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entitled 'Public Transportation: Washington Metro Could Benefit from
Clarified Board Roles and Responsibilities, Improved Strategic
Planning' which was released on June 30, 2011.
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2011:
Public Transportation:
Washington Metro Could Benefit from Clarified Board Roles and
Responsibilities, Improved Strategic Planning:
GAO-11-660:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-660, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (WMATA) public
rail transit and bus systems are vital to the national capital region.
However, the 35-year-old rail system has experienced safety and
reliability problems, including fatal accidents. A 16-member board of
directors governs WMATA, setting policies and providing oversight.
Recent reports have noted weaknesses in WMATA’s governance structure
and recommended changing it. GAO assessed WMATA’s governance in terms
of the board’s roles and responsibilities, oversight, and strategic
planning. To do so, GAO compiled leading practices from previous GAO
work on public and private sector governance, non-GAO transit
governance studies, and strategic planning standards; then compared
WMATA’s approach to those practices. GAO also spoke with six transit
agencies selected based on board composition and ridership, among
other things.
What GAO Found:
Although some requirements and guidance for board roles and
responsibilities are provided in the WMATA compact and board
procedures, WMATA board members, officials, and other stakeholders
have reported that sometimes the board focuses on management’s day-to-
day responsibilities rather than higher level board responsibilities
such as oversight and strategic planning. This focus may have resulted
from, for example, inadequate delineation and documentation of the board
’s responsibilities as well as inadequate communication among board
members. In addition, while leading governance practices state that
effective transit boards monitor the effectiveness of the board’s
organization, structure, and functioning through a regular board self-
assessment, WMATA’s board does not do so. As a result, the board lacks
a key mechanism for regular, ongoing measurement of its performance.
In April 2011, the board released draft bylaws that clarify the roles
and responsibilities for the board and propose that the board chair
coordinate a board self-evaluation. These draft bylaws represent a
good first step toward addressing some of the concerns discussed in
this report but will need to be adopted and then effectively
implemented to achieve their desired effect.
The board’s oversight role is supported by the board’s committee
structure, which provides a communication channel for information to
reach the board. Past board practices such as infrequent meetings of
the Audit and Investigations Subcommittee and the lack of routine
briefings on outside safety recommendations may have impaired the
ability of the board to use information about areas in need of
improvement regarding the operations and finances of the agency.
However, given the variety in other transit agencies’ practices and
the lack of clear criteria on how often audit committees should meet,
there is no clear standard against which to measure WMATA’s practices.
The board’s draft bylaws propose changes to the organization of the
board’s committee structure.
WMATA has developed elements of strategic planning over the past 4
years, but the agency’s board and management could enhance their
strategic focus and long-term planning processes to improve
performance. WMATA acknowledged several failed past efforts at
strategic planning. WMATA officials said that prior attempts failed
due to a lack of management support, employee buy-in, and specific
actions to execute the plans; and a focus on tactical versus strategic
decision making. WMATA management has developed several elements of
strategic planning, such as a mission statement, goals, objectives,
and strategies. However, the agency’s strategic planning process could
benefit from more board and stakeholder involvement, internal and
external environmental assessments, longer time frames, program
evaluations, and updated performance metrics. In June 2011, the board
launched an effort to overhaul its strategic planning process.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends among other things that the WMATA board of directors
follow through with its efforts to clarify the roles and
responsibilities of the board; conduct a regular self-assessment of
the board’s effectiveness; and improve its strategic planning process
by actions such as increasing the board’s involvement in the process
and updating the agency’s performance metrics. WMATA reviewed a draft
of this report and noted that it has taken recent actions that begin
to address some issues covered in this report.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-660] or key
components. For more information, contact David Wise at (202) 512-2834
or wised@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Stakeholders Believe Inadequate Delineation, Documentation,
Communication, and Self-Assessment of the Board's Responsibilities
Have Led to Occasional Lack of Strategic Focus:
WMATA's Board Is Structured to Receive Information That Could
Facilitate More Effective Oversight of the System:
WMATA Has Made Progress, but Does Not Fully Address All Elements of
Sound Strategic Planning:
GSA Lacks a Formal Process to Appoint Federal Board Members:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Discussion of Recommendations Concerning WMATA Board
Structural Changes:
Appendix III: Comparison of Selected Transit Agencies to WMATA:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority:
Appendix V: Comments from the General Services Administration:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Information on the Processes Used to Appoint WMATA Board
Members:
Table 2: Categories of Leading Practices:
Table 3: Entities and Offices Interviewed:
Table 4: Size and Composition of the Selected Transit Agencies:
Table 5: Jurisdictions Represented On Transit Agency Boards:
Table 6: Transit Services Provided:
Table 7: Size of Rail Operations:
Table 8: Heavy Rail Ridership as of 4th Quarter 2010:
Table 9: Transit Agencies Ranked by Passenger Trips in 2009:
Table 10: Operating and Capital Budgets:
Table 11: Size of Workforce:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of WMATA's Metrorail System Including Planned Expansion
and Total Capital and Operating Subsidy from Local Jurisdictions,
Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 2: WMATA Board of Directors Committee Structure (May 2011):
Figure 3: WMATA's Organization Chart as of May 2011:
Figure 4: Number of Board Meetings at Selected Transit Agencies, April
30, 2010, through May 1, 2011:
Abbreviations:
APTA: American Public Transportation Association:
BART: Bay Area Rapid Transit:
CTA: Chicago Transit Authority:
FTA: Federal Transit Administration:
GM/CEO: general manager/chief executive officer:
GSA: General Services Administration:
JCC: Jurisdictional Coordinating Committee:
MARTA: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority:
MBTA: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority:
MTA: Metropolitan Transportation Authority:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
NVTC: Northern Virginia Transportation Commission:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
RAC: Riders' Advisory Council:
SEPTA: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority:
WMATA: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority:
WSTC: Washington Suburban Transit Commission:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 30, 2011:
The Honorable Patty Murray:
Chair:
Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski:
United States Senate:
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) public
rail transit and bus systems are vital to meeting the transportation
needs of the national capital region, accounting for nearly 1.2
million passenger trips per weekday. However, WMATA's public rail
transit system is 35 years old and has experienced problems related to
the safety and reliability of its services, including fatal accidents,
equipment breakdowns, delays in scheduled service, crowding on trains,
and tunnel fires.[Footnote 1] In addition, the agency faces challenges
in maintaining the aging system while expanding the system to Dulles
International Airport, adding 23 miles and additional riders to the
rail transit system.[Footnote 2] In 2008, WMATA estimated that it had
about $11 billion worth of capital needs over 10 years, or $1.1
billion per year; its capital budget for fiscal year 2011 is $712.3
million. The agency annually weighs decisions to bridge gaps in its
operating budget by raising fares, cutting service, or requesting
additional contributions from its member jurisdictions.
WMATA is an interstate compact agency,[Footnote 3] governed by a 16-
member board of directors appointed by its four funding jurisdictions--
the federal government, Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.[Footnote 4] The board sets policies and oversees all of
WMATA's activities, including capital and operating budgeting, system
development and expansion, safety, and procurement. In 2010, two
reports concluded that weaknesses in WMATA's governance contributed to
the safety and operational reliability challenges facing the transit
system and recommended changes to WMATA's governance structure.
[Footnote 5] Our objective was to assess WMATA's governance in terms
of the board's roles and responsibilities, oversight, strategic
planning, and governance structure, and identify changes, if any, that
should be made. Specifically, we addressed the following question: How
do roles and responsibilities, oversight, and strategic planning
elements of WMATA's practices align with leading governance practices?
In addition, we provide information on the appointment of federal
members to WMATA's board by the General Services Administration (GSA).
In conducting our work, we focused on WMATA's governance in terms of
the board's structure, communication, policies, practices, and
documentation relating to its oversight of management and
implementation of its organizational mission. We analyzed management's
role in certain areas, such as strategic planning; however, we did not
fully assess the adequacy of management's role in effectively
operating the agency.
To determine relevant governance practices, we compiled practices from
several sources, including those practices used in previous GAO work
on public and private sector governance and non-GAO studies, reports,
and recommendations concerning the governance of transit agencies,
other similar organizations, and corporations. Additionally, we
incorporated strategic planning practices from the Transit Cooperative
Research Program, previous GAO work, and other sources as appropriate.
(For a full list of sources, see appendix I.) We then consolidated and
categorized leading governance practices and recommendations along
similar themes, such as structure, oversight, and strategic planning.
To determine how WMATA's practices align with these leading governance
practices, we reviewed and compared elements of the composition and
structure of the WMATA board and senior management, communication
between the board and management, policies and other documentation in
place to guide WMATA's practices, and WMATA's internal and external
oversight practices to the leading governance and strategic planning
practices that we identified. We conducted semistructured interviews
with WMATA senior management, current board members, local
jurisdictions, oversight agencies, and other groups conducting
governance reviews. In addition, we conducted semistructured
interviews with officials from transit agencies in Atlanta, Boston,
Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. Respectively, we
spoke with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA),
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Chicago Transit
Authority (CTA), Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA),
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), and Bay
Area Rapid Transit (BART). We chose these transit agencies based on
similarities to WMATA along many characteristics, including size and
makeup of the board, annual ridership, services provided, budget
issues, and complexity of the service area.
We conducted interviews with GSA concerning the appointment of federal
members to WMATA's board. Appendix I contains a more complete
description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
WMATA began rail operations in 1976. As of 2011, it operates the
nation's second largest rail transit system and sixth largest bus
system. WMATA provides service in the District of Columbia, suburban
Maryland, and Northern Virginia. In fiscal year 2011, WMATA based its
budget on a projected ridership on its rail transit and bus systems of
346 million trips. The rail transit system consists of 106.3 route
miles and 86 passenger stations and a fleet of over 1,100 rail cars. A
planned expansion of the rail transit system will add 11 stations and
extend the system 23 miles in Northern Virginia, providing service to
Dulles International Airport and Loudoun County, Virginia. (Figure 1
shows WMATA's rail transit route system and proposed fiscal year 2011
jurisdictional subsidies.) WMATA's Metrobus service operates 320
routes on 135 lines throughout the Metro region, utilizing 12,000 bus
stops and 2,398 shelters. In addition, WMATA offers a shared-ride,
door-to-door paratransit service for people whose disability prevents
them from using bus or rail transit. The paratransit system operates a
fleet of over 600 vehicles and is expected to provide 2.7 million
passenger trips in fiscal year 2011. WMATA is also the single largest
escalator/elevator operator in North America operating 589 escalators
and 271 elevators.
WMATA's funding comes from rider fares and parking and a variety of
federal, state, and local sources including grants from the federal
government and annual contributions by each of the local jurisdictions
that WMATA serves. (See figure 1.) WMATA's fiscal year 2011 budget
totals about $2.2 billion. Of the total amount, about 33 percent, or
$712.3 million, is for capital improvements and about 63 percent, or
$1.45 billion, is for operating expenses.
Figure 1: Map of WMATA's Metrorail System Including Planned Expansion
and Total Capital and Operating Subsidy from Local Jurisdictions,
Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Total proposed subsidy: ($1.330 billion):
Federal government ($391 million): 30%;
Maryland ($360 million): 27%;
District of Columbia ($348 million): 26%;
Virginia ($231 million): 17%.
Phase I Completion date: 2013;
Phase II Completion date: TBD.
Sources: WMATA and GAO.
Note: Federal government funding including federal formula grants and
dedicated funding is all provided for capital expenditures. Subsidies
for Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia include state and
local contributions.
[End of figure]
WMATA's Governance Structure:
WMATA was created in 1967 by an interstate compact--matching
legislation passed by Virginia, Maryland, the District of Columbia,
and the U.S. Congress[Footnote 6]--that describes its high-level
purpose, powers, general structure, funding, and authorities. The
compact, as amended, creates a 16-member board of directors (8 voting
and 8 alternate members) to govern WMATA and designates an appointing
authority for each signatory to appoint 2 voting members and 2
alternate members to the board. (See table 1.) As of June 2011, GSA--
which is responsible for selecting the board members representing the
federal government--had appointed 2 voting members and 1 alternate,
but had not appointed a second alternate.[Footnote 7] The District of
Columbia also has a single vacancy for an alternate member, leaving
board membership at 14. Nine of the 14 active members, including 7
voting members were appointed between January 2010 and May 2011. Also,
according to the compact, the board must elect a chair at the
beginning of every year. The chair has historically rotated between
the three local jurisdictions each year; however, beginning in January
2011, board procedures allow for anyone to be elected chair, including
the previous year's chair or a federal board member.
Table 1: Information on the Processes Used to Appoint WMATA Board
Members:
Appointing authority: Virginia: Northern Virginia Transportation
Commission (NVTC);
Selection process:
* NVTC appoints WMATA board members from among its board members, who
are elected officials;
* NVTC appoints the two voting WMATA board members--traditionally one
from Fairfax County and one from Arlington County. One alternate is
appointed from Fairfax County and the other from the City of
Alexandria[A];
* Board members are elected annually and can be reappointed.
Appointing authority: Maryland: Washington Suburban Transit Commission
(WSTC);
Selection process:
* Board members are selected from WSTC members, which are chosen by
the Governor of Maryland, Prince George's County, and Montgomery
County. Traditionally, WSTC members appointed by the Governor are
appointed as the voting board members, and WSTC members appointed by
Prince George's County and Montgomery County are appointed as
alternates;
* Board members serve 3-year terms; however, this is not a legal term
limit.
Appointing authority: District of Columbia: Council of the District of
Columbia (DC Council);
Selection process:
* The DC Council traditionally appoints one elected official from
among its membership and one appointed official from the Mayor's
administration to serve as its voting WMATA board members. The same
arrangement is used for its alternate members.
Appointing authority: Federal Government: GSA;
Selection process:
* GSA asks local stakeholders, including local transportation boards,
federal agencies, and Members of Congress representing local
jurisdictions, for suggestions on potential candidates;
* The compact requires that one of the voting members must be a
regular passenger and customer of WMATA's bus or rail service;
* Board members are appointed to 4-year terms.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by appointing authorities
and the Governance Task Force Report.
[A] On July 1, 2011, a law will take effect that allows the Governor
of Virginia to appoint one of the Virginia board members. See VA H.B.
1500, May 2, 2011, Act of Assembly, Chapter No. 890.
[End of table]
The compact also provides the board with broad policy-making
authority, specifically in the areas of planning, budgeting, and
financing. To help carry out these functions, the board has
established committees, such as safety and security, customer service
and operations, and finance and administration. (See figure 2.) WMATA
board procedures allow that alternate board members can vote in
committee meetings, but can only vote in full board meetings in the
absence of "their" voting member.[Footnote 8]
Figure 2: WMATA Board of Directors Committee Structure (May 2011):
[Refer to PDF for image: committee structure]
Board of Directors:
Committees:
* Safety and Security;
* Finance and Administration:
- Audits and Investigations (subcommittee);
* Customer Service and Operations:
- Technology Review (subcommittee);
* Policy, Program Development and Intergovernmental Relations;
* Joint Development and Real Estate;
* Governance.
Source: GAO.
Note: Draft bylaws propose changing the committee structure to include
six board committees: safety and security; finance and administration;
audits and investigations; customer service and operations; planning,
program development and real estate; and governance.
[End of figure]
In addition, the board is responsible for appointing a general
manager/chief executive officer (GM/CEO) and executive leadership team
to manage day-to-day operations and to develop policies and
procedures, draft a budget, and conduct all other tasks related to
operating and maintaining the transit system. Figure 3 shows the
organization of WMATA's executive leadership.
Figure 3: WMATA's Organization Chart as of May 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart]
Top level:
Board of Directors:
* General Counsel;
* Inspector General.
Second level, reporting to Board of Directors:
General Manager;
* Chief of Staff:
- Office of Performance;
- Human Resources.
Third level, reporting to General Manager:
* Safety;
* Deputy General Manager Operations:
- Transit Infrastructure and Engineering Services;
* Bus Services;
* Customer Service, Communications and Marketing;
* Metro Transit Police;
* Deputy General Manager Administration:
- Information Technology;
- Planning and Joint Development;
- Access Services.
Source: WMATA.
Note: This organizational chart shows the board of directors and
positions considered to be executive management.
[End of figure]
Studies Have Recommended Changes to WMATA's Governance:
Three reports issued in 2010 identified weaknesses in WMATA's
management and board oversight and called for change in WMATA's
governance structure and procedures.[Footnote 9] The Riders' Advisory
Council (RAC) and the Greater Washington Board of Trade and
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments sponsored Task Force
(Governance Task Force) both issued reports critiquing WMATA's board
and management.[Footnote 10] Examples of recommendations from both
reports include: (1) board roles and responsibilities should be more
clearly defined and (2) the board should redefine the general manager
position as WMATA's chief executive officer and that person should
oversee WMATA's daily management. (See appendix II for additional
information on the recommendations made by these reports.) In
addition, a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on a
fatal June 2009 accident discussed how shortcomings in WMATA's
internal communications, recognition of hazards, assessment of risk
from those hazards, and implementation of corrective actions are
evidence of the absence of a safety culture within the organization.
The report partially attributes this situation to WMATA's governance
due to inadequate or deficient oversight by the board.
Stakeholders Believe Inadequate Delineation, Documentation,
Communication, and Self-Assessment of the Board's Responsibilities
Have Led to Occasional Lack of Strategic Focus:
WMATA board members, officials, and other stakeholders have reported
that the board sometimes focuses on management's day-to-day
responsibilities rather than higher level board responsibilities such
as policy, oversight, and strategic planning. This lack of strategic
focus may have resulted from inadequate delineation and documentation
of the board's responsibilities, as well as inadequate communication
among board members.
Governance practices based on previous GAO work and other relevant
studies state that an effective transit board:
* focuses on policy making, principally specific elements such as
guidance and strategic issues as well as oversight and monitoring of
management and performance;
* clearly defines and formally documents its roles and
responsibilities and has a clear view of its role in relationship to
that of management. All activities, such as meetings and agenda items,
should focus members on policy making and away from day-to-day
management issues;
* delegates day-to-day management of the agency to the GM/CEO and
other senior management;
* informs and educates its members and provides orientation to new
board members; and:
* acts as a cohesive group, eliminating personal agendas.
Current and former board members and senior officials with whom we
spoke believed that the WMATA board and individual board members have
sometimes focused on the day-to-day operations of the transit agency
and become involved in areas that should be the responsibilities of
management. Specific cited examples of board involvement in
management's responsibilities include hiring and firing employees
beyond senior management; approval of a minor personnel policy; and
involvement and debate of specific detailed decisions such as station
tiles, bicycle facilities, and transit car seat colors.
Consistent with leading governance practices, WMATA board procedures
state, "No Member individually shall direct or supervise the GM/CEO or
any WMATA employee or contractor managers."[Footnote 11] However,
WMATA officials told us that rather than acting as a cohesive group,
individual board members had directed staff to make changes to
presentations prior to board meetings. These officials also reported
that some individual board members had what they believed to be
excessive contact with midlevel managers requesting specific
information rather than working through established channels such as
the board chairman, GM/CEO, or other senior management.
Several board members and WMATA officials also commented that the
frequency of board meetings can be inefficient and symptomatic of a
lack of a strategic focus by the board. Several board members believed
that the board meets too often, which can be an indication that it is
too involved in running the agency. Officials and board members also
stated that preparing for board activities--while important--can
reduce the time staff have available to conduct day-to-day operations
and analysis, or monitor and improve the performance of the transit
system. Between April 30, 2010, and May 1, 2011, the WMATA board met
84 times-
-17 board meetings and 67 committee meetings or executive sessions. By
comparison, the WMATA board met more frequently than five of the six
transit agencies we visited. Only New York's MTA--which carries
approximately 8 times the number of daily riders--met more frequently.
(See figure 4.) (Additional information comparing the six transit
agencies with WMATA is found in appendix III.)
Figure 4: Number of Board Meetings at Selected Transit Agencies, April
30, 2010, through May 1, 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Agency: MTA;
Board Meeting: 11;
Committee/other: 84.
Agency: WMATA;
Board Meeting: 17;
Committee/other: 67.
Agency: MARTA;
Board Meeting: 12;
Committee/other: 54.
Agency: SEPTA;
Board Meeting: 11;
Committee/other: 39.
Agency: CTA;
Board Meeting: 12;
Committee/other: 20.
Agency: BART;
Board Meeting: 26;
Committee/other: 3.
Agency: MBTA;
Board Meeting: 12;
Committee/other: 4.
Source: GAO analysis of information from MTA, WMATA, MARTA, SEPTA CTA,
BART, and MBTA.
Note: The number of meetings for MARTA is an estimate based on its
2011 meeting schedule.
[End of figure]
Board members and stakeholders, such as RAC and the Governance Task
Force, told us that the lack of strategic focus by the board may be in
part attributed to inadequate delineation and documentation of board
roles, inadequate communication among board members, and other
factors. Roles and responsibilities for the board are delineated in
two primary documents: the compact and board procedures. As mentioned
earlier, the compact provides the board with specific tasks and
authorities such as developing a mass transit plan, capital and
current expense budgets, and a financing plan; selecting a GM/CEO, an
independent auditor, and an audit committee; and adhering to legal
requirements such as the Davis-Bacon Act.[Footnote 12] The compact
also states that "subject to policy direction by the board," the
GM/CEO "shall be responsible for all activities" of WMATA.[Footnote
13] In addition, board procedures further delineate that the board
"determines agency policy and provides oversight for the funding,
operation and expansion of safe, reliable, and effective transit
service within the Transit Zone."[Footnote 14]
Although the compact and board procedures provide some guidance, there
is a perception among WMATA officials, some board members, and other
stakeholders that the described roles and responsibilities are too
broad and not clearly defined. The Governance Task Force found that
"the lack of delineation of responsibilities has created an
environment where there is no clear understanding of who is
accountable for issues such as day-to-day management, communication,
operations, and safety."[Footnote 15] In addition, some board members
we spoke with told us that while the existing documentation generally
provides clarity, it should be improved. For example, throughout the
history of WMATA, the board has made specific delegations of authority
to the GM/CEO covering such issues as procurements and personnel
policies. However, according to board members and WMATA's general
counsel, these delegations--and other board resolutions--are not
organized or readily accessible to the board.
Inadequate board communication including failure to orient, inform,
and educate new and existing board members has also contributed to the
lack of a strategic focus of the board, according to board members.
For example, in the past, orientation for new board members has been
informal, driven primarily through the initiative of the new board
members themselves. In comparison, officials at four of the six
transit agencies we visited told us that they provide a formal
orientation for new board members. For example, as a result of MARTA's
orientation process, a MARTA official stated that roles and
responsibilities for the board are clear and well-defined. Their
orientation includes (1) presentations by the senior executive team on
subjects such as the MARTA Act and its specific criteria and
allowances as well as the bylaws, (2) discussion of the roles and
responsibilities of board members, (3) an explanation of meeting
structure, and (4) a tour of key facilities. In contrast, at WMATA, we
observed that current efforts to inform and educate board members,
such as discussion during meetings, have not consistently proven to be
effective in informing board members of their role relative to
management's role in day-to-day operations.
Other factors might have also contributed to the lack of a strategic
focus for the board. For example, in the past, WMATA's board
procedures were subject to change by the annually rotated chairperson.
One senior WMATA manager told us that each time the procedures change
it takes time for the board members to adjust. In addition, the
Congressional Research Service noted that the model of the WMATA
board--which is closer to a public utility model than a private sector
model--requires action in decisions such as fare setting, route
selection, and frequency of service determinations that are normally
viewed as day-to-day decisions in the private sector.[Footnote 16] The
WMATA compact delineates that the board should develop and adopt a
mass transit plan that includes specific elements such as routes,
schedules, and fares. In contrast, officials at SEPTA told us that,
although the SEPTA board also plays a role in approving budgets,
service plans, and some procurements, SEPTA's enabling legislation
articulates that the board's focus is to be on long-term planning and
policy rather than the day-to-day administration of the agency's
business.[Footnote 17]
Additionally, WMATA's board does not conduct a self-assessment.
According to leading governance practices, effective transit boards
monitor their progress on an annual basis and conduct a thorough self-
assessment every 3 to 5 years. Such an assessment would not only
evaluate progress in terms of the transit system's performance, but
also evaluate the effectiveness of the board's organization,
structure, and functioning, and its impact on performance.[Footnote
18] The WMATA board does not do this type of an assessment; two board
members with whom we spoke pointed out that the only form of board
assessment is the replacement of board members by their appointing
authorities. As a result, the board is lacking a key mechanism for
regular, ongoing measurement of its performance. By comparison, New
York's MTA board is required by law to complete an annual board self-
assessment whereby the board as a whole and each of the committees,
individually, assesses its effectiveness. In addition, MTA's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) has statutory authority that makes it
permissible for it to audit and investigate the board of directors, or
its members if the need arises; past oversight efforts have included
reviewing the board's oversight of MTA capital mega-projects. MTA's
Inspector General told us that the ability to use such a broad,
general authority in this manner is an important oversight mechanism
for MTA. By comparison, the WMATA board has not adopted procedures to
allow the WMATA OIG to investigate claims against the board, including
alleged wrongdoing by board members or alleged instances of the board
not following procedures or protocols.
Some WMATA board members agreed that the board should focus on policy
making and should have a role in setting goals, strategic planning,
budgeting, oversight, and monitoring performance. Specifically, these
board members commented that the board should be more focused on
setting and evaluating performance metrics based on a strong strategic
planning process, an area that has been lacking in the past.[Footnote
19] Starting in December 2010, the board and management began taking
steps to further identify and delineate roles and responsibilities
including the establishment of the Governance Committee.[Footnote 20]
Additionally, in April 2011, the board released draft bylaws intended
to be permanent and amendable only by a majority vote of the board. If
adopted and then effectively implemented, the draft bylaws would
address some of the issues described above. For example, the draft
bylaws:
* assign roles and responsibilities for the board, board members, and
the chair and mandate an orientation program, a self-evaluation of the
board, and standardization of communication procedures and conduits.
* require the board to act as a cohesive group, focusing on policy
making, strategic planning, and oversight, as well as its specific
roles in creating and adopting a budget, determining a fare structure
and service levels, and developing a business plan.
* clarify that the GM/CEO has been delegated the authority and is
primarily responsible for the overall administration and operation of
WMATA subject to policy direction and oversight from the board.
In addition, the board has requested that WMATA's general counsel
organize and catalog board resolutions that delegate authority to the
GM/CEO. The board has also organized a new, more formal, orientation
program for new board members and plans to draft amended board
procedures and a revised code of ethics.
WMATA's Board Is Structured to Receive Information That Could
Facilitate More Effective Oversight of the System:
To help carry out its role as an oversight body, WMATA's board is
structured to have access to information that could help facilitate
effective oversight of management and the agency's operations.
According to leading governance practices, a board needs to have an
effective oversight process, supported by timely and accurate
information and clear communication channels. The types of oversight
information available to the board are important because they can
provide the board with understanding about areas in need of attention
and improvement regarding the operations and finances of the agency.
However, past board practices such as infrequent meetings of the Audit
and Investigations Subcommittee and the lack of routine briefings on
the status of recommendations from outside parties may have impaired
the ability of the board to use this information to effectively carry
out its oversight role.
The board receives or has access to several key sources of information
related to finance, operations, and safety that could facilitate
effective oversight. For example, in 2006, WMATA established the OIG
to conduct and supervise audits, program evaluations, and
investigations.[Footnote 21] The inspector general is appointed by the
board and reports directly to it. The board also receives information
that could facilitate effective board monitoring and oversight from
two important external entities. At the federal level, the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) conducts a triennial review, a
procurement systems review, and a financial management
review.[Footnote 22] In the most recent series of these reviews, in
2007 and 2008, FTA recommended improvements in several areas,
including preventative maintenance; internal controls related to real
property, facilities, and equipment; procurement policies and
procedures; and WMATA's cost allocation plan and grant budget
accounting.[Footnote 23] FTA officials stated that these types of
findings and recommendations were typical of those found at other
transit agencies.
Additionally, the Tri-state Oversight Committee was created in 1997 by
state-level agencies in Virginia and Maryland and the District of
Columbia to jointly oversee rail safety and security at WMATA.
[Footnote 24] In 2007, the committee made several findings and
observations, many of which dealt with updating agency documentation
or policies, such as the system safety program plan.[Footnote 25] More
recently, in 2010, the committee reported that WMATA has worked to
resolve outstanding safety issues and findings from previous internal
and external safety reviews and investigations.[Footnote 26]
Additionally, there are other mechanisms for the board to obtain
relevant information from stakeholders, including RAC, the
Jurisdictional Coordinating Committee (JCC), and a regular public
comment period during board meetings.
Internally, the board's six committees provide procedures and
communication channels to facilitate the flow of guidance and
oversight information to the board in areas such as finance, safety,
security, and customer service. For example, one of the board's key
governance areas is its responsibility to annually adopt a capital
budget for the agency. The Finance and Administration Committee--with
its overall responsibility for monitoring the financial integrity and
viability of WMATA--recommends capital and operating budget approval
to the board, monitors capital and operating budget implementation and
management, develops budget preparation guidance, and recommends
proposed budgetary changes to the board. Additionally, the committee
recommends policies for fare setting and oversees the operation and
development of fare collection mechanisms, among other things.
The Audits and Investigations Subcommittee, which is part of the
Finance and Administration Committee, serves as the main avenue for
information that can be used to facilitate the board's oversight of
financial reporting and audit processes--including the financial
reporting and related audits and OIG reports--which are reported or
otherwise available to the board. According to the subcommittee chair,
the subcommittee provides input, along with management, into an
internal audit plan developed by the OIG each year prior to the
adoption of the annual budget and uses the OIG's quarterly reports to
monitor the status of corrective actions taken by WMATA on outstanding
OIG recommendations. The subcommittee chair also noted that the
subcommittee uses an independent auditor's report on WMATA's financial
statements and single audit report to facilitate its oversight of the
quality and integrity of WMATA's internal controls, compliance systems
and accounting, auditing, and financial reporting processes.
Furthermore, the subcommittee chair explained that the board also uses
this information to monitor the status of corrective actions taken on
past recommendations made by the external auditor.
The board's Audits and Investigations Subcommittee is the board's main
channel for audit information and provides the opportunity for
financial oversight information to reach the board. However, the
subcommittee has met relatively infrequently. The subcommittee met
once in 2008 and twice in both 2009 and 2010--including meeting with
the OIG to discuss safety and investigative matters and to discuss and
accept the external auditor's annually required report on the audit of
WMATA's financial statements.[Footnote 27] Additionally, the current
placement of the subcommittee within a full committee differs from
other transit agency practices. By comparison, some transit agencies
we visited had an audit committee that met more often and had the
audit and financial reporting function elevated to a committee. For
example, the audit committees at SEPTA and New York's MTA met four and
seven times, respectively, over the last year; while Boston's MBTA met
less often. However, given the variety in other transit agencies'
practices and the lack of clear criteria on how often audit committees
should meet, there is no clear standard against which to measure
WMATA's practices.
According to the board procedures, the Safety and Security Committee
is responsible for providing safety and security policy direction;
oversight to assure that all facilities, equipment, and operations of
the transit system are safe and secure; and safety and security goals
for the GM/CEO and the agency. To carry out its duties, the committee
reviews WMATA's system safety program plan for consistency with safety
goals and receives periodic reports from the Tri-State Oversight
Committee. It also works with FTA and NTSB, as appropriate, to review
the status of WMATA safety with the goal of assuring that all safety
recommendations from any internal or external safety review or
investigation are handled expeditiously and effectively. The committee
has met regularly since October 2010, according to the agency.
A 2010 report by NTSB highlighted problems with the flow of safety
oversight information.[Footnote 28] That report states that the WMATA
board chairman told NTSB that prior to the June 2009 accident the
board did not receive routine briefings on safety recommendations or
corrective action plans; rather the board counted on the GM/CEO to
identify relevant issues that required the board's attention. In
response, NTSB recommended that the board evaluate actions taken in
response to recommendations and corrective action plans from NTSB,
FTA, and the Tri-State Oversight Committee. WMATA has several offices,
including the OIG, tasked with internal and external recommendation
tracking. The Safety and Security Committee receives regular reports
from the agency's Chief Safety Officer and Chief of Police on the
status of the responsiveness of the agency to internal and external
safety findings, including the status of corrective action plans, as
well as any significant accidents or incidents. WMATA officials told
us that they are developing an updated safety recommendation tracking
system, and NTSB has closed this recommendation as implemented.
Additionally, NTSB concluded that, before the June 2009 accident, the
board did not exercise oversight responsibility for the safety of the
WMATA system, leading it to recommend that the board elevate its
safety oversight role by developing a policy statement to explicitly
and publicly assume the responsibility for continual oversight of
system safety. WMATA has implemented this recommendation.
The board's other committees have additional oversight
responsibilities. For example, the Customer Service and Operations
Committee is responsible for overseeing transit system performance and
service standards; the quality of operations programs and procedures;
and customer service, communication, and outreach activities,
including public and media relations. The objective of the committee
is to help ensure that WMATA operational activities and programs are
designed to provide reliable, effective and clean transit service,
responsive to customer needs. The Policy, Program Development and
Intergovernmental Relations Committee is responsible for coordination
of regional planning issues and planning for transit service, access,
and system expansion, among other things.
As mentioned earlier, in April 2011, the recently created Governance
Committee released draft bylaws which, if adopted, would elevate the
Audits and Investigations Subcommittee to a full committee, streamline
board communications by standardizing communication procedures and
channels, and formalize the board's relationship with advisory
committees such as JCC and RAC.
While there is no single approach to best support all transit agency
oversight, officials at MTA noted that they also used additional ways
to support their oversight functions that they believed had benefits.
[Footnote 29] For example, officials told us that, pursuant to state
statute, the agency uses an independent engineer to evaluate key
technical or capital-intensive projects, assess risk, and act as a
control on those projects. One WMATA board member indicated a desire
to have access to independent expertise for consultation, noting that
such resources could improve the board's effectiveness.
Additionally, the Governance Task Force and RAC have recommended that
WMATA change elements of its board structure--such as increasing the
size of the board and changing the role of alternates--to improve its
governance. Our analysis, however, indicates that most of the
recommended changes have trade-offs--there are both benefits and
drawbacks to them. We compared the various recommendations to leading
governance practices, approaches taken by other transit agencies, and
the views of board members and stakeholders. Board members and
stakeholders indicated that proposed changes to the board's structure
and processes--such as eliminating alternate board members, changing
the size of the board, or eliminating the jurisdictional veto--have
trade-offs, and we did not find consistent support among leading
governance practices or other transit agencies that these changes
would improve governance. Some other proposed changes such as uniform
compensation and coordinated board member appointments will require
action by the three jurisdictions. To accomplish that task, the
Governance Task Force recommended that the signatories and the
appointing authorities form a WMATA Governance Commission[Footnote 30]
to make improvements to the authority's governance structure and hold
the board accountable for its performance. Such an additional
oversight body could help facilitate coordination among the
jurisdictions. However, we did not identify governance leading
practices, or find other transit agencies with a comparable oversight
board over a board of directors. Furthermore, such a commission was
viewed by some stakeholders we spoke with as redundant because it
would be comprised of most of the same membership that is responsible
for appointing the board of directors. Appendix II discusses selected
recommendations in more detail.
WMATA Has Made Progress, but Does Not Fully Address All Elements of
Sound Strategic Planning:
WMATA Has Established Some Strategic Planning Elements:
WMATA has developed elements of strategic planning over the past 4
years, but the agency's board and management could improve their
strategic focus and long-term planning processes. Leading
organizations that we have analyzed use strategic planning to
articulate a comprehensive mission as well as to identify and achieve
long-range goals and objectives for all levels of the organization.
While strategic planning practices may vary among organizations
according to agency-specific needs and missions, according to leading
strategic planning practices we identified, effective strategic
planning generally includes a mission statement, long-term goals and
objectives, and strategies to achieve the goals; covers the major
functions and operations of an agency; and establishes a multiyear
time frame and performance metrics for gauging progress. According to
the literature, the process for strategic planning should also include
assessing the organization's external and internal environments,
conducting a stakeholder analysis and involving the board and key
stakeholders in the strategic planning process, identifying key
strategic issues facing the organization, developing a process for
implementing and managing these issues, and reassessing the strategic
planning process.[Footnote 31]
WMATA has not succeeded in past attempts at strategic planning. WMATA
officials acknowledged several failed efforts at strategic planning,
which they said occurred because of a lack of management support and
employee buy-in, a lack of specific actions to execute the plans, and
a focus on tactical versus strategic decision making.
According to a senior WMATA official, however, the agency is in the
process of developing a strategic planning and performance management
system, which consists of a strategic framework, a GM/CEO's annual
execution plan, and internal departmental execution plans.[Footnote
32] The strategic framework is a one-page document, available on
WMATA's Web site, which outlines the agency's mission statement, along
with 5 goals and 12 objectives. The agency's departmental execution
plans are internal documents--not available on the Web site--that
identify actions, measures, targets, and responsibility for meeting
WMATA's strategic goals and objectives. The final component of WMATA's
strategic planning system is the GM/CEO's execution plan, which a
senior WMATA official told us identifies annual safety, operational,
and financial performance measures and targets. According to a senior
WMATA official, as of May 2011, this document was being reviewed by
the board. It was not made available to us.
WMATA has developed several elements of effective strategic planning
through its strategic framework and execution plans, such as a mission
statement, goals, objectives, strategies, and metrics. The agency's
strategic framework includes a mission statement for the agency, which
was approved by the board, along with goals and objectives for the
programs and operations of the agency. WMATA also has developed some
processes for implementing and managing its strategic issues through
departmental execution plans. These plans contain strategies for key
actions that are linked to the strategic goals and objectives. WMATA
has also linked the prioritization of its capital needs to its
strategic goals and objectives, as part of aligning its activities to
support the agency's goals. Furthermore, the departmental execution
plans also include performance metrics and targets for tracking
progress on the agency's key actions for achieving its goals and
objectives, some of which are publicly available and regularly
reported to the board.
WMATA's Strategic Planning Process Lacks Board and Stakeholder
Awareness and Involvement:
WMATA's strategic planning and performance management system does not
include some strategic planning elements of leading organizations that
we have studied, such as stakeholder awareness and involvement,
environmental assessments, a long-term time frame and regular
updating, program evaluations, and up-to-date performance metrics.
Specifically:
Board and stakeholder awareness and involvement are lacking. According
to strategic planning practices we identified, a strategic planning
process at a transit agency should be driven by the board, as part of
its role in setting the direction and priorities of the organization.
Board involvement in the strategic planning process allows the board
to help the system identify and maintain focus on strategic
priorities. Board leadership can also help implementation of strategic
actions proceed more effectively by providing support from an agency's
highest level. Furthermore, boards can help an agency identify and
assess external opportunities and challenges as part of their
responsibility for relating an organization to its external
environment. Several other major transit agencies we studied use board-
driven strategic planning processes to establish the direction of the
agency. For example, the strategic goals and plan for San Francisco's
BART are formally adopted by the agency's board and serve as the
guiding document for the agency's budget process.
WMATA's strategic framework was not developed with board input and did
not include a process to identify priorities and direction from the
board. For example, several WMATA board members told us that the board
has not been involved in strategic planning. Some board members also
were not aware of the agency's strategic planning efforts, as several
members told us they were not clear on the nature of WMATA's strategic
planning process or if the agency had a strategic plan at all. As
discussed earlier, the board's documented roles and responsibilities
also do not delineate a role for the board in strategic planning.
Board members expressed an interest in being more involved in
strategic planning and setting the direction of the agency. WMATA's
Governance Committee has also cited strategic planning as an upcoming
task for the board. A senior WMATA official also told us the board is
in the process of reviewing and approving the GM/CEO's 2011 execution
plan. However, without prior board involvement, WMATA's strategic
planning process may not appropriately reflect the views of parties
potentially affected by or interested in the agency's activities.
WMATA has also not fully communicated its strategic planning process
to some of its internal stakeholders. Strategic planning processes can
be important tools for communicating an organization's intentions
internally and ensuring the entire organization is moving in the same
direction, according to strategic planning practices we identified.
Further, a strategic planning process that affects an entire
organization should involve an organization's key decision makers.
WMATA's strategic plans have not been communicated to all key decision
makers. For example, a senior WMATA official noted that the agency's
strategic planning efforts did not account for workforce attrition and
he was unaware of the internal execution plan for WMATA's Human
Resources department, which includes actions to identify retirement
forecasts for employees. Without good communication, WMATA cannot
ensure its strategic planning process fully articulates the agency's
mission, goals, and objectives to its internal stakeholders.
A lack of transparency also exists among some external stakeholders,
such as the jurisdictions and the general public, in terms of
understanding the agency's strategic actions, priorities, and vision.
According to strategic planning practices we identified, stakeholder
analysis and involvement are important aspects of an effective
strategic planning process.[Footnote 33] A stakeholder analysis can
help an organization identify and incorporate the various criteria
their external stakeholders use to judge the organization and how the
organization is performing against those criteria. A senior WMATA
official told us that JCC, which consists of representatives from the
three local jurisdictions, was consulted on the agency's strategic
goals, performance measures, and reporting, but some officials from
the jurisdictions told us they were not aware of the agency's
strategic planning efforts and did not believe the agency engaged in
any strategic planning. Such awareness may be hindered because, of the
three components of WMATA's strategic planning process, only the one-
page strategic framework is publicly available. More publicly
available information on WMATA's strategic planning process could
improve awareness of the agency's efforts and challenges among
external stakeholders. In commenting on a draft of this report, WMATA
noted that in June 2011 it launched a new strategic planning
initiative that will include input from external stakeholders.
Senior officials at several transit agencies told us or have stated
publicly that stakeholder involvement and awareness of their strategic
planning efforts have created greater external understanding and
support for the agency and helped regional stakeholders understand
their decisions and needs. For example, officials with New York's MTA
told us that regional stakeholder awareness of the agency's strategic
planning efforts and future needs have increased stakeholder buy-in
for the agency's planning. Research on transit agency strategic
planning has also shown that stakeholder awareness of strategic
planning can help define the agency's core role and responsibilities
to the community. Additionally, if an organization does not understand
and effectively meet its stakeholders' performance criteria, then the
agency may not satisfy its stakeholders and could receive less support
from them.[Footnote 34]
Internal and external environmental factors that could affect goals
are not clearly assessed. WMATA's strategic planning and performance
management system does not clearly state key internal and external
risk factors that could significantly affect the achievement of its
goals and objectives. We have previously reported that for strategic
planning to be done well, organizations must assess their internal and
external environments.[Footnote 35] An agency should study its
internal environment to identify strengths and weaknesses of the
organization. Organizations should also identify external
opportunities and challenges, as many external forces that fall beyond
an organization's influence can affect its chances for success. Some
of the external factors that may be identified in these assessments
could be economic, demographic, social, or environmental and may be
stable, predictable, or variable. Other transit agencies we studied
take into account factors that may affect the achievement of their
goals. For example, the strategic plan for SEPTA in Philadelphia
includes an analysis of the internal and external factors, such as a
potential loss of dedicated funding and unfunded mandates for the
agency, that could impact the agency's strategic objectives. SEPTA's
plan states that this assessment helps the agency identify the
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the agency from
its environment.
While WMATA has taken into account threats to its capital program by
assessing the potential risks for the delivery of its capital
projects, it has not conducted an external environment assessment for
the rest of its strategic planning and performance management system,
though a WMATA official told us the agency has plans to do so in the
future. Without such assessments, WMATA may not be able to respond
effectively to changes in its environment.
Time frame and updating of strategic plan are unclear. WMATA's
strategic planning efforts do not clearly establish a long-term,
multiyear outlook and do not include a schedule for updating or
revising the agency's strategic goals, objectives, and strategies.
While strategic planning practices we identified vary on prescribing a
specific time frame necessary for strategic plans, the ones that did
identify a time frame state that strategic planning efforts should
look at least 4-6 years into the future. Several other transit
agencies, such as BART and MTA, have multiyear plans and regularly
update their strategic plans. For example, MTA officials told us they
plan 4 and 5 years into the future and annually review the agency's
priorities. MTA officials said this process helps the agency's board
focus on long-term issues and avoid short-sighted decisions. In
commenting on a draft of this report, WMATA noted that its new
strategic planning process will develop a multiyear vision and
multiyear business and operational plans.
WMATA uses a 10-year plan for its capital program linked to the
agency's strategic goals and objectives. But it is not clear from our
review of the strategic framework or departmental execution plans if
WMATA planned several years into the future for all of its major
operations and departments. For example, WMATA does not include any
multiyear goals or actions in its departmental execution plans that
extend beyond fiscal year 2012. In addition, WMATA officials told us
that, as a result of insufficient long-term planning, priorities such
as new technology, staff, and capital needs are approved--and
sometimes underfunded--during the annual budget process rather than
planned for strategically. In terms of regular updating, senior WMATA
officials told us that the GM/CEO's execution plan will include
performance metrics and targets the board will annually review. The
agency's strategic framework and departmental execution plans do not
include procedures for regular review and update. Ensuring a multiyear
time frame and regular updating of the agency's strategic planning
system can encourage the board and staff to have a more long-range
view in decision making and priority setting.
Long-term planning and regular updating could help WMATA address some
problems with the transit system. According to senior WMATA officials,
board members, and other stakeholders, WMATA has historically
concentrated on system expansion and has not sufficiently focused on
the long-term maintenance of the system. The agency has well-
documented maintenance issues, such as problems with the system's
escalators breaking down frequently. Additionally, WMATA's GM/CEO has
stated publicly that the agency lacks a long-term, systematic plan for
its track rebuilding program and is unable to plan major track
maintenance for more than 6 months in advance. One WMATA official told
us that certain maintenance projects and technological upgrades
undergo an inefficient and lengthy process from conception to
implementation.
Program evaluations are not systematic. While WMATA does perform some
evaluations that assess the effectiveness of its programs, these
evaluations are not conducted on a regular basis or uniformly across
the agency and the agency's strategic planning documents do not
describe or identify any program evaluations used for establishing or
revising the agency's goals and objectives. We have previously
reported that program evaluations can be a potentially critical source
of information in assessing the appropriateness and reasonableness of
goals, the effectiveness of strategies, and the implementation of
programs.[Footnote 36] A systematic evaluation of how a program was
implemented can also provide important information about the success
or failure of a program and suggest ways to improve it. A senior WMATA
official told us that the agency conducts performance spotlights on
areas with negative performance indicators, as a way of evaluating and
identifying the causes and possible solutions to an indicator's
performance. However, the agency's strategic planning documents and
comments from a senior official do not describe or identify any
program evaluations used for establishing or revising the agency's
goals and objectives or for evaluating the progress towards achieving
those goals.
Some performance metrics are outdated and were not developed with
board involvement. WMATA has made significant progress in performance
management, but some weaknesses remain. Strategic planning practices
we identified state that strategic planning processes should be linked
to performance measurement and include metrics for gauging progress
toward the attainment of each of the plan's long-term goals. This is
necessary for monitoring whether goals are being achieved and if
changes are necessary. To its credit, WMATA created an Office of
Performance in 2010 to develop a performance management framework for
the agency's operations through enhanced performance measurement and
reporting. The office has created a "vital signs" report, which is a
scorecard of 12 key performance indicators for WMATA. The board also
receives regular reports from the office on the agency's performance.
Additionally, the office has worked to establish consistency
throughout the agency by standardizing the tracking of information for
performance measurement. Further, WMATA's performance metrics and
targets are linked to the agency's strategic goals and objectives.
Although WMATA board members and officials indicated that the office
is a good start to improving the performance management of the agency,
some of WMATA's performance metrics and targets are out of date and
the board has not been fully involved in assessing the metrics and
their criteria. As part of its strategic planning efforts, WMATA has
established performance metrics and targets in its departmental
execution plans for measuring each key action for achieving the
agency's goals and objectives. Performance metrics and targets need to
be updated to anticipate changes in the agency's resources and
operating environment. Senior WMATA officials have acknowledged that
some of the agency's performance metrics and targets are based on data
and information that is out of date.
To address this issue, in May 2011, a senior WMATA official told us
management has proposed revised performance targets to the board's
Customer Service and Operations Committee. According to leading
strategic planning practices, as part of a board's role in overseeing
the agency and monitoring progress towards the achievement of
strategic goals, a board should review an agency's performance
measures on a regular basis. For example, BART's board works with
management to revisit goals and performance metrics on an annual
basis. By comparison, the WMATA board has not conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the criteria used for setting the agency's
performance measures. A senior WMATA official has told us that the
agency's performance targets will be reevaluated by the board on an
annual basis or if operating conditions change. Without such review
and input from the board, WMATA's performance metrics and targets may
not reflect the agency's current challenges or accurately measure
WMATA's progress towards achieving its goals and objectives.
GSA Lacks a Formal Process to Appoint Federal Board Members:
As a result of compact changes, WMATA's board expanded in August 2009
to include two members and two alternates representing the federal
government; as of June 2011, the agency responsible for making the
appointments--GSA--had appointed two federal board members and one
alternate. GSA officials noted the lack of compensation for board
members deters some possible candidates, particularly for alternates.
GSA officials told us they based appointments on the following
qualifications: the appointees must (1) be WMATA riders, (2) be able
to serve part-time and without additional compensation for their
service, and (3) possess transportation experience. Such
qualifications do not follow leading governance practices that call
for linking the composition and skill set of a board to the entity's
particular challenges and strategic vision. Furthermore, GSA has not
developed a documented process for fulfilling its obligation under the
compact to appoint federal board members. Without documenting the
steps and criteria for identifying and screening candidates and
selecting board members, GSA cannot be assured that it is appointing
qualified board members who have knowledge of the federal interest in
WMATA and federal employees who ride the system.
Once federal board members are appointed, GSA officials told us that
GSA does not have a role in providing staff support and providing
guidance on the federal views. By comparison, other WMATA board
members are provided staff support from their appointing
jurisdictions. One federal board member told us that he sometimes
coordinates with the U.S. Department of Transportation on issues;
however, the relationship is not formal.
Conclusions:
WMATA faces challenges in many areas, including projected shortfalls
in meeting long-term capital costs, increases in ridership levels, and
plans for system expansion. In addition, following the fatal June 2009
rail accident, WMATA board members and management have been tasked by
NTSB and other stakeholders with making WMATA a safer system. However,
the absence of a clear delineation of the board's roles and
responsibilities for providing oversight of management as well as the
absence of a board-driven strategic vision raise concerns about
WMATA's ability to systematically and effectively confront its many
challenges.
WMATA currently has some elements of effective governance in place.
However, board members and WMATA senior officials described a culture
in which there is a lack of clarity about the roles of the board and
individual board members, which has resulted in their overreach into
management responsibilities. Such a culture limits the ability of the
board to provide leadership, direction, and a strategic vision to
management. Without a long-term strategic vision, board members
approve priorities such as new technology and capital needs during the
annual budget process rather than proactively prioritize needs over
the long term.
Recent changes in the board, as well as the development of the
Governance Committee and draft bylaws, present an opportunity to
better formalize and document the roles and responsibilities of the
board and management and to collaboratively create and implement a
long-term, strategic vision for WMATA. In addition, regular
evaluations by the board of its own effectiveness relative to WMATA's
performance could help facilitate understanding by board members of
how well the board is functioning and how to improve board activities
and interactions. Successfully addressing these issues could better
position WMATA to meet the agency's future challenges.
In addition, GSA, which became responsible for appointing federal
members to WMATA's board in 2009 as a result of changes to WMATA's
compact, has subsequently appointed two members and one of two
alternates. Qualifications for appointment include riding WMATA and
possessing transportation experience. Such qualifications, although
important, do not follow leading governance practices that call for a
board to have the skill set to deal with the agency's particular
challenges. In addition, GSA has not documented a process or specific
criteria for making the appointments and it, therefore, lacks
assurance that it appoints qualified board members.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to improve the strategic focus of WMATA's board and improve
the agency's performance, the board of directors working with the GM/
CEO should take the following three actions:
1. As WMATA takes steps to clarify the roles and responsibilities of
the board and management in its draft bylaws, it needs to ensure that
a clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of each are
adopted and effectively implemented.
2. Improve the agency's strategic planning process by (1) defining and
documenting roles for the board, management, and stakeholders in
strategic planning; (2) ensuring that the strategic plan is
sufficiently long term; (3) ensuring that board-approved strategic
goals and objectives are linked to updated performance measures; (4)
including internal and external assessments and program evaluations;
and (5) reviewing the strategic plan on a regular basis and updating
it as needed.
3. Conduct a regular assessment of the board's performance, including
elements such as an evaluation of the effectiveness of the board's
organization, structure, and functioning, and its impact on
performance.
In addition, we recommend that the Administrator of the General
Services Administration document specific criteria for identifying and
selecting candidates to represent the federal government on WMATA's
board.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to WMATA, GSA, the Department of
Transportation, and NTSB for their review and comment. WMATA and GSA
provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV and
appendix V, respectively. WMATA and the Department of Transportation
also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the
report as appropriate. NTSB had no comments. WMATA recognized the
balance that we have striven for in the report between areas of
concern in WMATA's recent past and the progress the agency has
recently made on those issues. However, WMATA felt the report could be
strengthened by additional information on WMATA's recent actions. We
revised the report to include additional WMATA actions, such as
launching a new strategic planning process that will take a multi-year
perspective. GSA agreed, in part, with our recommendation and
findings. GSA disagreed with our statement that it cannot assure that
it is appointing qualified board members. We acknowledge the effort
GSA has taken to identify and appoint board members; however, past
efforts do not assure that future replacements for existing board
members will be qualified and appointed in a timely manner.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, the
Administrator of the General Services Administration, the Chairman of
the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Chairman and GM/CEO
of WMATA. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions or would like to discuss this
work, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Individuals making key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
David J. Wise:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objective was to assess the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority's (WMATA) governance in terms of the board's roles and
responsibilities, oversight, strategic planning, and governance
structure, and identify changes, if any, that should be made.
Specifically, we addressed the following question: How do roles and
responsibilities, oversight, and strategic planning elements of
WMATA's practices align with leading governance practices? In
addition, we provide information on the appointment of federal members
to WMATA's board.
For the purpose of this work, we focused on WMATA's governance in
terms of the board's structure, communication, policies, practices,
and documentation relating to its oversight of management and carrying
out of its organizational mission. In addition, we analyzed
management's role in certain areas, such as strategic planning;
however, we did not fully assess the adequacy of management's role in
effectively operating the agency.
We selected leading governance practices relevant to transit agencies
from several sources, including those practices used in previous GAO
work on public and private sector governance challenges at several
organizations[Footnote 37] and non-GAO studies, reports, and
recommendations concerning the governance of transit agencies, other
similar organizations, and corporations.[Footnote 38] Additionally, we
selected strategic planning practices from the Transit Cooperative
Research Program,[Footnote 39] previous GAO work,[Footnote 40] and
other sources as appropriate.[Footnote 41] We then consolidated and
categorized governance practices and recommendations along similar
themes, such as structure, oversight, and strategic planning (see
table 2).
Table 2: Categories of Leading Practices:
Board structure and responsibilities:
* Board composition, structure, and organization;
* Board cohesion;
* Board compensation;
* Board duties and responsibilities;
* Board leadership;
* Board procedures;
* Board access to information or records;
* Communication;
* General manager/CEO.
Strategic planning:
* Funding or revenue considerations;
* Strategic and performance planning;
* Performance evaluation.
Oversight and monitoring:
* Conduct and ethical considerations;
* Financial and internal controls;
* Independent audit or investigator general;
* Stakeholder involvement and access to information or records;
* Board performance.
Source: GAO analysis of GAO-06-15; GAO-07-808; GAO-07-993; GAO-08-632;
GAO-10-97; GAO-10-585; GAO-05-739SP; GAO/GGD-10.1.16; GAO/GGD-97-180;
GAO/GGD-96-118;Transit Cooperative Research Program(2002 and 2005);
OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 6; Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993; GPRA Modernization Act of 2010; United States Senate Report
103-58; and Bryson (2004).
[End of table]
To determine how WMATA's practices align with these leading governance
practices, we reviewed and compared the composition and structure of
the WMATA board and senior management, communication between the board
and management, policies and other documentation in place to guide
agency practices, and internal and external oversight practices to the
governance and strategic planning practices. We conducted
semistructured interviews with WMATA senior management listed in table
3. We also conducted semistructured interviews with local
jurisdictions, current board members, oversight agencies, and other
groups conducting governance reviews.[Footnote 42] In addition, we
conducted semistructured interviews with officials from transit
agencies and other stakeholder groups--such as metropolitan planning
organizations--in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia,
and San Francisco. We chose these agencies based on similarities to
WMATA along characteristics, such as size and makeup of the board,
annual ridership, services provided, budget issues, and complexity of
the service area.
Table 3: Entities and Offices Interviewed:
Location: Washington;
Transit agency officials and offices: Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority (WMATA ):
* Board members;
* General Manager/Chief Executive Officer;
* Inspector General;
* General Counsel;
* Chief Financial Officer;
* Chief of Staff;
* Transit Infrastructure and Engineering Services Department;
* Office of Management and Budget Services;
* Office of Safety;
* Office of Performance;
* Chief of Police;
External stakeholders (appointing authorities, oversight
organizations, metropolitan planning organizations, and riders'
groups):
* Washington Suburban Transit Commission;
* General Services Administration;
* Northern Virginia Transportation Commission;
* Federal Transit Administration (FTA);
* National Transportation Safety Board;
* Tri-State Oversight Committee;
* Board of Trade and Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments;
* Riders' Advisory Council;
* American Public Transportation Association.
Location: Atlanta;
Transit agency officials and offices: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority (MARTA):
* Board Chairman;
* General Manager;
* Audit Director;
External stakeholders (appointing authorities, oversight
organizations, metropolitan planning organizations, and riders'
groups): [Empty].
Location: Boston;
Transit agency officials and offices: Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA):
* Board Chairman and members;
* General Manager;
* General Counsel;
* Chief Financial Officer;
External stakeholders (appointing authorities, oversight
organizations, metropolitan planning organizations, and riders'
groups):
* Secretary of Transportation, Massachusetts Department of
Transportation;
* Executive Director, MBTA Advisory Board;
* Riders Oversight Committee.
Location: Chicago;
Transit agency officials and offices: Chicago Transit Authority (CTA):
* Board members;
* President;
* Inspector General;
* General Counsel;
* Chief Financial Officer;
* Chief of Staff;
* Deputy Chief of Staff;
* Acting Chief Operating Officer;
* Chief Infrastructure Officer;
* Chief Technology Officer;
* Chief Safety and Security Officer;
* General Manager - Safety and Risk Compliance;
* Chief Administrative Officer;
External stakeholders (appointing authorities, oversight
organizations, metropolitan planning organizations, and riders'
groups):
* City of Chicago Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs;
* Regional Transportation Authority;
* Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning.
Location: Philadelphia;
Transit agency officials and offices: Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority (SEPTA):
* General Manager;
* Assistant General Manager - Audit and Investigative Services;
* General Counsel;
* Chief Financial Officer/Treasurer;
Delaware River Port Authority:
* Chief Executive Officer;
Port Authority Transit Corporation:
* President;
* General Manager;
* Assistant General Manager;
External stakeholders (appointing authorities, oversight
organizations, metropolitan planning organizations, and riders'
groups):
* FTA;
* Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission;
* Delaware Valley Association of Rail Passengers.
Location: New York;
Transit agency officials and offices: Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (MTA):
* General Counsel;
* Chief Financial Officer;
* Chief of Staff;
* Inspector General;
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey:
* Inspector General;
* Board Chairman;
Port Authority Trans-Hudson:
* General Manager;
External stakeholders (appointing authorities, oversight
organizations, metropolitan planning organizations, and riders'
groups):
* New York Metropolitan Transportation Council;
* Permanent Citizens Action Committee.
Location: San Francisco;
Transit agency officials and offices: Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART):
* Board Chairman;
* General Manager;
* Deputy General Manager;
* Internal Auditor;
* General Counsel;
* Chief Financial Officer;
* Chief of Staff;
* Chief Safety Officer;
* Assistant General Manager, Operations;
* Manager Transit System Compliance;
* Manager, Grant Compliance Division;
* Office of Planning and Budget;
* Procurement Department;
* Office of Civil Rights;
* Capital Development;
External stakeholders (appointing authorities, oversight
organizations, metropolitan planning organizations, and riders'
groups):
* Metropolitan Transportation Commission.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Discussion of Recommendations Concerning WMATA Board
Structural Changes:
This appendix provides additional discussion of selected
recommendations from the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments and Greater Washington Board of Trade sponsored Task Force
(Governance Task Force) and includes the Riders' Advisory Council
(RAC) response or related recommendation, when applicable.[Footnote 43]
Size and Makeup of the WMATA Board:
Current Arrangement:
The WMATA compact provides that the authority shall be governed by a
board with 8 board members, 2 appointed by each signatory, and 2 from
the federal government. In addition, each signatory and the federal
government should appoint 2 alternate board members. The total
membership of the board is 16, including board members and alternate
board members. The WMATA board procedures allow that alternate board
members can vote in committee meetings and attend and participate in
full board meetings, but can only vote in absence of "their" voting
member.
Governance Task Force Recommendation:
The role of alternate members of WMATA's board is greater than that
envisaged by the compact, and it is unusual to have alternate members
on a transit board. Therefore, WMATA should "eliminate the role of
alternates and increase the number of primary members from two to
three for each Appointing Authority, resulting in a 12-member Board,
with one member appointed by the Chief Executive of each Signatory."
Leading Governance Practice and Other Transit Agencies:
According to some corporate governance guidelines, boards should have
no fewer than 5 members and no more than 15.[Footnote 44] Other
transit agencies we visited ranged in size from 5 to 17 voting members
(see table 4).
Table 4: Size and Composition of the Selected Transit Agencies:
Transit agency: Number of voting board members;
Washington, D.C. WMATA: 8;
New York MTA: 17;
Boston MBTA: 5;
San Francisco BART: 9;
Philadelphia SEPTA: 15;
Atlanta MARTA: 11;
Chicago CTA: 7.
Transit agency: Number of alternate or nonvoting members;
Washington, D.C. WMATA: 8 alternates;
New York MTA: 2 nonvoting members;
4 alternate nonvoting members;
Boston MBTA: None;
San Francisco BART: None;
Philadelphia SEPTA: None;
Atlanta MARTA: 1 nonvoting member;
Chicago CTA: None.
Source: GAO analysis of transit agency governance documents.
[End of table]
WMATA's use of alternate board members is unique among the transit
agencies we visited. We did not find leading governance practices on
the use of alternates or nonvoting board members.
Discussion:
WMATA's 8 voting member board compares with private sector corporate
governance guidelines; however, including alternates, WMATA's board is
among the largest boards that we reviewed, and larger than the size
recommended by corporate governance guidelines. A 12-member board with
no alternates, as recommended, would align with corporate governance
guidelines. In addition, eliminating alternates would create a board
comparable with four of the six transit agencies we visited. While the
Governance Task Force report recommended a change in the role of
alternates and number of primary board members, the report did not
find the current size of the board a problem. RAC also commented that
the current size of the board functions well and alternates provide
for representation for more riders. Eliminating the role of alternates
and increasing the number of primary members as recommended are
changes that would require a compact amendment.
Board members and stakeholders told us that there are trade-offs to
changing the size of the board. One board member offered that the
current size of the board is structurally weak and can make consensus-
building more difficult. However, another board member noted that the
extension of the rail system to Loudoun County will add another
jurisdiction to the rail service area. Therefore, reducing the size of
the board would make it difficult to envelop the additional
jurisdiction.
Board members varied in their views on the role of alternates. Several
board members commented that if the board has alternates--as currently
required by the compact--then those board members should be active and
informed on board business, and the current role of the alternates
provides that opportunity and can be a good way to learn about the
authority. Other board members commented that alternates bring
knowledge and value to the board and that alternates allow committee
work to be distributed among more members. However, two board members
believed that the time and commitment needed to be an alternate is too
high given that alternates cannot vote in board meetings. Two others
suggested that the compact be changed to allow alternates to become
voting members. Staff from each appointing authority told us that
board positions can be hard to fill. Staff from the General Services
Administration (GSA) further stated that filling alternate positions,
in particular, can be difficult.
Coordinated Appointing Process:
Current Arrangement:
The WMATA compact provides that board members shall be appointed by
the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission, for Virginia; by the
Council of the District of Columbia, for the District of Columbia; and
by the Washington Suburban Transit Commission, for Maryland. Federal
board members are appointed by GSA.[Footnote 45] The WMATA compact
does not have any specific requirements for board members, except that
one of the federal board members must be a regular rider of the
transit system. There is no requirement that jurisdictions coordinate
on board appointments.
Governance Task Force Recommendation:
There are no criteria or procedures in the current appointment process
to ensure the WMATA board collectively has the balance of attributes
it needs to perform effectively. Therefore, jurisdictions should have
a "coordinated process for appointing a board with the right balance
of attributes to serve WMATA and the region."
Leading Governance Practice and Other Transit Agencies:
Leading governance practices state that an effective transit board is
balanced along several dimensions and that it is important to have
board members who are political, as well as those with business,
financial, legal, and marketing backgrounds.[Footnote 46]
Requirements for balance of experience on boards at transit agencies
we visited or spoke with vary, but some have legislative or procedural
requirements for expertise on their boards. For example:
* In Boston, MBTA's enabling legislation requires that among its board
of directors, two shall be experts in public or private transportation
finance; two shall have practical experience in transportation
planning and policy; and one shall be a registered civil engineer with
at least 10 years experience.
* In New York, beginning in June 2009, newly appointed MTA board
members were required to have experience in one or more of the
following areas: transportation, public administration, business
management, finance, accounting, law, engineering, land use, urban and
regional planning, management of large capital projects, labor
relations, or have experience in some other area of activity central
to the mission of the authority. Additionally, geographic
representation requirements apply.
* In Chicago, CTA board members cannot hold government (local, state,
federal) office; rather, they must come from the local private sector
and community.
* In San Francisco, BART board members are directly elected based on
geographic regions.
Discussion:
Despite the lack of requirements, WMATA's board includes members with
diverse backgrounds or experience in transit, local and federal
government, business, and nonprofit organizations. In addition, the
jurisdictional nature of the appointing process ensures geographically
diverse representation.
Several current WMATA board members agreed that having a mix of
expertise on the board is beneficial; however, the board members
disagreed about whether expertise requirements were beneficial, or
even possible. One board member told us that the current board has as
much transit expertise as it has ever had, while another pointed out
that board members with transit expertise tend to get too involved in
operations.
Jurisdictional Veto:
Current Arrangement:
Under the WMATA compact, if both voting members from the same
jurisdiction vote against an action, this would constitute a
jurisdictional veto.[Footnote 47]
Governance Task Force Recommendation:
The Governance Task Force found that the threat of using the veto has
sometimes acted as an impediment to making the best regional
decisions. Therefore, the board should "limit use of the
[jurisdictional] veto to matters relating to the budget or system
expansion." Additionally, "the signatories should determine the
appropriate role of the veto in WMATA's decision-making process and
give serious consideration to eliminating it entirely."
Leading Governance Practice and Other Transit Agencies:
We were unable to find clear leading governance practices related to a
jurisdictional veto and none of the other transit agencies we visited
use a similar veto.
Discussion:
WMATA board members we spoke with had varied views of the current and
future role of the jurisdictional veto. These views include that the
jurisdictional veto is:
* helpful, because the threat of a veto can force consensus;
* rarely used;
* necessary to protect jurisdictions;
* redundant, because a jurisdiction could also withhold funding as a
"de facto" veto;
* should be limited to route planning and budget issues; and:
* should be eliminated.
WMATA's General Counsel pointed out that the compact provides for
limited exceptions to the use of the veto. One such exception is for
the mass transit plan, which serves as the plan for system expansion.
However, in this case, a jurisdiction could later decline to approve
operational funding for the system expansion, so the region has always
moved by consensus on system expansion, even though the jurisdictional
veto does not apply to approving a plan for system expansion or a plan
of finance for the system expansion.
RAC, in its report, differed from the Governance Task Force's
recommendations, commenting that while "the veto may rankle and appear
to create the opportunity for 'gridlock,' WMATA is above all else a
cooperative endeavor between three signatories with their own
interests. It must ensure that no one is put at a disadvantage to
ensure ongoing support from leaders and residents of all three. Messy
as it is, the veto is necessary and should stay." The elimination of
the jurisdictional veto would require a compact change.
Role of the Chairperson:
Current Arrangement:
According to the compact, the board must elect a chair at the
beginning of every year. The board recently changed its procedures to
end a policy that required the chair to rotate between jurisdictions
every year.
Governance Task Force Recommendation:
A term length of 1 year is too short for the chair to assume true
leadership. Therefore, "the board should increase the term length of
the chair from one to two years." In addition, responsibilities should
be clearly defined to ensure "the chair has sufficient authority to
assume a true leadership role."
Leading Governance Practice and Other Transit Agencies:
Leading governance practices state that a strong chairperson is
essential for an effective transit board and note that it is the
chair's role to lead and motivate the board in achievement of the
transit system's mission, strategic goals, and performance.[Footnote
48] Practices at other transit agencies vary--for example, MARTA has
similar rotations among jurisdictions, although they are not required
by legislation or procedures. Other transit agencies have structures
allowing for stronger chairs. For example, officials at SEPTA told us
that the SEPTA board has a strong chair, who helps organize board
activities, creates a clear chain of command within the board, and
helps ensure communication with management and dissemination of
information to board members.
Discussion:
Board members had differing views on chair rotation and the role of
the chair including comments that (1) the change to a longer term
chairmanship will have little impact, (2) the current role of the
chair is not a strong position, and (3) that it is most important that
the chair think regionally. However, two board members, respectively,
commented that a stronger, or longer-term, chair will lead to
improvements. Three other board members, respectively, told us that
the annual rotation did not make sense, resulted in a lost sense of
responsibilities, and the practice needs to be changed.
The board recently updated procedures to eliminate the need to rotate
the chairmanship. However, the compact requires that a chair be
elected each year. The compact does not require that the chair be a
different board member each year; however, a compact change would be
required to lengthen the term of the chair. Board procedures or other
board-approved documentation could be adjusted to strengthen the role
of the chair.
RAC made a similar recommendation, writing that "the Board chair
should no longer automatically rotate. Instead, Board members should
elect the best chair each year. Reelection of capable chairs is
encouraged for continuity."
Compensation Policy:
Current Arrangement:
The WMATA compact states that "members of the board and alternates
shall serve without compensation but may be reimbursed for necessary
expenses incurred as an incident to the performance of their duties."
However, some board members receive some remuneration by their
appointing jurisdiction.
Governance Task Force Recommendation:
The lack of consistency among the appointing authorities as regards
compensation arrangements is illogical and runs contrary to the spirit
of regional cooperation. Therefore, "a uniform compensation policy"
should be developed "for all members of the WMATA board."
Leading Governance Practice and Other Transit Agencies:
Leading governance practices state that boards should have uniform
compensation policies.[Footnote 49] The majority of transit boards are
voluntary and members either are not compensated or receive a modest
per diem.
Discussion:
Board members we spoke with had varying perspectives on the issue of
compensation. Several board members commented either that financial
support for service on the board should be uniform, or that board
members should receive no support, or both. However, some board
members that receive support told us that the stipend they receive
helps offset the expenses of participating on the board.
Governance Commission:
Current Situation:
The WMATA board currently has no fixed oversight body, other than the
jurisdictional appointing authorities that can change board members.
Governance Task Force Recommendation:
WMATA's signatories and appointing authorities do not meet, and they
have never agreed to uniform expectations or role descriptions for
their board members. This has resulted in a lack of clear delineation
of responsibilities among WMATA's governing entities. Therefore, "the
Signatories and the Appointing Authorities should come together to
form a WMATA Governance Commission,[Footnote 50] to make improvements
to the authority's governance structure and hold the board accountable
for its performance. The Commission would be responsible for
undertaking several of the Governance Task Force recommendations."
Leading Governance Practice and Other Transit Agencies:
We did not identify governance leading practices or find other transit
agencies with a comparable oversight board over a board of directors.
Among the transit agencies we visited, Boston MBTA is part of the
state government. Other transit agencies we visited, such as San
Francisco BART and Chicago CTA, are independent agencies with varying
degrees of accountability to other local agencies.
Discussion:
Many of the board members we spoke with were unclear about the purpose
of the governance commission, concerned about its purpose, or
generally disapproved of the concept.
Staff from the Governance Task Force told us that the proposed
governance commission was not designed to be an additional level of
bureaucracy, rather a forum for key stakeholders to gather and discuss
issues. A governance commission could fill an existing gap in
accountability and oversight over board members. However, such a
commission could be viewed as redundant because it would be comprised
of most of the same membership that is responsible for appointing the
board of directors.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comparison of Selected Transit Agencies to WMATA:
Tables 5 through 11 include data on the transit agencies we visited or
spoke with and show how those agencies compare to WMATA across several
data points, including ridership and budget.
Table 5: Jurisdictions Represented On Transit Agency Boards:
Transit agency: WMATA;
Jurisdiction represented:
* Multiple states and districts represented;
* District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, federal government;
* Jurisdictions represented equally with 2 voting members and 2
alternate members each.
Transit agency: Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) (New York);
Jurisdiction represented:
* One city and multiple counties represented, though not equally;
* Members are nominated by the Governor of New York with four seats
recommended by the Mayor of New York City and one each by the county
executives of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties. The
executives of Dutchess, Orange, Rockland, and Putnam counties also
nominate members and these members cast a collective single vote on
the board;
* Connecticut, which is served by MTA, is not represented on the board.
Transit agency: Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) (Chicago);
Jurisdiction represented:
* Multijurisdictional board with city and state members;
* City of Chicago and State of Illinois appoint board members.
Transit agency: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA)
(Boston);
Jurisdiction represented:
* Multiple cities served but only state of Massachusetts appoints
board members;
* Advisory board with one member from each community approves mass
transit plan and budget.
Transit agency: Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) (San Francisco);
Jurisdiction represented:
* Multiple counties represented;
* Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Francisco Counties;
* Board members are directly elected.
Transit agency: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
(SEPTA) (Philadelphia);
Jurisdiction represented:
* Multiple city/counties served with both suburban and urban areas
represented;
* Two members each from the five cities/counties in SEPTA's service
area--the City of Philadelphia, Bucks County, Chester County, Delaware
County, and Montgomery County;
* The Governor of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Senate Majority Leader,
Senate Minority Leader, House Majority Leader, and House Minority
Leader all appoint one member each to the board.
Transit agency: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)
(Atlanta);
Jurisdiction represented:
* Multijurisdictional with one city and two counties represented;
* City of Atlanta, DeKalb County, Fulton County as well as
representatives from the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority and
Georgia Department of Transportation.
Source: GAO analysis of transit agency documents.
[End of table]
Table 6: Transit Services Provided:
Transit agency: WMATA;
Heavy rail: Yes;
Bus: Yes;
Paratransit: Yes;
Other service: [Empty].
Transit agency: MTA (New York);
Heavy rail: Yes;
Bus: Yes;
Paratransit: Yes;
Other service: Yes (MTA also has commuter rail service and its
affiliate, Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, operates bridges
and tunnels).
Transit agency: CTA (Chicago);
Heavy rail: Yes;
Bus: Yes;
Paratransit: No;
Other service: No.
Transit agency: MBTA (Boston);
Heavy rail: Yes;
Bus: Yes;
Paratransit: Yes;
Other service: Yes (streetcar, trackless trolleys including Bus Rapid
Transit lines).
Transit agency: BART (San Francisco);
Heavy rail: Yes;
Bus: No;
Paratransit: Yes;
Other service: No.
Transit agency: SEPTA (Philadelphia);
Heavy rail: Yes;
Bus: Yes;
Paratransit: Yes;
Other service: Yes (trolley, trackless trolley, and commuter rail).
Transit agency: MARTA (Atlanta);
Heavy rail: Yes;
Bus: Yes;
Paratransit: Yes;
Other service: Yes (will operate a streetcar, which will open in 2013).
Source: GAO analysis of transit agency documents.
[End of table]
Table 7: Size of Rail Operations:
Transit agency: MTA (New York);
Number of miles of track: 2,047 miles;
Number of stations: 735.
Transit agency: CTA (Chicago);
Number of miles of track: 224.1 miles;
Number of stations: 143.
Transit agency: WMATA;
Number of miles of track: 106 miles;
Number of stations: 86.
Transit agency: BART (San Francisco);
Number of miles of track: 104 miles;
Number of stations: 44.
Transit agency: MARTA (Atlanta);
Number of miles of track: 47.6 miles;
Number of stations: 38.
Transit agency: MBTA (Boston);
Number of miles of track: 38 miles; (885 miles of total track,
including other forms such as trolley and light rail);
Number of stations: 53 (also, 78 stations served by streetcars and
light rail).
Transit agency: SEPTA (Philadelphia);
Number of miles of track: 25 subway/elevated;
(176 total miles including commuter rail);
Number of stations: 52 subway; 280 total.
Source: GAO analysis of transit agency documents.
[End of table]
Table 8: Heavy Rail Ridership as of 4th Quarter 2010:
Transit agency: MTA (New York);
Average weekday passenger trips: 8,047,700.
Transit agency: WMATA;
Average weekday passenger trips: 928,100.
Transit agency: CTA (Chicago);
Average weekday passenger trips: 663,900.
Transit agency: MBTA (Boston);
Average weekday passenger trips: 495,200.
Transit agency: BART (San Francisco);
Average weekday passenger trips: 361,100.
Transit agency: SEPTA (Philadelphia);
Average weekday passenger trips: 331,300.
Transit agency: MARTA (Atlanta);
Average weekday passenger trips: 240,900.
Source: GAO analysis of American Public Transportation Association
(APTA) 4th Quarter Transit Ridership data (2010).
Note: Passenger trips are the number of passengers who board public
transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board,
no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their origin to
their destination.
[End of table]
Table 9: Transit Agencies Ranked by Passenger Trips in 2009:
National rank: 1;
Transit agency: MTA (New York);
Passenger trips: 3,206,871,200.
National rank: 2;
Transit agency: CTA (Chicago);
Passenger trips: 521,241,800.
National rank: 4;
Transit agency: WMATA;
Passenger trips: 435,858,900.
National rank: 5;
Transit agency: MBTA (Boston);
Passenger trips: 367,247,600.
National rank: 6;
Transit agency: SEPTA (Philadelphia);
Passenger trips: 348,314,700.
National rank: 9;
Transit agency: MARTA (Atlanta);
Passenger trips: 156,542,400.
National rank: 13;
Transit agency: BART (San Francisco);
Passenger trips: 114,654,600.
Source: GAO analysis of APTA Transit Ridership data (2009).
Note: Passenger trips are the number of passengers who board public
transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board,
no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their origin to
their destination.
[End of table]
Table 10: Operating and Capital Budgets:
Transit agency: MTA (New York);
Annual operating budget: $13.4 billion;
Annual capital budget: $5.3 billion[A].
Transit agency: WMATA;
Annual operating budget: $1.5 billion;
Annual capital budget: $712 million.
Transit agency: CTA (Chicago);
Annual operating budget: $1.4 billion;
Annual capital budget: $638 million.
Transit agency: MBTA (Boston);
Annual operating budget: $1.4 billion;
Annual capital budget: $525 million.
Transit agency: SEPTA (Philadelphia);
Annual operating budget: $1.2 billion;
Annual capital budget: $303.6 million.
Transit agency: BART (San Francisco);
Annual operating budget: $588.7 million;
Annual capital budget: $777.4 million.
Transit agency: MARTA (Atlanta);
Annual operating budget: $404.4 million;
Annual capital budget: $320.8 million.
Source: National Transit Database and agency information.
Note: Data for MBTA and MARTA are for 2009, which were the most recent
figures available. Data for MTA, WMATA, CTA, BART, and SEPTA are for
2011.
[A] MTA's capital budget for 2010 through 2014 is $26.3 billion, which
amounts to a $5.26 billion average annual budget.
[End of table]
Table 11: Size of Workforce:
Transit agency: MTA (New York);
Number of employees: 69,756.
Transit agency: WMATA;
Number of employees: 10,974.
Transit agency: CTA (Chicago);
Number of employees: 10,208.
Transit agency: SEPTA (Philadelphia);
Number of employees: 9,268.
Transit agency: MBTA (Boston);
Number of employees: 6,100.
Transit agency: MARTA (Atlanta);
Number of employees: 4,542.
Transit agency: BART (San Francisco);
Number of employees: 3,017.
Source: GAO analysis of transit agency documents.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority:
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority:
600 Fifth Street NW:
Washington, DC 20001:
202/962-1234:
June 24, 2011:
Mr. David Wise
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: GAO Report 11-660: "Public Transportation: Washington Metro Could
Benefit from Clarified Board Roles and Responsibilities, Improved
Strategic Planning"
Dear Mr. Wise:
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Board of
Directors is deeply committed to addressing the various issues that
were studied and discussed in GAO Report 11-660. As you are aware, the
Board has been seriously engaged in refining its approach to
governance since November 2010. Our efforts have taken into account
reports on governance issued in 2010 by various groups as well as
comments from other stakeholders and our understanding of best
practices related to governance. Our work is necessitated by the fact
that the Board and the senior leadership of Metro must deal
concurrently with several parallel demands --- improving safety,
working towards a state of good repair, improving customer service and
meeting growing rider demand -- in a highly constrained financial
environment.
In addition, 2011 has seen the largest number of new Board members in
many years. Since January, fully half of the 14 Directors and
Alternates are new to the Board. Remarkably, there is consensus among
these Board members that the Board's focus must be directed to policy
matters and agency oversight. To that end, the Board has taken several
significant actions to clarify its role with respect to that of the
General Manager and Chief Executive Officer (GM/CEO) and delegate the
day to day running of the Authority to the GM/CEO.
The Board has taken several key actions and is pursuing some
additional initiatives:
1. A Governance Committee has been created as a standing Committee of
the Board.
2. A Safety and Security Committee has been meeting regularly since
October, 2010.
3. The Board has been actively engaged in drafting permanent Board By-
Laws and Rules of Procedure. (attached)
a. Created a work plan that allows easy tracking by the public of
changes that have been proposed in response to outside report
recommendations. (attached)
b. Actively sought out comments from a variety of stakeholder groups
using a variety of media.
c. Proposed a Standing Committee role for the current audit and
investigations subcommittee.
d. The proposed by-laws include the provision for the Board
conducting a self-evaluation.
4. The Board is reviewing and updating its Code of Ethics.
5. The monthly Vital Signs Report has been institutionalized as a
Board oversight and monitoring tool. (attached)
6. A Vision and Strategic Planning process has been launched to
develop a multi-year vision, accompanied by multi-year business and
operational plans; the effort will include input from WMATA's
stakeholders.
7. The Board has delegated authority to the GM/CEO to approve
reprogramming and procurement actions in order to streamline the
current processes; all within the policies adopted by the Board and
parameters provided by the budget.
On behalf of the WMATA Board of Directors, I want to thank you for the
careful work that has been done on this report. We appreciate very
much the attention you have given to WMATA staff's previous factual
comments. We recognize the careful balance you have striven for in the
report between areas of concern in WMATA's recent past and the
progress WMATA has made to date on those issues. It is never easy to
evaluate an organization in transition. We believe that the report
could be strengthened by more clearly calling out WMATA's progress,
where appropriate, in each of the findings or subject areas.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Catherine Hudgins:
Chair:
WMATA Board of Directors:
Attachments:
[End of letter]
Attachments:
Draft By-Laws and Rules of Procedure can be viewed at: [hyperlink,
http://www.wmata.corniabout_metro/board_ofdirectors/board_docs/052611_Dr
aftBylawsandProceduresforDisc.pdf]
Workplan (see attached)
Vital Signs Report can be viewed at: [hyperlink,
http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/scorecard/documentsNital_SignsJune_2011
.pdf]
WMATA Governance Committee Work Plan Updated Through June 23, 2011:
Discussion Topics: A. End Rotating Chair;
Expected Action or Product: Interim 2011 Procedures;
Target Completion Date: Complete;
Status: On January 27, 2011, the Board adopted Interim Procedures
eliminating the annually rotating Chair requirement (Resolution 2011-
07): Proposed Bylaws Article III further provides that the Chair
"shall be elected without regard to jurisdiction of residence or
representation."
Discussion Topics: B. Increase Chair Term to 2 years;
Expected Action or Product: Possible but not required by Interim
2011 Procedures;
Target Completion Date: Complete;
Status: See above regarding Interim Procedures. Proposed Bylaws
Article III follows Compact § 7 requirement to annually elect a Chair
and Vice-Chair, without further requirements or limitations, thus
permitting a Chair to serve more than a single one-year term.
Discussion Topics: C1. Define the Roles and Responsibilities of Board
Chair;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Board Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article III establishes that the Board Chair
"is dedicated to facilitating the work of the Board, encouraging the
creation of common ground and consensus that moves the Board's work
forward in a manner that promotes and enhances WMATA's overall
mission." Proposed Article III further details the Board Chair's roles
and responsibilities in the categories of facilitating the work of the
Board, establishing strong Board. and CEO relationship and fostering
Board communication with external stakeholders. Specifically, under
Proposed Article Ill.A.6, the Chair "facilitates self-evaluation of
the Board."
Discussion Topics: C2. Define the Roles and Responsibilities of Board
Members;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article II states that, "The Board governs
through policies and exercises oversight over policy compliance and
results." Article II also states that, "The Board is primarily
responsible for policy, financial direction and WMATA's relationships
with its customers, jurisdictional partners and signatories." Proposed
Article II further details Board Member responsibilities in the areas
of ensuring a safe and reliable system; exercising fiduciary
responsibilities; engaging in strategic regional leadership;
overseeing planning, operations and customer service; exercising
individual responsibilities as a Member of the Board; and evaluating
the CEO, Board Secretary, General Counsel and Inspector General.
Discussion Topics: D. Review Board Procedures to Assure Collective
Board Action in Governing;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article II states, "Active healthy debate is
encouraged; once a decision is made, the Board speaks with one voice."
See also Board Chair's responsibility to encourage common ground and
consensus and serve as the Board's primary spokesperson in Proposed
Article III.
Discussion Topics: E. Limit Jurisdictional Veto;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws/Procedures;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article VIII, part H, encourages resolving
inter-signatory disputes without the use of the jurisdictional veto,
and proposed Article III, part A.7, makes it the Chair's
responsibility to facilitate this process. Proposed Procedures Section
IV.0 supplements the Bylaws by requiring Members to provide advance
notice to the Chair whenever they intend to exercise a jurisdictional
veto, and requiring the Chair to then facilitate a resolution. The
Proposed Bylaws also seek to avoid situations in which the
jurisdictional veto might be exercised by encouraging active
communication and collegiality among Board Members, setting common
goals and consensus building. A few examples are: Article II ("Board
Members place the public interest of the Authority and the people of
the region foremost"); Article II.E.4 ("Help build good working
relationships among Board Members"); Article III ("The Chair is
dedicated to facilitating the work of the Board, encouraging the
creation of common ground and consensus that moves the Board's forward
in a manner that promotes and enhances WMATA's overall mission"); and
Article III.A.5 (the Chair "builds strong relationships among Board
Members")
Discussion Topics: F. Examine the Role of Alternate members and Update
as Appropriate;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws/Procedures;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: The Governance Committee extensively discussed the roles of
Alternate Members in Board and Committee meetings. Proposed Bylaws
Article VIII, parts B and G, provide that in Board meetings alternates
vote in the absence of a principle Board Member (per Compact § 5(a)).
Proposed Bylaws Article XII, part B, provides that, "Any Board Member
may attend and participate in Committee meetings."
Discussion Topics: G. Review and Update Committee Structure and Voting;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article XII eliminates standing subcommittees
and establishes six revised Committees and their responsibilities:
Safety and Security; Finance and Administration; Audits and
Investigations; Customer Service and Operations; Planning, Program
Development and Real Estate; and Governance. Proposed Article XII also
provides flexibility regarding composition—-from five members to
committees of the whole—-and permits all Board Members (Directors and
alternates) to attend and participate in meetings.
Discussion Topics: H. Define the Role of the Federal Government;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: The Proposed Bylaws do not distinguish between federal and
signatory Board Members, other than following WMATA Compact § 8, which
precludes federal members from exercising a jurisdictional veto or
from being needed to constitute a quorum in Board meetings. Proposed
Bylaws Article XII.B provides that Committee quorum must include at
least one Member for each signatory and a federal Member.
Discussion Topics: I. Define GM as CEO;
Expected Action or Product: Resolution;
Target Completion Date: Complete;
Status: On January 27, 2011, the Board directed that the General
Manager serves as the Chief Executive Officer. Resolution 2010-72. The
Proposed Bylaws and Procedures thus refer to the General Manager and
Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
Discussion Topics: J. Focus one Board Policy Development Functions
Balanced by Effective Customer Service Procedures;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws/Strategic Planning;
Target Completion Date: July 2011/Summer 2011;
Status: The Proposed Bylaws repeatedly emphasize that the Board's
focus is on policy development and oversight, and aim to enhance
customer service. Examples include: Article II ("The Board governs
through policies and exercises oversight over policy compliance and
results"); Article II.C.4 ("Adopt and review key performance and
service standards to provide policy guidance regarding the quantity
and quality of service"); Article IV ("The Board is primarily
responsible for policy, financial direction and WMATA's relationships
with its customers, jurisdictional partners and signatories"); and
Article XII ("The Customer Service and Operations Committee shall
ensure that WMATA operational activities and programs are designed to
provide reliable, effective and clean transit service, responsive to
customer needs"). Meanwhile, per Proposed Article IV, the CEO's
province is "the overall administration and operations of WMATA,
subject to policy direction and oversight from the Board."
Discussion Topics: K. Integrate KPI Information with Strategic
Planning to Assure Safe Reliable Service from High Performing
Organization;
Expected Action or Product: Board Strategic Planning Session;
Target Completion Date: Summer 2011;
Status: Reserved for review following the Board's Strategic Planning
Sessions during the Summer 2011. in addition, the Proposed Bylaws
incorporate an ongoing Board responsibility to engage in strategic
regional leadership, including to adopt and regularly update a
business plan, Article II.C.1; develop strategic priorities and
targets, and report them, Article 11.C.2; and adopt and review key
performance and service standards, Article II.C.4.
Discussion Topics: L. Establish Annual GM/CEO Performance Goals;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article III, part B.2, makes it the Chair's
responsibility to work with the CEO to develop CEO performance
measurements, which the full Board reviews and agrees upon. Proposed
Article Ill, part Ai& makes it the Chair's responsibility to initiate
the annual performance review of the CEO and other Board-appointed
officers.
Discussion Topics: M. Develop Orientation and Leadership Activities
for Board Members;
Expected Action or Product: Orientation Briefings/Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: February 2011/July 2011;
Status: At the Board's direction, orientation briefings were conducted
and materials are available to all new Board Members. In addition,
Proposed Article X11.13 requires the Governance Committee to
"implement an orientation program to assist all Board Members in
understanding the transit system and their individual and Board roles
and responsibilities, while building cohesion among the Members."
Further, by Proposed Article III.A.6, the Chair "facilitates self-
evaluation of the Board," which will be an opportunity to develop
leadership skills and note areas for improvement, such as attendance.
Discussion Topics: N. Set High Attendance Standards;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article II, Part E, requires all Board members
to exercise individual responsibility; including in part E.2 to,
"Regularly attend and participate in Board and Committee meetings and
Authority activities that build knowledge, awareness and support for
WMATA, including use of Metro transit systems."
Discussion Topics: O. Ride the System;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: See status of item N, above, regarding the requirement in
Proposed Bylaws Art. II.E.2 for all Board Members to regularly use
Metro transit systems.
Discussion Topics: P. Solicit Public input;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws/Procedures;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Bylaws Article VII, "Communication with the
Public," highlights that, "The Board is committed to the broadest
possible communication with customers, jurisdictional partners,
signatories, the federal government, stakeholders, funding partners,
transportation agencies, Board—established advisory bodies, other
transportation service providers, and oversight agencies including the
Tri-State Oversight Committee, and will provide regular opportunities
to receive and respond to comments" Further, Proposed Bylaws Article
VIII.E, "Public Comment," establishes an opportunity for public
comment at monthly Board meetings, in addition to presentations or
comments from jurisdictions, variety of advisory bodies and others at
the invitation of a Chair. Proposed Procedures Section III,
"Communication with the Public," details how public comment will be
solicited at both Board and Committee meetings. Specifically, Section
III.C.2 requires Committee agendas to "clearly identify all agenda
items on which comments will be received." Finally; other provisions
in the Proposed Bylaws also encourage public input including Article
II.B.1 ("Provide opportunities for customer and stakeholder input"),
and Article II.E.5 ("Facilitate stakeholder input and feedback").
Discussion Topics: Q. Clarify Policies about Releasing Information;
Expected Action or Product: Strategic Planning;
Target Completion Date: Summer 2011;
Status: Although there may be further changes, the Proposed Bylaws
emphasize the principles of transparency and communication, such as in
Article II.A.1 ("Develop Board policies and encourage Authority
practices that ensure safety, transparency, accountability ... regular
communication"); Article II.C.2 ("Develop Board strategic priorities
and targets, and include them in an annual report to customers and
stakeholders"); Article II.B.2 ("Assure transparency in reports on
priorities and targets"); Article II.B.3 ("Maintain clear lines of
communication between the Board, the [CEO], the public and all
stakeholders"); and Article III.C.1 (the Chair "represents the Board
as the primary spokesperson to the media, customers and external
stakeholders (on behalf of the Board not the Authority"). Further, the
Proposed Bylaws emphasize public access to Board proceedings, such as
in Article VII, "Board and Committee meetings (other than executive
sessions) will be publicly broadcast to the extent technologically
feasible." Currently, the audio of such meetings are streamed online,
and an online archive contains the audio of all public Board and
Committee meetings.
Discussion Topics: R. Establish Procedures by which Customers Have
Access to Individual Board Members and Board Members Respond to
Customers;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Bylaws/Procedures;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Procedures Section III.A details how customers have
access to individual Board members, how communications from and to
customers are shared to enhance the Board's understanding of public
opinion and WMATA operations, and how the Board members have
discretion in responding to customers: "Board Members will ensure that
all communications they receive that require staff assistance are
shared with the full Board and CEO. Board Members shall exercise
discretion in providing personal answers to policy-oriented
communications, and will provide any such answers to the rest of the
Board and management. All other customer communications shall be
submitted to the CEO for an appropriate response. The CEO shall assure
that all agency responses are shared with the full Board."
Discussion Topics: S. Start all Meetings with Public Comment;
Expected Action or Product: Adopt Procedures;
Target Completion Date: July 2011;
Status: Proposed Procedures Section IV includes the receipt of public
comment as an agenda item, immediately following the call to order and
approval of the agenda and minutes. Proposed Section III.0 expands
public comment to Committee meetings and provides more customer
friendly, informal and flexible procedures to maximize public
participation. For example, the Section III.0 equally emphasizes
written and oral comment and requires a convenient and accessible
method for customers to electronically submit comments, provides that
Committee Chairs may designate agenda items upon which comment is
sought, and reduces the procedural requirements to make oral comments
at both Board and Committee meetings.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the General Services Administration:
GSA:
The Administrator:
U.S. General Services Administration:
1275 First Street NE:
Washington, DC 20417:
Telephone: (202) 501-0800:
Fax: (202)219-1243:
June 28, 2011:
The Honorable Gene L. Dodaro:
Comptroller General of the United States:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Dodaro:
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report, "Public
Transportation: Washington Metro Could Benefit from Clarified Board
Roles and Responsibilities, Improved Strategic Planning."
GSA agrees in part to the findings and recommendations. However, we do
not agree that GSA cannot assure that qualified candidates are being
appointed to the Board. Although GSA lacks a published and formal
process to appoint Federal board members (page 30), GSA has worked
with both public (Federal, state and local) and private sector (local
transportation industry) stakeholders to identify and interview
qualified candidates. As stated in the report, GSA has the
responsibility of identifying and selecting two members and two
alternates representing the Federal Government. As of the date of this
report, GSA has appointed two members and one alternate. Only one
alternative position remains vacant and our agency is currently
reviewing eligible candidates. All three GSA-selected representatives
were deemed qualified with the requisite amount of experience. Both
appointed members are WMATA riders despite the stipulation that only
one of the four members selected must be a WMATA rider. Based on the
selections made by the agency, we respectfully disagree with the GAO
Report's assertion that GSA cannot be assured of appointing qualified
board members.
If you have any additional questions or concerns, please do not
hesitate to contact me. Staff inquiries may be directed to Mr. Rodney
P. Emery, Associate Administrator, Office of Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs. He can be reached at (202) 501-0563.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Martha Johnson:
Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David J. Wise, (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Teresa Spisak (Assistant
Director), Matthew LaTour, Jessica Evans, Colin Fallon, William King,
Susan Sachs, and Mindi Weisenbloom made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The most recent fatal accident occurred on June 22, 2009, when two
WMATA trains collided resulting in nine deaths and 52 injuries.
[2] The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority is constructing the
project. WMATA will operate trains on the extension when it is
complete.
[3] Interstate compacts are legal agreements between two or more
states that are designed to resolve problems or concerns that
transcend state lines. Such compacts enable states to act jointly and
collectively to devise solutions for matters that are beyond the
authority of an individual state but which are not within the
immediate purview of the federal government or easily resolved through
a purely federal response.
[4] As of May 2011, 14 members (8 voting members and 6 alternates) had
been appointed to the board. Two alternate positions--one from the
federal government and one from the District of Columbia--are unfilled.
[5] Greater Washington Board of Trade and Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments, Moving Metro Forward: Report of the Joint
WMATA Governance Review Task Force (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2010)
and Riders' Advisory Council, Report on Governance of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1, 2010).
The Riders' Advisory Council is a 21-member council established by
WMATA's board in 2005 to advise the board on ridership issues
concerning WMATA service.
[6] See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Pub.
L. No. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966). The compact, originally created
for the planning, financing, building, and operation of a rail transit
system in the Washington area, was most recently amended so that WMATA
could become eligible to receive federal grants authorized by the
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-
432, title VI, , 122 Stat. 4848, 4968-70 (2008). Among the major
changes to the compact were the addition of federal representatives to
the board and the codification of the Office of the Inspector General.
See Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation Regulation Compact
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 111-62, 123 Stat. 1998 (2009).
[7] GSA appointed one board member and one alternate board member in
January 2010. The alternate board member was later changed to be a
board member. In April 2011, an alternate board member representing
the District of Columbia became an alternate board member representing
the federal government.
[8] Either alternate from the District of Columbia can vote if either
of the voting District of Columbia board members is absent.
[9] Greater Washington Board of Trade and Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments (2010); Riders' Advisory Council (2010); and
NTSB, Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station (Washington, D.C.: July 27,
2010).
[10] According to the board, it has created a work plan that allows
the public to track changes being made in response to these
recommendations.
[11] Interim Procedures for WMATA Board of Directors, 2011.
[12] The Davis-Bacon Act generally requires employers to pay locally
prevailing wages and fringe benefits to laborers and mechanics
employed on federally-funded construction projects in excess of
$2,000. See 40 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. In addition, the compact grants
the board other responsibilities include bonding, execution of leases
or property, and setting fare and procurement policy.
[13] Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Title
III, Article III, § 9(b).
[14] Interim Procedures for WMATA Board of Directors, 2011.
[15] Greater Washington Board of Trade and Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments (2010).
[16] Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority (WMATA): Issues and Options for Congress
(Washington, D.C.: April 2010).
[17] See 74 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1712(b), which provides: "Limit on
exercise of powers. The board shall not involve itself in the day-to-
day administration of the authority's business. It shall limit its
exercise of powers to such areas of discretion or policy as the
functions and programs of the authority, the authority's operating and
capital budgets, the authority's standard of services, utilization of
technology, the organizational structure and, subject to the
provisions of this chapter, the selection of and the establishment of
salaries for personnel."
[18] A comprehensive self-assessment includes evaluating the board's
composition, membership, orientation, meetings, committee structure,
and information flow, as well as transit system performance criteria.
This assessment also includes periodically evaluating key management
processes, including, at a minimum, processes for risk assessment and
mitigation, internal control, and financial reporting. See, Transit
Cooperative Research Program, TCRP Report 85: Public Transit Board
Governance Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: 2002) and GAO, Legal Services
Corporation: Governance and Accountability Practices Need to be
Modernized and Strengthened, GAO-07-993 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15,
2007).
[19] We discuss the board's roles in strategic planning and oversight
in more detail later in this report.
[20] In January 2011 the Governance Committee developed a work plan
that includes tasks such as updating board procedures, developing
bylaws, and improving focus on board policy development.
[21] WMATA Board of Directors Resolution 2006-18. The OIG has since
been codified in the compact.
[22] The triennial review examines how WMATA meets the statutory and
administrative requirements of the Urbanized Area Formula Grants
Program; the Procurement Systems Review assesses WMATA's compliance
with federal procurement requirements set out in FTA Circular 4220.1F;
and the Financial Management Oversight Review examines the
effectiveness of WMATA's internal control environment.
[23] See, FTA, Final Report: FY2008 Triennial Review of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Washington, DC (Washington, D.C.:
September 2008); FTA Final Report: Procurement System Review for the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 29, 2007); and FTA, Financial Management Oversight Review
of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 21, 2008).
[24] The Tri-State Oversight Committee is required by regulation to
approve WMATA's safety and security plans; investigate accidents and
hazardous conditions that meet certain criteria, as prescribed in 49
C.F.R. Part 659; require and approve WMATA's corrective action plans
to address safety deficiencies; and conduct independent reviews of the
implementation of the safety and security plans on at least a
triennial basis.
[25] Tri-State Oversight Committee, Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority Triennial On-Site Safety Review (Washington, D.C.:
June 2007).
[26] Tri-State Oversight Committee, 2010 Triennial Safety and Security
Review of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2010).
[27] A previous version of an audit committee was dissolved in January
2007, as a result of a board decision to reduce the total number of
committees, and reinstated in February 2008 as a subcommittee.
[28] NTSB (2010).
[29] We did not assess the costs of these additional oversight
mechanisms.
[30] The Governance Task Force recommended that the commission consist
of the Governors of Maryland and Virginia, the District of Columbia
Mayor and Council Chair, the Chairs of the Maryland and Virginia
appointing authorities, and the GSA Administrator.
[31] J.M. Bryson, Strategic Planning For Public and Nonprofit
Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational
Achievement (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004); GAO, Executive Guide:
Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington,
D.C.: June 1996); GAO, Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key
Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16] (Washington, D.C.: May
1997); Transit Cooperative Research Program, TCRP Report 85: Public
Transit Board Governance Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: 2002).
[32] WMATA's strategic planning and performance management system is
in various stages of development. Goals and objectives are developed
and publicly available; however, some of the departmental execution
plans are still being revised.
[33] Bryson (2004); GAO, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118]; and GAO, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16].
[34] Bryson (2004).
[35] GAO, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16].
[36] GAO, Managing For Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal
Agencies' Strategic Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
16, 1997).
[37] GAO, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Governance Structure
Needs Improvements to Ensure Policy Direction and Oversight,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-808] (Washington, D.C.:
July 6, 2007); GAO, Legal Services Corporation: Governance and
Accountability Practices Need to Be Modernized and Strengthened,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-993] (Washington, D.C.:
Aug.15, 2007); GAO, Smithsonian Institution: Board of Regents Has
Implemented Many Governance Reforms, but Ensuring Accountability and
Oversight Will Require Ongoing Action, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-632] (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2008); and GAO, Federally Created Entities: An Overview of Key
Attributes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-97]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009). The Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation report, for example, compiled its governance practices
from several sources, including Carolyn K. Brancato and Christian A.
Plath, Corporate Governance Handbook 2005: Developments in Best
Practices, Compliance, and Legal Standards, Special Report SR-05-02,
The Conference Board (New York, N.Y.: 2005); Richard Steinberg,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Corporate Governance and the Board: What Works
Best, The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (May 1,
2000); and Scott Green, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Board of Directors:
Techniques and Best Practices for Corporate Governance, John Wiley and
Sons, Inc. (Hoboken, New Jersey: 2005). The Legal Services Corporation
report included practices from: Matteo Tomello and Carolyn K.
Brancato, Corporate Governance Handbook, 2007: Legal Standards and
Board Practices (New York, N.Y.: 2007); GAO, Results-Oriented
Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration
among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[38] Transit Cooperative Research Program, TCRP Report 85: Public
Transit Board Governance Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: 2002).
[39] Transit Cooperative Research Program, Strategic Planning and
Management in Transit Agencies: A Synthesis of Transit Practice
(Washington, D.C.: 2005).
[40] GAO, Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to
Ensure That Navy Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-585] (Washington, D.C.:
June 11, 2010); GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation:
Definitions and Relationships, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-739SP] (Washington, D.C.: May
2005); GAO, Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to
Facilitate Congressional Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16] (Washington, D.C.: May
1997); GAO, Managing For Results: Critical Issues for Improving
Federal Agencies' Strategic Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
16, 1997); GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the
Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[41] Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 6,
Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance
Plans, and Annual Program Performance Reports, (Washington, D.C.: June
2005); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; GPRA
Modernization Act of 2010; Committee on Governmental Affairs, United
States Senate, Report 103-58: Report to Accompany S.20 (Washington,
D.C.: June 16, 1993); John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning For Public
and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining
Organizational Achievement, 3RD ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004).
[42] We spoke with those board members who were active from January
13, 2011, to March 14, 2011.
[43] Greater Washington Board of Trade and Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments, Moving Metro Forward: Report of the Joint
WMATA Governance Review Task Force (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2010)
and Riders' Advisory Council, Report on Governance of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1, 2010).
[44] GAO, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-808].
[45] Public Law 111-62.
[46] Transit Cooperative Research Program (2002).
[47] According to a WMATA official, the term "jurisdictional veto" is
a practical description of what can occur per the voting rules set
forth in the compact if two board members from a signatory vote
against an action. Specifically, the compact provides that: "Four
(board members) or alternates consisting of at least one (board
member) or alternate appointed from each signatory, shall constitute a
quorum and no action by the board shall be effective unless a majority
of the board present and voting, which majority shall include at least
one (board member) or alternate from each signatory, concur therein;
provided, however, that a plan of financing may be adopted or a mass
transit plan adopted, altered, revised or amended by the unanimous
vote of the (board members) representing any two signatories."
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Title III,
Article III, § 8(a).
[48] Transit Cooperative Research Program (2002).
[49] Transit Cooperative Research Program (2002).
[50] It was recommended that the commission consist of the Governors
of Maryland and Virginia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the
Chairs of the Maryland and Virginia appointing authorities, the
District of Columbia Council Chair, and the GSA Administrator.
[End of section]
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