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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

July 2011: 

Space Research: 

Content and Coordination of Space Science and Technology Strategy Need 
to Be More Robust: 

GAO-11-722: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-722, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Each year, the United States spends billions of dollars on space-based 
systems to support national security activities. The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
develop and issue a space science and technology (S&T) strategy every 
2 years addressing S&T goals and a process for achieving these goals, 
among other requirements. As GAO is required to assess the strategy, 
this report addresses (1) the extent to which the strategy meets the 
statutory requirements, (2) if other approaches could be used to 
enhance the usefulness of the strategy, and (3) the extent of 
coordination efforts used in developing the strategy. GAO reviewed the 
strategy for sufficiency with statutory requirements and met with DOD 
and DNI officials to discuss the analyses and coordination used to 
support the content of the strategy. GAO also compared the strategy to 
strategic planning best practices to see if there are ways it could be 
improved. 

What GAO Found: 

The space science and technology strategy addresses eight statutory 
requirements, and DOD plans to address the two remaining requirements. 
While the statutory requirements were addressed, additional 
information that could have enhanced the strategy was not always 
included. For example, in relation to the strategy’s goals, a newly 
developed implementation plan for the achievement of the goals was not 
established. Instead, the strategy describes a plan for implementation 
where DOD components implement the strategy as a routine element of 
their existing budgetary process. Also, the 
strategy’s new goals were established without any prioritization, and 
while this was not required, given the breadth and scope of space S&T 
development activities, it is important that goals be prioritized. For 
the statutory requirements involving strategy implementation, 
officials explained that while the requirements to identify S&T 
projects with associated funding and schedule information were not 
addressed in the strategy, components and research laboratories 
conduct these activities as part of the normal DOD budgetary process. 

While the content of the strategy addresses statutory requirements, it 
does not address fundamental challenges facing the space S&T 
community. These challenges have been identified in high-level studies 
and prior GAO reports and include human capital shortages, growing 
fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in transitioning space S&T to 
acquisition programs. In this assessment, GAO identified some 
strategic planning best practices that, if used, could improve future 
strategy versions by addressing these fundamental challenges and 
thereby potentially enhancing the usefulness of the strategy. These 
practices include identifying required human capital; identifying 
required funding; prioritizing initiatives; establishing ways to 
measure progress; and establishing processes for revising goals in the 
future. 

Organizations involved in development of the strategy participated in 
creating its short- and long-term goals; however, their participation 
in developing other aspects of the strategy was more limited. DOD and 
DNI officials told GAO that their interpretation of the 2009 statute 
directing development of the strategy was that it did not require that 
the intelligence community be involved to the full extent in some 
aspects of the strategy. Moreover, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) together with the intelligence community, 
conduct a significant amount of space S&T. Although NASA and NOAA 
participation is not required, DOD may have missed an opportunity to 
leverage these agencies’ activities and optimize its own S&T spending 
by involving them in strategy development. GAO was also required to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms planned to 
implement the strategy. However, because the strategy has only 
recently been issued, it is too early to make such an evaluation. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD and DNI develop a more specific implementation 
plan; include additional information and prioritization, ways to 
measure progress, and processes for revision when establishing 
strategic planning goals; and enhance coordination among the DOD S&T 
community, the intelligence community, NASA, and NOAA. DOD concurred 
with the recommendations and DNI had no comment. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-722] or key 
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Summary: 

Space S&T Strategy Addresses Most Statutory Requirements, but Lacks 
Robust Detail: 

Fundamental Challenges Facing the Space S&T Community and Best 
Practices Not Addressed: 

Coordination Efforts in Strategy Development Were Limited and 
Implementation Efforts Are too Early to Assess: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Assessment of Space Science and Technology Strategy Compared 
to Statutory Requirements: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: DOD S&T Budget Categories within RDT&E Appropriations: 

Abbreviations: 

ASD: Assistant Secretary of Defense: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

DNI: Director of National Intelligence: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

NRO: National Reconnaissance Office: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

RDT&E: research, development, test and evaluation: 

S&T: science and technology: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 19, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

Each year, the United States spends billions of dollars to acquire 
space systems to support current military and other government 
operations. These assets support the national security activities of 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community, 
[Footnote 1] as well as civil and commercial activities. Specifically, 
space assets are used to support a wide range of military missions 
including, but not limited to, battlefield surveillance and 
management; global command, control, and communications; missile 
warning; navigation assistance; communications, navigation, timing, 
and positioning; weather and climatology; and intelligence collection. 
Given the critical role that space capabilities play, it is imperative 
that unique and related space science and technology (S&T) efforts are 
sufficient to provide the short-and long-term advanced space 
technology base, or foundation. A strong foundation in space S&T 
should help DOD and the intelligence community address the most 
challenging national security problems, reduce risk in major 
acquisition programs, maintain technological superiority over 
adversaries, maintain a healthy industrial base, and mitigate 
vulnerabilities to space systems. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2010),[Footnote 2] building on existing statutory 
requirements,[Footnote 3] establishes requirements for the Secretary 
of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)[Footnote 4] 
to jointly develop a space science and technology strategy (hereafter 
referred to as the strategy) and submit the first strategy to Congress 
on the date the President submits the budget for fiscal year 2012 to 
Congress.[Footnote 5] Additionally, the strategy is required to be 
submitted to Congress biennially on the date the President submits the 
budget to Congress for the next fiscal year and is to address short-
and long-term goals of the space S&T programs of DOD; a process for 
achieving those goals, including an implementation plan; a process for 
assessing progress made toward achieving those goals; and a process 
for transitioning space S&T programs to new or existing space 
acquisition programs. Coordination with DOD research laboratories and 
research components is also required in the development and 
implementation of the strategy. 

In the past, we have had concerns about DOD strategic planning, 
inadequate funding visibility, and the degree to which DOD and DNI 
have collaborated on space strategic planning. In 2006, we reported 
that DOD generally faced problems with deficiencies in strategic 
planning for critical technologies, processes for technology 
development and transition, and tools that support transition. 
[Footnote 6] We have also identified significant challenges or 
barriers for DOD in implementing a previous space S&T strategy, one of 
which was inadequate funding visibility.[Footnote 7] In 2008, we 
reported to Congress that we were concerned there was no overarching 
strategic guidance in place to link the defense and intelligence 
communities' future space programs, plans, and new space concepts. 
[Footnote 8] Our prior work has also shown that strategic planning is 
the foundation for defining what an agency seeks to accomplish, 
identifying the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and 
then determining how well it succeeds in reaching results-oriented 
goals and achieving objectives.[Footnote 9] 

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that we review and assess the 
first strategy no later than 90 days after its submission to 
Congress.[Footnote 10] In response, this report addresses (1) the 
extent to which the strategy meets the statutory requirements, (2) 
other approaches or methods that could be used to enhance the 
usefulness of the strategy, and (3) the extent of coordination efforts 
used in developing the strategy and the effectiveness of coordination 
mechanisms planned to implement the strategy. To address these areas, 
we reviewed the strategy for its sufficiency with statutory 
requirements and met with DOD and DNI officials to discuss and collect 
information on the methods, approaches, and analyses used to support 
the content of the strategy. We compared the strategy's contents to 
best practices in strategic planning and existing challenges in space 
S&T to determine if there are ways to improve it. We also discussed, 
or received written responses to questions on, the methods used to 
coordinate the development, as well as planned implementation, of the 
strategy with officials from the Office of Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Research and Engineering (formerly the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering); Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (including National Reconnaissance Office officials); 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Missile Defense Agency; 
Army Materiel Command; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Army Space and Missile 
Defense Command; Naval Research Laboratory; Office of Naval Research; 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; 
Air Force Research Laboratory; and Department of Energy.[Footnote 11] 
However, since the strategy has only recently been issued, and given 
the time constraints of our review, it was too early to assess whether 
the mechanisms and processes outlined in the strategy for its 
implementation will be effective in supporting and guiding future 
space S&T efforts. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to July 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I 
for more information on our scope and methodology. 

Background: 

In general, the S&T community includes government research 
laboratories[Footnote 12] and testing facilities as well as 
contractors and academic institutions that support these facilities. 
This community conducts research and development to support military 
or intelligence applications, such as space or weapon systems. While 
intelligence community funding levels for S&T are classified, DOD uses 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds for S&T work, 
including space S&T work, some of which is classified. 

Space S&T efforts are undertaken by many government organizations. 
While DOD and the intelligence community comprise the vast majority of 
organizations involved in space S&T, several civilian government 
organizations are also involved, including the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), and the Department of Energy (DOE). NASA's 
space S&T efforts are significant and drive advances in space science, 
technology, and exploration and often can involve technology transfers 
to DOD and other agencies. NOAA, which provides space weather 
information to other government organizations and the public, conducts 
research in the development of new satellite sensors, creates new 
applications for using satellite data, and develops innovative 
approaches for handling increased data rates as well as increases in 
computing power and data storage. DOE develops sensors that collect 
space weather data, and its laboratories often collaborate on space 
S&T efforts that are sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, the Air Force Research Laboratory, or the Naval 
Research Laboratories. Strategy developers told us that NASA and NOAA 
were not consulted in the development of the strategy because there 
was no statutory requirement to do so. According to strategy 
developers, DOE was involved in the development of the strategy even 
though their involvement was not required. 

DOD RDT&E investment is separated into seven discrete investment 
categories known as budget activities. Within the DOD S&T community, 
the first three categories--which represent basic research, applied 
research, and advanced technology development activities, and are 
collectively known as S&T activities--use RDT&E funds. Figure 1 
describes the three categories of DOD S&T investment. 

Figure 1: DOD S&T Budget Categories within RDT&E Appropriations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Basic research: 
RDT&E budget activity 1: 
Research that increases fundamental knowledge in a scientific or 
technology area without application to specific products or processes 
in mind. 

Applied research: 
RDT&E budget activity 2: 
Studies investigations and non-system-specific technology efforts that 
are directed toward general military needs in order to evaluate the 
feasability and practicality of proposed solutions. 

Advanced technology development: 
RDT&E budget activity 3: 
Development of subsystems and components and integration of subsytems 
and components for field experiments and tests in a simulated 
environment. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Congress required DOD to develop and implement a space S&T strategy in 
2004.[Footnote 13] DOD was not required to collaborate with DNI in 
developing the 2004 strategy. DOD's 2004 strategy described six 
specific investment areas: assured access to space; responsive space 
capability; assured space operations; spacecraft technology; 
information superiority; and the S&T workforce. The most significant 
space S&T goals were identified within each area, with the exception 
of S&T workforce. The strategy stated it would be necessary to 
successfully develop and demonstrate the requisite technologies in a 
relevant environment within the short-term, defined to be within the 
next 5 years, and the long-term, defined to be in the year 2020 or 
beyond. The 2004 strategy also discussed implementation mechanisms for 
the strategy, the importance of transitioning new technology to 
fielded capability, and an approach to assess progress toward 
achieving the goals. Though there are many diverse organizations 
carrying out S&T efforts related to space and a considerable amount 
being invested, DOD did not update its space S&T strategy between 2004 
and 2011.[Footnote 14] 

Our review of DOD's 2004 space S&T strategy found that it provided a 
foundation for coordination among space S&T efforts but lacked detail 
in key areas needed to achieve the strategy's goals.[Footnote 15] We 
found that DOD had taken an initial positive step in optimizing 
investments in space S&T projects by establishing short-and long-term 
goals. However, we also identified significant challenges or barriers 
for DOD in implementing the strategy such as inadequate funding 
visibility, decreased testing resources, workforce deficiencies, and 
long-standing incentives that encourage technology development to take 
place within acquisition programs rather than the S&T community. We 
recommended that the strategy contain stronger linkages to DOD's 
requirements-setting process, identify additional measures for 
assessing progress in achieving strategic goals, address barriers to 
achievement, and include all efforts related to space S&T. In 
addition, we recommended establishing protocols and mechanisms for 
enhancing coordination and knowledge sharing among the DOD S&T 
community, acquisition programs involved in space, and DOD 
intelligence agencies. DOD agreed with our recommendations. 

Summary: 

The content of the strategy addresses, or plans to address, the 
statutory requirements, but it did not establish a newly developed 
implementation plan for the achievement of the strategy's goals. 
Strategy developers acknowledge that in implementing the strategy, 
they did not direct DOD research laboratories and components to 
identify research projects in support of the strategy, or in support 
of the planned budget and schedule for executing those projects. 
Instead, the strategy indicates that each DOD component will implement 
the strategy as part of its routine program planning and budgeting 
procedures. Moreover, while the content of the strategy addresses 
statutory requirements, it does not address fundamental challenges 
facing the space S&T community. These challenges have been identified 
in high-level studies and prior GAO reports and include human capital 
shortages, growing fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in 
transitioning space S&T to acquisition programs. In this assessment, 
we identified some strategic planning best practices that, if used, 
could improve future strategy versions by addressing these fundamental 
challenges and thereby potentially enhancing the usefulness of the 
strategy. Furthermore, while DOD S&T organizations and the 
intelligence community were consulted in the development of the 
strategy, the input from the intelligence community and other agencies 
involved in space S&T was limited. Notably, NASA and NOAA were not 
involved in the strategy development because the statute did not 
require such involvement. The lack of coordination and attention to 
implementation is a weakness given that (1) space science and 
technology development activities span many organizations across the 
federal government; (2) we and others have identified problems with 
coordination, prioritization, and transition of technologies; and (3) 
funds available for such activities are increasingly limited. 

Space S&T Strategy Addresses Most Statutory Requirements, but Lacks 
Robust Detail: 

Our comparison of the strategy against the statutory reporting 
requirements found that the strategy addresses eight statutory 
requirements and DOD has plans to address two other statutory 
requirements. For two of the requirements involving strategy 
implementation, DOD has asserted that its normal budgetary process 
will suffice. While the requirements were met, additional information 
that could enable DOD to successfully implement the strategy was not 
included. See table 1 for our assessment of the strategy. 

Table 1: Assessment of Space Science and Technology Strategy Compared 
to Statutory Requirements: 

Statutory requirement: Address short-and long-term goals of DOD space 
S&T programs; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: Strategy identifies goals but did not prioritize or 
establish a way(s) to revise them. 

Statutory requirement: Address the process for achieving the goals, 
including an implementation plan for achieving the goals; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: Strategy describes existing processes but does not 
identify a separate plan specific to achieving the newly established 
goals. 

Statutory requirement: Address the process for assessing progress made 
toward achieving the goals; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: Strategy describes existing reviews used to assess 
progress in space S&T but does not identify new metrics or performance 
measures to be used to assess achievement of the strategy's newly 
established goals. 

Statutory requirement: Address the process for transitioning space S&T 
programs to new or existing space acquisition programs; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: Strategy describes many different processes for 
technology transition but does not establish a higher-level plan for 
transition or ways to measure transition successes. 

Statutory requirement: Develop in consultation with DOD research 
laboratories, research components, and other appropriate organizations; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: Strategy developed with input from required 
organizations but input was mainly limited to helping identify goals. 

Statutory requirement: Provide to DOD components and S&T entities to 
support DOD's planning, programming, and budgeting processes; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: Initial distribution of the strategy has been 
completed and the strategy will be posted on a DOD website. 

Statutory requirement: In strategy implementation, DOD research 
laboratories and research components shall identify research projects 
in support of the strategy that contribute directly and uniquely to 
the development of space technology; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: While the strategy does not direct organizations to 
specifically do this, DOD officials maintain these activities are done 
as part of the routine budget process. 

Statutory requirement: In strategy implementation, DOD research 
laboratories and research components shall inform the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering and the DOD Executive 
Agent for Space of the planned budget and planned schedule for 
executing the identified projects in support of the strategy; 
Requirement met? Yes; 
GAO observations: While the strategy does not direct organizations to 
specifically do this, DOD officials maintain these activities are done 
as part of the routine budget process. 

Statutory requirement: Include as part of the annual National Security 
Space Plan; 
Requirement met? Planned; 
GAO observations: Plans are for the strategy to be included as part of 
the National Security Space Plan. 

Statutory requirement: Submit biennially to the congressional defense 
committees; 
Requirement met? Planned; 
GAO observations: Plans are for the strategy to be submitted 
biennially to Congress. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents. 

[End of table] 

The contents of the strategy address four primary areas: (1) short-and 
long-term goals; (2) goal implementation; (3) goal assessment; and (4) 
the transition of space S&T technology to space acquisition programs. 
The strategy outlines a total of 54 space S&T goals--30 short-term and 
24 long-term, and describes existing, routine DOD processes such as 
program planning and budgeting procedures to help implement the 
strategy. It also mentions that periodic structured and informal 
programmatic and technical reviews are used to assess progress toward 
achievement of DOD goals and objectives and describes how there is no 
distinct process for transitioning space S&T products toward ultimate 
application in acquisition programs, while also describing several 
examples considered "success stories" in the transition of space S&T. 

While DOD addresses, or plans to address, the statutory requirements, 
in some instances, the inclusion of more detailed information could 
have allowed an opportunity for more successful implementation of the 
strategy. Specifically, in relation to the strategy's goals, it does 
not establish a newly developed implementation plan for the 
achievement of the goals. Instead, the strategy describes a plan for 
implementation where DOD components essentially implement the strategy 
as a routine element of their existing program planning and budgeting 
procedures while employing processes that are specifically tailored to 
each component's mission function. Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Research and Engineering (ASD (R&E)) officials, who served as leads in 
developing the strategy (strategy developers) also cited a program 
called Reliance 21[Footnote 16] as helping to manage and implement its 
entire S&T portfolio, including space S&T. While creation of a newly 
developed implementation plan was not a specific statutory 
requirement, it potentially could have provided a more delineated, 
exacting process for successfully achieving the strategy's goals. 

Also, DOD strategy developers told us that, as part of implementing 
the entire strategy, they did not specifically direct DOD components 
and research laboratories to meet the statutory requirements to (1) 
identify their research projects in support of the strategy that 
contribute directly and uniquely to the development of space 
technology, or (2) inform top DOD officials of their planned budget 
and planned schedule for executing those projects. However, officials 
explained that research components and research laboratories would do 
these activities as part of the normal DOD budgetary process. DOD 
strategy developers also told us that their entire S&T portfolio, 
including space S&T, is managed using the existing Reliance 21 
process, including implementation planning, execution, coordination, 
and review. They further explained that the Reliance 21 S&T Strategic 
Overview process fosters awareness and joint planning among senior S&T 
leadership and enhances coordination among DOD's S&T investment 
managers. In addition, the ASD(R&E), in conjunction with the S&T 
Executive Committee, conducts an annual review of all DOD S&T 
investments, and Space-related Advanced Technology Demonstrations are 
reviewed yearly at the Air Force Applied Technology Council[Footnote 
17] held as part of the Air Force Space Command Space S&T Council. 
Strategy developers further added that cooperation, collaboration, and 
partnerships among the S&T organizations are also achieved through a 
variety of mechanisms such as technology forums, workshops, 
conferences, project and program reviews, international agreements, 
partnerships, and on-site liaisons. 

Another example where key details were not present in the strategy is 
the establishment of 54 total goals without any prioritization. Though 
prioritization is not a statutory requirement, given the breadth and 
scope of space S&T development activities and issues we have 
identified in the past with respect to a lack of coordination and 
prioritization, it is important, and indeed a best practice, that 
goals be prioritized. We have also identified several, additional 
strategic planning best practices in the next section of this report 
that were not followed in the development of the strategy. If the 
strategy had more closely followed these best practices, it 
potentially could have allowed for the development of a more robust 
and useful space S&T strategy that addresses some of the major 
challenges in space S&T. 

Fundamental Challenges Facing the Space S&T Community and Best 
Practices Not Addressed: 

While the content of the space S&T strategy meets statutory 
requirements, it does not address fundamental challenges facing the 
space S&T community. These challenges include human capital shortages, 
growing fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in transitioning space 
S&T to acquisition programs. While adopting best practices in 
strategic planning for future versions of the strategy is not required 
under the current statutory requirements, we identified some best 
practice elements that could be used to develop well-structured goals 
in any strategic plan. 

Recent DOD-sponsored and congressional studies have addressed concerns 
over the DOD S&T laboratory personnel and the loss of talent in the 
space workforce.[Footnote 18] In addition, our prior reports have 
identified challenges facing the space S&T community. We have also 
consistently reported on today's challenging budgetary environment and 
that many of DOD's problems with poor cost and schedule outcomes on 
acquisition programs can be attributed to deficiencies (1) in 
strategic planning for critical technologies such as S&T investments, 
and (2) in processes for technology development and transition to 
acquisition programs.[Footnote 19] In fact, in S&T areas across DOD, 
we have found challenges in transitioning new technology from the 
laboratory to acquisition programs.[Footnote 20] The new space S&T 
strategy acknowledges there is no single process for transitioning 
space S&T products, and that transition is tailored to the nature of 
the technology being developed and the ultimate application. Strategy 
developers told us they recognize that having many different processes 
for technology transition to acquisition programs is a fact of life 
and they do not endorse a one-size-fits-all approach. However, as we 
have previously reported, DOD does not use a process with criteria 
that would allow lab and program managers to know when a technology is 
ready to transition.[Footnote 21] 

In our assessment, we identified some strategic planning best practice 
elements that, while not required for the strategy, should be part of 
well-structured goals in strategic plans. Most of these strategic 
planning best practices are contained in the Government Performance 
and Results Act of 1993,[Footnote 22] designed to provide a basis for 
the establishment of government strategic planning and performance 
management, as well as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
guidance[Footnote 23] designed to provide specific information to 
government agencies on the preparation and submission of strategic 
plans. We have also discussed DOD strategic planning best practices in 
our prior reports.[Footnote 24] If incorporated, these best practice 
elements could improve the usefulness of future strategy versions and 
position DOD to better address fundamental challenges in space S&T. In 
the absence of these more detailed best practice elements, the 
usefulness of the strategy for decision making may be limited. 
Adopting these best practice elements in future versions of the 
strategy is not required under the current statutory requirements, but 
we believe that incorporating them will ultimately improve the 
foundation the strategy provides for space S&T. 

* Identify Required Human Capital: Both the U.S. government and 
industry face substantial shortages of scientists and engineers and 
difficulty in recruiting new personnel because the space industry is 
one of many sectors competing for the limited number of these 
professionals. A recent U.S. House of Representatives study concluded 
that the space workforce is facing significant loss of talent and 
expertise and the challenge exists to smoothly transition to a new 
space workforce.[Footnote 25] Also, a recent study done for DOD on S&T 
observed that while the DOD S&T laboratory infrastructure was once 
world leading, the flow of research science, technology development, 
and engineering expertise is not as robust as it once was and, for the 
most part, it has declined to the point where most DOD S&T people are 
project managers who monitor research being done by others outside of 
DOD.[Footnote 26] While the discussion of human capital needs is 
considered a strategic planning best practice, the strategy does not 
include a discussion of the human capital currently engaged in space 
S&T or the human capital required to achieve the strategy's goals. 

* Identify Required Funding: Our prior work has shown that, in 
general, a lack of investment information can adversely affect the 
ability to avoid unnecessary duplication, control costs, ensure basic 
accountability, anticipate future costs, and measure performance. 
[Footnote 27] Funding required to implement and achieve the goals was 
not compiled or included in the strategy. Strategy developers told us 
that since they were not required to report funding information, they 
did not collect funding information from the various DOD research 
laboratories and components involved in space S&T and they did not 
impose funding constraints in developing the strategy. In addition, 
DNI officials told us there was no attempt to incorporate information 
on space S&T funding amounts associated with the intelligence 
community in the strategy. Furthermore, strategy developers told us 
that achieving top-level visibility for DOD space S&T funding is not a 
simple task and would require substantial effort. However, when asked 
about the biggest challenge to achieving the goals, strategy 
developers told us it was maintaining consistent funding in a funding-
constrained environment. In addition to funding information, neither 
an analysis of past trends nor future funding needs were included in 
the strategy, both of which could have established a recommended level 
of consistent funding. These efforts could potentially help mitigate 
risk to space S&T against the backdrop of growing national government 
fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that are straining all federal 
agencies' resources. 

* Prioritize Initiatives: The federal government faces real fiscal 
limitations and will have to make difficult choices about upcoming 
priorities, but the strategy does not go beyond what was required and 
prioritize the goals in a more definitive way than classifying them as 
either short-or long-term. We have reported that prioritizing 
initiatives enables evaluation in terms of overall importance to the 
portfolio and can help decision makers when allocating resources. 
[Footnote 28] Strategy developers told us criteria were not developed 
to either accept or reject goals for inclusion in the strategy or to 
prioritize a goal as either short-or long-term. Instead, they told us 
that meetings were convened to discuss and review draft goals and that 
the categorization of goals as either short-or long-term was based 
upon the professional judgment of the meeting participants with 
respect to the current state of technology and potential to achieve 
capabilities within nominal time frames. The strategy currently lists 
30 short-term and 24 long-term goals--22 more goals than were 
identified in the 2004 strategy--and gives no indication which ones 
are more important than the others. Strategy developers also added 
that more specific time frames or goal prioritization were not 
included in the strategy because that would require the assignment of 
resource (i.e., funding) commitments, which was not required. Since 
strategy goals were not prioritized, it will be difficult to determine 
which space S&T goals are the most important to the space S&T 
community if trade-off decisions are necessary. 

* Establish Ways to Measure Progress: Performance measures can be used 
to assess the value of projects relative to goals, demonstrate results 
and provide useful information for decision makers. The strategy did 
not develop new metrics or performance measures that could be used to 
assess whether the strategy's goals are being achieved. Rather, the 
strategy indicates that various periodic structured, and informal, 
programmatic and technical reviews are used to evaluate the 
effectiveness and quality of space S&T investments and assess progress 
toward achievement of objectives and goals. It is unclear how these 
reviews can help assess the larger strategic goals developed in the 
strategy that are meant to apply to DOD and the intelligence 
community. It is also unclear how the Reliance 21 program helps to 
specifically assess the progress of, and provide linkage to, the goals 
established in the strategy. Further, Reliance 21 reviews do not 
involve an examination of space S&T within the intelligence community. 
Without established ways to measure progress toward strategy goals, it 
will be more difficult to measure the progress and achievement of 
space S&T goals and implement corrective actions if needed. 

* Establish Process for Revising Goals in the Future: Criteria to 
establish and revise goals could help to improve performance and 
results. The strategy, however, does not articulate the process to be 
used to revise the goals in the future for the next version of the 
strategy. Strategy developers told us there were no criteria 
established to initially help formulate goals and that the general 
consensus of the officials involved determined which goals were 
included in the strategy. While this same process could be used to 
make revisions to the goals, the absence of criteria will likely make 
future revisions more difficult to track and understand, and certainly 
more ad hoc. 

Coordination Efforts in Strategy Development Were Limited and 
Implementation Efforts Are too Early to Assess: 

Although most organizations involved with the space S&T strategy 
participated significantly in developing its short-and long-term 
goals, participation among some organizations in developing other 
aspects of the strategy was more limited. DOD and DNI officials told 
GAO that their interpretation of the 2009 statute directing 
development of the strategy was that it did not require that the 
intelligence community be involved to the full extent in some aspects 
of the strategy. Moreover, although their involvement was not required 
by the statute, other agencies with investments in space S&T, such as 
NASA and NOAA, were not involved in the strategy's development. 
Together, the intelligence community and these other agencies conduct 
a significant amount of space S&T development. By limiting their 
involvement, DOD may have missed an opportunity to leverage these 
activities and optimize its own S&T spending. Also, since the strategy 
has only recently been issued, it is too early to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms planned to implement the 
strategy. 

Strategy Development Coordination within DOD Was Limited: 

According to an ASD (R&E) official, his office served as the lead in 
development of the strategy and explained that the methodology began 
with identifying DOD, DNI, and other space S&T stakeholders. As 
required, strategy developers consulted with the directors of DOD 
research laboratories and other DOD research components, as well as 
the heads of other DOD organizations that have interests in space S&T. 
Officials from most of the DOD laboratories and components said that 
they had participated in establishing the strategy goals. Seven of 
eight organizations we interviewed reported they were tasked to 
compile and submit their goals related to space S&T. Goals included in 
the final strategy were based on consensus agreement. Strategy 
developers organized the strategy goals under the space functional 
areas used in the National Security Space Plan. Goals were categorized 
as either short-or long-term, based on the professional judgment of 
the strategy developers with respect to the current state of 
technology and the potential to achieve the desired capabilities 
within nominal time frames. 

While it is clear that DOD research laboratories and components were 
consulted, and most assisted in the development of the strategy, it is 
also clear from our discussions with these organizations that their 
involvement was typically limited to contributing to the establishment 
of short-and long-term space S&T goals. Although workgroups were 
established to develop each of the strategy's sections, responses 
varied concerning the level of involvement. Some organizations' 
participation in the development of the strategy's sections that 
discuss the implementation, assessment, and transition of space S&T 
was limited. Some research laboratories and components reported 
playing larger roles in the workgroups than others. 

DOD strategy developers told us that, in developing the strategy, they 
did not direct DOD research laboratories or components to identify and 
provide a compilation of their space S&T projects being worked on or 
planned. On the basis of the statute, they were not specifically 
required to do so. They also were not required to, nor did they ask 
these research laboratories and components to, provide planned budget 
information associated with their space S&T projects. Officials 
explained that they did not believe this was necessary or would 
provide value to the development of the strategy and said they have 
processes in place, such as the Reliance 21 program, to help 
facilitate the coordination of space S&T projects within DOD. Reliance 
21, however, is a DOD program and does not involve reviews of space 
S&T projects within the intelligence community. 

Strategy Development Coordination between DOD and the Intelligence 
Community Was Limited: 

DNI, while not required to in the development of the strategy, did not 
provide a compilation of space S&T projects, nor the associated 
planned budget information for assessment as the strategy was being 
developed. While the statutory provision for the strategy was amended 
in 2009 to require DNI to jointly develop the strategy with DOD, 
[Footnote 29] other parts of the statute do not specifically call for 
DNI's involvement. DOD and DNI officials told us they interpreted this 
to mean the intelligence community was not required to be involved to 
the full extent in some aspects of the strategy. Specifically, DNI 
officials told us that they interpret the statute to apply to the 
establishment of goals for DOD in the strategy, and that there is no 
requirement that these goals take into consideration the goals of the 
intelligence community. According to DNI officials, only where the DOD 
goals coincide with the already established goals of the intelligence 
community do they plan to work jointly toward goal accomplishment. 
Further, DNI officials told us that while the strategy addresses plans 
for implementing the goals established, these plans only apply to DOD 
and the strategy does not include implementation plans for the 
intelligence community. While coordination between DOD and DNI was 
limited in development of the strategy, strategy developers told us 
that apart from the development, they do coordinate regularly with 
each other on space S&T projects and also use on-site liaison 
personnel at the Air Force Research Laboratory and the National 
Reconnaissance Office. Strategy developers also provided some limited 
information on meetings and councils in which agencies within the two 
organizations participate. 

Although DOD did coordinate with DNI and the intelligence community, 
we believe greater coordination among the stakeholders would allow for 
the formation of a single strategic plan to guide this important area. 
In the past, we have raised concerns about DOD strategic planning and 
the degree to which DOD and DNI collaborate on space strategic 
planning. In 2008, we reported to Congress that we were concerned 
there was no overarching strategic guidance in place to link the 
defense and intelligence communities' future space programs, plans, 
and new space concepts.[Footnote 30] The National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), which served as the lead agent for DNI and the primary 
participant from the intelligence community in the development of the 
strategy, typically develops sophisticated space capabilities and is 
critically important to space intelligence. While the amount of money 
NRO spends on space S&T is classified, it is the premier space 
reconnaissance organization in the world and has established a 
priority to improve this area of investment. 

Further, strategy developers stated that they did not coordinate with 
NASA or NOAA in developing the strategy because the statute did not 
direct that these agencies be involved. NASA and NOAA are both 
involved in significant space S&T efforts with NASA's fiscal year 2012 
budget request including over $1 billion for space research and 
technology. NASA has a strategic plan of its own with a primary 
mission to drive advances in space science, technology, and 
exploration and can be involved in technology transfers to DOD and 
other agencies. While DOD and DNI did not coordinate with NASA in the 
development of the strategy, NASA and DOD periodically coordinate on 
S&T projects as part of the National Science and Technology Council. 
[Footnote 31] NASA's procedural requirements also recommend they 
search research and technology literature prior to investing in new 
research areas to minimize duplication of effort and look for 
opportunities to augment research and technology efforts from other 
agencies.[Footnote 32] NOAA conducts research in the development of 
new satellite sensors, new applications of satellite data, new 
approaches for handling increased data rates, as well as increased 
computing power and data storage. 

Conclusions: 

If done well, strategic planning provides the foundation for the most 
important things organizations do each day and fosters informed 
communication between organizations and their stakeholders. Strategic 
planning provides decision makers with a framework to guide program 
efforts and the means to determine if these efforts are achieving the 
desired results. While the strategy was a first step, it unfortunately 
was not a rigorous, comprehensive strategic plan. Instead, it embraces 
the status quo without laying out a path for assuring effective and 
efficient progress. The space S&T strategy could have gone beyond 
statutory requirements and provided the basis for a rigorous, 
comprehensive space S&T program, consistent with economic trends and 
budgetary constraints to ensure the United States continues to possess 
the advantages that space provides DOD and the intelligence community. 
Improving coordination and incorporating changes in future versions 
would help ensure the strategy addresses space S&T challenges, and 
help supports agency investments. Addressing these kinds of factors 
would enable DOD and the intelligence community to have a more 
effective strategy to guide this critical area of investment. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To optimize government investment in space S&T and address key 
challenges, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (who would 
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering 
and the DOD Executive Agent for Space) and the Director of National 
Intelligence make the following three improvements to enhance the next 
version of the space S&T strategy: 

* Develop a specific implementation plan that provides a detailed 
process for achieving the strategy's goals. 

* Include information on required human capital; required funding; 
prioritization; ways to measure progress against the goals; and 
process(es) for revising goals to address the challenges in space S&T. 

* Enhance coordination between the DOD space S&T community, the 
intelligence space S&T community, and NASA and NOAA in the development 
of the strategy so that the space S&T area can be examined 
strategically. 

Agency Comments: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all 
three of our recommendations to enhance the next version of the space 
S&T strategy. DNI did not offer any comments on the draft report 
provided for their review. 

DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, the DOD 
Executive Agent for Space, the Director of National Intelligence, and 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The report also 
is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Staff members making key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Cristina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Chairman:
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss:
Vice Chairman:
Select Committee on Intelligence:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Mike Rogers:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, III:
Ranking Member:
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Norman Dicks: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent the 2011 space science and technology (S&T) 
strategy addressed statutory requirements, we compared the strategy 
contents to the congressional requirements in 10 U.S.C. Section 2272 
and asked the Department of Defense (DOD) and Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) officials for additional details when necessary. We 
also met with DOD and DNI officials to discuss and collect information 
on the methods, approaches, and analyses used to support the content 
of the strategy. 

We also identified existing challenges in space S&T documented in 
prior government and GAO reports and compared these challenges to the 
areas covered by the strategy's contents. Further, we identified best 
practices in strategic planning and compared the strategy's contents 
to these best practices to determine if there were ways to improve it. 
We obtained the strategic planning best practices from the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993, Office of Management and Budget 
Circular No. A-11, Part 6, Preparation and Submission of Strategic 
Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Program Performance 
Reports, July 2010, and prior GAO reports. 

To determine the extent of coordination efforts used to develop and 
implement the strategy, we discussed the coordination methods used in 
the strategy's development with officials from the Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering (formerly the Director, 
Defense Research and Engineering); Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (including National Reconnaissance Office officials); 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Missile Defense Agency; 
Army Materiel Command; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Army Space and Missile and 
Defense Command; Naval Research Laboratory; Office of Naval Research; 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; 
Air Force Research Laboratory; and the Department of Energy. Since the 
strategy has only recently been issued, and given the time constraints 
of our review,[Footnote 33] it was too early to assess the mechanisms 
and processes outlined in the strategy for its implementation. 

We also reviewed other relevant high-level space strategic plans 
including the National Security Strategy, the National Security Space 
Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Space Policy, 
the Defense Science and Technology Strategy, the DOD Research and 
Engineering Strategic Plan, and the DOD Space Science and Technology 
Strategy (2004). 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to July 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Research And Engineering: 
3030 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3030: 

July 6, 2011: 

Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. General Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO 11-722, "Space Research Content and Coordination of Space 
Science and Technology Strategy Need to be More Robust," dated July 
2011 (GAO Code 120978). 

The draft report recommends that the Secretary of Defense (who would 
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering 
and the DoD Executive Agent for Space) and the Director of National 
Intelligence make the following improvements to enhance the next 
version of the space S&T strategy: 

* Develop a specific implementation plan that provides a detailed 
process for achieving the strategy's goals. 

* Include information on required human capital; required funding; 
prioritization; ways to measure progress against the goals; and 
process(es) for revising goals to address challenges in space S&T. 

* Enhance coordination between the DOD space S&T community, the 
intelligence space S&T community, and NASA and NOAA in the development 
of the strategy so that the space S&T area can be examined 
strategically. 

The Department concurs with these recommendations. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

[Illegible] for: 
Zachary J. Lemnios: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or ChaplainC@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Art Gallegos, Assistant 
Director; Tim Persons; Marie Ahearn; Don Springman; LeAnna Parkey; and 
Laura Greifner made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The intelligence community includes organizations and offices from 
both DOD and the national intelligence community. In addition to the 
intelligence branches of the military services, there are four major 
intelligence agencies within DOD: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the 
National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; 
and the National Reconnaissance Office. The national intelligence 
community also includes agencies such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency as well as intelligence-related offices in other federal 
agencies. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 911 (2009). 

[3] 10 U.S.C. § 2272. 

[4] The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the 
national intelligence community. 

[5] The President's Budget for fiscal year 2012 was submitted to 
Congress on February 14, 2011. The first space science and technology 
strategy was submitted to Congress in April 2011. The statutory 
requirement is to submit the strategy to the Congressional defense 
committees. Additionally, House of Representatives Conference Report 
No. 111-288 (2009) for the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 further provided 
that the strategy is to be submitted to the Senate Committee on 
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

[6] GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD 
Technology Transition Processes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 
2006). 

[7] GAO, Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology 
Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future 
Versions Need to Be More Robust, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-155] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 
2005). 

[8] GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy 
Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-431R] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2008). 

[9] GAO, DOD's High Risk Areas: Observations on DOD's Progress and 
Challenges in Strategic Planning for Supply Chain Management, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-929T] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 27, 2010). 

[10] Additionally, GAO was directed to review and assess the 
effectiveness of the coordination process required under 10 U.S.C. § 
2272(b), which provides that in carrying out the developed space S&T 
strategy the directors of DOD research laboratories and other DOD 
research components, as well as the heads of other appropriate 
organizations, shall (1) identify research projects in support of the 
strategy that contribute directly and uniquely to the development of 
space technology and (2) inform certain DOD officials of the planned 
budget and planned schedule for executing those projects. 

[11] While statutory provisions also include the Army Research 
Laboratory as a DOD research laboratory, we did not meet with 
officials from that laboratory because Army officials told us they do 
not conduct a significant amount of space S&T work. 

[12] Government research laboratories can include both national 
laboratories and other federally funded research and development 
centers. 

[13] The strategy was required to be included as part of the annual 
National Security Space Plan and provided to DOD components and S&T 
entities to support the planning, programming, and budget process of 
DOD. Additionally, the strategy was required to be available for 
review by the congressional defense committees. The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136 § 911 
(2003). 

[14] The strategy was required to be revised annually "as 
appropriate." Pub. L. No. 108-136 § 911(a). DOD officials told us the 
strategy was reviewed in 2006, but it was determined an update was not 
necessary. 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-155]. 

[16] The Reliance 21 program is a DOD process established to help 
perform strategic planning by integrating and coordinating DOD S&T 
investment information and encouraging transparency across all DOD 
components by using a comprehensive database of DOD S&T investments to 
enable DOD scientists, engineers, and executives to formulate and 
conduct well-coordinated research programs. 

[17] The Applied Technology Council provides senior leadership 
attention and the forum to ensure that appropriate organizations 
associated with the Air Force Research Laboratory's Applied Technology 
Demonstrations (ATD) are brought together to formally commit resources 
to transition technologies to support the warfighter. The products of 
ATDs are technology options, which can be further developed, 
integrated, tested, and acquired. The end product is a weapon system, 
support, or infrastructure application. 

[18] S&T for National Security. DOD sponsored report written by MITRE 
Corp. (2009) and U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Challenges 
and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture, Report 
No. 110-914 (2008). 

[19] GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD 
Technology Transition Processes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 
2006). 

[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-113]. 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883]. 

[22] Pub. L. No. 103-62. 

[23] OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 6, Preparation and Submission of 
Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Program 
Performance Reports (July 2010). 

[24] GAO, DOD's High-Risk Areas: Observations on DOD's Progress and 
Challenges in Strategic Planning for Supply Chain Management, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-929T] (Washington, D.C.: 

July 27, 2010). 

[25] U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Challenges and 
Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture, Report No.110-
914 (2008). 

[26] S&T for National Security, DOD sponsored report written by MITRE 
Corp. (2009). 

[27] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve DOD's 
Oversight of Power Source Investments, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-113] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 30, 
2010). 

[28] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach 
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2007). 

[29] While there was no requirement for the 2004 strategy to be 
jointly developed by DOD and DNI, this was a requirement for the 2011 
strategy. 

[30] GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy 
Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-431R] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2008). 

[31] The National Science and Technology Council is a Cabinet-level 
Council that is the principal means within the executive branch to 
coordinate science and technology policy across the diverse entities 
that make up the federal research and development enterprise. 

[32] NASA Procedural Requirements, 7120.8, NASA Research and 
Technology Program and Project Management Requirements (Feb. 5, 2008). 

[33] 10 U.S.C. § 2272 as amended by the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010, section 911, which requires that GAO submit 
its report to the congressional defense committees no later than 90 
days after the strategy is submitted by the Secretary of Defense and 
the Director of National Intelligence. The first strategy was submitted 
April 2011. 

[End of section] 

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