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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2011:
Homeland Defense:
Actions Needed to Improve DOD Planning and Coordination for Maritime
Operations:
GAO-11-661:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-661, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recent events, such as the seaborne terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008
and the pirate attack on the Quest in February 2011, highlight
maritime threats to the United States. The maritime domain presents a
range of potential security threats—-including naval forces of
adversary nations, piracy, and the use of vessels to smuggle people,
drugs, and weapons-—which could harm the United States and its
interests. The Department of Defense (DOD) has also identified
homeland defense as one of its highest priorities. GAO was asked to
determine the extent to which DOD has (1) planned to conduct maritime
homeland defense operations, (2) identified and addressed capability
gaps in maritime homeland defense, and (3) made progress with
interagency partners, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, in addressing
information sharing challenges related to maritime domain awareness.
To conduct this work, GAO examined national and DOD guidance and
interviewed officials from DOD, Joint Staff, combatant commands, the
military services, and others.
What GAO Found:
U.S. Northern Command, as the command responsible for homeland defense
for the continental United States, has undertaken a number of homeland
defense planning efforts, but it does not have a key detailed
supporting plan for responding to maritime threats. Northern Command
requires supporting DOD organizations to develop plans to support its
homeland defense plan. The current, 2008 version of the plan requires
a supporting plan from the commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, who
is designated as the joint force maritime component commander for
Northern Command. Fleet Forces Command has undertaken some planning
efforts, but has not developed a supporting plan. Because the Northern
Command homeland defense plan is a concept plan, which are less
detailed than operation plans, and because the command does not have
naval forces routinely under its operational control, supporting plans
provide critical details on how operations are to be conducted and
allow Northern Command to assess the extent to which subordinate
commands are prepared to support the maritime homeland defense mission.
DOD has identified maritime homeland defense capability gaps and
determined actions necessary to address them, but it has not
adequately assessed the extent to which those actions have been
implemented. One way DOD identifies capability gaps that affect
mission execution is through capabilities-based assessments. A 2008
assessment identified three capability gaps specific to the maritime
homeland defense mission—-such as engaging and defeating maritime
threats—-and eight other gaps that affect a number of missions,
including maritime homeland defense—-such as information management
and sharing. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the
findings and requested relevant DOD organizations to take action to
close identified gaps. However, the responsible organizations did not
provide implementation plans or other documentation of actions taken
or under way to address these gaps. Without documentation on progress
in implementing recommended actions, Northern Command cannot be
assured that it has full and accurate information about the extent to
which other organizations have taken action to close these gaps.
National and DOD documents have identified challenges to the sharing
of maritime domain information, such as international coordination,
policy and processes, technology, legal restrictions, and cultural
barriers. DOD and interagency partners, such as the Coast Guard, have
efforts under way to address many of these challenges. One effort, the
interagency National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is
intended to improve data management by establishing data standards,
providing common terminology, and developing supporting technology. It
is intended to leverage the interagency National Information Exchange
Model, an effort currently under way to establish data standards,
facilitate the accessibility of common data across the maritime
community, and allow stakeholders to focus on configuring the display
of information to best meet their specific missions, whether through
data analysis capabilities or geographic displays.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that Fleet Forces Command develop a plan to support
Northern Command and that responsible DOD organizations provide
Northern Command with implementation plans for the actions identified
by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. DOD partially concurred
and agreed to take actions on each recommendation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-661] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagonstinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Northern Command Has Undertaken Maritime Homeland Defense Planning but
Faces Increased Uncertainty about Mission Execution:
Northern Command Has Assessed Its Maritime Homeland Defense
Capabilities, but Identified Gaps May Persist Due to Insufficient DOD
Oversight:
DOD Has Made Progress with Interagency Partners in Addressing
Information Sharing Challenges to Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness,
but Challenges Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 23, 2011:
Congressional Requesters:
The United States faces a range of security threats in the maritime
domain, including the naval forces of adversary nations, piracy, and
the use of vessels to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons. Recent
events, such as the seaborne terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008 and
the pirate attack on the Quest in February 2011, highlight the
potential for maritime threats to cause harm to the United States and
its interests. The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified homeland
defense as one of its highest priorities. Maritime homeland defense is
an essential component of DOD's broader homeland defense mission--the
protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and
defense critical infrastructure against external threats. DOD is the
lead agency for the maritime homeland defense effort in defending
against traditional external threats, but this mission involves global
coordination between DOD components and interagency partners,
including the U.S. Coast Guard, across areas where the military is
actively deployed and in the maritime approaches to and territorial
waters of the United States. Maritime domain awareness--the effective
understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that
could affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the
United States--has been identified as a key national security
requirement and a critical enabler for DOD's maritime homeland defense
mission. DOD Directive 2005.02E designated the Secretary of the Navy
as the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness.[Footnote 1]
For the purposes of this report, we focused our analysis of maritime
homeland defense planning on the U.S. Northern Command, because it is
the primary command responsible for that mission for the continental
United States.[Footnote 2] This report supplements prior GAO work on
DOD's homeland defense planning and capabilities. It also supplements
prior GAO work on maritime domain awareness. Some of our prior work
relating to maritime domain awareness focused on the role of the Coast
Guard, which uses maritime domain awareness particularly to protect
U.S. ports and waterways.[Footnote 3] In addition, we previously
examined the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage
its maritime domain awareness efforts and the extent to which a risk-
based approach was used to inform these efforts.[Footnote 4] See
related GAO products listed at the end of this report. In response to
your request, this report addresses (1) the extent to which DOD has
conducted maritime homeland defense planning, (2) the extent to which
DOD has identified and addressed maritime homeland defense capability
gaps, and (3) progress DOD has made with its interagency partners in
addressing information sharing challenges related to maritime domain
awareness.
To determine the extent to which DOD has conducted maritime homeland
defense planning, we documented the status of DOD's relevant planning
efforts and compared this information to DOD strategy and guidance--
such as DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support--as well
as joint doctrine on contingency planning, operational exercises, and
the execution of maritime homeland defense operations. We focused on
the extent to which required planning documents had been developed by
Northern Command and other DOD organizations. We also interviewed or
received written responses to questions from Joint Staff officials and
officials from combatant commands whose areas of responsibility
include United States territorial waters--primarily Northern Command
and U.S. Pacific Command--and relevant supporting commands. Further,
we discussed maritime homeland defense preparedness with
representatives of the Coast Guard. To assess the extent to which DOD
has identified and addressed maritime homeland defense capability
gaps, we reviewed DOD studies of maritime homeland defense
capabilities and actions necessary for closing any identified
capability gaps. We discussed the results of those studies with DOD
staff involved in undertaking them as well as representatives
responsible for addressing the identified capability gaps. To evaluate
DOD's progress in addressing information sharing challenges related to
maritime domain awareness with its interagency partners, we examined
national guidance such as National Security Presidential Directive 41
and the National Strategy for Maritime Security. We also interviewed
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, the
Joint Staff, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer,
the Department of the Navy, U.S. Strategic Command, and the National
Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office.[Footnote 5] Given our
previous work on DOD's management of maritime domain awareness, we
relied on, and updated where available, information on identified
capability gaps in DOD's information sharing and situational awareness
efforts. We also discussed these capability gaps with offices
responsible for addressing them. Appendix I contains additional
details regarding the scope and methodology of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
DOD strategic guidance and joint doctrine documents state that
homeland defense is the department's highest priority.[Footnote 6]
Joint doctrine identifies defense of the maritime domain as an
essential component of the broader homeland defense mission. In
furtherance of this mission, DOD employs a layered defense approach in
which it attempts to mitigate threats across three areas, or layers,
where maritime operations may be conducted.[Footnote 7] The first
layer, referred to as the "forward regions," includes foreign land
areas and sovereign waters outside the homeland. In this layer, the
objective is to mitigate or prevent those threats from reaching the
homeland. The second layer, referred to as the approaches, includes
the waters extending from the limits of the homeland to the forward
regions. The third layer, the homeland itself, includes the United
States, its territories and possessions, and the surrounding
territorial waters. Joint doctrine on homeland defense operations
notes that DOD components maintain a high state of readiness and the
flexible capabilities necessary for responding to threats of varying
scale in the maritime approaches and the maritime homeland domain. In
addition, DOD components must coordinate with interagency partners--
such as the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection--who
also have responsibility for ensuring the protection of the homeland
from threats in the maritime domain. The principal means by which the
U.S. government facilitates interagency coordination in determining
primary and supporting agency responsibilities for maritime
operations, including maritime homeland defense, is contained in the
Maritime Operational Threat Response plan. The Maritime Operational
Threat Response process is generally required to be used as maritime
threats arise and provides a forum in which agency stakeholders can
share information and coordinate an effective response that reflects
the desired national outcome.
Northern Command is the unified military command responsible for
planning, organizing, and executing DOD's homeland defense mission
within the continental United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin
Islands, and U.S. territorial waters. Pacific Command has similar
responsibilities in the Hawaiian Islands and U.S. territories in the
Pacific. Both combatant commands receive support from a variety of
commands and organizations in their direct chain of command and
throughout DOD. Given that the area of responsibility of Northern
Command includes the continental United States and many of its
maritime approaches, this command plays a key role in defending the
homeland by conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the United States. Northern Command
does not have an assigned Navy service component or naval forces
routinely under its operational control, but the commander of U.S.
Fleet Forces Command is a supporting commander and is designated as
the joint force maritime component commander for Northern Command.
[Footnote 8] Further, Northern Command must coordinate response
operations with a number of other DOD and interagency stakeholders--
such as Pacific Command and the Coast Guard.
DOD identifies and develops capabilities needed by combatant
commanders through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System process. This system was established to provide the department
with an integrated, collaborative process to identify and guide
development of new capabilities that address the current and emerging
security environment.[Footnote 9] One method by which this process
starts is with the development of a capabilities-based assessment.
Such an assessment identifies the capabilities required to
successfully execute missions such as the homeland defense mission,
the shortfalls in existing systems to deliver those capabilities, and
the possible solutions for the capability shortfalls. Next, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council--the body responsible for overseeing
the military requirements system--may validate the findings from such
assessments and direct relevant DOD organizations to undertake actions
to close any capability gaps that are identified. After the validation
of the findings from a capabilities-based assessment, the council may
determine that (1) an identified gap presents an acceptable level of
risk to operations and no further action is needed to address it, (2)
the risk presented by a capability gap requires the development of a
nonmateriel solution, such as changes to DOD doctrine; or (3) the risk
presented by a capability gap requires a materiel solution--such as a
new acquisition program.[Footnote 10]
Maritime domain awareness is a critical enabler for maritime homeland
defense. It assists in the identification and analysis of threats and
provides ongoing information during maritime operations. In December
2004, the White House issued maritime security policy in National
Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 13, which directed the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
Security to jointly lead an interagency effort to prepare a National
Strategy for Maritime Security. In 2005 the National Strategy for
Maritime Security provided broad strategic objectives and identified
strategic actions to be taken to enhance maritime domain awareness
efforts. The strategy required DOD and the Departments of Homeland
Security, Justice, and State to lead U.S. efforts to integrate and
align all U.S. maritime security programs into a comprehensive,
cohesive national effort that includes the appropriate state and local
agencies, the private sector, and other nations. The Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation each appointed an
executive agent for maritime domain awareness to assist in
coordinating efforts and informing maritime policy within and among
federal agencies in order to enhance national maritime domain
awareness efforts.
Building on national guidance, DOD policy has established broad roles
and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness efforts within the
department but recognizes, as does national guidance, that enhancing
maritime domain awareness must be a combined effort. DOD established
some roles and responsibilities for departmental maritime domain
awareness efforts in DOD Directive 2005.02E. This directive designates
the Secretary of the Navy as the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime
Domain Awareness and designates the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to oversee the activities of the DOD Executive Agent for
Maritime Domain Awareness. The directive also establishes several
management functions for the Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness to conduct in coordination with relevant partners, such as
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence. Required management functions outlined in
the directive include overseeing the execution of DOD maritime domain
awareness initiatives; developing and distributing goals, objectives,
and desired effects for maritime domain awareness; identifying and
updating maritime domain awareness requirements and resources; and
recommending DOD-wide maritime domain awareness planning and
programming guidance. An additional DOD instruction on maritime domain
awareness from the Secretary of the Navy, in 2009, assigned the Chief
of Naval Operations responsibility for achieving maritime domain
awareness within the Navy. This responsibility includes aligning Navy
guidance with DOD policy guidance and coordinating with the Joint
Staff to ensure that combatant commands have the necessary Navy
resources to support their respective maritime domain awareness
requirements.[Footnote 11]
DOD has made efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness within the
department, but recognizes that no single department, agency, or
entity holds all of the authorities and capabilities necessary to
fully achieve effective maritime domain awareness. For example the
process of allocating sufficient resources to maritime domain
awareness efforts is complicated because the cost associated with
maritime domain awareness efforts is spread across multiple agencies;
this also makes the total cost of maritime domain awareness efforts
difficult to determine. Resources and funding for maritime
capabilities can come from a number of sources, including national
intelligence funding, military intelligence funding, military service
funding, and funding from other interagency partners such as the Coast
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Maritime Administration.
Coordination challenges such as resource allocation among agencies are
common for interagency efforts like maritime domain awareness.
DOD faces challenges unique to the maritime domain as well as
challenges common to interagency coordination efforts in general.
Challenges unique to the maritime domain include the need for
international cooperation to ensure improved transparency in the
registration of vessels and identification of ownership, cargoes, and
crew of the world's multinational, multiflag merchant marine.
Environmental factors unique to the maritime domain also contribute to
maritime domain awareness challenges, such as the vastness of the
oceans, the great length of shorelines, and the size of port areas
that can provide concealment and numerous access points to the land.
Additionally, the fluid nature of crewing and operational activities
of most vessels offers additional opportunities for concealment and
challenges for those attempting to maintain maritime security. In
addition to challenges unique to the maritime domain are the
challenges DOD faces that are common to other interagency coordination
efforts. In 2009 we reported on common interagency coordination
challenges for efforts such as achieving maritime domain awareness
that included agencies not always sharing relevant information and
challenges inherent in managing and integrating information drawn from
multiple sources. As we previously reported, agencies may not always
share information because of concerns about another agency's ability
to protect shared information or to use the information properly;
cultural factors or political concerns; a lack of clear guidelines,
policies, or agreements with other agencies; or security clearance
issues. Challenges posed by managing and integrating information drawn
from multiple sources include managing redundancies in the information
after it is integrated; unclear roles and responsibilities; and data
not being comparable across agencies. We have previously recommended
that agencies involved in interagency collaboration efforts need to
enhance efforts to develop and implement overarching strategies,
create collaborative organizations, develop a well-trained workforce,
and share and integrate national security information across agencies.
[Footnote 12] Agencies generally agreed with our recommendations and,
in some cases, identified planned actions or actions that were under
way to address the recommendations.
In a recent report, we reviewed DOD efforts to enhance maritime domain
awareness and determined that DOD did not have a departmentwide
strategy for maritime domain awareness.[Footnote 13] We concluded that
in the absence of such a comprehensive strategy, DOD may not be
effectively managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. In order
to improve DOD's ability to manage implementation of maritime domain
awareness across DOD, we recommended that DOD develop and implement a
departmentwide strategy for maritime domain awareness that identifies
DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD for achieving
maritime domain awareness and aligns efforts and objectives with DOD's
corporate process for determining requirements and allocating
resources. Additionally, we recommended that the strategy identify
responsibilities for resourcing capability areas and include
performance measures for assessing the progress of the overall
strategy that will assist in the implementation of maritime domain
awareness efforts. An overarching maritime domain awareness strategy
would also enhance interagency collaboration efforts. DOD concurred
with our recommendation for an overarching maritime domain awareness
strategy and has notified us that it is working on producing such a
strategy.
Northern Command Has Undertaken Maritime Homeland Defense Planning but
Faces Increased Uncertainty about Mission Execution:
Northern Command, as the command responsible for homeland defense for
the continental United States, has undertaken a number of homeland
defense planning efforts, but it does not have a key detailed
supporting plan for responding to maritime threats. Northern Command
routinely conducts planning and exercises to prepare for execution of
its maritime homeland defense mission. As part of its planning
efforts, Northern Command requires supporting DOD organizations and
subordinate commands to develop supporting plans to its homeland
defense plan. The current, 2008 version of the Northern Command
homeland defense plan requires such a supporting plan from a number of
supporting commands, including the commander of Fleet Forces Command,
who is Northern Command's supporting commander and also Northern
Command's joint force maritime component commander. Fleet Forces
Command has developed an execute order that contains some elements
that would be addressed in a supporting plan. This execute order also
provides general details about types and numbers of forces that would
be made available to Northern Command to execute the maritime homeland
defense mission. Nonetheless, without a complete supporting plan,
Northern Command faces increased uncertainty about its ability to
execute its maritime homeland defense responsibilities.
Northern Command Conducts Maritime Homeland Defense Planning:
DOD provides guidance for developing contingency plans and
establishing objectives, and identifying capabilities needed to
achieve the objectives in a given environment.[Footnote 14] The
planning process is meant to ensure mission success and to reduce the
risks inherent in military operations. Contingency plans receive
extensive DOD review[Footnote 15] and can take several forms, from
very detailed operation plans to broad and less detailed concept
plans. For example, operation plans are developed for possible
contingencies across the range of military operations. Such plans may
be developed for military operations dictated by a specific foreign
threat or scenario, such as a scenario in which it is necessary to
oppose a landward invasion of the territory of a U.S. ally by a
hostile nation, while concept plans are prepared for less specific
threat scenarios, such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or
peace operations. Operation plans identify the specific forces,
functional support, and resources required to execute the plan. Some
concept plans may similarly provide detailed lists of military forces
that would provide required capabilities; however, not all concept
plans must include such information.
DOD guidance requires Northern Command to develop a homeland defense
plan that prepares it to employ military force in response to
unforeseen events, such as terrorist threats. The specific
contingencies for which Northern Command should plan are directed by
the President and the Secretary of Defense. Northern Command follows
several sets of strategies and guidance when developing homeland
defense plans--such as the National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America, the Unified Command Plan, and Contingency Planning
Guidance. Given that the potential threats to the homeland are broad,
the Northern Command homeland defense plan is a general concept plan--
as opposed to a detailed operation plan developed based on a specific
threat or scenario. The current version of Northern Command's homeland
defense plan, which was approved by DOD in 2008, contains a discussion
of the maritime homeland defense mission area.[Footnote 16] The
current version of the homeland defense concept plan does not contain
detailed lists of military forces that would provide required
capabilities in order to execute the plan.
The Northern Command homeland defense plan requires supporting DOD
organizations and subordinate commands to develop supporting plans to
assist Northern Command in responding to homeland defense events.
These organizations include Northern Command's subordinate commands,
such as Joint Task Force Alaska and Joint Force Headquarters National
Capitol Region; component commands, such as Army Forces North, Air
Forces North, and Marine Forces North; supporting commands, such as
Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Transportation Command; and DOD
agencies, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. The homeland defense plan provides its
subordinate, component, and supporting commands and agencies with
planning guidance, including types of incidents to prepare for and
what kinds of plans to prepare to support Northern Command's homeland
defense plan. Because the Northern Command homeland defense plan is a
concept plan, which are by definition less detailed than operation
plans, and because the command does not have naval forces routinely
under its operational control, these supporting plans provide critical
details on how operations are to be conducted and allow Northern
Command to assess the extent to which these organizations and
subordinate commands are prepared to support the homeland defense
mission. For example, the supporting plan allows the supported
commander to assess the extent to which the supporting command is
prepared to address all appropriate areas of the broader plan.
Supporting plans must adhere to the same joint doctrine standards as
the base plans and should contain objectives, assumptions and
constraints, and sections on such areas as command and control, task
organization, intelligence, and logistics. Further, supporting plans
can help guide subsequent specific actions that can enhance
preparedness--such as the development of execute orders and training
and readiness measures. Collectively, these supporting plans should
help to facilitate preparedness for and adequate response to an
incident in the homeland.
Additional means by which Northern Command and DOD plan for executing
maritime homeland defense operations include the use of standing
execute orders and exercises to test the maritime component of the
Northern Command homeland defense plan. DOD has developed standing
execute orders in the homeland defense area to identify the general
types and numbers of forces necessary to execute missions, including
maritime homeland defense. According to DOD officials, these execute
orders provide the authority for Northern Command to request
allocation of additional forces needed to conduct maritime homeland
defense missions.[Footnote 17] Additionally, Fleet Forces Command
tracks and provides information to Northern Command on the ability of
naval forces to satisfy requirements identified in the specific
execute order.
Exercises play an instrumental role in preparing for maritime homeland
defense operations by providing opportunities to test plans, improve
proficiency, assess capabilities and readiness, and clarify roles and
responsibilities. Short of performance in actual operations, exercises
provide the best means to assess the effectiveness of organizations in
achieving mission preparedness. Exercises also provide an ideal
opportunity to enhance preparedness by collecting, developing,
implementing, and disseminating lessons learned and verifying
corrective actions that have been taken to resolve previously
identified issues. Northern Command established a maritime exercise
branch in 2009, which focuses on exercising maritime homeland defense,
maritime security, and maritime events related to defense support to
civil authorities. Northern Command conducts maritime exercises in
conjunction with other, larger-scale exercises.
Fleet Forces Command Has Not Developed a Supporting Plan:
The 2008 Northern Command homeland defense plan requires a number of
supporting entities--including the commander of Fleet Forces Command
in his role as the joint force maritime component commander--to
develop supporting plans within 60 days of the completion of Northern
Command's 2008 plan. Fleet Forces Command did not provide such a
supporting plan. The command developed a maritime homeland defense
execute order, which in the view of Fleet Forces officials outlines a
robust command and control structure for maritime operations and
enables the execution of the maritime homeland defense mission in
Northern Command's area of responsibility.[Footnote 18] The execute
order addresses some elements that would be included in a supporting
plan, such as reflecting the command relationships and concept of
operations in Northern Command's homeland defense concept plan. The
execute order also identifies the types of naval units that would
respond to a maritime homeland defense threat and provides the
authorities for these forces to be transferred to Northern Command
control when needed. A revision to the Northern Command concept plan
for homeland defense is currently under review and, according to
Northern Command officials, a similar requirement for a supporting
plan from Fleet Forces Command is expected to be included. A complete
supporting plan would provide additional details that are not
generally present in execute orders. For example, according to DOD
planning guidance, execute orders focus specifically on allocating
forces and directing the initiation of military operations--whereas
supporting plans contain information on objectives; assumptions and
constraints; sections on such areas as command and control, task
organization, intelligence, and logistics; and other details requested
and required by the combatant commander. By completing a supporting
plan, Fleet Forces Command would expand on the operations planning
already done for the maritime homeland defense execute order and help
Northern Command further mitigate planning, operations, and command
and control challenges to the maritime homeland defense mission.
Northern Command Has Assessed Its Maritime Homeland Defense
Capabilities, but Identified Gaps May Persist Due to Insufficient DOD
Oversight:
DOD identifies and develops capabilities needed by combatant
commanders through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System process. One method by which this process starts is the
development of a systematic study--referred to as a capabilities-based
assessment--that identifies the capabilities required to successfully
execute a mission, capability gaps and associated operational risks,
and possible solutions for the capability shortfalls. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council--the body responsible for overseeing
the military requirements process--may validate the findings from such
assessments and direct relevant DOD organizations to undertake actions
to close any capability gaps that are identified. At the direction of
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and in response to a request from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs, Northern Command agreed to lead a departmentwide,
capabilities-based assessment for DOD's homeland defense and civil
support missions. The strategic goals of the effort were to enable
improvement in DOD homeland defense and civil support policy, evaluate
existing DOD capabilities and identify DOD capability gaps, improve
DOD's integration with interagency mission partners, and recommend
further action to promote future capability development for the
homeland defense and civil support missions. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense identified this capabilities-based assessment as one of DOD's
top 25 transformational priorities to be completed or advanced to a
major milestone by December 2008 and an important effort for
determining future resource allocation.
DOD conducted the capabilities-based assessment between September 2007
and October 2008, in accordance with DOD processes. DOD agencies, the
combatant commands, the military services, the National Guard Bureau,
the Department of Homeland Security, and other key federal interagency
partners participated in the assessment, which identified 31
capability gaps for DOD's homeland defense and civil support missions.
According to our analysis, the assessment identified three gaps
specific to the maritime homeland defense mission area--such as
engaging and defeating maritime threats--and eight gaps--such as
information management and sharing--in capabilities that enable a
number of missions, including maritime homeland defense. The three
maritime homeland defense capability gaps may affect DOD's ability to
coordinate maritime operations with relevant interagency stakeholders
and respond to the full range of potential threats in the Northern
Command maritime area of responsibility. For example, the assessment
noted that the command lacked a robust understanding of the roles and
responsibilities of its interagency partners, thus limiting the extent
to which it could effectively coordinate interagency operations in
response to maritime threats. Further, the assessment noted that the
command's ability to respond to certain threats without timely warning
might be inadequate.
In 2009, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the
capabilities-based assessment and requested relevant DOD
organizations--including the Navy; the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; DOD's Biometrics Task
Force; and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency--to undertake specific
actions to address the identified capability gaps. Thirteen
recommendations were directed at addressing the three capability gaps
in the maritime homeland defense mission area. For example, Northern
Command, with the support of Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Navy, and
Joint Staff, was to review the reorganization of forces to assign a
permanent naval component to Northern Command. In addition, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, with the support of Strategic Command
and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, was to integrate some
nuclear detection efforts. The council requested that each
organization responsible for undertaking recommended actions provide
an implementation plan to Northern Command--thus facilitating the
efforts of Northern Command and the council to track organizations'
progress in implementing recommendations.
However, the responsible organizations did not provide Northern
Command with implementation plans or other forms of documentation
regarding actions taken or under way. Northern Command officials
informed us that they requested information from these organizations
to assess their progress and stated that Northern Command does not
have the authority to compel those organizations to provide
implementation plans. They noted that in the absence of implementation
plans they relied on self-reported progress updates to document--where
possible--the extent to which responsible organizations had taken the
recommended actions. A Northern Command document used to track
progress in implementing the recommended actions noted that of the 13
recommendations focused on maritime homeland defense, 2 had been
implemented, 6 were in the process of being implemented, 4 had not yet
been addressed, and there was no information available on the progress
of the remaining recommendation. For example, one of the
recommendations that had not yet been addressed related to assessing
Navy and Coast Guard roles and responsibilities to ensure DOD's
ability to respond to the full spectrum of homeland defense threats in
the maritime domain. Without implementation plans or other forms of
documentation on progress in implementing recommended actions,
Northern Command cannot be assured that it has full and accurate
information about the extent to which the responsible organizations
have implemented actions to address maritime homeland defense
capability gaps. Without such documentation, DOD's efforts to
effectively identify and direct necessary resources to meet maritime
homeland defense needs may be further complicated.
DOD Has Made Progress with Interagency Partners in Addressing
Information Sharing Challenges to Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness,
but Challenges Remain:
Because of its dedicated resources and presence in the maritime
domain, DOD plays a key role in leading efforts to enhance maritime
domain awareness and has identified challenges and initiated efforts
to address these challenges in the domain. The 2005 National Plan to
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, a national strategy document,
states in its guiding principles that maritime domain awareness
depends on extensive information sharing among government agencies,
international partners (such as foreign governments and the
International Maritime Organization), and private-sector stakeholders
(such as the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism). Improved
information sharing would enable DOD and its interagency partners,
such as the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the
Maritime Administration, to better leverage existing data that have
already been collected within the federal government, promote a shared
awareness of potential threats, and facilitate a coordinated response
to any identified national security threat. To improve information
sharing, DOD has identified the need to adopt shared data standards
that can translate legacy maritime data sources into a common
information pool, making currently inaccessible data available. One
effort, the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is
focusing on creating a common pool of data and establishing data
standards.
The National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, an effort led by
the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, is intended to
improve data management and integration through establishing data
standards, providing a common maritime language, and developing
supporting technology. This effort is expected to leverage the
existing National Information Exchange Model--an effort under way at
DOD and the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to establish
data standards including some applicable to the maritime domain--and
provide supporting standards and guidance at a more detailed level.
The National Information Exchange Model has defined terms. For
example, it defines "length," as a numeric determination of measure
that is recorded as six digits. The National Maritime Domain Awareness
Architecture is intended to go beyond the National Information
Exchange Model effort by determining which partners will have access
to what information and defining how to query for automated responses--
for example, by naming a port of interest, vessel type, and estimated
time of arrival to attain specific information on what vessels are
arriving at a particular port. Interagency participation in this
effort is robust; the coordination office for Maritime Operational
Threat Response has already agreed to adopt the standards. DOD
officials told us that a number of countries--including France,
England, and Canada--and organizations such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization already are considering adopting the standards
once they are developed. The first version of the standards has been
published and is expected to be tested through summer exercises. As a
result of this effort, access to information is expected to improve,
and the amount of information available to inform analysts and
operational commanders is expected to increase as information becomes
easier to develop and share. One DOD official equated the anticipated
expansion of available, displayable data with that of smart phone
applications: once the infrastructure is in place, smart phone
applications become easy to create and subscribe to. In this analogy,
the infrastructure could potentially be provided through the National
Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture effort. Rather than focusing on
the development of one national common operational picture--presenting
a single, unified display of maritime information--the National
Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture may facilitate the
accessibility of common data across the maritime community and allow
stakeholders to focus on configuring the display of information to
best meet their specific missions, whether through data analysis
capabilities or geographic displays. DOD officials involved in the
National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture believe that if the
effort is successful, maritime domain awareness for the nation and our
partners would be enhanced.
However, challenges would remain. National and DOD documents identify
challenges affecting the sharing of maritime domain information, such
as international coordination, policy and processes, technology, legal
restrictions, and cultural barriers. DOD and interagency partners have
efforts under way to address many of these challenges.
International coordination: A DOD and interagency working group has
noted that the sharing of passenger, crew, and cargo information is
inhibited by a lack of international policy agreements. The existing
information sharing environment, made up of a collection of networks,
limits situational awareness and collaboration among maritime
partners. To address these challenges, DOD is working with other
international partners such as Singapore to improve vessel-tracking
procedures and Micronesia, Malaysia, and Indonesia to improve sharing
of relevant vessel tracking data; DOD is also supporting the Maritime
Safety and Security Information System--a ship-tracking information
sharing capability with over 60 participating nations.
Policies and processes: DOD recognizes that multiple agencies and
organizations have been collecting and storing identical information--
either because agencies have been unaware of others' efforts or
because agencies have been unable to share relevant information with
other organizations in the absence of information sharing standards,
agreements, policies, or processes to facilitate such sharing.
Challenges such as these may be addressed through efforts like the
Joint Integration of Maritime Domain Awareness, a 3-year joint test at
Northern Command. This effort will identify policy and procedural
improvements that could enhance information sharing between Northern
Command and its supporting operational commands and is expected to be
expandable to all combatant commands.
Technology: DOD has identified uncoordinated data and incompatible
technology systems as technological challenges to efforts to enhance
maritime domain awareness. Without data standards, data such as the
date an event occurred can be difficult to communicate, because this
information can be recorded in several different ways depending on
agency and personal preferences. The National Information Exchange
Model is one effort under way to address data standardization. Another
effort, the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is to
establish a technology architecture that will allow currently
incompatible technology systems to communicate and access common data.
Legal restrictions: The National Concept of Operations for Maritime
Domain Awareness notes that there are legal restrictions on the
sharing of public-private information, classified material, protected
critical infrastructure information, and sensitive industry or
government data. There are also privacy concerns that arise regarding
the sharing of information, such as the sharing of certain information
from passenger lists.
Cultural barriers: DOD recognizes that the culture of overprotecting
information impedes the transfer and sharing of information in a
lawful manner. For example, some data providers are reluctant to share
detailed information due to concerns that the information will not be
appropriately protected. Building relationships--such as the
colocation of defense, law enforcement, and international partners at
Joint Interagency Task Force-South--and direct, real-time
communication help to alleviate this cultural challenge. The Maritime
Operational Threat Response process is another good example of
overcoming cultural barriers; it provides a venue for direct, real-
time communication among key decision makers during specific maritime
threat events in order to quickly coordinate a national response to a
maritime threat.
While efforts under way may enhance national maritime domain
awareness, DOD recognizes that opportunities for improvement remain.
For example, the Office of the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness noted that DOD lacks the ability to assess progress and
investments in maritime domain awareness as a whole, align maritime
domain awareness initiatives and advancements across DOD components
and with other interagency efforts, and make informed planning and
programming recommendations to align resources to requirements and
priorities. We recommended in a prior report, and DOD agreed, that DOD
should develop and implement a strategy for maritime domain awareness
that establishes objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime
domain awareness and includes performance measures. Such a strategy
would enhance interagency coordination and assist in leveraging and
aligning existing and ongoing information sharing and dissemination
efforts in the maritime domain.
Conclusions:
DOD has recognized defense of the homeland as one of its key
responsibilities. In meeting this responsibility with regard to the
maritime domain--which presents a range of threats--DOD must work with
interagency partners to both improve the awareness of these threats
and effectively coordinate an appropriate response. Northern Command
has a unique role in preparing for and conducting homeland defense
missions and the command has worked to improve its coordination with
its interagency, state, local, and international partners. As Northern
Command's command and control relationships may rely on increased
coordination with these partners and other DOD supporting components,
efforts to improve its preparedness through planning and exercising
with these other organizations and working together to address
identified capability gaps are important to ensure that the command
can effectively deal with maritime threats as they occur. DOD uses its
planning and exercising processes to increase the level of assuredness
that threats can be neutralized should they arise. These processes
allow the department to assess its preparedness to address various
contingencies. Northern Command and its partners inside and outside of
DOD continue to improve planning and preparedness for maritime
homeland defense. With the completion of the joint force maritime
component commander's supporting plan, Northern Command and its
partners can further capitalize on these efforts and better inform
each other and decision makers about their preparedness for this
mission. As DOD and the rest of government face increasing demand and
competition for resources, policymakers will confront difficult
decisions on funding priorities. Planning undertaken by Northern
Command and its supporting commands also informs the department's
resourcing and investment decisions by identifying the types and
numbers of forces, as well as other capabilities, necessary to meet a
variety of threats. DOD's identification of capability gaps affecting
its homeland defense mission, as well as subsequent actions to address
these gaps, helps the department understand its preparedness to
conduct this mission. However, without completed implementation plans,
the department does not have a means of verifying that these actions
have been taken and these gaps have been addressed. The completion of
these implementation plans would provide Northern Command and the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council with the ability to monitor
progress made in addressing these gaps and would serve as an
additional source of information to inform resourcing and investment
decisions and assist DOD in making the best use of resources in a
fiscally constrained environment.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's preparedness to conduct maritime homeland defense
missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following two actions:
* To ensure that Northern Command is sufficiently prepared to conduct
maritime homeland defense operations, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the commander of Fleet Forces Command to develop a
complete supporting plan for the Northern Command homeland defense
plan, currently under review, once it is approved.
* To enable Northern Command to monitor progress toward addressing
maritime homeland defense capability gaps--including the three
specific to maritime homeland defense as well as the others that
affect the mission--identified in the Northern Command homeland
defense and civil support capabilities-based assessment, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct responsible DOD organizations to
provide Northern Command with implementation plans for undertaking the
actions identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our recommendations and discussed actions it is taking--or plans
to take--related to the issues raised by our recommendations.
Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
commander of Fleet Forces Command to develop a complete supporting
plan to the revised Northern Command homeland defense plan as soon as
the revision is approved, DOD indicated that in addition to
participating in the development of the current draft of Northern
Command's homeland defense concept plan, Fleet Forces Command will
prepare a supporting plan in accordance with the requirement. DOD
stated that further direction from the Secretary of Defense to a
service subordinate command was neither appropriate nor required. In
this report we cite the importance of complete supporting plans to
DOD's joint operation planning process. The completion of a supporting
plan from the joint force maritime component commander, as was
requested in the 2008 homeland defense plan and is expected to be
requested again in the new version of the plan, will further aid
Northern Command and DOD in capitalizing on other important prior and
ongoing efforts by Fleet Forces Command and others. If Fleet Forces
Command--as the joint force maritime component commander for Northern
Command--develops a complete homeland defense supporting plan, this
will satisfy the recommendation and we believe this will improve the
department's overall preparedness to conduct maritime homeland defense.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the
responsible department organizations provide Northern Command with
implementation plans for undertaking the actions identified by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. In its comments, DOD stated that
Northern Command will identify actions yet to be completed, ascertain
the utility in completing those actions, and close out recommendations
that may no longer be required. The department also stated that
Northern Command had diligently tracked the implementation of the
identified actions, although implementation plans were not received
from the myriad organizations responsible for these actions. According
to DOD, Northern Command suspended its follow-up on these recommended
actions when a substantial portion of the total recommended actions
had been completed, were on track for completion, or where the
remaining actions were unlikely to result in further progress. The
department indicated that Northern Command would now assess the
utility of completing outstanding actions. In our report, we discuss
the fact that Northern Command did not have implementation plans or
other documentation to assess the extent to which the responsible
organizations have implemented the recommended actions. Given that (1)
these actions were recommended to address identified gaps in the
department's ability to conduct civil support and homeland defense
missions and (2) not taking actions to close these gaps may present
significant operational risks to DOD, we continue to believe assessing
whether the recommended actions related to maritime homeland defense
capability gaps have been fully implemented would be an important step
in minimizing risk to such operations. If--as indicated by DOD's
response--Northern Command assesses the utility of completing actions
identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and fully
assesses progress toward those actions, that would satisfy our
recommendation.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.
The Department of Homeland Security also provided written comments on
the draft in which the department highlighted some of its continuing
efforts to improve the awareness and response to maritime-related
threats in coordination with DOD and other interagency partners. These
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. DOD and the
Department of Homeland Security also provided separate technical
comments, which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other
interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable William McClellan "Mac" Thornberry:
Chairman:
The Honorable James R. Langevin:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
conducted maritime homeland defense planning, we examined DOD's
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support as well as joint
doctrine on contingency planning, operational exercises, and the
execution of maritime homeland defense operations. We also interviewed
officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, North American Aerospace
Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and
the U.S. Coast Guard. Further, we received written responses from U.S.
Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet related to maritime homeland
defense planning efforts in the Pacific Command area of
responsibility. For the purposes of this report, we focused on the
extent to which required maritime homeland defense planning documents
had been developed by Northern Command and other DOD organizations. We
compared these planning documents to joint doctrine and other DOD
planning guidance.
To assess the extent to which DOD has identified and addressed
maritime homeland defense capability gaps, we analyzed maritime
homeland defense-related gaps identified in DOD's Homeland Defense and
Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment and a 2009 DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum on the assessment. We also
interviewed officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, the Joint Staff, and Northern Command to discuss the
maritime homeland defense-related components of the study and the
status of actions taken to address relevant capability gaps.
To evaluate progress DOD has made with its interagency partners in
addressing information sharing challenges related to maritime domain
awareness, we obtained and analyzed relevant national, interagency,
and DOD-level documentation--such as National Security Presidential
Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13, Maritime
Security Policy, National Strategy for Maritime Security, National
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Domain Awareness
Interagency Solutions Analysis Current State Report, and the 2010
assessment of maritime domain awareness plans conducted by the DOD
Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness. Given our previous work
on DOD's management of maritime domain awareness, we relied on, and
updated where available, information on identified capability gaps in
DOD's information sharing and situational awareness efforts. In
addition, we interviewed officials from the following DOD components
and interagency partners to discuss these capability gaps as well as
other issues related to maritime domain awareness information sharing:
* Office of the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness,
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer,
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
* Joint Staff,
* Combatant Commands:
- North American Aerospace Defense Command /U.S. Northern Command,
- U.S. Pacific Command, and:
- U.S. Strategic Command,
* U.S. Department of the Navy,
- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
- Office of the Chief Information Officer,
- U.S. Pacific Fleet, and:
- U.S. Fleet Forces Command,
* U.S. Coast Guard,
- Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination Center, and:
* National Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
These written comments were received from DOD on June 13, 2011.
Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Homeland Defense and American Security Affairs:
2600 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-11661, "Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve DoD
Planning and Coordination for Maritime Operations," dated May 12, 2011
(GAO Code 351538). DoD acknowledges receipt of the Draft report and
partially concurs with the recommendations contained therein. My
response to the recommendations is attached.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul N. Stockton:
Enclosure: As stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated May 12, 2011:
GA0-11-661 (GAO Code 351538):
"Homeland Defense: Actions Needed To Improve DOD Planning And
Coordination For Maritime Operations"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) to develop a
complete supporting plan for the Northern Command homeland defense
plan, currently under review, once it is approved.
DoD Response: Partially concur. USFFC has initiated development of a
supporting plan to complement U.S. Northern Command's homeland defense
planning efforts. Direction from the Secretary of Defense to a Service
subordinate command is neither appropriate nor required.
U.S. Northern Command ("USNORTHCOM") has expended significant planning
effort in preparation to execute its maritime homeland defense
mission, as reflected in the effective version of its homeland defense
concept plan, CONPLAN 3400-08 Revision 01. USFFC currently supports
the execution of USNORTHCOM's homeland defense concept plan through
two standing execute orders ("EXORDS") [Footnote 1] including one
which details how USFFC, as Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander-
North (JFMCC-N), will execute maritime homeland defense operations in
support of USNORTHCOM. A second EXORD directs how Commander, USFFC
will execute U.S. Joint Forces Command's responsibility to support
USNORTHCOM maritime homeland defense requirements. USNORTHCOM has
indicated a willingness to accept these EXORDs in lieu of the
supporting plan on an interim basis pending completion of USFFC's
supporting plan.
USNORTHCOM recently revised CONPLAN 3400-08 Revision 01 and has
developed a more detailed concept of operations for the maritime
homeland defense mission. This revision is currently under review.
Commander, USFFC participated actively and coordinated closely with
USNORTHCOM in developing this more detailed concept plan.
The revision will require the development of a maritime homeland
defense supporting plan. In anticipation, USFFC initiated a parallel
planning effort to develop a JFMCC-N supporting plan.
The USNORTHCOM CONPLAN will direct supporting commands to provide
their supporting plans within 60 days of the issuance of the revised
USNORTHCOM CONPLAN. USFFC has acknowledged this requirement and is
prepared to meet it.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct responsible DoD organizations to provide USNORTHCOM with
implementation plans for undertaking the actions identified by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
DoD Response: Partially concur. USNORTHCOM, as the designated lead for
the Homeland Defense/Civil Support Capabilities Based Assessment
(HD/CS CBA) will identify actions not yet completed, ascertain the
current utility in completing those actions, and close out those
actions it determines are no longer required.
The HD/CS CBA was a fourteen month analytical effort that examined DoD
homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS) missions primarily
focused on the 2014-2016 timeframe. The goals of this effort were to
identify required DoD HD and CS capabilities, determine capability
gaps, and develop recommendations for gap closure actions. At the
direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to conduct a CBA on HD
and CS and in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, the
Commander, USNORTHCOM agreed to lead this CBA.
The HD/CS CBA findings and recommendations, endorsed by the JROC,
identified 30 capability gaps and made 118 recommendations for
corrective actions. The JROC, in a memo dated February 9, 2009,
directed USNORTHCOM to track the implementation of these actions and
further directed identified Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR) to
provide their implementation plans to USNORTHCOM.
USNORTHCOM diligently tracked the implementation of the recommended
actions, albeit without having received implementation plans from each
of the myriad designated OPRs. USNORTHCOM suspended follow-up action
when records indicated that approximately 70% of the recommended
actions were either completed, close to completion, or on track for
completion and that the remaining actions were unlikely to make
further progress. However, the passage of time, along with the
completion of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review may well have
affected these recommendations and may well account for their not
having been completed. As the lead organization for tracking
implementation, USNORTHCOM will assess the utility of completing the
remaining actions from the JROC memo of February 9, 2009.
Footnote:
[1] Joint Publication 1-02 (May 15, 2011) defines an "execute order,"
or "EXORD," as either an order issued by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to
implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations,
or an order to initiate military operations as directed. In the
context in which the term is used above, it refers to an order to
initiate military operations.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, D.C. 20528:
June 15, 2011:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GAO-11-611 "Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to
Improve DOD Planning and Coordination for Maritime Operations"
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work in planning and
conducting its review and issuing this report. The Department is
pleased to note the report recognizes U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and
Border Protection responsibilities for ensuring the protection of the
homeland from threats in the maritime domain.
Although the report does not contain any recommendations specifically
directed at DHS, the Department remains committed to continuing its
work with its interagency partners, such as the Department of Defense,
and relevant stakeholders to both improve the awareness of maritime-
related threats and effectively coordinate responses, as appropriate.
For example, one of the principal ways by which DHS assists in
coordinating the determination of determining primary and supporting
agency responsibilities for maritime operations is via the Global
Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Coordination Center. The
Center, directed by a Coast Guard Senior Executive, executes the
Maritime Operational Threat Response process which provides a forum
for stakeholders to share information and coordinate appropriate
responses to ensure protection of the homeland from threats in the
maritime domain.
Also of note, the Commandant of the Coast Guard is designated the OHS
Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and a Senior
Coast Guard civilian employee serves as the Chair of the National MDA
Coordination Office (NMCO), which facilitate the creation of a
collaborative global, maritime, information sharing environment
through unity of effort across various entities with maritime
interests.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this
draft report. We look forward to working with you on future Homeland
Security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim H. Crumpacker:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum (Assistant
Director), Alisa Beyninson, Christy Bilardo, John Dell'Osso, Gina
Flacco, Brent Helt, Joanne Landesman, Katherine Lenane, Gregory
Marchand, and Kendal Robinson made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,
Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-621]. Washington, D.C.:
June 20, 2011.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency
Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364]. Washington, D.C.:
March 30, 2010.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program,
but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-849]. Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,
but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337]. Washington, D.C.: March 17,
2009.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were
Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672]. Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2008.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]. Washington, D.C.:
April 16, 2008.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-670]. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation have also appointed executive agents for maritime
domain awareness. These three executive agents, along with the
Director of the National Maritime Intelligence Center, constitute the
Executive Steering Committee for interagency maritime domain awareness
efforts.
[2] U.S. Northern Command is colocated with the North American
Aerospace Defense Command. Northern Command has two missions: homeland
defense and civil support. Meanwhile, the North American Aerospace
Defense Command, a joint U.S.-Canada command, has three missions:
aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning.
[3] For example, see GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems
Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be
Reviewed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009); Maritime Security: New Structures
Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing
Requires Further Attention, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-394] (Apr. 15, 2005); and Maritime
Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-868] (July 23, 2004).
[4] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a
Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain
Awareness, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-621]
(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011).
[5] On April 24, 2011, the Office of the DOD Executive Agent for
Maritime Domain Awareness was relocated and merged with the Navy
Maritime Domain Awareness Office. We met with both entities separately
during most of our audit work.
[6] For example, see Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005).
[7] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense
(July 12, 2007).
[8] Hereinafter, we use the term Fleet Forces Command in reference to
the commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command.
[9] The primary objective of this process is to ensure the
capabilities required by the joint warfighter are identified with
their associated operational performance criteria in order to
successfully execute assigned missions.
[10] If materiel solutions are to be pursued, an initial capabilities
document is produced. If only nonmateriel solutions are recommended or
a nonmateriel solution can be implemented independent of proposed
materiel needs, a joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, or facilities Change
Recommendation is produced.
[11] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3052.1, Maritime Domain
Awareness in the Department of the Navy (Jan. 30, 2009).
[12] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-621].
[14] A number of DOD doctrine publications and other guidance govern
the conduct of joint operational planning. For example, see Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Pub. 5-0 (Dec. 26,
2006).
[15] Once a plan is drafted, it is reviewed several times by a number
of DOD stakeholders, primarily from the Joint Planning and Execution
Community, which consists of a broad range of military stakeholders,
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military
services, the combatant commands, and the major DOD agencies. These
stakeholders provide input into all phases of planning, from mission
analysis to the final detailed plan.
[16] The homeland defense plan is currently undergoing another
periodic review. According to Northern Command officials, the draft of
this revised version includes additional information on the maritime
homeland defense mission.
[17] Joint Forces Command is currently designated as the joint force
provider, integrator, and trainer for homeland defense.
[18] An execute order is a directive to implement an approved military
course of action. Only the President and the Secretary of Defense have
the authority to approve and direct the initiation of military
operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the
authority of and at the direction of the President or Secretary of
Defense, may issue an execute order to initiate military operations.
Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate joint force
commanders use an execute order to implement the approved concept of
operations.
[End of section]
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