GAO-11-404, Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs


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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

June 2011: 

Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: 

Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major 
Programs: 

GAO-11-404: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-404, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Quality is key to success in U.S. space and missile defense programs, 
but quality problems exist that have endangered entire missions along 
with less-visible problems leading to unnecessary repair, scrap, 
rework, and stoppage; long delays; and millions in cost growth. For 
space and missile defense acquisitions, GAO was asked to examine 
quality problems related to parts and manufacturing processes and 
materials across DOD and NASA. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which 
parts quality problems affect those agencies’ space and missile 
defense programs; (2) causes of any problems; and (3) initiatives to 
prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. To accomplish 
this, GAO reviewed all 21 systems with mature designs and projected 
high costs: 5 DOD satellite systems, 4 DOD missile defense systems, 
and 12 NASA systems. GAO reviewed existing and planned efforts for 
preventing, detecting, and mitigating parts quality problems. Further, 
GAO reviewed regulations, directives, instructions, policies, and 
several studies, and interviewed senior headquarters and contractor 
officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Parts quality problems affected all 21 programs GAO reviewed at the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). In some cases they contributed to significant 
cost overruns and schedule delays. In most cases, problems were 
associated with electronic versus mechanical parts or materials (see 
figure). In several cases, parts problems discovered late in the 
development cycle had more significant cost and schedule consequences. 
For example, one problem cost a program at least $250 million and 
about a 2-year launch delay. 

Figure: Distribution of Quality Problems Found in Programs Reviewed 
Grouped by Electronic Parts, Mechanical Parts, and Materials: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Electronic parts: 64.7%; 
Materials: 20.6%; 
Mechanical parts: 14.7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

The causes of parts quality problems GAO identified were poor 
workmanship, undocumented and untested manufacturing processes, poor 
control of those processes and materials and failure to prevent 
contamination, poor part design, design complexity, and an inattention 
to manufacturing risks. Ineffective supplier management also resulted 
in concerns about whether subcontractors and contractors met program 
requirements. 

Most programs GAO reviewed began before the agencies adopted new 
policies related to parts quality problems, and newer post-policy 
programs were not mature enough for parts problems to be apparent. 
Agencies and industry are now collecting and sharing information about 
potential problems, and developing guidance and criteria for testing 
parts, managing subcontractors, and mitigating problems, but it is too 
early to determine how much such collaborations have reduced parts 
quality problems since such data have not been historically collected. 
New efforts are collecting data on anomalies, but no mechanism exists 
to use those data to assess improvements. Significant barriers hinder 
efforts to address parts quality problems, such as broader acquisition 
management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse leadership in the 
national security space community, the government's decreasing 
influence on the electronic parts market, and an increase in 
counterfeiting of electronic parts. Given this, success will likely be 
limited without continued assessments of what works well and must be 
done. 

What GAO Recommends: 

DOD and NASA should implement a mechanism for periodic assessment of 
the condition of parts quality problems in major space and missile 
defense programs with periodic reporting to Congress. DOD partially 
agreed with the recommendation and NASA agreed. DOD agreed to annually 
address all quality issues, to include parts quality. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-404] or key 
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Parts Quality Problems Are Widespread and in Some Cases Have Had a 
Significant Effect on Cost, Schedule, and Performance: 

Parts Quality Problems Were Caused by Poor Manufacturing Controls, 
Design, and Supplier Management: 

Agency and Industry Efforts to Address Parts Quality Problems Face 
Significant Challenges: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Description of DOD Satellite Systems, MDA Systems, and 
NASA Systems: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Policies to Prevent and Detect Parts Quality Problems at DOD 
and NASA: 

Table 2: Typical Roles of Government and Prime Contractors in Ensuring 
Parts Quality: 

Table 3: Cost and Schedule Effect of Parts Quality Problems at DOD and 
NASA: 

Table 4: Key Differences in Program Framework between GPS IIF and GPS 
III: 

Table 5: Examples of Organizations and Their Collaborative Efforts and 
Outcomes for Addressing Parts Quality: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Description of Hardware Levels That Result in a Finished 
Satellite or Missile System: 

Figure 2: Definitions of Materials, Process, and Parts Used in 
Satellite and Missile Manufacturing: 

Figure 3: Distribution of Quality Problems Found in Programs Reviewed 
and Grouped by Electronic Parts, Mechanical Parts, and Materials: 

Figure 4: Examples of Quality Problems with Electronic Parts and 
Manufacturing Materials That Affected Three or More Programs: 

Figure 5: Summary of Typical Key Testing Practices to Identify Parts 
Quality Problems: 

Figure 6: Example of a Capacitor with Tin Whiskers: 

Abbreviations: 

BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System: 

CDR: Critical Design Review: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

GPS: Global Positioning System: 

LSI: Lead System Integrator: 

MAP: Mission Assurance Provisions: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

MOU: Memorandum of Understanding: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

SIBC: Space Industrial Base Council: 

TSPR: Total System Performance Responsibility: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 24, 2011: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign 
Operations: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Tierney: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) space and missile defense systems play 
a vital role in protecting national and homeland security, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space systems 
provide global weather forecasting and all government space 
organizations facilitate important scientific research.[Footnote 1] 
Because of these systems' complexity, the environments they operate 
in, and the high degree of accuracy and precision needed for their 
operation, quality is paramount to their success. Yet in recent years, 
many space and missile defense programs, which rely on many of the 
same contractors, have struggled with quality problems. For example, 
the Air Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency communications 
satellite was launched on August 14, 2010, but has yet to reach its 
intended orbit because of a blockage in a propellant line that was 
most likely caused by a small piece of cloth inadvertently left in the 
line during the manufacturing process. In 2009, a major test for the 
Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
missile system was not completed because of a design and quality 
problem affecting the target. While these two cases were widely 
reported by the media, other space and missile defense programs have 
struggled with less-visible quality problems that have resulted in 
unnecessary repair, scrap, and rework, and in some cases, a complete 
halt in large-scale programs, months of delay, and millions of dollars 
in cost growth. Often, such problems have arisen at the tail end of 
problematic, long-term development efforts, creating a great deal of 
frustration for program and government officials. Moreover, while 
attention has increased in recent years on problems related to 
counterfeit parts, we have reported that problems affecting major 
missile defense and space programs have generally been the result of 
other issues, such as design instability and technology maturity. 
[Footnote 2] 

In view of the cost and importance of space and missile defense 
acquisitions, you asked that we examine parts quality problems 
affecting satellites and missile defense systems across DOD and NASA. 
Our review of parts quality problems includes problems with the 
materials and processes used in manufacturing. Parts are the basic 
elements of a system; their manufacturing must be dependable if a 
system's hardware is to be reliable. Moreover, given the span of 
agencies and systems we were examining, our focus on parts enabled 
consistent analysis of problems, causal factors, and improvement 
efforts. At the same time, however, our scope excluded quality 
problems that arose during assembly and integration of larger 
subsystems, assemblies, and components, unless such problems were tied 
to a specific part. Figure 1 depicts the focus of our review and 
figure 2 defines materials, process, and parts. 

Figure 1: Description of Hardware Levels That Result in a Finished 
Satellite or Missile System[Footnote 3]: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Primary focus of GAO review: 

Material: 
Process: 
Piece part: 

Component: 
Complete functional unit, such as a control electronics assembly, an 
antenna, a battery, or a power cord unit. 

Assembly: 
Functional group of parts, such as a hinge assembly, an antenna feed, 
or a deployment boom. 

Subsystem: 
All of the components and assemblies that constitute a satellite or 
missile subsystem, such as a bus or instrument. 

Satellite or missile: 
Complete vehicle. 

Sources: GAO analysis of satellite development literature (data); 
ArtExplosion (images). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: Definitions of Materials, Process, and Parts Used in 
Satellite and Missile Manufacturing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Materials: 
A metallic or nonmetallic element, alloy, mixture, or compound used in 
a manufacturing operation, which becomes either a temporary or a 
permanent portion of the manufactured item (i.e., gold, tantalum, 
silicon, polymer, etc.). 

Process: 
An operation, treatment, or procedure used during a step in the 
manufacture of a material, part, or assembly (i.e., brazing, plating, 
metal machining, vapor deposition, etc.). 

Parts: 
One piece or two or more pieces joined together that are not normally 
subjected to disassembly without destruction or impairment of their 
designed use (i.e., capacitor, transistor, memory chip, screw, optical 
lens, etc.). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA documents. 

[End of figure] 

Our specific objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which parts 
quality problems are affecting DOD and NASA space and missile defense 
programs; (2) the causes behind these problems; and (3) initiatives to 
prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. 

To determine the extent to which parts quality problems affected a 
program's cost, schedule and performance, we identified 21 DOD and 
NASA major acquisitions[Footnote 4] that had completed their critical 
design reviews (CDR) as of October 2009.[Footnote 5] This universe of 
21 programs includes 9 DOD systems (4 Air Force, 1 Navy,[Footnote 6] 
and 4 MDA) and 12 NASA systems. We asked officials from all 21 
programs to identify the most significant parts quality problems that 
had affected their programs, as well as the associated cost and 
schedule impacts, causes, and contributing factors. A quality problem 
is the degree to which the product attributes, such as capability, 
performance, or reliability, did not meet the needs of the customer or 
mission, as specified through the requirements definition and 
allocation process. 

From the 21 systems examined, we selected 2 from DOD (1 Air Force and 
1 MDA program) and 1 from NASA with known quality problems, as 
identified in previous GAO reports,[Footnote 7] for further review to 
gain greater insight into the root causes of the parts quality 
problems. We are unable to make generalizable or projectable 
statements about parts quality problems related to space and missile 
programs beyond this stated scope. We reviewed regulations, 
directives, instructions, and policies to determine how DOD, the Air 
Force, MDA, and NASA define and address parts quality. We interviewed 
senior DOD, MDA, and NASA headquarters officials, as well as system 
program and contractor officials from the Air Force, MDA, and NASA, 
about their knowledge of parts problems on their programs. We also 
reviewed several studies on parts quality from the Aerospace 
Corporation[Footnote 8] and met with officials to discuss their 
findings. To identify the extent to which parts problems are common 
across DOD, MDA, and NASA, we collected and reviewed failure review 
board reports, advisory notices, and cost and schedule analysis 
reports on parts problems affecting the 21 identified systems and 
interviewed program officials. To identify initiatives planned and 
practices used by DOD, MDA, and NASA to prevent and detect parts 
quality problems, we interviewed program officials at DOD, the Air 
Force, MDA, and NASA responsible for systems engineering and quality 
and obtained, reviewed, and discussed their parts quality policies and 
factors contributing to parts problems. For more on our scope and 
methodology, see appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to May 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

DOD and NASA build costly, complex systems that serve a variety of 
national security and science, technology, and space exploration 
missions. Within DOD, the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center 
is responsible for acquiring most of DOD's space systems; however, the 
Navy is also acquiring a replacement satellite communication system. 
MDA, also within DOD, is responsible for developing, testing, and 
fielding an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense system 
(BMDS) to defend against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all 
phases of flight.[Footnote 9] The major projects that NASA undertakes 
range from highly complex and sophisticated space transportation 
vehicles, to robotic probes, to satellites equipped with advanced 
sensors to study the Earth. Requirements for government space systems 
can be more demanding than those of the commercial satellite and 
consumer electronics industry. For instance, DOD typically has more 
demanding standards for radiation-hardened parts, such as 
microelectronics, which are designed and fabricated with the specific 
goal of enduring the harshest space radiation environments, including 
nuclear events. Companies typically need to create separate production 
lines and in some cases special facilities. In the overall electronics 
market, military and NASA business is considered a niche market. 

Moreover, over time, government space and missile systems have 
increased in complexity, partly as a result of advances in 
commercially driven electronics technology and subsequent obsolescence 
of mature high-reliability parts. Systems are using more and 
increasingly complex parts, requiring more stringent design 
verification and qualification practices. In addition, acquiring 
qualified parts from a limited supplier base has become more difficult 
as suppliers focus on commercial markets at the expense of the 
government space market--which requires stricter controls and proven 
reliability. 

Further, because DOD and NASA's space systems cannot usually be 
repaired once they are deployed, an exacting attention to parts 
quality is required to ensure that they can operate continuously and 
reliably for years at a time through the harsh environmental 
conditions of space. Similarly, ballistic missiles that travel through 
space after their boost phase to reach their intended targets are 
important for national security and also require reliable and 
dependable parts. These requirements drive designs that depend on 
reliable parts, materials and processes that have passed CDRs, been 
fully tested, and demonstrated long life and tolerance to the harsh 
environmental conditions of space. 

Shifts in Government Oversight and Management of Parts: 

There have been dramatic shifts in how parts for space and missile 
defense systems have been acquired and overseen. For about three 
decades, until the 1990s, government space and missile development 
based its quality requirements on a military standard known as MIL-Q- 
9858A. This standard required contractors to establish a quality 
program with documented procedures and processes that are subject to 
approval by government representatives throughout all areas of 
contract performance. Quality is theoretically ensured by requiring 
both the contractor and the government to monitor and inspect 
products. MIL-Q-9858A and other standards--collectively known as 
military specifications--were used by DOD and NASA to specify the 
manufacturing processes, materials, and testing needed to ensure that 
parts would meet quality and reliability standards needed to perform 
in and through space.[Footnote 10] In the 1990s, concerns about cost 
and the need to introduce more innovation brought about acquisition 
reform efforts that loosened a complex and often rigid acquisition 
process and shifted key decision-making responsibility--including 
management and oversight for parts, materials, and processes--to 
contractors. This period, however, was marked by continued problematic 
acquisitions that ultimately resulted in sharp increases in cost, 
schedule, and quality problems. 

For DOD, acquisition reform for space systems was referred to as Total 
System Performance Responsibility (TSPR). Under TSPR, program 
managers' oversight was reduced and key decision-making 
responsibilities were shifted onto the contractor. In May 2003, a 
report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory 
Board Joint Task Force stated that the TSPR policy marginalized the 
government program management role and replaced traditional government 
"oversight" with "insight." In 2006, a retired senior official 
responsible for testing in DOD stated that "TSPR relieved development 
contractors of many reporting requirements, including cost and 
technical progress, and built a firewall around the contractor, 
preventing government sponsors from properly overseeing expenditure of 
taxpayer dollars."[Footnote 11] We found that TSPR reduced government 
oversight and led to major reductions in various government 
capabilities, including cost-estimating and systems-engineering 
staff.[Footnote 12] MDA chose to pursue the Lead Systems Integrator 
(LSI) approach as part of its acquisition reform effort. The LSI 
approach used a single contractor responsible for developing and 
integrating a system of systems within a given budget and schedule. We 
found in 2007 that a proposal to use an LSI approach on any new 
program should be seen as a risk at the outset, not because it is 
conceptually flawed, but because it indicates that the government may 
be pursuing a solution that it does not have the capacity to manage. 
[Footnote 13] 

Within NASA, a similar approach called "faster, better, cheaper" was 
intended to help reduce mission costs, improve efficiency, and 
increase scientific results by conducting more and smaller missions in 
less time.[Footnote 14] The approach was intended to stimulate 
innovative development and application of technology, streamline 
policies and practices, and energize and challenge a workforce to 
successfully undertake new missions in an era of diminishing 
resources. We found that while NASA had many successes, failures of 
two Mars probes revealed limits to this approach, particularly in 
terms of NASA's ability to learn from past mistakes.[Footnote 15] 

As DOD and NASA moved from military specifications and standards, so 
did suppliers. According to an Aerospace Corporation study, both prime 
contractors and the government space market lost insight and 
traceability into parts as suppliers moved from having to meet 
military specifications and standards to an environment where the 
prime contractor would ensure that the process used by the supplier 
would yield a quality part. During this time, downsizing and tight 
budgets also eroded core skills, giving the government less insight, 
with fewer people to track problems and less oversight into 
manufacturing details.[Footnote 16] 

As DOD and NASA experienced considerable cost, schedule, and 
performance problems with major systems in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, independent government-sponsored reviews concluded that the 
government ceded too much control to contractors during acquisition 
reform. As a result, in the mid-to late 2000s, DOD and NASA reached 
broad consensus that the government needed to return to a lifecycle 
mission assurance approach aimed at ensuring mission success.[Footnote 
17] For example, MDA issued its Mission Assurance Provisions (MAP) for 
acquisition of mission and safety critical hardware and software in 
October 2006. The MAP is to assist in improving MDA's acquisition 
activities through the effective application of critical best 
practices for quality safety and mission assurance. In December 2008, 
DOD updated its acquisition process which includes government 
involvement in the full range of requirements, design, manufacture, 
test, operations, and readiness reviews. 

Also in the last decade, DOD and NASA have developed policies and 
procedures aimed at preventing parts quality problems.[Footnote 18] 
For example, policies at each agency set standards to require the 
contractor to establish control plans related to parts, materials, and 
processes. Policies at the Air Force, MDA, and the NASA component we 
reviewed also establish minimum quality and reliability requirements 
for electronic parts--such as capacitors, resistors, connectors, 
fuses, and filters--and set standards to require the contractor to 
select materials and processes to ensure that the parts will perform 
as intended in the environment where they will function, considering 
the effects of, for example, static electricity, extreme temperature 
fluctuations, solar radiation, and corrosion. In addition, DOD and 
NASA have developed plans and policies related to counterfeit parts 
control that set standards to require contractors to take certain 
steps to prevent and detect counterfeit parts and materials.[Footnote 
19] Table 1 identifies the major policies related to parts quality at 
DOD and NASA. 

Table 1: Policies to Prevent and Detect Parts Quality Problems at DOD 
and NASA: 

Agency: DOD--Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center; 
Policy: DOD Instruction 63-106, Specifications and Standards 
Instruction; 
Issue date: October 2009; 
Policy: DOD Standard SMC-S-009, Parts, Materials and Processes Control 
Program for Space and Launch Vehicles Standard[A]; 
Issue date: January 2009. 

Agency: DOD--Missile Defense Agency; 
Policy: Assurance Provisions; 
Issue date: October 2006; 
Policy: Parts, Materials, and Processes Mission Assurance Plan; 
Issue date: March 2008. 

Agency: NASA; 
Policy: NASA Policy Directive 8790.2C, NASA Parts Policy; 
Issue date: November 2008; 
Policy: Goddard Space Flight Center, EEE-INST-002, Instructions for 
Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical Parts Selection, 
Screening, Qualification and Derating[B]; 
Issue date: May 2003. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data. 

[A] The Navy's Mobile User Objective System is supported by this 
standard. 

[B] Although this policy is a NASA/Goddard-specific policy, all of the 
NASA systems we reviewed followed this policy. 

[End of table] 

Government policies generally require various activities related to 
the selection and testing of parts, materials, and processes. It is 
the prime contractor's responsibility to determine how the 
requirements will be managed and implemented, including the selection 
and management of subcontractors and suppliers. In addition, it is the 
government's responsibility to provide sufficient oversight to ensure 
that parts quality controls and procedures are in place and rigorously 
followed. Finally, DOD and NASA have quality and mission assurance 
personnel staff on their programs to conduct on-site audits at 
contractor facilities. Table 2 illustrates the typical roles of the 
government and the prime contractor in ensuring parts quality. 

Table 2: Typical Roles of Government and Prime Contractors in Ensuring 
Parts Quality: 

Government: Defines requirements for parts, materials, and processes 
and may require the prime contractor to conduct various activities 
related to the following: 
* Selection of parts, materials, and processes; 
* Selection of suppliers; 
* Testing (screening, qualification, and inspection); 
Ensure that parts, materials, and process controls and procedures are 
in place and rigorously followed; 
Conduct quality assurance audit functions and supplier surveillance. 

Prime contractor: Defines and documents how parts, materials, and 
process activities will be managed and implemented: 
* Ensures that requirements are met through thorough, complete, and 
traceable documentation and verification; 
* Ensures that all discrepancies/nonconformances are reported and 
resolutions are customer approved; 
* Establishes and/or follows a parts, materials, and processes control 
board that includes subcontractors to coordinate the program's parts, 
materials, and process controls program; 
* Is responsible for flow-down and implementation of requirements to 
all subcontractors, sub-tiers, and suppliers. 

Source: GAO analysis of the Aerospace Corporation's Mission Assurance 
Guidebook. 

[End of table] 

DOD and NASA also have their own oversight activities that contribute 
to system quality. DOD has on-site quality specialists within the 
Defense Contract Management Agency and the military services, MDA has 
its Mission Assurance program, and NASA has its Quality Assurance 
program. Each activity aims to identify quality problems and ensure 
the on-time, on-cost delivery of quality products to the government 
through oversight of manufacturing and through supplier management 
activities, selected manufacturing activities, and final product 
inspections prior to acceptance. Likewise, prime contractors employ 
quality assurance specialists and engineers to assess the quality and 
reliability of both the parts they receive from suppliers and the 
overall weapon system. In addition, DOD and NASA have access to one or 
more of the following databases used to report deficient parts: the 
Product Data Reporting and Evaluation Program (PDREP), the Joint 
Deficiency Reporting System (JDRS), and the Government Industry Data 
Exchange Program (GIDEP). Through these systems, the government and 
industry participants share information on deficient parts.[Footnote 
20] 

Parts Quality Problems Are Widespread and in Some Cases Have Had a 
Significant Effect on Cost, Schedule, and Performance: 

Parts quality problems reported by each program affected all 21 
programs we reviewed at DOD and NASA and in some cases contributed to 
significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced system 
reliability and availability. In most cases, problems were associated 
with electronics parts, versus mechanical parts or materials. 
Moreover, in several cases, parts problems were discovered late in the 
development cycle and, as such, tended to have more significant cost 
and schedule consequences. 

Table 3 identifies the cost and schedule effects of parts quality 
problems for the 21 programs we reviewed. The costs in this table are 
the cumulative costs of all the parts quality problems that the 
programs identified as most significant as of August 2010 and do not 
necessarily reflect cost increases to the program's total costs. In 
some cases, program officials told us that they do not track the cost 
effects of parts quality problems or that it was too early to 
determine the effect. The schedule effect is the cumulative total of 
months it took to resolve a problem. Unless the problems affected a 
schedule milestone such as launch date, the total number of months may 
reflect problems that were concurrent and may not necessarily reflect 
delays to the program's schedule. 

Table 3: Cost and Schedule Effect of Parts Quality Problems at DOD and 
NASA: 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
Satellites; 
Cost: $250 million[B]; 
Schedule: 24 month launch delay[C]. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Global Positioning System Block IIF; 
Cost: $0.2 million; 
Schedule: Not reported. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Space-Based Infrared System; 
Cost: Not reported; 
Schedule: Not reported. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Space-Based Space Surveillance; 
Cost: $3.3 million; 
Schedule: 1 month. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Navy: Mobile User Objective System; 
Cost: Not reported; 
Schedule: 18 months. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense; 
Cost: $1.9 million; 
Schedule: No impact. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Ground-Based Midcourse 
Defense; 
Cost: $19 million; 
Schedule: 25 months. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Space Tracking and 
Surveillance System; 
Cost: $7.8 million; 
Schedule: 5 months[D]. 

Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Targets and 
Countermeasures; 
Cost: $0.9 million; 
Schedule: 1-2 weeks impact or no impact. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Aquarius; 
Cost: $0.1 million; 
Schedule: 1 month. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Global Precipitation Measurement Mission; 
Cost: $0.3 million; 
Schedule: 16 months. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Glory; 
Cost: $72.2 million; 
Schedule: 20-month launch delay. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory; 
Cost: $0.4 million; 
Schedule: 1 month. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: James Webb Space Telescope; 
Cost: $5 million; 
Schedule: 6 months. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Juno; 
Cost: $4.5 million; 
Schedule: 13 months. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Landsat Data Continuity Mission; 
Cost: $5 million; 
Schedule: 25 months. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Magnetospheric Multiscale; 
Cost: Not reported; 
Schedule: Not reported. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Mars Science Laboratory; 
Cost: $10.5 million; 
Schedule: 26 months. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project; 
Cost: $105.2 million; 
Schedule: 27-month launch delay. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Radiation Belt Storm Probes; 
Cost: Not reported; 
Schedule: Not reported. 

Agency/system[A]: NASA: Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System; 
Cost: Not reported; 
Schedule: 3 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data. 

Note: "Not reported" can mean that there was no effect or that the 
effect was unknown. The cost and schedule effects do not necessarily 
reflect increases to the program's total cost or schedule. 

[A] See appendix II for a description of the systems. 

[B] Program officials identified eight parts quality problems that 
they considered to be the most significant; however, they initially 
reported that the costs associated with the problems were "unknown." 
Officials later stated that one of the eight problems reported added 
an additional cost of at least $250 million. 

[C] Program officials did not identify any schedule effects with the 
eight parts quality problems they reported. However, based on prior 
GAO work, we determined that parts quality problems contributed to a 2-
year launch delay. 

[D] According to program officials, parts quality problems contributed 
to but were not the main cause of a 2-year launch delay as described 
in GAO-09-326SP and GAO-06-391. 

[End of table] 

Programs Are Primarily Experiencing Quality Problems with Electronic 
Parts: 

The programs we reviewed are primarily experiencing quality problems 
with electronic parts that are associated with electronic assemblies, 
such as computers, communication systems, and guidance systems, 
critical to the system operations. Based on our review of 21 programs, 
64.7 percent of the parts quality problems were associated with 
electronic parts, 14.7 percent with mechanical parts, and 20.6 percent 
with materials used in manufacturing. In many cases, programs 
experienced problems with the same parts and materials. Figure 3 
identifies the distribution of quality problems across electronic 
parts, mechanical parts, and materials. 

Figure 3: Distribution of Quality Problems Found in Programs Reviewed 
and Grouped by Electronic Parts, Mechanical Parts, and Materials: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Electronic parts: 64.7%; 
Materials: 20.6%; 
Mechanical parts: 14.7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

In many cases, programs experienced problems with the same parts and 
materials. For electronic parts, seven programs reported problems with 
capacitors, a part that is widely used in electronic circuits. 
Multiple programs also reported problems with printed circuit boards, 
which are used to support and connect electronic components. While 
printed circuit boards range in complexity and capability, they are 
used in virtually all but the simplest electronic devices. As with 
problems with electronic parts, multiple programs also experienced 
problems with the same materials. For example, five programs reported 
problems with titanium that did not meet requirements. In addition, 
two programs reported problems with four different parts manufactured 
with pure tin, a material that is prohibited in space because it poses 
a reliability risk to electronics.[Footnote 21] Figure 4 identifies 
examples of quality problems with parts and materials that affected 
three or more programs. 

Figure 4: Examples of Quality Problems with Electronic Parts and 
Manufacturing Materials That Affected Three or More Programs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph and associated data] 

Problems that affected three or more programs: 

Electronic parts: 

Attenuator: 
Number of programs affected: 3. 
Attenuator is a part that reduces the strength of an alternating 
signal. 

Capacitor: 
Number of programs affected: 7. 
Capacitor is a part that, among other things, stores energy. 

Connector: 
Number of programs affected: 3. 
Connector is a part that connects two or more types of wiring items. 

Optocoupler: 
Number of programs affected: 3. 
Optocoupler is a part that transfers electrical signals using light 
waves. 

Oscillator: 
Number of programs affected: 4. 
Oscillator is a part that provides timing signals in digital and 
analog circuits. 

Printed wiring board: 
Number of programs affected: 3. 
Printed circuit board is a part used to support and provide connection 
of an electronic circuit. 

Resistor: 
Number of programs affected: 4. 
Resistor is a part that opposes the flow of current in an electrical 
circuit. 

Manufacturing materials: 

Titanium: 
Number of programs affected: 5. 
Titanium is a strong, corrosion-resistant material frequently used in 
jet engines, missiles, and spacecraft. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

Parts Problems Discovered Late in Development Cycle Had More 
Significant Consequences: 

While parts quality problems affected all of the programs we reviewed, 
problems found late in development--during final integration and 
testing at the instrument and system level--had the most significant 
effect on program cost and schedule. As shown in figure 5, part 
screening, qualification, and testing typically occur during the final 
design phase of spacecraft development. When parts problems are 
discovered during this phase, they are sometimes more easily addressed 
without major consequences to a development effort since fabrication 
of the spacecraft has not yet begun or is just in the initial phases. 
In several of the cases we reviewed, however, parts problems were 
discovered during instrument and system-level testing, that is, after 
assembly or integration of the instrument or spacecraft. As such, they 
had more significant consequences as they required lengthy failure 
analysis, disassembly, rework, and reassembly, sometimes resulting in 
a launch delay. 

Figure 5: Summary of Typical Key Testing Practices to Identify Parts 
Quality Problems: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Concept development: 
Preliminary design review; 

Design and fabrication: 
Parts problems found here are more easily addressed; 
Parts testing: 
* Part screening; 
* Part qualification; 
* Radiation testing; 
Critical design review; 
Point at which agencies seek to detect a part quality problem. 

Assembly and test: 
Parts problems found here have more significant consequences; 
System-level testing: 
* Acoustic testing; 
* Vibration testing; 
* Shock testing; 
* Thermal testing. 

Operations and support. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

Our work identified a number of cases in which parts problems 
identified late in development caused significant cost and schedule 
issues. 

* Parts quality problems found during system-level testing of the Air 
Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program 
contributed to a launch delay of almost 2 years and cost the program 
at least $250 million. A power-regulating unit failed during system-
level thermal vacuum testing because of defective electronic parts 
that had to be removed and replaced. This and other problems resulted 
in extensive rework and required the satellite to undergo another 
round of thermal vacuum testing. According to the program office, the 
additional thermal vacuum testing alone cost about $250 million. 

* At MDA, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System program 
discovered problems with defective electronic parts in the Space-
Ground Link Subsystem during system-level testing and integration of 
the satellite. By the time the problem was discovered, the 
manufacturer no longer produced the part and an alternate contractor 
had to be found to manufacture and test replacement parts. According 
to officials, the problem cost about $7 million and was one of the 
factors that contributed to a 17-month launch delay of two 
demonstration satellites and delayed participation in the BMDS testing 
we reported on in March 2009.[Footnote 22] 

* At NASA, parts quality problems found late in development resulted 
in a 20-month launch delay for the Glory program and cost $71.1 
million. In August 2008, Glory's spacecraft computer failed to power 
up during system-level testing. After a 6-month failure analysis, the 
problem was attributed to a crack in the computer's printed circuit 
board, an electronic part in the computer used to connect electronic 
components. Because the printed circuit board could not be 
manufactured reliably, the program had to procure and test an 
alternate computer. The program minimized the long lead times expected 
with the alternate computer by obtaining one that had already been 
procured by NASA. However, according to contractor officials, design 
changes were also required to accommodate the alternate computer. In 
June 2010, after the computer problem had been resolved, the Glory 
program also discovered problems with parts for the solar array drive 
assembly that rendered one of the arrays unacceptable for flight and 
resulted in an additional 3-month launch delay.[Footnote 23] 

* Also at NASA, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellite System Preparatory Project experienced $105 million in cost 
increases and 27 months of delay because of parts quality problems. 
[Footnote 24] In one case, a key instrument developed by a NASA 
partner failed during instrument-level testing because the instrument 
frame fractured at several locations. According to the failure review 
board, stresses exceeded the material capabilities of several brazed 
joints--a method of joining metal parts together. According to 
officials, the instrument's frame had to be reinforced, which delayed 
instrument delivery and ultimately delayed the satellite's launch 
date. In addition, officials stated that they lack confidence in how 
the partner-provided satellite instruments will function on orbit 
because of the systemic mission assurance and systems engineering 
issues that contributed to the parts quality problems. 

For some of the programs we reviewed, the costs associated with parts 
quality problems were minimized because the problems were found early 
and were resolved within the existing margins built into the program 
schedule. For example, the Air Force's Global Positioning System (GPS) 
program discovered problems with electronic parts during part-level 
testing and inspection. An investigation into the problem cost about 
$50,000, but did not result in delivery delays. An independent review 
team ultimately concluded that the parts could be used without a 
performance or mission impact. At NASA, the Juno program discovered 
during part-level qualification testing that an electronic part did 
not meet performance requirements. The program obtained a suitable 
replacement from another manufacturer; it cost the program $10,000 to 
resolve the issue with no impact on program schedule. 

In other cases, the costs of parts quality problems were amplified 
because they were a leading cause of a schedule delay to a major 
milestone, such as launch readiness. For example, of the $60.9 million 
cost associated with problems with the Glory spacecraft computer found 
during system-level testing, $11.6 million was spent to resolve the 
issue, including personnel costs for troubleshooting, testing, and 
oversight as well as design, fabrication, and testing of the new 
computer. The majority of the cost--$49.3 million--was associated with 
maintaining the contractor during the 15-month launch delay. 
Similarly, problems with parts for Glory's solar array assembly cost 
about $10.1 million, $2.7 million to resolve the problem and $7.4 
million resulting from the additional 3-month schedule delay. 
Similarly, program officials for NASA's National Polar-orbiting 
Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project attributed the $105 
million cost of its parts quality problems to the costs associated 
with launch and schedule delays, an estimated $5 million a month. 

In several cases, the programs were encountering other challenges that 
obscured the problems caused by poor quality parts. For example, the 
Air Force's Space-Based Infrared System High program reported that a 
part with pure tin in the satellite telemetry unit was discovered 
after the satellite was integrated. After an 11-month failure review 
board, the defective part was replaced. The program did not quantify 
the cost and schedule effect of the problem because the program was 
encountering software development issues that were already resulting 
in schedule delays. Similarly, NASA's Mars Science Laboratory program 
experienced a failure associated with joints in the rover propulsion 
system. According to officials, the welding process led to joint 
embrittlement and the possibility of early failure. The project had to 
test a new process, rebuild, and test the system, which cost about $4 
million and resulted in a 1-year delay in completion. However, the 
program's launch date had already been delayed 25 months because of 
design issues with the rover actuator motors and avionics package--in 
effect, buying time to resolve the problem with the propulsion system. 

In Some Cases, Parts Quality Problems Affected System Reliability and 
Availability: 

In addition to the launch delays discussed above, parts quality 
problems also resulted in reduced system reliability and availability 
for several other programs we reviewed. For example, the Air Force's 
GPS program found that an electronic part lacked qualification data to 
prove the part's quality and reliability. As a result, the overall 
reliability prediction for the space vehicle was decreased. At MDA, 
the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program discovered problems with an 
electronic part in the telemetry unit needed to transmit flight test 
data. The problem was found during final assembly and test operations 
of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle resulting in the cancellation of a 
major flight test. This increased risk to the program and the overall 
BMDS capability, since the lack of adequate intercept data reduced 
confidence that the system could perform as intended in a real-world 
situation. Also, MDA's Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program 
recalled 16 missiles from the warfighter, including 7 from a foreign 
partner, after the prime contractor discovered that the brackets used 
to accommodate communications and power cabling were improperly 
adhered to the Standard Missile 3 rocket motor. If not corrected, the 
problem could have resulted in catastrophic mission failure. 

The Costs of Parts Quality Problems Are Primarily Borne by the 
Government: 

Regardless of the cause of the parts quality problem, the government 
typically bears the costs associated with resolving the issues and 
associated schedule impact. In part, this is due to the use of cost- 
reimbursement contracts. Because space and missile defense 
acquisitions are complex and technically challenging, DOD and NASA 
typically use cost-reimbursement contracts, whereby the government 
pays the prime contractor's allowable costs to the extent prescribed 
in the contract for the contractor's best efforts. Under cost-
reimbursement contracts, the government generally assumes the 
financial risks associated with development, which may include the 
costs associated with parts quality problems. Of the 21 programs we 
reviewed, 20 use cost-reimbursement contracts. In addition, 17 
programs use award and incentive fees to reduce the government's risk 
and provide an incentive for excellence in such areas as quality, 
timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management. Award 
and incentive fees enable the reduction of fee in the event that the 
contractor's performance does not meet or exceed the requirements of 
the contract.[Footnote 25] Aside from the use of award fees, senior 
quality and acquisition oversight officials told us that incentives 
for prime contractors to ensure quality are limited. 

Parts Quality Problems Were Caused by Poor Manufacturing Controls, 
Design, and Supplier Management: 

The parts quality problems we identified were directly attributed to 
poor control of manufacturing processes and materials, poor design, 
and lack of effective supplier management. Generally, prime contractor 
activities to capture manufacturing knowledge should include 
identifying critical characteristics of the product's design and then 
the critical manufacturing processes and materials to achieve these 
characteristics. Manufacturing processes and materials should be 
documented, tested, and controlled prior to production. This includes 
establishing criteria for workmanship, making work instructions 
available, and preventing and removing foreign object debris in the 
production process. 

Poor workmanship was one of the causes of problems with electronic 
parts.[Footnote 26] At DOD, poor workmanship during hand-soldering 
operations caused a capacitor to fail during testing on the Navy's 
Mobile User Objective System program. Poor soldering workmanship also 
caused a power distribution unit to experience problems during vehicle-
level testing on MDA's Targets and Countermeasures program. According 
to MDA officials, all units of the same design by the same 
manufacturer had to be X-ray inspected and reworked, involving 
extensive hardware disassembly. As a corrective action, soldering 
technicians were provided with training to improve their soldering 
operations and ability to perform better visual inspections after 
soldering. Soldering workmanship problems also contributed to a 
capacitor failure on NASA's Glory program. Analysis determined that 
the manufacturer's soldering guidelines were not followed. 

Programs also reported quality problems because of the use of 
undocumented and untested manufacturing processes. For example, MDA's 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program reported that the brackets 
used to accommodate communications and power cabling were improperly 
bonded to Standard Missile 3 rocket motors, potentially leading to 
mission failure. A failure review board determined that the 
subcontractor had changed the bonding process to reduce high scrap 
rates and that the new process was not tested and verified before it 
was implemented. Similarly, NASA's Landsat Data Continuity Mission 
program experienced problems with the spacecraft solar array because 
of an undocumented manufacturing process. According to program 
officials, the subcontractor did not have a documented process to 
control the amount of adhesive used in manufacturing, and as a result, 
too much adhesive was applied. If not corrected, the problem could 
have resulted in solar array failure on orbit. 

Poor control of manufacturing materials and the failure to prevent 
contamination also caused quality problems. At MDA, the Ground-Based 
Midcourse Defense program reported a problem with defective titanium 
tubing. The defective tubing was rejected in 2004 and was to be 
returned to the supplier; however, because of poor control of 
manufacturing materials, a portion of the material was not returned 
and was inadvertently used to fabricate manifolds for two complete 
Ground-Based Interceptor Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles. The vehicles 
had already been processed and delivered to the prime contractor for 
integration when the problem was discovered. Lack of adherence to 
manufacturing controls to prevent contamination and foreign object 
debris also caused parts quality problems. For example, at NASA, a 
titanium propulsion tank for the Tracking Data and Relay Satellite 
program failed acceptance testing because a steel chip was 
inadvertently welded onto the tank. Following a 3-month investigation 
into the root cause, the tank was scrapped and a replacement tank was 
built. 

Design Flaws Also Resulted in Parts Quality Problems: 

In addition to problems stemming from poor control of manufacturing 
processes and materials, many problems resulted from poor part design, 
design complexity, and inattention to manufacturing risks. For 
example, attenuators for the Navy's Mobile User Objective System 
exhibited inconsistent performance because of their sensitivity to 
temperature changes. Officials attributed the problem to poor design, 
and the attenuators were subsequently redesigned. At NASA, design 
problems also affected parts for the Mars Science Laboratory program. 
According to program officials, several resistors failed after 
assembly into printed circuit boards. A failure review board 
determined that the tight design limits contributed to the problem. 
Consequently, the parts had to be redesigned and replaced. 

Programs also underestimated the complexity of parts design, which 
created risks of latent design and workmanship defects. For example, 
NASA's Glory project experienced problems with the state-of-the-art 
printed circuit board for the spacecraft computer. According to 
project officials, the board design was almost impossible to 
manufacture with over 100 serial steps involved in the manufacturing 
process. Furthermore, failure analysis found that the 27,000 
connection points in the printed circuit board were vulnerable to 
thermal stresses over time leading to intermittent failures. However, 
the quality of those interconnections was difficult to detect through 
standard testing protocols. This is inconsistent with commercial best 
practices, which focus on simplified design characteristics as well as 
use of mature and validated technology and manufacturing processes. 

Supplier Management Contributed to Quality Problems: 

Program officials at each agency also attributed parts quality 
problems to the prime contractor's failure to ensure that its 
subcontractors and suppliers met program requirements. According to 
officials, in several cases, prime contractors were responsible for 
flowing down all applicable program requirements to their 
subcontractors and suppliers. Requirements flow-down from the prime 
contractor to subcontractors and suppliers is particularly important 
and challenging given the structure of the space and defense 
industries, wherein prime contractors are subcontracting more work to 
subcontractors.[Footnote 27] At MDA, the Ground-Based Midcourse 
Defense program experienced a failure with an electronics part 
purchased from an unauthorized supplier. According to program 
officials, the prime contractor flowed down the requirement that parts 
only be purchased from authorized suppliers; however, the 
subcontractor failed to execute the requirement and the prime 
contractor did not verify compliance. Program officials for NASA's 
Juno program attributed problems with a capacitor to the supplier's 
failure to review the specification prohibiting the use of pure tin. 
DOD's Space-Based Infrared System High program reported problems with 
three different parts containing pure tin and attributed the problems 
to poor requirements flow-down and poor supplier management. Figure 6 
shows an example of tin whiskers on a capacitor, which can cause 
catastrophic problems to space systems. 

Figure 6: Example of a Capacitor with Tin Whiskers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program. 

[End of figure] 

Agency and Industry Efforts to Address Parts Quality Problems Face 
Significant Challenges: 

DOD and NASA have instituted new policies to prevent and detect parts 
quality problems, but most of the programs we reviewed were initiated 
before these policies took effect. Moreover, newer programs that do 
come under the policies have not reached the phases of development 
where parts problems are typically discovered. In addition, agencies 
and industry have been collaborating to share information about 
potential problems, collecting data, and developing guidance and 
criteria for activities such as testing parts, managing 
subcontractors, and mitigating specific types of problems. We could 
not determine the extent to which collaborative actions have resulted 
in reduced instances of parts quality problems or ensured that they 
are caught earlier in the development cycle. This is primarily because 
data on the condition of parts quality in the space and missile 
community governmentwide historically have not been collected. And 
while there are new efforts to collect data on anomalies, there is no 
mechanism to use these data to help assess the effectiveness of 
improvement actions. Lastly, there are significant potential barriers 
to success of efforts to address parts quality problems. They include 
broader acquisition management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse 
leadership in the national security space community, the government's 
decreasing influence on the overall electronic parts market, and an 
increase in counterfeiting of electronic parts. In the face of such 
challenges, it is likely that ongoing improvements will have limited 
success without continued assessments to determine what is working 
well and what more needs to be done. 

Agencies Are Undertaking Efforts to Strengthen Parts Quality 
Management: 

As noted earlier in this report, the Air Force, MDA, and NASA have all 
recently instituted or updated existing policies to prevent and detect 
parts quality problems. At the Air Force and MDA, all of the programs 
we reviewed were initiated before these recent policies aimed at 
preventing and detecting parts quality problems took full effect. In 
addition, it is too early to tell whether newer programs--such as a 
new Air Force GPS development effort and the MDA's Precision Tracking 
Space System--are benefiting from the newer policies because these 
programs have not reached the design and fabrication phases where 
parts problems are typically discovered. However, we have reported 
that the Air Force is taking measures to prevent the problems 
experienced on the GPS IIF program from recurring on the new GPS III 
program. The Air Force has increased government oversight of its GPS 
III development and Air Force officials are spending more time at the 
contractor's site to ensure quality.[Footnote 28] The Air Force is 
also following military standards for satellite quality for GPS III 
development. At the time of our review, the program had not reported a 
significant parts quality problem. Table 4 highlights the major 
differences in the framework between the GPS IIF and GPS III programs. 

Table 4: Key Differences in Program Framework between GPS IIF and GPS 
III: 

Requirements: 
GPS IIF: Addition of requirements after contract award; 
GPS III: Not allowing an adjustment to the program to meet increased 
or accelerated requirements. 

Development: 
GPS IIF: Immature technologies; 
GPS III: Incremental development, while ensuring technologies are 
mature. 

Oversight: 
GPS IIF: Limited oversight of contractor, relaxed specifications and 
inspections, and limited design reviews; 
GPS III: More contractor oversight with government presence at 
contractor facility; use of military standards; and multiple levels of 
preliminary design reviews, with the contractor being held to military 
standards and deliverables during each review. 

Source: GAO analysis based on discussions with the GPS program office 
officials and review of program documentation. 

[End of table] 

In addition to new policies focused on quality, agencies are also 
becoming more focused on industrial base issues and supply chain 
risks. For example, MDA has developed the supplier road map database 
in an effort to gain greater visibility into the supply chain in order 
to more effectively manage supply chain risks. In addition, according 
to MDA officials, MDA has recently been auditing parts distributors in 
order to rank them for risk in terms of counterfeit parts. NASA has 
begun to assess industrial base risks and challenges during 
acquisition strategy meetings and has established an agency Supply 
Chain Management Team to focus attention on supply chain management 
issues and to coordinate with other government agencies. 

Agencies and industry also participate in a variety of collaborative 
initiatives to address quality, in particular, parts quality. These 
range from informal groups focused on identifying and sharing news 
about emerging problems as quickly as possible, to partnerships that 
conduct supplier assessments, to formal groups focused on identifying 
ways industry and the government can work together to prevent and 
mitigate problems. As shown in table 5, these groups have worked to 
establish guidance, criteria, and standards that focus on parts 
quality issues, and they have enhanced existing data collection tools 
and created new databases focused on assessing anomalies. 

Table 5: Examples of Organizations and Their Collaborative Efforts and 
Outcomes for Addressing Parts Quality: 

Organizations: 

Government: 
* Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center; 
* Defense Contract Management Agency; 
* International agencies; 
* Missile Defense Agency; 
* National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
* National Reconnaissance Office; 
* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command; 
Industry: 
* Prime contractors; 
* Subcontractors; 
Other: 
* Aerospace Corporation. 

Examples of collaborative efforts: 

Councils and senior leader forums: 
* Joint Mission Assurance Council; 
* Mission Assurance Summit; 
* Space Industrial Base Council; 
* Space Quality Improvement Council; 
* Space Supplier Council. 

Government/industry technical committees: 
* Government-Industry Fastener Working Group (GIFWG); 
* NASA EEE Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG); 
* Pb-free Electronics Risk Management (PERM) Consortium; 
* SAE G-19 Technical Committee, Counterfeit Parts Avoidance; 
* TechAmerica G-11 and G-12, Component Parts. 

Working groups: 
* Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop; 
* National Security Space Advisory Forum; 
* Space Industrial Base Working Groups; 
* Space Parts Working Group. 

Other activities: 
* Joint supplier audits and assessments; 
* Meetings between agencies to share parts issues and assist in 
building quality assurance programs; 

Examples of outcomes: 

Communication among agencies, industry, and their leadership: 
* Venues for senior agency leadership to discuss quality issues and 
lessons learned; 
* Venues to discuss specific areas of interest and concerns, for 
example, problems with electronic parts and risk mitigation strategies; 
* New memorandum of understanding to increase interagency cooperation; 

Tools/actions: 
* Guidelines for flight unit qualification; 
* Mitigation plan for problems affecting batteries, solar cells and 
arrays, and traveling wave tube amplifiers; 
* Subcontractor management standards; 
* Supplier assessments jointly conducted by Defense Contract 
Management Agency, other agencies, and industry. 

Data collection/sharing enhancements: 
* Aerospace Corporation database of orbit and preflight anomalies; 
* National Security Space Advisory Forum--Web-based alert system for 
space system anomaly data and problem alerts; this supplements current 
GIDEP reporting system. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, NASA and space industry efforts. 

[End of table] 

One example of the collaborative efforts is the Space Industrial Base 
Council (SIBC)--a government-led initiative--which brings together 
officials from agencies involved in space and missile defense to focus 
on a range of issues affecting the space industrial base and has 
sparked numerous working groups focused specifically on parts quality 
and critical suppliers. These groups in turn have worked to develop 
information-sharing mechanisms, share lessons learned and conduct 
supplier assessments, soliciting industry's input as appropriate. For 
instance, the SIBC established a critical technology working group to 
explore supply chains and examine critical technologies to put in 
place a process for strategic management of critical space systems' 
technologies and capabilities under the Secretary of the Air Force and 
the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. The working group 
has developed and initiated a mitigation plan for batteries, solar 
cells and arrays, and traveling wave tube amplifiers.[Footnote 29] In 
addition, the Space Supplier Council was established under the SIBC to 
focus on the concerns of second-tier and lower-tier suppliers, which 
typically have to go through the prime contractors, and to promote 
more dialogue between DOD, MDA, NASA, other space entities, and these 
suppliers. Another council initiative was the creation of the National 
Security Space Advisory Forum, a Web-based alert system developed for 
sharing critical space system anomaly data and problem alerts, which 
became operational in 2005. 

Agency officials also cited other informal channels used to share 
information regarding parts issues. For example, NASA officials stated 
that after verifying a parts issue, they will share their internal 
advisory notice with any other government space program that could 
potentially be affected by the issue. According to several government 
and contractor officials, the main reasons for delays in information 
sharing were either the time it took to confirm a problem or concerns 
with proprietary and liability issues. NASA officials stated that they 
received advisories from MDA and had an informal network with MDA and 
the Army Space and Missile Defense Command to share information about 
parts problems. Officials at the Space and Missile Systems Center also 
mentioned that they have informal channels for sharing part issues. 
For example, an official in the systems engineering division at the 
Space and Missile Systems Center stated that he has weekly meetings 
with a NASA official to discuss parts issues. 

In addition to the formal and informal collaborative efforts, the Air 
Force's Space and Missile Systems Center, MDA, NASA, and the National 
Reconnaissance Office signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 
February 2011 to encourage additional interagency cooperation in order 
to strengthen mission assurance practices. The MOU calls on the 
agencies to develop and share lessons learned and best practices to 
ensure mission success through a framework of collaborative mission 
assurance. Broad objectives of the framework are to develop core 
mission assurance practices and tools; to foster a mission assurance 
culture and world-class workforce; to develop clear and executable 
mission assurance plans; to manage effective program execution; and to 
ensure program health through independent, objective assessments. 
Specific objectives include developing a robust mission assurance 
infrastructure and guidelines for tailoring specifications and 
standards for parts, materials, and processes and establishing 
standard contractual language to ensure consistent specification of 
core standards and deliverables. 

In addition, each agency is asked to consider the health of the 
industrial base in space systems acquisitions and participate in 
mission assurance activities, such as the Space Supplier Council and 
mission assurance summits. In signing the MOU, DOD, MDA, NASA, and the 
National Reconnaissance Office acknowledged the complexity of such an 
undertaking as it typically takes years to deliver a capability and 
involves hundreds of industry partners building, integrating, and 
testing hundreds of thousands of parts, all which have to work the 
first time on orbit--a single mishap, undetected, can and has had 
catastrophic results. 

Although collaborative efforts are under way, we could not determine 
the extent to which collaborative actions have resulted in reduced 
instances of parts quality problems to date or ensured that they are 
caught earlier in the development cycle. This is primarily because 
data on the condition of parts quality in the space and missile 
community governmentwide historically have not been collected. The 
Aerospace Corporation has begun to collect data on on-orbit and 
preflight anomalies in addition to the Web alert system established by 
the Space Quality Improvement Council. In addition, there is no 
mechanism in place to assess the progress of improvement actions using 
these data or to track the condition of parts quality problems across 
the space and missile defense sector to determine if improvements are 
working or what additional actions need to be taken. Such a mechanism 
is needed given the varied challenges facing improvement efforts. 

Improvement Efforts Face Potential Barriers to Success: 

There are significant potential barriers to the success of improvement 
efforts, including broader acquisition management problems, diffuse 
leadership in the national security space community, workforce gaps, 
the government's decreasing influence on the overall electronic parts 
market, and an increase in counterfeiting of electronic parts. Actions 
are being taken to address some of these barriers, such as acquisition 
management and diffuse leadership, but others reflect trends affecting 
the aerospace industry that are unlikely to change in the near future 
and may limit the extent to which parts problems can be prevented. 

* Broader acquisition management problems: Both space and missile 
defense programs have experienced acquisition problems--well beyond 
parts quality management difficulties--during the past two decades 
that have driven up costs by billions of dollars, stretched schedules 
by years, and increased technical risks. These problems have resulted 
in potential capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, 
military communications, and weather monitoring, and have required all 
the agencies in our review to cancel or pare back major programs. Our 
reports have generally found that these problems include starting 
efforts before requirements and technologies have been fully 
understood and moving them forward into more complex phases of 
development without sufficient knowledge about technology, design, and 
other issues. Reduced oversight resulting from earlier acquisition 
reform efforts and funding instability have also contributed to cost 
growth and schedule delays. Agencies are attempting to address these 
broader challenges as they are concurrently addressing parts quality 
problems. For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that 
critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition 
programs begin, requirements are defined early in the process and are 
stable throughout, and system designs remain stable. In response to 
our designation of NASA acquisition management as a high-risk area, 
[Footnote 30] NASA developed a corrective action plan to improve the 
effectiveness of its program/project management, and it is in the 
process of implementing earned value management within certain 
programs to help projects monitor the scheduled work done by NASA 
contractors and employees.[Footnote 31] These and other actions have 
the potential to strengthen the foundation for program and quality 
management but they are relatively new and implementation is uneven 
among the agencies involved with space and missile defense. For 
instance, we have found that both NASA and MDA lack adequate 
visibility into costs of programs. Our reports also continue to find 
that cost and schedule estimates across all three agencies tend to be 
optimistic. 

* Diffuse leadership within the national security space community: We 
have previously testified and reported that diffuse leadership within 
the national security space community has a direct impact on the space 
acquisition process, primarily because it makes it difficult to hold 
any one person or organization accountable for balancing needs against 
wants, for resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved 
with space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they 
need to be dedicated.[Footnote 32] In 2008, a congressionally 
chartered commission (known as the Allard Commission) reported that 
responsibilities for military space and intelligence programs were 
scattered across the staffs of DOD organizations and the intelligence 
community and that it appeared that "no one is in charge" of national 
security space.[Footnote 33] The same year, the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence reported similar concerns, focusing 
specifically on difficulties in bringing together decisions that would 
involve both the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary 
of Defense.[Footnote 34] Prior studies, including those conducted by 
the Defense Science Board and the Commission to Assess United States 
National Security Space Management and Organization (Space 
Commission),[Footnote 35] have identified similar problems, both for 
space as a whole and for specific programs. Changes have been made 
this past year to national space policies as well as organizational 
and reporting structures within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
and the Air Force to address these concerns and clarify 
responsibilities, but it remains to be seen whether these changes will 
resolve problems associated with diffuse leadership. 

* Workforce gaps: Another potential barrier to success is a decline in 
the number of quality assurance officials, which officials we spoke 
with pointed to as a significant detriment. A senior quality official 
at MDA stated that the quality assurance workforce was significantly 
reduced as a result of acquisition reform. A senior DOD official 
responsible for space acquisition oversight agreed, adding that the 
government does not have the in-house knowledge or resources to 
adequately conduct many quality control and quality assurance tasks. 
NASA officials also noted the loss of parts specialists who provide 
technical expertise to improve specifications and review change 
requests. According to NASA officials, there is now a shortage of 
qualified personnel with the requisite cross-disciplinary knowledge to 
assess parts quality and reliability. Our prior work has also shown 
that DOD's Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), which provides 
quality assurance oversight for many space acquisitions, was downsized 
considerably during the 1990s.[Footnote 36] While capacity shortfalls 
still exist, DCMA has implemented a strategic plan to address 
workforce issues and improve quality assurance oversight. The shortage 
in the government quality assurance workforce reflects a broader 
decline in the numbers of scientists and engineers in the space 
sector. The 2008 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
report mentioned above found that the space workforce is facing a 
significant loss of talent and expertise because of pending 
retirements, which is causing problems in smoothly transitioning to a 
new space workforce. Similarly, in 2010 we reported that 30 percent of 
the civilian manufacturing workforce was eligible for retirement, and 
approximately 26 percent will become eligible for retirement over the 
next 4 years.[Footnote 37] Similar findings were reported by the DOD 
Cost Analysis Improvement Group in 2009.[Footnote 38] 

* Industrial base consolidation: A series of mergers and 
consolidations that took place primarily in the 1990s added risks to 
parts quality--first, by shrinking the pool of suppliers available to 
produce specialty parts; second, by reducing specialized expertise 
within prime contractors; and third, by introducing cost-cutting 
measures that de-emphasize quality assurance. We reported in 2007 that 
the GPS IIF program, the Space-Based Infrared High Satellite System, 
and the Wideband Global SATCOM system all encountered quality problems 
that could be partially attributed to industry 
consolidations.[Footnote 39] Specialized parts for the Wideband Global 
SATCOM system, for example, became difficult to obtain after smaller 
contractors that made these parts started to consolidate. For GPS, 
consolidations led to a series of moves in facilities that resulted in 
a loss of GPS technical expertise. In addition, during this period, 
the contractor took additional cost-cutting measures that reduced 
quality. Senior officials responsible for DOD space acquisition 
oversight with whom we spoke with for this review stated that prime 
space contractors have divested their traditional lines of expertise 
in favor of acting in a broader "system integrator" role. Meanwhile, 
smaller suppliers that attempted to fill gaps in expertise and 
products created by consolidations have not had the experience and 
knowledge needed to produce to the standards needed for government 
space systems. For instance, officials from one program told us that 
their suppliers were often unaware that their parts would be used in 
space applications and did not understand or follow certain 
requirements. Officials also mentioned that smaller suppliers 
attempting to enter the government space market do not have access to 
testing and other facilities needed to help build quality into their 
parts. We recently reported that small businesses typically do not own 
the appropriate testing facilities, such as thermal vacuum chambers, 
that are used for testing spacecraft or parts under a simulated space 
environment and instead must rely on government, university, or large 
contractor testing facilities, which can be costly.[Footnote 40] 

* Government's declining share of the overall electronic parts market: 
DOD and NASA officials also stated that the government's declining 
share of the overall electronic parts market has made it more 
difficult to acquire qualified electronic parts. According to 
officials, the government used to be the primary consumer of 
microelectronics, but it now constitutes only a small percentage of 
the market. As such, the government cannot easily demand unique 
exceptions to commercial standards. An example of an exception is 
DOD's standards for radiation-hardened parts, such as 
microelectronics, which are designed and fabricated with the specific 
goal of enduring the harshest space radiation environments, including 
nuclear events. We reported in 2010 that to produce such parts, 
companies would typically need to create separate production lines and 
in some cases special facilities.[Footnote 41] Another example is that 
government space programs often demand the use of a tin alloy (tin 
mixed with lead) for parts rather than pure tin because of the risk 
for growth of tin whiskers. According to officials, as a result of 
European environmental regulations, commercial manufacturers have 
largely moved away from the use of lead making it more difficult and 
costly to procure tin alloy parts, and increasing the risk of parts 
being made with pure tin. Similarly, officials noted concerns with the 
increased use of lead-free solders used in electronic parts. Moreover, 
officials told us that when programs do rely on commercial parts, 
there tends to be a higher risk of lot-to-lot variation, obsolescence, 
and a lack of part traceability. 

* An increase in counterfeit electronic parts: Officials we spoke with 
agreed that an increase in counterfeit electronics parts has made 
efforts to address parts quality more difficult. "Counterfeit" 
generally refers to instances in which the identity or pedigree of a 
product is knowingly misrepresented by individuals or companies. A 
2010 Department of Commerce study identified a growth in incidents of 
counterfeit parts across the electronics industry from about 3,300 in 
2005 to over 8,000 incidents in 2008.[Footnote 42] We reported in 2010 
that DOD is limited in its ability to determine the extent to which 
counterfeit parts exist in its supply chain because it does not have a 
departmentwide definition of "counterfeit" and a consistent means to 
identify instances of suspected counterfeit parts.[Footnote 43] 
Moreover, DOD relies on existing procurement and quality control 
practices to ensure the quality of the parts in its supply chain. 
However, these practices are not designed to specifically address 
counterfeit parts. Limitations in the areas of obtaining supplier 
visibility, investigating part deficiencies, and reporting and 
disposal may reduce DOD's ability to mitigate risks posed by 
counterfeit parts. At the time of our review, DOD was only in the 
early stages of addressing counterfeiting. We recommended and DOD 
concurred that DOD leverage existing initiatives to establish 
anticounterfeiting guidance and disseminate this guidance to all DOD 
components and defense contractors. 

Conclusions: 

Space and missile systems must meet high standards for quality. The 
2003 Defense Science Board put it best by noting that the "primary 
reason is that the space environment is unforgiving. Thousands of good 
engineering decisions can be undone by a single engineering flaw or 
workmanship error, resulting in the catastrophe of major mission 
failure. Options for correction are scant."[Footnote 44] The number of 
parts problems identified in our review is relatively small when 
compared to the overall number of parts used. But these problems have 
been shown to have wide-ranging and significant consequences. 
Moreover, while the government's reliance on space and missile systems 
has increased dramatically, attention and oversight of parts quality 
declined because of a variety of factors, including the implementation 
of TSPR and similar policies, workforce gaps, and industry 
consolidations. This condition has been recognized and numerous 
efforts have been undertaken to strengthen the government's ability to 
detect and prevent parts problems. But there is no mechanism in place 
to periodically assess the condition of parts quality problems in 
major space and missile defense programs and the impact and 
effectiveness of corrective measures. Such a mechanism could help 
ensure that attention and resources are focused in the right places 
and provide assurance that progress is being made. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the 
NASA Administrator. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the 
Administrator of NASA direct appropriate agency executives to include 
in efforts to implement the new MOU for increased mission assurance a 
mechanism for a periodic, governmentwide assessment and reporting of 
the condition of parts quality problems in major space and missile 
defense programs. This should include the frequency such problems are 
appearing in major programs, changes in frequency from previous years, 
and the effectiveness of corrective measures. We further recommend 
that reports of the periodic assessments be made available to Congress. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided draft copies of this report to DOD and NASA for review and 
comment. DOD and NASA provided written comments on a draft of this 
report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes III and IV, 
respectively. DOD and NASA also provided technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to include in its 
efforts to implement the new MOU for increased mission assurance a 
mechanism for a periodic, governmentwide assessment and reporting of 
the condition of parts quality problems in major space and missile 
defense programs, to include the frequency problems are appearing, 
changes in frequency from previous years, and the effectiveness of 
corrective measures. DOD responded that it would work with NASA to 
determine the optimal governmentwide assessment and reporting 
implementation to include all quality issues, of which parts, 
materials, and processes would be one of the major focus areas. In 
addition, DOD proposed an annual reporting period to ensure planned, 
deliberate, and consistent assessments. We support DOD's willingness 
to address all quality issues and to include parts, materials, and 
processes as an important focus area in an annual report. Recent cases 
of higher-level quality problems that did not fall within the scope of 
our review include MDA's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile 
system and the Air Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
communications satellite, which were mentioned earlier in our report. 
It is our opinion that these cases occurred for reasons similar to 
those we identified for parts, materials, and processes. We recognize 
that quality issues can include a vast and complex universe of 
problems. Therefore, the scope of our review and focus of our 
recommendation was on parts, materials, and processes to enable 
consistent reporting and analysis and to help direct corrective 
actions. Should a broader quality focus be pursued, as DOD indicated, 
it is important that DOD identify ways in which this consistency can 
be facilitated among the agencies. In response to our second 
recommendation, DOD stated that it had no objection to providing a 
report to Congress, if Congress desired one. We believe that DOD 
should proactively provide its proposed annual reports to Congress on 
a routine basis, rather than waiting for any requests from Congress, 
which could be inconsistent from year to year. 

NASA also concurred with our recommendations. NASA stated that 
enhanced cross-agency communication, coordination, and sharing of 
parts quality information will help mitigate threats poses by 
defective and nonconforming parts. Furthermore, NASA plans to engage 
other U.S. space agencies to further develop and integrate agency 
mechanisms for reporting, assessing, tracking, and trending common 
parts quality problems, including validation of effective cross-agency 
solutions. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
and other interested parties. The report also will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
provided in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Our specific objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which parts 
quality problems are affecting Department of Defense (DOD) and 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space and missile 
defense programs; (2) the causes of these problems; and (3) 
initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. 

To examine the extent to which parts quality problems are affecting 
DOD (the Air Force, the Navy, and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)) 
and NASA cost, schedule, and performance of space and missile defense 
programs, we reviewed all 21 space and missile programs--9 at DOD, 
including 4 Air Force, 1 Navy, and 4 MDA systems, and 12 at NASA--that 
were, as of October 2009, in development and projected to be high 
cost, and had demonstrated through a critical design review (CDR) 
[Footnote 45] that the maturity of the design was appropriate to 
support proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration, 
and test.[Footnote 46] 

DOD space systems selected were major defense acquisition programs-- 
defined as those requiring an eventual total expenditure for research, 
development, test, and evaluation of more than $365 million or for 
procurement of more than $2.190 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant 
dollars. All four MDA systems met these same dollar thresholds. NASA 
programs selected had a life cycle cost exceeding $250 million. We 
chose these programs based on their cost, stage in the acquisition 
process--in development and post-CDR--and congressional interest. A 
quality problem was defined to be the degree to which the product 
attributes, such as capability, performance, or reliability, did not 
meet the needs of the customer or mission, as specified through the 
requirements definition and allocation process. 

For each of the 21 systems we examined program documentation, such as 
parts quality briefings, failure review board reports, advisory 
notices, and cost and schedule analysis reports and held discussions 
with quality officials from the program offices, including contractor 
officials and Defense Contract Management Agency officials, where 
appropriate. We specifically asked each program, at the time we 
initiated our review, to provide us with the most recent list of the 
top 5 to 10 parts, material or processes problems, as defined by that 
program, affecting its program's cost, schedule, or performance. Based 
on additional information gathered through documentation provided by 
the programs and discussions with program officials, we reviewed each 
part problem reported by each program to determine if there was a part 
problem, rather than a material, process, component, or assembly level 
problem. In addition, when possible we identified the impact that a 
part, material, or process quality problem might have had on system 
cost, schedule, and performance. We selected one system with known 
quality problems, as previously reported in GAO reports, within the 
Air Force (Space-Based Space Surveillance System), MDA (Ground-Based 
Midcourse Defense), and NASA (Glory) for further review to gain 
greater insight into the reporting and root causes of the parts 
quality problems. Our findings are limited by the approach and data 
collected. Therefore, we were unable to make generalizable or 
projectable statements about space and missile programs beyond our 
scope. We also have ongoing work through our annual DOD assessments of 
selected weapon programs and NASA assessments of selected larger-scale 
projects for many of these programs, which allowed us to build upon 
our prior work efforts and existing DOD and NASA contacts. Programs 
selected are described in appendix II and are listed below. 

DOD--Air Force: 

* Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites: 

* Global Positioning System Block IIF: 

* Space-Based Infrared System High Program: 

* Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10: 

DOD--Navy: 

* Mobile User Objective System: 

DOD--MDA: 

* Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: 

* Ground-Based Midcourse Defense: 

* Space Tracking and Surveillance System: 

* Targets and Countermeasures: 

NASA: 

* Aquarius: 

* Global Precipitation Measurement Mission: 

* Glory: 

* Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory: 

* James Webb Space Telescope: 

* Juno: 

* Landsat Data Continuity Mission: 

* Magnetospheric Multiscale: 

* Mars Science Laboratory: 

* National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
Preparatory Project: 

* Radiation Belt Storm Probes: 

* Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Replenishment: 

DOD and NASA have access to one or more of the following databases 
used to report deficient parts: the Product Data Reporting and 
Evaluation Program, the Joint Deficiency Reporting System, and the 
Government Industry Data Exchange Program. We did not use these 
systems in our review because of the delay associated with obtaining 
current information and because it was beyond the scope of the review 
to assess the utility or effectiveness of these systems. 

To determine the causes behind the parts quality problems, we asked 
each program to provide an explanation of the root causes and 
contributing factors that may have led to each part problem reported. 
Based on the information we gathered, we grouped the root causes and 
contributing factors for each part problem. We reviewed program 
documentation, regulations, directives, instructions, and policies to 
determine how the Air Force, MDA, and NASA define and address parts 
quality. We interviewed senior DOD, MDA, and NASA headquarters 
officials, as well as system program and contractor officials from the 
Air Force, MDA, and NASA, about their knowledge of parts problems on 
their programs. We reviewed several studies on quality and causes from 
the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Department of 
Commerce; and the Aerospace Corporation to gain a better understanding 
of quality and challenges facing the development, acquisition, and 
execution of space systems. We met with Aerospace Corporation 
officials to discuss some of their reports and findings and the status 
of their ongoing efforts to address parts quality. We relied on 
previous GAO reports for the implementation status of planned program 
management improvements. 

To identify initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality 
problems, we asked each program what actions were being taken to 
remedy the parts problems. Through these discussions and others held 
with agency officials, we were able to obtain information on working 
groups. We reviewed relevant materials provided to us by officials 
from DOD, the Air Force, MDA, NASA, and the Aerospace Corporation. We 
interviewed program officials at the Air Force, MDA, NASA, and the 
Aerospace Corporation responsible for quality initiatives to discuss 
those initiatives that would pertain to parts quality and discuss the 
implementation status of any efforts. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to May 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Description of DOD Satellite Systems, MDA Systems, and 
NASA Systems[Footnote 47]: 

DOD Satellite Systems: 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and 
tactical warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission 
control segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications 
are acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. 

* Program start: April 1999: 

* Development start: September 2001: 

* Design review: April 2003: 

* First launch: August 2010: 

* Total program cost: $12,919.6 in millions: 

Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIF: 

The Air Force's GPS includes satellites, a ground control system, and 
user equipment. It conveys positioning, navigation, and timing 
information to users worldwide. In 2000, Congress began funding the 
modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF satellites. GPS IIF is a new 
generation of GPS satellites that is intended to deliver all legacy 
signals plus new capabilities, such as a new civil signal and better 
accuracy. 

* Program start: January 1999: 

* Development start: February 2000: 

* Production decision: July 2002: 

* First satellite launch: May 2010: 

* Total program cost as of March 2010: $7,282.1 in millions in fiscal 
year 2010 dollars: 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site 
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity 
and improve availability for small terminals. MUOS will replace the 
Ultra High Frequency Follow-On satellite system currently in operation 
and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS consists of a 
network of satellites and an integrated ground network. 

* Program start: September 2002: 

* Development start: September 2004: 

* Design review: March 2007: 

* On-orbit capability: March 2012: 

* Total program cost: $6,830.2 in millions: 

Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program: 

The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is being developed to 
replace the Defense Support Program and perform a range of missile 
warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace 
awareness missions. SBIRS High consists of four satellites in 
geosynchronous earth orbit plus two replenishment satellites, two 
sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit plus two 
replenishment sensors, and fixed and mobile ground stations. 

* Program start: February 1995: 

* Development start: October 1996: 

* Design review: August 2001: 

* Satellite launch: May 2011: 

* Total program cost: $15,938.5 in millions: 

Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10: 

The Air Force's SBSS Block 10 satellite is intended to provide a 
follow-on capability to the Midcourse Space Experiment/Space Based 
Visible sensor satellite, which ended its mission in July 2008. SBSS 
will consist of a single satellite and associated command, control, 
communications, and ground processing equipment. The SBSS satellite is 
expected to operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to collect 
positional and characterization data on earth-orbiting objects of 
potential interest to national security. 

* Program start: February 2002: 

* Development start: September 2003: 

* Design review: November 2006: 

* Satellite launch: September 2010: 

* Total program cost as of March 2010: $873.2 in millions in fiscal 
year 2010 dollars: 

MDA Systems: 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): 

MDA's Aegis BMD is a sea-based missile defense system being developed 
in incremental, capability-based blocks to defend against ballistic 
missiles of all ranges. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 
radar, Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles, and command and control 
systems. It will also be used as a forward-deployed sensor for 
surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles. The SM-3 missile has 
multiple versions in development or production: Blocks IA, IB, and IIA. 

* Program start: October 1995: 

* Transition to MDA: January 2002: 

* Design review: May 2009: 

* Total program cost as of March 2010: $9,232.5 in millions in fiscal 
year 2010 dollars: 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

MDA's GMD is being fielded to defend against limited long-range 
ballistic missile attacks during their midcourse phase. GMD consists 
of an interceptor with a three-stage booster and exoatmospheric kill 
vehicle, and a fire control system that formulates battle plans and 
directs components integrated with Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BDMS) radars. We assessed the maturity of all GMD critical 
technologies, as well as the design of the Capability Enhanced II (CE- 
II) configuration of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which 
began emplacements in fiscal year 2009. 

* Program start: February 1996: 

* Design review: May 2006: 

* Total program cost as of March 2010: $33,129.7 in millions in fiscal 
year 2010 dollars: 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

MDA's STSS is designed to acquire and track threat ballistic missiles 
in all stages of flight. The agency obtained the two demonstrator 
satellites in 2002 from the Air Force SBIRS Low program that halted in 
1999. MDA refurbished and launched the two STSS demonstrations 
satellites on September 25, 2009. Over the next 2 years, the two 
satellites will take part in a series of tests to demonstrate their 
functionality and interoperability with the BMDS. 

* Program start: 2002: 

* Demonstration satellite launches: September 2009: 

* Total program cost: Not available: 

Targets and Countermeasures: 

The Targets and Countermeasures program provides ballistic missiles to 
serve as targets in the MDA flight test program. The targets program 
involves multiple acquisitions--including a variety of existing and 
new missiles and countermeasures. 

* Program start: Multiple: 

* Design review: Not applicable: 

* Total program cost: Not applicable: 

NASA Systems: 

Aquarius: 

Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA and the Space Agency 
of Argentina (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales) to 
investigate the links between the global water cycle, ocean 
circulation, and the climate. It will measure global sea surface 
salinity. The Aquarius science goals are to observe and model the 
processes that relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the 
global cycling of water and to understand how these variations 
influence the general ocean circulation. By measuring salinity 
globally for 3 years, Aquarius will provide a new view of the ocean's 
role in climate. 

* Formulation start: December 2003: 

* Design review: September 2006: 

* Satellite launch: June 2011: 

* Total project cost: $279.0 in millions: 

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission: 

The GPM mission, a joint NASA and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
project, seeks to improve the scientific understanding of the global 
water cycle and the accuracy of precipitation forecasts. GPM is 
composed of a core spacecraft carrying two main instruments: a dual- 
frequency precipitation radar and a GPM microwave imager. GPM builds 
on the work of the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission and will 
provide an opportunity to calibrate measurements of global 
precipitation. 

* Formulation start: July 2002: 

* Design review: December 2009: 

* Launch core spacecraft: July 2013: 

* Total project cost: $928.9 in millions: 

Glory: 

The Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that will contribute 
to the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The satellite has two 
principal science objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of 
aerosols and black carbon in the Earth's atmosphere and climate 
systems and (2) collect data on solar irradiance. The satellite has 
two main instruments --the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the 
Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM)--as well as two cloud cameras. The TIM 
will allow NASA to have uninterrupted solar irradiance data by 
bridging the gap between NASA's Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment 
and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System. The Glory satellite failed to reach orbit when it was launched 
on March 4, 2011. 

* Formulation Start: September 2005: 

* Design review: July 2006: 

* Launch readiness date: February 2011: 

* Total project cost: $424.1 in millions: 

Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL): 

The GRAIL mission will seek to determine the structure of the lunar 
interior from crust to core, advance our understanding of the thermal 
evolution of the moon, and extend our knowledge gained from the moon 
to other terrestrial-type planets. GRAIL will achieve its science 
objectives by placing twin spacecraft in a low altitude and nearly 
circular polar orbit. The two spacecraft will perform high-precision 
measurements between them. Analysis of changes in the spacecraft-to- 
spacecraft data caused by gravitational differences will provide 
direct and precise measurements of lunar gravity. GRAIL will 
ultimately provide a global, high-accuracy, high-resolution gravity 
map of the moon. 

* Formulation start: December 2007: 

* Design review: November 2009: 

* Launch readiness date: September 2011: 

* Total project cost: $496.2 in millions: 

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): 

The JWST is a large, infrared-optimized space telescope that is 
designed to find the first galaxies that formed in the early universe. 
Its focus will include searching for first light, assembly of 
galaxies, origins of stars and planetary systems, and origins of the 
elements necessary for life. JWST's instruments will be designed to 
work primarily in the infrared range of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
with some capability in the visible range. JWST will have a large 
mirror, 6.5 meters (21.3 feet) in diameter and a sunshield the size of 
a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshade will not fit onto the 
rocket fully open, so both will fold up and open once JWST is in outer 
space. JWST will reside in an orbit about 1.5 million kilometers (1 
million miles) from the Earth. 

* Formulation start: March 1999: 

* Design review: March 2010: 

* Launch readiness date: June 2014: 

* Total project cost: $5,095.4 in millions: 

Juno: 

The Juno mission seeks to improve our understanding of the origin and 
evolution of Jupiter. Juno plans to achieve its scientific objectives 
by using a simple, solar-powered spacecraft to make global maps of the 
gravity, magnetic fields, and atmospheric conditions of Jupiter from a 
unique elliptical orbit. The spacecraft carries precise, highly 
sensitive radiometers, magnetometers, and gravity science systems. 
Juno is slated to make 32 orbits to sample Jupiter's full range of 
latitudes and longitudes. From its polar perspective, Juno is designed 
to combine local and remote sensing observations to explore the polar 
magnetosphere and determine what drives Jupiter's auroras. 

* Formulation start: July 2005: 

* Design review: April 2009: 

* Launch readiness date: August 2011: 

* Total project cost: $1,107.0 in millions: 

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM): 

The LDCM, a partnership between NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey, 
seeks to extend the ability to detect and quantitatively characterize 
changes on the global land surface at a scale where natural and man- 
made causes of change can be detected and differentiated. It is the 
successor mission to Landsat 7. The Landsat data series, begun in 
1972, is the longest continuous record of changes in the Earth's 
surface as seen from space. Landsat data are a resource for people who 
work in agriculture, geology, forestry, regional planning, education, 
mapping, and global change research. 

* Formulation start: October 2003: 

* Design review: May 2010: 

* Launch readiness date: June 2013: 

* Total project cost: $941.6 in millions: 

Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS): 

The MMS is made up of four identically instrumented spacecraft. The 
mission will use the Earth's magnetosphere as a laboratory to study 
the microphysics of magnetic reconnection, energetic particle 
acceleration, and turbulence. Magnetic reconnection is the primary 
process by which energy is transferred from solar wind to Earth's 
magnetosphere and is the physical process determining the size of a 
space weather storm. The spacecrafts will fly in a pyramid formation, 
adjustable over a range of 10 to 400 kilometers, enabling them to 
capture the three-dimensional structure of the reconnection sites they 
encounter. The data from MMS will be used as a basis for predictive 
models of space weather in support of exploration. 

* Formulation start: May 2002: 

* Design review: August 2010: 

* Launch readiness date: March 2015: 

* Total project cost: $1,082.7 in millions: 

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL): 

The MSL is part of the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). The MEP seeks 
to understand whether Mars was, is, or can be a habitable world. To 
answer this question, the MSL project will investigate how geologic, 
climatic, and other processes have worked to shape Mars and its 
environment over time, as well as how they interact today. The MSL 
will continue this systematic exploration by placing a mobile science 
laboratory on the Mars surface to assess a local site as a potential 
habitat for life, past or present. The MSL is considered one of NASA's 
flagship projects and will be the most advanced rover yet sent to 
explore the surface of Mars. 

* Formulation start: November 2003: 

* Design review: June 2007: 

* Launch readiness date: November 2011: 

* Total project cost: $2,476.3 in millions: 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP): 

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
NPP is a joint mission with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration and the U.S. Air Force. The satellite will measure 
ozone, atmospheric and sea surface temperatures, land and ocean 
biological productivity, Earth radiation, and cloud and aerosol 
properties. The NPP mission has two objectives. First, NPP will 
provide a continuation of global weather observations following the 
Earth Observing System missions Terra and Aqua. Second, NPP will 
function as an operational satellite and will provide data until the 
first NPOESS satellite launches. 

* Formulation start: November 1998: 

* Design review: August 2003: 

* Launch readiness date: October 2011: 

* Total project cost: $864.3 in millions: 

Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP): 

The RBSP mission will explore the sun's influence on the Earth and 
near-Earth space by studying the planet's radiation belts at various 
scales of space and time. This insight into the physical dynamics of 
the Earth's radiation belts will provide scientists data with which to 
predict changes in this little understood region of space. 
Understanding the radiation belt environment has practical 
applications in the areas of spacecraft system design, mission 
planning, spacecraft operations, and astronaut safety. The two 
spacecrafts will measure the particles, magnetic and electric fields, 
and waves that fill geospace and provide new knowledge on the dynamics 
and extremes of the radiation belts. 

* Formulation start: September 2006: 

* Design review: December 2009: 

* Launch readiness date: May 2012: 

* Total project cost: $685.9 in millions: 

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) Replenishment: 

The TDRS replenishment system consists of in-orbit communication 
satellites stationed at geosynchronous altitude coupled with two 
ground stations located in New Mexico and Guam. The satellite network 
and ground stations provide mission services for near-Earth user 
satellites and orbiting vehicles. TDRS K and L are the 11th and 12th 
satellites, respectively, to be built for the TDRS replenishment 
system and will contribute to the existing network by providing high 
bandwidth digital voice, video, and mission payload data, as well as 
health and safety data relay services to Earth-orbiting spacecraft, 
such as the International Space Station. 

* Formulation start: January 2007: 

* Design review: February 2010: 

* Launch readiness date for TDRS K: December 2012: 

* Launch readiness date for TDRS L: December 2013: 

* Total project cost: $434.1 in millions: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

June 13, 2011: 

Ms. Cristina Chaplain: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GA0-11-404, "Space And Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic 
Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major 
Programs," dated May 6, 2011 (GAO Code 120864). 

The DoD partially concurs with the draft report's recommendation. The 
rationale for our position is included in the enclosure. I submitted 
separately a list of technical and factual errors for your 
consideration. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point 
of contact for this effort is Mr. David Crim, David.Crim@osd.mil, 703-
697-5385. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated May 6, 2011: 
GAO-11-404 (GAO Code 120864): 

"Space And Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed To 
Correct Parts Quality Problems In Major Programs" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of NASA direct appropriate agency executives to include 
in efforts to implement the new memorandum of understanding for 
increased mission assurance a mechanism for a periodic, government-
wide assessment and reporting of the condition of parts quality 
problems in major space and missile defense programs, including the 
frequency such problems are appearing in major programs, change in 
frequency from previous years, and the effectiveness of corrective 
measures. The GAO further recommends that reports of the periodic 
assessments be made available to the Congress. (See pages 40 through 
41/GAO Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. DoD will work with NASA to determine 
the optimal government-wide assessment and reporting implementation to 
include all quality issues, of which Parts, Materials and Processes 
would be one of the major focus areas. The DoD will propose the period 
of reporting be annual to ensure planned, deliberate, and consistent 
assessments. Subject to the approval of our partner in the memorandum 
of understanding, the DoD has no objections to providing the report to 
Congress, should Congress desire. The DoD will continue to work with
NASA and other US government space community stakeholders through the 
Space Industrial Base Councils working groups to address concerns 
about parts quality. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Headquarters: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

June 3, 2011: 

Reply to Attention of Office of Safety and Mission Assurance: 

Ms. Cristina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates 
the opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) draft report entitled, "Space and Missile Defense 
Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality
Problems in Major Programs." NASA considers parts quality to be a 
vital component of mission success and greatly values the constructive 
information and insights shared by GAO during the course of this 
effort. We further appreciate the extreme professionalism demonstrated 
by your review team and the continued open communications maintained 
between GAO and NASA. 

In the draft report, GAO provides one recommendation to the NASA 
Administrator (see below). In addition to directly responding to the 
GAO recommendation, our office provided clarification on key points 
and corrections of errors in fact at the exit conference on May 18, 
2011. NASA's response to this recommendation immediately follows. 

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA 
direct appropriate agency executives to include in efforts to 
implement the new memorandum of understanding for increased mission 
assurance a mechanism for a periodic, government-wide assessment and 
reporting of the condition of parts quality problems in major space 
and missile defense programs, including the frequency such problems 
are appearing in major programs, changes in frequency from previous 
years, and the effectiveness of corrective measures. We further 
recommend that reports of the periodic assessment be made available to 
the Congress. 

Management's Response: NASA concurs with GAO's recommendation. We 
fully agree that enhanced cross-agency communication, coordination, 
and sharing of parts quality information will help mitigate threats 
posed by defective and nonconforming parts. To this end, NASA will 
engage other U.S. space agencies (Missile Defense Agency, National 
Reconnaissance Office, and Air Force Space Command) to further develop 
and integrate agency mechanisms for reporting, assessing, tracking, 
and trending common parts quality problems, including the institution 
and validation of effective cross-agency solutions. NASA currently 
enjoys a positive collaborative relationship with these agencies 
through a variety of ongoing venues such as the Joint Mission 
Assurance Council, Space Quality Improvement Council, and Mission 
Assurance Summits and will employ these venues for regular open 
discussions concerning parts quality. These forums will be directly 
supported by me, NASA's Chief Engineer, and our executive staff in 
order to provide the strongest advocacy for aggressive, timely, and 
effective resolution of parts quality problems of mutual interest to 
United States space programs. 

NASA looks forward to continued work with the GAO in order to measure 
and improve our performance related to the procurement, installation, 
and deployment of quality parts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. If you 
have any questions or require additional information, please contact 
Kelly Kabiri at (202) 358-0590. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

[Illegible] for: 

Bryan O'Connor: 
Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, David B. Best, Assistant 
Director; Maricela Cherveny; Heather L. Jensen; Angie Nichols-
Friedman; William K. Roberts; Roxanna T. Sun; Robert S. Swierczek; and 
Alyssa B. Weir made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Best Practices Reports: 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 30, 2010. 

Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed 
to Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-294]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 1, 2008. 

Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon 
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 30, 2007. 

Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology 
Transition Processes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883]. Washington, D.C.: September 
14, 2006. 

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers 
Needed to Improve Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-110]. Washington, D.C.: November 
30, 2005. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-57]. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 
2003. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701]. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best 
Practices. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-469T]. 
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 
2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-199]. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2000. 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon 
System Decisions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137]. Washington, D.C.: 
April 26, 2000. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 
Improve Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999. 

Defense Acquisition: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 
Outcomes. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires 
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 24, 1998. 

Space Reports: 

Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading 
Capabilities Persist. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-636]. Washington, D.C.: September 
15, 2010. 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to 
Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate 
Data. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558]. Washington, 
D.C.: May 27, 2010. 

Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities, but 
Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-447T]. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 
2010. 

Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face Substantial 
Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-648T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2009. 

Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1039]. Washington, D.C.: September 
26, 2008. 

Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to 
Guide Future DOD Space Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-431R]. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 
2008. 

Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use of Best 
Practices. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-730T]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-391]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 31, 2006. 

Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address 
Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-96]. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 
2006. 

Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to Better 
Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-908]. Washington, D.C.: September 
21, 2006. 

Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions 
and Keys to Achieving Them. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-626T]. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 
2006. 

Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment 
Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-891T]. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 
2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD's New Space Systems 
Acquisition Policy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-379R]. Washington, D.C.: January 
29, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisition 
Management Policy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1073]. Washington, D.C.: September 
15, 2003. 

Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on 
Satellite and Related Acquisitions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-825R]. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 
2003. 

Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but 
Further Management Actions Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-379]. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 
2003. 

Missile Defense Reports: 

Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face 
Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. Washington, 
D.C.: December 21, 2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects 
Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-676]. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 30, 2010. 

Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and 
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 16, 2009. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 
Sites. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009. 

Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When 
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 26, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense 
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 13, 2009. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates 
for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. Washington, D.C.: September 
25, 2008. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process for 
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but 
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448]. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces 
Transparency of Program Cost. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-799T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2007. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Within DOD, the Air Force is the Executive Agent for Space and 
through its Space and Missile Systems Center is responsible for 
acquiring most of DOD's space systems, while the Missile Defense 
Agency is responsible for acquiring ballistic missile defense systems, 
and some associated space systems. 

[2] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010); Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to 
Enhance Space Capabilities, but Persistent Challenges Remain in 
Developing Space Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-447T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 
2010); and, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency 
and Accountability, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 
2011). 

[3] James R. Wertz and Wiley J. Larson, Space Mission Analysis and 
Design, El Segundo, Calif.: Microcosm Press, 2003. 

[4] DOD defines major defense acquisition programs as those requiring 
an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and 
evaluation of more than $365 million or for procurement of more than 
$2.190 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. DOD Instruction 
5000.02 (Dec. 2, 2008). The NASA projects selected were those with a 
life cycle cost exceeding $250 million. 

[5] DOD defines CDR as a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure 
that a system can proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test 
and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, schedule, 
risk, and other system constraints. Generally this review assesses the 
system final design as captured in product specifications for each 
configuration item in the system's product baseline, and ensures that 
each configuration item in the product baseline has been captured in 
the detailed design documentation. CDR is normally conducted during 
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase and is intended to 
assess whether the maturity of the design is appropriate to support 
proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and 
test. NASA's definition is similar to DOD's, and CDR typically occurs 
during NASA's implementation phase. See the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook and DOD Instruction 5000.02 (Dec. 2, 2008). NASA's 
definition is similar to DOD's, and CDR typically occurs during NASA's 
implementation phase. See NASA Interim Directive NM 7120-81 (2009). 

[6] Although the Air Force is responsible for acquiring most of DOD's 
space systems, the Navy is acquiring a replacement to its Ultra High 
Frequency Follow-On satellite system called Mobile User Objective 
System. 

[7] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Also, 
see GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010). 

[8] The Aerospace Corporation is a federally funded research and 
development center that provides systems engineering and technical 
services to national security and civil space programs. 

[9] The National Reconnaissance Office develops and operates overhead 
reconnaissance satellite systems and conducts intelligence-related 
activities for U.S. national security. The National Reconnaissance 
Office was excluded from our review because of the sensitive nature of 
its work. 

[10] Specifications and standards evolved from the need to ensure 
proper performance and maintainability of military equipment. The 
proliferation of specifications and standards, numbered in the 
thousands, was believed to impose unnecessary restrictions, increase 
cost to contractors and hence the government, and impede the 
incorporation of the latest technology. Secretary of Defense William 
Perry issued a memorandum in 1994 that prohibited the use of most 
defense standards without a waiver, and many defense standards were 
canceled. 

[11] Thomas Christie, "What Has 35 Years of Acquisition Reform 
Accomplished?" United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 132, 
no. 2 (2006). 

[12] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use 
of Best Practices, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-730T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 
2007). 

[13] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Role of Lead Systems Integrator on 
Future Combat Systems Program Poses Oversight Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-380] (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 
2007). 

[14] In 1992, the NASA Administrator initiated the "faster, better, 
cheaper" philosophy as a way of managing programs and projects. The 
goal was to shorten program development times, reduce cost, and 
increase scientific return by flying more and smaller missions in less 
time. To do this, the NASA Administrator challenged agency personnel 
to do projects faster, better, and cheaper by streamlining practices 
and becoming more efficient. 

[15] GAO, NASA Management Challenges: Human Capital and Other Critical 
Areas Need to be Addressed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-945T] (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 
2002). 

[16] B. Tosney and S. Pavlica, A Successful Strategy for Development 
and Testing (El Segundo, Calif.: Aerospace Corporation, 2003). 

[17] The Aerospace Corporation Mission Assurance Guide defines mission 
assurance as the disciplined application of general systems 
engineering, quality, and management principles toward the goal of 
achieving mission success. Mission assurance uses independent 
technical assessments as a cornerstone throughout the acquisition and 
operations lifecycle. Mission success is defined as the achievement of 
not only specified performance requirements but also the expectations 
of the users and operators in terms of safety, operability, 
suitability, and supportability. In contrast, acquisition success can 
be defined in terms of performance, cost, and schedule. 

[18] These policies alone do not bind the contractors--the contracts 
themselves must link or incorporate these policies. 

[19] GAO, Defense Supplier Base: DOD Should Leverage Ongoing 
Initiatives in Developing Its Program to Mitigate Risk of Counterfeit 
Parts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-389] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2010). 

[20] PDREP is an automated information system managed by the Navy to 
track quality, including part deficiencies. JDRS is an automated 
information system that the Naval Air Systems Command developed for 
reporting of part deficiencies for aeronautics. GIDEP is a Web-based 
database that allows government and industry participants to share 
information on deficient parts, including counterfeits. We did not use 
these systems in our review because of the delay associated with 
obtaining current information. We previously reported that a DOD 
military standard required the use of GIDEP, but that the standard was 
canceled during acquisition reform in 1996. We also cited concerns 
related to delayed reporting and liability issues. See GAO-10-389. 

[21] Electrically conductive crystalline structures of tin, or "tin 
whiskers," can grow from surfaces where pure tin is used, potentially 
causing short circuits and posing a serious reliability risk to 
electronic assemblies. According to NASA's Electronic Parts and 
Packaging Program, tin whisker-induced short circuits have resulted in 
on-orbit failure of commercial satellites and have caused failures of 
medical devices and consumer products. Alloys of tin and lead reduce 
the propensity for whisker growth; however, the electronics industry 
is largely moving away from the use of potentially hazardous 
materials, such as lead. 

[22] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009). 

[23] The Glory satellite launched on March 4, 2011, and failed to 
reach orbit because of a problem with the satellite launch vehicle. 

[24] The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint mission with the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Air Force. Three of the 
five NPP contracts for instruments were issued by the Air Force's 
Space and Missile Systems Center and managed jointly by the National 
Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellite System Integrated Program 
Office. According to NASA NPP program officials, management of those 
contracts is being transferred to NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. 

[25] We have reported on agencies' use of cost-plus-award-fee 
contracts, finding in some cases that award fees had been paid to 
contractors regardless of acquisition outcomes. GAO, Federal 
Contracting: Guidance on Award Fees Has Led to Better Practices but Is 
Not Consistently Applied, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-630] (Washington, D.C. May 29, 
2009). 

[26] Workmanship is defined as the control of design features, 
materials, and assembly processes to achieve the desired reliability 
for subassembly interconnections, such as those for printed wiring 
assemblies, and the use of inspection techniques and criteria to 
ensure quality, according to NASA's Workmanship Standards Program. 

[27] According to some DOD and industry experts, prime contractors are 
subcontracting more work on the production of weapons systems and 
concentrating instead on systems integration. Based on some estimates, 
60 to 70 percent of work on defense contracts is now done by 
subcontractors. See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Additional Guidance 
Needed to Improve Visibility into the Structure and Management of 
Major Weapon System Subcontracts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-61R] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 
2010). 

[28] GAO, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in 
Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-325] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 
2009). 

[29] Batteries identified were lithium-ion. A traveling wave tube 
amplifier is employed as a microwave power amplifier and can have 
application in both receiver and transmitter systems. 

[30] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 
2007). 

[31] GAO, Additional Cost Transparency and Design Criteria Needed for 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Projects, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-364R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 3, 2011). 

[32] GAO, Space Acquisition: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities, 
but Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-447T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 10, 2010). 

[33] Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and 
Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the 
Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of 
National Security Space (Alexandria, Va.: July 2008). 

[34] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on 
Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture 
(Washington, D.C.: October 2008). 

[35] Department of Defense, Report of the Commission to Assess United 
States National Security Space Management and Organization 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2001). 

[36] GAO, DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian 
Human Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military 
Personnel and Sourcing Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-475] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 
2003). 

[37] GAO, Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by 
Standardizing the Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 
2010). 

[38] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group, National Security Space Industrial Base Study 2008 Update 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2009). 

[39] GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address 
Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-96] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 
2006). 

[40] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing 
Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research 
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-21] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2010). 

[41] GAO, Briefing on Commercial and Department of Defense Space 
System Requirements and Acquisition Practices, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-315R] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 
2010). 

[42] Department of Commerce, Defense Industrial Base Assessment: 
Counterfeit Electronics (Washington, D.C., January 2010). 

[43] GAO, Defense Supplier Base: DOD Should Leverage Ongoing 
Initiatives in Developing Its Program to Mitigate Risk of Counterfeit 
Parts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-389] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2010). 

[44] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board/Air 
Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of 
National Security Space Programs, (Washington, D.C.: May 2003). 

[45] DOD and MDA define CDR as a multidisciplined technical review to 
ensure that a system can proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and 
test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, 
schedule, risk, and other system constraints. Generally, this review 
assesses the system's final design as captured in product 
specifications for each configuration item in the system's product 
baseline, and ensures that each configuration item in the product 
baseline has been captured in the detailed design documentation. CDR 
is normally conducted during the engineering and manufacturing 
development phase. See the Defense Acquisition Guidebook and DOD 
Instruction 5000.02 (Dec. 2, 2008). NASA's definition is similar to 
DOD's, and CDR typically occurs during NASA's implementation phase. 
See NASA Interim Directive NM 7120-81 (2009). 

[46] Since we started this review, two DOD space satellites and one 
NASA satellite have been completed and launched. The Space Based 
Surveillance System satellite launched on September 25, 2010; the 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite launched on August 14, 
2010; and the Glory satellite launched on March 4, 2011. The Glory 
satellite failed to reach orbit because of a problem with the 
satellite launch vehicle. 

[47] Descriptions of DOD and NASA systems are based on the following 
GAO reports: GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments 
of Selected Weapon Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 
2010); NASA: Assessments of Selected Larger-Scale Projects, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-239SP] (Washington, 
D.C: Mar. 3, 2011); and Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve 
Transparency and Accountability, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 
2011). All program costs are expressed in fiscal year 2011 dollars in 
millions and are current as of March 2011 unless otherwise noted. 

[End of section] 

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