This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-561 
entitled 'Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its 
Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens' which was released on June 3, 2011. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

June 2011: 

Combating Terrorism: 

U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens: 

GAO-11-561: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-561, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Denying safe haven to terrorists has been a key national security 
concern since 2002. Safe havens allow terrorists to train recruits and 
plan operations against the United States and its interests across the 
globe. As a result, Congress has required agencies to provide detailed 
information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. 

In this review, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of 
State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its 
Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has 
identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with 
reporting requirements. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed 
U.S. officials and analyzed national security strategies; State 
reporting; and country-level plans for the Philippines, Somalia, and 
Yemen. 

What GAO Found: 

State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual Country 
Reports on Terrorism but does not assess them with the level of detail 
recommended by Congress. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires State to include in its annual 
Country Reports on Terrorism a detailed assessment of each foreign 
country used as a terrorist safe haven. It also recommends that State 
include, to the extent feasible, details in the report such as actions 
taken to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is 
used as a safe haven. Since 2006, State has identified terrorist safe 
havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism. In August 2010, State 
identified 13 terrorist safe havens, including the southern 
Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. However, none of the assessments in 
State’s August 2010 report included information on one of the four 
elements recommended by Congress—the actions taken by countries 
identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in 
weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Also, about a 
quarter of the assessments in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism lacked information on another element recommended by 
Congress—the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist safe 
havens to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Including this 
information in State’s reports could help better inform congressional 
oversight related to terrorist safe havens. 

The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to 
identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. In IRTPA and 
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, Congress 
required the President to submit reports identifying such efforts. 
State responded to IRTPA with a 2006 report and subsequent annual 
updates to its Country Reports on Terrorism. However, efforts 
identified in State’s August 2010 report include only certain efforts 
funded by State and do not include some State and other U.S. 
government agency funded efforts, such as those of the Departments of 
Defense and Justice. For example, our discussions with agency 
officials and analysis of agency strategic documents identified at 
least 14 programs and activities not included in State’s reporting 
that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Yemen. 
According to officials from the National Security Staff, the National 
Security Council is responsible for producing the report required by 
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. As of 
March 2011, the report, which was due in September 2010, was not 
completed. According to agency officials, compiling such a list is 
challenging because it is difficult to determine if a given activity 
addresses terrorist safe havens or contributes to different, though 
possibly related, foreign policy objectives. While we recognize this 
challenge, a more comprehensive list that includes the efforts of all 
relevant agencies could provide useful information to Congress to 
enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward 
the governmentwide goal of denying terrorists safe haven. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends State and the National Security Council (NSC) improve 
reporting on assessments of and U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe 
havens. State concurred with our recommendation on assessments. State 
partially concurred with our recommendation on U.S. efforts to address 
terrorist safe havens, citing other reports it completes related to 
counterterrorism. However, the additional reports cited by State do 
not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address 
terrorist safe havens. The NSC reviewed our report but did not provide 
comments on its recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-561] or key 
components. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Country Reports on Terrorism Identifies Existing Terrorist Safe 
Havens but Does Not Assess these Safe Havens as Recommended by 
Congress: 

The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to 
Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments as Included in State's 
August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: 

Appendix III: Terrorist Safe Havens That Pose the Greatest Threats to 
U.S. National Security: 

Appendix IV: Profiles of Selected Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in 
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: 

Appendix V: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in 
Selected Countries: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Selected Legislation and Associated Reporting Requirements 
Related to Denying Terrorists Safe Haven: 

Table 2: Details Recommended by Congress for Inclusion in State's 
Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments: 

Table 3: Extent to Which the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism 
Includes Details on Terrorist Safe Havens Recommended Congress: 

Table 4: U.S. Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in 
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: 

Table 5: Non-State-Funded Efforts that May Contribute to Addressing 
Terrorist Safe Havens in Selected Countries: 

Table 6: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010 
Country Reports on Terrorism That Pose the Greatest Threat to U.S. 
National Security as Identified by Subject Matter Experts: 

Table 7: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in 
Selected Countries and Their Inclusion in the August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Selected U.S. Government Strategic Documents Emphasizing the 
Importance of Denying Safe Haven to Terrorists: 

Figure 2: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010 
Country Reports on Terrorism: 

Abbreviations: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FACTS: Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System: 

IRTPA: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: 

MSRP: mission strategic and resource plan: 

State: Department of State: 

Treasury: Department of the Treasury: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

June 3, 2011: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: United States 
Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign 
Operations: Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: House of 
Representatives: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management: Committee 
on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, denying safe haven 
to terrorists is an essential component of the U.S. strategy to defeat 
al Qaeda and its affiliates.[Footnote 1] In its August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism,[Footnote 2] the Department of State (State) 
declared denying safe haven to terrorists central to combating 
terrorism, which it cited as the United States' top security threat. 
Terrorist safe havens provide security for terrorists, allowing them 
to train recruits and plan operations. U.S. officials have concluded 
that various terrorist incidents demonstrate the dangers emanating 
from terrorist safe havens, such as the November 2008 attacks in 
Mumbai, India, planned, in part, from safe havens in Pakistan, and the 
attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, planned from safe 
havens in Yemen. 

This report provides information on U.S. efforts to address physical 
terrorist safe havens since 2005.[Footnote 3] Specifically, we assess 
the extent to which (1) State has identified and assessed terrorist 
safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism, and (2) the U.S. 
government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven 
consistent with reporting requirements. 

To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national 
security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning 
documents related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. 
Additionally, we discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities 
related to terrorist safe havens with U.S. officials from the 
Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), 
State, and the Treasury (Treasury); the Office of Management and 
Budget; the National Security Staff; the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID); and the intelligence community. We also spoke to 
subject matter experts from academia and governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations. 

To evaluate the extent to which State has identified and assessed 
terrorist safe havens, we reviewed U.S. agency reports, such as 
State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, we evaluated 
assessments of terrorist safe havens included in State's August 2010 
Country Reports on Terrorism against criteria recommended by Congress 
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA). Further, we interviewed U.S. agency officials to determine 
the process and criteria used to identify and assess terrorist safe 
havens, and spoke with subject matter experts to obtain their views on 
the characteristics of and threats posed by terrorist safe havens 
identified by State. 

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has identified 
efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting 
requirements, we reviewed agency budget documents, agency reports, and 
interagency strategies against provisions included in IRTPA. For a 
more detailed analysis of U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven, 
we selected three countries identified as having terrorist safe havens 
by State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism--the Philippines, 
Somalia, and Yemen. For these safe havens, we examined country-
specific strategies, such as mission strategic and resource plans, and 
discussed efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe 
havens with U.S. officials. We also considered information obtained 
during our previous reviews of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe 
havens in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. To obtain a more in-depth 
understanding of specific programs and activities, we traveled to 
Kenya (where State's Somalia unit is based) and the Philippines, where 
we met with U.S. government personnel involved in efforts to address 
terrorist safe havens in Somalia and the southern Philippines. We 
planned to travel to Yemen but were unable to do so due to the 
unstable security environment during the time of our review. Programs 
and activities identified are meant to serve as examples of U.S. 
efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, not 
an exhaustive list of efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Our 
analysis does not include intelligence-related programs and 
activities. See appendix I for more information on our objectives, 
scope, and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The Value of Safe Haven to Terrorist Groups: 

According to State, a terrorist safe haven is an area of relative 
security that can be exploited by terrorists to undertake activities 
such as recruiting, training, fundraising, and planning operations. 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(9/11 Commission) noted that the physical safe haven in Afghanistan 
allowed al Qaeda the operational space to gather recruits and build 
logistical networks to plan the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 
Concluding that the dangers posed by terrorist safe havens were 
significant, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. government 
identify and prioritize terrorist safe havens, as well as develop 
strategies to address them. 

U.S. Strategic Documents Related to Terrorist Safe Havens: 

The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as 
a key national security concern in a number of U.S. government and 
agency strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies 
released in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying 
safe haven to terrorists. In addition, plans issued by various U.S. 
agencies, such as DOD, DOJ, State, and USAID, as well as the National 
Intelligence Strategy issued by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, include language emphasizing the importance of 
addressing terrorist safe havens (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Selected U.S. Government Strategic Documents Emphasizing the 
Importance of Denying Safe Haven to Terrorists: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Selected national strategies: 

2010 National Security Strategy: 
Deny safe havens and strengthen at-risk states: “Wherever al-Qa’ida or 
its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven...we will 
meet them with growing pressure...These efforts will focus on 
information-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and establishing new 
practices to counter evolving adversaries. We will also help 
states...build their capacity for responsible governance and security 
through development and security sector assistance.” 

2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Eliminate physical 
safe haven: 
“The War on Terror...involves the application of all instruments of 
national power and influence to kill or capture the terrorists; deny 
them safe haven and control of any nation; prevent them from gaining 
access to WMD; render potential terrorist targets less attractive by 
strengthening security; and cut off their sources of funding and other 
resources they need to operate and survive.” 

Selected agency strategic documents: 

DOD: 
National Military Strategic Plan: 
“One of the most important resources to extremists is safe haven. Safe 
havens provide the enemy with relative freedom to plan, organize, 
train, rest, and conduct operations.” 

State/USAID: 
Strategic Plan: 
“The most intractable safe havens exist astride international borders 
and in regions where ineffective governance allows their presence; we 
must develop the means to deny these havens to terrorists. 

Intelligence community: 
National Intelligence Strategy: 
“Failed states and ungoverned spaces offer terrorist and criminal 
organizations safe haven and possible access to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)." 

DOJ: 
Strategic Plan: 
“Deny safe havens to criminal organizations involved in drug-related 
terrorist activities.” 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. and agency strategic documents. 

[End of figure] 

State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates 
policies and programs of U.S. agencies to counter terrorism overseas. 
According to State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
works with all appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure 
integrated and effective counterterrorism efforts that utilize 
diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military 
power. These elements include those in the White House, DOD, DHS, DOJ, 
State, Treasury, USAID, and the intelligence community. The Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism's role is to provide supervision 
of international counterterrorism activities, including oversight of 
resources. Its guiding principles reflect the goals of the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, including denying safe haven to 
terrorists. 

Legislative Reporting Requirements: 

Congress has enacted several laws that require the submission of 
reports to Congress on issues related to the denial of terrorist safe 
havens. See table 1 for selected legislation. 

Table 1: Selected Legislation and Associated Reporting Requirements 
Related to Denying Terrorists Safe Haven: 

Type: Assessment; 
Report to include: Detailed assessments of terrorist safe havens; 
Actor: State; 
Legislation: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(1)(D)); Frequency: Annual, to be 
included in State's Country Reports on Terrorism. 

Type: Assessment; 
Report to include: Intelligence assessment that identifies and 
describes each country or region that is a terrorist safe haven; 
Actor: Director of National Intelligence; Legislation: Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-487, Section 
305); Frequency: Once, to be completed by June 1, 2005. 

Type: U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens; Report to 
include: Report on strategy for addressing terrorist safe havens, 
including information on tools and tactics to disrupt terrorist safe 
havens[A]; Actor: President; 
Legislation: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7120(b)); Frequency: Once, to be 
completed by June 15, 2005. 

Type: U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens; Report to 
include: Updates, to the extent feasible, of the report on strategy, 
including information on tools and tactics to disrupt terrorist safe 
havens[A]; Actor: State; 
Legislation: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(2)(E)); Frequency: Annual, to be 
included in State's Country Reports on Terrorism. 

Type: U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens; Report to 
include: Counterterrorism status reports, including a list of U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe 
havens; Actor: President; 
Legislation: National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No. 
111-84, Section 1242 (b)(1)(F)(iv)); Frequency: Three times, to be 
completed September 30, 2010, 2011, and 2012. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. public law. 

Note: This table does not include legislation with reporting 
requirements related to specific safe havens, such as Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iraq. 

[A] Specifically, Section 7120 of IRTPA requires the President to 
submit a report to Congress on the activities of the U.S. government 
to carry out provisions in the subtitle to IRTPA on Diplomacy, Foreign 
Aid, and the Military in the War on Terrorism. The report was to 
include a description of the strategy for addressing terrorist safe 
havens, as well as a description of (1) terrorist safe havens that 
exist, (2) efforts by the U.S. government to work with other countries 
in bilateral and multilateral fora, and (3) long-term goals and 
actions designed to reduce the conditions that allow for the formation 
of terrorist safe havens. 

[End of table] 

In response to reporting requirements, State annually releases the 
Country Reports on Terrorism. State's August 2010 report includes a 
strategic overview of terrorist threats and a country-by-country 
discussion of foreign government counterterrorism cooperation. In 
addition, it includes chapters on weapons of mass destruction 
terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, designated foreign terrorist 
organizations, and terrorist safe havens. According to State, the 
Country Reports on Terrorism aims to enhance understanding of the 
terrorist threat, as well as serve as a reference tool to inform 
policymakers, the public, and U.S. foreign partners about U.S. 
efforts, progress, and challenges in the campaign against 
international terrorism. While released by State's Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Country Reports on Terrorism 
incorporates the views of the National Counterterrorism Center and 
National Security Staff, as well as other key agencies involved in 
addressing international terrorism. 

The Country Reports on Terrorism Identifies Existing Terrorist Safe 
Havens but Does Not Assess these Safe Havens as Recommended by 
Congress: 

State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual Country 
Reports on Terrorism, but does not assess these safe havens with the 
level of detail recommended by Congress. IRTPA[Footnote 4] requires 
State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports 
on Terrorism of each country whose territory is being used as a 
terrorist sanctuary, also known as a terrorist safe haven.[Footnote 5] 
The act further recommends that these assessments include, to the 
extent feasible, details regarding the knowledge of and actions taken 
to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is being 
used as a terrorist safe haven. While State has identified existing 
terrorist safe havens since 2006, its assessments of these safe havens 
do not always include the details recommended by Congress. For 
instance, none of the assessments in State's August 2010 report 
included information on the actions taken by countries identified as 
having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass 
destruction through their territories. Including this information in 
State's reporting could help inform congressional oversight related to 
terrorist safe havens. 

State Has Reported on Existing Terrorist Safe Havens Since 2006: 

IRTPA requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual 
Country Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign country 
whose territory is being used as a safe haven for terrorists or 
terrorist organizations.[Footnote 6] To fulfill this requirement, 
State first identifies and then assesses existing terrorist safe 
havens.[Footnote 7] Since 2006, State has identified existing 
terrorist safe havens in a dedicated chapter of its Country Reports on 
Terrorism. In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens. 
See figure 2 for the terrorist safe havens identified. 

Figure 2: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010 
Country Reports on Terrorism: 

[Refer to PDF for image: world map] 

Location of terrorist safe havens depicted on the map: 

Afghanistan; 
Colombia Border Region (Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela); 
Iraq; 
Lebanon; 
Northern Iraq; 
Pakistan; 
Somalia; 
Southern Philippines; 
Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral (maritime boundaries of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines); 
Trans-Sahara (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger); Tri-Border Area 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay); Venezuela; 
Yemen. 

Sources: Department of State’s August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism; Map Resources (map). 

Interactive instructions: 
The online version of this map is interactive. Hover your mouse over 
each text box to read State’s August 2010 assessment of why each 
identified country or region is considered a terrorist safe haven. To 
view these assessments in the offline version, please see appendix II. 

[End of figure] 

State has made few changes to the terrorist safe havens identified in 
its report since the April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, which 
identified 15 terrorist safe havens. Since that report, State has 
removed two terrorist safe havens--the Afghan-Pakistan Border and 
Indonesia--from the Country Reports on Terrorism. State officials 
explained that the Afghan-Pakistan Border was removed in 2009, but 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are each still identified as terrorist safe 
havens to highlight the different safe haven issues facing each 
country. State officials said that Indonesia was removed in 2008 
because the country passed counterterrorism legislation and captured 
several members of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. 

State's Safe Haven Assessments Do Not Include All Details Recommended 
by Congress: 

IRTPA includes congressional findings that the planning of complex 
terrorist operations requires safe haven from government and law 
enforcement interference and that terrorists remain focused on finding 
such safe havens. Further, IRTPA states that it is the sense of 
Congress that it should be U.S. policy to identify foreign countries 
that are being used as terrorist sanctuaries and assess current U.S. 
tools being used to assist foreign governments to eliminate these safe 
havens. Accordingly, IRTPA requires State to include detailed 
assessments of terrorist safe havens in its annual Country Reports on 
Terrorism.[Footnote 8] IRTPA also states that these detailed 
assessments should include, to the extent feasible, a variety of 
provisions, including information regarding knowledge of and actions 
to address terrorist activities taken by countries whose territory is 
being used as a terrorist safe haven.[Footnote 9] See table 2 for a 
list of these details. 

Table 2: Details Recommended by Congress for Inclusion in State's 
Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments: 

Recommended details: 

The extent of knowledge by the government of the country with respect 
to terrorist activities in the territory of the country; 

The actions of the country to eliminate terrorist safe havens in its 
territory; 

The actions of the country to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism 
efforts; 

The actions of the country to prevent the proliferation of and 
trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the 
territory of the country. 

Source: GAO analysis of 22 U.S.C. § 2656f and IRTPA. 

[End of table] 

In its Country Reports on Terrorism, State includes a terrorist safe 
havens chapter with assessments of each terrorist safe haven it 
identifies to explain why that country or region has been classified 
as a terrorist safe haven. However, our analysis of the assessments in 
State's August 2010 report determined that, while State included 
information on each identified terrorist safe haven, State did not 
assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. For 
instance, our evaluation determined that while State generally 
included information on the extent of knowledge by the government of 
the country with respect to terrorist activities, it did not include 
any information in its assessments about the actions countries took to 
prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass 
destruction in and through their territories. 

We also analyzed the "country reports" chapter of State's August 2010 
report and found that some of the information not included in the 
assessments in the terrorist safe haven chapter was contained in the 
country reports chapter. For instance, the country report for Yemen 
contained information regarding the Yemeni government's actions to 
cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, like the 
terrorist safe haven assessments, none of these country reports 
contained information regarding the actions that countries took to 
prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass 
destruction in and through their territories. Table 3 shows the number 
of safe havens for which State included the recommended details. 

Table 3: Extent to Which the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism 
Includes Details on Terrorist Safe Havens Recommended Congress: 

Recommended detail: The extent of knowledge by the government of the 
country with respect to terrorist activities in the territory of the 
country; Number of safe havens for which recommended details were 
included: 13 of 13. 

Recommended detail: The actions of the country to eliminate terrorist 
safe havens in its territory; Number of safe havens for which 
recommended details were included: 11 of 13. 

Recommended detail: The actions of the country to cooperate with U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts; Number of safe havens for which recommended 
details were included: 9 of 13. 

Recommended detail: The actions of the country to prevent the 
proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and 
through the territory of the country; Number of safe havens for which 
recommended details were included: 0 of 13. 

Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism. 

[End of table] 

State officials agreed that details related to the trafficking of 
weapons of mass destruction through terrorist safe havens were not 
included in its August 2010 report. These officials stated that time 
constraints and a limited number of staff present challenges to 
including these details in the terrorist safe haven assessments. 
Despite these challenges, officials told us that, after reviewing our 
analysis, they will gather--and believe they will be able to include-- 
details regarding weapons of mass destruction in the Country Reports 
on Terrorism to be released in 2011. In previous reporting, we have 
found that assessments can be used to define requirements and properly 
focus programs to combat terrorism.[Footnote 10] Moreover, in IRTPA, 
Congress has said that it should be U.S. policy to assess U.S. efforts 
to assist foreign governments to address terrorist safe havens. As 
such, including all of the details recommended by Congress in the safe 
haven assessments in State's Country Reports on Terrorism could help 
improve congressional understanding and inform congressional oversight 
related to terrorist safe havens. 

The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to 
Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven: 

The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to 
identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress 
required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. government 
efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws, IRTPA 
and the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. While 
reports produced in response to IRTPA contain some information on U.S. 
efforts to address terrorist safe havens, none provides a 
comprehensive, governmentwide list of U.S. efforts. According to 
agency officials, compiling a list of U.S. efforts is challenging 
because of difficulties determining which U.S. efforts specifically 
address terrorist safe havens. However, a more comprehensive list of 
U.S. efforts would enhance oversight activities, such as assessing 
U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying safe haven to 
terrorists. 

Country Reports on Terrorism Has Not Fully Identified U.S. Efforts to 
Deny Terrorists Safe Haven: 

IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that 
includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools of the U.S. 
government for disrupting or eliminating the security provided to 
terrorists by terrorist safe havens.[Footnote 11] IRTPA also 
recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent 
feasible, in its Country Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 12] IRTPA 
notes that it is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of 
the United States to implement a coordinated strategy to prevent 
terrorists from using safe havens and to assess the tools used to 
assist foreign governments in denying terrorists safe haven. 

In response to IRTPA provisions, State submitted a report to Congress 
in April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its Country 
Reports on Terrorism. These reports include a section on U.S. 
strategies, tactics, and tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to 
address terrorist safe havens. In the August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism, State identified several U.S. efforts for addressing 
terrorist safe havens, including programs such as State's Regional 
Strategic Initiative, Rewards for Justice, and Antiterrorism 
Assistance programs. See table 4 for the list of U.S. efforts 
identified in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. 
[Footnote 13] 

Table 4: U.S. Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in 
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: 

Identified effort: Antiterrorism Assistance; Description: Builds 
partner counterterrorism law enforcement capacity. 

Identified effort: Countering Violent Extremism; Description: Aims to 
prevent at-risk individuals from turning to extremist violence, 
amplify credible voices that reject extremist violence, and persuade 
disengaged terrorists to renounce violence. 

Identified effort: Counterterrorist Finance Training; Description: 
Assists U.S. partners in detecting, isolating, and dismantling 
terrorist financial movements and networks to deprive terrorists of 
funding for their operations. 

Identified effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist 
Organizations; Description: Blocks funding of terrorists and their 
supporters and promotes international cooperation against them. 

Identified effort: Middle East Partnership Initiative; Description: 
Seeks to build partnership between the United States and citizens of 
the Middle East to support the development of more prosperous, 
successful, participatory, and pluralistic societies. 

Identified effort: Rewards for Justice; Description: Offers and pays 
rewards for (1) information that prevents or successfully resolves an 
act of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property or (2) 
information that leads to the location of key terrorist leaders. 

Identified effort: Regional Security Initiative; Description: Enables 
ambassadors and their country teams to coordinate counterterrorism 
strategies across borders to help host nations understand threats and 
strengthen their political will and capacity to counter them. 

Identified effort: Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal 
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System; Description: 
Implements biometric capabilities to assist partner nations to 
correctly identify and track individuals entering and departing 
countries by land, sea, and airports of entry. 

Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism and Congressional Budget Justification documents. 

Note: The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, Millennium Challenge 
Account, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative have been included in earlier versions of the Country 
Reports on Terrorism but do not appear in the August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism. The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Program have also been 
included in previous reports and are mentioned in the August 2010 
Country Reports on Terrorism, but not in the chapter on terrorist safe 
havens. 

[End of table] 

However, State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism did not 
include some U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist 
safe havens according to our review of related budget information, 
strategic documents, and discussions with U.S. officials. 
Specifically, the list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe 
havens in the Country Reports on Terrorism did not include (1) all of 
the programs and activities State funds to address terrorist safe 
havens and (2) programs and activities funded by agencies other than 
State, such as DOD, DOJ, and Treasury that may contribute to 
addressing terrorist safe havens. 

Some State-Funded Efforts Are Not Included: 

State's budget information, strategic documents, and discussions with 
State officials indicate that some State-funded efforts that may 
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens were not included in 
the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. 

* First, budget information in State's Foreign Assistance Coordination 
and Tracking System (FACTS) identifies programs and activities to 
eliminate safe havens that were not included in State's August 2010 
Country Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 14] State identified in its 
budget database budget accounts that fund programs and activities for 
eliminating safe havens. However, certain activities funded by four of 
these accounts were not included in State's August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 15] For example, activities in Chad, a 
Trans-Saharan country, funded by the development assistance budget 
account were identified in FACTS as eliminating safe havens, as were 
some activities in Pakistan funded through the Economic Support Fund. 
However, neither of these budget accounts was included in State's 
August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 16] 

* Second, selected State strategic documents identify additional 
efforts funded by State that may contribute to denying terrorists safe 
haven but were not included in the August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism. For the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen,[Footnote 17] we 
reviewed each country's fiscal year 2012 mission strategic and 
resource plan (MSRP), submitted in April 2010, which included program 
funding information for goals related to addressing terrorist safe 
havens for fiscal years 2009 through 2015.[Footnote 18] (For more 
information on these three countries, see appendix IV.) Our review 
identified several examples of State-funded efforts that may 
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens but were not included 
in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For example, the 
Yemen MSRP indicates that the State-funded Foreign Military Financing 
program contributed to addressing safe havens in Yemen by funding 
activities to support border security and counter piracy. In addition, 
the MSRP for the Philippines included Foreign Military Financing 
program activities to sustain progress in developing the Philippine 
Defense Department capability to address terrorist safe havens. 
However, this program was not included in State's August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, USAID development assistance in the 
Philippines focuses on mitigating conflict, increasing economic 
opportunities, strengthening health services, and improving education, 
which, according to the country's MSRP, can inhibit terrorists from 
exploiting those living under marginal conditions. Development 
assistance was not included in State's August 2010 report. 

* Third, according to State officials, additional efforts undertaken 
by State, but not identified in State's August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism, may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For 
example, State officials indicated that activities funded through 
State's Peacekeeping Operations account contributed to addressing the 
terrorist safe haven in Somalia because it helped the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia keep the terrorist group al-Shabaab from 
gaining control of the country's capital city, Mogadishu. In addition, 
State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs funded a 
DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 
effort in the Philippines that may contribute to addressing the 
terrorist safe haven in that country by providing police development 
and capacity building programs in areas used by terrorists for illicit 
travel. Similarly, officials indicated that State-funded Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement training for Filipino and Yemeni officials to 
combat money laundering and bulk cash smuggling may contribute to 
addressing the safe havens in their countries. State-funded 
Peacekeeping Operations, the International Criminal Investigative 
Training Assistance Program, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
training programs were not included in State's August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism. 

In total, our analysis identified nine examples of State-funded 
efforts in the Philippines, four examples in Somalia, and nine 
examples in Yemen not included in State's August 2010 Country Reports 
on Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. 
Table 7 in appendix V describes U.S. efforts funded by State to 
address terrorist safe havens as identified by agency officials or 
MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen and indicates which of 
these efforts were included in State's August 2010 report. 

Agency officials explained that compiling a list of U.S. efforts, such 
as the one in State's Country Reports on Terrorism, is challenging 
because of difficulties determining which U.S. efforts specifically 
address terrorist safe havens. According to State and USAID officials, 
counterterrorism programs and activities may simultaneously contribute 
to multiple foreign policy goals. For example, according to State 
officials, U.S. programs assisting refugees on the Somali border may 
be considered as combating violent extremism or denying terrorists 
safe haven. Similarly, USAID officials explained that governance 
programs in Yemen aim to help local governments meet community needs, 
but in doing so may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens in 
Yemen by shrinking the terrorists' operating spaces in those 
communities. However, documents authored and databases managed by 
State contain information on additional U.S. efforts to address 
terrorist safe havens that would be feasible to include in State's 
reporting. 

Efforts Funded by Other U.S. Agencies Are Not Included: 

Our discussions with officials from various agencies and our review of 
MSRPs from the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen indicate that State's 
reports also do not include efforts funded by agencies other than 
State that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. 

* First, officials from DOD, DOJ, and Treasury indicated that their 
agencies fund efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe 
havens. Officials from DOD indicated that DOD-funded activities to 
build capacity of foreign partners' security forces to combat 
terrorism are key DOD efforts to address terrorist safe havens. For 
example, some DOD train and equip activities funded through the 
department's Global Train and Equip "Section 1206" and country-
specific funding accounts, such as the Afghanistan and Iraq Security 
Forces Funds, contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For 
example, DOD has used Section 1206 funding to conduct train and equip 
programs to build the capacity of security forces in Yemen and the 
Philippines to conduct counterterrorism operations. U.S. Coast Guard 
officials indicated that some coastal security training and technical 
assistance activities funded largely by DOD and implemented by the 
U.S. Coast Guard may also contribute to addressing terrorist safe 
havens in Yemen and the Philippines. 

* Second, our review of MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen 
indicated that additional efforts funded by agencies other than State 
and not included in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism 
may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, the 
safe haven-related goal in the fiscal year 2012 MSRP for the 
Philippines indicated that efforts will be made through the DOD Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to enhance counterterrorism 
capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The safe haven- 
related goal in Yemen's fiscal year 2012 MSRP indicated that DOJ's 
Federal Bureau of Investigation legal attachés participate in 
activities that empower Yemeni law enforcement officials to better 
identify and prosecute suspected terrorists. These efforts were not 
included in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. 

In total, our analysis identified seven examples of non-State-funded 
efforts in the Philippines, one example in Somalia, and five examples 
in Yemen that were not included in State's August 2010 Country Reports 
on Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, 
as shown in table 5. 

Table 5: Non-State-Funded Efforts that May Contribute to Addressing 
Terrorist Safe Havens in Selected Countries: 

Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines 
enabling activities; Example activities: Engagement to enable Armed 
Forces of the Philippines capacity to plan and execute Civil Military 
Operations. 

Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group capacity 
building activities; Example activities: Engagement to build Armed 
Forces of the Philippines capacity to plan and execute Civil Military 
Operations. 

Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Global Train and Equip "Section 1206" program; 
Example activities: Equipment and training to enhance Philippines' 
national military capacity to conduct CT operations. 

Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD[A]; 
Identified efforts: Coast Guard equipment[B]; Example activities: 
Provision of Coast Guard ship. 

Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Counterterrorism Fellowship Program professional 
education; Example activities: Special Operations Combating Terrorism 
course. 

Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOJ; 
Identified efforts: Federal Bureau of Investigations Legal Attaché; 
Example activities: Counterterrorism Financing and Money Laundering 
training. 

Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: Treasury; 
Identified efforts: U.S. Treasury Technical Assistance Programs; 
Example activities: Training to build foreign financial intelligence 
unit capacity. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
Funding agency: DOJ; 
Identified efforts: Federal Bureau of Investigations Legal Attaché 
activities; Example activities: Collaboration with the Transitional 
Federal Government in Somalia. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Global Train and Equip "Section 1206" program; 
Example activities: Equipment and training to provide the Yemeni 
Border Security Force with the capability to deter, detect, and detain 
terrorists along Yemen's borders with Saudi Arabia, and Oman. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Section 1205 authority to train and equip Yemeni 
Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Force; Example activities: Train 
and equip activities with the Yemeni Ministry of Interior 
Counterterrorism Force. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Coast Guard equipment[A]; Example activities: 
Delivery of water craft. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
Funding agency: DOD; 
Identified efforts: Counterterrorism Fellowship Program professional 
education; Example activities: Mobile education team counterterrorism 
training. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
Funding agency: DOJ; 
Identified efforts: Federal Bureau of Investigations Legal Attaché; 
Example activities: Training and mentoring activities. 

Sources: GAO analysis of MSRPs, interviews with U.S. agency officials, 
and U.S. agency data. 

[A] DOD is providing the cutter ship to the Philippines as a no-cost 
excess defense article. 

[B] The Coast Guard is a DHS component; however, Coast Guard capacity 
building activities are funded primarily by DOD. State also sometimes 
contributes funding for these activities. 

[End of table] 

IRTPA calls for a report on the activities of the U.S. government to 
address terrorist safe havens, and a stated intention of the Country 
Reports on Terrorism is to provide policymakers with an overview of 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts. As such, State's report is incomplete 
without including the contributions of its various interagency 
partners to address terrorist safe havens. As this information is 
included in State documents, and State approves certain activities 
funded by other agencies such as DOD's Section 1206 and 1205 programs, 
it is feasible for State to include this information in its annual 
report. 

The National Security Council Has Not Completed the Required Report 
Identifying U.S. Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven: 

In addition to the provisions in IRTPA, Congress demonstrated an 
ongoing interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny 
terrorist safe havens in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 2010. The conference report accompanying the act noted 
that existing executive branch reporting on counterterrorism does not 
address the full scope of U.S. activities or assess overall 
effectiveness. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2010 requires the President to submit a report to Congress on the U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy, including an assessment of the scope, 
status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in fighting al 
Qaeda and its affiliates and a list of U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
relating to the denial of terrorist safe havens. The act required the 
President to produce this report by September 30, 2010, and every 
September 30th until September 30, 2012. According to the act, the 
report is to be submitted in an unclassified form to the maximum 
extent practicable and accompanied by a classified appendix, as 
appropriate.[Footnote 19] According to the conference report 
accompanying the act, the required report would help Congress in 
conducting oversight, enhance the public's understanding of how well 
the government is combating terrorism, and assist the administration 
in identifying and overcoming related challenges. 

According to the President's National Security Staff, the National 
Security Council has been assigned responsibility for completing the 
report required under the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 2010. However, officials on the national security staff--
who are taking the lead in drafting the report--stated that while they 
were working on a draft, no report had been submitted to Congress as 
of March 2011. They were unsure when the report--including information 
requested by Congress to assist it in assessing the success of 
counterterrorism efforts to deny terrorists safe haven--would be 
completed. 

Conclusions: 

Given that dismantling terrorist safe havens is a top U.S. national 
security priority, it is important that accurate assessments of and 
comprehensive information on terrorist safe havens and U.S. efforts to 
address them is available. Congress has expressed its desire to 
receive this type of information in order to better understand the 
status of efforts related to terrorist safe havens and to better 
assess U.S. efforts to address them. While some reports have been 
provided to Congress on these issues, critical details recommended by 
Congress are not included in these documents, such as complete 
assessments of the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist 
safe havens to address terrorist activities. Further, despite multiple 
requests from Congress, neither State nor the National Security 
Council has compiled a list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe 
havens that includes the contributions of all relevant U.S. agencies. 
Providing this type of information to Congress could better define the 
nature of the threats posed by terrorist groups, as well as the status 
of and challenges faced by U.S. efforts to address them. Without this 
information, Congress and other decision makers may lack facts 
essential to assessing progress toward the U.S. goal of denying 
terrorists safe haven, making decisions on the allocation of 
resources, and conducting effective oversight. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the information provided to Congress and other decision 
makers, we make the following three recommendations: 

1. The Secretary of State should include in the Country Reports on 
Terrorism detailed assessments of identified terrorist safe havens 
using the provisions recommended by Congress in IRTPA. 

2. The Secretary of State, in collaboration with relevant agencies as 
appropriate, should include a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts for 
addressing terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested 
under IRTPA. 

3. The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant 
agencies as appropriate, should complete the requirements of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 to report to 
Congress on a list of U.S. efforts related to the denial of terrorist 
safe havens. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, 
USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security 
Council, and members of the intelligence community for their review 
and comment. State and DHS provided written comments, which are 
reprinted in appendix VI and VII respectively. In addition, DOD, DHS, 
DOJ, State, and the Office of Management and Budget provided technical 
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The National 
Security Council reviewed the report but did not provide comments on 
its recommendations. 

State concurred with our recommendation that it include detailed 
assessments of terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on 
Terrorism, and noted it will implement this recommendation in its 
updated report to be released in 2011. Related to our recommendation 
for State to include a governmentwide list of efforts to address 
terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested under the 
IRTPA, State concurred that reporting on U.S. efforts to deny 
terrorist safe havens should be more comprehensive. However, State did 
not agree that such a list should be part of its annual Country 
Reports on Terrorism, citing the fact that it completes other reports 
related to counterterrorism. However, in the IRTPA, Congress 
recommended that this information be included in the Country Reports 
on Terrorism. Moreover, while it is possible that other reports 
produced by State address IRTPA provisions, the antiterrorism 
assistance report cited by State in its comments does not constitute a 
governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, 
as it does not include the contributions of key agencies such as DOD. 
We maintain that such a list could assist decisionmakers in assessing 
progress toward the U.S. goal of denying terrorist safe havens and 
conducting effective oversight. 

DHS concurred with our report, noting its acknowledgment of several 
DHS training efforts to address terrorist safe havens in selected 
countries. DHS also stated it will continue to support, as 
appropriate, State and other relevant agency efforts to improve 
reporting on terrorist safe havens. 

We are sending copies of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, 
Treasury, USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National 
Security Council, and the intelligence community. In addition, the 
report will be available on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director: International Affairs and 
Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report provides information on U.S. efforts to address physical 
terrorist safe havens since 2005. Specifically, we assess the extent 
to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and 
assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and 
(2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe 
haven consistent with reporting requirements. 

To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national 
security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning 
documents related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. 
Additionally, we discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities 
related to terrorist safe havens with U.S. officials from the 
Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), 
State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury); the Office of Management 
and Budget; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the 
National Security Staff; and the intelligence community. We focused on 
these agencies because they are involved in efforts that may 
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. We also spoke to 13 
subject matter experts from academic, governmental, and 
nongovernmental organizations. We selected experts who met at least 
four of the following criteria: (1) knowledge of and experience in one 
or more of the following areas: (a) identification of terrorist safe 
havens or failed states, (b) factors that contribute to terrorist safe 
havens, or (c) process of terrorist recruitment or radicalization; (2) 
knowledge and experience regarding key safe havens; (3) travel to at 
least one key safe haven country or region; (4) writing and publishing 
of articles on key safe haven countries, regions, or issues; and (5) 
knowledge of and experience in government, for-profit organizations, 
nonprofit organizations, academia, or journalism. 

To evaluate the extent to which State has identified and assessed 
terrorist safe havens, we reviewed U.S. agency reports, such as 
State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, we evaluated 
assessments of terrorist safe havens included in the chapter specific 
to terrorist safe havens in State's August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism against criteria recommended, to the extent feasible, by 
Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA). To evaluate the assessments, two analysts independently 
analyzed the terrorist safe havens assessments against details 
included in IRTPA. Those analysts then discussed and resolved any 
differences in the results of their analyses; a supervisor reviewed 
and approved the final results of the analysis. We also interviewed 
U.S. agency officials to determine the process and criteria used to 
identify, assess, and prioritize these terrorist safe havens, and 
spoke with subject matter experts to obtain their views on the 
characteristics of and threats posed by terrorist safe havens 
identified by State. 

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has identified 
efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting 
requirements, we evaluated national counterterrorism and security 
strategies; agency budget and planning documents, including reports 
from State's Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System 
(FACTS); and agency reports against requirements included in IRTPA. 
Although we did not independently audit the funding data in the FACTS 
database, and are not expressing an opinion on them, based on our 
examination of the documents received and our discussions with 
cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the FACTS data we 
obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
engagement. We also examined country-specific strategies related to 
addressing terrorist safe havens by interviewing U.S. agency officials 
and reviewing mission strategic and resource plans (MSRP) for three 
countries identified as having terrorist safe havens--the Philippines, 
Somalia, and Yemen. We selected these countries based on consideration 
of the following criteria: (1) identification of a country or area as 
a terrorist safe haven by State in its August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism, (2) priority placed on a particular safe haven as expressed 
U.S. officials and subject matter experts, (3) consideration of 
related GAO work, and (4) congressional interest. Our analysis does 
not include intelligence-related efforts. We also considered 
information obtained during our previous reviews of U.S. efforts to 
address terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan,[Footnote 20] Pakistan, 
[Footnote 21] and Iraq.[Footnote 22] To obtain a more in-depth 
understanding of specific programs and activities, we traveled to 
Kenya (where State's Somalia unit is located) and the Philippines, 
where we met with U.S. government personnel involved in efforts to 
address terrorist safe havens in Somalia and the southern Philippines. 
We planned to travel to Yemen, but were unable to do so due to the 
unstable security environment during the time of our review. To 
supplement our understanding of U.S. efforts related to denial of 
terrorist safe haven in Yemen we spoke with officials based in 
Washington, D.C., from DOD, State, USAID, and the intelligence 
community. We compiled our list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist 
safe haven in the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen based on: (1) the 
efforts identified by cognizant U.S. officials as those contributing 
to addressing terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities 
associated with MSRP goals related to addressing terrorist safe 
havens. Programs and activities identified are meant to serve as 
examples of U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist 
safe havens not as an exhaustive list of efforts to address terrorist 
safe havens. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments as Included in State's 
August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: 

Terrorist safe haven: Afghanistan; Assessments: "The Government of 
Afghanistan, in concert with the International Security Assistance 
Force and the international community, continued its efforts to 
eliminate terrorist safe havens and build security, particularly in 
the country's south and east where the main Taliban based insurgents 
threatened stability. Many insurgent groups, including Taliban 
elements, the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, al-Qa'ida 
(AQ), and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, continued to use territory across the 
border in Pakistan as a base from which to plot and launch attacks 
within Afghanistan and beyond. Narcotics trafficking, poppy 
cultivation, and criminal networks were particularly prevalent, 
constituting a significant source of funding for the insurgency as 
well as fueling corruption within Afghanistan. AQ leadership in 
Pakistan maintained its support to militants conducting attacks in 
Afghanistan and provided funding, training, and personnel to 
facilitate terrorist and insurgent operations. Anti-Coalition 
organizations continued to operate in coordination with AQ, Taliban, 
and other insurgent groups, primarily in the east." 

Terrorist safe haven: Colombia Border Region (Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Peru, Panama, and Brazil); Assessments: "Columbia's borders with 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil include rough terrain and 
dense forest cover. These conditions, coupled with low population 
densities and historically weak government presence, create potential 
safe havens for insurgent and terrorist groups, particularly the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC, retreating in 
the face of Colombian military pressures, thus operated with relative 
ease along the fringes of Colombia's borders, and also uses areas in 
neighboring countries along the border to rest and regroup, procure 
supplies, and stage and train for terrorist attacks with varying 
degrees of success. The FARC elements in these border regions often 
engaged the local population in direct and indirect ways, including 
recruitment and logistical assistance. This appeared to be less so in 
Brazil and Peru where potential safe havens were addressed by stronger 
government responses. Ecuador and Panama have responded with a mix of 
containment and non-confrontation with Colombian narco-terrorist 
groups, although some confrontations do occur depending on local 
decisions and cross-border relations." 

Terrorist safe haven: Iraq; 
Assessments: "Iraq was not a terrorist safe haven in 2009, but 
terrorists, including Sunni groups like al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), and 
Ansar al-Islam (AI), as well as Shia extremists and other groups, 
viewed Iraq as a potential safe haven. Together, U. S. and Iraqi 
security forces continued to make progress against these groups. The 
significant reduction in the number of security incidents in Iraq that 
began in the last half of 2007 continued through 2009, with a steady 
downward trend in numbers of civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and 
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. AQI, although still 
dangerous, experienced the defection of members, lost key mobilization 
areas, suffered disruption of support infrastructure and funding, and 
was forced to change targeting priorities. A number of factors have 
contributed to the substantial degradation of AQI. The alliance of 
convenience and mutual exploitation between AQI and many Sunni 
populations has deteriorated. The Baghdad Security Plan, initiated in 
February 2007, along with assistance from primarily Sunni tribal and 
local groups, has succeeded in reducing violence to late 2005 levels 
and disrupted and diminished AQI infrastructure, driving some 
surviving AQI fighters from Baghdad and Anbar into the northern Iraqi 
provinces of Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. New initiatives with 
tribal and local leaders in Iraq have led Sunni tribes and local 
citizens to reject AQI and its extremist ideology. The continued 
growth, professionalism, and improved capabilities of the Iraqi forces 
have increased their effectiveness in rooting out terrorist cells. 
Iraqis in Baghdad, Anbar and Diyala Provinces, and elsewhere have 
turned against AQI and were cooperating with the Iraqi government and 
Coalition Forces to defeat it." 

Terrorist safe haven: Northern Iraq; Assessments: "The Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK) maintained an active presence in northern Iraq, 
from which it coordinated attacks into Turkey, primarily against 
Turkish security forces, local officials and villagers who opposed the 
organization. In October, the Turkish Parliament overwhelmingly voted 
to extend the authorization for cross-border military operations 
against PKK encampments in northern Iraq. Iraq, Turkey, and the United 
States continued their formal trilateral security dialogue as one 
element of ongoing cooperative efforts to counter the PKK. Iraqi 
leaders, including those from the Kurdistan Regional Government, 
continued to publicly state that the PKK was a terrorist organization 
that would not be tolerated in Iraq. Turkish and Iraqi leaders signed 
a counterterrorism agreement in October." 

Terrorist safe haven: Lebanon; 
Assessments: "Hizballah remained the most prominent and powerful 
terrorist group in Lebanon, with deep roots among Lebanon's large Shia 
community, which comprises at least one third of Lebanon's population. 
The Lebanese government continued to recognize Hizballah, a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, as a legitimate "resistance 
group" and political party. Hizballah maintained offices in Beirut and 
military-style bases elsewhere in the country and was represented by 
elected deputies in parliament. AQ associated extremists also operated 
within the country, though their presence was small compared to that 
of Palestinian groups operating in Palestinian refugee camps who were 
not aligned with AQ. The camps are officially controlled by the 
Lebanese government. While the Lebanese Armed Forces do not have a day-
to-day presence in the camps, they have at times conducted operations 
in the camps to combat terrorist threats." 

Terrorist safe haven: Pakistan; 
Assessments: "Despite increased efforts by Pakistani security forces, 
al-Qa'ida (AQ) terrorists, Afghan militants, foreign insurgents, and 
Pakistani militants continued to find safe haven in portions of 
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North-West 
Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan. AQ and other groups such as 
the Haqqani Network used the FATA to launch attacks in Afghanistan, 
plan operations worldwide, train, recruit, and disseminate propaganda. 
The Pakistani Taliban (under the umbrella moniker Tehrik-e-Taliban or 
TTP) also used the FATA to plan attacks against the civilian and 
military targets across Pakistan. Outside the FATA, the Quetta-based 
Afghan Taliban and separate insurgent organizations such as Hizb-e-
Islami Gulbuddin used the areas in Baluchistan and the NWFP for safe 
haven. Islamist Deobandi groups and many local tribesmen in the FATA 
and the NWFP continued to resist the government's efforts to improve 
governance and administrative control. Despite the August death of the 
Pakistani Taliban's leader Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistani military 
operations throughout the FATA and NWFP, the Pakistani Taliban, AQ, 
and other extremist groups remained dangerous foes to Pakistan and the 
international community. Despite international condemnation for its 
November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) continued to 
plan regional operations from within Pakistan. LT is an extremely 
capable terrorist organization with a sophisticated regional network. 
It continued to view American interests as legitimate targets. While 
the Government of Pakistan has banned LT, it needs to take further 
action against this group and its front organizations, which find safe 
haven within Pakistan." 

Terrorist safe haven: Somalia; 
Assessments: "A small number of al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives remained in 
East Africa, particularly Somalia, where they posed a serious threat 
to U.S. and allied interests in the region. These elements were 
disrupted in late 2006 and early 2007 as a result of Ethiopian 
military actions and again by the death of AQ operative Saleh Nabhan 
in September 2009. Somalia remained a concern given the country's 
long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, continued political 
instability, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, all of which 
provide opportunities for terrorist transit and/or safe haven and 
increased the regional threat level. AQ remains likely to make common 
cause with Somali extremists, most notably al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has 
expanded its area of control during its protracted insurgency against 
the Transitional Federal Government and particularly since the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in early 2009. The group controlled 
most of southern Somalia at year's end." 

Terrorist safe haven: Southern Philippines; Assessments: "Terrorist 
operatives have sought safe haven in areas of the southern 
Philippines, specifically in the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao. 
Philippine government control and the rule of law in this area is weak 
due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local Muslim minority resentment 
of central governmental policies. In addition to Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
fugitives and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists, the New People's Army 
and Rajah Solaiman Movement also operated in the southern Philippines." 

Terrorist safe haven: Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral (maritime boundaries 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines); Assessments: "In 
Southeast Asia, the terrorist organizations Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have sought safe haven in the vicinity of the 
Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Archipelago, which encompasses the maritime 
boundaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The area's 
thousands of islands make it a difficult region for authorities to 
monitor, while a range of licit and illicit activities that occur there 
- worker migration, tourism, and trade, for example - pose another 
challenge to identifying and countering the terrorist threat. Although 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved their efforts 
to control their shared maritime boundaries, the expanse nevertheless 
remains difficult to control. Surveillance is improved but remains 
partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups have 
provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, such as movement 
of personnel, equipment, and funds." 

Terrorist safe haven: Trans-Sahara (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and 
Niger); Assessments: "The primary terrorist threat in this region was 
al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM was based primarily in 
northeastern Algeria but factions also operated from a safe haven in 
northern Mali, from which they transited areas of the Maghreb and 
Sahel, especially Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. AQIM continued to 
conduct small scale ambushes and attacks on Algerian security forces 
in northeastern Algeria, but in 2009 the group was not able to conduct 
the "spectacular" attacks that were more common a few years ago such 
as their bombing of the UN and Algerian government buildings. AQIM 
factions in northern Mali used the safe haven to conduct kidnappings 
for ransom and murder of Western hostages and to conduct limited 
attacks on Malian and Mauritanian security personnel. AQIM derived 
financial support from the ransoms it collected, which were used to 
sustain the organization and plan further terrorist operations. AQIM 
routinely demanded the release of their operatives in custody in the 
region and elsewhere as a condition of release of hostages. Regional 
governments sought to take steps to counter AQIM operations, but there 
was a need for foreign assistance in the form of law enforcement and 
military capacity building in order to do so." 

Terrorist safe haven: Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Brazil); Assessments: "No corroborated information showed that 
Hizballah, HAMAS, or other Islamic extremist groups used the Tri-
Border Area (TBA) for military-type training or planning of terrorist 
operations, but the United States remained concerned that these groups 
use the region as a safe haven to raise funds. Suspected supporters of 
Islamic terrorist groups, including Hizballah, take advantage of 
loosely regulated territory and the proximity of Ciudad del Este, 
Paraguay and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil to participate in a wide range of 
illicit activities and to solicit donations from within the sizable 
Muslim communities in the region. The Argentine, Brazilian, and 
Paraguayan governments have long been concerned with arms and drugs 
smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, trafficking in persons, 
and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through the TBA. 
Concerns about the region moved the three governments to invite the 
United States to participate in the Three Plus One Group on Tri-Border 
Area Security, which focuses on practical steps to strengthen 
financial and border controls and enhance law enforcement and 
intelligence sharing. Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay have made 
notable strides in launching initiatives to strengthen law enforcement 
institutions and cooperation, including developing financial 
intelligence units, broadening border security cooperation, augmenting 
information sharing among prosecutors responsible for counterterrorism 
cases, and establishing trade transparency units." 

Terrorist safe haven: Venezuela; 
Assessments: "Corruption within the Venezuelan government and 
military, ideological ties with the FARC, and weak international 
counternarcotics cooperation have fueled a permissive operating 
environment for narco-traffickers. Other than some limited activities, 
such as the bombing of remote dirt airstrips on the border, there is 
little evidence that the government of Venezuela is moving to improve 
this situation in the near future. The FARC, as well as Colombia's 
second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), 
regularly used Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup, engage in 
narcotics trafficking, as well as to extort protection money and 
kidnap Venezuelans to finance their operations." 

Terrorist safe haven: Yemen; 
Assessments: "The security situation in Yemen continued to 
deteriorate. As Saudi security forces have clamped down on terrorism 
and foreign fighters have returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
Yemen's porous borders have allowed many terrorists to seek safe haven 
within Yemen. Al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY) announced its merger with al-
Qa'ida (AQ) elements in Saudi Arabia in January 2009, creating al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The creation of AQAP coincided 
with fewer attacks within Yemen, possibly due to the desire of its 
leadership to use Yemen as a safe haven for planning of future attacks 
and recruitment because the central government lacks a strong presence 
in much of the country. The absence of effective counterterrorism 
legislation contributed to Yemen's appeal as a safe haven and 
potential base of operations for terrorists. The Yemeni government's 
response to the terrorist threat was intermittent, and its ability to 
pursue and prosecute suspected terrorists remained weak for most of 
the year due to a number of shortcomings, including the stalling of 
draft counterterrorism in Parliament. The government's response 
improved dramatically in December with security forces taking strong 
action against a number of terrorist cells. Even with this turn of 
events, the government was often distracted by the "Sixth War" of the 
Houthi rebellion in the Sa'ada governorate in the north of the country 
and political unrest in southern Yemen." 

Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Terrorist Safe Havens That Pose the Greatest Threats to 
U.S. National Security: 

We spoke with 13 subject matter experts with knowledge related to 
terrorist safe havens. We asked these experts to determine which five 
terrorist safe havens identified in the State's August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism posed the greatest risk to U.S. national security 
(see table 6). 

Table 6: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010 
Country Reports on Terrorism That Pose the Greatest Threat to U.S. 
National Security as Identified by Subject Matter Experts: 

Countries and regions: Pakistan; 
Number of experts[A,B]: 12 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Yemen; 
Number of experts[A,B]: 10 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Somalia; 
Number of experts[A,B]: 9 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Afghanistan; Number of experts[A,B]: 8 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Iraq; 
Number of experts[A,B]: 5 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Trans-Sahara; Number of experts[A,B]: 2 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Lebanon; 
Number of experts[A,B]: 1 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Colombia's Border Region; Number of 
experts[A,B]: 0 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Northern Iraq; Number of experts[A,B]: 0 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Southern Philippines; Number of experts[A,B]: 0 
of 12. 

Countries and regions: Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral; Number of 
experts[A,B]: 0 of 12. 

Countries and regions: Tri-Border Area; Number of experts[A,B]: 0 of 
12. 

Countries and regions: Venezuela; 
Number of experts[A,B]: 0 of 12. 

Source: GAO interviews with subject matter experts. 

[A] One expert chose not to identify the terrorist safe havens that 
posed the greatest risk to U.S. national security. Therefore, our 
results are presented based on the 12 experts who answered. 

[B] While experts could identify up to five terrorist safe havens, 
some chose to identify less than five. 

[End of table] 

Although included in State's August 2010 report, none of our experts 
identified Colombia's border region, northern Iraq, the southern 
Philippines, the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral, the Tri-Border area, and 
Venezuela as among the top five terrorist safe havens posing the 
greatest risk to U.S. national security. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Profiles of Selected Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in 
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: 

Profiles on the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen can be found on the 
following pages. 

Terrorist Safe Havens: The Republic of the Philippines (Philippines) 
Fact Sheet: 

Key Facts About the Philippines: 

Population: Approximately 102 million people live in the Philippines, 
with about 35 percent of the population below the age of 15. The 
Philippines’ estimated population growth rate is the world’s 60th 
fastest. 

Government: The Philippines is a republic with a legal system based on 
Spanish and Anglo-American law. Its president, Benigno Aquino, has 
been in office since June 2010. 

Economy: The Philippines’ 2010 gross domestic product was estimated at 
about $353 billion, which represented a 7.3 percent growth rate that 
year. This growth was spurred by consumer demand, exports, and 
investments; yet because of high population growth rate and unequal 
distribution of income, poverty worsened. 

Programs and Activities to Address Terrorist Safe Haven in the 
Philippines: 

U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities to 
address terrorist safe havens in the Philippines. Examples include: 

* Training and equipping the Philippines’ security forces through the 
Department of Defense’s Section 1206 program. 

* Law enforcement training through the Department of State’s 
Antiterrorism Assistance. 

* Police transformation training through the Department of Justice’s 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. 

* Seaport interdiction training by the Department of Homeland Security’
s Customs and Border Protection officials. 

Figure: Map of the Philippines, depicting the capital of Manila: 

Sources: GAO; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Strategy in the Philippines: 

U.S. strategy in the Philippines combines security and development 
assistance to address several policy objectives, including 
counterterrorism, economic growth, and the development of responsive 
democratic institutions. To address the terrorist groups that find 
safe haven on the islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the 
United States has deployed military personnel to train and assist the 
Philippine armed forces and to engage in civil-military operations to 
change the conditions that allow terrorist safe havens. 

U.S. assistance to the Philippines has been more than $120 million in 
each of the past three years, and $135 million has been requested for 
fiscal year 2011. About 60 percent of this assistance has supported 
development programs in Muslim areas of Mindanao and the Sulu 
Archipelago with the aim of reducing the economic and political 
conditions that foster extremist ideologies and activities. U.S. 
military assistance is aimed primarily at Muslim insurgents and has 
supported intelligence gathering, operations planning, and 
communications support; supplied modern equipment; and provided U.S. 
special operations advisors to assist two Philippine Regional 
Combatant Commands in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. 

Terrorist Groups in the Philippines: 

The Department of State (State) reports that multiple terrorist groups 
are active in the Philippines, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 
elements of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and the New People’s Army (NPA). 

The National Counterterrorism Center described ASG as the most violent 
of the Islamic separatist groups operating out of the southern 
Philippines. State reports the ASG engages in kidnappings for ransom, 
bombings, beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. The stated goal 
of the group is to promote an independent Islamic state in heavily 
Muslim populated areas of the southern Philippines. 

JI is based in Indonesia, but believed to have elements in the 
Philippines. The group’s goal is the establishment of an Islamic 
caliphate in Southeast Asia. In December 2000, JI was involved in 
several bombings in Manila. A faction of the group was also 
responsible for attacks in July 2009 at hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia. 

NPA is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. 
The group’s aim is to overthrow the government through guerilla 
warfare. The Philippine government reports NPA killed 132 soldiers and 
55 civilians in 2009. 

Other groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), are 
also active in the southern Philippines. The MILF is a Muslim 
separatist group seeking political autonomy. It has been reported that 
without resolving political questions related to the MILF, instability 
that could create the conditions for safe haven could persist in the 
southern Philippines. 

Challenges to Addressing Terrorist Safe Haven in the Philippines: 

Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to 
addressing terrorist safe havens in the Philippines, including 
lawlessness, corruption, and poor economic conditions. 

* Lawlessness in the southern Philippines: According to State’s 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Philippine government control and 
the rule of law are weak due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local 
Muslim minority resentment of central government policies. 

* Corruption of local leaders and police: Officials told us that 
corruption, as well as the limited capacity of the Philippine police, 
is a major challenge to denying terrorists safe haven. Corruption is 
rampant in the Philippine police, the group that implements law 
enforcement approaches to denying safe haven. 

* Poor economic conditions: Officials noted that poor economic 
conditions in the Philippines contribute to an environment that allows 
terrorist groups to increase recruitment. Economic development 
programs are essential to reduce the conditions that allow for 
terrorists to build safe havens in the Philippines. 

Figure: Terrorist Attacks in the Philippines, 2005–2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Number of attacks: 139. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Number of attacks: 256. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Number of attacks: 219. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Number of attacks: 376. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Number of attacks: 279. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Number of attacks: 260. 

Source: National Counterterrorism Center. 

Note: The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System is the National 
Counterterrorism Center's database of terrorist incidents. According 
to the National Counterterrorism Center’s definition, terrorism occurs 
when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately 
or recklessly attack civilians or noncombatants or their property and 
the attack does not fall into another special category of political 
violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Philippines Fact Sheet] 

Terrorist Safe Havens: Somalia Fact Sheet: 

Key Facts About Somalia: 

Population: An estimated 10 million people live in Somalia, with an 
estimated 45 percent below the age of 15. Somalia’s estimated 
population growth rate is the 71st fastest in the world. 

Government: Somalia has no permanent national government and no 
national legal system. Transitional Federal President Sheikh Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed has been in office since January 2009. 

Economy: Somalia’s 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at 
$6 billion, representing a growth of almost 3 percent that year. 
Despite lacking an official national government, Somalia has 
maintained an informal economy, largely based on livestock 
(agriculture contributes about 40 percent of GDP), remittance and 
money transfer companies, and telecommunications. 

Programs and Activities to Address Terrorist Safe Haven in Somalia: 

The Department of State (State), with the assistance of implementing 
agencies, has put in place a number of programs and activities to 
address terrorist safe havens in Somalia. Examples include: 

* Augment the capacity of Somalia’s emerging security forces to 
identify and eliminate terrorists through State’s Peacekeeping 
Operations activities and security enhancement activities through State’
s Antiterrorism Assistance program. 

* Activities supporting the social reintegration of demobilized youth 
through State’s Economic Support Fund. 

Figure: Map of Somalia, depicting the capital of Mogadishu. 

Sources: GAO; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Strategy in Somalia: 

U.S. strategy in Somalia is described as “dual-track”—providing 
continued support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of 
Somalia and also recognizing the potential role of other actors in 
ending conflict and establishing basic governing institutions. Efforts 
include, among other things, degrading the abilities of al-Shabaab-—a 
designated foreign terrorist organization based in Somalia-—and 
increasing the capacity of the TFG while also increasing engagement 
and support for Somaliland, Puntland, and local administrative 
entities and civil society groups. The administration has requested 
almost $85 million for State and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development assistance for fiscal year 2011 to continue conflict 
mitigation, governance, and economic growth programs in Somalia. 

In addition, the Partnership for Regional East African 
Counterterrorism is the current State strategy for long-term 
engagement and capacity building in East Africa to combat evolving 
terrorism threats in, and emanating from, the Horn of Africa and along 
the Swahili Coast. The Partnership for Regional East African 
Counterterrorism aims to, among other things, contain and reduce the 
operational capacity of terrorist networks in Somalia; deter and 
reduce the appeal of and support for violent extremism across East 
Africa; and improve and expand border security in East Africa, 
particularly around Somalia. 

Terrorist Groups in Somalia: 

Al-Shabaab—also known as the Mujahideen Youth Movement, among other 
names—is the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council 
that took control of most of southern Somalia in the latter part of 
2006. In a 2-week war during December 2006 and January 2007, the 
Somalian government and Ethiopian forces defeated the Somali Islamic 
Courts Council. Since that time, al-Shabaab has led an insurgency 
against the TFG and international peacekeepers in Somalia. At various 
times during the last 4 years, the group has controlled strategic 
locations in southern and central Somalia. 

According to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), al-Shabaab 
is not monolithic in its goals. State reports that many rank and file 
members of al-Shabaab are interested in issues within Somalia, rather 
than pursuing a global agenda. However, NCTC and State note that
members of al-Shabaab’s core leadership is linked ideologically to al 
Qaeda and that some members of the group previously trained and fought 
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility 
for several bombings and shooting throughout Somalia, as well as 
assassinations of government officials, journalists, and peace
activists. The group also claimed responsibility for suicide bomb
attacks in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010, which killed more than 70
people. 

Challenges to Addressing Terrorist Safe Haven in Somalia: 

U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to addressing
terrorist safe havens in Somalia, including limited access to the 
country as well as the lack of a central government. 

* Limited access: U.S. officials told us that because the United States
does not have an embassy in Somalia and few personnel are allowed
to travel there for safety reasons, implementing programs in the
country is complicated. For example, the absence of U.S. diplomatic
presence makes monitoring the implementation of security assistance
activities difficult. 

* Lack of a central government: Officials stated that a lack of a 
central government in Somalia limits the number of credible partners 
with which U.S. agencies can work to implement assistance programs.
According to officials, this void legally constrains agencies’ ability 
to use resources from some security assistance programs, such as 
Global Train and Equip “Section 1206” and Foreign Military Financing, 
to undertake assistance activities in Somalia. 

Figure: Terrorist Attacks in Somalia, 2005–2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Number of attacks: 25. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Number of attacks: 31. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Number of attacks: 413. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Number of attacks: 448. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Number of attacks: 501. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Number of attacks: 589. 

Source: National Counterterrorism Center. 

Note: The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System is NCTC’s database of 
terrorist incidents. According to NCTC definition, terrorism occurs 
when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately 
or recklessly attack civilians or noncombatants or their property and 
the attack does not fall into another special category of political 
violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Somalia Fact Sheet] 

Terrorist Safe Havens: Republic of Yemen (Yemen) Fact Sheet: 

Key Facts About Yemen: 

Population: Approximately 24 million people live in Yemen, with 43 
percent of its population below the age of 15. Yemen’s estimated 
population growth rate is the 23rd fastest in the world. 

Government: Yemen is a republic with a legal system based on Islamic 
law, Turkish law, English common law, and local tribal customary law.
Ali Abdullah Saleh, who served as the president of the Yemen Arab 
Republic (North Yemen) from 1978 to 1990, has been the president of
Yemen since May 1990. 

Economy: Yemen’s 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at 
about $62 billion. Petroleum accounts for nearly 25 percent of Yemen’s 
GDP. As oil resources have declined, Yemen has tried reforms to 
diversify its economy. Despite these actions, Yemen faces long term 
challenges, including declining water resources and rapidly expanding 
population. 

Programs and Activities to Address Terrorist Safe Haven in Yemen: 

U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities to
address terrorist safe havens in Yemen. Examples include: 

* Training and equipping Yemeni security forces through the Department 
of Defense’s (DOD) Section 1206 program. 

* Anticorruption training through the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
Overseas and Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training program. 

* Airport security and police training through the Department of 
State’s (State) Antiterrorism Assistance program. 

Figure: Map of Yemen, depicting the capital of Sanaa. 

Sources: GAO; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Strategy in Yemen: 

U.S. strategy in Yemen, as articulated by the White House, takes a
comprehensive approach, including both security assistance to counter al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and development assistance to
address the environment that allows AQAP to exist. According to State
testimony, this strategy has two parts: (1) strengthening the Yemeni
government’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from 
violent extremists within its borders, and (2) mitigating Yemen’s 
economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of 
services, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget requests $106 million for 
Yemen. The United States is also engaged with international partners 
to provide assistance to Yemen. In 2006, an international donors’ 
conference in London pledged $5.2 billion for Yemen, although, 
according to State, a significant portion of this funding has yet to 
be provided. At a Friends of Yemen (an international coordination 
group) meeting in September 2010, the international community called 
for the creation of a development fund for Yemen and more coordination 
of international aid. 

Terrorist Groups in Yemen: 

AQAP is based in Yemen. The group emerged in January 2009, formed by a 
merger of Yemeni and Saudi operatives. 

AQAP’s predecessor, al Qaeda in Yemen, came into existence after 23 al 
Qaeda members escaped from a prison in Sanaa, Yemen, in February 2006. 
Al Qaeda in Yemen was responsible for a September 2008 attack on the 
U.S. embassy in Sanaa that killed 19 people, including 6 terrorists. 

According to the National Counterterrorism Center, AQAP is pursuing a 
global agenda. The group attempted to bomb a plane headed to the 
United States on December 25, 2009. The group also claimed 
responsibility for the attempted package bombings of planes in October 
2010. 

Members of AQAP have been named Specially Designated Nationals by the 
U.S. government. In July 2010, the United States designated Anwar al-
Aulaqi, a key leader for AQAP, for supporting acts of terrorism and 
for acting for or on behalf of AQAP. In March 2011, the United States
designated Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, describing him as an AQAP 
operative and bomb maker. State noted that Al-Asiri gained notoriety
for recruiting his younger brother as a suicide bomber in a failed
assassination attempt of Saudi Prince Muhammed bin Nayif. 

Challenges to Addressing Terrorist Safe Haven in Yemen: 

Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to
addressing terrorist safe havens in Yemen, including the limited 
capacity of Yemeni security forces, inconsistent cooperation of the 
Yemeni government, and instability in Yemen. 

* Limited capacity of Yemeni security forces: Officials noted that
Yemeni security forces have limited, but improving, capacity. This
creates a problem for addressing terrorist safe havens, according to
officials, because it limits the ability of the Yemeni government to
control territory that AQAP may want to use as a safe haven. 

* Inconsistent cooperation with the government of Yemen: According
to State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, the Yemeni
government’s response to terrorism was intermittent. The report also
cites the absence of effective counterterrorism legislation as
contributing to Yemen’s appeal as a safe haven for terrorists. 

* Instability in Yemen: Officials told us that instability in Yemen
creates challenges to addressing safe haven. Specifically, they cited
unstable conditions in northern and southern Yemen and political
unrest resulting from the 2011 uprisings against President Saleh’s
rule. 

Figure: Terrorist Attacks in Yemen, 2005–2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Number of attacks: 16. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Number of attacks: 11. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Number of attacks: 6. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Number of attacks: 31. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Number of attacks: 56. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Number of attacks: 196. 

Source: National Counterterrorism Center. 

Note: The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System is NCTC’s database of 
terrorist incidents. According to NCTC definition, terrorism occurs 
when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately 
or recklessly attack civilians or noncombatants or their property and 
the attack does not fall into another special category of political 
violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence. 

[End of Yemen Fact Sheet] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in 
Selected Countries: 

We identified nine examples of State-funded efforts in the 
Philippines, four examples in Somalia, and nine examples in Yemen not 
included in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism that may 
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. We compiled our list 
of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe haven in the Philippines, 
Somalia, and Yemen based on: (1) the efforts identified by cognizant 
U.S. officials as those contributing to addressing terrorist safe 
havens and (2) programs and activities associated with MSRP goals 
related to addressing terrorist safe havens. Table 7 describes U.S. 
efforts funded by State to address terrorist safe havens as identified 
by agency officials or MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen 
and indicates which of these efforts were included in State's August 
2010 report. 

Table 7: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in 
Selected Countries and Their Inclusion in the August 2010 Country 
Reports on Terrorism: 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Antiterrorism Assistance[A]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Law enforcement training and capacity building to 
enhance ability to detect, deter, counter, and investigate terrorist 
activities and enable police to secure lawless areas. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Counterterrorist Finance Training[A,B,C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Financial investigative, analysis, and 
prosecutorial training to improve capacity to combat terrorist 
financing. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist 
Organizations[A,C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Designation of Abu Sayyaf Group as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Regional Strategic Initiative (East Asia); 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Activities to counter the regional proliferation 
of violent extremist ideology. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Rewards for Justice Program; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Rewards to motivate Filipinos to target and arrest 
terrorist leaders. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Customs and Border Protection training 
programs[B]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Seaport interdiction training. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Development Assistance programs[D]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Peace and development activities to inhibit 
terrorists and lawless elements from exploiting those living under 
marginal conditions. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Export Control and Related Border Security 
Assistance; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Aid to the Philippines to strengthen 
customs/border controls to detect/interdict weapons. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Foreign Military Financing programs[E]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Support to sustain progress in Philippine Defense 
Department development such as transport and logistics capabilities. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program capacity building[D]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Police transformation training. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
training[A,B,C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Training to combat money laundering and bulk cash 
smuggling. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: International Military Education and Training[C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Long-term military professional development. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement capacity building; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Capacity building of the Philippine criminal 
justice system to prevent, investigate, and successfully prosecute 
domestic and transnational crimes. 

Selected country: The Philippines; 
State-funded effort: Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and 
Training[A]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Anti-trafficking training. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
State-funded effort: Antiterrorism Assistance; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Capacity building activities to equalize regional 
counterterrorism abilities. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
State-funded effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist 
Organizations[A,C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
State-funded effort: Regional Strategic Initiative (East Africa); 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Included in discussions regarding regional partner 
capacity. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
State-funded effort: Conventional Weapons and Small Arms/Light Weapons 
Destruction; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Destruction of stockpiles of conventional weapons. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
State-funded effort: Economic Support Fund programs[D]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Support for social reintegration of demobilized 
youth. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
State-funded effort: International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement capacity-building; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Capacity building activities to equalize regional 
counterterrorism abilities. 

Selected country: Somalia; 
State-funded effort: Peacekeeping Operations capacity-building; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Capacity building of Somalia's emerging security 
forces to identify and eliminate terrorists. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Antiterrorism Assistance; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Airport security and police training. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Countering Violent Extremism; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Secure Border Initiative. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Counterterrorist Finance Training[A,B,C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Financial investigations training. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist 
Organizations[A,C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Designation of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative activities; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Establishment of high school student councils to 
educate Yemeni youth about the concept of democracy. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Regional Strategic Initiative (East Africa)[D]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Activities focused on political and economic 
reform while increasing counterterrorism capacity. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Terrorist Interdiction Program; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included; 
Example activities: Provision of immigration system computer equipment. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Customs and Border Protection training program[B]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: International Visitors Program. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Export Control and Related Border Security 
Assistance programs; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Customs, coast guard, and other border security 
agency engagement. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Foreign Military Financing programs[E]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Counterterrorism, border security, and counter-
piracy support. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Humanitarian Demining; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Efforts to secure communities from the threat 
posed by civil war mine fields. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
training[A,B,C]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Training to combat money laundering and bulk cash 
smuggling. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: International Military Education and Training[E]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Long-term military professional development. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement capacity building; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Community policing and rule of law enhancement. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and 
Training[A]; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Anti-corruption training. 

Selected country: Yemen; 
State-funded effort: Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction; 
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included; 
Example activities: Efforts to mitigate destabilizing effects of 
illegal weapons dealing. 

Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on 
Terrorism, MSRPs, interviews with U.S. agency officials, and U.S. 
agency program data. 

Note: Some additional programs were identified as relevant to MSRP 
goals related to addressing terrorist safe havens, but if no specific 
activities were discussed, they are not included in the table above. 
These include Economic Support Fund programs, Food for Peace 
activities, and USAID Global Health and Child Survival programs in the 
Philippines; and Food for Peace activities in Yemen. 

[A] Implemented in part by DOJ. 

[B] Implemented in part by DHS. 

[C] Implemented in part by Treasury. 

[D] Implemented in part by USAID. 

[E] Implemented in part by DOD. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

May 23, 2011: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating 
Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist 
Safe Havens," GAO Job Code 320804. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Rhonda Shore, Public Affairs & Outreach Advisor, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism at (202) 647-1845. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc: GAO - Charles M. Johnson: 
S/CT - Robert F. Godec: 
State/OIG - Evelyn Klemstine: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on 
Terrorist Safe Havens (GAO-11-561, GAO Code 320804)L 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on 
GAO's draft report entitled "COMBATING TERRORISM: U.S. Government Should
Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens." 

Recommendation: Include in the Country Reports on Terrorism detailed
assessments of identified terrorist safe havens using the provisions 
recommended by Congress in the IRTPA. 

Response: The Department concurs with the GAO's recommendation to 
include detailed assessments of identified terrorist safe havens using 
the provisions recommended by Congress in the IRTPA. The Department 
has already begun to more fully implement this recommendation in the 
soon-to-be issued Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, including 
detailed assessments of efforts to prevent the proliferation of and 
trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the 
territory of the country. 

Recommendation: The Secretary of State, in collaboration with relevant 
agencies as appropriate should, when it updates the report requested 
under the IRTPA, include a government-wide list of U.S. efforts for 
addressing terrorist safe havens. 

Response: The Department concurs with GAO's general recommendation to 
make more comprehensive the reporting on U.S. efforts to deny safe 
haven to terrorists. The Department does not concur, however, that a 
comprehensive government-wide list of U.S. efforts should be included 
as part of the annual Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT). As noted in 
the GAO report, there are multiple reporting requirements concerning 
U.S. efforts to deny safe havens to terrorists and to provide 
antiterrorism assistance. To avoid duplication of effort and ensure 
efficient use of government resources, the Department will undertake 
to include information related to those separate reporting 
requirements already in the CRT. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department a Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

May 25, 2011: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re:	Draft Report GAO 11-561, "Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government 
Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens" 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note the report's positive acknowledgment 
of several of its efforts to address terrorist safe havens in selected 
countries, including training related to counterterrorist financing, 
customs and border protection, and immigration and customs 
enforcement. DHS will continue to support Department of State and 
other relevant agency efforts to improve reporting on terrorist safe 
havens, as appropriate. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. We look forward to working with you on future Homeland 
Security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Jason Bair, Assistant 
Director; Christy Bilardo; Kathryn Bolduc; Lynn Cothern; Martin de 
Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; Elizabeth Repko; and Celia Thomas made key 
contributions to this report. Tonita Gillich, Julia Jebo, Eileen 
Larence, Heather Latta, Marie Mak, Sarah McGrath, John Pendleton, Nina 
Pfeiffer, and Jena Sinkfeld provided additional support. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Department of State defines terrorist safe havens as 
ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and 
nonphysical areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. 
national security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds, 
communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because 
of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both. 

[2] State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism is required to be 
transmitted to Congress by April 30th of each year and covers 
terrorist events in the preceding year. For instance, State's Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2009 covers events from January 1 to December 31, 
2009, but was released in August 2010. In this report, we refer to 
Country Reports on Terrorism by their release date. Thus, State's 
August 2010 report refers to the Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. 

[3] The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that, in 
addition to physical terrorist safe havens in geographic territories, 
terrorist safe havens can also be nonphysical or virtual, existing 
within legal, cyber, and financial systems. In this report, however, 
we focus on physical terrorist safe havens. 

[4] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102. 

[5] In this report, we use the term terrorist safe haven, which, 
according to State, has the same meaning as terrorist sanctuaries. 

[6] The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 required 
the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress an 
intelligence assessment identifying and describing each country or 
region that is a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations. 
We plan to provide additional information on this topic in a 
classified product later this year. 

[7] State is not required to identify potential terrorist safe havens. 
In its April 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism, State wrote that its 
report identified "selected potential and physical safe havens." 
However, in the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, State 
identified safe havens in which terrorists are able to operate in 
relative security. We spoke with subject matter experts who identified 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Kenya, the Caucasus, and urban areas such as 
Karachi, Pakistan, as areas at risk of becoming terrorist safe havens 
in the next 5 years. 

[8] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(1)(D). 

[9] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(2)(C). 

[10] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism 
and Public Health Initiatives, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSAID-99-112] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 16, 1999). 

[11] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7120(b). 

[12] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(2)(E). 

[13] State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism also identifies 
several multilateral efforts, not discussed in this report, for 
disrupting or eliminating terrorist safe havens. These include efforts 
by the United Nations Security Council, European Union, Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 

[14] FACTS is a database used by State to collect foreign assistance 
planning and reporting data, including plans for implementing current- 
year appropriated budgets and performance planning and reporting data. 
It tracks State-funded foreign assistance spending by aligning each 
dollar of assistance with categories State calls "program areas, 
elements, and sub-elements." The FACTS standardized program structure, 
known as the "F Framework," includes a "counter-terrorism" program 
area that has an element--"deny terrorist sponsorship, support and 
sanctuary"--with a sub-element--"eliminate safe havens." 

[15] The four budget accounts identified in FACTS as funding 
activities for eliminating safe havens that were not included in 
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism are the Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative, Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies, 
Development Assistance, and the Economic Support Fund. 

[16] These budget accounts fund some activities that FACTS identifies 
as eliminating safe haven. However, other funding from these accounts 
is assigned to different program areas. For instance, while some 
activities funded by the development assistance budget account are 
identified by FACTS as eliminating safe havens, other development 
assistance funds are identified by FACTS in program areas such as 
Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation, Good Governance, Health, 
Education, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Economic Opportunity. 

[17] Programs and activities identified in the Philippines, Somalia, 
and Yemen are meant to serve as examples of U.S. efforts that may 
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, not an exhaustive list 
of efforts to address terrorist safe havens. 

[18] MSRPs for all three countries included a goal related to 
addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, the Somalia MSRP 
includes a goal "Successful Dialogue and Reconciliation Contributing 
Toward a More Stable Somalia" describing that "political, economic, 
and developmental stability will make it increasingly difficult for 
transnational terrorists to find a safe haven in Somalia." Financial 
data included in fiscal year 2012 MSRPs include actual fiscal year 
2009 funding; estimated fiscal year 2010 funding; requested fiscal 
years 2011 and 2012 funding; and projected fiscal years 2013, 2014, 
and 2015 funding. 

[19] We plan to provide additional information on terrorist safe 
havens in a classified product later this year. 

[20] GAO, Afghanistan Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009). 

[21] GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive 
Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in 
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 
2008). 

[22] GAO, Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government 
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1195] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007). 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: