calls, even if rates were lower. 

[40] Because the Director of BOP may make expenditures out of the 
Commissary Fund of the Federal System for programs, goods, and 
services for the benefit of inmates (to the extent the provision of 
those programs, goods, or services to inmates is not otherwise 
prohibited by law), general appropriations may not be used for those 
purposes. The specific authority to operate the fund for the purposes 
described acts as a specific appropriation for that purpose. If an 
agency has a specific appropriation for a particular purpose, and also 
has a general appropriation broad enough to cover the same purpose, it 
does not have an option as to which to use. It must use the specific 
appropriation. 

[41] BOP officials told us this installation was done without using 
conduit for wiring, secure boxes for sensors, and without connecting 
the system to BOP's network. 

[42] Due to BOP concerns over revealing the locations where this 
detection system is in use, we have omitted the specific BOP locations 
examining the RF sensor-based system. 

[43] Six of the state DOCs we interviewed reported using cell phone 
detection canines. 

[44] Two of the state DOCs we interviewed reported using a managed 
access system. 

[45] According to OST officials, these criteria have been modified 
over time and were most recently collapsed into four dimensions in 
preparation of NTIA's report. Analysis for NTIA's report began soon 
after December 2009, when Congress directed the NTIA, in coordination 
with BOP, the FCC, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate and 
evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies might 
be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in 
federal and state prison facilities. See U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless Technology 
Solutions (December 2010). 

[46] For example, some cell phone detection equipment captures 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information, and BOP would 
have to obtain a court order to use this equipment. 

[47] In other words, equipment must work with the phones of all cell 
phone operators, including AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and other smaller 
operators. 

[48] BOP considers "reasonable" cost to be a subjective determination 
based on common sense value of the equipment, weighing such factors as 
effectiveness of the equipment, relative cost compared to similar 
equipment, coverage area, perceived threat, risks and consequences, 
and alternative solutions. 

[49] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[50] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399]. 

[51] BOP Program Statement P1066.04: Pilot Initiatives, Approval and 
Evaluation (Nov. 14, 2007). 

[52] OST officials told us that pilot projects require extensive 
oversight and that such a designation is only given to new technology 
with a broad, high-level scope. Although BOP's RF sensor-based system 
may have qualified as a pilot project if tested by OST, implementation 
of the system at the regional and institutional level required no such 
assessment. 

[53] BOP's six regional offices oversee the operations of the 
institutions in their respective regions. Among other things, regional 
office staff provide management and technical assistance to 
institutional personnel. 

[54] BOP Program Statement 1400.04: Contacts with Other Agencies and 
Organizations (Sept. 9, 1996). 

[55] GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can 
Enhance Emergency Preparedness, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1009] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 
2004). 

[56] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49]. 

[57] A TWG is a practitioner-based committee of 10 to 30 experienced 
practitioners from local, state, tribal, and federal agencies and 
laboratories associated with a particular NIJ technology investment 
portfolio. Three of NIJ's TWGs are concerned with, among other things, 
the issue of cell phones in correctional institutions. OST 
participates in the Institutional Corrections TWG and the Sensors and 
Surveillance TWG, but not the Communications TWG. The Institutional 
Corrections TWG is particularly interested in contraband detection and 
interdiction of wireless devices. NIJ officials report that, with 
respect to cell phones, this TWG is currently focused on exploring 
smaller-scale cell phone detection technology, such as hand-held 
devices, due in part to limited funds available to many state and 
local correctional departments. The Sensors and Surveillance TWG is 
exploring various cell phone detection technologies. The 
Communications TWG is interested in controlled (or managed) access, 
which would still allow the lawful use of cell phones in prison. 

[58] BOP Program Statement 1400.04. 

[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49]. 

[60] Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons, 75 Fed. Reg. 
26733-01 (May 12, 2010). 

[End of section] 

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