GAO-11-415, Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to Be Implemented


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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

May 2011: 

Haiti Reconstruction: 

U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to Be Implemented: 

GAO-11-415: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-415, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

On January 12, 2010, an earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 
230,000 people, displaced about 2 million more, and exacerbated 
longstanding challenges. In July 2010, Congress appropriated more than 
$1.14 billion in supplemental funds for reconstruction assistance, 
most of which was provided to the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). In April 
2010, the Haitian government created the Interim Haiti Recovery 
Commission (IHRC), a joint Haitian-international entity, for an 18-
month term to coordinate donors, conduct strategic planning, approve 
reconstruction projects, and provide accountability. In this report, 
GAO addresses (1) the planned uses for U.S. reconstruction assistance 
and the amounts provided so far, (2) USAID’s internal controls for 
overseeing U.S. funds, and (3) IHRC’s progress establishing governance 
and oversight structures. GAO interviewed U.S. government officials in 
Washington, D.C., and Haiti, as well as officials from Haitian 
ministries, the IHRC, and nongovernmental organizations, and reviewed 
U.S. and IHRC documents. 

What GAO Found: 

The U.S. government plans to allocate about $918 million of the $1.14 
billion in supplemental Haiti reconstruction funds available through 
the end of fiscal year 2012 to USAID and State. USAID and State plan 
to allocate $770 million and $148 million, respectively, to projects 
in three geographic regions of Haiti, selected for their development 
potential, and four key sectors: (1) infrastructure and energy; (2) 
governance and rule of law; (3) health and other basic services; and 
(4) food and economic security. About half of the total funding is 
intended for infrastructure and energy projects and an additional 
third is for governance and rule-of-law programs. State and USAID 
reported they had obligated over $184.3 million, or about 20 percent 
of the funding, as of March 2011. USAID provided most of this amount 
to fulfill the U.S. government’s pledge of $120 million to the 
multidonor Haiti Reconstruction Fund. State and USAID reported that 
they obligated most of the remaining $64.3 million to a small number 
of bilateral activities, including projects to restore basic 
government functions. 

USAID intends to expand and enhance its internal control framework to 
address the increased risk factors associated with the almost $650 
million of the $770 million in supplemental reconstruction funds 
allocated to the agency and is at varying stages of implementing new 
internal controls. The agency plans to (1) augment existing internal 
controls to provide additional financial management and oversight of 
reconstruction projects, and (2) establish a new independent 
monitoring and evaluation unit. As of April 2011, while the agency had 
taken initial steps to implement some new controls, such as 
reorganizing staff to address the increase in oversight of 
supplemental reconstruction funds, it is in planning stages for other 
controls, particularly the new monitoring and evaluation unit. 
Additionally, the USAID Office of Inspector General plans to expand 
its audit and oversight activities and has begun to implement these 
plans. 

Although IHRC has established key governance structures and 
procedures, the commission is not fully operational. IHRC, which State 
officials said has helped improve transparency and coordination, has 
made progress setting up a new organization in a challenging 
environment. However, although the commission’s mandate ends in 
October 2011, IHRC is not fully operational due to delays in staffing 
the commission and defining the role of its Performance and 
Anticorruption Office—which IHRC officials cited as key to 
establishing the commission as a model of good governance. IHRC also 
has made progress developing project review procedures and approving 
reconstruction projects, but IHRC’s ability to direct funding to 
Haitian priorities is limited, in part because those priorities have 
not been clear. As a result, funding for approved projects is uneven 
across sectors and not necessarily aligned with Haitian priorities. 
For example, although the Haitian government identified nearly equal 
18-month funding requirements for debris removal and agriculture, IHRC 
has approved about 7 times more funding for agriculture projects. IHRC 
has recently developed a strategic plan to begin to help clarify 
Haitian priorities. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends USAID take steps to ensure planned monitoring and 
evaluation activities are implemented in a timely manner. We also 
recommend State work with IHRC to make it fully operational. State 
agreed with our recommendations and USAID noted steps it is taking in 
line with our recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-415] or key 
components. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-
3149 or Gootnickd@gao.gov, or Susan Ragland at (202) 512-8486 or 
Raglands@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

U.S. Government Is Providing Reconstruction Funding to Stimulate 
Economic Development, Obligating 20 Percent of Funding as of March 
2011: 

USAID's Initiatives for Oversight and Monitoring of Reconstruction 
Funds Are at Varying Stages of Implementation: 

IHRC Has Begun to Establish Governance Structures and Procedures, but 
Is Not Fully Operational: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Humanitarian Relief Spending in Haiti by U.S. Government 
Agencies, as of the End of Fiscal Year 2010: 

Appendix III: The Government of Haiti's Action Plan for Reconstruction 
and Development: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Government's Post-Earthquake Haiti Strategy Toward 
Renewal and Economic Opportunity: 

Appendix V: Timeline of Government of Haiti, the International 
Community, and U.S. Government Actions in Response to the 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake: 

Appendix VI: Priority Sectors and Funding Needs Identified in IHRC's 
Strategic Plan: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Supplemental Funding for Haitian Relief and Reconstruction: 

Table 2: U.S. Preferences for Supplemental ESF Funds Provided to HRF: 

Table 3: Supplemental U.S. Reconstruction Funds Reported as Obligated, 
as of March 2011: 

Table 4: Status of Priority Staffing Needs, as of January, 2011: 

Table 5: IHRC-Approved Projects, June 2010-March 2011: 

Table 6: IHRC-Approved Projects to Be Fully or Partially Funded by the 
U.S. Government: 

Table 7: Breakout of Funding Sources among U.S. Agencies Providing 
Post-Earthquake Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti in Fiscal Year 2010: 

Table 8: Breakout of State and USAID Fiscal Year 2010 Humanitarian 
Spending among its Implementing Partners: 

Table 9: Total Estimated Reconstruction Costs by Haiti Action Plan 
Sector for the First 18 Months: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Process for Approving and Funding Haiti Reconstruction 
Projects Using U.S. Government Supplemental Funds: 

Figure 2: U.S. Government's Development Corridors in Haiti: 

Figure 3: Fiscal Year 2010 State and USAID Supplemental Reconstruction 
by Sector (dollars in millions): 

Figure 4: U.S. Infrastructure and Energy Sector Reconstruction: 

Figure 5: U.S. Governance and Rule-of-Law Sector Reconstruction: 

Figure 6: U.S. Health and Other Basic Services Sector Reconstruction: 

Figure 7: U.S. Food and Economic Security Sector Reconstruction: 

Figure 8: Organizational Chart of USAID Mission in Haiti: 

Figure 9: OFM Structure Following Reorganization, as of October 2010: 

Figure 10: Organization of IHRC: 

Figure 11: IHRC Project Approvals, by Date: 

Figure 12: U.S. Government's Post-Earthquake Haiti Reconstruction 
Strategy: 

Figure 13: Details of Sector Priorities Established in the U.S. 
Reconstruction Strategy for Haiti: 

Abbreviations: 

AAD: Activity Approval Document: 

Action Plan: Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of 
Haiti: 

ADS: Automated Directives System: 

BPA: blanket purchase agreement: 

CARICOM: Caribbean Community: 

CHF: Cooperative Housing Foundation International: 

DAI: Development Alternatives, Incorporated: 

ESF: Economic Support Funds: 

FMFIA: Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982: 

FY: fiscal year: 

HOP: E2006 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership 
Encouragement Act: 

HRF: Haiti Reconstruction Fund: 

IHRC: Interim Haiti Recovery Commission: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: 

Mission: USAID Mission in Haiti: 

M&E: monitoring and evaluation: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

OAA: Office of Acquisition and Assistance: 

OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance: 

OFM: Office of Financial Management: 

OIG: Office of the Inspector General: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

OTI: Office of Transition Initiatives: 

PAO: Performance and Anticorruption Office: 

PCPS: Office of Policy Coordination and Program Support: 

PEPFAR: U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: 

RIG: Regional Inspector General: 

State: Department of State: 

T-shelters: transitional shelters: 

Treasury: Department of the Treasury: 

UN: United Nations: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 19, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

The January 12, 2010, earthquake centered near Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 
was one of the deadliest and most destructive natural disasters in 
recent history. The quake is estimated to have killed approximately 
230,000 people, injured 300,000, and displaced approximately 2 million 
from their homes according to a United Nations (UN) report. The World 
Bank estimates the earthquake caused $7.8 billion in damage (over 100 
percent of Haiti's 2009 gross domestic product). According to 
Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) officials, the disaster generated the largest 
international humanitarian relief effort ever undertaken and prompted 
the international community to pledge billions for reconstruction, 
including a pledge of $1.15 billion over the first 2 years by the U.S. 
government. The amount of this assistance--more than triple the 
average annual assistance provided by the U.S. government to Haiti 
between 2006 and 2009--has raised concerns by U.S. government 
officials about the U.S. and Haitian governments' ability to monitor, 
maintain accountability over, and effectively use this funding. The 
lack of transparency and accountability in governance and allegations 
of pervasive corruption in Haiti could stall the country's economic 
and political recovery and undermine U.S. and donor confidence in the 
assistance effort. 

In July 2010, Congress appropriated supplemental funds for Haiti's 
relief and reconstruction and directed GAO to monitor post-earthquake 
aid and other expenses related to Haiti.[Footnote 1] This report 
addresses (1) the planned uses for U.S. reconstruction assistance and 
the amount provided so far; (2) USAID's internal controls for 
overseeing and monitoring U.S. funds provided for reconstruction 
efforts; and (3) the progress the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 
(IHRC), a joint Haitian-international body, has made in establishing 
governance and oversight structures. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed reports, documents, and data 
from, and obtained the views of officials at, State and USAID in 
Washington, D.C., and Haiti. In Haiti, we also met with Haitian 
ministry officials and representatives from IHRC, the Haiti 
Reconstruction Fund (HRF), a multidonor trust fund organized to help 
finance high-priority post-earthquake reconstruction projects, and 
international and Haitian nongovernmental organizations (NGO) involved 
in the relief and reconstruction efforts. We met with USAID 
implementing partners and local recipients of U.S. assistance in Port- 
au-Prince, Saint-Marc, and other locations in central Haiti. We 
reviewed and analyzed U.S. government documents on allocations and 
plans for monitoring and evaluating reconstruction funds, and Haitian 
and IHRC documents on their efforts to assess reconstruction needs and 
priorities and establish procedures to conduct project selection and 
oversight. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 through May 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our work objectives. See appendix I 
for a detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

Background: 

Humanitarian Relief: 

As part of an unprecedented international humanitarian effort in the 
year following the earthquake, U.S. and international relief 
activities helped feed more than 4 million people, and removed 2 
million cubic meters of rubble. This effort also vaccinated about 1 
million internally displaced persons against communicable diseases in 
the first 6 months after the quake. The UN reported that as of April 
2011, the United States and at least 125 other countries responded to 
the earthquake with humanitarian contributions totaling nearly $2 
billion in financial and other assistance; and donations from private 
individuals, foundations, and corporations totaled over $1.5 billion. 
[Footnote 2] 

As of the end of fiscal year 2010, U.S. government agencies had 
provided more than $1.1 billion within Haiti to meet humanitarian 
needs. This aid included food, medical assistance, temporary shelter, 
and short-term employment. International earthquake relief efforts 
were challenged by other emergencies that occurred in the year after 
the earthquake, including (1) Hurricane Tomas in early November 2010, 
which caused additional loss of life and severe flooding; (2) a 
cholera epidemic that afflicted more than 240,000 people and claimed 
at least 4,600 lives between October 2010 and March 2011;[Footnote 3] 
and (3) the violence and political turmoil arising from the disputed 
results of the November 28, 2010, presidential and legislative 
elections. Appendix II provides details on humanitarian-relief 
spending in Haiti by U.S. government agencies as of the end of fiscal 
year 2010. 

Global and U.S. Funding for Haiti's Relief and Reconstruction: 

On March 31, 2010, the international community pledged over $9 billion 
to meet Haiti's reconstruction and development needs over 10 years; of 
this amount, $5.3 billion was directed to the reconstruction effort in 
2010 and 2011, including $1.15 billion from the United States. As of 
March 2011, total pledges exceeded $10.1 billion.[Footnote 4] 

On July 29, 2010, Congress appropriated $2.93 billion in supplemental 
funding.[Footnote 5] This amount includes (1) more than $1.64 billion 
in relief funds largely used to reimburse U.S. government departments' 
emergency and humanitarian activities; and (2) more than $1.14 billon 
in reconstruction funds available through the end of fiscal year 2012. 
[Footnote 6] 

Of the $1.14 billion appropriated for reconstruction, about $918 
million was directed to State and USAID, including $770 million in 
USAID-administered Economic Support Funds (ESF), which included $120 
million for the HRF; and about $148 million in State-administered 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds. 
[Footnote 7] The appropriation also included funding for the 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for Haitian debt relief, a 
Treasury attaché office in the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and 
technical assistance, as well as funding for the USAID Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) (see table 1). 

Table 1: Supplemental Funding for Haitian Relief and Reconstruction: 

Recipient: State and USAID; 
Relief: $556.5; 
Reconstruction: $917.7; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: $144.0; 
Total: $1,618.2. 

Recipient: State; 
Relief: $96.5; 
Reconstruction: $147.7; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: $144.0; 
Total: $388.2. 

Recipient: USAID; 
Relief: $460.0; 
Reconstruction: $770.0; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: $[Empty]; 
Total: $1,230.0. 

Recipient: Agriculture; 
Relief: $150.0; 
Reconstruction: [Empty]; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: [Empty]; 
Total: $150.0. 

Recipient: Defense; 
Relief: $655.0; 
Reconstruction: [Empty]; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: [Empty]; 
Total: $655.0. 

Recipient: Treasury; 
Relief: [Empty]; 
Reconstruction: $7.8; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: [Empty]; 
Total: $7.8. 

Recipient: Treasury Debt Relief; 
Relief: [Empty]; 
Reconstruction: $212.0; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: [Empty]; 
Total: $212.0. 

Recipient: Homeland Security; 
Relief: $60.6; 
Reconstruction: [Empty]; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: [Empty]; 
Total: $60.6. 

Recipient: Health and Human Services; 
Relief: $220.0; 
Reconstruction: [Empty]; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: [Empty]; 
Total: $220.0. 

Recipient: USAID Inspector General; 
Relief: [Empty]; 
Reconstruction: $4.5; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: [Empty]; 
Total: $4.5. 

Recipient: Total; 
Relief: $1,642.1; 
Reconstruction: $1,142.0[B]; 
Diplomatic-related expenses[A]: $144.0[C]; 
Total: $2,928.1. 

Source: Congressional Research Service, GAO analyses of U.S.-
government fiscal year 2010 supplementary budget request and final 
appropriation in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub.L. No. 
111-212). 

[A] State Department funds under diplomatic-related expenses include 
$65 million appropriated for State's diplomatic/consular operations 
and $79 million for embassy security, construction, and maintenance. 

[B] All reconstruction funds are available through the end of fiscal 
year 2012; however, $690,000 in Treasury funds for salaries and 
expenses are available until expended. 

[C] This total excludes $3 million provided in the supplemental 
appropriation for the Broadcasting Board of Governors for emergency 
broadcasting support and other expenses related to Haiti. The Board is 
an independent agency with a separate appropriation, although the 
Secretary of State is one of nine board members. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the funds specifically provided by this Act for efforts 
in Haiti, a March 2011 State report stated that as of December 31, 
2010, State and USAID obligated about $468 million from existing base 
fiscal year 2009 and 2010 Development Fund appropriations which also 
could be attributed as support for the longer-term reconstruction and 
economic development of Haiti.[Footnote 8] 

Haitian Framework for Reconstruction: 

In the year after the earthquake, the Haitian government took three 
steps to prioritize its needs and establish a reconstruction framework. 

First, the Haitian government (with assistance from the World Bank and 
other international organizations) completed a post-earthquake needs 
assessment and issued a 10-year Action Plan for National Recovery and 
Development of Haiti (Action Plan) in March 2010. The Action Plan 
identified about $3.9 billion needed for the initial 18 months of 
reconstruction (including almost $1.2 billion in budget support for 
the Haitian government). The plan prioritized short-and long-term 
reconstruction needs in four areas: (1) territorial rebuilding in Port-
au-Prince and three targeted regions;[Footnote 9] (2) economic 
rebuilding in sectors such as construction, agriculture, and tourism; 
(3) social rebuilding in the health, education, food security, and 
other sectors; and (4) institutional rebuilding focused on developing 
government capacity, justice, and a legal and regulatory framework 
(see appendix III for additional details on the government of Haiti's 
Action Plan). 

Second, in April 2010, the government of Haiti established IHRC, a 
joint Haitian-international commission, under an 18-month mandate that 
ends in October 2011.[Footnote 10] IHRC was designed to plan, 
coordinate, and oversee all reconstruction projects of bilateral and 
multilateral donors, NGOs, and some private-sector projects. Although 
donors submit projects to IHRC for approval, IHRC does not directly 
fund or implement any reconstruction projects. Nevertheless, U.S. 
officials have cited IHRC as the key entity for providing transparency 
and accountability over the reconstruction effort. In that regard, 
IHRC has established the following mechanisms: 

1. IHRC reviews and approves reconstruction projects funded by 
bilateral and multilateral donors in an effort to align projects with 
the priorities established in the Action Plan. 

2. IHRC established the Performance and Anticorruption Office (PAO) to 
monitor reconstruction efforts,[Footnote 11] including facilitating 
project approval, overseeing IHRC's internal operations, investigating 
allegations of corruption, and monitoring project performance. 

These mechanisms do not replace any of the financial tracking or 
oversight responsibilities of donor countries or project implementers. 
As currently envisioned by U.S. and IHRC officials, IHRC's functions 
will transfer to a permanent Haitian development agency when its 
mandate expires. 

Third, the international community, at the request of the Haitian 
government, created HRF, a multidonor trust fund, in May 2010 to help 
the Haitian government fund IHRC-approved projects that donors may not 
otherwise fund.[Footnote 12] IHRC-approved projects sent to HRF are 
developed and implemented in conjunction with one of three 
participating partners: the Inter-American Development Bank, the World 
Bank, or the UN. Donors indicated they would contribute $577 million 
of their total reconstruction pledges--about 11 percent of the $5.3 
billion in total funds pledged for the first 2 years of reconstruction-
-to HRF. As of April 2011, 17 donors had transferred $282 million into 
HRF to fund their pledges, including $120 million from the U.S. 
government. Although some donors (including the U.S. government) 
expressed preferences for how their contributions would be used, the 
donors retain no explicit control over funding once it is transferred 
to HRF. 

U.S. Government Framework for Reconstruction: 

The U.S. government has taken steps to prioritize its actions in 
support of the Haitian reconstruction effort. In September 2010, State 
and USAID issued a joint spending plan to allocate supplemental 
reconstruction funds among projects.[Footnote 13] In accordance with 
the plan, USAID directly controls and provides oversight over the bulk 
of ESF reconstruction funds--about $650 million--after making $120 
million in ESF available for transfer via Treasury to the HRF. 
[Footnote 14] 

In January 2011, the Obama Administration issued a 5-year plan, the 
Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic 
Opportunity, which targets resources in geographic areas and economic 
sectors to help Haiti implement its Action Plan objectives. The 
strategy seeks to concentrate U.S. projects in a small number of 
economic sectors in the hope of encouraging private-sector led 
sustainable development. The strategy also targets geographic areas 
for development and outlines objectives and intermediate results to 
guide projects over the life of the strategy (2011 through 
2015).[Footnote 15] The strategy encompasses some, but not all, of the 
objectives set forth in the Action Plan. See appendix IV for details 
on the Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy. 

According to USAID officials, USAID is developing one or more Activity 
Approval Documents (AAD) for each of the economic sectors in this 
strategy. USAID policies require that an AAD describe the project or 
activity, including its intended results, implementation methods, and 
financing plans. An AAD also certifies that appropriate planning for 
the related activities has been completed.[Footnote 16] 

Figure 1 depicts the flow of U.S. supplemental funds and 
reconstruction projects through the Haitian and U.S. governments' 
reconstruction frameworks. 

Figure 1: Process for Approving and Funding Haiti Reconstruction 
Projects Using U.S. Government Supplemental Funds: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

U.S. oversight of bilateral projects: 

State Department; USAID (strategy): 
Spending plan and funding: to: 
Project Development (Activity Approval Documents). 
Spending plan: to Project submissions: 
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC): 
Obligated fund to: 
Implementers; and; 
Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). 

Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC): 
Approved projects: 
Implementers; and; 
Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). 

Implementers: 
Government of Haiti; 
NGOs/contractors; 
Multilaterals (United Nations, World Bank, etc.); 
U.S. government agencies. 

Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF): 
Approved projects and funds to: 
United Nations; 
World Bank; 
Inter-American Development Bank; 
Funds and approved projects from each of the above to: 
Implementers. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

Notes: 

Each bilateral or HRF-funded project may use one or more of the types 
of implementers listed. U.S. bilateral projects typically are 
implemented by NGOs or contractors. U.S. government agencies may 
implement technical assistance projects directly. 

Other donors use a similar process to submit project proposals to 
IHRC, allocate their reconstruction funds, and implement projects. 

[End of figure] 

A timeline summarizing the Haitian and U.S. reconstruction frameworks 
in response to the earthquake is found in appendix V. 

Existing Accountability and Controls Framework for USAID-Administered 
Funds: 

Funds administered by USAID are subject to an accountability and 
internal controls framework[Footnote 17] established by USAID's policy 
directives and required procedures, as provided by USAID's ADS. 
[Footnote 18] ADS is organized into six function series, which direct 
the mission in Haiti (mission) in designing and implementing its 
internal controls and any policy or procedural changes that need to be 
made.[Footnote 19] ADS delineates a number of required control 
functions, including: 

* The Office of Financial Management (OFM) is responsible for 
supporting the development and implementation of internal controls 
over financial activities. According to ADS,[Footnote 20] effective 
and efficient internal control includes control activities to help 
ensure management directives such as proper execution of financial 
transactions and events, accurate and timely recording of such 
transactions, and physical control over vulnerable assets, such as 
cash, to help ensure that management directives are carried out. 

* Reconstruction projects are subject to ADS directives that define 
and address the controls needed to monitor and evaluate program 
progress and results.[Footnote 21] 

Projects are also subject to the monitoring and evaluation functions 
discussed in the U.S. government's reconstruction strategy. According 
to the strategy, the mission will establish an independent monitoring 
and evaluation unit to assess reconstruction progress and impact. 
Additionally, USAID issued a revised Evaluation Policy in January 2011 
to update the agency's standards and practices. The revised policy is 
intended to develop the use of evaluation as a crucial tool to inform 
USAID's global development efforts and make management and operational 
decisions, and emphasizes the need to collect and establish baseline 
data when initiating new projects. 

Independent from the mission in Haiti, USAID's OIG conducts and 
supervises internal audits and investigations of USAID programs in 
Haiti through its regional office located in El Salvador. OIG's 
oversight of mission activities includes audits and investigations 
based on authority provided through the Inspector General Act of 1978, 
as amended.[Footnote 22] 

U.S. Government Is Providing Reconstruction Funding to Stimulate 
Economic Development, Obligating 20 Percent of Funding as of March 
2011: 

The U.S. government allocated the $918 million in supplemental 
reconstruction funds to stimulate development in three geographic 
areas selected for their development potential--referred to as 
development corridors--according to the U.S. governmentwide strategy 
for Haiti. Within each economic development corridor, State and USAID 
will distribute funding among projects in four sectors: (1) 
infrastructure and energy, (2) food and economic security, (3) health 
and other basic services, and (4) governance and rule of law. Nearly 
half of the funding, or about $426 million, is intended for 
infrastructure and energy projects. An additional third, or about $293 
million, is intended for governance and rule-of-law programs. Over 20 
percent of the total amount, or $184.3 million, was reportedly 
obligated as of March 2011.[Footnote 23] This total includes the 
entire $120 million U.S. government contribution to the HRF. 

U.S. Government Strategy Focuses on Three Development Corridors: 

The U.S. governmentwide strategy calls for funding to stimulate 
economic activity and improve basic services delivery in three 
geographic development corridors between 2011 and 2015. According to 
the strategy, this is in accordance with the Action Plan's objective 
to support new and diverse economic opportunities outside Port-au-
Prince, by focusing on investments in housing, energy, agriculture, 
health, security, and national and local governance. State and USAID 
officials noted that targeting these three areas, which present a 
comparative advantage for growth and a need for stability, is an 
attempt to decongest Port-au-Prince by providing economic 
opportunities elsewhere in Haiti. Figure 2 identifies the development 
corridors. 

Figure 2: U.S. Government's Development Corridors in Haiti: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Haiti] 

Depicted on the map: 

Cap-Haïtien Corridor; 
Saint-Marc Corridor; 
Port-au-Prince Corridor. 

Sources: Multiple U.S. Government Agencies, Post-Earthquake USG Haiti 
Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity (Washington, D.C., 
January 2011); Map Resources,(map). 

Note: A State document notes the Port-au-Prince Corridor is located in 
and just to the north of Port-au-Prince, extending east to the 
Dominican Republic border and encompassing the entirety of the Cul-de- 
Sac watershed; the Saint-Marc Corridor will be anchored by the 
municipality of Saint-Marc in the Department of Artibonite and will 
continue down the west coast of Haiti encompassing the Cabaret/Saint- 
Marc watersheds; the Cap-Haïtien Corridor includes the area around Cap-
Haïtien, and continues to the Haiti-Dominican border in the east and 
encompasses the entirety of the Limbe and Cap-Haïtien watershed on the 
western end. 

[End of figure] 

Under the State-USAID spending plan, a portion of supplemental funding 
is for corridors outside Port-au-Prince. For example, the spending 
plan allocates $137.1 million for roads and ports in development 
corridors; USAID officials also indicated that a substantial portion 
of the $61.6 million allocated to provide homes and infrastructure to 
internally displaced persons will be located in these corridors. 

U.S. Government Is Allocating $918 Million in Reconstruction Funding 
to Four Core Economic Development Sectors: 

The U.S. strategy identifies four sectors as critical to achieving 
economic growth and stability. The spending plan allocates: (1) $426 
million (46 percent of total funding) for infrastructure and energy; 
(2) $293 million (32 percent) for governance and rule of law;[Footnote 
24] (3) $118 million (13 percent) for health and other basic services; 
and (4) about $64 million (7 percent) for food and economic security. 
[Footnote 25] The plan identifies subsectors within each of the four 
sectors. Also, under the plan, the $120 million provided to the HRF is 
allocated to subsectors within three of the sectors.[Footnote 26] 
Figure 3 describes funding for the four sectors, and figures 4 through 
7 provide additional sector and subsector details. 

Figure 3: Fiscal Year 2010 State and USAID Supplemental Reconstruction 
by Sector: 

[Refer to PDF for image: table and pie-chart] 

Sector: Infrastructure and Energy: $425.85 million (46%); 
USAID-Administered Subsectors: 
* Shelter and supporting infrastructure; 
* Urban upgrading in Port-au-Prince; 
* Rubble removal; 
* Energy infrastructure; 
* Infrastructure for the agricultural and industrial sector. 

Sector: Governance and Rule of Law: $292.59 million (16%); 
USAID-Administered Subsectors: 
* Community stabilization; 
* Enabling the government of Haiti to function; 
* Supporting dialogue on relief and recovery; 
* Public institution and civil-society strengthening; 
* Justice reform and human rights; 
State-Administered Subsectors: 
* Justice reform and human rights; 
* Corrections; 
* Policing; 
* Counternarcotics and anticorruption; 
* Trafficking in persons; 
* Peacekeeping. 

Sector: Health and Other Basic Services: $118.12 million (13%); 
USAID-Administered Subsectors: 
* Health systems, professional training, and reconstruction; 
* Health services to internally displaced persons; 
* Assistance for people with disabilities; 
* Education. 

Sector: Food and Economic Security: $63.61 million (7%); 
USAID-Administered Subsectors: 
* Rural economic growth and development; 
* Market access and value chains; 
* Agricultural services and institutional strengthening; 
* Natural resource management; 
* Partial credit guarantee fund. 

Sector: Other: $17.50 million (2%). 
USAID-Administered Subsectors: 
* USAID operating expenses; 
* Budget support to the government of Haiti. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: U.S. Infrastructure and Energy Sector Reconstruction: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photos, pie-chart, table] 

Infrastructure and Energy $425.85 million (46%): 

Subsector: Energy infrastructure; 
Allocation[A]: $137.11 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Rehabilitate 
and expand high-priority infrastructure and power generation as well
as support for regulatory, legal, and sector governance reform. 

Subsector: Infrastructure for the agricultural and industrial sectors; 
Allocation[A]: $137.11 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Primarily for 
road and port development to facilitate farm-to-market transportation. 

Subsector: Urban upgrade in Port-au-Prince; 
Allocation[B]: $65.0 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: U.S. government 
to provide via multi-donor HRF while expressing a preference that this
funding be used to repair housing, construct essential community 
infrastructure, and provide technical support to develop local 
capacity to manage land claims and ensure the use of safe construction 
methods. 

Subsector: Permanent housing in the U.S. government development 
corridors; 
Allocation[A]: $61.63 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Provide 
permanent housing for internally displaced people in new developments or
upgraded transitional shelters in accessible locations along the 
development corridors. Includes technical support for the development 
of a national housing strategy, improved building codes, and a housing 
finance system. 

Subsector: Rubble removal; 
Allocation[B]: $25.0 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: U.S. government 
to provide via multi-donor HRF projects while expressing a preference
for rubble removal in residential communities. 

Sources: GAO analysis of USAID and State data; photos, GAO. 

[A] FY 2010 Haiti supplemental spending plan allocation. 

[B] To HRF. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 5: U.S. Governance and Rule-of-Law Sector Reconstruction: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 pie-charts, 2 tables] 

Governance and Rule of Law: $292.59 million (16%): 

USAID-Administered: 

Subsector: Public institution and civil society strengthening; 
Allocation[A]: $63.89 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Strengthen 
public administration and improve public sector performance in 
priority institutions, including the Office of the Prime Minister and 
Ministries of Finance, Planning, Justice & Public Security, 
Agriculture, Health, and Public Works. 

Subsector: Community stabilization; 
Allocation[A]: $48.30 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Encourage 
people to move out of camps to new communities or back to their 
neighborhoods, and to revitalize priority public spaces. 

Subsector: Justice reform and human rights; 
Allocation[A]: $14.74 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: The passage and 
implementation of new criminal and criminal procedure codes, to 
standardize case tracking, and other efforts to improve court 
functionality. 

Subsector: Enabling the government of Haiti to function; 
Allocation[A]: $11.0 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Strengthening 
the capacity of key national-government ministries and some local 
entities to engage in rebuilding operations by providing infrastructure,
office and communications equipment, and technical assistance. Includes
provision of material assistance and short-term technical expertise to 
IHRC. 

Subsector: Supporting dialogue on relief and recovery; 
Allocation[A]: $7.0 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Support to 
media, conducting surveys, and government of Haiti outreach. 

State-Administered: 

Subsector: Peacekeeping; 
Allocation[A]: $45.0 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Support UN 
peacekeeping operations by doubling the U.S. contingent to 100 police 
advisors and 10 corrections advisors, help establish effective 
internal displaced-person camp-security measures, and provide 
equipment and training to the UN's formed police units. 

Subsector: Policing; 
Allocation[A]: $35.1 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Reconstruct 
damaged portions of the Haitian National Police training facility and 
provide assistance for training new police recruits. 

Subsector: Corrections; 
Allocation[B]: $33.36 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Support 
renovations or rebuilding of damaged prison facilities. 

Subsector: Counternarcotics and anticorruption; 
Allocation[A]: $14.7 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Re-establish 
and enhance the Haitian National Police capacity for counternarcotics, 
maritime, and transnational anticrime operations. 

Subsector: Justice reform and human rights; 
Allocation[A]: $7.5 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Support the 
strategy to address the 85 percent pretrial detention rate in Haiti, 
funds will provide a mobile court system to transport judges to 
prisons to adjudicate and classify prisoners. 

Subsector: Trafficking in persons; 
Allocation[A]: $5.5 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Supplement 
existing programs to support technical assistance on antitrafficking 
legislation and address the need for enactment and enforcement of 
protection laws and programs to address gender-based violence. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

[A] FY 2010 Haiti supplemental spending plan allocation. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 6: U.S. Health and Other Basic Services Sector Reconstruction: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photos, pie-chart, table] 

Health and Other Basic Services: $118.12 million (13%): 

Subsector: Health systems, professional training, and reconstruction; 
Allocation[A]: $70.0 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Renovate 
damaged infrastructure, including hospitals and medical schools in 
Port-au-Prince. Will also renovate or build new health centers and 
hospitals in communities targeted for U.S. government development 
assistance. Includes technical support for the Ministry of Health. 

Subsector: Health services to internally displaced persons; 
Allocation[A]: $28.29 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Support the 
provision of family planning, tuberculosis, and routine immunization 
services at health facilities in the Port-au-Prince area. Will also 
increase access to basic health care at communal health facilities. 

Subsector: Education; 
Allocation[B]: $10.0 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Provide via 
multidonor HRF to support Haiti’s education system with an expressed
preference to support the IADB’s plan to build or rehabilitate 
schools, improve teacher quality, and promote better enforcement of 
education standards. 

Subsector: Assistance for people with disabilities; 
Allocation[A]: $9.83 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Establish or 
strengthen services for disabled persons at four to six service 
centers, and train rehabilitation technicians and staff. Also support 
capacity development for government ministries and the IHRC to improve 
access to public facilities for the disabled. 

Sources: GAO analysis of USAID and State data; photos, GAO. 

[A] FY 2010 Haiti supplemental spending plan allocation. 

[B] To HRF. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 7: U.S. Food and Economic Security Sector Reconstruction: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photos, pie-chart, table] 

Food and Economic Security: $63.61 million (7%): 

Subsector: Natural resource management; 
Allocation[A]: $24.57 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Improve and 
restore watershed areas in support of increasing productivity of 
certain staple and export crops in U.S. government development 
corridors (includes $7.5 million to provide alternatives for firewood 
and charcoal fuel). 

Subsector: Partial credit guarantee fund; 
Allocation[B]: $12.5 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: U.S. government 
expressed a preference that this funding provided via HRF multidonor 
projects be used to refinance distressed or nonperforming loans held 
by small and medium-sized businesses negatively affected by the 
earthquake by facilitating implementation of a partial credit 
guarantee fund to encourage banks to refinance and make new loans. 

Subsector: Rural economic growth and development; 
Allocation[A]: $11.79 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Support effort 
to double yields of high-value export crops (mango and cocoa) and staple
crops in selected areas over 5 years. 

Subsector: Agricultural services and institutional strengthening; 
Allocation[A]: $11.79 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Work with 
government of Haiti to create cooperative-owned agribusinesses to reduce
dependence on donated seed and fertilizers. Also includes provision of 
advisors to support applied agricultural research and extension and
vocational training. 

Subsector: Market access and value chains; 
Allocation[A]: $4.91 million; 
Description of reconstruction projects and priorities: Expand access 
to technology and training to rural small and medium enterprises, and
a market-price information system. 

Sources: GAO analysis of USAID and State data; photos, GAO. 

[A] FY 2010 Haiti supplemental spending plan allocation. 

[B] To HRF. 

[End of figure] 

Twenty Percent of U.S. Supplemental Funding Had Been Obligated by 
March 2011: 

As of the end of March 2011, USAID and State reported that 
approximately $184.3 million, or about 20 percent of $918 million, had 
been obligated.[Footnote 27] The obligated amount includes $120 
million in ESF funds contributed to HRF through Treasury. The U.S. 
government expressed preferences for how HRF would apportion the $120 
million among certain subsectors (see table 2). These preferences are 
reflected in IHRC-approved projects to date that are funded in whole 
or in part by U.S. contributions to HRF. 

Table 2: U.S. Preferences for Supplemental ESF Funds Provided to HRF: 

Source of funds (by sector): Infrastructure and Energy; 
Subsector: Housing; 
Amount: $65.0 million. 

Source of funds (by sector): Infrastructure and Energy; 
Subsector: Rubble removal; 
Amount: $25.0 million. 

Source of funds (by sector): Food and Economic Security; 
Subsector: Partial Credit Guarantee fund; 
Amount: $12.5 million. 

Source of funds (by sector): Health and Other Basic Services; 
Subsector: Education; 
Amount: $10.0 million. 

Source of funds (by sector): Other; 
Subsector: Government of Haiti budget support; 
Amount: $7.5 million. 

Source of funds (by sector): Total; 
Amount: $120.0 million. 

Source: U.S. government supplemental spending plan for Haiti. 

Note: The $7.5 million in government of Haiti budget support 
originally included $6 million to help fund a portion of IHRC's 18-
month operations budget, which the commission estimates will total 
nearly $15 million by the end of October 2011. As of April 2011, 
however, the U.S. government has not yet finalized an agreement with 
the government of Haiti about the specific budgetary line items 
against which it will apply this support. 

[End of table] 

In addition, USAID and State reported they obligated another $64.3 
million in supplemental reconstruction funds between December 2010 and 
March 2011. USAID reported obligating $44 million in ESF funds for 
reconstruction projects and operating requirements. State reported 
obligating another $20.3 million in INCLE funding was for a small 
number of bilaterally conducted rule-of-law projects (see table 3). 

Table 3: Supplemental U.S. Reconstruction Funds Reported as Obligated, 
as of March 2011: 

Sector (source of funds): Governance and Rule of Law (INCLE); 

Priority and project area: Peacekeeping--Support for United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); 
Amount: $9.6 million. 

Priority and project area: Policing--Repair of police infrastructure; 
Amount: Sector (source of funds): $5.5 million. 

Priority and project area: Corrections--Renovate and rebuild prisons; 
Amount: Sector (source of funds): $0.6 million. 

Priority and project area: Trafficking in persons--Strengthen 
institutional and civil society capacity to address trafficking, and 
protect victims of gender-based violence; 
Amount: $4.5 million. 

Sector (source of funds): Governance and Rule of Law (ESF); 

Priority and project area: Community stabilization through temporary 
employment--Includes activities to remove rubble and repair public 
infrastructure; 
Amount: $26.1 million[A]. 

Priority and project area: Enabling government of Haiti to function--
Provision of technical assistance, office equipment, and temporary 
facilities to the offices of the President and the Prime Minister, and 
key Haitian government ministries and IHRC; 
Amount: $9.8 million[A]. 

Priority and project area: Supporting dialogue on relief and recovery--
Promotes greater dialogue and information exchange between the public, 
civil society, media, and the government of Haiti. Includes support 
for infrastructure and short-term technical assistance to the Ministry 
of Culture and Communications; 
Amount: [Empty]. 

Priority and project area: Public institution and civil society 
strengthening--Transfer of $2 million to the Smithsonian Institution's 
Haiti Cultural Recovery Project to rescue, safeguard, and preserve 
Haiti's important collections of art, artifacts, museum collections, 
and architecture; 
Amount: $2.0 million. 

Sector (source of funds): Food and Economic Security (ESF); 
Priority and project area: Natural resource management--Watershed 
restoration and improvement; 
Amount: $5.0 million. 

Sector (source of funds): USAID operating expenses; 
Priority and project area: [Empty]; 
Amount: $1.1 million. 

Sector (source of funds): Total; 
Amount: $64.3 million[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data. 

[A] According to an OTI official, obligations for OTI's projects will 
be distributed among these three project and priority areas in 
proportion to their share of the total allocation of $66.3 million in 
supplemental funds noted in the spending plan: community stabilization 
projects will receive about 73 percent of the obligated funds; 
projects enabling the government of Haiti to function will receive 17 
percent; and projects supporting dialogue on relief and recovery will 
receive approximately 10 percent. 

[B] Total differs due to rounding. This total excludes most of the 
$6.5 million in supplemental ESF allocated for USAID operating 
expenses in fiscal year 2011, but not reported as obligated as of 
March 2011. According to USAID officials, $5.5 million of this amount 
was distributed to the mission for obligation (but not yet obligated), 
and $1 million was withheld for use by USAID's Haiti Task Team in 
Washington, D.C. 

[End of table] 

* The State-administered INCLE obligations contributed to doubling the 
number of U.S. police advisors working with MINUSTAH from 55 to 110, 
[Footnote 28] replacing some equipment lost in the earthquake by the 
U.S. contingent with MINUSTAH, repairing certain Haitian police 
facilities, and conducting site surveys and beginning construction or 
renovation of prison facilities. 

* The USAID-administered ESF amount includes (1) a December 2010 
obligation for an agricultural/integrated watershed program in rural 
Haiti, to which USAID added some activities for food distribution and 
production of locally grown food,[Footnote 29] and (2) grants awarded 
in January and March 2011 under two existing and one new contract for 
OTI's short-and medium-term activities to support community 
revitalization, help restore basic government functions, and provide 
technical and other assistance to the Haitian government (including 
IHRC). 

USAID's Initiatives for Oversight and Monitoring of Reconstruction 
Funds Are at Varying Stages of Implementation: 

USAID intends to expand and enhance its internal control framework to 
address the increased risk factors associated with the increase in 
funding USAID will oversee and is at varying stages of implementing 
new controls.[Footnote 30] To oversee $648 million of supplemental 
reconstruction funds allocated to USAID, the mission plans to (1) 
augment existing internal controls to provide additional financial 
management and oversight of reconstruction projects by the mission's 
OFM; and (2) establish a new independent monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) unit in the mission's Office of Policy Coordination and Program 
Support (PCPS). As of April 2011, OFM has taken initial steps to 
implement new controls, such as reorganizing staff to address the 
increase in oversight of supplemental reconstruction funds; however, 
PCPS is in its planning stages. Additionally, the USAID OIG, 
independent of the mission, plans to enhance its audit and oversight 
activities in Haiti and has begun to implement its plans. USAID plans 
to allocate at least $16.5 million in supplemental funding to these 
new measures.[Footnote 31] Figure 8 depicts the organization of the 
USAID mission in Port-au-Prince and highlights its relationships with 
the three offices responsible for maintaining accountability and 
internal controls. 

Figure 8: Organizational Chart of USAID Mission in Haiti: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

USAID/Haiti Mission Office of Director: 
Coordinating function with: 
* USAID OIG in San Salvador. 

Reporting to USAID/Haiti Mission Office of Director: 
* Executive Office; 
* Office of Financial Management; 
* Office of Policy Coordination and Program Support; 
* Office of Acquisition and Assistance; 
* Office of Governing Justly and Democratically; 
* Office of Health and Education; 
* Office of Food Security & Humanitarian Assistance; 
* Office of Economic Growth. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID/Haiti data. 

[End of figure] 

OFM Developed Plans for Expanding and Enhancing Oversight and 
Monitoring of Reconstruction Funds and Is in Early Stages of 
Implementation: 

OFM intends to augment its existing controls to address the heightened 
risks associated with the increase in funding, including by providing 
additional fiscal oversight over the four development sectors 
identified in the U.S. reconstruction strategy, adding staffing 
resources, and conducting financial management training. As of April 
2011, OFM had developed plans to conduct additional oversight 
activities, such as conducting audits specifically of reconstruction 
funds used to maintain USAID's fiscal oversight. OFM had also taken 
initial steps to reorganize its structure to better align with the 
U.S. reconstruction strategy, and initiated the contracting process 
for obtaining assistance for OFM to conduct additional financial 
oversight activities. 

OFM Plans to Conduct Expanded Oversight of Supplemental Fund Grantees: 

OFM has developed plans to apply expanded controls over supplemental 
reconstruction funds. OFM officials stated that they developed these 
plans to address the risks associated with increased amounts of funds 
(and the existing risks associated with grants and acquisitions in 
Haiti, such as high levels of corruption) and because they had prior 
experience implementing similar plans responding to other natural 
disasters in Haiti, such as a tropical storm in 2004. These risks 
include (1) the substantial increase in the amount of funding USAID 
will oversee in fiscal years 2011 and 2012;[Footnote 32] (2) the 
increased number of new grantees, particularly Haitian grantees; and 
(3) the need to obligate and spend funds quickly to meet pressing 
needs. OFM's plans for its additional oversight activities were 
included in an April 2010 action memorandum outlining the mission's 
financial oversight strategy for the earthquake response and its 
Fiscal Year 2011 Yearly Financial Plan, released in November 2010. 

The April 2010 action memo was developed by OFM as an oversight plan 
to augment the mission's internal control framework by implementing 
additional controls over supplemental reconstruction funding and 
providing USAID financial management training. The action memo 
reflected input from various sources, including the views of the 
mission's senior management staff and USAID OIG's oversight strategy 
for reconstruction activities.[Footnote 33] It stated the planned 
additional controls will provide assurance that supplemental 
reconstruction funds will be safeguarded through activities, such as 
(1) conducting additional financial reviews of all grantees and 
contractors receiving reconstruction funds; (2) developing additional 
policies and procedures for local grantees and contractors receiving 
reconstruction funds; (3) and performing control environment 
assessments and risk assessments[Footnote 34] of grantees with no 
previous experience working with the mission. In the action memo, OFM 
also identified the need to provide additional USAID financial 
management training to grantees. 

OFM officials stated their fiscal year 2011 financial plan focuses on 
maintaining oversight of all USAID funds, including reconstruction 
funds, and aligns OFM's planned oversight activities with the four 
development sectors identified in the U.S. government's reconstruction 
strategy.[Footnote 35] Under the plan, OFM will provide financial 
support services, including audits, financial reviews, payment 
verifications, and financial visits in accordance with USAID's ADS to 
each development sector in the strategy.[Footnote 36] To help 
developmental sector program teams safeguard USAID assets, verify that 
assets are used for intended purposes, and provide timely and accurate 
financial information to USAID management, OFM will provide 
recommendations to each these teams, if necessary. Moreover, OFM 
officials developed a schedule of the office's planned financial 
audits, which provide oversight for ongoing USAID projects and new 
reconstruction projects, for fiscal year 2011. 

OFM Reorganized Its Structure and Developed Plans to Add Internal and 
External Staffing Resources to Maintain Oversight of Reconstruction 
Funds: 

To carry out the activities in the action memo, OFM reorganized its 
structure in October 2010 to better align with the four development 
sectors and has taken steps to implement its plans to increase the 
office's staff levels. In particular, OFM officials stated that 
financial analysts would be dedicated to the four development sectors 
to provide financial management assistance. According to its plan, OFM 
will undertake some additional oversight measures, such as conducting 
financial reviews and financial visits[Footnote 37] of grantees and 
contractors receiving reconstruction funds. According to OFM 
officials, they identified the need for additional staff and created 
new positions to address the anticipated increase in the workload 
associated with implementing OFM's planned oversight procedures. As of 
April 2011, OFM officials told us they promoted 2 personnel into two 
recently created accounting positions within OFM. Moreover, OFM 
officials stated they plan to hire 5 more staff by June 2011, 
increasing personnel from 16 to 21. Figure 9 shows the reorganized 
OFM, as of October 2010, with oversight and accounting staff to cover 
the four key developmental sectors. 

Figure 9: OFM Structure Following Reorganization, as of October 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Office of Financial Management (Controller): 
Coordinating function with: 
* Regional Inspector General in San Salvador. 

Reporting to Office of Financial Management (Controller): 
* Financial Analysis Supervisor: 
- Contracted local accounting/contracting firms; 
- Financial Analysis focused on development sectors; 
* Chief Accountant: 
- Financial Accounting focused on development sectors; 
- Payments and Payroll. 

Source: GAO analysis of OFM data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to adding OFM staff to help implement planned additional 
oversight, OFM plans to contract with local accounting and consulting 
firms--four have been identified and certified by USAID OIG--to 
conduct most of the financial reviews of local grantees and 
contractors, including developing additional policies and procedures 
and conducting control environment assessments and risk assessments of 
new grantees and contractors. Moreover, the firms will execute annual 
financial audits of local private voluntary organizations and local 
for-profit contractors that expend $300,000 or more in reconstruction 
funding in a fiscal year.[Footnote 38] USAID officials noted that OFM 
will review the work completed by these local accounting and 
consulting firms and share its findings with USAID OIG and relevant 
mission program officials. 

OFM Has Initiated Implementation of Planned Additional Controls, but 
Further Implementation Is Dependent on Obligation of Reconstruction 
Funds: 

OFM identified the need to contract with firms to help implement 
additional oversight activities and conduct training for grantees and 
subgrantees on financial management of reconstruction funds to address 
risks associated with spending reconstruction funds in Haiti. OFM has 
initiated the implementation of planned additional controls, such as 
starting the procurement process to contract with local accounting and 
consulting firms to provide additional oversight. However, officials 
stated they are waiting for the mission to further obligate 
reconstruction funds to execute planned additional oversight 
activities, such as performing specific audits and providing training. 

In April 2011, OFM officials told us they expect to have contracts in 
place no later than June 2011 with local accounting and consulting 
firms to provide (1) additional financial reviews assessing local 
grantees' and contractors' financial management and (2) financial 
management training. These OFM officials stated they had submitted the 
draft blanket purchase agreement (BPA),[Footnote 39] to the mission's 
Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA)--the mission's office 
responsible for procuring goods and services, anticipating that OAA 
would finalize the BPA in early June,[Footnote 40] prior to further 
obligation of supplemental reconstruction funds.[Footnote 41] 
According to these officials, the BPA statements of work, which were 
finalized in December 2010, include objectives, steps and procedures, 
reporting requirements, and terms of performance in such detail that 
the contracted firms should be able to begin performing their assigned 
oversight responsibilities as firms are identified. However, OFM 
officials added that until the mission identifies grantees to receive 
reconstruction funds, OFM will not be able to identify grantees to 
audit or determine what training may be necessary. 

The Mission Plans to Develop a New Monitoring and Evaluation Unit to 
Assess Progress and Is in the Early Stages of Planning: 

PCPS drafted plans to establish a new, independent M&E unit in 
accordance with the U.S. Haiti strategy and USAID's new agency-wide 
evaluation policy.[Footnote 42] In response to the U.S. reconstruction 
strategy's requirement for an increase in M&E activities, the mission 
will dedicate $12 million in supplemental reconstruction funds to 
create the new M&E unit. USAID's evaluation policy, issued in January 
2011, updated the agency's standards and practices. The revised policy 
highlights the use of evaluation as an important tool to inform 
USAID's global development effort and make operational 
decisions.[Footnote 43] USAID's evaluation policy also clarified the 
purposes for and approaches to conducting evaluations, such as 
requiring external parties (i.e., a third-party contractor) to conduct 
evaluations to mitigate biased reporting or conflicts of interest. For 
example, if an evaluation team is composed of USAID staff, the 
evaluation policy requires an outside expert to lead the team. 

Additionally, the evaluation policy focuses on establishing methods 
that ensure credibility, transparency, and high-quality information. 
According to PCPS documents, the mission's plans include the following 
M&E efforts: 

* Collect and track baseline data--or data that establish the 
conditions that exist before a project's implementation--and project- 
level indicator[Footnote 44] data for all reconstruction projects 
through a contract with an external organization; and: 

* Evaluate the impact of mission programs, the relevance of program 
objectives, the effectiveness of design and implementation, the 
efficiency of resource use, and the sustainability of results beyond 
donor funding. 

The mission plans to use information from the M&E unit to make 
adjustments and corrections to its programs, if necessary, and to help 
management make informed program decisions and shape long-term 
strategies in Haiti. 

The M&E unit is in its early planning stages. PCPS developed a broad 
outline for the unit, and officials said the mission is working with a 
USAID M&E expert to develop the unit's operations. The expert will 
help the mission draft a detailed M&E plan, determine a strategy to 
coordinate and gather data from each of the development sectors, and 
assist the mission on other tasks. PCPS officials said the mission had 
identified nine positions to comprise the new M&E unit. Of the nine, 
seven team members have been hired or are at the mission, including a 
monitoring manager; four M&E specialists, one from each of the four 
development sectors; one evaluation manager; and one economist. The 
mission is working on hiring a second economist and a mapping 
specialist. 

According to PCPS officials, collecting baseline data for projects in 
each of the four sectors is foundational to the M&E plan. USAID's 
evaluation policy also emphasizes the need to establish baseline data 
when initiating new projects.[Footnote 45] In particular, the 
evaluation policy states that officials should ensure that baseline 
data are collected early in the project lifespan, before any 
significant project implementation has occurred. As of April 2011, 
PCPS was designing its baseline data-collection tool and had not begun 
to collect baseline data.[Footnote 46] Mission officials estimated the 
mission will start collecting baseline data in the summer of 2011. 
According to a PCPS official, after the initial baseline data 
collection, data will continue to be collected annually for 5 years. 
Mission officials noted the baseline data-collection tool is based on 
the mission's AADs,[Footnote 47] which document implementation plans 
for reconstruction activities in the four developmental sectors. 
According to mission officials, as of March 2011, the mission's 
program teams had drafted seven of eight AADs detailing activities for 
the four developmental sectors, but none had been finalized. Mission 
officials stated they still had time to plan since only one project 
that did not use reconstruction funds had been implemented, but 
officials did not have a mechanism for coordinating with program teams 
to determine when project plans are finalized so that the timing of 
baseline data collection aligns with project implementation. 

USAID OIG Has Developed and Begun to Implement Plans to Increase 
Oversight of Supplemental Funds: 

USAID OIG's Regional Inspector General (RIG)[Footnote 48] developed, 
independently from the mission, an audit strategy for its post- 
earthquake reconstruction activities due to the risk factors 
associated with reconstruction in Haiti. According to the RIG, USAID 
OIG's strategy was developed based on prior experience and activities 
conducted in similar disaster-affected areas. It is designed to 
minimize the risk of fraud and corruption to programs in Haiti and 
strengthen the internal control systems of USAID, its contractors, and 
implementing partners. USAID OIG has created a tentative audit 
schedule. The strategy outlines other planned activities, such as 
conducting training for USAID staff, grantees, and contractors about 
fraud. USAID OIG also will oversee financial audits performed by 
contracted private accounting firms or the U.S. Defense Contract Audit 
Agency.[Footnote 49] Congress provided $4.5 million in supplemental 
appropriations to USAID OIG to carry out its oversight activities. 
[Footnote 50] 

The USAID OIG has begun to implement its plans to provide increased 
oversight of supplemental funds. In February 2011, USAID OIG 
officially established its Port-au-Prince office, although a senior 
RIG official noted that USAID OIG officials frequently traveled to 
Haiti and began working there within weeks of the earthquake. The 
senior RIG official stated that it was important for USAID OIG to set 
up its office in Haiti before a large amount of supplemental funds 
were obligated because of the potential for corruption and uncertainty 
about grantees' financial management systems to adequately account for 
reconstruction funds. The senior RIG official stated she anticipates a 
surge of programs will be implemented with supplemental reconstruction 
funds in fiscal year 2012 and that USAID OIG plans to dedicate 50 
percent of its total staffing resources for the entire region--Latin 
America and the Caribbean--to oversight in Haiti. 

USAID OIG has filled two positions--an auditor and an investigator, 
planned to deploy a third officer to Haiti in April 2011,[Footnote 51] 
and plans for a total staff of seven once the office is fully 
operational. In addition, the senior RIG official stated that the 
USAID OIG investigator has been conducting fraud-awareness briefings 
to grantees and mission officials to educate them and help prevent 
fraud. The senior RIG official added that USAID OIG planned to 
complete fraud-awareness briefings for all primary grantees, mission 
officials, and technical teams by March 2011. 

Additionally, USAID OIG has implemented additional oversight through 
an increase in the number of audits it conducts in Haiti. As of 
February 2011, the RIG official told us that USAID OIG had planned or 
initiated six audits in Haiti, most of which involved post-earthquake 
activities using supplemental humanitarian funding or reprogrammed 
funding appropriated in prior years.[Footnote 52] In comparison, USAID 
OIG averaged one audit per year in Haiti from fiscal years 2006 
through 2009. USAID OIG issued three audit reports following the 
earthquake; one reviewed the cash-for-work program,[Footnote 53] 
another involved the use of fiscal year 2009 funding with program 
implementation ending May 2011,[Footnote 54] and a third addressed 
USAID's post-earthquake transitional shelter program.[Footnote 55] 
Another senior RIG official stated that USAID OIG was in the process 
of completing an additional audit and planned to initiate five more 
audits in fiscal year 2011. Due to their timing, the audits conducted 
thus far have not covered the use of supplemental reconstruction 
funds.[Footnote 56] USAID OIG anticipates its work to oversee the use 
of supplemental reconstruction funding will begin in fiscal year 2012. 
According to a senior RIG official, they will adjust the strategy, if 
necessary, as the mission implements additional projects. 

IHRC Has Begun to Establish Governance Structures and Procedures, but 
Is Not Fully Operational: 

Although IHRC, the Haitian commission established to oversee 
reconstruction efforts, has made progress in establishing key 
governance structures and project review procedures, the commission is 
not fully operational. IHRC, which U.S. officials stated has improved 
transparency and donor coordination, has made progress setting up a 
new organization in a challenging environment. However, although the 
commission's 18-month tenure ends in October 2011, IHRC is not fully 
operational due to delays in staffing the commission and defining 
PAO's role. IHRC also has made progress in developing project review 
procedures and approving reconstruction projects, but IHRC's ability 
to direct funding to Haitian priorities is limited, in part because 
those priorities have not been clear. IHRC has taken recent steps, 
however, to begin to clarify Haitian priorities. 

IHRC Has Made Progress Establishing Key Governance Structures, and 
Officials Report It Has Improved Coordination and Transparency: 

IHRC was established in a challenging environment in post-earthquake 
Haiti. According to the U.S. government, the earthquake killed an 
estimated 17 percent of civil service employees and destroyed almost 
all ministry buildings. As a result, IHRC was created at a time when 
the ministries were operating at low capacity and were trying to re- 
establish operations. U.S. officials noted that simply finding a space 
out of which IHRC could operate presented an initial challenge. 
[Footnote 57] Additionally, IHRC officials noted that the commission 
had to establish its administrative structure without having access to 
all operational funding. Finally, the massive international response 
to the earthquake resulted in an influx of funding to Haiti and an 
increase in the number of donors and implementers operating in the 
country. 

The commission has made progress in establishing some key governance 
structures in a challenging environment. In June 2010, within 2 months 
of its formation, IHRC established a Board of Directors--co-chaired by 
Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and former U.S. President 
Bill Clinton--and held its first Board meeting. The order creating 
IHRC requires that at least half of the Board of Directors be Haitian 
and allows representation by the bilateral and multilateral donors 
pledging at least $100 million in reconstruction funding over 2 years 
or at least $200 million in debt relief.[Footnote 58] The Board also 
includes nonvoting members who represent local and international NGOs, 
the Haitian diaspora,[Footnote 59] and the Organization of American 
States. Currently, the Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Secretary 
of State serves as the U.S. representative on the IHRC Board. In 
total, the commission has held six board meetings through April 2011. 

At the first meeting of the Board of Directors, the Board approved the 
bylaws of the commission, which outline the general structure of the 
Board and the Secretariat and provide a high-level overview of the 
responsibilities of various offices and individuals within the 
commission. Additionally, IHRC developed an organizational outline, 
shown in figure 10, and identified key staffing needs and budget 
requirements needed to make the commission fully operational. In July 
2010, IHRC appointed an executive director for the commission and it 
has begun to fill some staff positions. 

Figure 10: Organization of IHRC: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Board: Co-chairs. 

Reporting to the Board: 
* Executive Director. 
* Performance and Anti-Corruption Office: 
- Transparency and Accountability; 
- Complaints Investigation; 
- Impact Assessment. 

Reporting to the Executive Director: 
* Director of Strategy and Planning; 
* Director of Projects; 
* Director of Communications; 
* Director of Finance; 
* Director of Shared Services. 

Reporting to Director of Strategy and Planning: 
* Master Planning; 
* Territorial Rebuilding; 
* Economic Rebuilding; 
* Surveys, Data Analysis and Needs Assessment; 
* Social Rebuilding; 
* Institutional Rebuilding. 

Reporting to Director of Projects: 
* Policies, Protocols and Standards; 
* Project Review and Approval; 
* Stakeholder liaison Offices (including private sector, NGOs and 
others). 

Reporting to Director of Communications: 
* External Communications; 
* Outreach and Community Relations. 

Reporting to Director of Finance: 
* Budgeting; 
* Accounting; 
* Internal procurement. 

Reporting to Director of Shared Services: 
* Administration and Security; 
* IT; 
* HR; 
* Legal. 

Source: IHRC. 

Note: The Secretariat consists of the Executive Director, all of the 
offices reporting through him, and PAO. 

[End of figure] 

According to U.S. and IHRC officials, IHRC's operations have 
contributed to improved transparency and enhanced coordination among 
donors. One of IHRC's primary goals is to provide transparency over 
the reconstruction effort. IHRC notes that one way it increases 
transparency is to publicize information on all approved 
reconstruction projects through its Web site. According to State 
officials, meeting regularly with other donors through IHRC Board 
meetings ensures that donors are informed of one another's activities, 
which promotes increased collaboration. IHRC officials noted the 
commission has looked for new opportunities to create partnerships 
between donors, implementers, and other stakeholders. For example, 
U.S. and IHRC officials both cited an agreement between the French and 
U.S. governments to rebuild the general hospital in Port-au-Prince as 
an example of such a partnership. U.S. officials noted that these 
benefits are less tangible than other outcomes, such as the number of 
approved projects, but they are valuable and have resulted in improved 
effectiveness of reconstruction efforts. 

IHRC Is Not Fully Operational Due to Staffing Shortfalls and PAO's 
Unclear Role: 

Although progress has been made, IHRC is not yet fully operational. 
According to U.S. and NGO officials, staffing shortages affected the 
project review process--a process to determine whether project 
proposals should be approved for implementation--and communications 
with stakeholders, such as the Board of Directors. Additionally, IHRC 
has only just begun to carry out its project oversight function 
because the role of PAO--the IHRC office responsible for oversight--
has not been fully defined. 

Staffing Shortfalls Affected Project Review Processes and 
Communications: 

Although IHRC has begun to fill staff positions, it experienced delays 
in hiring staff and has considerable staffing needs. According to the 
Executive Director, staffing the commission has progressed more slowly 
than preferred, largely because the commission initially focused on 
the project review process to avoid reconstruction delays. As of 
December 2010, IHRC filled 53 of the approximately 100 positions the 
commission anticipates needing to operate at full capacity.[Footnote 
60] Additionally, in June 2010 the commission outlined 34 positions-- 
including director positions, heads of several offices, and sector 
experts--as priority staffing needs. As of January 2011, IHRC filled 
12 of these positions, with 22 remaining vacant, as shown in table 4. 

Table 4: Status of Priority Staffing Needs, as of January, 2011: 

IHRC functional area: Directors; 
Priority positions identified: 5; 
Positions filled: 2; 
Positions not filled: 3. 

IHRC functional area: Projects, communications, and other services; 
Priority positions identified: 5; 
Positions filled: 0; 
Positions not filled: 5. 

IHRC functional area: Strategy--sectoral pillar managers; 
Priority positions identified: 4; 
Positions filled: 0; 
Positions not filled: 4. 

IHRC functional area: Strategy--sectoral experts; 
Priority positions identified: 8; 
Positions filled: 4; 
Positions not filled: 4. 

IHRC functional area: Strategy--other positions; 
Priority positions identified: 2; 
Positions filled: 0; 
Positions not filled: 2. 

IHRC functional area: Office positions; 
Priority positions identified: 10; 
Positions filled: 6; 
Positions not filled: 4. 

IHRC functional area: Total; 
Priority positions identified: 34; 
Positions filled: 12; 
Positions not filled: 22. 

Source: GAO analysis of IHRC data. 

Note: Both the Executive Director and Director of Shared Services 
positions were filled in June 2010 and, therefore, were not included 
on IHRC's list of priority hiring needs. Additionally, some positions 
not included in the June list of priority needs have been filled. 

[End of table] 

The absence of staff has affected the project review process and the 
timeliness of communications with some stakeholders, such as the Board 
of Directors. For example, because IHRC does not have all of the staff 
needed to review project proposals, it used a different process for 
each of the first three rounds of project review. According to the 
Executive Director, IHRC's projects division and sector experts are 
critical to the commission's intended project review processes and, 
until those staff are in place, IHRC does not have a full internal 
project review capability. IHRC has filled some of the commission's 
day-to-day staffing needs with consultants and temporary staff from 
international donors and has used review panels, consisting of sector 
experts from international donors and Haitian ministries, to conduct 
technical reviews of submitted projects. Additionally, IHRC 
anticipates PAO will contribute to the project review process by 
conducting risk analyses of project proponents' and implementers' 
ability to self-monitor and provide effective oversight of proposed 
projects; however, as of February 2011, these analyses had not been 
conducted because that office was not staffed. Stakeholders, including 
IHRC Board members and members of the NGO community, also have 
criticized some communication from the Secretariat, claiming that 
information has not always been provided in a timely manner and the 
commission has not conducted sufficient outreach to educate people 
about its role and the processes for working with the commission. NGO 
and U.S. officials attributed communications issues, in part, to a 
lack of staff. 

PAO's Intended Operations Are Not Fully Defined: 

While IHRC has established a general outline of PAO's role, and 
awarded a contract to a major audit firm to further develop PAO, 
details about its intended operations remain unclear. The Haitian 
presidential order establishing the IHRC requires that the commission 
include an office to conduct audits and monitor the performance of 
reconstruction projects. IHRC intends that PAO will reinforce IHRC as 
a model of good governance and ensure that the reconstruction process 
is transparent, accountable, and effective. The specific functions of 
the office are subject to the approval of the Board of Directors; 
however, according to IHRC officials, Board members held differing 
opinions on PAO's appropriate role. For example, some Board members 
questioned whether PAO should be responsible for monitoring ongoing 
reconstruction projects as this may duplicate donors' existing 
monitoring and compliance systems. The Board established a working 
group to address these questions and arrive at agreement on a general 
outline of PAO's role. 

The working group developed a set of implementing guidelines that 
broadly defined PAO's role and addressed concerns the Board raised, 
such as stating that PAO will leverage donors' monitoring and 
compliance resources to the extent possible and focus its monitoring 
activities on projects posing higher risks. After these guidelines 
were developed, the Board agreed to PAO's creation in October 2010. 
According to IHRC documents, PAO will have several responsibilities, 
including: 

* oversight of IHRC's internal operations; 

* monitoring progress and implementation of reconstruction projects; 

* investigating and responding to accusations of corruption, fraud, 
waste, and abuse and, if necessary, taking corrective action; 

* contributing to the project review process by screening proposals 
for potential risks and examining donors' and implementers' internal 
controls; and: 

* communicating reconstruction results and progress to the people of 
Haiti. 

Additionally, because IHRC intends to transfer a fully operational PAO 
to a Haitian development agency that will be created to succeed IHRC 
at the end of its 18-month mandate in October 2011, some Board members 
noted that building Haitian capacity should be one of the office's top 
priorities. As a result, the guidelines state that the office should 
be staffed primarily by Haitian nationals and augmented by experts 
from international donors and consultants hired by IHRC. Further, the 
guidelines highlight PAO's intended knowledge-transfer and capacity- 
building functions. 

The daily operations of PAO have not been defined, however, and its 
role has not been fully clarified. For example, although PAO's 
implementing guidelines state that its monitoring activities will 
focus on projects posing higher risks, IHRC has not yet developed 
procedures for assessing a project's risk level or guidelines 
outlining how IHRC will use risk assessments to select projects for 
monitoring. In March 2011, IHRC began to take initial actions to 
clarify the role of PAO. IHRC hired a PAO Director, who started work 
in late March, and hired a consulting firm to provide technical 
assistance to establish and implement PAO, which also began work in 
March. According to a request for proposals that IHRC issued in 
January, the consulting firm will be responsible for developing 
protocols and procedures for PAO. According to IHRC, no other PAO 
staff have been hired as of March 2011. 

IHRC Has Developed Initial Project Review Procedures and Approved Over 
$3 Billion in Reconstruction Projects, but Its Initial Process Was 
Challenged by Unclear Strategic Priorities: 

IHRC also has made progress developing criteria and procedures for 
reviewing reconstruction projects and has approved over $3 billion in 
projects as of March 2011. However, IHRC's ability to direct projects 
to Haitian priorities is limited, in part because those priorities 
have been unclear. Although IHRC has recently taken steps to begin 
clarifying Haitian priorities, it is too soon to determine whether 
these actions will result in a better alignment between approved 
projects and Haitian priorities. 

IHRC Has Developed Initial Project Review Procedures and Approved Over 
$3 Billion in Reconstruction Projects: 

IHRC has established an initial set of project review procedures. To 
avoid reconstruction delays, IHRC decided to focus its early efforts 
on a framework for reviewing and approving reconstruction project 
proposals to ensure they are aligned with the Haitian government's 
Action Plan. IHRC has developed criteria and initial project review 
procedures and has approved 86 projects that would require about $3.2 
billion--or about one-third of the approximately $10 billion pledged 
by international donors over 10 years--through March 2011. 

Using the following criteria, IHRC determines if a submitted project: 

* is aligned with the Action Plan and government of Haiti sector 
strategies; 

* addresses a clear gap in the Action Plan or sector plan(s); 

* provides desirable social and economic benefit; 

* has donors and implementers with the capacity to carry out the 
project effectively; 

* has an appropriate budget; 

* has been sufficiently coordinated with the Haitian government; 

* has been assessed for its social and environmental impact; 

* was also submitted to affected communities for input; 

* makes a sustainable change; 

* maximizes use of local labor and local resources; and: 

* promotes gender equality. 

IHRC decided not to include the extent to which a project had secured 
funding as one of its review criteria. According to the Executive 
Director, this allowed IHRC to highlight projects that met all the 
commission's criteria, but otherwise lacked complete funding. He noted 
that IHRC hoped to encourage donors to work together to fund projects 
deemed important. 

From June 2010 through March 2011, IHRC approved 86 reconstruction 
projects, requiring over $3.2 billion, at five board meetings, as 
shown in figure 11. 

Figure 11: IHRC Project Approvals, by Date: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

Date: June 2010; 
Number of projects: 2; 
Cost of projects: $56 million. 

Date: August 2010; 
Number of projects: 29; 
Cost of projects: $1.722 billion. 

Date: October 2010; 
Number of projects: 18; 
Cost of projects: $777.2 million. 

Date: December 2010; 
Number of projects: 24; 
Cost of projects: $429.6 million. 

Date: February 2011; 
Number of projects: 13; 
Cost of projects: $251.5 million. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Of the over $3.2 billion in total estimated project costs, donors 
committed to fund about $2.1 billion at the time the projects were 
approved. IHRC has outlined approved projects by sector, a summary of 
which is provided in table 5. 

Table 5: IHRC-Approved Projects, June 2010-March 2011: 

Sector: Agriculture; 
Number of projects: 6; 
Estimated cost of projects: $373 million; 
Funding committed: $336 million. 

Sector: Budget support; 
Number of projects: 1; 
Estimated cost of projects: $55 million; 
Funding committed: $55 million. 

Sector: Capacity building; 
Number of projects: 2; 
Estimated cost of projects: $13 million; 
Funding committed: $13 million. 

Sector: Cross-sectoral; 
Number of projects: 2; 
Estimated cost of projects: $35 million; 
Funding committed: $18 million. 

Sector: Debris removal; 
Number of projects: 2; 
Estimated cost of projects: $27 million; 
Funding committed: $10 million. 

Sector: Development; 
Number of projects: 1; 
Estimated cost of projects: $14 million; 
Funding committed: $6 million. 

Sector: Disaster preparedness; 
Number of projects: 1; 
Estimated cost of projects: $20 million; 
Funding committed: $20 million. 

Sector: Education; 
Number of projects: 4; 
Estimated cost of projects: $202 million; 
Funding committed: $43 million. 

Sector: Energy; 
Number of projects: 4; 
Estimated cost of projects: $208 million; 
Funding committed: $12 million. 

Sector: Environment; 
Number of projects: 1; 
Estimated cost of projects: $1 million; 
Funding committed: $1 million. 

Sector: Finance and investment; 
Number of projects: 2; 
Estimated cost of projects: $509 million; 
Funding committed: $280 million. 

Sector: Health; 
Number of projects: 20; 
Estimated cost of projects: $332 million; 
Funding committed: $269 million. 

Sector: Housing; 
Number of projects: 12; 
Estimated cost of projects: $263 million; 
Funding committed: $211 million. 

Sector: Infrastructure; 
Number of projects: 9; 
Estimated cost of projects: $619 million; 
Funding committed: $487 million. 

Sector: Institutional; 
Number of projects: 8; 
Estimated cost of projects: $8 million; 
Funding committed: $7 million. 

Sector: Job creation; 
Number of projects: 6; 
Estimated cost of projects: $280 million; 
Funding committed: $188 million. 

Sector: Shelter; 
Number of projects: 3; 
Estimated cost of projects: $67 million; 
Funding committed: $51 million. 

Sector: Water/sanitation; 
Number of projects: 1; 
Estimated cost of projects: $200 million; 
Funding committed: $115 million. 

Sector: Women and children; 
Number of projects: 1; 
Estimated cost of projects: $11 million; 
Funding committed: $1 million. 

Sector: Total; 
Number of projects: 86; 
Estimated cost of projects: $3.236 billion; 
Funding committed: $2.123 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of IHRC data. 

Note: The Funding committed column lists the funding available at the 
time of IHRC approval. Some projects have subsequently received 
additional funding. 

[End of table] 

Fourteen of the 86 projects approved by IHRC as of March 2011 will be 
fully or partially funded by the United States, either bilaterally or 
through the U.S. contribution to HRF. These 14 projects have a total 
U.S. contribution of more than $330 million, or about 10 percent of 
the estimated $3.2 billion in projects approved by the 
commission.[Footnote 61] The largest U.S. project--to develop an 
industrial park in the northern part of Haiti in conjunction with the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the government of Haiti--
constitutes over one-third of the cost of approved U.S. projects. 
Table 6 lists the U.S. projects approved by IHRC through March 2011. 

Table 6: IHRC-Approved Projects to Be Fully or Partially Funded by the 
U.S. Government: 

Project title: Northern industrial park; 
U.S. contribution: $124.0 million. 

Project title: New settlements in the Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien 
development corridors[A]; 
U.S. contribution: $23.0 million. 

Project title: Building demolition and debris removal with heavy 
equipment[B]; 
U.S. contribution: $25.0 million. 

Project title: Port-au-Prince neighborhood upgrading[B]; 
U.S. contribution: $65.0 million. 

Project title: Rehabilitation and reintegration of persons with 
disabilities program; 
U.S. contribution: $10.0 million. 

Project title: Development Credit Authority; 
U.S. contribution: $8.5 million. 

Project title: Building demolition and debris removal with heavy 
equipment; 
U.S. contribution: $10.0 million. 

Project title: New Millet Bridge construction; 
U.S. contribution: $1.6 million. 

Project title: Seven technical assistance projects involving 
government of Haiti central administration[C]; 
U.S. contribution: $7.0 million. 

Project title: Reconstruction of the University Hospital; 
U.S. contribution: $25.0 million. 

Project title: Reconstruction of education sector[B]; 
U.S. contribution: $10.0 million. 

Project title: Rehabilitate priority electricity substations in the 
Port-au-Prince area; 
U.S. contribution: $8.0 million. 

Project title: Emergency community assistance and planning for shelter 
and settlement; 
U.S. contribution: $3.0 million. 

Project title: Partial credit guarantee fund[B]; 
U.S. contribution: $12.5 million. 

Project title: Total; 
U.S. contribution: $332.6 million. 

Source: State. 

[A] Funding for new settlements in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien was 
originally reported as $53 million. However, the northern industrial 
park project accounts for $30 million of funding initially counted in 
this item. We have adjusted this item to eliminate double counting 
between the two projects. 

[B] Projects to be funded through the U.S. contribution to HRF. 

[C] While IHRC counts this as seven separate projects, State reports 
them as one project because they all involve technical assistance from 
Treasury to the government of Haiti. 

[End of table] 

IHRC's Ability to Direct Funding to Haitian Government Priorities Is 
Limited: 

According to IHRC, funding for reconstruction projects is unevenly 
spread among sectors and does not necessarily reflect Haitian 
government priorities. Since IHRC does not directly control any 
reconstruction funds, officials noted the commission's ability to 
direct funding to priority areas is somewhat limited. IHRC can only 
approve those projects submitted to the commission, and donors 
determine how much funding they are willing to provide in each 
priority area. IHRC and U.S. officials noted it can be difficult to 
convince donors to fund some priority areas, such as rubble removal, 
when doing so requires that donors reduce their intended contributions 
to other sectors, such as health or education. HRF provides some 
flexibility for IHRC to direct resources to priority areas, but HRF 
and IHRC officials noted that some donors' practice of attaching 
preferences to their HRF contributions effectively limits the fund's 
ability to respond to Haitian priorities.[Footnote 62] 

IHRC's ability to ensure that approved projects are consistent with 
the government of Haiti's priorities also has been complicated by a 
lack of clarity about those priorities. The Action Plan, which is the 
core document for laying out reconstruction needs and IHRC's primary 
criteria for reviewing reconstruction projects, is broad and does not 
provide detailed guidance on project-level requirements. Additionally, 
it outlines 18-month budget needs for all sectors, but does not 
establish explicit priorities across sectors. Sector strategic plans 
developed by Haitian government ministries provide more specificity 
regarding the government's priorities within a sector, but not all 
priority sectors have strategic plans. For example, the Ministries of 
Health and Agriculture developed detailed sector plans after the 
earthquake, but the government of Haiti does not have a housing 
strategy. Developing this strategy is challenging because at least 
five agencies have some responsibilities related to housing. In 
addition, there is no lead housing agency, and the agencies involved 
have overlapping competencies and limited policy enforcement, making 
it difficult to reach agreement on a comprehensive strategy. The 
government of Haiti also does not have sector strategies for debris 
removal or energy. 

According to IHRC's Executive Director, the lack of specificity in the 
Action Plan and the absence of some sector plans have challenged the 
commission's ability to ensure that approved projects are aligned with 
the government's reconstruction priorities. He noted it can be 
difficult to approve projects in sectors without strategic plans 
because it is difficult to demonstrate that projects are consistent 
with the government's priorities. According to the Executive Director, 
by approving projects in sectors with no strategic plans, IHRC is 
effectively establishing the government's priorities for that sector. 
The Secretariat has been hesitant to recommend approval of many 
projects in such sectors without explicit direction from the Board of 
Directors that setting such priorities for the government is an 
appropriate role for the commission. 

While all projects approved by IHRC address needs outlined in the 
Action Plan, our analysis confirms that approved projects have 
directed substantially more funding to some sectors, relative to the 
needs outlined in the Action Plan, than others.[Footnote 63] We 
compared the 86 projects approved by IHRC through March 2011 with the 
Action Plan's 18-month budgetary requirements. We found that approved 
projects exceed the total 18-month needs outlined in the Action Plan 
in some sectors, while other sectors received only a fraction of the 
18-month requirements in the Action Plan. For example: 

* Debris removal. The Action Plan outlines an 18-month need of $265 
million for debris removal, but as of March 2011, IHRC approved an 
estimated $52 million for debris removal projects. 

* Agriculture. The Action Plan outlines an 18-month need of $260 
million for agricultural production. However, IHRC has approved 
projects in the agricultural sector totaling about $380 million. 

* Institutional rebuilding. The Action Plan identifies an 18-month 
need for more than $800 million to rebuild and improve Haitian 
government institutions; IHRC has approved about $113 million in 
projects to address this challenge. 

* Transportation network. The Action Plan identified an 18-month need 
of $180 million to improve the national transportation network. As of 
February 2011, IHRC has approved road-construction projects totaling 
more than $680 million. 

IHRC Has Recently Taken Steps to Begin Clarifying Reconstruction 
Priorities: 

IHRC has recently taken steps to begin clarifying reconstruction 
priorities across sectors, but it is too early to determine whether 
IHRC's steps will result in a better alignment between project 
approvals and stated priorities. At the December 2010 Board meeting, 
the Secretariat presented a strategic plan for the remainder of IHRC's 
18-month term, which identifies eight sectors as priorities on which 
IHRC will focus through the end of its mandate in October 2011. The 
strategy lists target outcomes to be achieved by October 2011, as well 
as programs that can contribute to achieving those targets, an 
estimate of the funding necessary, and policy or institutional 
decisions that can aid in program implementation. To meet IHRC's 
targets, the strategy outlines about $780 million in additional needs 
beyond those areas in which donors have already committed funding. 
Appendix VI summarizes the sectors, target outcomes, and additional 
funding needs outlined in the strategic plan. 

U.S. officials stated that the targets IHRC established appear to be 
reasonable goals that are achievable by October 2011. While we did not 
assess the feasibility of implementing the strategy, it outlines 
additional actions IHRC, donors, implementers, and the government of 
Haiti will need to take to achieve the targets. IHRC intends to (1) 
work with implementers to map ongoing projects against the target 
outcomes in the plan; (2) work with Haitian ministries to develop 
requests for precise projects and programs for donors and 
implementers; and (3) publicize the targets, request relevant 
projects, and work with proponents to refine project concepts. 
Additionally, IHRC requested that donors and implementers support the 
strategy by (1) considering funding projects in line with the 
strategic plan;[Footnote 64] (2) operationalizing and implementing 
projects in accordance with the targets laid out in the plan; and (3) 
to the extent possible, adapting current projects to address outcomes 
presented in the strategic plan. IHRC also requested that the 
government of Haiti help resolve policy and institutional impediments 
to project implementation and answer public-policy questions in a 
timely manner. 

According to U.S. officials, strategic planning is one of IHRC's most 
valuable roles and the strategy is an important step in identifying 
Haiti's reconstruction priorities and the resources needed to address 
those priorities. However, as IHRC and donors need to take additional 
actions to implement the strategy, it is too soon to determine whether 
the strategy will result in a better alignment between project 
approvals and stated priorities. Additionally, IHRC's strategy does 
not fully clarify Haitian priorities in all sectors because it only 
focuses on a subset of the sectors included in the Action Plan. 
Further, it does not outline priorities and goals beyond October 2011, 
when IHRC's mandate ends. IHRC notes that the Haitian government has 
begun to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy,[Footnote 65] based on 
the Action Plan, which may help to further clarify Haitian priorities. 

Conclusions: 

Haiti's disaster resulted in an unprecedented international 
humanitarian and reconstruction effort, with donors pledging more than 
$10 billion over 10 years. USAID has begun expanding oversight and 
monitoring of the $648 million in U.S. supplemental reconstruction 
funding for which it is directly responsible. Only a small amount of 
these funds were obligated as of March 2011 (with most of that amount 
targeted for HRF rather than bilateral projects). USAID has identified 
risks associated with obligating and expending supplemental 
reconstruction funding, such as the increased level of funding and 
number of grantees compared to past years. To address these risks, 
USAID has several oversight and monitoring initiatives in varying 
stages of progress where implementation of the planned controls is 
dependent on reconstruction project activities. Further, USAID has 
placed importance on the mission's new M&E unit to collect and analyze 
accurate project data, particularly collecting baseline data before 
initiating reconstruction projects. However, as the mission finalizes 
planning for its projects, USAID will need to monitor this progress to 
ensure that the timing of baseline data collection aligns with the 
initiation of reconstruction projects and USAID retains its 
opportunity to collect baseline data before a new reconstruction 
project can make an impact on reconstruction efforts. 

In addition, IHRC, which is responsible for coordinating and providing 
oversight of international reconstruction assistance, has approved 
projects estimated at $3 billion--or about 30 percent of total donor 
pledges--and has made an important contribution to getting the 
reconstruction effort under way. IHRC's mandate ends in October 2011, 
however, and limited time remains to fully staff its operations and 
those of PAO, IHRC's oversight office, which has been cited as key to 
building the Haitian government's capacity and furthering 
accountability and good governance. As a result, IHRC's project 
approval process does not fully possess an internal evaluation 
capability that could strengthen IHRC project approval decision making 
and monitoring. Moreover, the projects IHRC has approved are not 
necessarily aligned with Haiti's most pressing needs because strategic 
priorities have not been clear and donor proposals have not 
necessarily reflected the most immediate needs. Therefore, even though 
numerous valuable efforts are now under way, these current projects 
may not be providing the assistance that is most urgently needed. 
Although IHRC has begun to clarify Haitian priorities through a 
strategic plan, it is too soon to determine whether this will result 
in a better alignment between Haitian priorities and approved 
projects. IHRC intends to take additional actions to implement the 
strategy, such as determining the extent to which target outcomes in 
the strategy are being addressed by ongoing projects and provided 
further details on projects and programs that would be consistent with 
the strategy's priorities. Finally, the role and operations of PAO 
have not been clearly defined. Without clear goals, procedures, or 
structures, it is unclear how PAO can contribute to IHRC operations or 
eventually serve as an oversight body in a Haitian development agency. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help strengthen ongoing efforts to monitor and evaluate the use of 
supplemental reconstruction funds and prepare for when reconstruction 
funds are further obligated in Haiti, we recommend the USAID Mission 
Director in Haiti, in collaboration with USAID officials in 
headquarters and the field, develop mechanisms within PCPS for 
coordinating with development sector staff to determine when project 
plans are finalized so the timing of baseline data collection aligns 
with project implementation. 

To strengthen IHRC capacity to coordinate and oversee international 
donor assistance, ensure the consideration of Haitian priorities in 
planning projects, and assist with IHRC's transfer to a Haitian 
development agency, we recommend the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the USAID Administrator, encourage IHRC leadership 
to take the following three actions: 

* ensure that priority staffing needs are met, including staffing the 
projects division with sector experts and hiring PAO staff who can 
provide technical guidance and analysis during upcoming project 
selection rounds; 

* determine the specific goals and structure of PAO and ensure 
oversight procedures and staff are in place before the end of IHRC's 
term so monitoring and oversight functions can be transferred to a 
successor agency; and: 

* continue to take steps to implement IHRC's strategic plan by, for 
example, finalizing more detailed plans for projects and programs that 
address the goals laid out in the plan. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

State and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report, 
which are reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII. State and USAID also 
provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. 
State concurred with our recommendations and noted it will continue to 
work with IHRC leadership to address them. State also noted that an 
IHRC projects director had been hired by the Board of Directors at its 
April 2011 meeting. The Director has announced plans to focus on 
linking sector ministries of the government of Haiti with the project 
approval process and build its capacity to review projects before the 
end of the IHRC mandate in 2011. We modified our recommendations 
accordingly. 

USAID acknowledged our recommendation and outlined steps it has taken, 
or will take, to establish its M&E unit and begin baseline data 
collection. USAID stated that the M&E unit has been created and it 
expects to complete a baseline data collection scope of work by May 
2011, commence baseline data collection by July 2011, and provide 
ongoing data collection for projects initiated after that. USAID 
asserts that project implementation under the U.S government strategy 
will not be far enough along at that time to significantly affect the 
baseline data. We acknowledge USAID's intent to collect baseline data 
prior to the significant implementation of projects and look forward 
to continued progress in implementing this recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or any of your staffs have any question about this report, 
please contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov 
or Susan Ragland at (202) 512-8486 or raglands@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in Appendix IX. 

Signed by: 

David Gootnick: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

Signed by: 

Susan Ragland: 
Director, Financial Management and Assurance: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lindsey Graham:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Kay Granger:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The objectives of this report were to: (1) describe the planned uses 
for U.S. reconstruction assistance and the amounts provided so far; 
(2) identify the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) 
internal controls for overseeing and monitoring U.S. funds provided 
for reconstruction efforts; and (3) assess the progress the Interim 
Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) has made in establishing governance 
and oversight structures. This work was mandated in the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 2010, which provides funding for our effort to 
review U.S. efforts in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake.[Footnote 
66] 

Our scope included the $918 million in reconstruction funding provided 
to USAID and the Department of State (State) in the fiscal year 2010 
supplemental appropriation legislation, with the agencies receiving 
about $770 million and $148 million, respectively. We did not review 
in depth the approximately $220 million in reconstruction assistance 
provided to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for debt relief 
and technical assistance. Additionally, we did not review $1.64 
billion in funding provided primarily to reimburse U.S. agencies for 
their emergency and humanitarian efforts in Haiti immediately 
following the January 2010 earthquake, nor did we examine the 
approximately $148 million in U.S. embassy-related funding included in 
the law, all of which was also included in the supplemental 
appropriations law. Further, our scope included the identification of 
expanded internal controls that USAID is currently planning and 
implementing to provide oversight over supplemental reconstruction 
funding; we did not evaluate these controls as they have not been 
fully planned and implemented and, therefore, cannot be tested. In 
addition, we did not review USAID's existing and standard internal-
control structure other than to provide a brief background 
description. Finally, we reviewed the structure and procedures of IHRC 
as it had been established as of March 2011, with an understanding 
that the operations of this commission are still incomplete and 
evolving, although the entity is more than halfway through its 
established term of 18 months (which began in April 2010). 

To obtain information on the intended uses of U.S. reconstruction 
funding for Haiti, we reviewed the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
2010; the FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan (September 
2010), prepared by State; and the interagency Post-Earthquake USG 
Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity (January 
2011). We also reviewed documents prepared by the Haitian government, 
such as the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and the Action Plan for 
National Recovery and Development of Haiti (Action Plan) from March 
2010. We also met with officials from State, Treasury, the Department 
of Justice, and USAID, as well as representatives of nongovernmental 
organizations and USAID-implementing partners receiving U.S. 
government funding in Washington, D.C., and in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. 

To determine the amount of funding provided to date, we included 
obligations data reported by State and USAID as of March 31, 2011, to 
determine the levels of USAID's Economic Support Fund (ESF) funding 
and State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 
supplementary funding being allocated to reconstruction projects. The 
obligations totals reported by State and USAID include both 
expenditures and unexpended obligated balances. These data included 
information on obligations of supplemental appropriation funding 
overall, as well as amounts provided for particular projects. We 
discussed intended uses and funding provided with officials from 
State, USAID, and Treasury. We did not conduct an independent data-
reliability assessment of the obligations reported by USAID and State. 
However, because the data are limited in volume, pegged to specific 
projects, and came from the users responsible for collecting and 
compiling the data, we determined the data to be sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of this report. 

To identify USAID's plans to expand and enhance internal controls over 
supplemental reconstruction funding, we reviewed portions of USAID's 
Automated Directives System (ADS) and USAID's new agency-wide 
evaluation policy, issued in January 2011, that are relevant for 
internal controls. We also examined Haiti-specific documentation that 
describe new and expanded oversight efforts such as the Office of the 
Inspector General's Oversight Framework for USAID/Haiti Earthquake 
Response, Recovery, and Rebuilding Efforts, as well as the Fiscal Year 
2011 Yearly Financial Plan. We discussed increased oversight with and 
reviewed relevant documents provided by the USAID mission's Office of 
Financial Management and Office of Policy Coordination and Program 
Support, as well as the Regional Inspector General's office in San 
Salvador, El Salvador. Finally, we reviewed the activities and plans 
of these organizations to reorganize their offices and augment their 
staffing levels in anticipation of maintaining accountability and 
control over the expanded levels of USAID funding for Haitian 
reconstruction and development programs. 

To assess the progress of IHRC in establishing governance and 
oversight structures, we reviewed IHRC documentation such as an IHRC 
strategic plan, a 1-year report, Board documentation, presentations, 
and internal documentation regarding the Performance and 
Accountability Office (PAO), and project approval listings. We 
discussed the operations and progress of IHRC with the commission's 
Executive Director and other key staff, and also discussed IHRC 
progress with State's Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, and 
USAID officials. We were unable to speak with consultants hired to 
assist with the establishment of IHRC as they stated that their work 
was proprietary and could not be disclosed to outside parties. To 
determine the extent to which projects approved by IHRC align with the 
priorities of the Action Plan, we conducted a limited content 
analysis, in which two analysts independently reviewed descriptions of 
all 86 projects approved by IHRC through March 2011 and assigned each 
project to the priority sector(s) in the Action Plan addressed by the 
project. We then reconciled the two lists. If the analysts' 
independent assignments of a project to priority sectors did not 
match, they discussed how the project addressed the key elements of 
each sector in more detail and agreed upon the project's assignment in 
one or more of the Action Plan's priority sectors. 

To provide insights into all objectives, we traveled to Haiti in 
August and September 2010 and met with U.S. officials from USAID, 
State, Treasury, and the Department of Defense, as well as 
representatives of some of USAID's international and local 
implementing partners for humanitarian, development, and 
reconstruction programs--including Catholic Relief Services; 
Chemonics; Development Alternatives, Incorporated (DAI); and the 
Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) International. We also met with 
officials from IHRC; the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF); the Haitian 
ministries of Finance, Health, Interior, and Public Works; and the 
Haitian Supreme Audit Institution, the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et 
du Contentieux administratif. We visited camps for internally 
displaced people and sites and neighborhoods in and around Port-au-
Prince that demonstrated the extent of the earthquake destruction, as 
well as ongoing efforts to provide humanitarian aid, build 
transitional shelters and services, and begin the rebuilding process. 
We also visited the Haiti Apparel Center, a USAID-funded project to 
train garment workers to meet the demand for employees for an industry 
seen as a key to Haiti's economic recovery as the apparel 
manufacturers are serving Haiti's growing export market to the United 
States.[Footnote 67] We also made site visits in one of the 
development corridors targeted for supplementary reconstruction 
assistance in and around the town of Saint-Marc. There, we observed 
and discussed with implementers and local Haitians the results of 
completed and ongoing U.S.-funded development programs, including a 
community bank, a hospital, and a number of agricultural and watershed 
management projects. We also met with representatives from HRF and the 
International Organization for Migration to discuss multilateral post- 
earthquake assistance. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to May 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our work objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Humanitarian Relief Spending in Haiti by U.S. Government 
Agencies, as of the End of Fiscal Year 2010: 

As of the end of fiscal year 2010, U.S. government agencies had spent 
more than $1.1 billion within Haiti to meet humanitarian needs arising 
from the January 2010 earthquake.[Footnote 68] U.S. government and 
international agencies reported that U.S. efforts included the 
following results: 

* Immediate response. The U.S. military provided more than 22,000 
personnel for critical security, transportation, and logistics tasks; 
moreover, State and other agencies deployed about 1,000 additional 
U.S. and Haitian staff on a temporary basis to the U.S. Embassy in 
Port-au-Prince. 

* Food. The U.S. government participated in an international food- 
distribution operation that fed more than 4 million people; in 
addition, USAID provided seed, fertilizer, and tools to boost crop 
production in selected areas in 2010. 

* Medical. U.S. government medical personnel provided aid for 31,000 
patients and administered vaccines for 1 million people that helped 
prevent widespread disease outbreaks. 

* Shelter. USAID humanitarian programs provided temporary shelter for 
1.5 million internally displaced persons. This included funding 33,000 
"shelter solutions" as part of the ongoing effort to move these 
internally displaced persons from temporary tent camps to more durable 
shelter.[Footnote 69] The mission reported its grantees completed 
18,000 transitional shelters (T-shelters) capable of accommodating an 
estimated 90,000 people as of March 31, 2011. This is approximately 32 
percent of the 57,000 T-shelters built by the international community. 
Moreover, USAID grantees helped the government of Haiti assess over 
380,000 buildings and completed repairs to earthquake-damaged 
buildings sufficient to accommodate 3,900 households, as of March 
2011.[Footnote 70] 

* Employment. U.S. humanitarian efforts funded a number of employment 
projects for internally displaced persons, particularly cash-for-work 
programs conducted by several USAID implementers, including Catholic 
Relief Services, and CHF International. By January 2011, U.S. cash-for-
work programs had cumulatively employed over 350,000 people and were 
providing wages for 8,000 persons per day to remove rubble and help 
with the response to the cholera epidemic. 

Six U.S. Government Agencies Were Involved in Post-Earthquake 
Humanitarian Assistance: 

DOD and USAID spent approximately 99 percent of the U.S. post- 
earthquake humanitarian assistance provided to Haiti in fiscal year 
2010. The remainder of assistance within Haiti was spent by State's 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Other agencies, 
including the Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland 
Security, Interior, and Agriculture, acted as USAID implementing 
partners within Haiti.[Footnote 71] Table 7 depicts the value of the 
humanitarian funding provided by three departments. 

Table 7: Breakout of Funding Sources among U.S. Agencies Providing 
Post-Earthquake Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti in Fiscal Year 2010: 

Department/agency: USAID; 
FY 2010 Humanitarian funding total: $662,686,000[A]; 
Percentage of total: 58%. 

Department/agency: DOD; 
FY 2010 Humanitarian funding total: $464,080,000; 
Percentage of total: 41%. 

Department/agency: State[B]; 
FY 2010 Humanitarian funding total: $14,600,000; 
Percentage of total: 1%. 

Department/agency: Total; 
FY 2010 Humanitarian funding total: $1,141,366,000; 
Percentage of total: 100%. 

Source: USAID, Haiti-Earthquake Fact Sheet #73 Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 
(Washington, D.C., Sept. 24, 2010): 

[A] Includes funding provided via OFDA,Office of Food for Peace, 
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the USAID mission in Haiti 
(mission),and the USAID mission in the Dominican Republic. 

[B] Funding provided via State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration. 

[End of table] 

The implementing partners for the U.S.-government humanitarian effort 
include: (1) 40 nongovernmental organizations (NGO); (2) UN, UN- 
affiliated, and other international organizations; (3) six departments 
of the U.S. government, plus the Peace Corps; and (4) two local U.S. 
governments.[Footnote 72] Table 8 provides a breakout of USAID and 
State humanitarian funding among its implementing partners. 

Table 8: Breakout of State and USAID Fiscal Year 2010 Humanitarian 
Spending among its Implementing Partners: 

Organization type: Top 15 NGOs[A]; 
Funding: $319.2 billion; 
Percentage of total humanitarian spending: 47%; 
Funding source: USAID. 

Organization type: Other 24 NGOs; 
Funding: $46.2 billion; 
Percentage of total humanitarian spending: 7%; 
Funding source: USAID. 

Organization type: International agencies; 
Funding: $187.8 billion; 
Percentage of total humanitarian spending: 28%; 
Funding source: USAID; 
State. 

Organization type: U.S. federal government agencies; 
Funding: $115.4 billion; 
Percentage of total humanitarian spending: 17%; 
Funding source: USAID. 

Organization type: Local U.S. government; 
Funding: $8.7 billion; 
Percentage of total humanitarian spending: 1%; 
Funding source: USAID. 

Organization type: Total; 
Funding: $677.3 billion; 
Percentage of total humanitarian spending: 100%; 
Funding source: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID, Haiti-Earthquake Fact Sheet 
#73. 

Note: Totals may differ due to rounding. 

[A] NGOs receiving $5 million or more in U.S.-government humanitarian 
funding for earthquake relief. 

[End of table] 

U.S. Private Donors Provided More than $1 Billion in Post-Earthquake 
Relief Funding: 

According to State and USAID officials, the earthquake generated an 
unprecedented response by the U.S. and international NGOs. The UN 
reported that, as of April 2011, the United States and at least 125 
other countries responded to the earthquake with humanitarian 
contributions totaling nearly $2 billion in financial and other 
assistance; and donations from private individuals, foundations, and 
corporations was over $1.5 billion. A State report estimates that one 
out of every two households in the United States contributed to the 
Haiti assistance effort. InterAction, an organization representing 
many U.S.-based humanitarian and development NGOs, estimated that 66 
of its member NGOs working in Haiti in the wake of the earthquake 
received about $1.3 billion in private contributions, and had expended 
$531 million as of January 2011. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: The Government of Haiti's Action Plan for Reconstruction 
and Development: 

In the aftermath of the earthquake, the government of Haiti convened 
teams of local and international experts to conduct a postdisaster 
needs assessment, which mapped and quantified the destruction suffered 
by Haiti's social, economic, and administrative structures. The study 
estimated that overall damage and losses totaled approximately $7.8 
billion--more than the country's entire gross domestic product in 
2009. On the basis of the assessment, the government of Haiti produced 
the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (Action 
Plan) and presented it at the March 31, 2010, Donors Conference in New 
York City. This plan, which envisions nearly $3.9 billion in new 
development projects to be funded by international donors over the 
next 18 months,[Footnote 73] seeks to mobilize efforts and resources 
to achieve a qualitative change in Haiti within 20 years. 

The Action Plan concentrated on four priority areas: 

(1) Territorial rebuilding ($1.2 billion). In addition to Port-au- 
Prince, three new regional poles of development--Cap-Haïtien, Saint- 
Marc, and Les Cayes--are proposed. The majority of the needs outlined 
in this priority area are oriented toward the reconstruction of Port- 
au-Prince and other earthquake-affected areas by, among other things, 
clearing debris and rebuilding critical infrastructure such as 
electricity and rainwater drainage systems. 

Key investments include. Repairs to the airport in Port-au-Prince, as 
well as the construction of two new international airports in Les 
Cayes and Cap-Haïtien and two new deep-water ports outside of Port-au-
Prince; 600 kilometers of roads and bridges for the development of a 
national highway system connecting all major cities; and disaster-risk 
mitigation in Gonaïves, Jacmel, and Cabaret. 

(2) Economic rebuilding ($0.4 billion). Recovery investments will 
target four key sectors: agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and 
tourism. 

Key initiatives include. Creating 500,000 new jobs in construction, 
agribusiness, and manufacturing; creating a new land register; 
construction of new thermal and renewable/hydropower plants; and 
increasing the tax base to 18 percent. 

(3) Social rebuilding ($1.4 billion). Providing shelter is both an 
immediate and long-term priority. An expanded primary-care health 
network and education system, including vocational and higher 
education, is deemed critical for rebuilding. 

Key initiatives include. Reconstruction of housing, school feeding for 
2.2 million children, and reconstruction of 30 hospitals. 

(4) Institutional rebuilding ($0.8 billion). Focuses on establishing 
and rebuilding public administration, justice, and security; 
supporting democratic institutions through elections support; 
redefining the legal and regulatory framework; and establishing a 
governmental institution to manage the reconstruction. 

The Action Plan identified 20 project areas with accompanying cost 
estimates for initial projects. See Table 9 for project descriptions 
and total estimated costs. 

Table 9: Total Estimated Reconstruction Costs by Haiti Action Plan 
Sector for the First 18 Months: 

Sector: Reconstruction of devastated areas; 
Total investments: $780 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $150 million; 
Other funding: $0. 

Sector: National transport network; 
Total investments: $180 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $50 million; 
Other funding: $114 million. 

Sector: Hurricane season and disaster-risk management; 
Total investments: $130 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $75 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Regional hubs and urban renovation; 
Total investments: $75 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: 0; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: National planning and local development; 
Total investments: $50 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: 0; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Watershed management; 
Total investments: 0; 
Budgetary support[A]: 0; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: National production; 
Total investments: $260 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $40 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Relaunch of economic and financial channels; 
Total investments: 0; 
Budgetary support[A]: 0; 
Other funding: $400 million. 

Sector: Electricity; 
Total investments: $157 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $90 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Housing of the population; 
Total investments: 0; 
Budgetary support[A]: 0; 
Other funding: $295 million. 

Sector: Creation of high-intensity labor jobs; 
Total investments: $200 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $50 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Social protection; 
Total investments: $70 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $30 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Education: return to school and construction of schools; 
Total investments: $470 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $150 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Healthcare; 
Total investments: $390 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $120 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Food security; 
Total investments: $140 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $35 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Water and sanitation; 
Total investments: $160 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $60 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Democratic institutions; 
Total investments: $155 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $20 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Relaunching the administration; 
Total investments: $372 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $250 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Support to Parliament[B]; 
Total investments: $20 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: $10 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Justice and security; 
Total investments: $255 million; 
Budgetary support[A]: 50 million; 
Other funding: 0. 

Sector: Total; 
Total investments: $3.9 billion; 
Budgetary support[A]: $1.2 billion; 
Other funding: $809 million. 

Source: Government of Haiti's Action Plan for National Recovery and 
Development of Haiti (Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 2010). 

[A] Budgetary support is included in total investments and includes 
$350 million requested to complete the 2009-2010 budget year. 

[B] In a summary page, the Action Plan lists this as a separate line 
item; however, it is included as part of the "Democratic institutions" 
sector within the plan, so it may be double counted. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: U.S. Government's Post-Earthquake Haiti Strategy: Toward 
Renewal and Economic Opportunity: 

The new strategy's goal is to create a stable and economically viable 
Haiti, based upon two broad objectives. Figure 12 lays out the 
strategic framework of the U.S. government's interagency 2011-2015 
development strategy for Haiti. 

Figure 12: U.S. Government's Post-Earthquake Haiti Reconstruction 
Strategy: 

Strategic Framework: 

5 Principles; 
* USG assistance will be country-led and build country capacity; 
* USG assistance will be comprehensive and integrated; 
* USG assistance will leverage and be coordinated with the resources 
of other partners; 
* USG assistance will leverage multilateral mechanisms wherever 
appropriate; 
* USG assistance will be sustained and accountable. 

4 Core Development Pillars: 
* Infrastructure and Energy; 
* Food and Economic Security; 
* Health and Other Basic Services; 
* Governance and Rule of Law. 

3 Development Corridors: 
* Port-au-Prince Corridor; 
* Saint Marc Corridor; 
* Cap Haïtien Corridor. 

2 Objectives: 
* To catalyze economic growth through investments in agriculture, 
energy, and infrastructure; 
* To ensure long-term stability through investments in public 
institutions. 

1 Goal: 
* A stable and economically viable Haiti. 

Source: Multiple U.S. Government Agencies, Post-Earthquake USG Haiti 
Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity (Washington, D.C., 
January 2011). 

[End of figure] 

The strategy identified four core development pillars where investment 
is critical to achieving economic growth and stability. The strategy 
also outlines a set of objectives and intermediate results to guide 
efforts over the life of the 5-year strategy. Figure 13 depicts the 
objectives, expected results, and some of the numerical targets 
associated with each of the four core development sectors. 

Figure 13: Details of Sector Priorities Established in the U.S. 
Reconstruction Strategy for Haiti: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Assistance Objective: A Stable and Economically Viable Haiti: 

Infrastructure and Energy Intermediate Result 1: Improved 
infrastructure that supports community and commercial development: 

Subintermediate results: 
1.1 Increased access to housing and community services; 
1.2 Improved access and reliability of electricity; 
1.3 Increased access to international markets via secondary port; 
1.4 Increased domestic mobility via improved roads and bridges; 
1.5 Stronger government of Haiti capabilities and housing policies; 
1.6 Reduced charcoal and firewood for cooking. 

Targets (18 months to 5 years): 
* Fund relocation of IDPs to 100,000 repaired/rebuilt homes; 
* 250,000 people in 47,500 shelter solutions; 
* Resolve 40,000 to 80,000 occupancy claims in Port-au-Prince; 
* Support improved housing management plans for Port-au-Prince and 
development corridors; 
* Develop an energy-sector reform model to modernize regulations, reduce
subsidies, and attract private investment. 

Food and Economic Security Intermediate Result 2: Increased food and 
economic security: 

Subintermediate results: 
2.1 Improved performance of the agriculture sector; 
2.2 Improved nutritional status of women and children; 
2.3 Increased employment. 

Targets (within 5 years): 
* Invest in comprehensive agricultural development for competitive 
commodities in four watersheds; 
* Sustained improvement of 100,000 smallholder farm households; 
* Improved business environment for small and medium enterprises 
addressing lending, taxes, and land titles; 
* Job creation in target sectors. 

Health and Other Basic Services Intermediate Result 3: Improved health 
status and learning environment: 

Subintermediate results: 
3.1 Increased access to health and nutrition services;
3.2 Improved services for people with disabilities;
3.3 Strengthened Ministry of Health capabilities in provision of 
health services; 
3.4 Strengthened government of Haiti capabilities in governing school 
systems and maintaining universal standards; 
3.5 Increased services for vulnerable youth. 

Targets (18 months): 
* Invest in 3 community health networks; 
* Establish guidelines and train technicians for disability services; 
* Help create and equip Haitian government offices for education 
management; 
Targets (Within 5 years): 
* Support all 12 expanded health networks within the development 
corridors; 
* 4 to 6 disability service centers. 

Governance and Rule of Law Intermediate Result 4: More responsive 
government and improved rule of law: 

Subintermediate results: 
4.1. Strengthened representative, effective, and transparent 
governance; 
4.2. Strengthened rule of law and human rights, 

Targets (18 months): 
* Manual case-tracking system in 3 jurisdictions; 
* Significant drop in pretrial detention rates; 
* Stand up Superior Judicial Council; 
Targets (Within 5 years): 
* Civil and criminal databases developed; 
* 30 percent reduction in pretrial detention; 
* Ministry of Justice and Public Security offices rebuilt. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. government data. 

Note: Each health network consists of five to eight community clinics 
and one communal hospital. Each network is to serve 40,000 to 80,000 
people. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Timeline of Government of Haiti, the International 
Community, and U.S. Government Actions in Response to the 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake: 

Government of Haiti/International Community: 

1/12/2010: 
Earthquake. 

3/31/2010:	
International Donors Conference; 
United States pledges $1.15 billion for reconstruction. 

4/21/2010:	
IHRC created. 

5/11/2010: 
HRF established. 

7/29/2010: 
Congress appropriates supplemental funds.	 

September 2010: 
State-USAID reconstruction spending plan issued. 

October 2010: 
Cholera outbreak. 

November 2010: 
U.S. government disburses $120 million to HRF and $204 million for 
debt relief. 

11/28/2010: 
Inconclusive Haiti national elections. 

December 2010: 
Strategy for remainder of IHRC mandate released. 

1/3/2011: 
U.S. government	reconstruction strategy issued. 

3/20/2011: 
Runoff elections. 

5/14/2011: 
Michel Martelly inaugurated as President. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. government, government of Haiti, and HRF 
documents.	 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Priority Sectors and Funding Needs Identified in IHRC's 
Strategic Plan: 

Priority sector[A]: Housing; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Reduce camp population by 400,000 people; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: $210 million[B]. 

Priority sector[A]: Debris removal and management; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Remove 40 percent of debris in a way that is environmentally sound; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: $160 million. 

Priority sector[A]: Education; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Build and staff 250 temporary structures; 
* Build and staff 60 primary schools in areas where no public schools 
exist; 
* Equip up to 3000 schools (public and private); 
* Feed 250,000 children; 
* Provide up to 500,000 children with an education kit (manuals and 
uniforms); 
* Provide up to 500,000 children with financial assistance in private 
schools; 
* Train 5,000 teachers; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: $152.6 million. 

Priority sector[A]: Energy; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Increase hours of service for 30,000 urban households by 20 percent; 
* Expand electricity service to 10,000 rural households; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: $65 million. 

Priority sector[A]: Health; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Improve service delivery through targeted reconstruction and 
construction of 40 hospitals, 75 clinics, and an ambulance network to 
connect communities to health care services; 
* Increase the health care workforce through the reconstruction or 
reinforcement of four medical schools, four nursing schools, and 
training programs to reach 4,000 allied-health professionals; 
* Pilot and expand approaches to health care financing, including 
ensuring access to care for children under 5 years old and expanding 
access for pregnant women; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: $154.5 million. 

Priority sector[A]: Job creation; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Provide full-time employment to hundreds of thousands of Haitians; 
* Outside Port-au-Prince, jobs will be mainly created in agriculture, 
watershed management, and road construction; 
* Within Port-au-Prince jobs will mainly be created housing and debris-
related development activities; 
* Begin construction of two public and three private industrial parks; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: (no specific funding needs 
are identified). 

Priority sector[A]: Water and sanitation; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Increase sustainable access rate to potable water from 2 percent to 
50 percent; 
* Increase the access rate to toilets or latrines to meet 
international standards, from 10 percent to at least 27 percent; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: $19 million. 

Priority sector[A]: Capacity building of Haitian institutions; 
Main targets through October 2011: 
* Reinforce or create necessary sector tables[C]; 
* Assist ministries in developing strategies and investment plans; 
Additional funding needed to meet targets: $16.5 million[D]. 

Source: IHRC. 

[A] IHRC's Strategic Plan focuses on eight priority sectors. These 
sectors are a subset of the sectors listed in table 5; however, the 
Strategic Plan uses slightly different names for some sectors. 

[B] IHRC identifies a total estimated need of $350 million to meet the 
housing targets for 2011 and notes that, of that amount, about 40 
percent is committed by donors, but that it is programmed to be spent 
over a longer period of time. We only included the 60 percent of 
funding that is not yet committed, but did not account for the 
extended time frames of donors' existing commitments. 

[C] Sector tables are groups consisting of representatives from the 
Haitian government and civil society, donors, implementers, and the 
private sector that are intended to improve coordination within a 
sector. IHRC envisions that sector tables will be led by Haitian 
ministries and supported by a dedicated Secretariat. 

[D] The IHRC strategy does not lay out a specific total funding need 
to support capacity building of Haitian institutions. However, it 
notes that donors should fund the operations of a Secretariat to 
support sector tables in each of 11 sectors. The strategy also 
estimates an average annual cost of $1.5 million per Secretariat, 
which would result in a total funding need of approximately $16.5 
million. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

April 26, 2011:	 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 	
Government Accountability Office: 	
441 G Street, N.W.	
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 
	
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:	 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,	
"Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded	
Oversight Still to Be Implemented," GAO Job Code 320782.	 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for	
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.	 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact	
Shamin Kazemi, Economic Officer, Office of the Haiti Special 
Coordinator at (202) 647-9467.	 

Sincerely,	 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette:	 

cc: GAO — David Gootnick:	
S/HSC — Thomas C. Adams:	
State/OIG — Evelyn Klemstine:	 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded Oversight 
Still to be Implemented (GA0-11-415, Job Code 320782): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on 
GAO's draft report entitled "Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have 
Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to be Implemented." 

Recommendation: To strengthen IHRC capacity to coordinate and oversee
international donor assistance, ensure the consideration of Haiti 
priorities in planning projects, and help with IHRC's transfer to a 
Haitian development agency, we recommend that the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the USAID Administrator, encourage IHRC 
leadership to: 

* Ensure that priority staffing needs are met, including staffing the 
projects division with a director of projects and sector experts, and 
hiring PAO staff that can provide technical guidance and analysis 
during upcoming project selection rounds; 

Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation, and will 
continue to follow up with the IHRC both at the expert-level and at 
the Board of Directors. A projects director had been hired by the 
April Board of Directors meeting. The new projects director announced 
plans to focus on linking sector ministries of the Government of Haiti 
with the project approval process, and building their capacity to 
review projects before the end of the IHRC mandate in 2011. 

Recommendation:
* ...Determine the specific goals and structure of the PAO and ensure
oversight procedures and staff are in place before the end of the 
IHRC's term so monitoring and oversight functions could be transferred 
to a successor agency; 

Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation, and will 
continue to follow up with the IHRC both at the expert-level and at 
the Board of Directors. The PAO has begun its initial work of 
collecting information about the implementation status of IHRC-
approved projects, but has not yet clarified its approach to assessing 
project risk, or its approach to develop an institution that could 
play an audit role after the end of the IHRC mandate. 

Recommendation:
* ...Continue to take steps to implement the IHRC's strategic plan by, 
for example, finalizing more detailed plans for projects and programs 
that address the goals laid out in the plan. 

Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation, and will 
continue to follow up with the IHRC both at the expert-level and at 
the Board of Directors. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

April 29, 2011: 

David Gootnick:	
Director, International Affairs and Trade:	
U.S. Government Accountability Office:	
Washington, DC 20548:
	
Dear Mr. Gootnick,	 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's	
formal response to the GAO draft report entitled: "Haiti 
Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to 
be Implemented" (GAO-11-415).	 

The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this	
letter as an appendix to the final report.	 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the	courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
review.	 

Sincerely,	 

Signed by: 

Sean Carrol:	
Chief Operating Officer:	
U.S. Agency for International Development: 
	
Enclosure: a/s: 

[End of letter] 

USAID Comments On GAO Draft Report No. GAO-11-415: 

Thank you for allowing the Agency for International Development the 
opportunity to comment on the draft report, "Haiti Reconstruction: 
U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to be Implemented." 
We appreciate the recommendations offered by the GAO. 

Recommendation 1: To help strengthen ongoing efforts to monitor and 
evaluate the use of supplemental reconstruction funds, and be prepared 
when reconstruction funds are further obligated in Haiti, we recommend 
that the USAID Mission Director in Haiti, in collaboration with USAID 
officials in headquarters and the field, develop mechanisms within 
PCPS for coordinating with development sector staff to determine when 
project plans are finalized so that the timing of baseline collection 
aligns with project implementation. 

Response: The USAID Mission Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) team in up 
and running, and has begun the ongoing task of coordinating with 
development sector staff to initiate baseline data collection as new 
projects come on stream. 

A baseline data collection scope of work will be completed in May 
2011. This is timely for data collection this June or July. Project 
implementation under the U.S Government Strategy (approved in January 
2011) will not be far enough along at that time to significantly 
affect the baseline data. 

Internally, the Mission is in the process of increasing the amount of 
data provided by implementing partners. The Mission's M&E plan is to 
work with multiple. sources of data for monitoring and evaluation, in 
addition to the collection of baseline data. 

Final Action Target Date: 

* Creation of the M&E team: completed.
* Collection of baseline data; Commencing by July 2011 and ongoing for 
new projects coming on stream after that. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

David Gootnick (202) 512-3149 or Gootnickd@gao.gov: 

Susan Ragland (202) 512-8486 or Raglands@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contacts named above, Leslie Holen, Assistant 
Director; B. Patrick Hickey; Kara Marshall; Kimberly McGatlin; Bonnie 
Derby; Sunny Chang; David Dornisch; Ashley Alley; Lynn Cothern; Etana 
Finkler; Reid L. Lowe; Gena Evans; and Cheron Green made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, title 
I, ch. 10, 124 Stat. 2302, 2320 (July 29, 2010). The law mandated that 
funds previously available to GAO pursuant to Title I, Chapter 4 of 
Pub.L. No. 106-31 (to monitor provision of assistance to address the 
effects of hurricanes in Central America and the Caribbean) also be 
available to GAO to monitor post-earthquake expenses related to Haiti, 
including relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction aid. 

[2] Twenty-two of these 125 other countries provided in-kind 
assistance, but did not report the monetary value of these relief 
contributions, according to a UN report. Two additional countries had 
pledged to provide assistance but had not committed funds as of April 
2011. 

[3] According to a USAID document, the U.S. government provided nearly 
$40 million in cholera assistance as of December 14, 2010, including 
the provision of disaster-relief teams, chlorine for safe drinking 
water, and support for cholera treatment facilities, particularly in 
underserved and rural areas. 

[4] The donors conference, held in New York City, involved more than 
150 countries and international organizations. Pledged donations 
included about $874 million of funds reprogrammed from projects 
initiated before the earthquake. The U.S. pledge did not include 
reprogrammed funds. 

[5] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 
Stat. 2302 (July 29, 2010). 

[6] While the U.S. government pledged $1.15 billion for Haiti's 
reconstruction, the Act appropriated $1.14 billion in supplemental 
funding for reconstruction. The Act also made available for Haitian 
debt relief up to $40 million in prior year State appropriations. This 
report defines all supplemental funds made available to State and 
USAID up through the end of fiscal year 2012 for new Haitian recovery, 
reform, and development activities as reconstruction funds, including 
the $66.3 million made available to recovery programs conducted by 
State's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). 

[7] The ESF furnishes assistance to countries and organizations to 
promote economic or political stability. INCLE funds are provided to 
help foreign countries and international organizations develop and 
implement policies and programs to strengthen institutional law 
enforcement and judicial capabilities, including countering drug 
flows, combating transnational crime, and establishing rule of law. 

[8] State issued this report in response to a request from the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations. In addition to ESF and INCLE funding, 
this reported total includes funding from USAID's Food for Peace Title 
II funds; State's Foreign Military Financing and International 
Military Education and Training funds; and State and USAID's combined 
Global Health/Child Survival programs. 

[9] The targeted regions are Cap-Haïtien, Saint-Marc, and Les Cayes. 

[10] IHRC is governed by a Board of Directors comprised of Haitian 
officials and members of the international community. An Executive 
Director and a Secretariat, which was originally expected to total 
approximately 100 staff, carry out the daily operations of IHRC. To be 
enforceable, the decisions of IHRC must be confirmed by the Haitian 
President; any IHRC decisions that are not vetoed by the President 
within 10 business days are deemed to be confirmed. 

[11] The order establishing IHRC, issued by the President of Haiti on 
April 21, 2010, mandates that IHRC include an audit and performance 
office to ensure accountability and transparency. 

[12] While the World Bank established HRF at Haiti's request in March 
2010, Haiti's Minister of Finance and key advisors to Haiti's 
President did not validate it until May 2010. The World Bank signed 
its first HRF donor agreement with Brazil in that month. 

[13] State, in consultation with USAID and Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, was required to follow notification procedures and submit a 
spending plan to the appropriations committees within 45 days of the 
Supplemental Appropriations Act's enactment. According to State and 
USAID officials, they were able to obligate the supplemental funding 
beginning in November 2010, after the congressional review of the 
spending plan had been completed. 

[14] This total dropped to $648 million after a further $2 million in 
ESF funding was made available to the Smithsonian Institution to fund 
a bilateral cultural preservation project in Haiti. 

[15] State also appointed a Special Coordinator for Haiti in September 
2010 to oversee the implementation of the reconstruction strategy in 
partnership with the government of Haiti. 

[16] USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS), Planning, ADS 201.3.8 
and 201.3.11.16 (Washington, D.C., rev. Mar. 17, 2011). 

[17] Accountability represents the processes, mechanisms, and other 
means--including financial reporting and internal controls--by which 
an entity's management carries out its stewardship and responsibility 
for resources and performance. Internal control is an internal 
component of an organization's management, which is comprised of the 
plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and 
objectives, and thereby support performance-based management. 

[18] USAID uses ADS to implement its existing internal-control duties 
under 31.U.S.C. §3512(c).d, commonly referred to as the Federal 
Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA), which provides the 
statutory basis for USAID management's responsibility for and 
assessment of internal control. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
Management's Responsibility for Internal Control OMB Circular No. A- 
123, (Washington, D.C., rev. Dec. 21, 2004), sets out the guidance for 
implementing the statute's provisions, including agencies' assessment 
of internal control under the standards prescribed by the Comptroller 
General in GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
November 1999). 

[19] For example, the mission in Haiti used the ADS regulation Chapter 
591: Financial Audits of USAID Contractors, Grantees, and Host 
Government Entities to develop its Fiscal Year 2011 Yearly Financial 
Plan. Specifically, ADS 591.3.4.2 Foreign Contractors and Recipients 
states that missions must develop an audit plan that completely covers 
direct awards to foreign recipients on an annual basis. See USAID ADS, 
Foreign Contractors and Recipients, ADS 591.3.4.2 (Washington, D.C., 
rev. Apr. 14, 2010). 

[20] USAID ADS, Management's Responsibility for Internal Control, ADS 
596.3.1.(c) (Washington, D.C., March 2010). 

[21] In particular, USAID ADS, Assessing and Learning, ADS 203 
(Washington, D.C., rev. Apr. 2, 2010) defines monitoring as measuring 
progress made toward planned results throughout the life of the 
program. Moreover, ADS Chapter 200: Introduction to Programming 
Policy, defines evaluation as the systematic collection of information 
about the characteristics and outcomes of programs in order to make 
judgments, improve effectiveness, and/or inform decisions about 
current and future programming. See USAID ADS, Introduction to 
Programming Policy, ADS 200 (Washington, D.C., rev. Apr. 2, 2010). 

[22] Codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. Appendix. USAID OIG is an 
independent office (5 U.S.C. app. § 2). The IG is appointed and 
removed by the President and the IG's pay is determined by statute (§ 
3). The office's budget is also not controlled by the agency (§ 6). 

[23] State and USAID obligations include both expenditures and 
unexpended obligated balances. 

[24] Of this $293 million, $66.3 million in ESF was allocated for 
USAID's transitional programs, which are conducted by OTI. 

[25] The State-USAID spending plan assigns the remaining $17.5 million 
(2 percent) for USAID operating expenses and budget support for the 
government of Haiti. 

[26] The plan also includes $2 million in ESF to the Smithsonian 
Institution for projects not directly overseen by USAID. 

[27] An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal 
liability of the U.S. government for the payment of goods and services 
ordered or received (GAO-05-734SP). Consistent with 31 U.S.C. § 1501, 
which defines when an agency can record an obligation, USAID generally 
treats as an obligation the bilateral agreements it makes with other 
countries to deliver assistance. This report defines obligations as 
amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and 
similar transactions during a given period that will require payments 
during the same or future period. USAID labels these actions 
subobligations. According to USAID officials at the mission in Haiti, 
they will consider the supplemental ESF funding allocated to the 
mission "obligated" once the U.S. government enters into a bilateral 
agreement with the government of Haiti, which they expect will be 
finalized in June 2011. In addition to bilateral agreements, agencies 
also incur obligations when they sign contracts and award grants. 
According to an official from OTI in Washington, D.C., OTI reported 
supplemental ESF funding allocated to its projects as obligated when 
it was awarded under new and existing contracts. The $184.3 million 
includes both the obligations incurred by the signing of bilateral 
agreements and the obligations incurred by the award of OTI contracts. 

[28] Total contribution will include 100 police and 10 corrections 
officers. 

[29] The goal of this program is to improve the livelihoods of rural 
populations and reduce the risks posed by environmental degradation 
through rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, good governance of 
natural resources, public-private partnerships, and enhanced 
agricultural productivity. 

[30] Of the $770 million in supplemental ESF allocated to USAID, $120 
million was obligated by Treasury and transferred to the HRF and $2 
million was allocated to the Smithsonian Institution. Therefore, $648 
million of the supplemental ESF allocation will be subject to USAID 
project oversight. 

[31] This amount consists of an allocation of $12 million to develop a 
monitoring and evaluation unit and $4.5 million to support the USAID 
OIG. 

[32] According to OFM officials, their office provided oversight over 
USAID funding totaling about $407 million in fiscal years 2009 and 
2010. 

[33] This strategy is documented in USAID OIG, Oversight Framework for 
Haiti Earthquake Response, Recovery and Rebuilding Efforts 
(Washington, D.C., Jan. 29, 2010). 

[34] Under GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government, the "control environment" is the foundation for internal 
control, which provides discipline, structure, and climate throughout 
the organization to set a positive and supportive attitude toward 
internal control and conscientious management. "Risk assessment" is 
the identification and analysis of relevant internal and external 
risks the agency faces that could prevent it from achieving its 
objectives and forms a basis for determining how risks should be 
managed. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1], pages 8, 10. 

[35] USAID OFM, Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and 
Economic Opportunity (Washington, D.C., January 2011). 

[36] According to OFM's Fiscal Year 2011 Yearly Financial Plan, audits 
are conducted to provide reasonable assurance that USAID grantees have 
used USAID funds for the purposes stated in their financial assistance 
award (grant agreements, cooperative agreements, contracts, etc.), and 
established and maintained financial systems in conformity with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Payment verification reviews 
determine if grantees and contractors receiving USAID funding are 
maintaining an acceptable financial management system to account for 
funds, as determined by OFM officials. Finally, OFM officials noted 
they will perform financial visits of all grantees receiving USAID 
funding to determine whether they are maintaining adequate financial 
management systems. These visits are less detailed than payment 
verification reviews. 

[37] According to OFM, a financial review is conducted of foreign 
nonprofit grantees and for-profit contractors expending less than 
$300,000 in reconstruction funding in a fiscal year and is more 
comprehensive than a financial visit, which covers all grantees and 
contractors receiving reconstruction funding. 

[38] Under the Single Audit Act, as amended and implemented by OMB, 
each nonfederal entity that expends $500,000 or more in federal awards 
within their fiscal year shall have a single or program-specific 
audit. In its implementing directives, USAID has imposed the annual 
audit requirement on foreign grantees expending $300,000 or more. See 
the Single Audit Act, codified, as amended, in part at 31 U.S.C. § 
7502; OMB, Audits of States, Local Governments and Non-Profit 
Organizations OMB Circular No. A-133, (Washington, D.C., rev. June 26, 
2007); USAID ADS, Financial Audits of USAID Contractors, Recipients, 
and Host Government Entities, ADS 591 (Washington, D.C., rev. Apr. 14, 
2010). 

[39] The blanket purchase agreement is a simplified method supported 
by the U.S. General Services Administration to fill recurring 
services, take advantage of quantity discounts, save administrative 
time, and reduce paperwork. See the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 
codified at 48 C.F.R. subpart 13.303. 

[40] According to OFM officials, after the blanket purchase agreement 
is finalized, it would take about 3 weeks for OFM to select an 
accounting or consulting firm to procure planned financial oversight 
services and complete a contract. 

[41] In April 2011, OFM officials stated that the mission would not 
start obligating reconstruction funds to award to new grantees until 
the mission enters a bilateral agreement with Haiti (estimated to be 
executed in June 2011) to deliver reconstruction assistance. Officials 
added that once the mission started to obligate awards to new 
grantees, OFM would be able to monitor the activity because the 
mission's OAA notifies OFM when the mission submits a request to award 
USAID funds, including supplemental reconstruction funds, to a new or 
existing grantee. 

[42] Additionally, internal control standards state that ongoing 
monitoring should generally occur in the course of normal operations. 
See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1], page 
20. 

[43] According to the new evaluation policy, USAID revised its past 
evaluation policies to address the decline in the quantity and quality 
of evaluation practices within USAID in the recent past. Additionally, 
USAID's overall monitoring and evaluation policies are based on the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as amended. 

[44] As defined by USAID, indicators are used to observe progress and 
measure actual results compared with expected results. 

[45] Specifically, the evaluation policy states that when a project 
subject to evaluation is initiated, baseline data, including variables 
that correspond to key outcomes and impacts, are to be collected using 
high-quality methods and analyzed to establish a reference point. To 
obtain needed baseline data, the policy notes that household or 
individual surveys are often valuable baseline data sources and can be 
replicated toward the conclusion of implementation to assess changes. 

[46] In addition to this data collection, officials noted they will 
use data from a number of other sources, including a demographic 
health survey to be conducted by the mission's health team and data 
collected by entities such as the Haitian Bureau of Statistics. 

[47] AADs certify that appropriate planning for the activities covered 
in the document has been completed. Different types of documentation 
may be included, but AADs must provide a project or activity 
description, including intended results, implementation methods, and 
financing plans. 

[48] The RIG in San Salvador is responsible for oversight of USAID 
foreign assistance to 34 countries and territories, including Haiti. 

[49] According to USAID OIG's audit strategy, OIG will contract 
private accounting firms to audit local NGOs. The U.S. Defense 
Contract Audit Agency, which audits U.S. for-profit firms, will 
perform audits of firms contracted by the mission to implement 
reconstruction activities. 

[50] This amount, as discussed earlier, is included in the $16.5 
million in supplemental funding dedicated to the mission's oversight 
effort but is not included in the $648 million in supplemental ESF 
funding available for program implementation. 

[51] According to a senior USAID OIG official, oversight efforts may 
be affected as new staff may need time for training. 

[52] An agency reprograms funding when it shifts funds within an 
appropriation or funds account to use them for purposes other than 
those contemplated at the time of appropriation. See GAO-05-734SP, 
page 85. 

[53] USAID OIG, Audit of USAID's Cash-For-Work Activities in Haiti, 
1-521-10-009-P (Washington, D.C., Sept. 24, 2010). 

[54] USAID OIG, Review of Fondation Sogebank's Activities Financed by 
USAID/Haiti, 1-521-11-001-S (Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 2010). 

[55] USAID OIG, Audit of USAID's Efforts to Provide Shelter in Haiti, 
1-521-11-003-P (Washington, D.C., Apr. 19, 2011). 

[56] Although most supplemental reconstruction funds had not been 
obligated, USAID OIG officials stated that this fact alone would not 
alter the intent of the audit strategy. 

[57] IHRC operates out of a temporary structure, provided by the 
Canadian government, on the grounds of the former U.S. embassy. 

[58] IHRC has 27 voting members on its board: 2 co-chairs; 13 Haitian 
officials representing the Haitian national and local governments, the 
private sector, and labor unions; and 12 members of the international 
community, including 1 representative of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and 11 representatives from bilateral and multilateral 
donors meeting the pledge requirements. 

[59] The Haitian diaspora refers to Haitian nationals residing outside 
the country. 

[60] The 53 filled positions constitute a variety of employment 
arrangements. For example, about 25 are permanent IHRC employees, 
while the other half is made up of technical assistants from 
international donors, temporary employees, consultants, and Haitian 
government officials. 

[61] The U.S.-funded projects approved by IHRC do not necessarily 
reflect U.S. government obligations of supplemental reconstruction 
funds. First, according to State officials, U.S. projects are 
submitted to IHRC for approval at various states of development; some 
projects are submitted to IHRC after they are well developed and the 
U.S. government is prepared to obligate funds, while others are 
submitted to IHRC at an earlier stage, and the U.S. government may not 
obligate funds to the project for some time. Second, officials stated 
that IHRC does not need to review supplemental funds obligated to 
existing projects. Finally, some U.S. projects approved by IHRC will 
use reprogrammed funds from prior appropriations instead of fiscal 
year 2010 supplemental appropriations. 

[62] While HRF is not required to direct funding according to donor 
preferences, IHRC and HRF officials stated that they intended to 
follow donor preferences, if possible. 

[63] The UN conducted a related analysis comparing donors' intended 
funding with Haitian government 18-month budget needs--based on the 
Action Plan--and found that gaps exist. For example, the UN's 
analysis, which does not include U.S. plans for allocating 
reconstruction funding because they were not yet finalized, estimates 
that donors have committed to funding just 12 percent--or $96 million 
out of an anticipated need of $780 million--for projects the Action 
Plan categorizes as Reconstruction of Devastated Zones, which includes 
activities such as rubble removal and reconstruction of basic 
infrastructure--for example, rainwater drainage and drinking water 
supply systems. 

[64] According to U.S. officials, the U.S. government does not intend 
to change the priorities outlined in the spending plan in response to 
the IHRC strategy because the spending plan is consistent with the 
goals presented in IHRC's strategic plan. 

[65] A Poverty Reduction Strategy paper describes the macroeconomic, 
structural, and social policies and programs a country will pursue 
over several years to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as 
external financing needs and the associated sources of financing. They 
are prepared by governments in low-income countries through a 
participatory process involving domestic stakeholders and external 
development partners, including the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. 

[66] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, ch. 
10, 124 Stat. 2302, 2320 (July 29, 2010). The law mandated that funds 
previously available to GAO pursuant to Title I, Chapter 4 of Pub.L. 
No. 106-31 (to monitor provision of assistance to address the effects 
of hurricanes in Central America and the Caribbean) also be available 
to GAO to monitor post-earthquake expenses related to Haiti, including 
relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction aid. 

[67] We reported that Haitian apparel exports to the United States 
increased steadily in the 10 years prior to the earthquake, from $251 
million in 2000 to $512 million in 2009, in part because of the 
preferential access given to U.S. imports of Haitian apparel under the 
terms of the 2006 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership 
Encouragement Act (HOPE). This preferential access was increased under 
a 2008 amendment to the act. See GAO, International Trade: Exporters' 
Use of the Earned Import Allowance Program for Haiti Is Negligible 
because They Favor Other Trade Provisions, GAO-10-654 (Washington, 
D.C.: June 16, 2010). 

[68] This total excludes U.S. government assistance to address the 
outbreak of cholera in areas outside of Port-au-Prince beginning in 
October 2010. As of January 2011, the U.S. government had provided an 
additional $42 million in aid to address the epidemic (which had 
killed more than 3,800 persons and infected over 185,000 more by that 
time). This aid helped establish and equip 33 treatment centers and 
provide rehydration salts and other medicines. 

[69] Overall, the international community planned, as of March 2011, 
to provide a total of 133,000 shelter solutions by August 2011. 

[70] USAID officials describe T-shelters as single-family housing 
units built with timber framing and concrete foundations covered with 
plywood or corrugated sheeting designed to last 3 to 5 years; the 
framing and foundations can serve for a more permanent structure. 

[71] Agencies from three other U.S. government departments acted as 
USAID-implementing partners within Haiti using USAID/Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funding: (1) the Department of Homeland 
Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency; (2) the Department of 
Health & Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 
and (3) the Department of Agriculture's U.S. Forestry Service. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also provided both 
emergency and ongoing care at 109 sites across Haiti established by 
the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) funding. 

[72] Emergency services were provided by the County Governments of Los 
Angeles, California, and Fairfax, Virginia. 

[73] Of the $3.9 billion, $1.2 billion was identified as needed for 
budget support. Additionally, the plan outlines a request for $800 
million from the private sector or through public-private partnerships. 

[End of section] 

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