This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-621 
entitled 'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a 
Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain 
Awareness' which was released on June 20, 2011. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

June 2011: 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: 

DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime 
Domain Awareness: 

GAO-11-621: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-621, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including 
the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and 
piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on 
the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness—-that 
is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient 
awareness to make timely decisions—-a means for facilitating effective 
action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense 
mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has 
developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts 
and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD 
documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness 
officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in 
maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a 
previous, sensitive report. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has identified numerous maritime capability gaps and developed 
documents that articulate a broad strategy for maritime domain 
awareness. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that 
adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps, 
aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to 
guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, and to 
assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps. GAO has 
previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy 
that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing 
those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and 
responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives. DOD and 
its components have developed a number of documents that incorporate 
some of these key elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain 
awareness such as a definition of the problem. However, collectively 
they do not have several key elements a strategy should contain. For 
example, neither DOD’s Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating 
Concept nor the DOD’s Executive Agent Assessment of U.S. Defense 
Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans fully address 
organizational roles and responsibilities and resources, investments, 
performance measures, and risk management. 

Additionally, DOD leverages numerous capabilities to collect, fuse, 
and share maritime information to respond to global maritime 
challenges. DOD components have identified and started prioritizing 
capability gaps; however, DOD does not have a departmentwide risk 
assessment to address high priority capability gaps. DOD combatant 
commands and components prioritize maritime domain awareness 
differently based upon their respective missions and these component-
level views may not provide a full view of the risks associated with 
these gaps at a departmentwide level. Prior GAO work has emphasized 
the importance of using a comprehensive risk assessment process. A 
strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based approach to 
managing maritime domain awareness may provide better information to 
decision makers about the potential implications of policy and 
resourcing decisions both within DOD and across the interagency. In 
the absence of a departmentwide strategy, DOD may not be effectively 
managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. 

This report is a publicly releasable version of a previously issued, 
sensitive report. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with 
objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, 
aligns with DOD’s corporate process, identifies capability resourcing 
responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a 
comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability 
gaps and future investments. DOD agreed with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-621] or key 
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD Identified Numerous Maritime Capability Gaps, but Does Not Have a 
Comprehensive, Departmentwide Strategy to Manage Risk Associated with 
These Capability Gaps and Guide Future Investments: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: The Extent to Which DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint 
Integrating Concept and the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment of the 
U.S. Defense Components Annual MDA Plans 2009 Address GAO's Desirable 
Characteristics for National Strategies: 

Table 2: The Extent to Which DOD Documents Meet GAO Risk Assessment 
and Management Criteria: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Maritime Challenges: 

Figure 2: GAO Risk Management Framework: 

Figure 3: Extent to Which Maritime Domain Awareness Covers Several 
Joint Requirements Capability Integration System Process Functional 
Capabilities Boards: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 20, 2011: 

Congressional Requesters: 

Security threats to the United States from the maritime domain include 
the naval forces of potential adversary nations as well as terrorism 
and piracy. Historical and potential threats include the use of large 
merchant vessels to transport weapons of mass destruction; explosive- 
laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels to smuggle people, drugs, 
weapons, and other contraband. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in 
Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very 
real threats to U.S. interests and persons. The September 2005 
National Strategy for Maritime Security identifies as a key national 
security requirement the understanding of all the activities, events, 
and trends within the maritime domain that could threaten the safety, 
security, economy, or environment of the United States and its people. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness-- 
that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient 
awareness to counter those threats--a means for facilitating effective 
action in the maritime domain. DOD does not consider maritime domain 
awareness to be a distinct mission, but rather an enabler for the 
range of military operations performed in the maritime domain. 
Maritime domain awareness is also a critical supporting pillar for 
DOD's maritime homeland defense mission and for the execution of the 
National Military Strategy of the United States of America.[Footnote 
1] In addition, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called 
for DOD and its interagency partners to more comprehensively monitor 
the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains for potential direct 
threats to the United States. As we have previously reported, the 
federal government is facing serious long-term fiscal challenges, and 
DOD may confront increased competition over the next decade for 
federal discretionary funds.[Footnote 2] In this environment, it will 
be increasingly important for DOD decision makers to evaluate 
competing priorities and alternatives to determine the most cost-
effective solutions for providing needed capabilities, including 
capabilities to enhance maritime domain awareness. 

The federal government has actively sought to enhance maritime 
security and has established entities dedicated to maritime domain 
awareness. DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of Transportation have all appointed executive agents for 
the federal government's maritime domain awareness efforts. No single 
department, agency, or entity holds all of the authorities and 
capabilities necessary to fully achieve effective maritime domain 
awareness, and the cost associated with maritime domain awareness 
efforts is spread across multiple agencies, making the total cost 
difficult to determine. In addition, resources and funding for 
maritime capabilities can come from a number of sources including 
national intelligence funding, military intelligence funding, military 
service funding, and funding from other interagency partners such as 
the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection. Additionally, 
the intelligence community's diverse organizational cultures, funding 
arrangements, requirements processes, and missions that DOD supports 
present a challenge for DOD in prioritizing its intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, including capabilities 
that support maritime domain awareness. 

Combatant commands use maritime domain awareness to support their key 
missions. For example, for U.S. Northern Command and North American 
Aerospace Defense Command, maritime domain awareness is critical for 
meeting the maritime homeland defense and maritime warning missions, 
respectively. For U.S. Pacific Command, maritime domain awareness 
supports overall awareness of its extremely large area of 
responsibility, including location of friendly forces, force 
projection, and theater security. U.S. Southern Command and Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South both use maritime intelligence 
capabilities to aid in locating and tracking highly mobile illicit 
traffickers. 

DOD considers the ability to monitor activity around the globe in 
order to identify unknown threats to be a key aspect of maritime 
domain awareness. The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness refers to this ability as persistent monitoring, which is 
defined as the integrated management of a diverse set of collection 
and processing capabilities, operated to detect and understand the 
activity of interest to expeditiously assess adversary actions, 
predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an adversary, and assess 
results of U.S. and partner actions. DOD relies on both its own and 
national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to 
provide comprehensive intelligence to the joint warfighting forces. 

Our prior work relating to maritime domain awareness focused on the 
role of the U.S. Coast Guard, which uses maritime domain awareness 
particularly to protect U.S. ports and waterways.[Footnote 3] You 
asked us to examine DOD's current and planned maritime domain 
awareness capabilities and maritime homeland defense efforts. This is 
a public version of a sensitive report, issued in November 2010 and 
examines the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy and uses a 
risk-based approach to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts. 
This version omits information on specific DOD intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; capability gaps; and 
operations. As we agreed with your offices, we will address maritime 
homeland defense and report separately in 2011 on those issues. 

To address this objective, we analyzed national and DOD maritime 
domain awareness planning documents; interviewed DOD and partner 
agency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits 
to facilities, such as operations centers and combatant commands 
engaged in maritime domain awareness and homeland defense activities. 
We selected these visits based on interviews with DOD officials and 
reviews of relevant maritime domain awareness policy and strategy 
documents and combatant command documents. To determine the extent to 
which DOD has developed a strategy to guide implementation of maritime 
domain awareness, we assessed information in the Department of Defense 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept and the DOD 
Executive Agent's Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual 
Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 2009 against our prior work on 
desirable characteristics of national strategies. We also assessed the 
documents against information obtained from interviews with combatant 
command, Navy, intelligence agency, and Coast Guard officials. In 
addition, we evaluated DOD efforts to allocate resources, measure 
performance, and monitor progress in addressing maritime domain 
awareness capability gaps. We compared information found in relevant 
DOD and DOD component-level plans and strategies with GAO criteria on 
management best practices. To determine what capabilities DOD 
currently uses to support maritime domain awareness, what gaps still 
exist, and how these gaps are prioritized, we assessed information we 
received in interviews and site visits with combatant command, 
military service, and supporting intelligence agencies' officials. We 
compared this information with capability needs established in 
national guidance such as the National Strategy for Maritime Security 
and the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and DOD 
guidance such as the Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating 
Concept and DOD Directive 2005.02E, which establishes DOD policy for 
maritime domain awareness. We reviewed prior GAO work on risk 
management and compared it to existing DOD maritime domain awareness 
capability documents to determine the extent to which DOD applies a 
risk-based approach to managing capabilities related to maritime 
domain awareness. Appendix I provides additional details regarding the 
scope and methodology of this report. 

We conducted this performance audit primarily from June 2009 through 
November 2010, and coordinated with DOD from January to May 2011 to 
produce this public version of the prior, sensitive report issued in 
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

Background: 

DOD Shares Responsibility for Maritime Domain Awareness with Other 
Interagency Partners: 

Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has emphasized the 
need for a coordinated response to maritime threats. In December 2004, 
the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 41 
(NSPD-41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13), 
Maritime Security Policy, defining maritime domain awareness as the 
effective understanding of anything associated with the global 
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or 
environment of the United States. NSPD-41/HSPD-13 also directed the 
Secretaries of Defense and of Homeland Security to jointly lead an 
interagency effort to prepare a National Strategy for Maritime 
Security to align all federal government maritime security programs 
and initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort 
involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector 
entities.[Footnote 4] 

Interagency coordination for maritime domain awareness is primarily 
exercised within the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee, 
which reports to the National Security Council Deputies Committee. A 
Maritime Domain Awareness Stakeholders Board consists of 
representatives from all departments and the intelligence community 
advises the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee through its 
Executive Steering Committee. DOD, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and the Department of Transportation have all appointed 
executive agents for maritime domain awareness who, together with a 
representative of the intelligence community, constitute the Maritime 
Domain Awareness Stakeholder Board Executive Steering Committee. DOD 
Directive 2005.02E establishes policy and roles and responsibilities 
for maritime domain awareness within DOD. This directive designated 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as Office of the Secretary 
of Defense Principal Staff Assistant to oversee the activities of the 
DOD Executive Agent for maritime domain awareness and designated the 
Secretary of the Navy as the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain 
Awareness. In addition, the directive establishes several management 
functions that the Executive Agent is required to conduct for maritime 
domain awareness, including: 

* Overseeing the execution of maritime domain awareness initiatives 
within DOD and coordinating maritime domain awareness policy with the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); 

* Developing and distributing goals, objectives, and desired effects 
for maritime domain awareness, in coordination with the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Intelligence); 

* Identifying and updating maritime domain awareness requirements and 
resources for the effective performance of DOD missions; and: 

* Recommending DOD-wide maritime domain awareness planning and 
programming guidance to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and 
the Director of Programming, Analysis, and Evaluation (now the Office 
of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation).[Footnote 5] 

The Secretary of the Navy issued an instruction in January 2009 that 
assigned the Chief of Naval Operations with responsibility for 
achieving maritime domain awareness within the Navy. This 
responsibility includes aligning Navy guidance with DOD policy 
guidance and coordinating with the Joint Staff to ensure that 
combatant commands have the necessary Navy resources to support their 
respective maritime domain awareness requirements.[Footnote 6] 

In May 2009, the DOD Executive Agent requested that the Joint Staff 
solicit maritime domain awareness annual plans from the military 
services, combatant commands, and defense intelligence components, as 
required by DOD Directive 2005.02E. In December 2009, the DOD 
Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness completed an assessment 
of DOD components' annual maritime domain awareness plans.[Footnote 7] 
The effort was intended to provide the Executive Agent with a 
"horizontal look" at maritime domain awareness concerns across DOD. 
The Executive Agent used information from the plans to: (1) gather 
program and project priorities, (2) formulate and update overarching 
DOD maritime domain awareness goals and objectives, (3) craft 
programming and planning recommendations, and (4) synchronize and 
align combatant command and component efforts and resources. The DOD 
Executive Agent is currently conducting an assessment of 2010 
component plans.[Footnote 8] 

DOD relies on organizations both within and outside of the department 
to achieve maritime domain awareness. The Office of Naval Intelligence 
is a core element of Global Maritime Intelligence Integration, whose 
goal is complete Maritime Domain Awareness and their primary mission 
is to produce meaningful maritime intelligence. The Office of Naval 
Intelligence produces a Common Operating Picture and Common 
Intelligence Picture, both of which are compiled from multiple sources 
of intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence, together with the 
Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center, compiles and provides 
a list of vessels of interest to DOD and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) components. In addition, the National Maritime 
Intelligence Center, created by the Director of National Intelligence, 
serves as the integration point for maritime information and 
intelligence collection and analysis in support of national policy and 
decision makers, maritime domain awareness objectives, and interagency 
operations at all levels. 

DOD Leverages Numerous Capabilities to Collect, Fuse, and Share 
Maritime Information to Respond to Global Maritime Challenges: 

DOD, combatant commands, and joint task forces leverage numerous 
capabilities to enhance maritime domain awareness, including 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection platforms; 
intelligence fusion and analysis; and information sharing and 
dissemination. These capabilities assist DOD in responding to the 
range of maritime challenges, some of which are identified in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Maritime Challenges: 

[Refer to PDF for image: world map] 

Challenges depicted at specific points on the map: 

Drug Trade; 
Environmental Attack; 
Human Smuggling; 
Illegal Immigration; 
Organized Crime; 
Piracy; 
Terrorism; 
Trade Disruption; 
Weapons Proliferation. 

Source: Department of the Navy. 

[End of figure] 

A range of platforms, such as sensors on naval vessels and aircraft, 
provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection 
capabilities. Once maritime domain awareness related data is 
collected, fusion and analysis capabilities assist DOD combatant 
commands and joint task forces to combine data from a variety of 
sources to provide information that may include location, course, 
destination, cargo, crew, and passengers of a given vessel. In 
addition, DOD uses a number of capabilities to promote the sharing and 
dissemination of maritime domain awareness information. For example, 
the Maritime Safety and Security Information System uses an existing, 
worldwide vessel safety system--the Automatic Information System--to 
produce unclassified, Internet-based, password-protected ship tracking 
system.[Footnote 9] Currently, more than 50 nations participate in the 
Maritime Safety and Security Information System. In addition, DOD is 
working with other international partners to set up more advanced 
networks to share information. 

To validate joint warfighting requirements, including those associated 
with maritime domain awareness, DOD uses its Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System. The primary objective of the 
system is to ensure the capabilities required by the joint warfighter 
are identified with their associated operational performance criteria 
in order to successfully execute assigned missions.[Footnote 10] The 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council oversees this system and 
Functional Capabilities Boards, headed by a general, admiral, or 
government civilian equivalent, support the council by evaluating 
capability needs, recommending enhancements, examining joint 
priorities, and minimizing duplication of effort across the 
department. There are nine Functional Capabilities Boards: Battlespace 
Awareness, Building Partnerships, Command and Control, Force 
Application, Force Support, Logistics, Net Centric, and Protection. 

DOD Identified Numerous Maritime Capability Gaps, but Does Not Have a 
Comprehensive, Departmentwide Strategy to Manage Risk Associated with 
These Capability Gaps and Guide Future Investments: 

DOD has articulated a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness and 
identified numerous maritime capability gaps through various 
documents. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that 
adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps, 
aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to 
guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, measure 
progress, and assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps. 

DOD Strategy Documents Does Not Have Departmentwide Objectives, 
Identify Roles and Responsibilities, and Align with National 
Strategies: 

We previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy 
that lays out goals and objectives, identifies actions for addressing 
those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and 
responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives. 
[Footnote 11] The federal government, DOD, and its components have 
developed a number of documents that incorporate some of these key 
elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain awareness. 
Examples include the following: 

* The National Strategy for Maritime Security broadly identifies 
threats to maritime security and strategic objectives and actions 
needed to achieve maritime security.[Footnote 12] 

* The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is intended 
to guide the execution of the security plans tasked in NSPD-41/HSPD-
13. It supports the National Strategy for Maritime Security by 
outlining broad goals, objectives, threats, and priorities in order to 
coordinate maritime domain awareness efforts at the federal level. 
[Footnote 13] 

* U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command worked with the Joint 
Staff to develop DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating 
Concept to, among other things, provide a common vision for the future 
of maritime domain awareness related operations within DOD, identify 
maritime domain awareness capabilities and tasks and conditions for 
each capability, and inform future capability analyses.[Footnote 14] 

* The DOD's Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness completed an 
annual assessment of maritime domain awareness plans prepared by 
several DOD commands, military services, and defense intelligence 
components.[Footnote 15] The assessment organized the analyzed 
information from the plans into three critical areas where it 
determined that DOD must focus and expand its efforts: increased 
information sharing, enhanced situational awareness, and enhanced data 
on vessels, cargo, and people. 

We found that these documents and others DOD and the Navy have 
developed demonstrate a considerable amount of effort toward defining 
and organizing DOD's maritime domain awareness efforts, but we 
determined that they do not have several key elements that a strategy 
should contain. DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating 
Concept and the Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime 
Domain Awareness Plans are two of the key documents used to guide 
current maritime domain awareness efforts and execute the national 
strategies. DOD's Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness 
reviewed and assessed plans submitted by the combatant commands, the 
military services, and defense intelligence components. Table 1 
summarizes the desirable characteristics of a strategy and compares 
the elements contained in DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint 
Integrating Concept and the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment of the 
U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 2009. 
[Footnote 16] 

Table 1: The Extent to Which DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint 
Integrating Concept and the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment of the 
U.S. Defense Components Annual MDA Plans 2009 Address GAO's Desirable 
Characteristics for National Strategies: 

Desirable characteristic: Problem definition and risk assessment; 
Description: Addresses the particular national problem and threats the 
strategy is directed toward; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially 
addresses--This document discusses risk and defines the problem, but 
does not provide threat, criticality, or vulnerability assessments for 
each capability or task that needs to be addressed; 
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially 
addresses--This document defines the problem, but does not provide an 
analysis of threats to and vulnerabilities of critical assets and 
operations. 

Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology; 
Description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its 
coverage, and the process by which it was developed; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially 
addresses--The document identifies the purpose of the document along 
with the purpose and scope of maritime domain awareness; 
however the purpose and methodology of the strategy are not 
specifically identified; 
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Addresses. 

Desirable characteristic: Organizational roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination; 
Description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what 
their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for 
coordination of efforts; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address; 
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially 
addresses--The assessment generally states who is responsible for 
implementing maritime domain awareness but does not assign specific 
responsibility for the critical areas. 

Desirable characteristic: Integration and implementation; 
Description: Addresses how the strategy relates to other strategies' 
goals, objectives, and activities; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially 
addresses--The document states that capabilities and tasks cited were 
informed by national and interagency documents, but the alignment 
between the Joint Integrating Concept's tasks and national-level gaps 
and tasks is not clearly identified; 
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially 
addresses--The assessment identifies joint concepts, plans, and 
policies each critical area relates to, but does not clearly align 
future goals and objectives with those listed in national strategies 
and plans. 

Desirable characteristic: Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, 
measures of performance, and monitoring of progress; 
Description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps 
to achieve those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and 
measures to gauge results and monitor progress; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially 
addresses--The document lists capabilities and tasks that need to be 
addressed but does not contain mechanisms for monitoring progress; 
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially 
addresses--The document contains goals and objectives, and priorities 
DOD should focus on; 
but does not contain specific performance measures or mechanisms for 
measuring progress. 

Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management; 
Description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and 
types of resources, and where resources and investments should be 
targeted; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address; 
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Does not address. 

Source: GAO analysis of departmentwide maritime domain awareness 
strategy documents. 

Note: Explanations are provided only for why an element partially 
meets GAO criteria for desirable characteristics of strategy 
documents. A document "addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly 
cites all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity 
and details and thus could be improved upon. A document "partially 
addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites some, but not all 
elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of "partially 
addresses" there is a wide variation between a document that addresses 
most of the elements of a characteristic and a document that addresses 
few of the elements of a characteristic. A document "does not address" 
a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any 
elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references are 
either too vague or general. 

[End of table] 

DOD and its components have completed or are developing additional 
efforts that may assist the department in organizing its maritime 
domain awareness efforts. The Department of the Navy developed a 
strategy for maritime domain awareness in response to a congressional 
committee report requirement, and several draft maritime domain 
awareness roadmaps to guide the Navy's implementation of maritime 
domain awareness. Additionally, as of November 2010, the Chief of 
Naval Operation's Information Dominance Office was developing a Navy 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Roadmap that outlines 
the Navy's vision for capabilities needed to fulfill its missions and 
priorities, including maritime domain awareness. Additionally, several 
of the services, combatant commands, and military intelligence 
components submitted maritime domain awareness annual plans to the DOD 
Executive Agent in 2009. As of November 2010, U.S. Pacific Command was 
in the process of drafting a maritime domain awareness concept of 
operations. This concept of operations is intended to provide a common 
understanding of intelligence support to maritime domain awareness 
throughout the combatant command. In June 2010, an interagency working 
group issued the Current State Report, a reference document which 
identifies maritime domain awareness tasks, capabilities gaps, and 
ongoing efforts related to each gap. Finally, in July 2010, the DOD 
Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness developed Maritime 
Domain Awareness Planning and Programming Recommendations, which was 
based, among other things, on the 2009 Annual Maritime Domain 
Awareness Plans submitted by DOD Components to the Executive Agent. 
While these efforts may help the individual components work towards 
more effective maritime domain awareness, developing a departmentwide 
strategy that clearly outlines objectives and roles and 
responsibilities will better position DOD to align more detailed 
objectives with national strategies and coordinate the results of 
ongoing and future efforts across the department. 

National and DOD Strategy Documents Also Do Not Have Provisions for 
Allocating Resources, Measuring Performance, and Monitoring Progress: 

As part of the overall framework for successful strategies, prior GAO 
work has also emphasized the importance of allocating resources, 
measuring performance, and monitoring progress as sound management 
practices critical for decision making and achieving results in 
specified time frames.[Footnote 17] 

While DOD, its interagency partners, and other DOD components have 
identified numerous capability gaps, DOD does not have a risk-based 
approach for assessing its maritime capabilities and gaps. Although 
some interagency-level and DOD component-level documents have 
prioritized maritime domain awareness capability gaps in comparison to 
other maritime gaps, the identified gaps have not been allocated 
resources within DOD. Additionally, DOD does not measure performance 
and monitor progress in implementing maritime domain awareness and 
addressing these gaps. 

We assessed a number of DOD and interagency documents to determine the 
extent to which resource allocation and performance measurement were 
incorporated and found mixed results. Examples include: 

* National Maritime Domain Awareness Interagency Investment Strategy. 
DOD representatives collaborated with interagency stakeholders to 
develop a document that identified critical tasks and recommended lead 
and supporting federal agency stakeholders to coordinate interagency 
activities to address these tasks. However, the Interagency Investment 
Strategy is not what is traditionally considered an investment 
strategy with developed cost estimates or proposed dollar amounts for 
each agency to invest. Instead, it identifies critical capability gaps 
and makes recommendations on areas for interagency efforts. For 
example, it recommended that DOD work with DHS and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence to establish national data standards 
for maritime domain awareness. 

* Interagency Solutions Analysis Current State Report. The Current 
State Report provides the status of maritime domain awareness 
capability gaps, solutions, and tools in use to address those gaps and 
the effectiveness of those solutions to mitigate the gaps. This 
document is an output of the Interagency Solutions Analysis Working 
Group, a group of interagency subject matter experts that are 
comparing current capabilities against scenarios that required, among 
other things, information sharing and other capabilities in the 
maritime domain. The DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain 
Awareness, the Department of the Navy, and the Office of Naval 
Intelligence participated in this process. However, this document does 
not identify resources to address identified gaps. Additionally, this 
document does not provide metrics to assess performance or monitor 
progress in addressing identified gaps. 

* Department of Defense Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating 
Concept. This document identifies required capabilities, associated 
tasks, and the DOD joint capability area for each required capability 
and each associated task.[Footnote 18] However, it does not identify 
how resources should be targeted to address the capabilities and tasks 
nor does it assign specific components within DOD to address each 
capability and task. Additionally, this document does not contain 
milestones for measuring progress in addressing the capability gaps 
and tasks will be measured. 

* Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain 
Awareness Plans 2009. The DOD Executive Agent solicited Maritime 
Domain Awareness Annual Plans from DOD combatant commands, military 
services, and defense intelligence components. The plans outlined each 
component's planned maritime domain awareness capabilities and 
described current gaps. The Executive Agent assessed the plans and 
listed critical areas for expanded focus and efforts. However, several 
DOD components did not submit plans, so the assessment may not include 
departmentwide data. Also, as identified in table 1, this assessment 
does not incorporate several key elements that would help guide DOD's 
implementation of maritime domain awareness including an allocation of 
resources and investments, performance measures, and a mechanism to 
monitor progress. 

* Department of the Navy Initial Capabilities Document for Data Fusion 
and Analysis Functions of Navy Maritime Domain Awareness. This 2009 
Navy document summarized a capabilities-based assessment that 
identified capability shortfalls and recommended approaches to improve 
Navy's overall maritime domain awareness capability. According to some 
DOD officials the Initial Capabilities Document reflects the Navy's 
view, but not necessarily the views of other DOD components and 
interagency stakeholders. For example, many Navy maritime domain 
awareness documents are Navy-centric and it is unclear how they align 
with interagency efforts. Lastly, the Navy Initial Capabilities 
Document does not resource identified gaps. 

These documents articulated broad strategic goals for maritime domain 
awareness and identified several critical capability gaps; however, 
DOD has not allocated resources to these efforts. Additionally, the 
Department of The Navy Initial Capabilities Document, DOD's Maritime 
Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept, and the National Maritime 
Domain Awareness Working Group Interagency Investment Strategy gaps 
were separately approved by DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council, but DOD has not developed a departmentwide capability gap 
assessment for approval by the council. We also previously reported 
that the requirements determination process is more focused on the 
needs of military services than the joint warfighter, and combatant 
commands and defense intelligence agency needs are often not 
incorporated into this process.[Footnote 19] A departmentwide 
strategy, including a capability gap assessment, would assist DOD in 
assessing and prioritizing maritime domain awareness capability gaps 
that have already been identified through various service and 
interagency efforts in order to integrate them into its corporate 
processes--such as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development 
System--for determining requirements and allocating resources. 
[Footnote 20] 

Multiple DOD and Interagency Documents Have Identified Maritime 
Capability Gaps Primarily in the Areas of Collection, Fusion and 
Analysis, and Information Sharing: 

Interagency maritime domain awareness documents identified maritime 
capability gaps and designated DOD as the lead agency to address some 
of these gaps. For example, in October 2005, the National Plan to 
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness identified numerous near-and long- 
term maritime domain awareness priorities relating to maritime 
capabilities, and listed DOD as the lead agency for 22 of these 
priorities. In May 2007, the National Maritime Domain Awareness 
Requirements and Capabilities Working Group developed the National 
Maritime Domain Awareness Study Interagency Investment Strategy, which 
prioritized capability gaps.[Footnote 21] The Interagency Investment 
Strategy listed DOD as the lead or co-lead agency to address a 
majority of the prioritized gaps. The Maritime Domain Awareness 
Steering Executive Steering Committee approved an execution plan for a 
maritime domain awareness Interagency Solutions Analysis which would 
develop a coordinated, interagency approach for addressing previously 
identified gaps. In April 2010, the Interagency Solutions Analysis 
working group decided to focus immediate efforts on closing existing 
gaps related to information about the three areas of people, cargo, 
and vessels for the interagency group to initially address. 

In addition to interagency efforts, DOD and Navy documents have 
identified maritime domain awareness capability gaps related to the 
department's ability to collect, analyze, and share information on 
maritime vessels. For example, DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint 
Integrating Concept identified required capabilities that the joint 
forces will need to address in order to conduct future operations to 
develop and maintain awareness of the maritime domain. In addition, 
DOD is conducting a Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating 
Concept capabilities-based assessment that is considering current and 
programmed capabilities through 2012 in addition to projections of 
future programs. An initial capabilities document for this assessment 
was approved on November 29, 2010. This capabilities-based assessment 
is also intended to validate the Maritime Domain Awareness Joint 
Integrating Concept and provide a baseline of maritime domain 
awareness elements to inform interagency efforts. 

Key themes have emerged through the identification of capability gaps 
in several national, interagency, and department documents that DOD 
may need to address to support maritime domain awareness. DOD 
components have also identified maritime domain awareness capability 
gaps. While initial capability assessments share common themes, there 
has not been a departmentwide prioritization of these capability gaps. 
As DOD components start developing solutions for these gaps and 
allocating resources, the absence of a departmentwide prioritization 
may result in unnecessary duplication of efforts or redundancy in 
addressing shared capability gaps. A departmentwide prioritization, 
determined by a comprehensive, risk-based approach would assist 
decision makers in more effectively allocating resources to the joint 
forces departmentwide and contribute to interagency efforts to 
prioritize maritime capability gaps. 

DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive, Risk-Based Approach to Assessing 
Maritime Domain Awareness Capability Gaps: 

DOD has not assessed the risk associated with its maritime capability 
gaps, in addition to not prioritizing these gaps. As we have 
previously reported, an agency's strategic plan should, among other 
things, address risk-related issues that are central to the agency's 
mission.[Footnote 22] To provide a basis for analyzing these risk 
management strategies, we have developed a framework based on industry 
best practices and other criteria. This framework, shown in figure 2, 
divides risk management into five major phases: (1) setting strategic 
goals and objectives, and determining constraints; (2) assessing 
risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing these risks; (4) 
selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5) implementing the 
alternatives and monitoring the progress made and results achieved. 

Figure 2: GAO Risk Management Framework: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Continuous, interlocking circle: 

strategic goals, objectives, and constraints; 
risk assessment; 
alternatives evaluation; 
management selection; 
implementation and monitoring. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Even though DOD, its interagency partners, and its components have 
made efforts to identify and start prioritizing capability gaps, DOD 
does not have a departmentwide risk assessment to address high 
priority capability gaps. DOD Directive 2005.02E, which establishes 
the department's policy for maritime domain awareness, states that the 
department will determine its resource priorities and awareness levels 
needed to persistently monitor the maritime domain. The 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review states that risk management is central to 
effective decision-making. As shown in table 1, we have previously 
reported that risk assessment and risk management are desirable 
characteristics of national strategies. We have described risk 
assessments as including an analysis of threats to, and 
vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations. The results of 
risk assessments may be used to define and prioritize related resource 
and operational requirements. 

Currently, maritime domain awareness is prioritized through various 
mechanisms across DOD, instead of through a departmentwide approach. 
For example, DOD's combatant commands and components prioritize 
maritime domain awareness differently based upon their respective 
missions. Additionally, when prioritizing capabilities across DOD, 
maritime domain awareness falls into multiple capability areas. For 
example, according to DOD documents and DOD officials, maritime domain 
awareness capabilities are assessed under multiple joint capability 
areas and functional capability boards through the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System process. Figure 3 illustrates this. 

Figure 3: Extent to Which Maritime Domain Awareness Covers Several 
Joint Requirements Capability Integration System Process Functional 
Capabilities Boards: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Maritime Domain Awareness issues: 
* Battle Space Awareness Board; 
* Command and Control Board; 
* Net-Centric Board; 
* Building Partnerships Board. 

Protection Board; 
Logistics Board; 
Force Application Board; 
Force Support Board. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents and interviews with DOD 
officials. 

[End of figure] 

The various interagency and DOD views on capability gaps and 
priorities may not provide a full assessment of the risks associated 
with these gaps at a departmentwide level. Table 2 illustrates that 
current DOD-wide documents do not meet all of GAO's criteria for a 
risk assessment. Prior GAO work has cited that while principles of 
risk management acknowledge that risk generally cannot be eliminated 
altogether, enhancing protection from known or potential threats can 
serve to significantly reduce risk. 

Table 2: The Extent to Which DOD Documents Meet GAO Risk Assessment 
and Management Criteria: 

GAO risk management criteria[A]: Assess threats: identify and evaluate 
potential threats based on factors such as capabilities, intentions 
and past activities; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially 
addresses--Maritime domain threats are identified but not evaluated; 
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Partially 
addresses--This document addresses the mission impact of not 
addressing each critical area but does not provide a specific threat 
assessment. 

GAO risk management criteria[A]: Assess vulnerabilities: identify 
weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and suggest 
options to address these weaknesses; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially 
addresses--The document identifies broad solutions and discusses risk, 
but does not include specific threat and vulnerability assessments. It 
also broadly discusses risk mitigation; 
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Partially 
addresses--The mission impact of not addressing each critical area is 
discussed; 
but threat, vulnerability and criticality assessments are not 
identified. 

GAO risk management criteria[A]: Assess the criticality of assets and 
functions: evaluate and prioritize important assets and functions in 
terms of factors such as mission and target significance; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address; 
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Does not address. 

GAO risk management criteria[A]: Use assessment results to balance 
threats and vulnerabilities, and to prioritize related resource and 
operational requirements; 
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address; 
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Does not address. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents. 

Note: A document "addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites 
all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity and 
details and thus could be improved upon. A document "partially 
addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites some, but not all 
elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of "partially 
addresses" there is a wide variation between a document that addresses 
most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that addresses 
few of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy "does not address" 
a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any 
elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references are 
either too vague or general. 

[A] For more information on these criteria, see GAO-02-160T. 

[End of table] 

Efforts such as The Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating 
Concept and Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Maritime 
Domain Awareness Plans have demonstrated DOD's progress in identifying 
capability gaps related to maritime domain awareness, but have not 
been included in a larger, departmentwide maritime domain awareness 
risk assessment. As a result, DOD may lack the insight needed to 
actively manage the risk associated with identified capability gaps. 

Additionally, because maritime domain awareness is a broad interagency 
effort, DOD may be unable to effectively coordinate with its 
interagency partners in the absence of a clear departmentwide strategy 
for maritime domain awareness. Consolidating these component efforts 
to prioritize capability gaps into a comprehensive departmentwide 
approach to risk management may facilitate developing solutions for 
each gap. A strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based 
approach to managing maritime domain awareness, including a 
departmentwide assessment of the critical capabilities, may also 
provide better information to decision makers about the potential 
implications of policy and resourcing decisions both within DOD and 
across the interagency. 

Conclusions: 

Our prior work has shown that a strategy including goals, roles, and 
responsibilities; resource allocation; and performance measures can 
help ensure that agencies are supporting national and interagency 
objectives. Achieving maritime domain awareness requires cooperation 
across a range of agencies throughout the federal, state, and local 
levels. DOD has a lead role in maritime domain awareness both because 
it serves as a key enabler for its own maritime activities and because 
DOD is positioned to provide so many of the resources which assist 
other agencies in meeting their respective maritime domain awareness 
needs. It is important that DOD components' efforts are consolidated 
together and aligned amongst each other to ensure that departmentwide 
maritime domain awareness needs are met and appropriate contributions 
to the efforts of its interagency partners are made. In the absence of 
a departmentwide strategy for maritime domain awareness, including the 
prioritized allocation of resources to maritime domain awareness, 
measures of performance in meeting the goals and objectives, 
monitoring of progress in addressing capability gaps, and assessing 
risk, DOD may not be effectively managing its maritime domain 
awareness efforts. Efforts on the part of DOD combatant commands, 
military services, the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain 
Awareness, and interagency working groups resulted in the 
identification of several capability gaps, some identified by multiple 
components. The next step in achieving effective departmentwide 
maritime domain awareness would be a departmentwide strategy and risk 
assessment that incorporates these efforts. As DOD and the rest of 
government face increasing demand and competition for resources, 
policymakers will confront difficult decisions on funding priorities. 
Threats to the maritime domain are numerous and include the use of 
large merchant vessels to transport weapons of mass destruction; 
explosive-laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels to smuggle 
people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband. The importance and 
vulnerabilities of the maritime domain require that efforts be made to 
reduce the risk of maritime threats and challenges, such as a 
terrorist attack or acts of piracy. Additionally, a comprehensive, 
risk-based approach would help DOD capitalize on the considerable 
effort it and its components have already devoted to maritime domain 
awareness, make the best use of resources in a fiscally constrained 
environment, and contribute to interagency efforts to address maritime 
threats. A strategic, risk-based approach is particularly important in 
light of emerging threats in the maritime domain and an increased 
strain on government resources. Such a departmentwide approach will 
provide DOD with important tools that can assist in confronting the 
myriad policy and fiscal challenges the department faces. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve DOD's ability to manage the implementation of maritime 
domain awareness across DOD we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD's Executive Agent, to take 
the following two actions: 

* Develop and implement a departmentwide strategy for maritime domain 
awareness that, at a minimum: 

- Identifies DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD 
for achieving maritime domain awareness, and aligns efforts and 
objectives with DOD's corporate process for determining requirements 
and allocating resources; and: 

- Identifies responsibilities for resourcing capability areas and 
includes performance measures for assessing progress of the overall 
strategy that will assist in the implementation of maritime domain 
awareness efforts. 

* In collaboration with other maritime interagency stakeholders, such 
as the Coast Guard and the National Maritime Intelligence Center, 
perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis to include consideration 
of threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities relating to the 
management of maritime domain awareness in order to prioritize and 
address DOD's critical maritime capability gaps and guide future 
investments. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of the prior, sensitive report, DOD 
concurred with our recommendations and discussed actions they are 
taking--or plan to take--to address them. DOD's written comments are 
reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where 
appropriate. 

In concurring with the first recommendation, DOD stated that they have 
completed the initial policy, goals, and objectives for maritime 
domain awareness and promulgated it in a document to all DOD 
components. DOD also stated their intent to identify responsibilities 
for resourcing capability gaps and performance measures for assessing 
progress in achieving maritime domain awareness. DOD identified 
further steps it is taking to establish objectives for maritime domain 
awareness, assign appropriate roles and responsibilities, and conduct 
a second assessment of annual maritime domain awareness plans to 
inform DOD's overall effort to develop a departmentwide strategy. We 
believe these actions will address the intent of our recommendation 
and better enable DOD to address maritime capability gaps. 

DOD also concurred with our second recommendation. DOD stated that it 
will collaborate with the other principal members of the National 
Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office to develop a 
comprehensive, risk-based approach for maritime domain awareness. The 
DOD Executive Agent is also requesting that DOD components include 
risk assessments in their annual maritime domain awareness plans. We 
believe these actions will address the intent of our recommendation 
and help DOD prioritize its maritime capability gaps and guide future 
investment decisions. 

We are distributing this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Navy, and other relevant DOD officials. We are also 
sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees. 
The report is also available on our Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Mac Thornberry: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James R. Langevin: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Committee on Armed 
Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Adam Smith: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

We were initially asked to look at four questions: (1) to what extent 
has the Department of Defense (DOD) developed the capability to 
perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
activities in the maritime domain; (2) to what extent has DOD 
integrated the maritime domain awareness investment strategy into its 
overall ISR capability investment strategy; (3) to what extent does 
DOD have operational plans, planning and coordination structures in 
place to meet maritime domain awareness and maritime homeland defense 
requirements; and (4) what gaps, if any, exist in DOD's ability to 
identify maritime threats, achieve fusion of information sources from 
interagency and international partners, coordinate a response, and 
deploy forces to address identified threats at all relevant distances 
from the United States. We agreed with the requesters to respond to 
this request with two reports. The first report focuses on maritime 
capabilities and the second report will focus on maritime homeland 
defense. However, we considered the homeland defense perspective when 
we determined our site visits so we could gather relevant data on 
maritime homeland defense where possible and feasible to support the 
second report. As a result, we focused the scope of this audit on 
geographic combatant commands that had both a maritime focus and a 
homeland defense mission set. We determined that U.S. Northern 
Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command met this 
criteria, and we conducted site visits to a facilities, such as 
operations centers, engaged in both maritime domain awareness and 
homeland defense that support these combatant commands. 

To determine what capabilities DOD currently uses to support maritime 
domain awareness, what gaps still exist and how these gaps are 
prioritized, we assessed capability needs established in national 
guidance such as the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness and DOD guidance such as the Joint Integrating Concept and 
DOD Directive 2005.02E, which establishes DOD policy for maritime 
domain awareness. We compared this information with current 
capabilities and gaps described by combatant command, military 
service, and supporting intelligence agency's officials during 
interviews and site visits. For example, we visited several combatant 
and joint operation centers to observe what capabilities were used at 
maritime operations centers. In addition, we evaluated DOD's efforts 
to prioritize capability gaps against established DOD acquisition 
processes such as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System. We reviewed prior GAO work on risk management and compared it 
to existing DOD maritime domain awareness capability documents to 
determine the extent to which DOD applies a risk-based approach to 
managing capabilities and identified gaps related to maritime domain 
awareness. 

To determine the extent to which DOD developed a strategy to address 
maritime domain awareness capability gaps, we reviewed prior GAO work 
on strategic planning including GAO's work on assessing specific 
components of national strategies. Given that there is no established 
set of requirements for strategies, we relied on GAO assessments of 
national strategies and the criteria that were applied to assess these 
strategies.[Footnote 23] We identified six desirable characteristics 
that national or departmentwide strategies should contain. We assessed 
these criteria against existing DOD and component-level documents such 
as the Joint Integrating Concept, the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment 
of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 
2009, and the Department of the Navy's Capability Assessment and 
roadmaps to determine the extent to which these documents contain the 
elements of a departmentwide strategy. We specifically focused our 
assessment on the two departmentwide efforts to identify a maritime 
domain awareness strategy, DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint 
Integrating Concept and DOD's Executive Agent for Maritime Domain 
Awareness's Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime 
Domain Awareness Plans 2009. To determine the extent to which DOD has 
allocated resources, measured performance and monitored progress in 
addressing identified capability gaps, we reviewed the same documents 
noted above to see if identified gaps were resourced within DOD, and 
if implementation and monitoring programs were discussed in relation 
to these gaps. We also assessed the information described in these 
documents against information obtained from combatant command, 
military service, and supporting intelligence agency's officials 
during interviews and site visits. 

To evaluate our reporting objectives, we obtained relevant national, 
interagency, and DOD-level documentation and interviewed officials 
from the following DOD components and interagency partners:[Footnote 
24] 

* Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence): 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
and America's Security Affairs: 

* Defense Intelligence Agency: 

* Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center: 

* National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: 

* Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics): 

* Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

* Department of the Navy: 

* Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness: 

* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N3/N5): 

* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Information Dominance 
Division (N2/N6): 

* Office of the Chief Information Officer: 

* Office of Naval Intelligence: 

* Office of Naval Research: 

* U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet: 

* U.S. Navy Third Fleet: 

* Naval Air Systems Command: 

* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command: 

* Combatant Commands:
- Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command:
- Headquarters, U.S. Northern Command:
- Headquarters, North American Aerospace Defense Command:
- Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command:
- Headquarters, Fleet Forces Command: 

* Joint Forces Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance, U.S. Strategic Command: 

* Joint Interagency Task Forces:
- Joint Interagency Task Force-South: 

* The United States Coast Guard:
- Headquarters:
- District Five, Sector Hampton Roads:
- District Eleven, Sector San Diego:
- Intelligence Coordination Center:
- Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (Atlantic Area):
- Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (Pacific Area):
- Joint Harbor Operations Center, Port of San Diego:
- The Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness/National 
Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office: 

* National Maritime Intelligence Center: 

We conducted this performance audit primarily from June 2009 through 
November 2010, and coordinated with DOD from January to May 2011 to 
produce this public version of the prior, sensitive report issued in 
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Intelligence: 
5000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-5000: 

October 14, 2010: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino, 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, [redacted] "Intelligence, 
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance - DoD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based 
Approach to Enhance its Maritime Domain Awareness", dated 11 September 
2010 [redacted]. The Department of Defense acknowledges receipt of the 
DRAFT report and concurs with the recommendations. The Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence response is attached. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John B. Salvatori: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technical Collections and 
Analysis: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated September 11, 2010: 
[Redacted] 

"Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a 
Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance its Maritime Domain 
Awareness" 

Department of Defense Comments to the GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD's Executive Agent, develop 
and implement a department-wide strategy for maritime domain awareness 
that, at a minimum: 

* Identifies DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD 
for achieving maritime domain awareness, and aligns efforts and 
objectives with DOD's corporate process for determining requirements 
and allocating resources; and; 

* Identifies responsibilities for resourcing capability areas and 
includes performance measures for assessing progress of the overall 
strategy that will assist in the implementation of maritime domain 
awareness efforts. 

DoD Response: Concur. On 22 September 2009, the Director of the Office 
of the DoD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness (DoD EA for 
MDA) promulgated to all DoD components the initial Policy. Goals and 
Objectives (PGO) for MDA within DoD. On 29 July 2010, the Under 
Secretary of the Navy signed the initial MDA Planning & Programming 
Recommendations (PPR). Both documents, called for in DoD Directive 
2005.02E, provide the foundation for developing and implementing a 
department-wide strategy for maritime domain awareness. 

The current PGO identifies DoD objectives for achieving maritime 
domain awareness and will he forwarded for signature by the DoD EA for 
MDA and re-issuance by the end of 2010. Also, the Office of the DoD EA 
for MDA has begun work to update and re-issue the PPR by mid-2011 and 
the P00 by the end of 2011. These revised documents will assign roles 
and responsibilities within DoD for achieving maritime domain 
awareness and align efforts and objectives with DOD's corporate 
process for determining requirements and allocating resources. These 
documents will also identify responsibilities for resourcing 
capability areas and include performance measures for assessing 
progress of the overall strategy that will assist in the 
implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts. In the interim, 
the Office of the DoD EA for MDA plans to include an assessment of 
progress made against the current PGO as part of its Semi-Annual 
Report. 

Additionally, by the end of 2010, the Office of the DoD EA for MDA 
will complete its second Assessment of Annual MDA Plans (A2MP) and 
begin the cycle for submission of the 2011 AMPs, The AMP and A2MP 
serve as key tools to inform the PGO, PPR and other documents in 
developing and implementing a department-wide strategy for maritime 
domain awareness. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD's Executive Agent and in 
collaboration with other maritime interagency stakeholders, such as 
the Coast Guard and the National Maritime Intelligence Center, perform 
a comprehensive risk-based analysis to include consideration of 
threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities relating to the management 
of maritime domain awareness in order to prioritize and address DOD's 
critical maritime capability gaps and guide future investments. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Director of the Office of the DoD EA for MDA 
serves as one of the four principal members of the interagency 
National MDA Coordination Office (NMCO) and will present this matter 
for further consideration and development of a collaborative way 
forward with the other NMCO Principals from the Department of 
Transportation, Department of Homeland Security/United States Coast 
Guard and National Maritime Intelligence Center. 

Additionally, within DoD as part of the cycle for collection of the 
2011 Annual MDA Plans (AMP), the Office of the DoD EA for MDA will 
request that DoD Components report on threats, vulnerability and 
criticality as well as provide insight as to how threats and 
vulnerabilities are balanced, The Office of the DoD EA for MDA is also 
working with the National Maritime Intelligence Center to include 
their requirements in the 2011 AMP cycle. Information gathered from the
2011 AMP submissions will serve to enable a comprehensive risk-based 
analysis that will further inform DoD prioritization and investment 
decisions. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum (Assistant 
Director), Alisa Beyninson, Christy Bilardo, Stephen Caldwell, Gina 
Flacco, Brent Helt, Greg Marchand, Timothy Persons, Steven Putansu, 
Amie Steele, and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America (Washington, D.C.: 2004). The National 
Military Strategy is the Joint Chiefs of Staff's document that 
establishes three military objectives: (1) protect the United States 
against external attacks and aggression, (2) prevent conflict and 
surprise attack, and (3) prevail against adversaries. 

[2] GAO, Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but 
Not All Required Items, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-575R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 
2010); The Federal Government's Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: January 2010 
Update, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-468SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2010). 

[3] For example, see GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems 
Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be 
Reviewed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009); Maritime Security: New Structures 
Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing 
Requires Further Attention, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-394] (Apr. 15, 2005); and Maritime 
Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate 
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-868] (July 23, 2004). 

[4] The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Sept. 2005. 

[5] DOD Directive 2005.02E, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the 
Department of Defense (Aug. 27, 2008). 

[6] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3052.1 Maritime Domain Awareness 
in the Department of the Navy (Jan. 30, 2009). 

[7] Department of Defense Executive Agent for Maritime Domain 
Awareness, Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime 
Domain Awareness Plans 2009, (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 31, 2009). 

[8] The DOD Executive Agent completed its assessment of 2010 component 
plans in January 2011, subsequent to the issuance of the original, 
sensitive version of this report. 

[9] Automatic Identification System equipment transmits information 
such as the name of the vessel, its position, speed, course, and 
destination to receivers within range of its broadcast, allowing these 
vessels to be tracked when they are operating in coastal areas, inland 
waterways, and ports. Automatic Identification System requirements 
apply in general to larger commercial vessels, such as those 300 gross 
tons or more, not to smaller vessels, such as most commercial fishing 
boats or recreational boats. 

[10] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3170.01G, 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 1, 2009). 

[11] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004). 

[12] The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Sept. 2005. 

[13] The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, Oct. 2005. 

[14] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Maritime Domain 
Awareness Joint Integrating Concept (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2009). 

[15] The following components were requested to submit maritime domain 
awareness plans to the DOD Executive Agent: the Departments of the 
Navy and Air Force, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 
European Command, U.S Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. 
Southern Command, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Transportation Command, 
U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the 
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency. 

[16] We assessed these two documents against GAO criteria for national 
strategies. The criteria are cited in GAO, Combating Terrorism: 
Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related 
to Terrorism, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). Given the size and complexity of 
DOD, a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness would be similar 
in scope to a national strategy. Of all the documents DOD and its 
components provided GAO, these were the two that were departmentwide 
documents. Other related documents, such as the Department of the 
Navy's roadmaps, strategies, and capability assessments and the 
defense component maritime domain awareness plans are limited to that 
particular component. 

[17] See GAO, Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal 
Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 1999); Performance Plans: Selected Approaches for Verification 
and Validation of Agency Performance Information, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-99-139] (Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999). 

[18] Joint capability areas are collections of like DOD capabilities 
functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy 
development, investment decision making, capability portfolio 
management, and capabilities-based force development and operational 
planning. DOD Functional Capabilities Boards are organized around 
joint capability areas and are responsible for ensuring that the joint 
force is best served through the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System and acquisition process in each assigned functional 
area 

[19] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Has 
Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2008). 

[20] DOD refers to these corporate processes as the Planning 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System. 

[21] This strategy did not include developed cost estimates that 
typically are included in an investment strategy. 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T], for 
discussions on GAO criteria for risk management, see Homeland 
Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-150T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 
2002). 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T]. 

[24] While the audit included visits to some joint DOD and Coast Guard 
operation centers and meetings with Coast Guard officials, we 
primarily focused on DOD entities involved with maritime domain 
awareness and maritime homeland defense. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: