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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

July 2011: 

Ballistic Missile Defense: 

Actions Needed to Improve Training Integration and Increase 
Transparency of Training Resources: 

GAO-11-625: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-625, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent over $80 billion 
on developing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 
comprised of various land-and sea-based elements employed by multiple 
combatant commands and services. Since the time available to intercept 
a missile is short, integrating training among all organizations 
involved is important to connect seams where commands and elements 
must work together. In response to House Report 111-491 which 
accompanied H.R. 5136, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) 
developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile defense training 
across and among commands and multiple elements, and identified 
training roles, responsibilities, and commensurate authorities; and 
(2) identified and budgeted for the resources to support training. To 
do so, GAO analyzed DOD training instructions, plans, exercises, and 
budgets and assessed the extent to which the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) and the services have agreed on training cost estimates and 
funding responsibilities. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has identified roles and responsibilities and developed training 
plans for individual ballistic missile defense elements and combatant 
commands, but has not developed a strategy for integrating training 
among ballistic missile defense organizations and elements in a manner 
that requires them to operate as they would in an actual engagement. A 
Joint Staff Instruction sets out tenets of joint training including “
train the way you operate” and DOD guidance requires synchronization 
of training among the services and combatant commands. The services 
and combatant commands are conducting some integrating training—
training across and among combatant commands and services—but our 
analysis of exercises shows that there may be some training gaps. For 
example, although some exercises included more than one combatant 
command, few included multiple live elements. GAO’s guide for 
assessing training programs states that a training program should 
include an overall training strategy and an organization that is held 
accountable for achieving training goals. However, DOD has not 
developed an overall strategy that includes requirements and standards 
for integrating ballistic missile defense training because DOD has not 
clearly designated an entity to be responsible for integrating 
training across and among all organizations involved and provided it 
with the authority to do so. Without an overall strategy that includes 
requirements and standards for integrating training, DOD runs the risk 
that the organizations that need to work together may have limited 
opportunities to realistically interact prior to an actual engagement. 

DOD lacks visibility over the total resources that may be needed to 
support ballistic missile defense training since the funds are 
currently dispersed across MDA and the services, and some of the 
services’ budget estimates do not separately identify ballistic 
missile defense training. A further complication is that agreements 
between MDA and the services on funding responsibilities and life-
cycle cost estimates—which include training—have not been completed 
and approved for all elements. GAO compiled budget documents and data 
from various sources and estimated about $4 billion has been planned 
for ballistic missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 
2016. However, some of the services’ resources for ballistic missile 
defense training are not easily identifiable since some training is 
funded as part of a more comprehensive training program. GAO found 
examples of gaps between training requirements and budgeted resources, 
such as a $300 million requirement in the Terminal High Altitude Air 
Defense program that is not included in MDA’s budget plans. DOD and 
MDA policies identify the need to complete cost estimates and funding 
responsibilities for elements as they are developed; however, there 
are no procedures or deadlines in place requiring that MDA and the 
services agree on funding responsibilities and complete training cost 
estimates before elements are fielded. As a result, DOD and 
congressional decision makers do not have a full picture of the 
resources that will be needed over time and risk training gaps. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD designate an entity with authority to develop 
a strategy for integrating training, and set a deadline to complete 
training cost estimates and funding agreements and report total BMDS 
training cost estimates. DOD generally concurred with the merits of 
our recommendations but did not commit to a timeframe for 
implementation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-625] or key 
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (404) 679-
1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Some Integrating Ballistic Missile Defense Training Occurs but Gaps 
May Exist and Current Efforts Are Not Guided by a Holistic Strategy: 

Ballistic Missile Defense Training Funds Are Dispersed and Total 
Resources Not Easily Identified: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: GAO's Analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense Exercises: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: List of Selected BMDS Elements, the Lead Service, 
Description, and Date Initially Fielded: 

Table 2: Summary of BMDS Integrating Training Exercises Conducted in 
Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010: 

Table 3: Training Responsibilities of Various DOD Organizations: 

Table 4: GAO's Compilation of MDA, Army, Navy, and Air Force Budget 
Estimates for Ballistic Missile Defense Training: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Training Tiers: 

Figure 2: Integrating Training Among the Tiers in Ballistic Missile 
Defense Exercises: 

Figure 3: Integrating Training Across the Tiers in Ballistic Missile 
Defense Exercises: 

Figure 3: Continued: 

Abbreviations: 

AN/TPY-2: Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance System: 

BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 18, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

In 2002, the President of the United States directed the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to field an integrated, interconnected, and layered 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capable of defending the U.S. 
homeland, deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic 
missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. DOD has spent over $80 
billion to develop the BMDS, and since its initial fielding has added 
additional capabilities. Since there is limited time available to 
intercept an incoming missile, integrating training among all 
organizations involved is essential to connect the seams where the 
commands and services must work together. However, DOD recognizes that 
funding for training will face significant budget pressures amid the 
department's competing demands for current operations, acquisitions, 
and personnel expenses. 

The BMDS is comprised of various land-and sea-based elements,[Footnote 
1] including radars, interceptors,[Footnote 2] and command and control 
systems that are employed together to effectively intercept an 
incoming missile. Ballistic missile defense is an inherently joint 
operation that may require the simultaneous involvement of multiple 
commands and services which operate the system's elements. For 
example, each combatant command is responsible for ballistic missile 
defense operations in its geographic area and individual ballistic 
missile defense elements are operated by a lead military service. 
[Footnote 3] In addition, a combatant command and the service units 
and organizations in one geographic area may have to work with their 
counterparts in another geographic area to intercept a ballistic 
missile that crosses from one area into another. Since the time 
available to identify, track, and intercept ballistic missiles is 
generally less than 30 minutes,[Footnote 4] effective integration of 
all the commands and elements is critical to successful ballistic 
missile defense operations. Training of the combatant commands and 
services in a joint environment is essential to such integration. 

This report responds to House Report 111-491 which accompanied a bill 
for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 
5136). In the House Report, the committee expressed concerns that 
current training programs for missile defense do not fully reflect the 
global and inherently joint nature of ballistic missile defense system 
operations. The House Report directed GAO to provide information 
describing existing training and education programs for ballistic 
missile defense, an assessment of synchronization and standardization 
across training programs and recommendations for training 
improvements. In response, this report assesses the extent to which 
DOD has (1) developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile defense 
training across and among commands and multiple elements and 
identified training roles, responsibilities, and commensurate 
authorities; and (2) identified and budgeted for resources to support 
ballistic missile defense training. 

To address our objectives we obtained and analyzed relevant documents-
-including reports, instructions, and data--related to ballistic 
missile defense training and interviewed officials from across DOD 
such as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA); the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics; the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; 
the combatant commands; and various organizations within the 
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. To assess the extent to 
which DOD has developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile 
defense training across and among commands and multiple elements and 
identified training roles, responsibilities, and commensurate 
authorities, we obtained and reviewed DOD, combatant command, and 
service instructions and training plans. We also analyzed ballistic 
missile defense exercise information from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 
to determine the extent to which integrating training across and among 
commands and service-operated elements has occurred. To assess the 
extent to which DOD has identified and budgeted for resources to 
support ballistic missile defense training, we analyzed MDA and 
service budget documents and assessed training budget data and 
compared budget documents and data to training requirements to assess 
whether there were shortfalls between budget estimates and training 
requirements. We also assessed the extent to which MDA and the 
services have agreed on training cost estimates and funding 
responsibilities. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to July 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further 
details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

Background: 

There are several levels of DOD organizations that are involved in 
ballistic missile defense operations. In general, these organizations 
can be categorized into "tiers" as shown in the figure below: 

Figure 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Training Tiers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Tier 1: 
Individuals who exercise national command authority (e.g. the 
Secretary of Defense). 

Tier 2: 
Combatant command staff (e.g. personnel from US Pacific Command). 

Tier 3:
Regional operations centers within the services[A] (e.g. air 
operations centers). 

Tier 4: 
Service tactical units responsible for operating the various ballistic 
missile defense elements (e.g. the 100th Missile Defense Brigade, 
which operates the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element). 

Source: GAO summary of DOD documents. 

Note: Although the definition of tiers can vary somewhat, we worked 
with the combatant commands to define the tiers as shown here. 

[A] Regional operations centers develop operational plans based on 
strategic guidance. 

[End of figure] 

Integrating training is training that includes live participants from 
more than one tier and/or multiple organizations from within the same 
tier. Live participants refer to personnel who participate in the 
exercises using equipment that requires them to operate as they would 
in an actual ballistic missile defense engagement. According to a 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction[Footnote 5] the 
joint training vision is for everyone required to conduct military 
operations to be trained under realistic conditions and to exacting 
standards prior to execution of those operations. The instruction also 
sets out tenets of joint training, including "train the way you 
operate" and states that joint training must be based on relevant 
conditions and realistic standards. In addition, according to joint 
doctrine for joint operations to counter theater air and missile 
threats across the range of military operations, coordination between 
organizations involved in cross-boundary missile defense operations 
must be rehearsed--i.e., trained--not just planned.[Footnote 6] 
Depending on the type of ballistic missile defense engagement, not all 
four tiers need to be involved in each event for the training to be 
realistic; however, ballistic missile defense operations generally 
necessitate integration both horizontally across a tier, and 
vertically between at least two tiers. For example, engaging a 
ballistic missile threat may require horizontal coordination across 
more than one combatant command and multiple elements as well as 
vertical coordination from the combatant commands down to the 
elements. Finally, DOD recognizes the importance of integrating 
ballistic missile defense training horizontally and vertically. DOD's 
Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department 
of Defense[Footnote 7] considers synchronizing training among the 
services, combatant commands, and others to be a requirement of 
training integration and states that an immersive training environment 
must support full-spectrum operations, including missile defense. To 
enhance training integration for the BMDS the U.S. Strategic Command, 
U.S. Joint Forces Command, and MDA began organizing the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Training and Education Group, which also includes 
combatant commands and the services in July 2010.[Footnote 8] 
According to the draft charter, goals for the group include 
identifying, evaluating, and coordinating ballistic missile defense 
training requirements and, in coordination with key ballistic missile 
defense stakeholders, increasing the effectiveness of ballistic 
missile defense training by promoting the development and 
implementation of a standardized training program. 

DOD faces training challenges as it concurrently develops the elements 
and transitions the elements to the services to operate them. Table 1 
includes a description of selected BMDS elements, the lead service for 
each element, and shows when each element was initially fielded. 

Table 1: List of Selected BMDS Elements, the Lead Service, 
Description, and Date Initially Fielded: 

BMDS element: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense; 
Lead Service: Navy; 
Description: This ship-based element is designed to protect deployed 
U.S. forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missile attacks and 
to serve as a forward-deployed sensor, especially in support of the 
ground-based mission; 
Date initially fielded: September 2004. 

BMDS element: Ground-based Midcourse Defense; 
Lead Service: Army; 
Description: This element is designed to protect the U.S. homeland 
against incoming ballistic missiles launched from Northeast Asia and 
the Middle East; 
Date initially fielded: September 2004. 

BMDS element: Patriot Advanced Capability 3; 
Lead Service: Army; 
Description: This element provides simultaneous air and missile 
defense capabilities as the Lower Tier element in defense of U.S. 
deployed forces and allies against short-range ballistic missiles; 
Date initially fielded: September 2001; Transferred to Army in 2003. 

BMDS element: Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/ 
TPY-2) Forward Based; 
Lead Service: Army; 
Description: This transportable, land-based X-band radar will be 
forward-based to provide additional advance warning of ballistic 
missile launches; 
Date initially fielded: June 2006. 

BMDS element: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); 
Lead Service: Army; 
Description: This ground-based element is designed to defend deployed 
U.S. forces and population centers against short-and medium-range 
ballistic missiles; 
Date initially fielded: 2nd Quarter 2012. 

BMDS element: Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications; 
Lead Service: None; 
Description: A networked computer and communications element developed 
by MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing deliberate planning, 
situational awareness, sensor management, and battle management 
capabilities; 
Date initially fielded: Initial capability delivered in 2004. 

BMDS element: Sea Based X Band Radar; 
Lead Service: Navy; 
Description: This radar, built on a movable sea platform, will improve 
the ability to acquire, track, and discriminate decoys during the 
midcourse of flight; 
Date initially fielded: February 2007. 

BMDS element: Cobra Dane; 
Lead Service: Air Force; 
Description: This sensor is designed to provide updated midcourse 
missile tracking data to the ground-based element; 
Date initially fielded: October 2004. 

BMDS element: Upgraded Early Warning Radar; 
Lead Service: Air Force; 
Description: This sensor is designed to provide updated midcourse 
missile tracking data to the ground-based element; 
Date initially fielded: December 2004. 

Source: Summary from prior GAO reports and DOD information. 

[End of table] 

In order to facilitate the transition of responsibilities for 
ballistic missile defense elements--including responsibilities for 
training--from MDA to the services, MDA has overarching memoranda of 
agreement with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each of these 
overarching agreements provides a framework for the service and MDA to 
develop specific agreements on responsibilities, including developing 
doctrine, training, and facilities requirements for each element. In 
addition, DOD intends to develop element-specific agreements to 
specify which organization will fund specific operating and support 
costs, including training. In 2008, DOD created the BMDS Life Cycle 
Management Process, in part, to manage the BMDS as a portfolio and 
develop a ballistic missile defense budget that includes funding for 
MDA support of ballistic missile defense training. 

This report is one in a series of reports we have issued on ballistic 
missile defense. For example, we reported earlier this year that while 
MDA has improved the transparency and accountability of its 
acquisition decisions, we found issues limiting the extent to which 
cost, schedule, and performance can be tracked and unexplained 
inconsistencies in unit and life-cycle cost baselines.[Footnote 9] 
Also this year, we reported that DOD's implementation of the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach faces challenges including a lack of clear 
guidance and life-cycle cost estimates.[Footnote 10] In addition, in 
September 2009 we reported that DOD had not identified its 
requirements for BMDS elements and had not fully established units to 
operate the elements before making them available for use.[Footnote 
11] DOD generally concurred with our recommendations in these reports, 
and in their comments indicated plans to take some action to address 
them. For a list of GAO reports on ballistic missile defense, see the 
list of Related GAO Products at the end of this report. 

Some Integrating Ballistic Missile Defense Training Occurs but Gaps 
May Exist and Current Efforts Are Not Guided by a Holistic Strategy: 

DOD has identified roles and responsibilities and developed training 
plans for individual ballistic missile defense elements and combatant 
commands, but it has not developed an overarching strategy for 
integrating ballistic missile defense that specifies requirements for 
training across and among commands and multiple elements. DOD and 
Joint Staff guidance emphasize the importance of realistic joint 
training based on relevant conditions and realistic standards. In 
addition, DOD's strategic plan for training sets out requirements for 
training integration including synchronizing DOD component training 
among the services and combatant commands. The services and combatant 
commands conduct some integrating training; however, our analysis 
showed that there are some training gaps such as limited training 
across more than two tiers and simulated rather than live 
participation in exercises. For example, only 7 of the 45 exercises we 
analyzed included live combatant commands, regional operations 
centers, and tactical units participating together. DOD officials 
stated that realistic training for the BMDS should include multiple 
live elements operated by service personnel--rather than simulations--
and multiple tiers interacting in the same training scenario, but 
there are no clear requirements for how much integrating training 
would be sufficient. GAO's guide for assessing training programs 
states that a training program should include the development of an 
overall training strategy.[Footnote 12] However, DOD has not developed 
an overall training strategy for the BMDS because it has not 
identified an entity to be responsible for doing so. Without a clear 
strategy for conducting integrating ballistic missile defense training 
across and among commands and elements, DOD faces the risk that 
organizations that need to work together may have limited 
opportunities to realistically interact prior to an actual engagement. 

DOD Is Conducting Some Ballistic Missile Defense Integrating Training 
but Gaps May Exist: 

We analyzed 45 ballistic missile defense exercises that occurred in 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and found examples of integrating training 
that occurred across and among tiers. The combatant commands conduct 
major exercises for training their staffs and assigned forces in their 
mission-essential tasks--of which ballistic missile defense is one--
and hosted 21 exercises that included ballistic missile defense in 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010. These exercises often included live 
participation from regional operations centers and some live tactical 
units. At the tactical level, the Navy requires ships to train at 
least every 6 months in an integrated ballistic missile defense 
exercise that always includes live Aegis ballistic missile defense 
ships and often includes cross-element training with live Patriot 
units. These exercises also occasionally included integrating training 
with the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense elements, and often included live 
participation from regional operations centers. In addition, U.S. 
Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 
Missile Defense sponsors integrating training events synchronized with 
MDA equipment tests. Although these events focus on testing they also 
provide integrating training opportunities for combatant command 
staff, regional operations centers, and tactical units. 

While DOD is performing some integrating BMDS training, our analysis 
of ballistic missile defense exercises showed some gaps. For example, 
we found limited live participation of BMDS tactical units and only 10 
of the 45 exercises included more than two tiers. Specifically, only 7 
of the 45 exercises that we analyzed included live combatant commands, 
regional operations centers, and tactical units, and only 1 of those 
also included all four tiers. Moreover, as can be seen in table 2, 
live participation of BMDS tactical units was limited mostly to Aegis 
and Patriot. (More detailed results of GAO's ballistic missile defense 
exercise analysis are provided in appendix II.) 

Table 2: Summary of BMDS Integrating Training Exercises Conducted in 
Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010: 

Exercise sponsor: Combatant commands; 
Number of exercises: 21; 
Extent of integration: Live participation was typically limited to 
interaction with regional operations centers; Elements were usually 
simulated; Only one third of the exercises included more than one live 
combatant command. 

Exercise sponsor: Regional operations centers; 
Number of exercises: 8; 
Extent of integration: Live participation was limited to interaction 
with tactical units; Few elements participated live. 

Exercise sponsor: Tactical units; 
Number of exercises: 16; 
Extent of integration: Live participation of tactical units was 
typically limited to Aegis and Patriot; Live participation was 
typically limited to interaction with regional operations centers. 

Exercise sponsor: Total; 
Number of exercises: 45. 

Source: GAO analysis of combatant command and service exercise data. 

Note: Although the detailed results of the BMDS exercises are 
classified, the above table is an unclassified summary of the 
exercises. 

[End of table] 

Although most of the exercises we analyzed included the participation 
of either regional operations centers or tactical units, DOD officials 
at several organizations stated that more training focused on 
integrating those two tiers is necessary in order to achieve realistic 
training as identified in DOD policy. Officials also identified the 
need for an affordable, scalable, distributed, and fully integrated 
training capability that would allow for more integrating training 
with live participants within and across the tiers. To address this 
need, officials indicated DOD is planning a more robust missile 
mission training capability to enable integrating training through the 
tiers, but officials said this capability is early in development and, 
at this time, does not include tactical-level BMDS elements. 

DOD Has Not Developed a Strategy for Integrating BMDS Training: 

GAO's guide for assessing training programs states that a training 
program should include the development of an overall training strategy 
and an organization that is held accountable for achieving training 
goals.[Footnote 13] Additionally, DOD officials stated that increased 
frequency of integrating training would be beneficial but there are no 
clear requirements for how much integrating training would be 
sufficient. However, DOD has not developed such a training strategy 
for the holistic BMDS that specifies clear requirements and standards 
for integrating training because DOD has not clearly designated an 
entity to be responsible for integrating ballistic missile defense 
training across and among combatant commands and services and provided 
the entity with the authority to do so. 

Individual combatant commands and services have training 
responsibilities within their own organizations but generally do not 
establish training requirements for other organizations. Table 3 below 
shows training responsibilities of various DOD organizations. 

Table 3: Training Responsibilities of Various DOD Organizations: 

DOD organization: Joint Staff; 
Responsible for: Formulating policies for joint training. 

DOD organization: U.S. Strategic Command; 
Responsible for: Synchronizing planning for global ballistic missile 
defense operations. 

DOD organization: U.S. Joint Forces Command; 
Responsible for: Assisting combatant commands and services in 
preparing for joint operations. 

DOD organization: Regional Combatant Commands; 
Responsible for:: Training their staffs and assigned forces. 

DOD organization: Missile Defense Agency; 
Responsible for: Providing new equipment training, individual training 
for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, and all training for 
the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications element. 

DOD organization: Services; 
Responsible for: Individual, unit, and sustainment training. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD documents. 

[End of table] 

The training responsibilities of these DOD organizations do not 
clearly identify an organization with responsibility for integrating 
ballistic missile defense training across and among tiers. For 
example, although U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for 
synchronizing planning for missile defense, officials explained that 
the command is only responsible for synchronizing planning for 
operations and it does not have the responsibility or authority for 
integrating ballistic missile defense training. U.S. Joint Forces 
Command is designated as the joint force trainer, but officials 
explained their role is to support combatant commands' joint training 
by providing the technical capabilities for different organizations to 
train together, not to set training requirements for any particular 
mission, such as ballistic missile defense.[Footnote 14] MDA provides 
initial training for new and upgraded elements, most of the training 
for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element and all training for 
the Command, Control Battle Management and Communications element. MDA 
is not responsible for developing training requirements for other DOD 
organizations. In addition, Joint Staff guidance for joint training 
charges the Chairman with responsibility for formulating policies for 
joint training and requires the development of training plans, but 
officials said the training policy generally does not include setting 
training requirements for any particular mission. 

DOD recognizes the need for a cross-cutting group to examine BMDS 
training issues, but its latest effort is structured differently from 
other groups created to establish joint training requirements and as a 
result may not be as effective. In 2010, DOD organized a group, called 
the Ballistic Missile Training and Education Group. According to the 
group's draft charter, the department does not have a coordinated 
ballistic missile defense training and education approach "that will 
ensure [an] effective synergistic employment of assets…" In addition, 
the draft charter sets out the group's goals which include 
identifying, evaluating, and coordinating ballistic missile defense 
training requirements and, in coordination with key ballistic missile 
defense stakeholders, increasing the effectiveness of ballistic 
missile defense training by promoting the development and 
implementation of a standardized training program. However, the draft 
charter does not indicate that the group itself will have the 
authority to set ballistic missile defense training requirements and 
standards, or that its members will have the authority to speak on 
behalf of the organizations they represent. Instead, the group is 
expected to review issues that members nominate and make 
recommendations for improving training to the group's senior 
leadership--comprised of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, and MDA--which may, in turn, raise issues to the Missile 
Defense Executive Board.[Footnote 15] At a March 2011 meeting, the 
group identified several issues such as improving distributed training 
capabilities and training devices. However, the group has not 
identified the need to develop a strategy for integrating training 
across and among tiers that would include training requirements and 
standards. Although DOD officials have expressed confidence in this 
group, the group is not quite a year old, is still finalizing its 
charter and its effectiveness in identifying and resolving training 
issues is unproven. Further, it is not clear that any of the three 
organizations comprising the group's senior leadership would have the 
authority to develop an integrating training strategy or requirements 
that all tiers must meet. In similar instances, DOD has designated a 
lead organization with clearly defined responsibilities and the 
authority to establish joint training requirements. For example, the 
Joint Staff has issued instructions for Joint Interface Training and 
for joint training on the Global Command and Control System. In both 
instances, the instructions defined responsibilities and provided the 
designated groups with the authority to develop and implement training 
requirements. 

Without a clear strategy that specifies requirements and standards for 
integrating ballistic missile defense training across and among the 
commands involved, DOD may have difficulty identifying and resolving 
training gaps. The lack of a strategy also means that some 
organizations that are developing a capability to increase live 
participation in integrating training are doing so without guidance or 
goals on which organizations should participate and at what frequency--
factors that may influence the design and capacity of the training 
capability. In addition, different organizations may develop varying 
training requirements and priorities for integrating their training 
programs with other organizations. Further, without a strategy, DOD 
runs the risk that organizations that need to work together may have 
limited opportunities to realistically interact prior to an actual 
engagement and this risk may increase over the next few years as more 
elements are fielded. 

Ballistic Missile Defense Training Funds Are Dispersed and Total 
Resources Not Easily Identified: 

DOD lacks visibility over the total resources that may be needed to 
support ballistic missile defense training since the funds are 
currently dispersed across MDA and the services, and some of the 
services' budget estimates do not separately identify ballistic 
missile defense training. An additional complication is that 
agreements between MDA and the services on funding responsibilities 
and life-cycle cost estimates--which include training--have not been 
completed and approved for all elements.[Footnote 16] We compiled 
budget documents and data from various sources and estimated about $4 
billion is planned to support ballistic missile defense training from 
fiscal years 2011 through 2016 but this number could vary as 
additional capabilities are added. We also found examples of gaps 
between training requirements and budgeted resources, such as a $300 
million requirement in the THAAD Program that is not included in MDA's 
budget plans. DOD and MDA policies identify the need to complete cost 
estimates and funding responsibilities for elements as they are 
developed. However, DOD has not yet identified the total resources 
necessary to support ballistic missile defense training and has not 
determined the long-term funding responsibilities because there are no 
procedures or firm deadlines in place requiring that MDA and the 
services agree on funding responsibilities and complete training cost 
estimates before elements are fielded. As a result, DOD and 
congressional decision makers do not have a full picture of the 
resources that will be needed over time and risk training gaps. 

Ballistic Missile Defense Training Funds are Dispersed Across Multiple 
Organizations and Difficult to Identify: 

DOD's budget and Future Years Defense Program include funds for 
ballistic missile defense training, but funds are dispersed across MDA 
and multiple accounts across the services, making it difficult for DOD 
to identify the total training resources. Currently, MDA's budget 
supports new equipment training for BMDS elements, the portion of 
combatant command exercises that include ballistic missile defense 
events, general ballistic missile defense education courses, all 
training for the Command, Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications element, and most training for the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense element.[Footnote 17] The Army and Navy budgets 
support individual, unit, and sustainment training for their elements, 
and facilities to support this training.[Footnote 18] 

We compiled available budget documents and data from MDA and the 
services and estimated about $4 billion is planned to support 
ballistic missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 
2016. While we were able to compile an approximate budget estimate, 
some of the service's ballistic missile defense specific training 
budgets are not easily identifiable since some ballistic missile 
defense training for the services is provided and funded as part of a 
more comprehensive training program and some training budget estimates 
were not able to be identified. For example, the budget estimates to 
support multimission elements like Aegis and Patriot include training 
for ballistic missile defense in addition to training for missions 
other than ballistic missile defense. Furthermore, an Army official 
was unable to provide budget estimates for the AN/TPY-2 radar from 
fiscal years 2011 to 2016 because they only recently began using the 
Army's budget development system and have not yet estimated costs 
across the Future Years Defense Program.[Footnote 19] Table 4 below 
summarizes GAO's compilation of MDA and the services' budget estimates 
for training. 

Table 4: GAO's Compilation of MDA, Army, Navy, and Air Force Budget 
Estimates for Ballistic Missile Defense Training: 

MDA and service budget estimates: 

MDA training budget[A]: 

Ballistic Missile Defense Training and Education Center; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $37.7 million. 

Combatant Command Exercises; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $154.4 million. 

Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $34.7 million. 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $70.5 million. 

THAAD; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $67.8 million. 

Aegis; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $33.1 million. 

THAAD Simulators; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $1.922 billion. 

Subtotal MDA; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $2.320 billion. 

Army training budget[B]: 

Patriot Advanced Capability-3; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $1.380 billion. 

THAAD; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $313.6 million. 

Subtotal Army; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $1.693 billion. 

Air Force training budget: 

Advanced Missile Defense Warning Course; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $4.0 million. 

Air Operations Center Integrated Air and Missile Defense Training; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $2.5 million. 

Subtotal Air Force; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $6.5 million. 

Navy training budget[C]: 

Aegis; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $159.5 million. 

Subtotal Navy; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $159.5 million. 

Total training budget estimates; 
Total FY 2011-2016: $4.179 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Amounts may not total because of rounding. 

[A] The MDA training budget includes funding for development and 
acquisition of training aids, devices, and simulators for the THAAD 
element. 

[B] The Army's training budget includes funds for the THAAD individual 
training courses currently offered and establishing the THAAD school. 
The Army estimates that unit training for a single battery will cost 
$583,843 in fiscal year 2012 and DOD plans to have a total of nine 
batteries activated by fiscal year 2018. However, we did not include 
these estimates in our analysis since the timing for unit training is 
uncertain. Funds for the Patriot element include individual, unit, and 
sustainment training and include training facilities. However, funds 
for Patriot training also include training not specific to ballistic 
missile defense. 

[C] Since Aegis training includes training for missions in addition to 
ballistic missile defense, such as anti-air warfare, the Navy's budget 
does not identify funding to perform only Aegis ballistic missile 
defense training. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the limitations discussed above, funding 
responsibilities may become increasingly dispersed as DOD transitions 
responsibilities for the elements from MDA to the services. For 
example, the Army's budget for the THAAD element will increase over 
time as the Army assumes full responsibility for individual training 
in fiscal year 2015. Also, if a lead service is designated responsible 
for the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications 
element, some of the training and funding responsibilities for that 
element would likely transfer from MDA to the lead service. 

MDA and the Services Have Not Agreed on Funding Responsibilities and 
Cost Estimates That Could Better Inform Training Budgets: 

Another factor that complicates estimating the resources to support 
ballistic missile defense training is that MDA and the services have 
not fully identified funding responsibilities and life-cycle cost 
estimates for each of the BMDS elements. MDA's Acquisition Directive 
[Footnote 20] identifies the need to develop life-cycle cost 
estimates--which include training--for the elements at certain phases 
of development.[Footnote 21] The Strategic Plan for the Next 
Generation of Training for the Department of Defense[Footnote 22] 
developed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness highlights the importance of aligning 
resources to meet training goals. We found that eight of the nine BMDS 
elements included in our analysis have been fielded,[Footnote 23] yet 
planning documents detailing the transition of training 
responsibilities and life-cycle cost estimates--which include training 
costs--have not been fully developed and approved for about half of 
the fielded elements with a designated lead service. In addition, 
three of the completed agreements do not include service-specific 
funding to support training. As a result, DOD does not have element-
specific agreements or approved training cost estimates for MDA and 
the services to use in budget development. 

In addition to the overarching memoranda of agreement, which include a 
general description of MDA and service roles and responsibilities for 
the elements, DOD intends for MDA and the services to develop specific 
agreements for each element that would include funding agreements with 
details on MDA and the services' funding responsibilities for training 
as the element transitions from MDA to the service. However, MDA and 
the services have had difficulty completing these element-specific 
agreements, and to date have only fully completed agreements for three 
out of seven BMDS elements requiring element-specific agreements. 
[Footnote 24] For example, officials from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics stated that MDA 
and the Army have had difficulty agreeing on funding for the AN/TPY-2 
radar and have delayed the completion of the agreement until the 
Missile Defense Executive Board issues further guidance. Furthermore, 
while officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics are responsible for monitoring 
the completion of the agreements and have identified very general 
deadlines (by fiscal year) to complete them, officials stated that the 
completion of the agreements is not schedule driven. Officials also 
stated that while the remaining element-specific agreements are in 
staffing, in some cases the services and MDA have not agreed on 
completion times and that they are uncertain when the agreements will 
be finalized. 

The overarching memoranda of agreement also identify the need for MDA 
and the services to complete joint life-cycle cost estimates for each 
of the elements, which would include training cost estimates. MDA and 
the Army have signed an agreement explaining how they will work 
together to develop operations and support cost estimates to inform 
their budgets for the THAAD, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and AN/ 
TPY-2 elements.[Footnote 25] However, according to Army officials, 
some cost estimates are still in development and have not been 
approved by the Army Cost Review Board and none of the operations and 
support cost estimates--including training cost estimates--have been 
reviewed by DOD's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. 
[Footnote 26] For example, Army officials stated that the Army Cost 
Review Board has not approved the estimates for THAAD, Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense, and forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar elements. 
Officials stated that while the methodology behind the MDA and Army 
cost estimates is accurate, the Army does not agree with some 
assumptions on which the cost estimates are based. For example, Army 
officials said that the most recent THAAD estimate did not include 
unit training costs to relocate THAAD batteries, yet that estimate was 
used to inform the Army's budget request for THAAD operations. 
Furthermore, DOD officials confirmed that they only recently began 
developing operations and support cost estimates with the Navy for the 
Aegis ballistic missile defense element. 

DOD has not yet identified the total resources necessary to support 
ballistic missile defense training and has not determined the long-
term funding responsibilities because there are no procedures or firm 
deadlines in place to ensure that either the element-specific 
agreements or life-cycle cost estimates--to include training--be 
completed before elements are fielded or in time to inform budget 
development. Without completed memoranda of agreement or cost 
estimates for supporting MDA and service ballistic missile defense 
training, there is no transparency over the total resources that DOD 
may need to fully support ballistic missile defense training. As a 
result, DOD is at risk of training gaps that may prevent the services 
and combatant commands from meeting their training requirements. For 
example, while the Army and MDA are working to prioritize funding to 
address training for the THAAD element, Army officials identified a 
$308.6 million discrepancy between MDA's funding and the Army's 
documented equipment requirements to support individual and unit 
training. Army officials said that without this equipment, they will 
have difficulty keeping up with the demand for individual and unit 
training. Specifically, some critical tasks that would normally be 
trained at the institution would need to be performed by the units on 
actual tactical equipment rather than training devices, which would 
result in additional wear and tear on tactical equipment and increase 
overall training costs. In addition, the Army has identified a 
$960,000 requirement to upgrade training materials to support sensor 
manager training for the AN/TPY-2 radar. However, MDA has not funded 
this requirement, and an Army official indicated that without upgraded 
training materials, properly trained crews may not be available to 
operate the radar. Without MDA and service cooperation to develop 
complete and transparent ballistic missile defense training cost 
estimates, decision makers do not have the necessary visibility to 
budget for ballistic missile defense training or identify and address 
training shortfalls, an issue that may become more problematic as 
additional elements are fielded. Since training to support ballistic 
missile defense has been identified as a high priority within the 
department, the lack of transparency in the funds needed to support 
ballistic missile defense training hinders DOD's ability to assess 
competing priorities and decide how to allocate scarce resources to 
meet training goals. 

Conclusions: 

Defending against ballistic missile attacks requires quick responses 
and an integrating training strategy is important to connect seams 
where commands, tiers, or elements must work together. However, there 
are no DOD requirements and standards for integrating training across 
and among all of the tiers. Although individual organizations are 
taking some initial steps, training across and among tiers is still 
relatively infrequent. In similar instances, DOD has issued guidance 
to designate an organization with the responsibility and authority for 
establishing joint training requirements. However, DOD has not 
designated an organization with the responsibility and authority to 
develop a strategy that would include specific requirements and 
standards for integrating training across and among all of the tiers 
for ballistic missile defense. As a result, the department runs the 
risk that personnel may have had limited opportunities to interact 
across the training tiers and elements under realistic conditions 
prior to an actual ballistic missile defense engagement. A number of 
DOD organizations have identified the need for an affordable, 
scalable, distributed, and fully integrated training capability that 
would develop the capabilities necessary for all tiers to experience 
realistic training at a frequency to prepare them for ballistic 
missile defense operations. Without an entity responsible for 
developing an integrating training strategy, the department's ability 
to develop requirements and standards for integrating training across 
and among all of the tiers, and to assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of a standardized approach for improving integrating 
training capabilities may be hindered. 

Given that DOD has identified ballistic missile defense as a high- 
priority mission area and has expended substantial resources to 
develop the BMDS, it is important that funding for training be clearly 
and easily identified to ensure that training priorities are being met 
and budgets are aligned to support training requirements and address 
any training shortfalls. No full picture of the total service and MDA 
BMDS training budget exists since funding is dispersed across the 
department and there is no procedure or deadline mandating that 
funding agreements and training cost estimates be completed and 
approved in time to inform annual budget development. As a result, DOD 
and congressional decision makers lack visibility over the ballistic 
missile defense training budget to assess whether budgeted resources 
are adequate to support ballistic missile defense training and ensure 
there are no significant training gaps. Until the department addresses 
these challenges, DOD will likely face increasing risks over time to 
its ability to provide necessary integrating training as more elements 
are developed and fielded. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three 
actions: 

To enhance DOD's ability to identify and resolve issues in integrating 
ballistic missile defense training across and among combatant commands 
and services and to improve training realism, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, issue guidance that: 

* designates an entity to be responsible for integrating training 
across and among combatant commands and elements and provide that 
entity with the authority to develop an overall ballistic missile 
defense training strategy which includes specific requirements and 
standards for integrating training and identifying and resolving any 
gaps in capabilities to enhance integrating training across and among 
all tiers (or combatant commands and elements). 

To improve the transparency of the resources to support ballistic 
missile defense training requirements and to inform budget 
development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency to: 

* set a firm deadline to complete training cost estimates and element- 
specific agreements for elements already fielded and establish 
procedures that require the training cost estimates and element- 
specific funding agreements delineating funding responsibilities 
between MDA and the services be completed before additional elements 
are fielded; and: 

* establish procedures that require annual development and reporting 
of the total BMDS training budget (i.e., all Missile Defense Agency 
and service costs for individual, unit, and sustainment training and 
combatant command and service exercise costs). 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one 
recommendation and partially concurred with two recommendations. 
Although DOD generally concurred with our recommendations, DOD's 
response did not include specifics about when it intended to complete 
actions to implement these recommendations. Considering that DOD has 
identified ballistic missile defense as a high-priority mission area, 
we believe it is important that DOD take action as soon as possible. 
After we received DOD's comments, the department completed its 
security review and determined that this report is unclassified and 
contains no sensitive information. DOD's comments are reprinted in 
their entirety in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that DOD issue guidance that 
designates an entity to be responsible for integrating training across 
and among combatant commands and elements and provide that entity with 
the authority to develop an overall ballistic missile defense training 
strategy. The department further stated that Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and U.S. Strategic 
Command, with the assistance of the Joint Staff will provide the 
policy and required advocacy for the development of an integrated 
training strategy for ballistic missile defense. Although DOD 
concurred with this recommendation and stated its intention to issue 
policy for developing an integrating training strategy, the department 
did not state when it intended to do so. Since defending against 
ballistic missile attacks requires a quick response, it is important 
that DOD develops an integrating training strategy to connect seams 
where commands, tiers, or elements must work together. Therefore, we 
believe that DOD should issue this policy as soon as possible. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries 
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the Missile 
Defense Agency set a firm deadline to complete training cost estimates 
and element-specific agreements for elements already fielded and 
establish procedures that require the completion of training cost 
estimates and element-specific funding agreements delineating funding 
responsibilities between MDA and the services before additional 
elements are fielded. In its comments, DOD stated that new ballistic 
missile defense capabilities are essential to defense and must not be 
delayed. The department acknowledges the benefit of establishing 
training cost estimates but believes that these estimates and funding 
agreements can be developed in parallel with the fielding of 
additional capabilities. Although DOD partially concurred, DOD did not 
state that it would set a firm deadline to implement the 
recommendation. DOD generally requires that weapons systems complete 
life-cycle cost estimates--including training cost estimates--prior to 
a system being fielded. As we noted in our report, DOD has not 
completed cost estimates or funding agreements. Further, we reported 
that MDA and the services have had difficulty completing the 
agreements for each element that would include details on MDA and the 
services' funding responsibilities as the elements transition from MDA 
to the services. Without completed and approved training cost 
estimates to inform the funding agreements and annual budget 
development, there is no clear identification of the resources that 
DOD may need to support ballistic missile defense training and DOD is 
at risk of training gaps. In fact, we noted examples of discrepancies 
between funding and training requirements. Given that DOD has 
identified ballistic missile defense as a high-priority mission area, 
has had difficulty completing cost estimates and funding agreements in 
the past, and there are already examples of some funding gaps, we 
continue to believe that DOD should establish a firm deadline to 
ensure that training cost estimates and element-specific agreements 
are completed before additional elements are fielded. 

Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency establish procedures that require annual 
development and reporting of the total BMDS training budget (i.e., all 
Missile Defense Agency and service costs for individual, unit, and 
sustainment training and combatant command and service exercise 
costs). In its comments, DOD stated that the department defines total 
ballistic missile defense training costs as those direct or 
incremental ballistic missile defense system training costs associated 
with the fielding and sustaining element mission readiness for 
ballistic missile defense capabilities. DOD further stated that the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
will work with the services and the Missile Defense Agency to develop 
policy for capturing and reporting total ballistic missile defense 
training costs as defined above. As we stated in our report, no full 
picture of the total service and MDA BMDS training budget exists since 
funding is dispersed across the department and there is no procedure 
or deadline mandating that funding agreements and training cost 
estimates be completed and approved in time to inform annual budget 
development. As a result, DOD and congressional decision makers do not 
have a full picture of the resources to inform budget development and 
risk training gaps. Considering that funding for training could face 
significant budget pressures amid the department's competing demands 
for current operations, acquisitions, and personnel expenses, we 
continue to believe it is important that DOD implement the policy for 
developing and reporting cost estimates for ballistic missile defense 
training as soon as possible. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the combatant commands, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force, and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile defense training 
across and among commands and multiple elements we reviewed combatant 
command and service training plans and assessed whether these plans 
addressed ballistic missile defense training. To determine the extent 
to which DOD has identified training roles, responsibilities, and 
commensurate authorities, we assessed DOD, combatant command, and 
service instructions, policies, and training plans to identify where 
training roles, responsibilities, and authorities were clearly 
identified and whether these documents clearly identified roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities for integrating training across and 
among commands and services. Finally, we discussed our results with 
DOD officials to corroborate our analysis and discussed any areas 
where responsibilities may not be clearly identified. 

To quantify the extent to which the Ballistic Missile Defense System, 
(BMDS) training is integrated horizontally across the combatant 
commands and elements and vertically from the combatant commands down 
through the elements (i.e. through all tiers) we first developed a 
standard definition of the training tiers using the description in the 
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense's Fiscal Year 2010 through 2011 Annual Training Plan as a 
guide and confirmed the definitions with various DOD commands. Next, 
we gathered and analyzed information on 45 training exercises that 
included ballistic missile defense and were conducted during fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010. We included all of the exercises led by combatant 
commands, operations centers, and the services within this time frame. 
We also included an average representation of the participants in 
weekly training provided by the Joint Staff to officials at tier one. 
[Footnote 27] For each exercise, we gathered information to identify 
participants at each tier and whether each participant was live or 
simulated. We summarized the data and corroborated the results with 
the commands that provided the information. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has identified and budgeted for 
the resources to support ballistic missile defense training, we 
gathered and analyzed available training budget documents and data 
provided by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the services to 
support ballistic missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 
through 2016 to include budget estimates for training in schools, 
exercises and for facilities such as simulators. To determine the 
funding for Patriot unit training, Army officials provided the average 
estimated training cost for one unit that the Army uses to develop its 
budget and we multiplied that amount by the total number of units 
across fiscal years 2011 to 2016. We documented instances where the 
services could not identify training resources specific to ballistic 
missile defense, and reported that these budget estimates are to 
support training for missions in addition to ballistic missile defense 
or instances that ballistic missile defense specific budget estimates 
were unavailable. We also obtained documentation from MDA and the 
services on their actual costs to support ballistic missile defense 
training in fiscal year 2010. We interviewed DOD, combatant command, 
and service officials to corroborate our compilation of available 
training budget estimates, and to identify areas where there may be a 
mismatch or shortfall between training requirements and budget 
estimates. We interviewed MDA and service officials to determine 
whether element-specific annexes and joint life-cycle cost estimates 
for each of the elements have been completed and approved. To ensure 
the reliability of our data we provided the tables showing the 
estimated budgeted amounts for ballistic missile defense training to 
DOD and service officials for review. Furthermore, to assess the 
reliability of the computer-processed data provided by the Army to 
support their ballistic missile defense training budgets, we 
interviewed knowledgeable officials about the data and internal 
controls on the system that contains them. We determined that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this audit. 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards from July 2010 to July 2011. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We obtained appropriate data and documentation and interviewed 
officials from the following organizations: 

Department of Defense and Joint Staff: 

* Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness: 

- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics: 

- Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller): 

- Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment Program 
Evaluation: 

* United States Joint Forces Command: 

* United States Strategic Command and its Joint Functional Component 
Command for Integrated Missile Defense: 

* United States Pacific Command: 

* United States Northern Command: 

* United States Central Command: 

* United States European Command: 

* Joint Staff J3-Operations Directorate: 

* Joint Staff J7-Operational Plans and Joint Force Development 
Directorate: 

* Joint Staff J8-Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization: 

* Missile Defense Agency: 

Department of the Army: 

* Army G-3/5/7-Training Directorate: 

* Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and 
Economics: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology: 

* Army Training and Doctrine Command: 

* Army Forces Command: 

* Fires Center of Excellence and Air Defense Artillery School: 

* 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command: 

* 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command: 

* Army Space and Missile Defense Command: 

* 100th Missile Defense Brigade: 

Department of the Navy: 

* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N86-Surface Warfare 
Division: 

* Naval Sea Systems Command: 

* United States Fleet Forces Command: 

* U. S. Surface Forces Atlantic: 

* Navy Air and Missile Defense Command: 

* Center for Surface Combat Systems: 

* Navy 3rd Fleet: 

* Navy 7th Fleet Maritime Operations Center: 

* U. S. Pacific Fleet: 

Department of the Air Force: 

* Air Force Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations, Plans, and Requirements: 

* Air Combat Command: 

* Air Force Space Command: 

* 613th Air Operations Center: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO's Analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense Exercises: 

Figure 2: Integrating Training Among the Tiers in Ballistic Missile 
Defense Exercises: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Tier 2 exercises: 

Exercise 1: 
Tier 1: Live; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 2: 
Tier 1: Live; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 3: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 4: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 5: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 6: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 7: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 8: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 9: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 10: 
Tier 1: Live; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 11: 
Tier 1: Live; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 12: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Simulated. 

Exercise 13: 
Tier 1: Live; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 14: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 15: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Simulated; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 16: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 17: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Simulated; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 18: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Simulated; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 19: 
Tier 1: Live; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 20: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 21: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Tier 3 exercises: 

Exercise 22: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 23: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 24: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 25: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 26: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 27: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Simulated. 

Exercise 28: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Simulated. 

Exercise 29: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Tier 4 exercises: 

Exercise 30: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Simulated. 

Exercise 31: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 32: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Simulated. 

Exercise 33: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 34: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 35: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Simulated; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 36: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 37: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 38: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 39: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Live; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 40: 
Tier 1: Simulated; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Live. 

Exercise 41: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 42: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 43: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Simulated; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 44: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Exercise 45: 
Tier 1: Did not participate; 
Tier 2: Did not participate; 
Tier 3: Live; 
Tier 4: Did not participate. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Integrating Training Across the Tiers in Ballistic Missile 
Defense Exercises: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Tier 2 exercises: 

Exercise: 1; 
Tier 1 Live: 3; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 9. 

Exercise: 2; 
Tier 1 Live: 2; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 9. 

Exercise: 3; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 4; 
Tier 2 Live: 2; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 3; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 6. 

Exercise: 4; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 4; 
Tier 2 Live: 2; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 3; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 4; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 5. 

Exercise: 5; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 5; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 6; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 7; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 2; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 8; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 6; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 5; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 9; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 6; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 5; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 7. 

Exercise: 10; 
Tier 1 Live: 1; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 3; 
Tier 2 Live: 5; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 8. 

Exercise: 11; 
Tier 1 Live: 1; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 3; 
Tier 2 Live: 5; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 8. 

Exercise: 12; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 2; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 3. 

Exercise: 13. 
Tier 1 Live: 1; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 2; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 3. 

Exercise: 14; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 5; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 15; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 3. 

Exercise: 16; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 1; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 3; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 17; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 18; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 19; 
Tier 1 Live: 1; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 3; 
Tier 2 Live: 3; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 3; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 5. 

Exercise: 20; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 21; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Tier 3 exercises: 

Exercise: 22; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 23; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 24; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 25; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 26; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 27; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 28; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 29; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Tier 4 exercises: 

Exercise: 30; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 2; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 31; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 32; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 2; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 33; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 2; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 2. 

Exercise: 34; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 3; 
Tier 2 Live: 3; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 2; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 2; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 35; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 1; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 2; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 2; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 36; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 37; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 2; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 38; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 39; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 4; 
Tier 2 Live: 3; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 2; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 1; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 4; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 4. 

Exercise: 40; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 2; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 3; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 2; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 41; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 42; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 43; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Exercise: 44; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 1; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 0. 

Exercise: 45; 
Tier 1 Live: 0; 
Tier 1 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 2 Live: 0; 
Tier 2 Simulated: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Navy Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Air Force Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Live: 0; 
Army Tier 3 Simulated: 0; 
Tier 4 Elements Live: 2; 
Tier 4 Elements Simulated: 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel And Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000: 

July 6, 2011: 

Mr. John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton, 

This is the Department of Defense response to the Government 
Accountability Office draft report titled: Actions Needed to Improve 
Training Integration and Increase Transparency of Training Resources 
(GA0-11-625). Thank you for the opportunity to comment. Regarding the 
recommendations, we concur with item 1 and partially concur with items 
2 and 3. Elaboration on these positions is in the enclosure appended 
to this letter. 

Regarding your request for an FOUO and classification review, initial 
subject matter expert feedback indicates that portions of the report 
may contain FOUO information, and a detailed review is still in 
progress. I will forward the Department's coordinated security review 
response in separate correspondence once the review is complete. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Laura J. Juno: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Readiness: 

[End of letter] 

Enclosure: 

GAO Draft Report Dated June 2, 2011: 
GA0-11-626 (GAO Code 351506): 

"Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed To Improve Training 
Integration And Increase Transparency Of Training Resources" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
issue guidance that designates an entity to be responsible for 
integrating training across and among combatant commands and elements 
and provide that organization with authority to develop an overall 
ballistic missile defense training strategy which includes specific 
requirements and standards for integrating training and identifying 
and resolving any gaps in capabilities to enhance integrating training 
across and among all tiers (or combatant commands and elements). (See 
page 23/GAO Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department agrees the Secretary of Defense 
should issue guidance designating an entity to be responsible for 
assisting the combatant commands and Services in defining and 
coordinating enhanced, jointly integrated, standardized, and cost-
effective ballistic missile defense training and education. This 
guidance is in line with the overarching strategy for training put 
forth in the "Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for 
the Department of Defense," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel and Readiness, September 23, 2010. The Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and US Strategic
Command, with the assistance of the Joint Staff J-7, will provide the 
policy and required advocacy for the development of an integrated 
training strategy for ballistic missile defense. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency set a firm deadline to complete 
training cost estimates and element-specific agreements for elements 
already fielded and establish procedures that require the training 
cost estimates and element-specific funding agreements delineating 
funding responsibilities between the Missile Defense Agency and the 
Services be completed before additional elements are fielded. (Page 
23/GAO Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. New ballistic missile defense 
capabilities are essential to defense and must not be delayed. The 
Department acknowledges the benefit of establishing training cost 
estimates and believes that these estimates and funding
agreements can be developed in parallel with the fielding of 
additional capabilities. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency establish procedures that 
require annual development and reporting of the total Ballistic 
Missile Defense System training budget (Le., all Missile Defense 
Agency and Services costs for individual, unit, and sustainment 
training and combatant command and Services exercise costs.) (See page 
23/GAO Draft Report). 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department defines total ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) training costs as those direct or incremental 
BMD system training costs associated with fielding and sustaining 
element mission readiness for BMD capabilities. The Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will work with 
the Services and the Missile Defense Agency to develop policy for 
capturing and reporting total BMD training costs as defined above. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Patricia W. Lentini, 
Assistant Director; Brenda M. Waterfield; Randy F. Neice; Meghan E. 
Cameron; Joseph J. Watkins; Rebecca Shea; Joel Grossman; Karen Nicole 
Harms; and Erik Wilkins-McKee made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and 
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2011. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and 
Implementation Challenges for future Capabilities in Europe. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-220]. Washington, D.C.: 
January 26, 2011. 

Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face 
Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. Washington, 
D.C.: December 21, 2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects 
Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-676]. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 30, 2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity 
to Strengthen Acquisition Approach. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311], Washington, D.C.: February 
25, 2010. 

Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and 
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 16, 2009. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 
Sites. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009. 

Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When 
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 26, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense 
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 13, 2009. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates 
for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. Washington, D.C.: September 
25, 2008. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for 
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but 
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448]. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces 
Transparency of Program Cost. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-799T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2007. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting 
Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-430]. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 
2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between 
Flexibility and Accountability. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-727T]. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 
2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates 
Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-387]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2007. 

Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and 
Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473]. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 
2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability 
but Falls Short of Original Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-327]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for 
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-817]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 6, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 
Approach. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-962R]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 
Approach. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-540]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 
2004. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-243]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency 
of DOD's Projected Resource Needs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-514]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and 
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-409]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing 
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-254]. Washington, D.C.: February 
26, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for 
Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-600]. Washington, D.C.: August 21, 
2003. 

Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and 
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-597]. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 
2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but 
Risks Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-441]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce 
Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-631]. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 
2002. 

Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early 
National Missile Defense Flight Test. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-124]. Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2002. 

Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New 
Patriot Missiles to Buy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-153]. Washington, D.C.: June 
29, 2000. 

Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be 
Revised to Reduce Risk. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-121]. Washington, D.C.: May 
31, 2000. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Missile Defense Agency was established to develop the BMDS and 
the system's elements discussed in this report include Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense; Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system 
forward-based radar; Command, Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications; Ground-based Midcourse Defense; Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3; Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense; Sea-based X-Band 
Radar; Upgraded Early Warning Radar; and Cobra Dane Radar. See table 1 
for details describing each of these elements. 

[2] An interceptor is a component of some ballistic missile defense 
elements that is used to destroy an adversary's ballistic missile. For 
example, the Missile Defense Agency is building the Standard Missile-3 
to be used as an interceptor as part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense element. 

[3] Each lead service is responsible for providing personnel; force 
protection; operations and support; and developing doctrinal, 
organizational, and facilities requirements. The transition process 
from MDA to a lead service also involves the lead service beginning to 
assume responsibility for operating, supporting, and funding BMDS 
elements. DOD has designated lead services for eight of the nine BMD 
elements that are currently or soon will be fielded. All the elements 
are operated by military personnel except for the Sea-based X Band 
Radar which is operated by the contractor. 

[4] Flight times are 3-9 minutes for a short-range missile, 9-19 
minutes for a medium-range missile, 19-26 minutes for an intermediate- 
range missile, and greater than 26 minutes for an intercontinental 
missile. 

[5] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01F, Joint 
Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States 
(Nov. 19, 2010). 

[6] Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats (Feb. 
5, 2007). 

[7] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness), Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the 
Department of Defense (Sept. 23, 2010). 

[8] DOD had previously established the Integrated Training Working 
Group, in 2004, to coordinate training efforts across DOD, develop 
ballistic missile defense training policy, and validate a master BMDS 
training plan. According to DOD officials, the group did not complete 
these tasks and ceased meeting around September 2009. Once the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Training and Education Group charter is 
signed, it will officially replace the Integrated Training Working 
Group according to DOD officials. 

[9] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and 
Accountability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2011). 

[10] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and 
Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-220] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 26, 2011). 

[11] GAO, Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements 
and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 16, 2009). 

[12] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 
2004). 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G]. 

[14] U.S. Joint Forces Command officials are uncertain how the 
proposed disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command will affect the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Training and Education Group. 

[15] DOD created the Missile Defense Executive Board in 2007 to 
recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies, plans, 
program priorities, and investment options. The board is supported by 
four committees: Policy and Oversight; Operational Forces; Program, 
Acquisition, and Budget Development; and Test and Evaluation. 

[16] We reported earlier this year that six of MDA's life-cycle cost 
baselines had insufficient evidence to be a high-quality cost 
estimate. See GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve 
Transparency and Accountability, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 
2011). 

[17] As elements transition from MDA to a lead service, the lead 
service begins to assume responsibility for operating, supporting, and 
funding BMDS elements. However, as the materiel developer of the BMDS, 
MDA retains some responsibilities for combat support, including some 
training responsibilities. 

[18] The elements for which the Air Force is lead service do not 
require significant ballistic missile defense specific training, but 
the Air Force does support a Missile Defense Warning course and some 
training to integrate ballistic missile defense operations into the 
air operation centers. 

[19] For fiscal year 2012, an Army official was able to identify 
approximately $56 thousand for AN/TPY-2 individual training courses, 
and approximately $227 thousand to support Army and MDA Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense individual and unit training and accreditation. The 
Army official also identified approximately $3.6 million in contractor 
and civilian manpower costs to support AN/TPY-2 and Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense training in fiscal year 2012. 

[20] Missile Defense Agency, Acquisition Management: MDA Directive 
5010.18, (Washington, D.C., Apr. 29, 2011). 

[21] Life-cycle costs are the total costs to the government for a 
program over its full life, consisting of research and development, 
production, operations, maintenance, and disposal costs. 

[22] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness), Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the 
Department of Defense (Sept. 23, 2010). 

[23] See table 1 above, which shows when each element was initially 
fielded. 

[24] Only seven elements require element-specific agreements because 
the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications element has 
not had a lead service designated and Patriot has transferred to the 
Army. There are two agreements for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense--
one for the ship and one for the missile. MDA and the Navy have 
completed the agreement for the Aegis missile and have not completed 
the agreement for the ship. 

[25] According to the DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and Support Cost-Estimating 
Guide (October 2007), operating and support cost estimates for 
training should include the following: individual and unit training, 
training devices/simulator operations, instructors, training support 
personnel, course support, course materials, and all costs of trainees. 

[26] The agreement between the Army and MDA for preparing and 
approving joint operations and support cost estimates explains that 
the Army Cost Review Board will review the estimate and, if the review 
is favorable, recommend to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Financial Management and Comptroller that the Army accept the cost 
estimate. This agreement also explains that the Army and MDA will 
request that the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
conduct an independent cost estimate. 

[27] Since information was not available on all of these training 
events, we worked with DOD officials to document live and simulated 
participants that typically participated in this event. 

[End of section] 

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