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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
June 2011:
Diplomatic Security:
Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges
to Training Efforts:
GAO-11-460:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-460, a report to the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(Diplomatic Security) protects people, information, and property at
over 400 locations worldwide and has experienced a large growth in its
budget and personnel over the last decade. Diplomatic Security trains
its workforce and others to address a variety of threats, including
crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions,
political violence, and terrorism. To meet its training needs,
Diplomatic Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security
Training Center (DSTC).
GAO was asked to examine (1) how Diplomatic Security ensures the
quality and appropriateness of its training, (2) the extent to which
Diplomatic Security ensures that training requirements are being met,
and (3) any challenges that Diplomatic Security faces in carrying out
its training mission. GAO examined compliance with accreditation
processes; analyzed data and documentation related to the agency’s
training efforts; and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and
five overseas posts.
What GAO Found:
To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic
Security primarily adheres to Federal Law Enforcement Training
Accreditation (FLETA) standards, along with other standards.
Diplomatic Security incorporated FLETA standards into its standard
operating procedures, using a course design framework tailored for
DSTC. To meet standards, DSTC also integrates both formal and informal
feedback from evaluations and other sources to improve its courses.
However, GAO found DSTC’s systems do not have the capability to obtain
feedback for some required training, including distributed learning
efforts (interactive online course content). Without feedback, DSTC is
less able to ensure the effectiveness of these efforts.
Diplomatic Security developed career training paths for its personnel
that identify the training required for selected job positions at
different career levels. It uses various systems to track
participation in its training, but DSTC’s systems do not have the
capability to track whether personnel have completed all required
training. DSTC systems also are not designed to track training
delivered through distributed learning.
Diplomatic Security faces significant challenges to carrying out its
training mission. DSTC must train Diplomatic Security personnel to
perform new missions in Iraq as they take on many of the protective
and security functions previously provided by the U.S. military. DSTC
also faces dramatic increases in high-threat training provided to
State and non-State personnel (see figure below), but State does not
have an action plan and time frames to manage proposed increases.
These expanded training missions constrain DSTC’s ability to meet
training needs. In addition, many of DSTC’s training facilities do not
meet its training needs, a situation that hampers efficient and
effective operations. To meet some of its needs, in 2007, DSTC
developed an Interim Training Facility. In 2009, State allocated funds
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and other acts to
develop a consolidated training facility; State is in the process of
identifying a suitable location.
Figure: Increase in DSTC-Provided High-Threat Training from 2006 to
2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2006;
Number of students: 971
Year: 2007;
Number of students: 1,135
Year: 2008;
Number of students: 1,504
Year: 2009;
Number of students: 1,760
Year: 2010;
Number of students: 2,132
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that State enhance DSTC’s course evaluation and
tracking capabilities. GAO also recommends that State develop an
action plan and time frames to address proposed increases in high-
threat training. State reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with
all of the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-460] or key
components. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4268
or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Diplomatic Security's Training Development Process Generally Adheres
to Standards, but Evaluation Component Has Weaknesses:
Diplomatic Security Generally Ensures That Personnel Follow
Established Career Training Paths, but DSTC's Systems Do Not Have the
Capability to Track All Its Training:
DSTC Faces Significant Challenges to Carrying Out Its Expanded Mission:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Organization of the Diplomatic Security Training Center:
Appendix III: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Process:
Appendix IV: DSTC Accreditation Results:
Appendix V: DSTC Training Framework Example Documents and Reports:
Appendix VI: DSTC Career Training Paths by Diplomatic Security
Position:
Appendix VII: Diplomatic Security Training Facilities:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Diplomatic Security Training Financial Plan by Program,
Fiscal Years 2006-2011:
Table 2: Overview of Diplomatic Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 2011:
Table 3: Foreign Affairs Security Training Center Funding, Fiscal
Years 2009-2012:
Table 4: Findings of FLETA's Assessments of DSTC:
Table 5: Diplomatic Security Training Facility Use:
Figures:
Figure 1: DSTC Training Framework:
Figure 2: FACT--An Example of Course Revisions:
Figure 3: Selected Career Training Paths:
Figure 4: Increase in DSTC-Provided High-Threat Training from 2006 to
2010:
Figure 5: Diplomatic Security Use of Marine Corps Base Quantico Firing
Range:
Figure 6: Disrepair and Crowding at State Annex-7:
Figure 7: Simulated Tape Walls Used in Training:
Figure 8: The Interim Training Facility:
Figure 9: Diplomatic Security Use of Bill Scott Raceway Facilities:
Figure 10: Organization of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's
Training Directorate:
Figure 11: FLETA Process for Obtaining Accreditation:
Abbreviations:
ARSO: Assistant Regional Security Officer:
ATA: Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance:
CAST: Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training:
DSTC: Diplomatic Security Training Center:
FACT: Foreign Affairs Counter Threat:
FAM: Foreign Affairs Manual:
FASTC: Foreign Affairs Security Training Center:
FLETA: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation:
FSI: Foreign Service Institute:
HTT: High Threat Tactical:
ISO: International Organization for Standards:
ITF: Interim Training Facility:
MRAP: Mine-Resistant/Ambush Protection:
MSD: Mobile Security Deployment:
QDDR: Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review:
RSO: Regional Security Officer:
SA: State Annex:
SEO: Security Engineering Officer:
SNOE: Security for Non-traditional Operating Environment:
STS: Security Technical Specialist:
TPS: Office of Training and Performance Standards:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 1, 2011:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(Diplomatic Security) is responsible for the protection of people,
information, and property at over 400 foreign missions and domestic
locations. Since the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa,
the scope and complexity of threats facing Americans abroad and at
home have increased. Diplomatic Security must be prepared to counter
threats such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud,
technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. As we
previously reported, Diplomatic Security has experienced a large
growth in both its budget and personnel to meet these growing threats.
[Footnote 1] Diplomatic Security's responsibilities are expected to
further increase given the planned U.S. troop withdrawal in Iraq.
Diplomatic Security trains its workforce of agents, investigators,
Security Protective Specialists, engineers, technicians, and couriers
not only to provide protection and counter an increasing number of
threats, but also to manage a growing number of security contracts and
contractors. To meet the training needs of its workforce, Diplomatic
Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security Training Center
(DSTC), housed within its Training Directorate. Diplomatic Security
also increasingly provides information technology security awareness
training to non-State personnel and enhanced personal security
training to non-Diplomatic Security personnel being posted to high-
threat posts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, as well as
Sudan, Yemen, and parts of Mexico.
In response to your request, we (1) determined how Diplomatic Security
ensures the quality and appropriateness of its training, (2) examined
the extent to which Diplomatic Security ensures that training
requirements are being met, and (3) assessed any challenges that
Diplomatic Security faces in carrying out its training mission.
To address these objectives, we reviewed past GAO reports on both
Diplomatic Security and training, Office of Personnel Management
guidance, State and other legislative and regulatory guidance and
policy, and education standards and processes of established
educational organizations. We interviewed and corresponded with a key
official from Federal Law Enforcement and Training Accreditation
(FLETA). We also reviewed and analyzed data and documentation related
to Diplomatic Security-provided training efforts, such as standard
operating procedure, planning, performance, course development, course
evaluation, accreditation, and career development documents;
information and data on recent DSTC and other Diplomatic Security-
provided course offerings; and overall funding for training from 2006
to 2011. We interviewed officials and instructors at Diplomatic
Security headquarters, several training facilities, and several
overseas posts, including Diplomatic Security agents in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Pakistan, and the Washington, D.C., field office, and engineers
and technicians in Germany, South Africa, and Florida. We observed
classroom-and exercise-based training at several Diplomatic Security
training facilities and viewed examples of other types of DSTC-
provided learning. We also interviewed officials from several other
State offices, as well as officials from the U.S. General Services
Administration.[Footnote 2]
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to May 2011, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
contains additional details about our scope and methodology.
Background:
The core mission of Diplomatic Security is to provide a safe and
secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Diplomatic
Security is one of several bureaus that report to the Undersecretary
for Management within State and contains several directorates,
including Diplomatic Security's Training Directorate (see appendix II).
To implement U.S. statute,[Footnote 3] the Diplomatic Security
Training Directorate trains or helps train Diplomatic Security's 1,943
law enforcement agents and investigators, 340 technical security
specialist engineers and technicians, 101 couriers, and a growing
number of new Security Protective Specialists, as well as other U.S.
government personnel, and runs several specialized programs designed
to enhance Diplomatic Security's capabilities. In fiscal year 2010,
DSTC conducted 342 sessions of its 61 courses and trained 4,739
students.
The training directorate is headed by a senior Foreign Service Officer
and has three offices, the Offices of Training and Performance
Standards, Mobile Security Deployment (MSD), and Antiterrorism
Assistance, which do the following:
* The Office of Training and Performance Standards' mission is to
train and sustain a security workforce capable of effectively
addressing law enforcement and security challenges to support U.S.
foreign policy in the global threat environment--now and into the
future. The office's mission has grown along with the expanding
mission of Diplomatic Security. The Office of Training and Performance
Standards encompasses DSTC and is often referred to as DSTC. The
office is the primary provider of Diplomatic Security's training, and
its entire mission falls within the scope of this report; its efforts
are the focus of our review. The office also provides personal
security training to Diplomatic Security and non-Diplomatic Security
personnel posted to the high-threat environments, including the 5-week
High Threat Tactical (HTT) course designed for Diplomatic Security
special agents and Security Protective Specialists operating in high-
threat or hazardous environments, the 3-week Security for Non-
traditional Operating Environment (SNOE) course designed for Civilian
Response Corps and Provincial Reconstruction Team personnel operating
in remote areas, and the 1-week Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT)
course designed for all U.S. personnel under Chief of Mission
authority at high-threat posts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.
* The Office of Mobile Security Deployment's mission is to provide
security training and exercises for overseas posts, enhanced security
for overseas posts, and counterassault capability for domestic and
overseas protective security details. The first of these missions--to
provide training to U.S. government personnel and dependents at posts
abroad--falls within the scope of this report.
* The Office of Antiterrorism Assistance's mission is to build the
counterterrorism capacity of friendly governments, enhance bilateral
relationships, and increase respect for human rights. Because of its
exclusive training of non-U.S. government personnel, the Office of
Antiterrorism Assistance falls outside the scope of this report.
[Footnote 4]
Growth in Diplomatic Security Training Budget and Personnel:
Diplomatic Security's training budget grew steadily from fiscal years
2006 to 2010--increasing from approximately $24 million in fiscal year
2006 to nearly $70 million in fiscal year 2010 (see table 1). During
this period, Diplomatic Security's training budget increased from 1.5
percent to 3 percent of the bureau's total budget.
Table 1: Diplomatic Security Training Financial Plan by Program,
Fiscal Years 2006-2011:
Program: Office of the Assistant Director for Training;
2006: $50,000;
2007: $50,000;
2008: $50,000;
2009: $52,000;
2010: $53,000;
2011[A]: $53,000.
Program: DSTC[B];
2006: $12,823,000;
2007: $12,823,000;
2008: $25,030,000;
2009: $34,166,000;
2010: $47,414,000;
2011[A]: $50,000,000.
Program: CAST[C];
2006: $5,325,000;
2007: $5,139,000;
2008: $1,489,000;
2009: 0;
2010: 0;
2011[A]: 0.
Program: Mobile Security Deployment;
2006: $3,261,000;
2007: $3,100,000;
2008: $3,100,000;
2009: $4,156,000;
2010: $5,488,000;
2011[A]: $5,208,000.
Program: Iraq Supplemental training;
2006: $2,450,000;
2007: $1,000,000;
2008: $6,240,000;
2009: $12,564,000;
2010: $16,607,000;
2011[A]: $21,580,000.
Program: Total Diplomatic Security training;
2006: $23,909,000;
2007: $22,112,000;
2008: $35,909,000;
2009: $50,938,000;
2010: $69,562,000;
2011[A]: $76,841,000.
Source: GAO review of data provided by Diplomatic Security.
Notes: Financial plan amounts do not include funds that other agencies
pay for training that their personnel receive at DSTC, such as high-
threat or information awareness and cybersecurity training.
[A] Fiscal year 2011 budget numbers reflect the interim budget.
[B] The DSTC funds are reported to the Office of Personnel Management
as part of State's training budget.
[C] The Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training (CAST) program
was an earlier effort to develop a consolidated training facility that
began in 2003 and was aborted when it was determined that the site
being considered would not fulfill Diplomatic Security's training
needs. The remaining funds were used to expand Diplomatic Security's
use of the Bill Scott Raceway, one of DSTC's leased training
facilities, and develop its Interim Training Facility (ITF).
[End of table]
The Diplomatic Security Training Directorate is responsible for
training Diplomatic Security's over 3,000 direct hires to carry out
various security functions (see table 2). The size of Diplomatic
Security's direct-hire workforce has more than doubled since 1998.
Recently, Diplomatic Security's reliance on contractors has grown to
fill critical needs in high-threat posts. According to DSTC officials,
they also rely on contractors to support course development and serve
as instructors in many of their courses. In addition to training
Diplomatic Security personnel, the Training Directorate also provides
training to non-State personnel supporting embassy security functions
such as the Marine Security Guards and Navy Seabees, as well as to
personnel from other federal agencies through its high-threat training
and information security awareness courses.
Table 2: Overview of Diplomatic Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 2011:
Direct hires[A]:
Position: Special agents;
Number: 1,795;
Description: Special agents are the lead operational employees of
Diplomatic Security. About 40 percent serve as Regional Security
Officers (RSO) and Assistant Regional Security Officers (ARSO)
overseas, managing all post security requirements. About 60 percent
serve domestically, conducting investigations and providing protective
details to foreign dignitaries. Special agents also serve in
headquarters positions that support and manage Diplomatic Security
operations.
Position: ARSO-Investigators;
Number: 75;
Description: ARSO-Investigators are special agents that focus on
investigations into passport and visa fraud at posts with high levels
of fraud. ARSO-Investigators also augment post security as needed.
Position: Criminal Investigators;
Number: 73;
Number:
Description: Diplomatic Security posts civil service Criminal
Investigators at domestic field offices to conduct criminal
investigations--including visa and passport fraud cases.
Position: Security Engineering Officers (SEO);
Number: 207;
Description: Engineers and technicians are responsible for technical
and informational security programs domestically and at overseas
posts. They service and maintain security equipment at overseas posts,
such as cameras, alarms, and screening systems that help to secure
posts, among other responsibilities.
Position: Security Technical Specialists (STS);
Number: 133;
Description: Engineers and technicians are responsible for technical
and informational security programs domestically and at overseas
posts. They service and maintain security equipment at overseas posts,
such as cameras, alarms, and screening systems that help to secure
posts, among other responsibilities.
Position: Couriers;
Number: 101;
Description: Couriers ensure the secure movement of classified U.S.
government materials across international borders.
Position: Security Protective Specialists;
Number: 38;
Description: Security Protective Specialists serve as supervisory
personnel on protective details in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Position: Management support staff;
Number: 600;
Description: Management support staff includes nonagent civil service
employees who provide managerial and administrative services.
Direct hires[A]: Subtotal;
Number: 3,022.
Other U.S. government support staff:
Position: Marine Security Guards;
Number: 1,170;
Marine Security Guards' primary role is to protect classified
information at posts. They also control access to many State
facilities overseas.
Direct hires[A]: Seabees;
Number: 116;
Seabees are active duty Navy construction personnel with skills in
building construction, maintenance, and repair essential to State
facilities and security programs worldwide.
Other U.S. government support staff: Subtotal;
Number: 1,286.
Contract and support staff:
Position: Private security contractors;
Number: 1,377;
Private security contractors provide protective services for
dignitaries in critical threat environments in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Israel.
Position: Diplomatic Security guards and surveillance detection;
Number: 35,150;
Diplomatic Security guards provide perimeter security to post
compounds, as well as residential security. Surveillance detection
teams augment post security by identifying suspicious activity outside
of post compounds.
Position: Support contractors;
Number: 1,680;
Contractor support staff include both personal-service and third-party
contractors at headquarters who provide administrative support.
Position: Uniformed protective officers;
Number: 848;
Officers provide security at domestic facilities, such as State's
headquarters.
Contract and support staff: Subtotal;
Number: 39,055.
Total: 43,363.
Source: GAO review of data provided by Diplomatic Security.
[A] These numbers do not include locally employed staff. Diplomatic
Security was unable to provide a definitive number of all locally
employed staff, but noted there were 488 Foreign Service National-
Investigators that assist with criminal investigations.
[End of table]
Diplomatic Security's Training Development Process Generally Adheres
to Standards, but Evaluation Component Has Weaknesses:
To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic
Security primarily adheres to Federal Law Enforcement Training
Accreditation standards, along with other statutory and State
standards. In 2005, Diplomatic Security incorporated the FLETA
standards into its standard operating procedures, using a course
design framework tailored for the organization. To meet the
combination of FLETA and other standards, DSTC integrates both formal
and informal feedback from evaluations and other sources into its
courses. However, DSTC does not have the systems in place to obtain
feedback from its entire training population.
Diplomatic Security Complies with Multiple Sets of Standards to Ensure
Quality and Appropriateness of Its Training:
Diplomatic Security's training responsibilities are established by a
number of statutory standards and State Department policies. The
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as codified
at section 4802 of title 22 of the United States Code, provided the
security authorities for the Secretary of State.[Footnote 5] The
Secretary of State delegated these security responsibilities,
including law enforcement training, to Diplomatic Security and granted
it authority to establish its own training academy.[Footnote 6]
Diplomatic Security also follows policy guidance and procedures found
in State's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and its Foreign Affairs
Handbooks, which also establish Diplomatic Security's Training
Directorate.[Footnote 7]
Diplomatic Security is accredited by and relies primarily on the
standards of the FLETA process. The FLETA Board was established in
2002 to create and maintain a body of standards to enhance the quality
of law enforcement training and to administer an independent
accreditation process for federal law enforcement agencies.[Footnote
8] The voluntary accreditation process provides assurance that every 3
years, the agency carries out a systematic self-assessment to ensure
the standards established by the law enforcement community are met;
each self-assessment must be verified by FLETA's external peer
reviewers, whose findings are then reviewed by a committee of the
FLETA Board. FLETA standards are designed to describe what must be
accomplished; however, it is up to each agency to determine how it
will meet the standards. Agencies may submit applications to have
their basic agent and instructor development courses accredited, and
if they obtain accreditation for both courses, they can apply for
academy accreditation. In 2010, FLETA revised its standards.[Footnote
9] (For more details on the FLETA process see appendix III.)
Beginning in 2005, DSTC established standard operating procedures in
order to comply with FLETA and other standards. In 2005, Diplomatic
Security began hiring training professionals and created the
Instructional Systems Management division to formalize course
development, instead of relying solely on the knowledge of experienced
personnel and subject matter experts. According to DSTC officials, the
formalized process resulted in greater consistency in how courses are
developed and taught. Diplomatic Security was the first federal agency
to ever receive accreditation through the FLETA process, in 2005, and
was reaccredited in 2008. (For more details on DSTC's accreditation
results see appendix IV.) DSTC is currently undergoing a new cycle of
reaccreditation.[Footnote 10] DSTC officials expressed confidence that
their courses and the academy would be reaccredited.
DSTC Uses a Training Framework to Meet Accreditation Standards and
Training Needs:
To meet accreditation standards and its training needs, DSTC uses an
industry-recognized training framework for course design and
development.[Footnote 11] According to a senior FLETA official, 44
percent of FLETA standards are based on this training framework. The
seven-phased DSTC framework is applied to new courses or course
revisions (see figure 1 and appendix V for examples of the documents
and reports created during the different phases of the framework and
hyperlinked to the figure). Throughout the process and at each phase,
DSTC involves division chiefs, branch chiefs, subject matter experts,
and its instructional staff. At the end of each phase, a report is
produced for a DSTC training advisor to approve, before the process
progresses to the next phase.[Footnote 12] The seven phases are:
* Proposal phase: DSTC staff analyzes the request for development or
revision to a training course and makes recommendations to senior
management on whether to proceed.
* Analysis phase: DSTC staff examines the audience, identifies job
tasks and job performance measures, selects the instructional setting,
and validates cost estimates. A task list is developed to guide
initial course development, which involves subject matter experts in
verifying the job tasks.
* Design phase: DSTC staff determines the training objectives, lists
course prerequisites, identifies needed learning objectives, and
establishes the appropriate performance tests.
* Development phase: DSTC staff develops the appropriate instructional
materials, reviews and selects existing course materials, and develops
the necessary coursework.
* Implementation phase: A pilot course is created and taught by an
approved instructor to a targeted audience. The pilot course is tested
and observed by both subject matter experts and instructional design
staff.
* Evaluation phase: DSTC staff and the students evaluate the
effectiveness of the training. DSTC conducts three types of
evaluations:
1. tier-1 evaluations of the training and the instructors by the
students shortly after taking the course,
2. tier-2 evaluations to check extent of knowledge and skills transfer
to the students during the course, and:
3. tier-3 evaluations of the students' ability to apply the training
on the job 6 to 12 months after training depending on when the skills
are used.
According to DSTC officials, tier-1 and tier-3 evaluations are
generally made up of survey questions with some short answers, while
tier-2 evaluations involve testing students through either a practical
or written exam, or both.
* Revision: Courses go through the revision process at least every 5
years, prompted and guided in part by evaluations and feedback from
students, supervisors, and other stakeholders.
Figure 1: DSTC Training Framework:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Proposal:
Describes the project[A];
plus:
Describes a problem and impact summary[A];
plus:
Identifies resource requirements[A];
plus:
Provides training recommendation[A];
equals: Deliverable: training proposal document[B].
Analysis:
Answers what is the need question[A];
plus:
If training, identifies the target audience and the tasks to be
taught[A];
plus:
How to measure training success[A];
plus:
Instructional settings[A];
equals: Deliverable: analysis phase report[B].
Design:
Choose instructional methods and strategies[A];
plus:
Write learning objectives[A];
plus:
Determine any course/program prerequisites[A];
plus:
Identify training activities and create tests[A];
equals: Deliverable: design phase report[B].
Development:
Develop lesson plans[A];
plus:
Develop instructional elements including training materials[A];
plus:
Develop tests instruments[A];
plus:
Prepare for the pilot offering[A];
equals: Deliverable: development phase report[B].
Implementation:
Resources and instructors are prepared and in place[A];
plus:
Teach the course[A];
plus:
Validate the training[A];
plus:
Collect and summarize class and instructor evaluations[A];
plus:
Prepare pilot course monitoring report and course decision
memorandum[A];
equals: Deliverable: implementation phase report[B].
Evaluation:
Is the course meeting the training requirement?[A]
plus:
Collect and analyze all levels of evaluation data[A];
plus:
Review instructor notes[A];
equals: Deliverable: evaluation phase report[B].
Revision:
Revise course lesson plans and materials[A];
plus:
Assign different instructors[A];
plus:
Revise course prerequisites[A];
plus:
Utilize different training aids, facilities[A].
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data.
[A] Prepared by instructional staff.
[B] TPS training advisor approval.
Click on deliverables for examples of framework documents.
Note: Examples are also shown in appendix V.
[End of figure]
DSTC applies its training framework to all courses, not just the
courses for which it seeks accreditation through the FLETA process. We
previously reported that agencies need to ensure that they have the
flexibility and capability to quickly incorporate changes into
training and development efforts when needed.[Footnote 13] According
to DSTC, its training framework allows for flexibility and supports
frequent evaluation, giving Diplomatic Security the ability to respond
to changes in its mission and its customers' requirements. Moreover,
agency officials noted that because DSTC's training framework model is
well established for developing courses, Mobile Training Teams
[Footnote 14] and Diplomatic Couriers[Footnote 15]---both of which
provide training to meet their own organizational needs outside of
DSTC--use the model as a foundation for tailoring their courses.
DSTC Uses Various Methods of Collecting Feedback:
DSTC uses a variety of methods to collect feedback from students,
supervisors, and other stakeholders. FLETA standards and DSTC's
standard operating procedures require DSTC to collect feedback and use
significant feedback to shape and revise courses. According to DSTC,
feedback is valued because it demonstrates the extent to which the
training is yielding the desired outcomes in performance and helps
instructional staff identify what should be modified to achieve the
outcomes more effectively. DSTC receives feedback from multiple
sources, including tier-1, tier-2, and tier-3 evaluations, as well as
focus groups, in-country visits, inspection reports, counterparts
across the government, and directives from senior officials--such as
ambassadors. For instance, following the 1998 embassy bombings, DSTC
implemented the State-convened Accountability Review Board
recommendation to enhance surveillance detection and crisis management
training provided to the Regional Security Officers.
In addition, DSTC regularly meets with other State offices and bureaus
to discuss how to maintain effective training or identify needed
changes to course material. For example, DSTC meets quarterly with the
Office of International Programs, which is responsible for managing
the RSOs posted overseas, to ensure that the basic Regional Security
Officer course materials remain relevant. HTT provides another example
of course revision. HTT was initially 39 days long but was shortened
to about 27 days in response to senior management's need to get more
people overseas faster, as well as feedback from agents indicating
that they were not extensively using certain aspects of the course
such as land navigation and helicopter training. (See the figure 2
text box concerning revisions to the FACT course for more examples of
how feedback is incorporated into course revisions.) On the basis of
interviews with Diplomatic Security personnel at nine posts and
training sites, we found that DSTC's overall training was viewed as
high-quality and appropriate. Diplomatic Security personnel we
interviewed generally agreed that DSTC's training was a significant
improvement compared with the training they received prior to DSTC's
accreditation.
Figure 2: FACT--An Example of Course Revisions:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph and accompanying
information]
FACT began in 2003 as the Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course-
Iraq. Diplomatic Security envisioned a comprehensive antiterrorism
course that would be taken once every 5 years and would familiarize
participants with the skills and techniques most likely to be needed
by those assigned to high-threat environments. That course was
designed to focus on the threats facing personnel in Iraq. In 2006,
the course was revised to produce the current FACT, which was designed
to address the threats that personnel might face in a number of high-
threat posts. Initially, FACT was required for those assigned under
Chief of Mission authority-—including non-State personnel—-in Iraq.
Personnel assigned to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan were required
to attend FACT beginning in 2008. In 2010, the one post in Yemen and
the six Mexican border posts were added to the list of posts requiring
FACT training. The increase in the number of posts has also led, in
part, to an increase in the number of students taking FACT from 912 in
fiscal year 2006 to 1,794 in fiscal year 2010 (see figure below).
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2006;
Number of students: 971
Year: 2007;
Number of students: 1,135
Year: 2008;
Number of students: 1,504
Year: 2009;
Number of students: 1,760
Year: 2010;
Number of students: 2,132
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data.
Note: The 2006 and 2007 statistics combine the number of students who
took the FACT predecessor courses, the Diplomatic Security
Antiterrorism Course and the Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course-
Iraq, during that same year.
FACT and its predecessor courses have undergone regular content
revisions as the threats have changed. For example, a 2005 State
Office of Inspector General report noted that U.S. government
personnel were not expected to drive themselves in Iraq, but regularly
did so, contrary to expectations. As a result, DSTC added driving skills
to the FACT course. According to DSTC, over a 9-month period in 2009,
23 students reported using counterthreat driving techniques in
Afghanistan. In 2009, as a result of indirect fire attacks, the
Ambassador to Iraq noted that personnel needed to know what the sirens
announcing a rocket attack sounded like and what the protective
bunkers looked like, in part because personnel were injuring
themselves entering the bunkers. In response, DSTC built two bunkers
at one of its leased facilities, and used them in conducting duck-and-
cover exercises to recorded sirens as part of the FACT course.
According to Diplomatic Security, other additions to FACT included
personnel recovery and medical training because of a signed
presidential directive and meetings with State’s Foreign Service
Institute respectively. In addition, DSTC also conducted in-country
team visits to obtain information approximately once a year, and these
have resulted in other changes to the course. DSTC officials noted
that FACT is very well received by the students. For example, in one
instance, a State official noted that the reason for her surviving a
bombing attack in Islamabad was because of her FACT training.
[A] Under Secretary Henrietta Fore signed a memorandum creating the
Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course in July 2006. FACT's
predecessor, Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course-Iraq, was
designed in late 2003 in response to the need to provide training to
State personnel who were deploying to Baghdad in support of the
Coalition Provisional Authority.
[End of figure]
DSTC's Systems Do Not Have the Capability to Obtain Comprehensive
Feedback on All Training:
Because of difficulties obtaining satisfactory response rates for some
evaluations, identifying users of its distributed learning efforts,
[Footnote 16] and contacting non-State students, DSTC officials
acknowledged that their systems do not have the capability to obtain a
comprehensive evaluation of all of their training as required by their
training framework. However, DSTC officials said they are exploring
ways to address identifying users of its distributed learning efforts
and contacting non-State students. We previously reported that
evaluating training is important and that the agencies need to develop
a systematic evaluation processes to assess the benefits of training
development efforts.[Footnote 17] According to DSTC officials, the
tier-1 response rate for most courses averages about 80-90 percent,
and the tier-3 evaluations response rate for its courses averages
about 30 percent for 6-month feedback.[Footnote 18]
DSTC officials acknowledged that they currently do not have a system
in place to identify who has accessed distributed learning and certain
other learning tools, and thus they have few effective options for
soliciting student feedback on those tools. According to DSTC
officials, distributed learning efforts are growing as part of DSTC
efforts to save costs and reach people in the field. DSTC is exploring
several different ways to deliver distributed learning efforts. For
example, Diplomatic Security is expected to provide personnel recovery
training to about 20,000 people--many of whom are non-State personnel.
This training will be done primarily through online distributed
learning as well as classroom instruction. In addition to its
distributed learning efforts, DSTC sends out to posts its "Knowledge
from the Field" DVDs, an information and professional development
product that includes lessons learned from attacks and other incidents
at consulates and embassies. DSTC is also developing new interactive
computer-based training simulations. However, DSTC's systems do not
have the capability to track who is accessing its online materials or
who is accessing the DVDs. Without knowing who to send evaluations to,
DSTC cannot solicit feedback to see if these efforts are helpful or
effective.
According to DSTC officials, DSTC also has difficulty obtaining
feedback from non-State personnel, which constitute a growing portion
of its student body because of DSTC's provision of training to
multiple agencies. For example, DSTC provides information awareness
and cybersecurity training to State, as well as the Department of
Homeland Security and National Archives and Records Administration,
among others.[Footnote 19] In addition, as noted in figure 2, the
number of students taking FACT training, which is provided to non-
State personnel, has increased significantly. While DSTC collects
feedback after each lesson and course via tier-1 evaluations and makes
efforts to collect tier-3 evaluations, according to DSTC officials, it
is the responsibility of the students' home agencies to send out
evaluations to their personnel on the training that DSTC provides.
According to DSTC officials, evaluations conducted by other agencies
are not automatically shared with DSTC. Instead, to measure the
effectiveness of its training for non-State personnel, DSTC relies on
voluntary comments from the agencies or individual students from those
agencies.
DSTC officials noted that they are pursuing access to a more robust
learning management system to address some of the difficulties with
their existing systems. Learning management systems are software
applications for the administration, documentation, tracking, and
reporting of training programs, classroom and online events, e-
learning programs, and training content. DSTC officials stated that
their current suite of software, including Microsoft Office SharePoint
and several State-specific systems, does not provide all the
functionality they need to effectively evaluate all of their courses.
DSTC has increased its reliance on using Microsoft Office SharePoint
to store current learning materials for DSTC courses on its intranet,
but the software does not have an evaluation mechanism in place.
According to DSTC officials, they were interested in procuring a
learning management system that would cost about $284,000, with
additional maintenance and technical support costing about $28,500 a
year. In 2009, DSTC officials conducted a cost-benefit analysis by
examining the savings from converting two existing courses into
courses delivered entirely online. The analysis indicated that State
would save about $2 million a year in travel costs alone as well as
give DSTC a number of additional functionalities. According to DSTC,
as of May 2011, its request to purchase the system is under review,
and DSTC was advised to explore FSI's learning management system.
According to FSI and DSTC officials, DSTC began discussions with FSI
about the use of FSI's learning management system. FSI officials noted
that FSI's learning management system has or can be modified to have
several of the capabilities DSTC is looking for, including the ability
to limit access to specific groups (such as Diplomatic Security
personnel or non-State personnel), to distribute and evaluate
distributed learning, and to e-mail evaluations to non-State students.
According to DSTC officials, DSTC and FSI are working to create a
subdomain in FSI's learning management system for DSTC content. They
are also discussing the process for using the learning management
system for classified material. As of May 2011, these matters are
still under discussion.
Diplomatic Security Generally Ensures That Personnel Follow
Established Career Training Paths, but DSTC's Systems Do Not Have the
Capability to Track All Its Training:
Diplomatic Security developed career training paths for its personnel
that identify the training required for each major job position at
different career levels. Using various systems, Diplomatic Security
can track instructor-led training that its personnel take. However,
DSTC's systems do not have a way of accumulating the names of
personnel who have not taken required courses. DSTC also faces
difficulties tracking everyone who receives training through its
distributed learning and its courses for non-State personnel. However,
DSTC is working to address these difficulties.
Diplomatic Security Developed Training Requirements for Its Career
Paths:
DSTC established career training paths that specify the required
training for entry-level, midlevel, and in some cases senior-level
personnel according to their career specialty (see figure 3, and for a
description of the specialty positions, see table 2 above).[Footnote
20] All Diplomatic Security Foreign Service career specialists attend
required State orientation for Foreign Service personnel provided by
FSI. (For additional information on training at FSI, see our recently
issued report on State training.[Footnote 21]) As they progress from
entry level to midlevel, and in some specialties to senior level,
Diplomatic Security personnel follow their career training paths.
[Footnote 22] For example, after orientation, the Security Engineering
Officers take technical and fundamental training. As the SEOs move on
to midlevel positions, they complete a variety of in-service training
courses. All midlevel and most senior-level positions require
leadership and management training provided by FSI.[Footnote 23] DSTC
officials noted that all DSTC training fulfills either a career
training path requirement or some other training requirement. For
example, outside of standard training courses, DSTC provides
specialized training to meet evolving threats, such as HTT, that is
required for special agents at high-threat posts. See appendix VI for
additional details on the training requirements for different career
paths.
Figure 3: Selected Career Training Paths:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Career path: Special agents;
Entry-level training:
* FSI-provided orientation;
* Basic special agent course;
* Basic Regional Security Officer course;
Midlevel training:
* Special agent in-service course;
* Regional Security Officer in-service;
* FSI-provided administrative, leadership, and management courses;
Senior-level training:
* Special agent in-service course;
* Basic Regional Security Officer in-service;
* FSI-provided leadership and management courses.
Career path: Security Engineering Officers;
Entry-level training:
* Technical training and SEO fundamentals;
* Technical surveillance countermeasures courses;
* FSI-provided orientation and administrative courses;
Midlevel training:
* Technical and equipment in-service training;
* Investigative skills training;
* Various information and computer security training;
* FSI-provided leadership and management courses;
Senior-level training:
* FSI-provided administrative, leadership and management courses.
Career path: Security Technical Specialists;
Entry-level training:
* Technical training and STS fundamentals
* FSI-provided orientation and administrative courses;
Midlevel training:
* Technical and equipment in-service training;
* FSI-provided leadership and management courses;
Senior-level training:
* STS do not have senior-level training.
Career path: Diplomatic Couriers;
Entry-level training:
* Diplomatic Courier (initial training);
* Diplomatic Courier hub training;
* Diplomatic Courier in-service training;
Midlevel training:
* Midlevel courier manager training;
Senior-level training:
* Couriers do not have senior-level training.
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data; Art Explosion; Adobe Illustrator
(symbols).
[End of figure]
DSTC Uses Various Systems to Track Participation in Its Training:
DSTC uses various systems to track participation in its training. DSTC
relies on State's Career Development and Assignments Office and its
registrar database to keep records, in addition to an internal tracker
for participants in FACT training. State's Career Development and
Assignments office also provides career development guidance and is
responsible for ensuring that State personnel attend training required
for upcoming assignments. For example, when an agent is assigned to a
high-threat post, the office checks to make sure the agent has taken
the HTT course; an agent who has not taken the course is scheduled for
training, and must complete the course prior to deploying. Both the
DSTC registrar and the Career Development and Assignments office use
the Student Training Management System to track the training completed
by State personnel. This system is State's registrar system for
maintaining personnel training records; it records enrollments, no
shows, and completions. The Student Training Management System
regularly provides updated data directly to the Government Employee
Management System, State's human resources management system, which
populates training information into employee personnel records. The
DSTC registrar office and State's Career Development and Assignments
office work together to confirm completion of training before
personnel move on to their next assignment. However, if State
employees need to demonstrate course completion, they can access the
Student Training Management System online to retrieve a copy of their
training record from their personal records and print out an
unofficial transcript for their supervisor; alternatively, their
supervisor can contact the DSTC registrar's office to verify that the
student has completed the course.
The registrar database has the ability to verify personnel who have
taken high-threat training, but does not have a way of accumulating
the names of these personnel. Because State is responsible for the
safety and security of U.S. personnel under Chief of Mission authority
and requires high-threat training for all personnel at high-threat
posts, DSTC officials noted that they have instituted unofficial
methods of tracking completion of the training for those going to
these posts. DSTC designed and implemented the FACT tracker on its
internal web site to log in all personnel who take the class. The FACT
tracker provides a continuously updated unofficial document listing
all personnel who have taken the FACT course--which includes non-State
students. The RSOs in high-threat posts can access the FACT tracker to
check on new arrivals to see if they have taken the course. Those who
have not completed FACT must remain within the safety of the compound
until they are sent home. DSTC officials acknowledged that in the
past--before the FACT tracker--they used graduation photographs of
FACT graduates to ensure that personnel completed the required
training. This was a flawed verification process since students could
opt out of having their photos taken. In addition to the FACT tracker,
Diplomatic Security maintains a separate spreadsheet of over 700
agents who have taken HTT, which is always available for the director
of Diplomatic Security to consult. This enables the director to
quickly determine which agents are eligible for assignments to support
temporary needs at high-threat posts.
DSTC Is Working to Improve Its Ability to Track Required Training and
Participation in Distributed Learning:
According to DSTC officials, DSTC faces challenges in ensuring that
personnel complete all required training, particularly in tracking
personnel who use distributed learning efforts. However, DSTC has
initiatives in place to address some of these issues. The challenges
stem from a combination of factors, including training schedules that
are constrained by the lack of resources and staff. This creates an
obstacle for personnel who cannot fit the training into their work
schedules or whose jobs take priority. According to several Diplomatic
Security personnel, staff often do not have the time to take in-
service training when required, in part because of scheduling
constraints. For example, staff could be on temporary duty or travel
when in-service training is offered. In addition to the costs for
travel to attend in-service training at other posts, several posts are
understaffed. According to the Diplomatic Security personnel, they
often do not have enough personnel to support the post when staff go
to in-service training.
Even though DSTC relies on the Student Training Management System, the
system does not allow DSTC to effectively track who has or has not
taken what course, when, and also be able to schedule a person for the
next available course. According to DSTC officials, their system does
not have the ability to automatically identify how many people
required to take a given course have not yet taken it. Additionally,
agents are required to pass a firearms requalification every 4 months
when they are posted domestically and once a year if posted overseas.
[Footnote 24] It is the agents' and supervisors' responsibility to
keep track when their next requalification is due. According to DSTC
officials, when agents are posted overseas at certain posts where
firearms training is restricted, they often fall behind on their
requalification because this can be completed only at a limited number
of facilities. As a result, according to Diplomatic Security
officials, some personnel fail to maintain weapons qualification,
especially if they have been overseas for a number of years.
DSTC has increased its use of distributed learning to enhance training
of its workforce, but it does not have a way to keep records of
participation or performance of personnel who take training through
distributed learning. For example, DSTC shares interactive online
content on Microsoft Office SharePoint for personnel to use, but
according to DSTC officials, SharePoint does not have a tracking
mechanism to see who has accessed the content. In another example,
DSTC provides distributed learning on OC Spray (also known as pepper
spray) that is required every year. However, DSTC cannot say for
certain if its personnel have accessed the training and does not have
the systems in place to track distributed learning efforts.
DSTC is working to develop the ability to ensure that personnel
complete all required training and to keep track of who completes DSTC
training through distributed learning. DSTC officials stated that
their current suite of software systems does not include the
capabilities needed to track all their training efficiently and
effectively, in particular training delivered through distributed
learning. As noted above, DSTC has begun discussions with FSI about
the possibility of using FSI's learning management system or procuring
its own system to help DSTC improve its ability to track training. As
of May 2011, it appears that some of DSTC's tracking and evaluation
needs may be met through FSI's learning management system. DSTC is in
the process of working with FSI to determine how to meet these needs.
DSTC Faces Significant Challenges to Carrying Out Its Expanded Mission:
DSTC faces several challenges that affect its operations. In
particular, DSTC is faced with training Diplomatic Security personnel
to meet their new roles and responsibilities in Iraq as the U.S.
military transfers to State many of its protective and security
functions for the U.S. diplomatic presence. In addition to this
expanded training mission, State has proposed a fivefold increase in
the amount of training DSTC provides to non-Diplomatic Security
personnel. At the same time, many of DSTC's training facilities pose
additional challenges. DSTC lacks a consolidated training facility of
its own and therefore uses 16 different leased, rented, or borrowed
facilities at which DSTC's training needs are not the priority.
Moreover, several of the facilities do not meet DSTC's training needs
and/or are in need of refurbishment. According to Diplomatic Security
officials, this situation has proven inefficient; it has expanded
training times and likely increased costs. To meet some of its current
needs, in 2007 DSTC developed an Interim Training Facility, and in
2009 State allocated funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act and other acts to begin the process of building a consolidated
training facility. State is in the process of identifying a suitable
location for the facility.
Expanding Diplomatic Security Missions in Iraq and Other High-Threat
Posts Constrain DSTC's Ability to Meet Training Needs:
With the planned withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq in
December 2011, Diplomatic Security is expected to assume full
responsibility for ensuring safety and security for the U.S. civilian
presence. As part of its new responsibilities, Diplomatic Security
plans to add critical support services that the U.S. military
currently provides, and which Diplomatic Security has had little or no
experience in providing, including downed aircraft recovery,
explosives ordnance disposal, route clearance, and rocket and mortar
countermeasures, among others. Consequently, Diplomatic Security is
leveraging Department of Defense expertise and equipment to build the
capabilities and capacity necessary to undertake its new missions. For
example, the Department of Defense is assisting Diplomatic Security
with the operation of a sense-and-warn system to detect and alert to
artillery and mortar fire. As a result of its increased security
responsibilities, Diplomatic Security anticipates substantial use of
contractors to provide many of these specialized services.
Nevertheless, Diplomatic Security personnel will still need training
in order to properly manage and oversee those contractors and to
perform those services for which contractors are not being hired.
DSTC noted that it is following events in Iraq, seeking feedback from
Embassy Baghdad, and evaluating and updating its training programs to
ensure they remain relevant to the needs of post personnel and
conditions on the ground. To identify training needs, DSTC is
collaborating with multiple offices on various contingency plans. DSTC
is a member of the Diplomatic Security Iraq Transition Working Group.
The purpose of this working group is to identify and analyze the
structural, logistical, personnel, and training impacts of the
transition on Diplomatic Security and the Regional Security Office in
Baghdad as U.S. military forces draw down in Iraq. Additionally, DSTC
is an active participant in the Contingency Operations Working Group,
whose purpose is to improve collaboration within Diplomatic Security
to support RSO operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and
Sudan. DSTC also is a member of the Iraq Policy and Operations Group,
chaired by State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the Iraq
Training Course Advisory Group, chaired by FSI.
DSTC is developing training plans to address various contingencies
arising from anticipated Diplomatic Security personnel increases in
Iraq and introduction of new equipment. Regarding personnel increases,
DSTC is identifying resources and planning to train additional
security personnel to meet Embassy Baghdad's goal of filling 84
Security Protective Specialist positions and 25 new special agent
positions in Iraq.[Footnote 25] High-threat courses are also being
added to accommodate additional Diplomatic Security personnel being
assigned to Iraq and other high-threat locations. For example, an
additional four HTT courses were added to the DSTC training schedule,
making a total of 13 course offerings in fiscal year 2011 compared
with 9 in fiscal year 2010.
According to DSTC, it is endeavoring to meet the need for new
capabilities and equipment. DSTC, in coordination with the Diplomatic
Security Mine-Resistant/Ambush Protection (MRAP) armored vehicles
working group, is developing ways to integrate MRAP training into
Diplomatic Security courses, and as of March 2011 had completed the
design and development of a training course. This effort includes
acquiring an MRAP egress trainer at the ITF in West Virginia and one
at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.[Footnote 26] To address expanding RSO
air operations, DSTC acquired UH-1 and CH-46 nonflyable helicopter
airframes from Cherry Point Marine Air Station in order to improve air
operations training. An additional helicopter airframe, a CH-53, is
also being acquired from the same location. For FACT students,
protective vests and helmets were obtained to better accustom students
to working conditions on the ground. Other HTT additions will include
personnel recovery, tactical communications, and tactical operations
command training. DSTC is working closely with the Iraq Training
Course Advisory Group to develop a new Iraq predeployment immersion
training course for civilian employees, as well as special agents,
which will combine both security and operational exercises. According
to Diplomatic Security officials, this training will likely increase
the time needed to get trained Diplomatic Security personnel into the
field.
Despite these efforts, Diplomatic Security noted that the locations,
personnel numbers, and resources that Diplomatic Security will require
in Iraq are being finalized through the various transitional working
groups mentioned above, as well as by Embassy Baghdad and U.S. Forces-
Iraq. However, according to State's Inspector General, Diplomatic
Security does not have the funding, personnel, experience, equipment,
or training to replicate the U.S. military's security mission in Iraq.
[Footnote 27] Similar concerns were raised by the Commission on
Wartime Contracting and a majority report issued by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.[Footnote 28] Diplomatic Security acknowledged it
is not designed to assume the military's mission in Iraq and will have
to rely on its own resources and the assistance of the host country to
protect the U.S. mission in the absence of the funding, personnel,
equipment, and protection formerly provided by the U.S. military.
Furthermore, with clear deadlines in place for the U.S. military
departure from Iraq, delays in finalizing State's operations in Iraq
could affect DSTC's ability to develop and deliver any additional
required training.
Future Training Requirements May Further Strain DSTC Resources:
In addition to the resource demands placed on DSTC by the pending
drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq, DSTC has seen a significant
increase in the number of U.S. personnel to whom it provides training,
especially high-threat training such as FACT, SNOE, and HTT (see
figure 4). Most notable is the increase in the number of non-
Diplomatic Security personnel to whom Diplomatic Security must provide
training since both FACT and SNOE are designed for nonagents. For
example, the number of U.S. personnel taking high-threat training in
fiscal year 2006 was 971. That number more than doubled in fiscal year
2010 to 2,132.
Figure 4: Increase in DSTC-Provided High-Threat Training from 2006 to
2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Number of students:
Fiscal year: 2006;
High-Threat Tactical course: 59;
Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments course: 0;
Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course: 912.
Fiscal year: 2007;
High-Threat Tactical course: 81;
Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments course: 0;
Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course: 1,054.
Fiscal year: 2008;
High-Threat Tactical course: 87;
Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments course: 0;
Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course: 1,417.
Fiscal year: 2009;
High-Threat Tactical course: 111;
Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments course: 12;
Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course: 1,637.
Fiscal year: 2010;
High-Threat Tactical course: 215;
Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments course: 123;
Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course: 1,794.
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data.
[End of figure]
In addition to the significant increase in students, State has levied
additional training requirements on DSTC that may further strain
DSTC's resources. State's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review (QDDR) stated that all personnel at high-threat posts, as well
as those at critical-threat posts, will now receive FACT training.
[Footnote 29] According to Diplomatic Security officials, this change
in policy would increase the number of posts for which FACT is
required from 23 to 178, increasing the number of students taking FACT
each year from 2,132 in fiscal year 2010 to over 10,000. DSTC
officials noted that they lack the capacity to handle so many students
and that current FACT classes are already filled to DSTC's capacity.
DSTC would need to locate or build additional driving tracks, firearms
ranges, and explosives ranges, as well as obtain instructors and other
staff to support such a dramatic increase in students. At a cost of
almost $4,000 per student, not including the need to develop
additional facilities, this requirement could cost government agencies
over $30 million. The QDDR did not identify additional resources or
facilities to support this decision. According to Diplomatic Security
officials, State has not completed an action plan or established time
frames to carry out the QDDR recommendation. Given these difficulties,
Diplomatic Security officials noted that they did not see how the new
requirement could be implemented.
Existing Facilities Hamper Training Efforts and Strain Resources;
However, DSTC Has Taken Interim Steps and Has Long-Term Plans to
Address These Challenges:
The Diplomatic Security Training Directorate's three offices,
including DSTC, use 16 facilities to accomplish their training
missions (see appendix VII), which DSTC officials believe is
inefficient and more costly than a consolidated training facility
would be. For example, DSTC maintains a fleet of vehicles to transport
students from one training facility to another. In 2009, DSTC
officials estimated that students spent 1 week of the then 8-week HTT
course in transit. According to DSTC officials, until recently the
Training Directorate used four additional facilities, including three
other military bases, but military officials at those bases decided
that they could no longer accommodate DSTC and still meet their own
training needs. This forced DSTC to find or make use of alternative
training sites.
Diplomatic Security leases, rents, or borrows all the facilities it
uses, and the number of facilities in use at any given time and how
they are used will vary based on training requirements and facility
availability. For example, although Marine Corps Base Quantico is
primarily used for firearms training, Diplomatic Security also uses
its ranges for land navigation and its mock villages for scenario
training with nonlethal ammunition. According to DSTC officials,
because Diplomatic Security does not own the facilities it uses (or
the land on which they are built, in the case of its ITF), its access
to some facilities may be constrained by the facility owners. For
example, Diplomatic Security uses the firearms ranges at Marine Corps
Base Quantico to train with heavier weapons that none of its other
facilities can accommodate (see figure 5). However, according to
Diplomatic Security officials, the Marines occasionally force
Diplomatic Security to change its training schedule, sometimes with
minimal notice, which increases costs and makes it difficult for DSTC
staff to meet training objectives within the time available. DSTC
noted, however, that the Marines work with them to minimize the
disruptions to Diplomatic Security training at Marine Corps Base
Quantico.
Figure 5: Diplomatic Security Use of Marine Corps Base Quantico Firing
Range:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Several of the leased facilities, notably the State Annex (SA)
buildings, do not meet DSTC's needs. For example, SA-7, in
Springfield, Virginia, was originally leased commercially in the 1970s
when, according to Diplomatic Security officials, Diplomatic Security
had fewer than 500 special agents, less than one-third of the
approximately 1,900 it has now. Both SA-7 and SA-31 are overcrowded
and need various repairs, according to Diplomatic Security officials,
in part because of disputes between Diplomatic Security and its lessor
over which party is responsible for structural repairs such as leaks
in the ceiling, repairs to water pipes, and repairs to the ventilation
systems (see figure 6 for pictures of SA-7). DSTC's main firearms
ranges are located in these buildings, but according to DSTC
officials, the ranges are small and have some unusable firing lanes
(see figure 6). Because of the limitations of its facilities,
Diplomatic Security has had to improvise with makeshift solutions to
provide some types of training, for example, placing tape on the
floors of its garage at SA-11 to simulate walls for conducting room-
entry training (see figure 7). DSTC officials commented that this was
not the most effective way to conduct training.
Figure 6: Disrepair and Crowding at State Annex-7:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
Leaking ceiling;
Crowded storeroom;
Broken firing range lane;
Storage in firing range area.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: Simulated Tape Walls Used in Training:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
To help meet the training demands of its growing mission, DSTC has
identified alternate sites as backup training locations and used them
in the past year when other facilities could not be used to meet
training requirements. For example, the HTT course used a paintball
park in 2010 when Marine Corps Base Quantico could not accommodate
DSTC's final practical exercise. As noted below, with the increased
capability at the ITF, Diplomatic Security has been able to
consolidate some functions and reduce, but not eliminate, the need for
other facilities. In April 2011, Diplomatic Security officials stated
that DSTC began firearms training and requalifications at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center's Cheltenham, Maryland, facility.
Diplomatic Security now has access to the firing ranges at Cheltenham
to conduct agents' firearms requalifications, as well as support
office, classroom, and storage space--allowing them to use the small
SA-7 firing range as a backup range.
Diplomatic Security Is Developing an Interim Training Facility to
Address Some Current but Not Future Needs:
Recognizing that its existing facilities were inadequate, in 2007,
according to DSTC officials, Diplomatic Security signed a 5-year
contract with one of its lessors, Bill Scott Raceway, to fence off
12.5 acres of land and build a modular Interim Training Facility in
Summit Point, West Virginia, for approximately $10 million (see figure
8). The facility includes a number of training features that
Diplomatic Security needs, including a gymnasium with mat rooms, a two-
story indoor tactical maze, an indoor firing range, a video-based
firearms simulation, and a mock urban training area. As the ITF is
located on Bill Scott Raceway land, it is colocated with the
facilities Diplomatic Security leases to provide driver training, some
small arms training, bunker training, and small explosives
demonstrations (see figure 9).
Figure 8: The Interim Training Facility:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
Mock urban terrain and rappelling wall;
Gym;
Tactical maze;
Marksmanship and judgment training simulator.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Diplomatic Security Use of Bill Scott Raceway Facilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
Driving tracks;
Outdoor firing range;
Explosives demonstration;
Demonstration bunker.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Diplomatic Security acknowledged that the ITF is helping it meet
several of its training needs, including most defensive tactics
training and scenario training with nonlethal ammunition.
Nevertheless, Diplomatic Security officials noted that the ITF is only
a stopgap solution with inherent limitations and cannot meet a number
of Diplomatic Security's training needs such as the firing of heavier
weapons, the use of more powerful explosives to train agents in
incident management, and the integrated tactical use of driving and
firearms training in a mock urban environment. The ITF also lacks
space for Diplomatic Security to train its personnel for many of the
additional missions that they are expected to take over from the U.S.
military in Iraq, such as land navigation and downed aircraft
recovery, among others. In addition, the ITF lacks many of the support
services that a training academy might otherwise have, such as campus
housing; adequate classroom, office, and dining areas, and storage
areas for the explosives used in training.
Diplomatic Security Is Pursuing Construction of a Consolidated
Training Facility:
After years of unsuccessful funding efforts, in 2009 State allocated
$118.1 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and Worldwide
Security and Protection funds to acquire a site for, design, and build
the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC), a consolidated
training facility (see table 3). State began the search for a
dedicated training facility in 1993 and revisited the need in 1998
following the embassy bombings in Africa prior to developing the
Interim Training Facility. In 2004, State received funding to develop
the Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training. In 2006, when the
plans for locating such a center at Aberdeen Proving Ground were not
successful, the development of CAST was abandoned and Diplomatic
Security sought guidance from State's legal office. According to
Diplomatic Security officials, based on the legislative language,
State's legal office stated that no specific site was indicated.
Therefore, according to officials, based on Diplomatic Security's
critical need for an antiterrorism training center, the funds could be
spent on a temporary facility. Consequently, the remaining funds were
used to expand Diplomatic Security's use of the Bill Scott Raceway
facilities and develop the ITF. State also informed us that
congressional staff were briefed regarding the use of funds
appropriated for CAST.
In June 2009, the U.S. General Services Administration announced that
it had initiated the search on behalf of State for an appropriate
space to build the FASTC, thereby initiating development of the
consolidated facility. According to State and General Services
Administration officials, State obligated approximately $10.6 million
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds on architectural
planning and project management. State obligated the remaining
Recovery Act funds by transferring them to the General Services
Administration to continue the identification and development of the
FASTC. State also allocated about $48.1 million of fiscal year 2009
and fiscal year 2009 supplemental Worldwide Security and Protection
funds and an additional $17.6 million of fiscal year 2010 Worldwide
Security and Protection funds,[Footnote 30] all of which were
obligated to the General Services Administration to build the FASTC.
Subsequent phases of the project are expected to be wholly funded
through Worldwide Security and Protection funds. Diplomatic Security
expects future costs to be approximately $30 million annually.
[Footnote 31] Diplomatic Security received no additional funds in the
fiscal year 2011 budget, and the administration did not include
additional funds in its fiscal year 2012 budget request; nevertheless,
State and the General Services Administration continued development of
the FASTC.
Table 3: Foreign Affairs Security Training Center Funding, Fiscal
Years 2009-2012:
Funding source: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act;
2009: $70,000,000;
2010: NA;
2011: NA;
Estimated 2012: NA;
Total: $70,000,000.
Funding source: Worldwide Security and Protection base budget;
2009: $34,676,000;
2010: $17,551,000;
2011: 0;
Estimated 2012: 0;
Total: $52,227,000.
Funding source: Worldwide Security and Protection base budget as
increased by supplemental appropriation;
2009: $13,375,000;
2010: 0;
2011: 0;
Estimated 2012: 0;
Total: $13,375,000.
Funding source: Total;
2009: $118,051,000;
2010: $17,551,000;
2011: 0;
Estimated 2012: 0;
Total: $135,602,000.
Source: GAO analysis.
NA = not applicable.
[End of table]
After going through a formalized process of identifying a location and
working with the General Services Administration, State identified a
potential location for the FASTC in Queen Anne's County, Maryland.
State had planned to begin building by early 2011; however, on June
28, 2010, State and the General Services Administration determined
that the site would no longer be considered, because of local concerns
regarding environmental and other land use issues that could delay the
project for several years.
State subsequently expanded its FASTC criteria, most notably
increasing the acceptable distance from Washington, D.C., and--because
of a presidential memorandum issued in June 2010 requesting that
agencies try to use existing federal land instead of purchasing new
property--focusing the search on publicly owned properties. The
General Services Administration evaluated approximately 40 sites
against the revised site criteria, which include four steps to
determine the viability of the site for placement of the FASTC
project. Step 1 evaluates the site regarding public ownership, size,
the ability to support 24/7 operations, climate conditions, and
proximity to Diplomatic Security headquarters. A site that meets Step
1 criteria continues on to Step 2, which evaluates the site's
developable area, compatible surroundings, ease of acquisition, life
support and community support, and suitable climate, and includes
performing initial test fits of the site. A site that meets Step 2
criteria will move on to Step 3, in which a feasibility study is
conducted on the site. The feasibility study takes into consideration
the mission, program requirements, phasing, risk, cost, procurement,
environmental assessment, and utilities. Step 4 of the criteria is to
conduct an Environmental Impact Statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 for the preferred site.[Footnote 32]
Two of the evaluated sites met the Step 1 criteria. One site also met
Step 2 criteria, and moved on to Step 3 in which a feasibility study
was completed. The second site under consideration is currently being
evaluated under Step 2 criteria. If the site meets Step 2 criteria,
the process will continue to Step 3 and a feasibility study will be
conducted. Once both sites have been assessed, senior department
officials will make a recommendation on which site will proceed to
Step 4. Environmental studies will be conducted on the selected site,
and the master plan and construction documents will be completed. Step
4 environmental studies are estimated to take 18 to 24 months to
complete. Construction could begin, pending funding availability,
after the studies and construction documents are complete. State
officials noted that in an ideal situation they could begin building
the FASTC by the end of 2013; however, they said it was difficult to
know what environmental obstacles, if any, they might encounter and
how those obstacles might affect the FASTC's development.
State expects the FASTC will include state-of-the-art classrooms,
simulation and practical applications laboratories, administrative
support offices, and a fitness center to meet soft skill training
needs.[Footnote 33] State plans to construct a series of indoor and
outdoor weapons firing ranges, an explosives demonstration area,
several mock urban environments designed to simulate a variety of
urban scenarios, and driving tracks to meet its hard skill training
needs. State also expects to provide various support elements,
including dormitories, a dining facility, physical fitness facilities
to include an athletic field and track, bike and jogging trails, and
on-site medical and fire emergency services. State expects to build,
enhance, or rely on existing infrastructure, such as power, potable
water, wastewater treatment, and telecommunications capabilities.
Conclusions:
U.S. diplomats and other personnel at overseas diplomatic posts face a
growing number of threats from global terrorism to cyberattacks and,
in some countries, from constant dangers due to the violence of war or
civil unrest. To counter these growing threats, State has expanded the
mission of its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, with a corresponding
rapid increase in its staffing. As a result, DSTC has had to meet the
challenge of training more personnel to perform additional duties
while still getting Diplomatic Security's agents, engineers,
technicians, and other staff--as well as a growing number of personnel
outside of its workforce--into the field, where they are needed. DSTC
has largely met this challenge. Certain issues, however, constrain the
effectiveness of DSTC's systems. First, DSTC is shifting more of its
training online to better serve its student population, but does not
have the systems needed to evaluate the training's effectiveness
despite its own standards to do so. Without this feedback, DSTC will
be less able to ensure the effectiveness of and improve the training
it provides. Second, DSTC systems do not accurately and adequately
track the use of some of its training. For example, DSTC cannot
identify who has not taken required training. Consequently, DSTC
cannot be assured that all personnel are adequately trained to counter
threats to U.S. personnel, information, and property.
DSTC also faces a number of challenges as a result of an increasing
number of training missions, particularly in Iraq, and inadequate
training facilities. These challenges should be addressed
strategically; however, State's recent effort to conduct a strategic
review, the QDDR, added to DSTC's training missions. Specifically, the
QDDR levied a requirement on Diplomatic Security to quintuple its
student body by providing FACT training to an additional 8,000
students without addressing necessary resources. Without an action
plan and associated time frames to meet the new requirement, it is
unclear to what extent State can accomplish its training mission and
ensure the security preparedness of civilian personnel assigned
overseas.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of State:
1. develop or improve the process to obtain participant evaluations
for all of DSTC required training, including distributed learning
efforts;
2. develop or improve the process to track individual DSTC training
requirements and completion of DSTC training; and:
3. develop an action plan and associated time frames needed to carry
out the QDDR recommendation to increase the number of posts at which
FACT is required.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of State. State
provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix VIII.
State agreed with all three recommendations, and noted several steps
it is taking or is planning to take to address the recommendations. In
particular, DSTC noted that it will seek an electronic survey tool to
enhance its evaluation efforts and is exploring ways to modify
existing State computer systems to enhance its ability to track
training. In addition, Diplomatic Security is working with the other
State offices to set parameters for expanding FACT training to
additional personnel. State also noted that existing Diplomatic
Security training facilities and instructor resources are at maximum
capacity, and emphasized DSTC's need for a consolidated training
facility to meet its expanded training mission.
We also provided relevant portions of the report to FLETA and the
General Services Administration for technical comments. We
incorporated technical comments from both agencies and State
throughout the report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested
Members of Congress, the Secretary of State, and relevant agency
heads. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202)
512-4268 or mailto:fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contribution to this
report are listed in appendix IX.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We (1) evaluated how Diplomatic Security ensures the quality and
appropriateness of its training, (2) examined Diplomatic Security's
training strategies for its personnel and other U.S. government
personnel and how Diplomatic Security ensures that training
requirements are being met, and (3) assessed the challenges that
Diplomatic Security faces in meeting its training mission.
To address these objectives and establish criteria, we reviewed past
GAO reports on both Diplomatic Security and training, Office of
Personnel Management guidance, State and other legislative and
regulatory guidance and policy, and education standards and processes
of established educational organizations. To understand the
accreditation process to which Diplomatic Security was subject, we
obtained information from a key official from Federal Law Enforcement
and Training Accreditation. We also reviewed and analyzed data and
documentation related to Diplomatic Security-provided training
efforts, such as standard operating procedure, planning, performance,
course development, course evaluation, accreditation, and career
development documents; information and data on recent Diplomatic
Security Training Center (DSTC)-and other Diplomatic Security-provided
course offerings; and overall funding for training from 2006 to 2011.
To assess the reliability of registrar data for detailing the increase
in students taking high-threat courses, Diplomatic Security training
budget data, and Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC)
funding data, we discussed with Diplomatic Security officials the
quality of the data and how they were collected, and corroborated the
data by comparing them with data supplied by or interviews with other
officials. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report.
We interviewed officials and instructors at Diplomatic Security
headquarters, several training facilities, and several overseas posts.
Among others, we interviewed DSTC officials, including DSTC
instructors and contractors at several training facilities and
officials from all of DSTC's divisions and branches (see appendix II).
We interviewed other Diplomatic Security Training Directorate
officials, including officials from the Offices of Mobile Security
Deployment and Antiterrorism Assistance. We also interviewed officials
from the Diplomatic Courier Service. We asked a standard set of
questions through in-person and videoconference interviews with
Diplomatic Security agents in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the
Washington, D.C., field office, as well as engineers and technicians
in Germany, South Africa, and Florida, to get feedback from
supervisors on the quality of their staff's training and any unmet
training needs. These posts and offices represent a judgmental sample
selected because of their regional coverage and relatively large
number of personnel compared with that of personnel at other posts and
offices. We observed a wide variety of both classroom-based and
exercise-based training at six Diplomatic Security training facilities
in Virginia and West Virginia and viewed examples of other types of
DSTC-provided learning. In addition, we interviewed officials from
State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to discuss their course
registration and learning management systems, as well as how they
coordinate with DSTC, and States' Career Development and Assignment
office on how it tracks training. We interviewed Diplomatic Security
officials from a variety of offices concerning the transition in Iraq,
results of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR),
and how the purchase of new security technology is coordinated with
DSTC. We also interviewed officials from State headquarters and the
General Services Administration to discuss the status of the project
to develop a consolidated training facility. We evaluated the
information we received from both documentation and interviews against
the identified criteria.
Our review focused on the efforts of the Training Directorate's Office
of Training and Performance Standards and to a lesser extent the
Training Directorate's Office of Mobile Security Deployment and other
offices within Diplomatic Security, such as the Diplomatic Courier
Service--which has called upon the expertise of DSTC to help develop
its own training. Because the Training Directorate's Office of
Antiterrorism Assistance provides training to non-U.S. personnel, it
fell outside the scope of our work. In addition, because we recently
reviewed training provided by FSI, this report does not include an
assessment of the training that Diplomatic Security personnel receive
through FSI.[Footnote 34]
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to May 2011, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Organization of the Diplomatic Security Training Center:
The Office of Training and Performance Standards, also known as DSTC,
is the primary provider of Diplomatic Security's training. To carry
out its mission, DSTC is organized into four divisions, each with
three or four branches (see figure 10).
* The Security and Law Enforcement Training Division consists of three
branches: Domestic Training, Overseas Training, and Special Skills.
The division is primarily responsible for training Diplomatic
Security's agents, investigators, and Security Protective Specialists.
The division is also responsible for providing personal security
training to Diplomatic Security and non-Diplomatic Security personnel
posted to the high-threat environments, including the High Threat
Tactical (HTT), Security for Non-traditional Operating Environment
(SNOE), and Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) courses.
* The Security Engineering and Computer Security Division consists of
three branches: Security Engineering, Technical Training, and
Information Assurance. The division is primarily responsible for
training Diplomatic Security's security engineers and technicians, as
well as providing information technology security awareness training
to a number of U.S. departments and agencies such as the National
Archives and Records Administration and the Department of Homeland
Security.
* Instructional Systems Management ensures that the Diplomatic
Security Training Center meets independent Federal Law Enforcement
Training Accreditation (FLETA) standards by providing course needs
analysis and course design and development for both the Security and
Law Enforcement Training Division and Security Engineering and
Computer Security Division, creating and posting learning tools,
obtaining and analyzing student feedback, and providing instructor
training. In addition, Instructional Systems Management assists other
offices within Diplomatic Security, such as the Diplomatic Courier
Service, with non-DSTC course development and learning tools, as
needed.
* Administrative and Training Support Services manages the DSTC
registrar and student records, coordinates with FSI, manages external
training, and provides a variety of other support functions such as
managing DSTC's budget and maintaining training facilities and
equipment.
Figure 10: Organization of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's
Training Directorate:
[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart]
Top level:
Department of State.
Second level:
Undersecretary for Management.
Third level:
Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Fourth level:
Training Directorate:
* Office of Antiterrorism Assistance;
* Office of Mobile Security Deployment;
* Office of Training and Performance Standards (Diplomatic Security
Training Center).
Fifth level, under Office of Training and Performance Standards
(Diplomatic Security Training Center):
* Security and Law Enforcement Training Division;
* Security Engineering and Computer Security Division;
* Instructional Systems Management;
* Administrative Training and Support Services.
Sixth level, under Security and Law Enforcement Training Division:
* Domestic Training Branch;
* Overseas Training Branch;
* Special Skills Branch.
Sixth level, under Security Engineering and Computer Security Division:
* Security Engineering Branch;
* Technical Training Branch;
* Information Assurance Branch.
Sixth level, under Instructional Systems Management:
* Accreditation Manager;
* Curriculum and Instructional Systems Design;
* Distributed Learning and Interactive Content.
Sixth level, under Administrative Training and Support Services:
* Budget Analyst;
* Registrar;
* Support Service Specialists;
* External training.
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Process:
To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic
Security relies primarily on the standards of the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Accreditation process. Generally, the process
involves the five steps summarized below (see figure 11).
Figure 11: FLETA Process for Obtaining Accreditation:
[Refer to PDF for image: process map]
Step 1:
FLETA Application.
Step 2:
Applicant Preparation: Develop plan to fill gaps discovered during a
gap analysis.
Deficiencies?
Yes: Prepare Corrective Action Plan: Complete Corrective Action(s);
return to Self Assessment Report;
No: proceed to Step 3.
FLETA Accreditation Steps:
These activities are coordinated by the FLETA OA.
Step 3:
FLETA Assessment:
Deficiencies?
Yes: Prepare Corrective Action Plan: Requires OA-ED approval; Complete
Corrective Action(s); Return to FLETA Assessment;
No: FLETA Assessment Report and Supplements: Completed by the
Assessment Team.
Step 4:
FLETA Board Review Committee:
FLETA Board Approval?
Yes: FLETA Accreditation Award;
No: Continue accreditation?
Yes: Return to Prepare Corrective Action Plan; No: Drop out of FLETA.
FLETA Accreditation Award:
Annual Report #1 Completed by the Agency;
Annual Report #2 Completed by the Agency;
After the 2nd Annual report:
Continue accreditation?
No: Drop out of FLETA;
Yes: Step 5: FLETA Reaccreditation Application (return to Step 2).
Source: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation.
[End of figure]
1. Application: An agency can apply for accreditation of a program, an
academy, or both. However, a separate application must be submitted
for each program and academy. In most cases, agencies first submit
applications for their basic agent training and instructor training
first. Once those have been accredited, the agency submits an
application to have its academy accredited.
2. Agency preparation: The agency conducts a self-assessment and gap
analysis to identify which of the FLETA standards it does not meet;
identifies corrective steps, if necessary; and reports its results to
FLETA's Office of Accreditation.
3. FLETA assessment: FLETA carries out its assessment. The assessment
teams visit training locations, review files documenting the agency's
compliance with standards, observe training, and interview
administrators and trainers. If deficiencies are found during the
assessment process, the agency must prepare a corrective action plan.
The assessment team prepares the final report of the FLETA assessment,
which is submitted to the FLETA Board Review Committee.
4. FLETA accreditation: A FLETA Board Review Committee reviews the
findings before FLETA awards accreditation to the submitted course,
academy, or both. Afterward, the agency provides annual updates to
FLETA in order to maintain the accreditation. The updates include
information that would modify the previous submissions to ensure
continued compliance with current FLETA standards.
5. Reaccreditation: Reaccreditation is a fresh look at a course or
academy to ensure continued compliance with the FLETA standards.
Reaccreditation occurs every 3 years. The course or academy submits
supporting evidence for each year since the previous accreditation.
FLETA thoroughly assesses the agency's program or academy using the
FLETA guidelines and professional training standards for program and
academy accreditation. For a program to receive accreditation, an
agency must demonstrate that the program's policies and procedures,
facilities, and resources comply with applicable FLETA standards.
[Footnote 35] In general, the academy meets the same FLETA standards
as the programs, but the standards are applied to the organization as
a whole. As of 2010, agencies applying for accreditation must provide
evidence that at least five other programs, in addition to the basic
agent training and instructor development training, comply with FLETA
standards.
FLETA standards are designed to describe what must be accomplished;
however, it is up to each agency to determine how it will meet the
standards. FLETA has one set of academy standards and four sections of
program standards, which include: (1) program administration, (2)
training staff, (3) training development, and (4) training delivery.
Each set or section of standards has 7 to 23 individual standards. For
example, 1 academy standard requires that the academy establish a
vision, mission, goals, and objectives, while 1 training staff
standard requires that new instructors are monitored and mentored.
A FLETA Assessment Team reviews all documented administrative controls
and supporting evidence submitted, including academy policies,
procedures, and operations, and the team also conducts interviews with
key personnel. To further support documentation, site visits are
conducted at the agency's training facilities. Live training scenarios
are also observed.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: DSTC Accreditation Results:
DSTC has gone through the accreditation process for the basic special
agent and the instructor development programs and for its academy,
DSTC. In 2005, DSTC opted to have the academy accredited first--an
option no longer available under current FLETA standards. DSTC then
sought accreditation for two programs--the basic special agent course
and the instructor development course--which were accredited in 2006.
In 2008, DSTC opted to have those programs and the academy go through
the accreditation process simultaneously. (See table 4.) DSTC is
currently undergoing reaccreditation for its programs and academy and
expects that this process will be completed in 2011.
Table 4: Findings of FLETA's Assessments of DSTC:
Year: 2005;
Type of accreditation: Academy accreditation;
FLETA findings: DSTC received its accreditation. The review of the
accreditation files revealed that they were complete and accurate.
DSTC was found to be in compliance with all standards.
Year: 2006;
Type of accreditation: Instructor Development Course (program);
FLETA findings: The Instructor Development Course received its
accreditation. A review of the accreditation files revealed they were
complete and accurate. The program was found to comply with all
standards. Three best practices were identified: (1) DSTC used web
survey software that allows users to design level 1 and level 3 (tier-
1 and tier-3) survey instruments for participants and past graduates.
(2) DSTC created computer-based training modules to provide
orientation to new instructors and training staff members. (3) DSTC
utilized a database to manage all program-related files, storing both
current and archived files.
Year: 2006;
Type of accreditation: Basic Special Agent Course (program);
FLETA findings: The Basic Special Agent Course received its
accreditation. The review of the files revealed they were complete and
accurate. DSTC had documented administrative controls to effectively
direct program operation, and the program was found to comply with all
standards.
Year: 2008;
Type of accreditation: Instructor Development Course (program);
FLETA findings: The Instructor Development Course received its
reaccreditation. The review of the accreditation files revealed that
most files were complete, accurate, and in compliance with FLETA
standards. However, the assessment team found two weaknesses. The team
found that DSTC did not have a clear mechanism in place to standardize
how the course materials were being taught. In addition, the
assessment team found that students did not have an opportunity to
provide tier-1 feedback on administrative and support elements of the
training received. DSTC responded by amending its standard operating
procedures, specifying that instructors cannot deviate from lesson
plans and must notify DSTC of needed changes. DSTC also now asks for
evaluations at the end of every course, including questions about the
training environment.
Year: 2008;
Type of accreditation: Basic Special Agent Course (program);
FLETA findings: The Basic Special Agent Course received its
reaccreditation. However, the review of the accreditation files
revealed that two files were incomplete and not in compliance with
FLETA standards--the same two standards identified in the Instructor
Development Course above. However, the assessment team found DSTC had
documented administrative controls that efficiently and effectively
directed academy and training program operations.
Year: 2008;
Type of accreditation: Academy accreditation;
FLETA findings: DSTC received its reaccreditation. A review of the
accreditation files revealed compliance with all but the two
standards, summarized above in the findings for the Instructor
Development Course.
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data.
Note: For additional details on the accreditation standards, see the
FLETA Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.fleta.gov/].
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: DSTC Training Framework Example Documents and Reports:
DSTC uses a seven-phase training framework for course design and
development. Examples of the documents and reports created during the
different phases of the framework, and hyperlinked to figure 1 on page
11, can be found below:
Proposal:
U.S. Department of State — Diplomatic Security Service:
Office of Training & Performance Standards (TPS):
Training Proposal:
Project Title: Redesign of the Basic Regional Security Officer (BRSO)
course:
Source: Tom Haycraft:
Phone: 703-204-6180:
Office: DSITPS/OTB:
E-mail: HaycraftT@state.gov:
ISM Rep.: Meredith Cross:
Phone: 571-226-9514:
Section 1. Description of the Training Project.
The Basic Regional Security Officer (BRSO) course (0T101) has been
identified as needing lo be reviewed and revised. Its last major
revision, based on a formal job task analysis, was in 2005 and it is
the training centers goal (per SOP) to review a course at least once
every five years. in addition, this review is designed to prepare the
BRSO course for separate program accreditation through the Office of
Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA), with the
ultimate goal of achieving graduate level college credit for graduates
through a college or university.
This course is part of the Overseas Training Branch (OTB) and is
Offered approximately six times per year. II is currently eleven weeks
long and is mostly taught at SA-11, the Diplomatic Security Training
Center (DSTC). Some modules are taught at AP Hill, SA-7;31. the ITF
(Mat Room, Driving Track and Tactical Maze), and the Fraudulent
Document Lab (FDL). Field trips are also taken to the National
Security Agency (NSA) and DS Command Center.
Section 2. Problem & Impact Summary.
The BRSO course was last reviewed in 2005. The Level I and Level TIT
evaluations have suggested the need for a review of how content is
being delivered and the pertinence of the content. Management has also
requested u review of the course length and identification of
opportunities to cut back on course time. Another aspect that will be
reviewed is the necessity of managing the logistics involved with
maintaining the large number of guest instructors from outside program
offices (roughly 35 guest speakers in addition to the multitude of
training center instructor staff used).
There is no alternative to conducting this course. The BRSO course
contains State Department specific information which has no commercial
equivalent. Agents do not receive any other training to prepare them
for the differences in responsibilities that they will have when
serving overseas for the first time. RSOs are expected to be able to
perform a high volume of tasks from the very beginning of their
assignment and they need to be trained prior to arriving at rest.
However, there are aspects of the course (i.e., certain lessons or
topics) that may be able to be replaced with an alternative to
training (ex., job aid, online resource center, etc.) or alternative
training strategies.
The audience for this course is agents going overseas for their first
assignment as an Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO), Deputy
Regional Security Officer (DRSO) or a Regional Security Officer (RS0).
Section 3. Resources & Planning.
The BRSO will remain mostly at SA-11 in room 260 and will continue to
be taught as often as is necessitated by the volume of assignments of
agents overseas. The current BRSO course will remain unchanged until
the revised 1311 SO is completed. There is no required due dale for
the revised course at this lime. Estimations on completion will begin
to formulate more with the next phase of design.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Directorate of International
Programs (DSIIP) will have an interest in this training since RSO's
have a direct working relationship with IP. The FAM (Foreign Service
Manual) will be reviewed for agent job requirements as well as prior
survey results and feedback from those currently serving in the field.
The course, as it stands now, is mostly instructor-lead with several
required computer-based training (CBT) modules. It already employs
some group work, presentations and activities. The review will
consider all methods of delivery and will take into account the years
of feedback from students, graduates and instructors on what does and
does not work well. Ways of adding more realism into the course will
be a priority to better prepare course participants for the problem
solving that will be required of them in the field.
RSO's are required to complete the Contracting Officer Representative
(COR) course, which is offered as part of BRSO. It should be noted
that the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and the Office of Overseas
Protective Operations (DS/IP/OPO) are working on developing an online
modulo to replace this with an expected delivery date of March 2011.
This module, in either format, will need to remain and will not be
part of this review.
Instructional Facilities & Resources:
This course is already being taught and there are no additional
facilities and extraordinary resources anticipated at this point.
It may be determined that hiring a full-time instructor with the
background of having recently been an RSO in the field is the most
effective means of teaching and would eliminate the need for many of
the guest instructors and help to make the curriculum more consistent.
This new position would require funding if it is determined to be
necessary.
Estimated Development Costs:
It does not appear at this time that there will be any travel costs
incurred in the development of this coarse. It is anticipated that
further collaboration, review and approvals can be completed via
email, telephone, fax and travel via the DoS shuttle.
Back to figure:
[End of Proposal]
Analysis:
Task Listing: DS Instructor:
Job: Instructional Systems Design (ISD):
See Key below on L, M, H and H+.
Tasks:
1. Prepare Course Proposal.
Sub-tasks/steps:
1.1 Write Section 1: Description of the Training Project;
Frequency: H;
Learning difficulty: L;
Importance: H+;
Job experience: L;
Priority: 5.
1.1.1 Explain what the course will provide.
1.1.2 Explain why the course is necessary.
1.1.3 Explain where the course will be taught by whom.
1.1.4 Identify who requested the course.
1.1.5 Identify when the course will be ready to pilot.
1.1.6 Identify the project POC.
1.2 Write Section 2: Problem Analysis and Impact Summary;
1.2.1 Describe the problem(s) the course will solve.
1.2.2 Identify the target audience.
1.2.3 Explain how training is the right answer.
1.2.4 Identify any course prerequisites.
1.3 Write Section 3: Resources and Planning Requirements;
1.3.1 Identify any existing training programs that could help meet the
need and lessen costs.
1.3.2 Identify the resources needed to develop and offer the course on
an on-going basis.
1.4 Write Section 4: Training Request Recommendation;
1.4.1 Provide a Project Manager recommendation to with go or no-go on
the project.
1.5 Write Section 5: Training Proposal Authorization.
1.5.1 Identify staff involved in proposal writing.
1.5.2 Obtain approval signatures.
1.6 File the approved proposal in the Oracle Database.
Back to figure:
[End of Analysis]
Design:
Training And Performance Support:
Task-to-Objective Matrix:
Instructor Development Course:
Instructor Responsibilities — Steve Swanson:
All Tasks & Objectives are taught in the "Instructor Responsibilities"
lesson.
Terminal Objective:
Objective #: T1;
Objective Statements: Given a requirement to teach a course of
instruction, the student will follow the appropriate TPS policies and
procedures related to the course such that all policies are followed
and administrative actions are performed following guidance in the TPS
SOP.
Task#: 1.
Task Statement: Explain the instructor qualification process.
Objective #: 1.1
Objective Statements: In order to provide guidance to other
instructors, the student will be able to briefly explain the
instructor qualification process as written in the TPS SOP;
Level of Learning (Competencies): Comprehension.
Task#: 2.
Task Statement: Explain the course administration procedures related
to student records.
Objective #: 2.1
Objective Statements: The student will correctly explain the course
administration procedures related to student records as outlined in
the TPS SOP;
Level of Learning (Competencies): Comprehension.
Task#: 3.
Task Statement: Explain the policies related to suspending training.
Objective #: 3.1
Objective Statements: To ensure a clear understanding of TPS policy,
the student will properly explain the policies related to suspending
training;
Level of Learning (Competencies): Comprehension.
Task#: 4.
Task Statement: Explain TPS copyright policies.
Objective #: 4.1
Objective Statements: Given a question regarding the use of public
printed materials for a class, the student will be able to correctly
explain TPS copyright policies as written in the TPS SOP;
Level of Learning (Competencies): Comprehension.
Task#: 5.
Task Statement: Explain TPS policies related to the impact of
inclement and adverse weather on training.
Objective #: 5.1
Objective Statements: When required to make a decision as to whether
or not a class should be canceled due to weather, the student will be
able to explain the TPS policies related to the impact of inclement
and adverse weather on training as written in the TPS SOP;
Level of Learning (Competencies): Comprehension.
Training And Performance Support:
Objective-to-Test Matrix:
Instructor Development Course:
ISD (updated 12/27/07):
Objective #: 1.1;
Objective Statements: Given a 45-minute student presentation, the
student will write a sample proposal for the presentation that
contains all the necessary information required of a course proposal
as identified in the TPS SOP.
Level of Learning (Competencies): Application;
Test/Exercise/Application: As a part of the 45-minute student
presentation, the student will be given preparation time to write a
sample proposal for the module he/she will give to the class. The
proposal will contain ail the parts of a standard proposal giving each
requirement at least one or two sentences. Proposals will be given to
another student who will read it and critique it for a simulated
approval process.
Objective #: 2.1;
Objective Statements: Given a 45-minute student presentation, the
student will write sample analysis phase documentation to include
target audience description, task analysis sheets, job performance
measures, and instructional setting description.
Level of Learning (Competencies): Application;
Test/Exercise/Application: As a part of the 45-minute student
presentation, the student will be given preparation time to write a
sample analysis documents for the module he/she will give to the
class. The documentation will contain a target audience description,
task analysis sheet, job performance measures, and instructional
setting description. Documentation will be reviewed in class.
Objective #: 3.1;
Objective Statements: Given a 45-minute student presentation, the
student will prepare sample design phase documentation to include
objectives, test items, and instructional strategies.
Level of Learning (Competencies): Application;
Test/Exercise/Application: As a part of the 45-minute student
presentation, the student will be given preparation time to write a
sample design phase documents for the module he/she will give to the
class. The documentation will contain objectives, test items, and
instructional strategies. Documentation will be reviewed in class.
Back to figure:
[End of Design]
Development:
United States Department of State — Diplomatic Security Service:
Diplomatic Security Training Center:
Lesson Plan Cover Sheet:
Course: Instructor Development Course:
Course Code: DS-103:
Lesson: 06 - Instructor Responsibilities:
Version: 03 - 10/22/09:
Classification Of Lesson: Unclassified:
Description: This lesson covers specific policies and procedures which
instructors are responsible for following to ensure that the training
center complies with accreditation standards.
Audience: New instructors:
Duration: One hour (01.0):
Method(s) of Instruction: Lecture (1.0).
Lesson Objectives: A. Given a requirement to teach a course of
instruction, the student will follow the appropriate TPS policies and
procedures related to the course as outlined in the TPS SOP.
1. Explain the TPS instructor approval process.
2. Explain the course administration procedures related to student
attendance and records.
3. Explain the policies related to suspending training
4. Explain TPS copyright policies.
5. Explain TPS policies related to the Privacy Act, Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and classified material.
6. Explain the IPS testing policies and explain the use of the
SCANTRON testing system.
7. Describe the FLETA Accreditation process.
Prerequisite To Assignments: To effectively participate in this
lesson, the student must complete the following items prior to class:
No prerequisites.
Lesson Equipment: Standard classroom A/V.
Student Materials: TPS Instructor Desk Guide; TPS SOP.
Instructor Materials: TPS Instructor Desk Guide; TPS SOP.
Method(s) of Evaluation: Class participation, final exam questions.
Instructor Guidance: This lesson will provide an opportunity for the
students to use the TPS SOP as a reference and to understand their
role in accreditation.
Review And Approval:
Signature, Printed Name and Title:
Submitted: Steven Swanson (DS/T/TPS/ISM/CISD); 10/21/09.
Reviewed: Steven Swanson, Curriculum Manager; 10/21/09.
Design Approval: Cynthia K. White, Training Advisor; 11/5/09.
U.S. Department of State — Diplomatic Security Service:
Office of Training and Performance Standards:
A. Lesson Introduction: (Slide 1)
1. Instructor Background - Instructor provides a quick background,
emphasizing their qualifications to teach this lesson. This is only
done if the instructor has not been previously introduced.
2. Purpose of Lesson/Establish Rapport - The purpose of this lesson is
to describe the TPS policies and procedures that arc applicable to the
new TPS instructor. in order to function effectively within the TPS
system. It is important that the new instructor be familiar with
his/her responsibilities to the training center, the staff, and the
students, especially where accreditation is concerned.
3. Method of Evaluation - Students will he evaluated through their
participation in class and through final exam questions.
B. Lesson Objectives: (Slide 2-3)
1. Explain the TPS instructor approval process.
2. Explain the course administration procedures related to student
attendance and records.
3. Explain the policies related to suspending training.
4. Explain TPS copyright policies.
5. Explain TPS policies related to the Privacy Act, Freedom of
Information Act (FOTA) and classified material.
6. Explain the TPS testing policies and explain the use of the
SCANTRON testing system.
7. Describe the FLETA Accreditation process.
C. Explain the TPS instructor approval process: (Slide 4)
1. What is the difference between an instructor who is "Qualified"
versus "Approved"?
a. A "Qualified" instructor is one who has successful completed formal
instructor training, but has Not completed the audit of lessons and
the teaching under supervision.
b. An "Approved" instructor has completed all three steps and received
the written approval of the TPS Training Advisor.
2. First step: (Slide 5)
a. The first step toward TPS instructor approval is to receive some
type of formal instructor training. If the new staff member has not
received any type of instructor training from other sources, the TPS
staff member must attend the Instructor Development Course (IDC) as
soon as possible after arrival.
b. TPS will accept formal instructor training from other sources. Some
examples include FLETC LEITP, military service certificates,
commercial training, and college teaching certifications.
c. If TPS is unfamiliar with a particular program, the staff member
may he asked to present a class curriculum and/or syllabus for the
training they attended.
d. The staff member must present a completion certificate for review
by the TPS Training Advisor.
3. Second step: (Slide 6)
a. Upon completion of formal instructor training, the prospective
instructor is required to audit TPS lessons as an observer to become
familiar with procedures and classroom management. The number of
lessons observed is decided by the Branch Chief.
b. Normally, the lesson(s) being observed should be the lesson(s) that
this instructor will be eventually expected to teach. However, class
schedules
Back to figure:
[End of Development]
Implementation:
Pilot Course Monitoring Report:
Part 1. Course Data.
Course Title: DS Media Training Course.
Pilot Course Date: June 28 and August 14, 206 (two classes).
Pilot Course Location: DS Training Center, Dunn Loring, Virginia.
Pilot Course Instructors: Grace Moe, Jack Warner, Jill Olmstead, Tom
Hendrick, Rosemary Reed.
Pilot Course Observers: Steve Swanson, Curriculum Manager.
Pilot Course Methodology: The pilot of the DS Media Training course
was conducted during the First two offerings of the course. It was
taught to 16 members of DS who are either senior staff or Special
Agents in Charge at field offices. The course is an adaptation of a
course conducted by Jack Warner, who was asked by Ambassador Griffin
to provide the course to DS personnel. A copy of the pilot course
schedule is at Attachment A.
Part 2. Pilot Report.
General:
The course is designed to provide senior DS members with DS public
affairs policy, fundamental of conducting certain types of interviews
with the media, and critiqued practical exercises. During the course,
students are required to participate in two mock television
interviews, a mock radio interview, a mock press conference, and a
prepared speech. These exercises are videotaped and critiqued
immediately afterwards by the instructors.
With the exception of the initial briefing on OS public affairs policy
by DS/PA, the entire course is conducted by Jack Warner and a group of
professional journalists that assist him.
Observer Feedback Summary:
Jack Warner has conducted this course for many years and it shows in
his confidence and depth of knowledge. The journalists that assist him
add their knowledge and experience to the course, making it a very
beneficial experience for all students. The use of practical/mock
exercises help to reinforce his comments and provide the student with
experience to bolster their ability to handle real media situations
should they occur.
Given that, Jack Warner mentioned several times his desire to retire
from doing this. If we plan to continue this course for the long term,
we need to think about other instructors would can conduct a similar
level of training.
This course is very labor-intensive for the TPS staff. It requires the
use of two, sometime three multimedia specialists for most of the
practical exercises. The press conference requires 6-B volunteers from
within the TPS staff for about an hour. To date, some of these
volunteers have been the summer interns and injured BSAC students.
Continued support of this course will require the cooperation of all
TPS division chiefs.
During the initial discussions regarding this course, a field of
approximately 24 potential students was identified. With four more
class of eight students scheduled for FY-06 and FY-07, we need to
identify who we want to expand the availability of this training to.
There is interest in this course from the general DS population and
since it is listed in the catalog, we will start receiving requests to
attend. DS/PA will need to screen these applications.
Student Critiques (Level 1):
Attachment B contains summary data derived from the 14 (out of 16)
completed Student Critique surveys. We will conduct a Level III for
this course in December 06.
Jack Warner and his assistants received many compliments for the
professional way they conducted the training.
Specific comments/suggestions from the student critiques include:
- The students did not feel the prepared speech was useful as most of
them have given speeches and it was critiqued like the other
exercises. Substituting a mock ARB or Hill testimony session was
suggested as an alternative.
- The students required additional handouts on topics such as
interview techniques, a DS fact sheet, or DS press bullets that would
be effective in each type of media scenario.
- Some examples of good and bad media events, from press conferences or
television public affairs shows (i.e. Meet the Press) were requested.
- The need to include this type of training at earlier points in the
career of a DS agent, such as during BSAC and RSO training, was
recommended.
Part 3. Pilot Report Action Plan:
The next offering of the Media Training course is scheduled for
September 6. Action items have been identified and assigned to staff
with due dates for the completion of the assigned action.
Action Item 1. Examine the development of additional handouts as
suggested by the students.
Assigned To: Steve Swanson, ISM and DS/PA staff.
Due Date: 09/01/05.
Action Item 2. Research the availability of appropriate video clips to
use in class of examples of good and/bad interviews.
Assigned To: Steve Swanson, ISM and DS/PA staff.
Due Date: 09/01/06.
Action Item 3. Explore the development of media lessons for BSAC. RSO
and other classes to expand the availability of media training to
other points in the career of DS agents.
Assigned To: Steve Swanson, ISM and DS/PA staff.
Due Date: 10/2/06.
Action Item 4. Purchase backdrop curtain for the Training Center to
eliminate the need to rent this curtain for each class.
Assigned To: Multimedia staff, ISM.
Due Date: 09/01/06.
Action Item 5. Identify the audience for future classes.
Assigned To: DS/PA staff.
Due Date: 09101/06.
Part 4. Review and Approval:
Signed by:
Steven R. Swanson:
Curriculum and Accreditation Manager:
Signed by:
Cynthia K. White:
Training Advisor:
Back to figure:
[End of Implementation]
Evaluation:
Instructor Development Course (IDC) (081208):
1) What is your current office assignment?
T/TPS: 4; 50%
T/MSD: 0; 0%;
T/AIA: 2; 25%;
Other (Please specify in comments section): 2; 25%.
Total Respondents For Question: 8.
Comments:
- Trainer at post (azzi psu).
- FTC.
2) Now that you have had some instructing experience since graduating
from the Instructor Development Course, how well do you feel the
training did regarding the following areas?
2) The course adequately covered training logistics (i.e., pre-course
planning and set-up) to the level required for my position.
Strongly Disagree: 0; 0.00%;
Disagree: 0; 0.00%;
Neutral: 0; 0.00%;
Agree: 1; 12.50%;
Strongly Agree: 7; 87.50%;
N/A, Have not had to do this since DC: 0; 0.0%.
Total Respondents For Question: 8.
2) The course adequately covered instructor/facilitator podium skills.
Strongly Disagree: 0; 0.00%;
Disagree: 0; 0.00%;
Neutral: 0; 0.00%;
Agree: 1; 12.50%;
Strongly Agree: 7; 87.50%;
N/A, Have not had to do this since DC: 0; 0.0%.
Total Respondents For Question: 8.
Instructor Development Course (IDG) Supervisory Level III Survey:
1) Whet office do you work within?
TPS/SSB: 3; 30%;
TPS/DTB: 4; 40%;
TPS/OTS: 1; 10%;
TPS/SEB: 1; 10%;
TPS/IAB: 1; 10%;
TPS/TTB: 1; 10%;
MSD: 1; 10%;
ATA: 0; 0%.
Total Respondents For Question: 10.
2) About how often are you able to observe your IDC graduates while
they teach?
Hardly ever: 4; 36.35%
Roughly 25% of the time that they teach: 3; 27.27%;
Roughly 50% of the time that they teach: 2; 18.18%;
Roughly 75% of the time that they teach: 2; 18.18%;
Almost very time that they teach: 0; 0%.
Total Respondents For Question: 11.
Comments:
Not scheduled to instruct a class at the moment. I will observe during
my first instruction.
3) How would you rate your IDC graduates' podium or presentation
skills?
The majority lack adequate presentation skills and need to improve
these skills: 0; 0%;
All need improvement, but some less than others: 2; 22.22%;
The majority has accurate presentation skills, however several could
use improvement: 5; 55.5%;
All my IDC graduates are excellent instructors who need little, if
any, improvement: 2; 22.22%.
[End of Evaluation]
Back to figure:
AN: As shown on figure 1, there is no Revision phase document]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: DSTC Career Training Paths by Diplomatic Security
Position:
Special Agents:
Special agents are the lead operational employees of Diplomatic
Security. In general, when special agents are overseas, they manage
post security requirements; when they serve domestically, they conduct
investigations and provide protective details. New special agents
follow an entry-level career training path designed to equip them to
fulfill the basic responsibilities of the job. For example, after the
3-week orientation provided by FSI, special agents go through the
basic special agent course. It includes about 12 weeks at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center and is followed by about 12 weeks of
additional DSTC training. Upon assignment to an overseas post, special
agents must take the basic Regional Security Officer course, the basic
field firearms officer course, and the security overseas seminar. If
special agents are posted to a designated high-threat post, they must
also take the high-threat tactical training course. In addition, at
all career levels, depending on the post, special agents may have to
take language training.
Once special agents are in a supervisory role, both midlevel and
senior-level agents have additional required training. For example,
they are required to attend FSI-provided leadership and management
training. If agents are posted to a designated high-threat post at
this level, they must take the HTT course if they have not taken HTT
within the previous 5 years. Special agents are also required to take
Regional Security Officer in-service training every 3 years, to keep
up to date on current policies and procedures.
In addition to following the standard special agent career path,
special agents have the option of specializing in different areas--for
example, in providing security protection and training or in focusing
on investigations into visa and passport fraud, human trafficking,
smuggling, and internal malfeasance. Each specialty has its own
required training. Those opting to specialize in security protection
and training can apply to join the Mobile Security Deployment Division
(MSD) for a 3-year tour. When they become MSD agents, special agents
receive 6 months of additional training. Similarly, those who opt to
focus on investigations, becoming Assistant Regional Security Officers-
Investigators, must also take additional training.
Security Engineering Officers (SEO):
Security engineers are responsible for the technical and informational
security programs at diplomatic and consular posts overseas. While
both SEOs and Security Technical Specialists (STS) share similar tasks
at posts, SEOs are expected to be more engineering and design
oriented, while STS are expected to be hands-on technicians. To become
SEOs, personnel must have specific types of engineering or technical
degrees. SEO training was recently restructured. Following the 3-week
FSI-provided orientation, SEOs go through technical training and SEO
fundamentals courses for about 107 days while assigned to a domestic
office for 12 to 24 months. SEOs also go through technical
surveillance countermeasures training, in addition to administrative
training. If assigned to a technical security overseas position, the
SEO then takes the Overseas SEO training course, which takes 25 days.
During training, SEOs (if budget and resources are available) can
complete a 3-or 4-week temporary duty training program at an Engineer
Service Center or Engineer Service Office to get practical on-the-job
experience. In addition, at all career levels, depending on the post,
SEOs may have to take language training.
Once SEOs achieve a supervisory role (both midlevel and senior-level
positions), they are required to take additional FSI-provided
leadership and management courses. SEOs at the midlevel are also
required to take additional in-service training, which may include a
focus on computer network and operating systems, access control
systems, investigation skills, and video surveillance systems, among
others. SEOs are required to take in-service training every 2-3 years,
depending on the needs of the post and available resources.
Security Technical Specialists:
Security Technical Specialists are assigned throughout the world to
develop, implement, and maintain technical security programs at posts
overseas. As noted above, despite the different career paths, in
practice their work is often similar to that of the SEOs. STS
generally have a technical background. Following the 3-week FSI-
provided orientation, STS are required to take technical training and
STS fundamentals at DSTC. During training, STS (if budget and
resources are available) can complete a 3-or 4-week temporary duty
training program at an Engineer Service Center or Engineer Service
Office to get practical on-the-job experience. STS also have to take
FSI-provided administrative training. In addition, at all career
levels, depending on the post, STS may have to take language training.
Once STS achieve midlevel positions, they have additional required
training. STS are required to take FSI-provided leadership and
management training. In addition, STS are also required to take
various in-service training that includes video surveillance, access
control systems, and explosives detection, among others. This is
similar to the in-service training that SEOs take. The STS career
path, however, does not have senior-level positions, so STS do not
take senior-level administrative, leadership, and management training.
Diplomatic Couriers:
Couriers ensure the secure movement of classified U.S. government
materials across international borders. The Diplomatic Courier Service
is a small organization within Diplomatic Security whose members
travel constantly; Diplomatic Courier Service officials noted that
they had unique training challenges--particularly with regard to the
travel logistics to attend training--and have taken responsibility for
training their own personnel. Couriers first go through a 3-week
orientation to the State Department that is identical to the FSI-
provided orientation but is provided by the Diplomatic Courier
Service; the new hires then undergo 3 weeks of functional introductory
courier training. This is the only required course for couriers.
However, the couriers also have a midlevel courier manager training
course that prepares couriers for the manager position, focusing on
supervisory and managerial issues. In addition, the Diplomatic Courier
Service is developing its own in-service training and hub training
courses. The in-service course will act as a refresher to the initial
training, and the hub training would be a 1-day module on how overseas
courier hubs function. No additional training is required for senior-
level couriers.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Diplomatic Security Training Facilities:
The Diplomatic Security Training Directorate's three offices,
including DSTC, currently use 16 facilities to accomplish their
training missions (see table 5).
Table 5: Diplomatic Security Training Facility Use:
Facility: Diplomatic Security Interim Training Facility, Summit Point,
WV;
Use[A]: Hard skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Bill Scott Raceway, Summit Point, WV;
Use[A]: Hard skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Virginia Ki Society, Fairfax, VA;
Use[A]: Hard skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: backup utilization;
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: AirSoft Training Facility, Manassas, VA;
Use[A]: Hard skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: backup utilization;
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA;
Use[A]: Hard skills[C];
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Fort A. P. Hill, VA;
Use[A]: Post blast training;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, GA;
Use[A]: Criminal investigator training program, advanced law
enforcement training, analysts;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Cheltenham, MD;
Use[A]: Firearms;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: backup utilization;
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Canine Training,
Front Royal, VA;
Use[A]: Canine;
Facility utilization[B]: TPS: [Empty];
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: general utilization.
Facility: Camp Dawson, WV (West Virginia Army National Guard Training
Site Command);
Use[A]: Hard skills;
[Empty];
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: [Empty];
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: backup utilization.
Facility: National Guard Training Base, San Luis Obispo, CA;
Use[A]: Hard skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: [Empty];
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: backup utilization.
Facility: U.S. Training Center, Moyock, NC;
Use[A]: Hard skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: [Empty];
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: general utilization.
Facility: Department of State Annex 7A, Springfield, VA;
Use[A]: Firearms, soft skills, security engineering and computer
security labs;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Department of State Annex 11A, 11B, 11C, Dunn Loring, VA;
Use[A]: Soft skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: general utilization;
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Department of State Annex 31, Springfield, VA;
Use[A]: Security engineering and computer security labs, special
skills;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: [Empty].
Facility: Interagency Training Center, Fort Washington, MD;
Use[A]: Technical surveillance countermeasures;
Facility utilization[B]:
TPS: general utilization;
MSD: [Empty];
ATA: [Empty].
Source: DSTC.
[A] Hard skills include the hands-on training that DSTC provides in
areas such as firearms, driving, defensive tactics, and room entry
techniques. Soft skills include training that is classroom-based in
areas such as legal, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, physical
security, and criminal investigations.
[B] TPS = Office of Training and Performance Standards; MSD = Office
of Mobile Security Deployment, ATA = Office of Anti-Terrorism
Assistance.
[C] Quantico Marine Base is most frequently used for firearms training
but has been used for land navigation and other training.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
May 18, 2011:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities
Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts," GAO Job Code 320792.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Nancy Stout, Deputy Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Security at
(703) 204-6182.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO - Jess T. Ford:
DS - Eric J. Boswell:
State/OIG - Evelyn Klemstine:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities
Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts:
(GA0-11-460, GAO Code 320792):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on
GAO's draft report entitled "Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions
and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training
Efforts."
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State:
Develop or improve the process to obtain participant evaluations for
all of DSTC required training, including distributed learning efforts;
Response: The Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC) agrees with
the recommendation and will seek an automated electronic survey tool
that can reach State and non-State students in order to obtain
training feedback.
Develop or improve the process to track individual DSTC training
requirements and completion of DSTC training; and;
Response: DSTC agrees with the recommendation. DSTC currently tracks
student completions (for State and Non-State personnel) and course
information in the Foreign Service Institute's (FSI) Student Training
Management System (STMS). Reports may now be run to parse by course or
by individual student transcript. STMS does not have the capability to
automatically schedule students in courses, but we are exploring the
capacity it has to produce reports that show who has not taken courses
or automatic notification for those due to enroll in a course. DSTC is
also exploring with FSI the capabilities of their learning management
system.
Develop an action plan and associated timeframes needed to carry out the
QDDR recommendation to increase the number of posts at which FACT is
required.
Response: The Department of State agrees with the recommendation. This
portion of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) is
being coordinated by the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) and the Office of
Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (1WPRI) as part of the
task to the framework. Diplomatic Security (DS) is revise risk
management participating actively with the Department and setting
parameters for what additional posts should be added to the Foreign
Affairs Counter Treat (FACT) requirement. Existing DS training
facilities and instructor resources are now at maximum student
capacity capabilities. It is imperative that the Foreign Affairs
Security Training Center (FASTC) be constructed in order to expand the
delivery of FACT training for U.S. Government employees working in
high threat overseas locations.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Anthony Moran, Assistant
Director; Thomas Costa; Anh Nguyen; David Dayton; and Daniel Elbert
provided significant contributions to the work. Martin de Alteriis,
Miriam Carroll Fenton, Cheron Green, Lisa Helmer, Grace Lui, and
Jamilah Moon provided technical assistance and other support.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth
Warrants Strategic Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-156] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12,
2009).
[2] Because GAO recently carried out a review of training provided by
the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), this report does not include an
assessment of the training that Diplomatic Security personnel receive
through FSI. See GAO, Department of State: Additional Steps Are Needed
to Improve Strategic Planning and Evaluation of Training for State
Personnel, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-241]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2011) and GAO, Department of State:
Additional Steps are Needed to Improve Strategic Planning and
Evaluation of Training for State Personnel, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-438T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8,
2011). GAO made several recommendations for State to improve strategic
planning and evaluation of the department's efforts to train
personnel, including improvements to State's efforts to assess
training needs and efforts to ensure that training achieves desired
results.
[3] 22 U.S.C. § 4802 broadly and 22 U.S.C. § 4802(a)(2)(f) more
specifically.
[4] GAO has issued several reports about the Office of Antiterrorism
Assistance in the past, most recently in 2008. GAO, Combating
Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved
Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29,
2008), and its corresponding testimony, Combating Terrorism: Guidance
for State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and
State Does Not Systematically Assess Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-875T] (Washington, D.C.: June 4,
2008).
[5] Pub. L. No. 99-399, Title I, § 103, 100 Stat. 856, codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 4802.
[6] 22 U.S.C. § 4802(a)(2)(f) and Delegation of Responsibilities Under
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995,
and Certain Related Acts, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,790 (Oct. 5, 1994).
[7] For example, 1 FAM 261.1(b)(16) provides the State guidance for
development of facilities, methods, and materials to develop and
upgrade necessary skills, and 1 FAM 262.4-2 describes the Training
Directorate's Office of Training Performance and Standards, and its
components.
[8] The FLETA Board is composed of senior law enforcement and training
professionals from federal and independent agencies or organizations,
including members from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security,
and Justice, as well as the head of DSTC.
[9] Currently, for an academy to receive accreditation, the academy
has to demonstrate that 50 percent of all its courses or five courses--
whichever number is smaller--meet FLETA course standards. In addition,
the basic agent and instructor development courses cannot be included,
but they still require separate accreditation. This change was made
retroactively so that the academies will have to produce evidence that
the courses have met all the standards since the previous academy
accreditation. For Diplomatic Security, this means that evidence of
compliance for the courses must be produced for the years 2009, 2010,
and 2011. DSTC has chosen to use the HTT, SNOE, FACT, Information
Assurance for System Administrators, and Construction Surveillance
Technician/Cleared American Guard as its five courses.
[10] In May 2011, DSTC will undergo the self-assessment and prepare
for the FLETA assessment in October 2011 to be able to receive its
second round of reaccreditation.
[11] DSTC uses a modified version of Instructional Systems Design, the
industry-recognized training framework. DSTC's version, the "PADDIE+R"
model, includes two additional course design and development phases, a
proposal phase and a revision phase.
[12] The revision phase does not have a defined deliverable at the end
of the phase. The deliverable varies depending on the analysis done
throughout the course development process and whether significant
changes are made to course content.
[13] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,
2004).
[14] The Mobile Training Teams are a component of the Office of Mobile
Security Deployment that delivers security training at overseas posts.
The Mobile Training Teams most often work with local guard forces,
embassy drivers, and the Marine Security Guards and tailor the
training they provide to the needs of the post.
[15] The Diplomatic Courier Service is a small organization within
Diplomatic Security whose members travel constantly; Diplomatic
Courier Service officials noted that they had unique training
challenges--particularly with regard to the travel logistics to attend
training--and have taken responsibility for training their own
personnel. The service adopted International Organization for
Standardization quality management structures (ISO 9000) in 2008 to
streamline and standardize its training and other practices. As a
result, the service requested and received DSTC assistance to develop
its courses in compliance with the service's new quality management
standards.
[16] DSTC defines "distributed learning" as interactive online content
for its courses, including computer scenarios or games. Students can
interact with the content before, during, or after a class.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G].
[18] According to DSTC officials, a 30 percent response rate for tier-
3 evaluations equals or exceeds education industry norms for tier-3
evaluation response rates. DSTC officials added that they find value
in analyzing the information from tier-3 evaluations to determine if
there are notable comments or common themes that may support course
revisions or suggest the need for new courses.
[19] In 2010, DSTC was recognized as a Center of Excellence by the
Department of Homeland Security for its provision of information
awareness and cybersecurity training.
[20] Security Protective Specialists are hired as limited, noncareer
appointments. Although they are considered State employees, their
limited appointment is for a 5-year period, and as noncareer
appointees, there is no career development program (i.e., training
continuum).
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-241].
[22] The DSTC training career paths do not apply to the Diplomatic
Courier Service, since it is outside of the Diplomatic Security
Training Directorate.
[23] The exceptions are the Diplomatic Couriers, who do not have
senior-level training, and the STS, who are not considered for senior-
level positions.
[24] 12 FAM 023 (2.4B-1 and 2.4C-1) Department of State Deadly Force
and Firearms Policy, Frequency of Qualification.
[25] We previously reported that Diplomatic Security was having
difficulty recruiting and hiring a sufficient number of Security
Protective Specialists (GAO-10-156). As of January 2011, Diplomatic
Security officials reported that 38 of 77 existing positions were
filled. State expects to fund a total of 148 positions by the end of
2011.
[26] An MRAP egress trainer is an MRAP armored vehicle cab mounted on
a rotating platform to simulate rollovers.
[27] United States Department of State and Broadcasting Board of
Governors Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection:
Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, Report Number
ISP-C-11-08A, October 2010.
[28] Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Special Report on Iraq Transition Planning: Better Planning for
Defense-to-State Transition in Iraq Needed to Avoid Mistakes and
Waste, CWC Special Report 3, July 12, 2010, and United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Iraq: The Transition from a Military
Mission to a Civilian-Led Effort, S. Prt. 112-3, One Hundred Twelfth
Congress, First Session, January 31, 2011.
[29] Department of State, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power, 2010. The QDDR was
intended to set State's priorities and provide strategic guidance on
the capabilities State needs, as well as the most efficient and
effective allocation of resources. In our previous work (GAO-10-156),
we recommended that State use the QDDR as a vehicle to conduct a
strategic review of Diplomatic Security to ensure its mission and
activities address priority needs, as well as address key human
capital and operational challenges. State agreed with this
recommendation; however, Diplomatic Security officials told GAO that
the QDDR was not used to conduct such a review.
[30] State allocated funds for Worldwide Security and Protection from
appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-117, Div. F, 123 Stat. 3034, 3312 (2009); Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, Title XI, 123 Stat.
1859, 1890; and Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8,
Div. H, 123 Stat. 524, 831. The appropriating acts set aside funding
for Worldwide Security Protection, and State refers to these funds as
Worldwide Security and Protection funds.
[31] According to Diplomatic Security and General Services
Administration officials, total costs for the FASTC will be dependent
on the conditions of whatever site is chosen for the facility.
[32] Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347.
[33] Hard skills include the hands-on training that DSTC provides in
areas such as firearms, driving, defensive tactics, and room entry
techniques. Soft skills include training that is classroom-based in
areas such as law, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, physical
security, and criminal investigations.
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-241].
[35] Facilities must be safe from hazards and address the needs of the
courses, and the resources must be based on the needs of the programs
to both estimate the costs and ensure consistent training.
[End of section]
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