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on DOD's Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies' which was 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

May 2011: 

Warfighter Support: 

Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD's Prepositioning 
Programs May Increase Efficiencies: 

GAO-11-647: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-647, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment to help ensure 
combat-ready forces receive equipment in days rather than the weeks it 
would take if it had to be moved from the United States to their 
location. Prepositioned stocks may also support activities including 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. As GAO’s third report in 
response to Congress’s annual reporting requirement, GAO assessed the 
extent to which DOD has (1) met the six reporting requirements in the 
annual report to Congress on its prepositioned stocks, and whether 
additional information may be needed related to those requirements; 
(2) developed effective departmentwide guidance on prepositioned 
stocks to achieve national military objectives; and (3) organized 
effectively to provide joint oversight over its prepositioning 
programs and achieve efficiencies. To meet these objectives, GAO 
reviewed relevant DOD reports, strategies, and policies, and met with 
DOD and service officials in the U.S., Kuwait, and Qatar. 

What GAO Found: 

In its 2010 report to Congress, DOD generally responded to its six 
required reporting elements and GAO’s prior recommendations, which 
resulted in a more informative report. However, DOD’s report does not 
discuss the full range of prepositioned equipment, such as Army 
equipment required in excess of a military unit’s authorization to 
meet specific combatant command planning requirements. The Army may 
spend at least $441 million to replenish this equipment, which is part 
of the $4.5 billion needed to fully reconstitute the Army’s 
prepositioned stocks. Without this information, Congress may lack a 
complete picture of areas where potential efficiencies may be gained. 
In addition, DOD’s report does not list any operation plan affected by 
shortfalls in prepositioned stocks, as required. Further, DOD’s report 
does not include the specific risks of such shortfalls, the full range 
of mitigation factors, and the extent to which these factors reduce 
risk. Although not required, we believe that such information would 
help clarify DOD’s assessment of the consequences of choosing among 
options and continuing evaluation of areas where the department can 
assume greater risk, as called for in its 2008 National Defense 
Strategy. 

DOD has limited departmentwide guidance that would help ensure that 
its prepositioning programs accurately reflect national military 
objectives, such as those included in the National Defense Strategy 
and the National Military Strategy. DOD has developed departmentwide 
guidance, referred to as Guidance for Development of the Force, but as 
of September 2010 this guidance contained little information related 
to prepositioned stocks even though DOD’s 2008 instruction on 
prepositioned stocks specifically directed the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy to develop such guidance. Furthermore, the 
information the services use to determine their requirements for 
prepositioned stocks may not clearly state the full range of DOD’s 
need for these stocks. DOD’s challenges in identifying the full range 
of potential demands for prepositioned stocks highlight the importance 
of departmentwide guidance specifying planning and funding priorities 
associated with DOD’s current and future needs in this area. 

DOD faces organizational challenges which may hinder its efforts to 
gain efficiencies in managing prepositioned assets across the 
department. Specifically, DOD has been unable to ensure that the 
working group established to address joint prepositioning issues 
achieves its objectives because the working group lacks clearly stated 
lines of authority and reporting to other components within DOD. As a 
result, the working group may not be able to effectively synchronize 
or integrate, as appropriate, the services’ prepositioning programs 
and the results of its efforts may not go beyond the working group 
itself. According to joint and service officials, efficiencies or cost 
savings could be gained through improved joint program management 
across the services and leveraging components in DOD such as the 
Defense Logistics Agency, which may be able to provide efficiencies in 
delivering stocks during early stages of contingency operations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense take five actions to 
provide comprehensive information, develop overarching guidance, and 
enhance joint oversight to increase program efficiencies. DOD agreed 
with GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-647] or key 
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 
512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD's Report Addressed the Six Required Reporting Elements, but 
Additional Information Would Further Enhance Future Reports: 

DOD Has Limited Departmentwide Guidance Linking Its Prepositioning 
Programs with the Achievement of National Military Objectives: 

Organizational Challenges May Hinder DOD's Ability to Provide 
Effective Joint Oversight for Its Prepositioning Programs and Achieve 
Potential Efficiencies: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Prepositioned Equipment and Materiel Represented in DOD's 
Annual Report by Service: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EUCOM: U.S. Europe Command: 

GDF: Guidance for Development of the Force: 

PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 16, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment at strategic 
locations around the world to enable it to field combat-ready forces 
in days, rather than the weeks it would take if equipment had to be 
moved from the United States to the locations of conflicts. Beyond the 
rapid fielding of combat forces, today's global security environment 
creates other potential needs for prepositioned stocks, such as 
supporting security cooperation activities, deterrence, multilateral 
training exercises abroad, and humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief. Effectively achieving national military objectives in this 
fiscally challenged environment requires careful balancing of current 
and future needs with other DOD planning and funding priorities. 

Through their individual programs, each of the military services 
maintains preconfigured groups of combat and logistics equipment on 
ships and ashore at locations around the world. These equipment "sets" 
are intended to speed response times of U.S. forces to operating 
locations and reduce the strain on scarce airlift or slower sealift 
assets. The Army stores sets of combat brigade equipment, supporting 
supplies, and other stocks at land sites in several countries and 
aboard prepositioning ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The 
Marine Corps stores equipment and supplies for its forces aboard 
squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships located around the world 
and at land sites in Norway. The Air Force stores ammunition at land 
sites and aboard prepositioning ships and prepositions base support 
equipment, vehicles, and supporting supplies at several land sites. 
The Navy stores equipment and supplies to support ship offloading, 
deployable hospitals, and construction projects also aboard the 
maritime prepositioning ships and at land sites around the world. 

In recent years, we have identified a number of ongoing and long-term 
challenges regarding DOD's prepositioned stocks and made 
recommendations related to centralized operation direction, risk 
assessment, inventory management, equipment excesses, maintenance, and 
requirements determination, among other issues. For example, in our 
September 2005 report,[Footnote 1] we found that absent a 
departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution 
of prepositioned stocks,[Footnote 2] the services were developing 
plans without a clear understanding of how they would fit together to 
meet evolving defense strategy. We recommended that DOD publish a 
departmentwide strategy to set a direction and a shared foundation for 
the services' prepositioning programs. Further, we recommended that 
the Secretary of Defense direct an assessment of the near-term 
operational risks associated with shortfalls in prepositioned stocks. 
DOD concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations. DOD 
has not yet developed such a strategy, and the extent to which it has 
assessed the near-term operational risks of shortfalls in 
prepositioned stocks is unclear. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008[Footnote 
3] amended Title 10 of the United States Code[Footnote 4] so as to 
require DOD to submit an annual report to the congressional defense 
committees on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment as of 
the end of each fiscal year. DOD's reports are required to address the 
following six elements: (1) the level of fill for major end items of 
equipment and spare parts in each prepositioned set as of the end of 
the fiscal year covered by the report; (2) the materiel condition of 
equipment in the prepositioned stocks, as of the end of such fiscal 
year, grouped by category or major end item; (3) a list of major end 
items of equipment drawn from prepositioned stocks that fiscal year 
and a description of how the equipment was used and whether it was 
returned to the stocks after its use; (4) a time line for completely 
reconstituting any shortfall in the prepositioned stocks; (5) an 
estimate of the funding required to completely reconstitute any 
shortfall in the prepositioned stocks and a description of the 
Secretary's plan for carrying out the reconstitution; and (6) a list 
of any operation plans affected by a shortfall in the prepositioned 
stocks and a description of the action taken to mitigate any risk 
created by that shortfall. In May 2010, DOD submitted its report to 
Congress on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment for 
the time period of October 2008 to September 2009. DOD's report 
includes an unclassified section to address reporting elements one 
through five and a classified annex to address reporting element six. 
The annual reporting requirement also directs GAO to review DOD's 
annual reports and submit to the congressional defense committees any 
additional information that will further inform the committees on 
issues relating to the status of the materiel in prepositioned stocks. 

This report is GAO's third report in response to its annual reporting 
requirement.[Footnote 5] In our first report, issued in December 2008, 
we found that additional information on the funding requirements for 
the services' prepositioning programs and on the risk to current 
operation and concept plans could further inform congressional defense 
committees.[Footnote 6] As a result, we recommended that DOD (1) 
provide additional information to Congress on funding requirements for 
the services' programs, and in addition to the required elements, (2) 
include in DOD's report to Congress information on the effect of 
prepositioned equipment shortfalls on current operation and concept 
plans, including risks and mitigation strategies to provide better 
visibility over possible risks. DOD agreed with the first part of our 
recommendation and provided this information in its subsequent report 
to Congress. DOD did not concur with the second part of our 
recommendation, stating that the department already provides a 
comprehensive and more holistic approach to risk and mitigation 
strategies each year with its submission of the Chairman's Risk 
Assessment.[Footnote 7] In our second report, issued in November 2009, 
we found that DOD's future reports to Congress on the status of its 
prepositioned materiel and equipment would benefit from additional 
information in three areas: (1) the amount of spare parts the Army 
maintains in its prepositioned stocks; (2) the condition of the Air 
Force's materiel and equipment needed to establish bases; and (3) the 
services' progress to replenish their individual prepositioned sets, 
such as level of fill and readiness rates and changes in those sets 
from the previous year.[Footnote 8] We made recommendations in each of 
these areas. DOD concurred with all three recommendations and included 
most of the information we recommended it provide in its most recent 
report to Congress. 

For this report, which is an unclassified version of a report we 
issued on February 7, 2011, our objectives were to assess the extent 
to which DOD has (1) addressed the six reporting requirements in the 
annual report to Congress on its prepositioned stocks, and whether 
additional information would be useful; (2) developed effective 
departmentwide guidance on prepositioned stocks to achieve national 
military objectives; and (3) organized effectively to provide joint 
oversight for its prepositioning programs and achieve efficiencies. To 
meet our objectives, we examined prior GAO and DOD reports on the 
services' prepositioning programs; reviewed relevant DOD and service 
strategies, policies, and assessments; and met with DOD and service 
officials in the United States, Kuwait, and Qatar. While we did not 
independently assess the data DOD provided to Congress, we discussed 
the reliability of the systems used to develop the report data with 
service officials and determined that the data were sufficiently 
reliable to meet the objectives of this engagement. A more detailed 
discussion of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I. We 
conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to November 2010 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

While DOD provided information in response to the six required 
reporting elements, our review of its 2010 annual report identified 
several areas where more information would provide Congress with 
comprehensive reporting to better weigh competing priorities. First, 
with regard to the required reporting elements, DOD improved its 
reporting in several areas in its 2010 annual report. For example, DOD 
included reporting on the readiness of individual equipment sets, 
grouped by military unit location or by capability. Additionally, DOD 
included information on the Army's spare parts associated with its 
prepositioned sets. However, DOD's annual report did not discuss the 
full range of prepositioned equipment, particularly equipment and 
materiel not directly associated with major unit sets, including 
equipment the services plan to reconstitute; DOD's report only 
includes major end items, such as tactical wheeled and tracked 
vehicles, and some spare parts. For example, DOD's report provides 
limited information on an element of the Army's Prepositioned Stocks 
program that includes items required by commanders' operation plans 
beyond unit authorizations. The Army may spend at least $441 million 
to aid in reconstituting these stocks, which include tents, lights, 
and cots--items that are in high demand for operations in Afghanistan. 
Second, DOD did not include in its annual report a list of operation 
plans affected by any shortfall in prepositioned stocks, as required. 
While DOD provided some information related to the risks of shortfalls 
in prepositioned stocks, it did not provide the specific, non-
aggregated risks of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks on its 
operation plans, the full range of measures the services have in place 
to mitigate the short-term risks of shortfalls in prepositioned 
stocks, or the extent to which these measures reduce risk. Although 
not explicitly required in its annual report to Congress, DOD already 
reports much of this information in other forums. However, the 
directorate within the Joint Staff most closely responsible for 
assessing operational risk was not required to provide input to the 
report and as a result DOD's report did not include such data. We 
believe this information would help DOD to clarify its assessments of 
the consequences of choosing among options and continued evaluation of 
areas where the department can assume greater risk, as called for in 
its 2008 National Defense Strategy. More broadly, without providing a 
complete picture of the scope of its prepositioned stocks, including 
associated funding, and enhancing its reporting of risks of shortfalls 
in these stocks, DOD may not be able to provide Congress complete 
information with which to determine the sufficiency of its 
justification for the additional resources needed to reconstitute its 
prepositioned stocks and Congress may not be able to fully recognize 
areas where potential efficiencies may be gained. We therefore are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the annual 
report to Congress include comprehensive information about the full 
scope and associated funding of the services' prepositioning programs 
and report the linkage between shortfalls in prepositioned stocks and 
risks to DOD's operation plans and extent to which the full range of 
mitigation measures in place reduce said risks. 

DOD has limited departmentwide guidance for linking its prepositioning 
programs with national military objectives. The 2008 DOD Instruction 
that addresses prepositioned stocks requirements directs the Office of 
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to develop and coordinate 
departmentwide guidance, referred to as Guidance for Development of 
the Force (GDF), that identifies overall prepositioned stocks strategy 
to achieve desired capabilities and responsiveness in support of the 
National Defense Strategy.[Footnote 9] According to DOD strategic 
planning guidance, GDF establishes force development planning and 
funding priorities needed to meet future contingencies.[Footnote 10] 
While DOD established GDF in 2008 and updated this guidance in 2009, 
as of September 2010, this guidance did not contain information on 
current or future departmentwide needs for prepositioned stocks or set 
the planning and funding priorities to meet them. Meanwhile, existing 
sources of information the services use to determine current and 
future needs for prepositioned stocks may not fully reflect DOD's 
broader potential needs for prepositioned stocks in the current global 
security environment. For example, according to DOD officials, key 
operation planning data do not encompass potential needs such as 
support for theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and 
deterrence. In the absence of clearly stated departmentwide needs and 
priorities for prepositioned stocks, the services may not be able to 
shape their prepositioning programs to most effectively and 
efficiently meet evolving defense challenges. To help DOD clarify 
evolving defense challenges, it has undertaken or recently completed 
several studies. However, without an overall strategy for 
prepositioned stocks in the GDF that would help ensure that the 
results of these studies will have authority and visibility, DOD may 
be less able to fully implement them and integrate their results into 
any departmentwide guidance. To ensure that the services have the 
overarching guidance they need to make informed management decisions 
on program effectiveness and efficiency and that DOD will be best 
positioned to fully implement the results of its studies, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Policy to develop GDF that defines departmentwide needs 
for prepositioned stocks, including the appropriate planning and 
funding priorities. 

DOD faces organizational challenges at the joint level in overseeing 
its prepositioning programs, which may hinder its efforts to gain 
efficiencies. Specifically, DOD has been unable to ensure that the 
organization established to address joint prepositioning issues, the 
Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group, achieves its 
objectives because the working group lacks clearly stated lines of 
authority and reporting to other components within DOD. According to 
DOD officials, DOD's joint working group is not conducting the full 
range of tasks outlined in DOD's instruction on prepositioned stocks, 
focusing more narrowly on sharing information among the services and 
coordinating the services' responses to audit inquiries. Further, the 
working group does not include a representative from the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which is responsible for 
developing related departmentwide GDF. These issues may hinder the 
working group's ability to effectively synchronize or integrate, as 
appropriate, the services' prepositioning programs. Also, they may 
hinder the potential reduction of unnecessary duplication. In 
particular, according to DOD officials, efficiencies or cost savings 
may be gained through improved joint program management across the 
services and leveraging components in DOD such as the Defense 
Logistics Agency. For example, according to DOD officials, several 
capabilities critical to supporting ongoing operations in U.S. Central 
Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, such as bulk fuel 
distribution, are resident in more than one of the services' 
prepositioned inventories but are procured and sustained separately. 
To enhance DOD's joint oversight of its prepositioning programs and 
better position the department to achieve potential efficiencies, we 
are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate 
DOD components to (1) assess the continued relevance of the joint 
working group's assigned tasks and membership and make any necessary 
adjustments, including making the Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy a core member; (2) clarify lines of authority and 
reporting between the working group and other components within DOD, 
such as the Global Posture Executive Council; (3) implement effective 
and appropriate oversight to ensure that the working group achieves 
its objectives; and (4) implement authoritative strategic guidance, 
such as Guidance for Development of the Force, to integrate and 
synchronize at a DOD-wide level, as appropriate, the services' 
prepositioning programs so that they include updated requirements and 
maximize efficiency in managing prepositioned assets across the 
department. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment, and DOD's 
comments are attached as appendix II. In commenting on a draft of this 
report, DOD concurred with our recommendations and discussed steps it 
is taking or has already taken to address them. 

Background: 

Each military service maintains different configurations and types of 
equipment and materiel to support its own prepositioning program. The 
Army and Marine Corps programs forward deploy and preposition sets of 
materiel and equipment by support unit or brigade type either on land 
or at sea aboard ship storage facilities. The Navy and Air Force 
maintain materiel that support capabilities through land and ship 
storage facilities. For example, the Navy is currently modernizing its 
prepositioned theater hospitalization capability by transforming its 
fleet hospitals into expeditionary medical facilities that can be 
sized according to the needs of particular military operations. The 
Air Force maintains Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources that 
provide basing assets at austere airfields and Fuels Operational 
Readiness Capability Equipment to provide fueling capabilities in 
areas without supporting infrastructure. 

DOD's national military objectives are spelled out in various levels 
of detail throughout numerous strategic and operational documents, 
including the National Defense Strategy, the National Military 
Strategy, and the geographic combatant commanders' plans.[Footnote 11] 
Depending on the required level of detail, in these plans the 
geographic combatant commanders may articulate the specific forces 
needed to achieve the stated military objectives. The services then 
determine how best to meet the needs of the combatant commanders, 
which may include the issuance of prepositioned stocks or other types 
of equipment to support the commanders' goals. For example, the Air 
Force, Army, and Marine Corps have provided equipment out of their 
prepositioned stocks to satisfy CENTCOM's requirements associated with 
the build-up of forces in Afghanistan. More generally, prepositioned 
stocks are employed by the geographic combatant commanders, who have 
the authority to organize commands and forces and employ forces as 
they deem necessary to accomplish assigned missions. The services' 
prepositioned equipment is apportioned among the geographic combatant 
commands according to joint strategic planning guidance.[Footnote 12] 
Because they can be moved as needs dictate, afloat prepositioned 
stocks may be apportioned to more than one geographic combatant 
command. 

DOD generally makes the determination of whether prepositioned stocks 
will be used as part of the joint operation planning process, which 
results in the production of plans that guide the employment of 
military forces. Joint operation planning is a coordinated process 
used by commanders, including the geographic combatant commanders, to 
determine the best method of accomplishing a mission. In non crisis 
situations, the process is called contingency planning.[Footnote 13] 
There are four types of contingency plans, distinguished by the level 
of detail they contain. Joint planning guidance describes the most 
detailed level of plans, called operation plans, as containing, among 
other things, time-phased force deployment data, which includes the 
specific units to be deployed in support of the plan and the timeline 
for when these forces are needed. According to DOD officials, these 
data allow the services to determine whether prepositioned equipment 
is necessary to achieve a plan's goals by, for example, making a fully 
combat-equipped force available to the combatant or joint force 
commander in a shorter time frame than would be possible using other 
sources of equipment. Some plans with lesser detail, called concept 
plans, may also contain these data as determined by joint strategic 
guidance. Combatant commanders periodically review their contingency 
plans, including an assessment of risk,[Footnote 14] and report the 
results to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

DOD's Report Addressed the Six Required Reporting Elements, but 
Additional Information Would Further Enhance Future Reports: 

DOD provided information in response to the six elements required in 
its 2010 annual report and addressed some of our prior 
recommendations,[Footnote 15] which resulted in a more informative 
report, but additional information would further enhance future 
reports. Further, in its annual report to Congress, DOD is required to 
include a list of operation plans affected by any shortfall in 
prepositioned stocks and a description of any action taken to mitigate 
any risk that such a shortfall may create.[Footnote 16] DOD did not 
provide a list of affected operation plans its annual report to 
Congress although it did provide some information on the risks of 
shortfalls in its prepositioned stocks and mitigation strategies. In 
addition, DOD did not discuss the full range of measures the services 
have in place to mitigate the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned 
stocks, and the extent to which these measures reduce risk. DOD did 
not provide this information because the elements within the Joint 
Staff most closely responsible for tracking such information were not 
required to provide input to DOD's report. 

DOD's Annual Report to Congress Has Improved, but Information on the 
Full Range of Prepositioned Stocks and Associated Funding Would 
Further Enhance the Report: 

In its May 2010 report to Congress, DOD provided more detail than in 
prior reports on the status of its prepositioned stocks and the 
estimated baseline and overseas contingency operations funding needed 
to reconstitute major items associated with these stocks. Earlier DOD 
reporting on funding for prepositioned stocks was aggregated. In 
response to prior GAO recommendations, the 2010 annual report included 
not only the quantities of equipment available and their 
serviceability, but also the status of these items as organized into 
military unit sets, either by geographic location, in the case of the 
Army, or by capability sets, in the case of the Air Force and Marine 
Corps. In addition, the report included, for the Army and Marine 
Corps, information on the on-hand quantity and serviceability of the 
repair parts intended to sustain these services' prepositioned stocks 
upon their use. DOD's fiscal year 2010 annual report stated that the 
services estimate that it will take at least $6.1 billion to replace 
depleted major end items[Footnote 17] in their prepositioned stocks-- 
$1.1 billion for the Air Force, $4.5 billion for the Army, and $498 
million for the Marine Corps. The Navy did not report any shortfalls 
in its prepositioned stocks, but provided estimates on the costs to 
replace its complete inventory of prepositioned equipment in this 
year's annual report to Congress. The Army and Marine Corps 
categorized their funding requirements for fiscal years 2010 through 
2015 and fiscal years 2010 through 2012 respectively, by procurement 
and operations and maintenance funding, and divided those categories 
further into base budget and overseas contingency operations funding. 
Within the overseas contingency operations funding line, the Army 
created a separate category for reset funding dedicated to 
reconstituting its prepositioned stocks which, according to the Army, 
provides an essential source of funds to reset its prepositioned 
stocks and cover program shortfalls. 

Despite these reporting improvements, DOD did not fully represent all 
types of prepositioned stocks in its report because the report only 
includes major end items such as tactical wheeled vehicles and tracked 
vehicles like tanks and some spare parts, in response to the reporting 
elements. Information on the level of fill and serviceability of the 
major end items included in DOD's report is useful because the absence 
of or lack of serviceability among these items significantly impact 
the readiness of the services' prepositioned stocks. In general, these 
types of equipment items and the spare parts needed to maintain their 
serviceability are part of the services' prepositioned unit or 
capability sets. For example, the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning 
Force includes not only major repair items such as transmissions and 
engines, but also other parts such as screws and light bulbs. 
According to Marine Corps officials, these parts are stocked 
specifically to support the prepositioned Marine Corps equipment and 
are represented in DOD's annual report to Congress. Similarly, in 
response to our prior recommendation, the Army included in DOD's 
annual report the prepositioned repair parts needed to sustain its 
prepositioned unit equipment. However, equipment prepositioned by the 
services other than the major items and associated repair parts 
comprising their unit and capability sets are not fully represented in 
DOD's annual report. For example, according to a Marine Corps 
official, the Marine Corps prepositions fuel distribution equipment 
and medical stocks to support an entire deploying Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade or Marine Air Ground Task Force. According to this official, 
these stocks are not represented in DOD's annual report because they 
are usually at 100 percent readiness. The Marine Corps also 
prepositions other "capability sets" including water, habitability 
equipment such as tents, electrical power/distribution equipment, and 
rations, among other items, which are not represented in DOD's annual 
report. According to an Air Force official, elements of the Air Force 
prepositioning program not represented in DOD's annual report to 
Congress include munitions, auxiliary fuel tanks, missile launchers, 
pylons, ejector racks, and adapters,[Footnote 18] medical stocks, 
fuel, and Defense Logistics Agency-managed items such as rations, with 
on-hand quantities valued at approximately $17.3 billion and fill 
levels at or near 100 percent. According to the Navy official in 
charge of compiling the Navy portion of DOD's annual report for the 
past 2 years, the Navy represented all elements of its prepositioned 
program in DOD's annual report. In addition, this official stated that 
the Navy intends to provide further details about the equipment types 
included in the Naval Facilities and Civil Engineering and Support 
Equipment categories in future reports to Congress. These categories 
comprise non rolling stock, such as tents and communications gear, and 
rolling stock, such as vehicles and generators, respectively. 

In DOD's report, the Army did not discuss its prepositioned equipment 
and materiel not associated with its unit stocks, including 
Operational Project stocks and Army War Reserve Sustainment stocks. 
Operational project stocks are groupings of equipment required in 
excess of a military unit's authorizations in order to meet specific 
combatant command planning requirements. Equipment in these sets 
includes clothing for enemy prisoners of war, aircraft matting, pipes 
to distribute petroleum, emergency rations, and housekeeping items 
such as tents, lights, and cots, which have been in high demand for 
operations in Afghanistan. In total, the Army maintains 12 categories 
of operational project stocks, with an on-hand quantity worth about 
$300 million throughout its land-based sites. The value of the 
operational project stock equipment the Army does not yet have on hand 
adds up to approximately $441 million, which is part of the $4.5 
billion the Army has reported it needs to replace its depleted 
prepositioned stocks. Army War Sustainment Stocks are prepositioned in 
or near a theater of operations to support forces until wartime supply 
lines are established. This category of prepositioned stocks is 
comprised of major end items, ammunition, and parts needed to sustain 
deployed forces in a theater, including forces that fall in on Army 
Prepositioned Stocks and forces arriving with their own equipment, 
until resupply from the United States can be established. War reserve 
secondary items include not just the items on the repair parts 
stockage lists required for the Army Prepositioned Stocks unit sets 
included in the DOD report, but the parts needed for sustaining all 
Army forces up to 60 days in theater, parts for repair facilities, 
medical equipment, housekeeping sets, and packaged petroleum. The Army 
obligated approximately $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 
overseas contingency operations funding incorporated into its working 
capital funds to reconstitute these stocks.[Footnote 19] 

Our prior work has demonstrated the need for decision makers, such as 
Congress, to be fully informed in order to weigh competing priorities 
effectively.[Footnote 20] Without comprehensive visibility of the 
services' prepositioning programs and their funding, Congress may not 
be able to make fully informed decisions about these programs. 
Although some of the categories of equipment and materiel the services 
do not discuss in DOD's annual report may be fully stocked or have 
less of an impact on overall readiness if they are not fully stocked, 
these program elements may represent areas where potential 
efficiencies can be gained, for example, by considering the benefits 
and costs of jointly managing commodities that each of the services 
preposition such as repair parts, medical supplies, and fuel 
distribution equipment. Further, some of the types of prepositioned 
stocks not discussed in DOD's report that each of the services 
maintain, such as equipment needed to set up bases at forward 
locations, are used interchangeably because the services may not 
possess such equipment in quantities sufficient to meet requirements. 
For example, the Air Force has provided 29 of its expeditionary 
military base sets to the Army and Marine Corps for use in Afghanistan 
and, according to Army officials, the Army has provided 3 of its 
similar sets to the Marine Corps. The potential for gaining 
efficiencies by jointly managing such equipment is discussed in more 
detail later in this report. Without information representative of all 
the services' prepositioning program elements, including those 
elements not directly associated with unit equipment sets, Congress 
may be less able to have visibility over DOD's efforts to identify 
opportunities in which efficiencies or cost savings may be realized. 
Figure 1 below illustrates which service prepositioning program 
elements are represented in DOD's annual report. 

Figure 1: Prepositioned Equipment and Materiel Represented in DOD's 
Annual Report by Service: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Army: 
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) 1-5: 

Represented: Brigade Combat Team (BCT): 

* Stocks stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships; 

* Sets designed to support 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers; 

* Abrams Tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, High Mobility 
Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles, support trucks, and vehicles; 

* Spare parts and other sustainment stocks to support the early stages 
of a conflict. 

Not represented: Sustainment stocks: 

* Stocks stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships; 

* Replacement equipment for losses in early stages of operations or 
until resupply is established; 

* Stocks to include major end items such as tracked vehicles; 

* Secondary items such as meals, clothing, petroleum supplies, 
construction materiels, ammunition, medical materiels, and repair 
parts. 

Operational project stocks: 

* Stocks stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships; 

* Authorized material above unit authorizations designed to support 
Army operations or contingencies; 

* Equipment and supplies for special operations forces, bare base 
sets, petroleum and water distribution, mortuary operations, and 
prisoner-of-war operations. 

Marine Corps: 
Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON)1-3: 

Represented: Forward deployed; Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF): 

* Sets stored aboard 16 prepositioning ships organized into three 
squadrons; 

* Each squadron’s stocks that support about 16,000 Marines and sailors 
for up to 30 days; 

* Combat systems, communications systems, and some sustainment stocks. 

Prepositioning program, Norway: 

* Stocks stored in six cave sites and two storage facilities/air 
stations located in central Norway; 

* Stocks designed to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) with 
select types and classes of vehicles, equipment, and supplies; 

* Stocks including vehicles, engineering equipment, and other 
equipment that will be used to support any geographic combatant 
command. 

Not represented: Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and 
Prepositioning program, Norway components: 

* Capability sets including petroleum and water distribution 
equipment, rations, medical supplies, electric power generation 
equipment, and bare base equipment such as tents; munitions. 

Navy: 
Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON) 1-3: 

Represented: Navy prepositioned assets: 

* Assets stored aboard maritime prepositioning force ships and at land 
sites; 

* Equipment to offload prepositioning ships, including material 
handling equipment, ramps and barges, landing and amphibious craft, 
and bulk fuel; 

* Construction equipment such as cranes, forklifts, trucks, and 
tractor trailers; 

* Stocks to include approximately 2,100 fleet hospital beds. 

Air Force: Various geographic locations: 

Represented: Bare base sets: 

* Base operating support equipment and supplies used to house forces 
at austere bare base forward operating locations; 

* Stocks to support up to 77,500 personnel and 850 combat/mobility 
aircraft at up to15 forward operating locations worldwide; 

* Stocks to include housekeeping sets for personnel life support, 
industrial operations sets to establish expeditionary airbase 
infrastructure, and flight line (flying) operations sets. 

Operational stocks: 

* Direct and indirect mission support equipment and vehicles for up to 
43 forward operating locations to support major combat operations and 
vignettes as specified in DOD’s Integrated Security Posture and 
Strategic Planning Guidance; 

* Stocks to include equipment stored at forward operating locations 
(land bases) worldwide to provide direct mission support such as 
Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) for flying operations, Fuels 
Operational Readiness Capability Equipment (FORCE) for aircraft 
refueling, and general aviation support; 

* Stocks to include both general purpose vehicles such as trucks, 
buses, vans, and special purpose vehicles such as material handling 
equipment, fire trucks, and civil engineering construction equipment. 

Not represented: Other aviation support equipment and supplies: 

* Stocks to include other war reserve materiel sustainment equipment 
and supplies such as rations, munitions stored at land sites and 
aboard prepositioning ships, petroleum (aircraft fuel), oils, 
lubricants at multiple locations, tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons. 

Source: GAO and DOD. 

[End of figure] 

DOD Did Not Clearly State the Risks of Shortfalls in Prepositioned 
Stocks on Operation Plans, but Did Provide Some Information on the 
Risks of Such Shortfalls: 

In its annual report to Congress, DOD is required to include a list of 
operation plans affected by any shortfall in prepositioned stocks and 
a description of any action taken to mitigate any risk that such a 
shortfall may create.[Footnote 21] In regard to the first part of this 
requirement, DOD did not provide a list of affected operation plans 
its annual report. In preparing the report, the Joint Staff employs a 
methodology for determining the risks and mitigation related to 
shortfalls in prepositioned stocks which compares the services' 
materiel and equipment shortfalls with the combatant commanders' 
Integrated Priority Lists.[Footnote 22] According to Joint Staff 
officials, Integrated Priority Lists are a key source of information 
considered by leadership within DOD when directing further study or 
approving funding priorities to mitigate DOD capability gaps. DOD's 
report states that this year's Integrated Priority Lists and Joint 
Capability Gap assessments related to prepositioned stocks did not 
directly relate shortfalls in these stocks to operation plans' 
execution risk. Although the Integrated Priority Lists summarized in 
DOD's report include contingency plans as a source for the mission 
analyses upon which the assessments are based, the risks are not 
stated in terms of impact on the combatant commands' ability to 
execute these plans. Further, other sources of information within DOD 
indicate that shortfalls in prepositioned stocks result in risks to 
operation plans which DOD should have listed in its annual report. In 
particular, DOD readiness reporting shows that, as of June 2010, risks 
associated with shortfalls in prepositioned stocks affected one 
specific operation plan. However, this specific plan is not listed in 
DOD's annual report to Congress. 

Concerning the second part of the requirement, DOD's report provided 
some information on the risks of shortfalls in its prepositioned 
stocks and measures the services have in place to mitigate such risks, 
but additional information would be useful. In particular, DOD's 
annual report summarized the capability gaps related to shortfalls in 
prepositioned stocks, including risks to CENTCOM's theater posture and 
U.S. Europe Command's (EUCOM) ability to build partnerships, 
capabilities, and capacities of partners and institutions. Both 
capability gap documents also contain the operational risk level 
associated with the capability gaps that include shortfalls in 
prepositioned stocks, which CENTCOM and EUCOM both assess as "high." 
In addition, the Integrated Priority Lists and capability gap 
assessments included recommended programmatic actions and associated 
funding, policy changes, and capability development needed to mitigate 
the gaps. For example, CENTCOM's assessment cites the need to 
reconstitute depleted Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps equipment as 
essential to the successful execution of its Theater Strategy. As we 
previously reported, by including equipment shortfalls identified by 
combatant commanders and service mitigation strategies, the Joint 
Staff's methodology can provide DOD and the services greater 
visibility to better assess the risks and subsequent mitigation plans 
and better inform congressional decision making on the potential 
ramifications associated with specific shortages of prepositioned 
stocks.[Footnote 23] However, the Integrated Priority Lists that 
underpin DOD's classified supplement aggregate the combatant commands' 
descriptions of the impact of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks with 
their descriptions of the impact of other related shortfalls, such as 
military construction. Similarly, the 2010 Chairman's Risk Assessment, 
which provides a holistic department-level assessment of risk, 
discusses the impact of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks in the 
context of other risks. 

DOD's annual report provides some information on the steps the 
services are taking to mitigate the risks of shortfalls in 
prepositioned stocks, but this information does not include some 
measures the services have in place to reduce short-term risk or the 
extent to which these measures reduce risk. Such information would be 
helpful to understand the full range of risks and mitigation 
associated with shortfalls in prepositioned stocks. According to DOD's 
report, with the exception of a potential Marine Corps CENTCOM-
specific equipment set that is currently awaiting program of record 
definition, no additional steps will be taken by the services aside 
from existing plans to reconstitute their prepositioned stocks. 
Similarly, the 2010 Secretary of Defense Risk Mitigation Plan states 
that DOD is "aggressively" pursuing funding to reconstitute its 
prepositioned stocks, although, as the information in DOD's annual 
report to Congress indicates, full reconstitution of all the services' 
prepositioned stocks will not be complete until fiscal year 2017. 
However, the services have taken other steps to mitigate the short-
term risks associated with current shortfalls in prepositioned stocks. 
For example, the Army Prepositioned Stocks Strategy 2015 states that 
the Army has implemented three risk mitigation measures to heighten 
the Army's ability to provide trained and equipped forces to support 
DOD's contingency requirements, which, according to Army officials, 
will help decrease the time required to move equipment to where it is 
needed. In addition, according to Air Force officials, the Air Force's 
"mobility assets," which are assets positioned at Air Force bases 
worldwide similar to those it prepositions, are available in 
sufficient quantity to mitigate current shortfalls in its 
prepositioned equipment. These measures are not discussed in DOD's 
report, but would be useful if provided in future reports.[Footnote 
24] Further, neither the classified supplement of DOD's annual report 
nor the Integrated Priority Lists upon which the classified supplement 
is based specify the extent to which the mitigation steps identified 
by the services may reduce the risks associated with shortfalls in 
prepositioned stocks, or whether these mitigation measures are 
sufficient. For example, although the Army stated in DOD's report that 
as a result of demands for equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan it could 
not support EUCOM's request for accelerating the reconstitution of 
portions of its land-based prepositioned stocks in Europe, the extent 
to which the department has accepted risk by not meeting EUCOM's 
request or mitigated overall risk by meeting higher priority needs 
elsewhere is unclear. 

DOD did not concur with our 2008 recommendation to provide additional 
information on the risk of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks and 
mitigation strategies, and stated that because the Chairman's Risk 
Assessment considers all factors relating to DOD readiness and 
strategy, it better aids decision making than would information 
specific to the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks. According 
to DOD's 2008 National Defense Strategy, addressing the risks 
associated with successfully executing the strategy within acceptable 
costs entails clearly articulating the risks inherent in and the 
consequences of choosing among options and proposing mitigation 
strategies that would help to identify areas where the department can 
assume greater risk. Similarly, according to DOD planning guidance, 
Integrated Priority Lists are intended to outline potential areas in 
which DOD can accept increased risk to cover the costs of the 
mitigation strategies identified. We continue to believe that without 
clearly articulating the extent to which shortfalls in prepositioned 
stocks, relative to other factors, contribute to the risks cited in 
the Integrated Priority Lists and Chairman's Risk Assessment, stating 
these risks in terms of impact on DOD's contingency plans, providing 
the full range of measures the department has in place to mitigate 
risk, and assessing the extent to which these measures reduce risk, 
DOD's ability to present areas where it can accept increased risk to 
cover the costs of mitigating other risks, as could become 
increasingly necessary in the current fiscally constrained 
environment, may be limited with respect to prepositioned stocks. 
Further, Congress may be less able to determine the extent to which 
funding directed towards reconstituting DOD's prepositioned stocks 
will reduce risk relative to funding directed towards other programs. 

Other DOD Information Sources Provide More Indication of Risks of 
Shortfalls in Prepositioned Stocks and Extent to Which Mitigation 
Steps Reduce Risk: 

DOD's Joint Force Readiness Review and associated documentation 
provide more indication of the extent to which DOD's mitigation steps 
reduce the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks, although 
questions remain.[Footnote 25] For example, such reporting suggests 
that shortfalls in prepositioned stocks may not be significant drivers 
of risk and that available mitigation further reduces risk. In 
addition, one combatant command that submitted capability gap 
documentation related to shortfalls in prepositioned stocks in fiscal 
year 2008 did not do so in fiscal year 2009. As a result, the Joint 
Force Readiness Review, when considered together with the steps DOD 
has taken to mitigate risk, provides some indication of the 
sufficiency of mitigation of the risks to the one operation plan that 
lists shortfalls in prepositioned stocks as an execution risk. 
However, although EUCOM identifies "forces for building partner 
capacity" as a deficiency in the most recent Joint Force Readiness 
Review, neither its submission nor CENTCOM's identification of 
shortfalls in prepositioned stocks as stated in DOD's report is shown 
in the Joint Force Readiness Review as influencing operational risk or 
resulting in the inability to conduct mission-essential tasks. In 
addition, mitigation strategies addressing these shortfalls as they 
relate to EUCOM and CENTCOM are not included in the Joint Force 
Readiness Review. As a result, questions remain as to the sufficiency 
of service-specified mitigation for the shortfalls in prepositioned 
stocks identified by these combatant commands in their joint 
capability gap assessments and Integrated Priority Lists, especially 
in the short term until the services' reconstitution of their 
prepositioned stocks is complete. 

Combatant command staffs take steps to mitigate short-term risk but 
these actions may not be consistently reported. According to CENTCOM 
officials, shortfalls in prepositioned stocks in their area of 
responsibility had never resulted in any risk--short, medium, or long 
term--that could not be mitigated to within acceptable levels. For 
example, the Army decided to issue prepositioned stocks to support the 
rapid movement of combat-equipped forces into Iraq in 2003, the surge 
of forces in Iraq in 2006-2007, and the ongoing increase of 30,000 
forces in Afghanistan. In response to these decisions, CENTCOM 
assessed that the risk of issuing prepositioned stocks was mitigated 
because the forces to which the stocks were issued were located in the 
same area of operations as the stocks themselves, and the units which 
received this equipment could be rapidly retasked to respond to 
another contingency in the same area of responsibility. Further, in 
the case of increasing the forces in Afghanistan, issuing the specific 
types of required equipment did not significantly affect the combat 
capability of the prepositioned set in Kuwait, even though the forces 
using the equipment were operating further from the location where 
they would most likely be needed should another contingency erupt, 
according to the officials. In general, according to the CENTCOM 
planners, risk assessment and mitigation comprise the majority of 
combatant command planners' daily workload, although the results of 
these actions may not always be reported outside of the combatant 
command. We therefore recognize that external reporting on combatant 
commands' risk mitigation for shortfalls in prepositioned stocks may 
be limited.[Footnote 26] 

The DOD internal tasking process used to respond to the annual 
reporting requirement may have limited its ability to provide the 
information on the risks to operation plans resulting from shortfalls 
in prepositioned stocks that it already collects as part of the Joint 
Force Readiness Review.[Footnote 27] As an example, a Joint Staff 
official responsible for compiling the input for DOD's report to 
Congress for the past 2 years said that in tasking the logistics 
directorate to produce DOD's report, the Joint Staff did not require 
input from the operations directorate, which is most closely 
responsible for tracking information related to operational readiness 
issues, such as the impact of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks on 
operation plans. As a result, the information DOD already reports 
elsewhere related to risks to DOD's operation plans of shortfalls in 
prepositioned stocks has not been fully covered in DOD's report. 
Without integrating the information in the Joint Force Readiness 
Review with the information DOD currently provides to Congress in its 
annual report on prepositioned stocks and in other products such as 
the Chairman's Risk Assessment, Congress may lack information about 
risk as it applies specifically to shortfalls in prepositioned stocks, 
how these risks relate to other risks such as the risk of not 
completing military construction projects, and the extent to which 
DOD's mitigation measures reduce these risks. More broadly, without 
providing a complete picture of the scope of DOD's prepositioning 
programs and associated funding needed for their reconstitution, 
together with a clearer discussion of the risk of shortfalls in its 
prepositioned stocks and associated mitigation, DOD may not be able to 
provide Congress the information necessary to determine the 
sufficiency of DOD's justification for the additional resources needed 
to reconstitute the department's prepositioned stocks. 

DOD Has Limited Departmentwide Guidance Linking Its Prepositioning 
Programs with the Achievement of National Military Objectives: 

DOD has limited departmentwide guidance that would help ensure that 
its prepositioning programs accurately reflect national military 
objectives, such as those included in the National Defense Strategy 
and the National Military Strategy. DOD has developed departmentwide 
guidance, referred to as the Guidance for Development of the Force 
(GDF), but as of September 2010, this guidance contained little 
information related to prepositioned stocks even though DOD's 2008 
instruction that addresses prepositioned stocks specifically directed 
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to develop GDF for 
prepositioned stocks. Because other sources of information the 
services use to determine their requirements for prepositioned stocks 
may not clearly state the full range of DOD's need for these stocks, 
without overarching planning and funding priorities that link DOD's 
prepositioning programs to its national military objectives the 
services' ability to make informed decisions about the future of their 
programs may be limited. 

DOD's Guidance for Development of the Force Does Not Contain 
Information Synchronizing Its Prepositioning Programs with National 
Military Objectives: 

DOD's efforts to develop departmentwide guidance to synchronize its 
prepositioning programs with national military objectives are 
incomplete. In June 2008, DOD issued an instruction directing the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to develop and coordinate 
guidance for approval by the Secretary of Defense, referred to as GDF, 
that identifies overall prepositioned stocks strategy to achieve 
desired capabilities and responsiveness in support of the National 
Defense Strategy.[Footnote 28] According to a Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff instruction on joint strategic planning, GDF 
establishes the department's force development planning and resource 
priorities needed to meet future contingencies, and provides a 
critical linkage between the National Defense Strategy, the National 
Military Strategy, and DOD's budget.[Footnote 29] GDF for 
prepositioned stocks would provide the services with information on 
the medium and long-term departmentwide priorities they need to 
effectively plan and apply their resources to meet future 
contingencies, thus linking DOD's prepositioning programs with its 
overall national defense strategies. DOD issued its GDF in 2008, prior 
to the publication of its instruction on prepositioned stocks, and 
updated this guidance in 2009. However, as of September 2010, the GDF 
did not contain any information that would synchronize DOD's 
prepositioning programs with national military goals. According to 
officials from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 
and the 2008 GDF, the information on prepositioning in the GDF has 
been limited to instructions for the geographic combatant commanders 
to include information on prepositioned stocks in their theater 
posture plans.[Footnote 30] Thus, the extent of DOD's definition of 
departmentwide planning and funding priorities for prepositioned 
stocks is more limited, and the department continues to lack an 
overarching assessment and prioritization of combatant commander needs 
and service initiatives to meet these needs. As a result, the 
information available to the services in terms of departmentwide needs 
and priorities as they relate to prepositioned stocks remains limited. 

Information from Other Sources on DOD's Needs for Prepositioned Stocks 
Is Limited: 

Beyond GDF, other sources of information used by the services to 
determine combatant commanders' needs also may not clearly state the 
full potential demand for prepositioned stocks in meeting national 
military objectives. Title 10 of the U.S. Code charges the secretary 
of each department with responsibility for carrying out the functions 
of that department so as to fulfill the current and future operational 
requirements of the combatant commands.[Footnote 31] In that role, the 
services determine whether the needs of combatant commands can best be 
supported with prepositioned equipment or with equipment from other 
sources. In addition to overarching guidance such as GDF, other 
sources of information, including DOD's contingency plans, may inform 
the development of service requirements, such as those for 
prepositioned stocks. For DOD's contingency plans that call for the 
early entry of forces into combat, determining the need for 
prepositioned stocks is relatively straightforward. For example, 
according to Joint Staff officials, the fully developed operation 
plans in U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) area of responsibility spell 
out the combatant commander's requirements that the services have 
determined can be best met with prepositioned stocks. According to 
these officials, this is possible because PACOM's plans include time-
phased force deployment data.[Footnote 32] However, out of DOD's 50 
top priority plans, only 7 are directed to contain these data, 
according to Joint Staff documentation. As a result, the majority of 
DOD's contingency plans may not include the data necessary for the 
services to determine a clear need for prepositioned stocks based on 
these plans' requirements. 

Needs other than the support of early entry of forces into a military 
operation, such as theater security cooperation, low-level military 
action, or humanitarian assistance, may not be identified in operation 
plans in as much detail as time-phased force deployment data provide. 
Because combatant commands do not necessarily tie these types of 
demands to such data, requirements for prepositioned stocks other than 
those which facilitate early entry of forces may be harder to 
determine and, according to a joint staff official, more difficult for 
the combatant commands to justify. For example, as discussed earlier, 
EUCOM has expressed a need for prepositioned stocks to build the 
capacity of partner states. However, EUCOM does not have an operation 
plan with time-phased force deployment data. As a result, EUCOM may 
face challenges in justifying needs for prepositioned equipment that 
reflect the current global security environment. In fact, EUCOM's 
posture plan stated that a reexamination is necessary for how afloat 
and land-based prepositioned equipment and materiel can be best 
managed to support not just major military operations, which typically 
are associated with time-phased force deployment data, but also 
theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 
relief, explicitly articulating the need for high-level action in this 
area. Without combatant command statements of need expressed in terms 
of detailed operational requirements, the services may be less able to 
determine whether prepositioned stocks or equipment from other sources 
would be most appropriate to meet these needs. Further, without such 
information, the services may face challenges in resourcing combatant 
command needs for prepositioned stocks. For example, according to Air 
Force officials, one combatant command has expressed a need for 
additional prepositioned stocks for some time, but as of August 2010 
had yet to finalize an operation plan with time-phased force 
deployment data. As a result, according to Air Force officials, the 
Air Force has been unable to obtain the funding authorizations for the 
prepositioned equipment it would need to support the draft plan. 

Further, other potential sources of requirements outside of DOD's 
contingency plans, such as Defense Planning Scenarios,[Footnote 33] 
may not fully reflect current combatant commander needs. For example, 
the 2010 Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study, which is based 
on these scenarios and assumes the full reconstitution of all 
currently programmed prepositioned equipment, found that combat 
equipment on afloat prepositioned stocks was not employed early in the 
fight for a particular scenario involving operations in the PACOM area 
of responsibility. However, joint and service officials raised 
questions about this conclusion, stating that combatant commander 
needs may have changed since that particular scenario had been 
developed. In particular, according to Army planning officials, 
Defense Planning Scenarios incorporate combatant commander input in 
the beginning of their development phase, but existing DOD planning 
guidance does not require such input as part of the final validation 
of these scenarios, which can occur 2 years later. As a result, these 
scenarios may not fully reflect the current global security and 
operational environments, including needs for prepositioned stocks 
that may have changed during the 2-year period of scenario 
development. By extension, this lack of clarity in the demand for 
prepositioned stocks may affect the department's ability to 
effectively determine its current and future needs for prepositioned 
stocks, and link these needs with national military goals. 

Without an overall prepositioned stocks strategy in its GDF, DOD may 
not be able to effectively articulate the policy implications stemming 
from the placement of prepositioned stocks in accordance with DOD's 
global defense posture. For example, according to CENTCOM officials, 
prepositioning provides combatant commanders the ability to signal a 
U.S. commitment to its allies without officially making such a 
commitment. As such, according to officials from the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, prepositioning forms an integral 
component of DOD's global defense posture. For example, according to 
CENTCOM officials, a decision to alter the size or composition of 
prepositioned stocks at a location or replace them with something 
else, such as an ongoing force presence, may diminish U.S. flexibility 
of response, affect relationships with allies, and increase costs and 
institutional risks. Further, removing prepositioned stocks could 
embolden our adversaries by reducing the U.S. government's deterrence 
capability, these officials stated. Such issues have intrinsic policy 
components, according to officials from the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. However, in the absence of 
policy-level direction on prepositioning from a source such as GDF, 
DOD may not be able to ensure that the services' decisions about the 
future of their prepositioning programs fully reflect current and 
future needs in these areas. 

In the absence of clearly stated departmentwide needs and priorities 
for prepositioned stocks, the services may not be able to shape their 
prepositioned stocks programs to most effectively and efficiently meet 
evolving defense challenges. Both the Chief of Staff of the Army and 
the Secretary of the Navy are currently considering major proposals to 
adjust their prepositioning programs. Specifically, the Army is 
considering eliminating its prepositioned heavy brigade combat team 
equipment in Europe and, as of July 2010, the Navy had decided to 
place a major portion of the Marine Corps' prepositioned ships in a 
reduced operating status at locations in the United States rather than 
locations abroad beginning in fiscal year 2013. However, the 
information made available to the Secretary of the Navy focused on the 
past usage of the Marine Corps' prepositioned stocks and, according to 
Marine Corps documentation, did not consider the potential risks to 
both known and unknown contingencies of reducing the capability to 
rapidly respond to crises. In both cases, the combatant commands, 
joint staff, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy may not have provided their formal input into the decisions as 
of August 2010, according to DOD officials and documentation. Further, 
the working group DOD established to oversee its prepositioning 
programs at the joint level, which is discussed in more detail later 
in this report, has, according to its charter, the responsibility for 
monitoring requirements and risks associated with prepositioned stocks 
and for remaining current on service plans. However, this group did 
not meet before the recommendations were formally presented by service 
senior leadership. Although the joint community will likely have the 
opportunity to formally provide its input to these decisions, such 
input will occur after the service chiefs make their decisions and as 
a result the outcome may be more difficult to influence, according to 
DOD officials. Without the development and implementation of 
departmentwide guidance that includes planning and funding priorities 
linking current and future needs and desired responsiveness of DOD's 
prepositioned stocks to evolving national defense objectives, the 
services may not be able to make fully informed decisions about the 
future of their programs that would support the effective and 
efficient achievement of such objectives. 

DOD has undertaken or recently completed five major studies or reviews 
which could help the department clarify evolving defense challenges 
and determine its current and future needs for prepositioned stocks. 
For example, in August 2010, the Senior Warfighting Forum concluded a 
4-month review, during which each combatant command achieved consensus 
on the attributes of prepositioning programs most valuable to them and 
ranked these attributes by priority.[Footnote 34] The six attributes, 
in order of prioritization, were responsiveness, tailorability, 
expeditionary, flexibility, reliability, and relevance. The intent was 
to incorporate the Senior Warfighting Forum results into a wide-
ranging review conducted by the Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. This wide-ranging 
review, which is not yet complete, seeks to examine the Army and 
Marine Corps prepositioning programs to identify costs and potential 
efficiencies to be gained, provide information on how prepositioned 
stocks have been used since 1990, identify the linkages between DOD's 
contingency plans and its prepositioned stocks, and develop 
alternatives to prepositioning equipment and materiel for senior DOD 
leadership to consider. In addition, according to DOD officials, the 
Joint Staff resources directorate is leading a study on global defense 
posture, which will include a prepositioning component. Further, 
according to officials, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Policy is studying prepositioning as part of its ongoing efforts 
to create implementing documentation for the posture strategy 
articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Finally, in August 2010 
the Under Secretary of the Navy initiated a review of the Department 
of the Navy's prepositioning programs, including the Marine Corps' 
prepositioned stocks. These studies have the potential to inform a 
departmentwide approach to prepositioning requirements that fully 
considers the current security environment and increases efficiencies 
or cost savings, but the absence of policy, such as overarching 
guidance, and the organizational means to institutionalize the results 
of these efforts, may limit the studies' impact. 

Organizational Challenges May Hinder DOD's Ability to Provide 
Effective Joint Oversight for Its Prepositioning Programs and Achieve 
Potential Efficiencies: 

DOD faces organizational challenges which may hinder its efforts to 
gain efficiencies. Specifically, DOD established the Global 
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group to address joint 
prepositioning issues. However, DOD has been unable to ensure that the 
working group's activities include the full range of tasks the working 
group was established to perform, including making recommendations 
that would synchronize and integrate, as appropriate, the services' 
prepositioning programs, because the working group lacks clear 
oversight and reporting relationships to authoritative bodies within 
DOD. According to joint and service officials, efficiencies or cost 
savings could be gained through improved joint program management 
across the services and leveraging components in DOD, such as the 
Defense Logistics Agency. 

DOD's Joint Organization Responsible for Providing Oversight for Its 
Prepositioning Programs May Be Unable to Achieve Its Objectives: 

DOD faces organizational challenges in effectively synchronizing the 
individual services' prepositioning programs. The 2008 DOD instruction 
on war reserve materiel policy directed the establishment of a Global 
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group, comprised of 
officials from the services, joint organizations, and entities within 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. According to DOD officials, 
this working group was formalized in June 2008, although it had been 
in existence for several years. Further, according to DOD officials, 
this working group has constituted DOD's response to recommendations 
from GAO to develop a departmentwide strategy related to prepositioned 
equipment and materiel. In particular, according to DOD officials 
involved with the group since its inception, the intent of the working 
group was to provide an overall view of DOD's prepositioning programs 
and ensure that the services' programs were synchronized, as a 
strategic plan would do. According to GAO's Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government, internal control should provide 
reasonable assurance that an agency's objectives are being achieved in 
the areas of effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations.[Footnote 35] 

According to the standards, federal agencies are to employ internal 
control activities, such as oversight through reviews by managers, to 
help ensure that an organization's directives are carried out and 
resources are effectively and efficiently used. DOD's working group 
has not carried out all of its responsibilities under the DOD 
instruction or the objectives and responsibilities in its charter. 
According to DOD's instruction, the working group is responsible for, 
among other things, addressing joint issues concerning requirements 
and positioning for prepositioned stocks and developing 
recommendations for improved processes, as needed, and making 
recommendations that balance limited resources against operational 
risk for use during budget and program reviews. However, instead of 
conducting these tasks, the working group has served primarily as a 
forum for service representatives to share information about their own 
service's programs, collect information to support the publication of 
DOD's annual report to Congress on the status of its prepositioned 
stocks, and coordinate responses to audit inquiries such as those in 
support of GAO's annual review, according to joint and service 
officials. Although these tasks are consistent with the purpose 
statement in the working group's charter, both the charter and the DOD 
instruction illustrate a much broader set of objectives and 
responsibilities, as noted above. Further, according to DOD officials 
involved in the working group since 2008, as working group 
participants became more comfortable with the annual reporting process 
and GAO's annual review, the frequency of meetings--which initially 
occurred quarterly and then increased to monthly--declined and the 
results of the group's discussions may not have been consistently 
recorded. 

In addition, DOD's 2008 instruction on prepositioned stocks may not 
specify the correct core membership for the working group. One of the 
objectives set out in the charter for DOD's working group is to 
support DOD's global defense posture initiative. However, the working 
group's core membership does not include representation from the 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which develops 
DOD's global defense posture and is responsible for developing GDF 
that identifies overall prepositioned stocks strategy to achieve 
desired capabilities and responsiveness in support of the National 
Defense Strategy. On the other hand, DOD's instruction does include 
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness in the list of working group participants. However, a 
working group participant did not recall someone from this office ever 
having attended a working group meeting. 

DOD's ability to ensure that its joint prepositioning working group's 
activities include the full range of tasks the group was established 
to perform and that the group includes the correct core membership has 
been limited by unclear reporting relationships between the group and 
other components within DOD. According to the working group's charter, 
the responsibility for ensuring that the working group meets the 
objectives set out in the charter falls on the group's co-chairs-- 
representatives from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
In addition, shortly after the working group was formalized, officials 
stated that the working group reports to officials senior to the co- 
chairs in their respective organizations. Further, DOD's instruction 
states that the working group will make recommendations that balance 
limited resources against operational risk to the Director of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation, now referred to as the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 
during program reviews, and to the Undersecretary of Defense 
Comptroller during budget reviews. According to officials involved in 
the working group, the group has not made recommendations to these 
offices. In addition, officials from the joint staff stated that the 
working group in fact did not formally report to any other 
organization within the department, although these officials were 
considering developing a recommendation that the working group report 
to another working group focused on global posture, called the Global 
Posture Executive Council.[Footnote 36] Unless appropriate reporting 
relationships are clarified and adhered to, and the group is overseen 
by an authoritative body that can review its activities, DOD may 
continue to be unable to ensure that the group's activities and 
objectives align and that the results of its efforts will go beyond 
the working group itself. Further, without taking the appropriate 
steps, such as periodic reviews, to ensure that the working group 
performs its assigned functions and includes the proper core 
membership, DOD may be hindered in its ability to synchronize, at the 
joint level, its prepositioning programs with planning and funding 
priorities to better oversee its prepositioning programs, which may 
affect the department's ability to gain potential efficiencies or cost 
savings. 

Efficiencies May Be Gained through Improved Joint Integration of 
Service Prepositioning Programs: 

According to joint and service officials, better synchronization and 
integration among the services' prepositioning programs and other 
components within DOD may result in efficiencies or cost savings. In 
particular, efficiencies or cost savings may be gained by an increased 
emphasis on joint program management, as appropriate, and by 
leveraging components in DOD such as the Defense Logistics Agency. 

Potential Opportunities for Joint Program Management: 

DOD officials involved in the department's prepositioning programs 
generally agreed that integrating elements of DOD's prepositioning 
programs may lead to efficiencies. According to DOD officials, 
materiel and equipment critical to supporting ongoing operations in 
CENTCOM's area of responsibility are resident in more than one of the 
services' prepositioned inventories and yet are managed and funded 
separately. For example, all of the services include in their 
prepositioning programs equipment to distribute and store fuel. In 
addition, the Air Force and Army both field similar sets of equipment 
used to establish bases in forward locations. Because these sets are 
currently managed and funded separately, officials from both services 
agreed that consolidating the management of these capabilities would 
result in savings. Challenges for making this change, however, would 
include establishing a common quality-of-life standard for the sets 
acceptable to all the services and determining who would be 
responsible for funding. According to an Air Force official, the 
department is moving towards establishing common quality-of-life 
standards for the services, and departmentwide initiatives, such as 
the Joint Expeditionary Basing Working Group, have successfully 
implemented joint management for certain equipment and materiel, such 
as refrigerator units and hygiene sets. Funding is a major challenge 
under current arrangements, especially for the Air Force, which has 
provided a significant number of its expeditionary base sets to the 
Army and Marine Corps. The Air Force is currently unable to replace 
this equipment, and has not yet been reimbursed for the sets it has 
provided to the Army. As a result, the Air Force faces a $315 million 
shortage that will affect its ability to meet the requirements of 
other contingency plans, according to Air Force data. 

Officials from both the Army and the Marine Corps agreed that 
efficiencies could be gained by implementing some kind of joint 
management arrangement for afloat prepositioned stocks. Marine Corps 
officials offered that the Marine Corps afloat prepositioned stocks 
maintenance and staging facility in Jacksonville, Florida could 
support a level of expansion sufficient to incorporate the Army's 
afloat prepositioning program. These officials also stated that it may 
make sense to develop and implement an "executive agency" form of 
management for DOD's afloat prepositioned stocks. Similarly, EUCOM's 
posture plan recommends joint consolidation of stocks. An Air Force 
official noted that the joint program management concept has been 
employed with DOD's Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program. 
Although the Institute for Defense Analyses studied the potential cost 
savings of combining the Army's and Marine Corps' afloat prepositioned 
stocks maintenance facilities, located in Charleston, South Carolina, 
and Jacksonville, Florida, it found no compelling reason to combine 
the facilities since doing so would offer small and uncertain cost 
savings and could result in strategic drawbacks.[Footnote 37] However, 
this study was conducted over 12 years ago. 

Although it is currently unclear whether combining the Army's and 
Marine Corps' entire afloat prepositioning programs would be 
beneficial, efficiencies may be gained through joint management of 
elements within each service's program. For example, both the Army and 
Marine Corps maintain separate contracted capabilities to load and 
maintain equipment stored on prepositioned ships at their respective 
facilities. Although the capabilities are very similar and are now 
even provided by the same contractor, each is managed as a separate 
program. In fiscal year 2010, the Army obligated about $48 million for 
its contract and the Marine Corps obligated about $74 million. 
According to Army officials, consolidating these programs under one 
office may result in savings to the government through efficiencies 
gained by, for example, reducing the overhead costs associated with 
parallel management and contract oversight functions. Further, 
according to Army officials, managing the Army's and Marine Corps' 
afloat prepositioned stocks maintenance activities under one program 
would help the contractor streamline its workforce and ensure 
experienced management oversight in both locations. According to the 
charter for DOD's working group for prepositioned stocks, one of the 
group's objectives is to evaluate and provide recommendations for 
assignment of management responsibility for common items to designated 
entities. However, without proper management oversight facilitated by 
clear reporting relationships, the ability of the working group to 
provide such recommendations and the responsibility of the recipient 
offices to consider them is unclear. 

Leveraging Components in DOD: 

Increased emphasis on leveraging components within DOD, such as the 
Defense Logistics Agency, may also improve prepositioning program 
effectiveness over current service-centric strategies. For example, 
the Army's current requirements for its war reserve sustainment 
stocks, worth about $608 million, are based largely on a new 
methodology that established the demand for parts during operations in 
Iraq as a baseline for global requirements for these parts. The 
methodology emphasizes placing "big, heavy, and cheap" items in 
forward locations in order to minimize the lift required to transport 
these items to the locations if needed for a contingency operation. 
Army officials responsible for executing the Army's prepositioning 
program raised concerns with this methodology, arguing that the needs 
experienced during operations in Iraq may not reflect the demand for 
parts that would occur during operations elsewhere in the world. For 
example, officials responsible for executing the Army's prepositioning 
program in East Asia noted that 20,000 tires are currently stored in 
Korea solely because operating forces in the early days of military 
operations in Iraq had to change a lot of tires. However, even if 
operations in Korea would require this number of tires in sustainment 
stocks, which the officials doubted, they noted that they could not be 
used anyway because the Army has switched to tire/wheel assemblies as 
the authorized parts. Army officials predicted that the Army would 
have to find a way to rapidly ship a large amount of parts at the last 
minute to supply its forces should a contingency operation arise, 
because the stocks authorized under the new methodology would not meet 
the needs on the ground, or accept risk if such shipment capability 
were unavailable. These officials and others agreed that, while 
tedious, involving the operating forces on the ground in validating 
sustainment stocks requirements is the best way to determine the 
needed equipment and materiel. 

DOD officials also stated that the Defense Logistics Agency could 
provide greater efficiencies in delivering sustainment stocks. For 
example, according to Defense Logistics Agency officials, the Defense 
Logistics Agency's global supply chain, which already provides 84 
percent of all the military services' repair parts, may be leveraged 
to provide certain materiel when needed in the early stages of a 
conflict at a potentially lower cost than would be incurred by 
prepositioning, allowing the services to reduce their prepositioned 
inventories. In addition, by obtaining such materiel through 
requisitions from the operating forces on the ground, the services may 
be more likely to have on-hand the actual items needed than they would 
by relying on methodologies that project demand. The Army has begun 
exploring ways to better take advantage of the Defense Logistics 
Agency's capabilities. Further, the charter for DOD's Global 
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group states that one of 
its objectives is to leverage the capabilities of defense agencies to 
better synchronize their efforts with the services' prepositioning 
programs. However, without departmentwide guidance and appropriate 
lines of authority and oversight for the Global Prepositioned Materiel 
Capabilities Working Group, DOD may not be able to fully realize 
potential efficiencies that could be gained by integrating the 
services' prepositioning programs with each other and with other DOD 
components, as appropriate. 

Conclusions: 

Moving forward, DOD's annual report, as well as the active interest 
and involvement of the congressional defense committees, can continue 
to be an effective tool to help DOD effectively plan for and use its 
prepositioned equipment to achieve national military objectives. The 
ongoing evolution in the types of contingencies to which DOD may be 
called upon to respond creates challenges for the department in how it 
determines the demand for prepositioned stocks. Combatant commanders' 
equipment and materiel needs related to low-level military 
engagements, disaster relief, and theater security cooperation now 
accompany requirements associated with major combat operations, but 
may not be formalized in operation plans to the level of detail 
necessary for the services to easily determine whether such needs can 
be best met with prepositioned stocks, and therefore may be more 
difficult to justify. Further, such demands may go beyond the major 
equipment end items and spare parts required to be included in DOD's 
annual report, to include other types of equipment such as the Army's 
Operational Project Stocks. Providing additional information on the 
full range of DOD's prepositioning programs would allow Congress 
greater visibility on the scope of options available to meet national 
military objectives within these programs when making decisions about 
future funding--which would be especially helpful in finding potential 
efficiencies to be gained in today's increasingly fiscally constrained 
environment. Similarly, including in the annual report a more detailed 
summary of the risks to operation plans resulting from current 
shortfalls in these stocks and the full range of DOD's mitigation 
measures, together with readiness information DOD already collects and 
reports, would provide Congress a better idea of how these shortfalls 
specifically affect the operational readiness of the force. Further, 
DOD's challenges in identifying the full range of potential demands 
for prepositioned stocks highlight the importance of departmentwide 
guidance specifying DOD's current and future needs for these stocks as 
well as associated planning and funding priorities. This is 
particularly true given the many studies and reviews DOD has completed 
or will complete in the near future, which have the potential to 
inform departmentwide guidance and the future composition of the 
services' prepositioning programs. Without such guidance, the services 
may not be able to most effectively plan and apply their resources to 
meet the needs of future contingencies. Finally, without clarifying 
its joint prepositioning oversight structure, to include clearly 
stated reporting relationships and management reviews to ensure that 
DOD's joint activities in this area align with stated objectives, DOD 
may continue to face organizational challenges that hinder its ability 
to take full advantage of potential efficiencies that may be gained, 
for example, through minimization of overlap or duplication among the 
services' programs. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that DOD more fully informs the congressional defense 
committees on the status of prepositioned equipment and materiel 
through its annual report to Congress and to enhance joint oversight, 
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 
actions: 

1. Direct the Joint Staff and the Secretaries of the military services 
to provide, in addition to the six elements currently required in the 
annual report, a more comprehensive picture of the full scope of the 
services' prepositioning programs, to include (1) a representative 
summary description including the dollar value and, as appropriate, 
level of fill and information on serviceability, of (a) Army 
Operational Projects and Army War Reserve Sustainment Stocks, (b) Air 
Force munitions, medical stocks, rations, and fuel elements of its War 
Reserve Materiel program, and (c) Marine Corps materiel prepositioned 
to support an entire deployed Marine Corps force, such as its 
capability sets; and (2) all sources of funding for the services' 
prepositioned equipment and materiel, including working capital funds. 

2. Direct the Joint Staff operations and plans directorates to provide 
in DOD's annual report to Congress, in addition to the information DOD 
already includes related to Integrated Priority Lists and capability 
gap assessments, information it reports as part of the Joint Force 
Readiness Review, including (1) a summary of all DOD's plans the 
services have determined include requirements for prepositioned 
stocks, (2) a description of the extent to which the combatant 
commands assess that shortfalls in prepositioned stocks contribute to 
any specific execution risk in these plans, (3) the full range of 
measures in place to mitigate the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned 
stocks, and (4) an assessment of the extent to which the mitigation 
measures identified by the services reduce risk. 

3. Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, to (1) assess the continued relevance of the Global 
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group's assigned tasks and 
membership as stated in DOD Instruction 3110.06 and the group's 
charter and make any necessary adjustments to ensure that the working 
group's objectives align with its activities. These would include 
making the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy a core 
member, and clarifying lines of authority and reporting between the 
working group and other components within DOD, such as the Global 
Posture Executive Council, so as to instill accountability through 
appropriate oversight and management review. 

4. Upon clarifying DOD's joint oversight structure for prepositioned 
stocks, direct the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 
to leverage the expertise of the Global Prepositioned Materiel 
Capabilities Working Group members, the offices they represent, and 
the results of the multiple recent or ongoing prepositioning studies 
to develop appropriately detailed authoritative strategic guidance, 
such as Guidance for Development of the Force. The guidance would 
include planning and resource priorities linking the department's 
current and future needs for prepositioned stocks, including desired 
responsiveness, to evolving national defense objectives. 

5. Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretaries of the military services to implement DOD's authoritative 
strategic guidance on prepositioned stocks in such a way so as to 
integrate and synchronize at a DOD-wide level, as appropriate, the 
services' prepositioning programs so that they include updated 
requirements and maximize efficiency in managing prepositioned assets 
across the department to reduce unnecessary duplication. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendations and provided information on the steps it is taking or 
plans to take to address them. With regard to our first two 
recommendations, which concern additional information that would be 
useful to include in DOD's annual report to Congress, DOD stated that 
the department will review our recommended additions to the report and 
determine the elements within the services' programs that are 
appropriate to include in future reports. DOD also stated that it 
would include relevant information pertaining to prepositioned stocks 
as reported in the Joint Force Readiness Review that does not conflict 
with other risk assessment mechanisms, such as the Chairman's Risk 
Assessment. With regard to our third recommendation, which is focused 
on DOD's joint oversight of its prepositioning programs, DOD stated 
that current studies undertaken by the department, such as those 
discussed in our report, may result in significant changes to the 
structure and management of the department's prepositioning programs. 
As such, DOD stated that it will review and make necessary adjustments 
to the roles and responsibilities of the Global Prepositioned Materiel 
Capabilities Working Group based on the outcome of its ongoing studies 
and codify lines of authority and reporting between this group and 
other DOD components. Further, according to DOD, the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy 
Directorate, and, as necessary, the Joint Staff Operations Directorate 
(Readiness), are now included as core members of the joint working 
group. With regard to our fourth and fifth recommendations, which 
address the need for developing and implementing authoritative 
departmentwide guidance, the department stated that it will develop 
strategic direction concerning prepositioned stocks and explore 
opportunities to integrate and synchronize DOD-wide prepositioning 
efforts based on the results of its studies. The department's comments 
are reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff; the Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; 
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This report also is available 
at no charge on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology: 

To address our first objective on the extent to which DOD addressed 
the six reporting requirements in its annual report to Congress on its 
prepositioned stocks and whether additional information would be 
useful, we compared DOD's report to the congressional defense 
committees with the statutory reporting requirements. We interviewed 
knowledgeable DOD, joint, and military service officials to determine 
the full scope of the services' prepositioning programs, including an 
understanding of the elements included in DOD's annual report, the 
extent to which the services' programs have elements that are not 
included in the report, and whether additional information could 
further inform Congress on the status of prepositioned equipment and 
materiel. We also reviewed prior GAO and DOD reports on the services' 
prepositioned stock programs and collected and reviewed readiness data 
on the services' equipments sets and materiel. While we did not 
independently assess the data on levels of fill and material condition 
DOD provided to Congress, we discussed the reliability of the systems 
used to develop the report data with service officials. In addition, 
we physically observed sites where the Air Force and the Army store 
land-based prepositioned stocks at Al Udeid Air Base and Camp As 
Sayliyah, Qatar, and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, to determine whether there 
were any obvious visual discrepancies between the information DOD 
reports and the status of the equipment stored at these sites. We 
selected these locations because (1) they represent different 
services' storage sites, (2) they included equipment stored both 
indoors and outdoors, and (3) travel was possible within the short 
time frame allowed by this review. We also visited locations where the 
Army and Marine Corps maintain and load their afloat prepositioned 
stocks onto ships in Goose Creek, South Carolina, and Jacksonville, 
Florida. We determined that the data reported by the services were 
sufficiently reliable to meet the objectives of this engagement. To 
determine if the funding required to reconstitute shortfalls in 
prepositioned stocks was transparent, accurate, and comprehensive, we 
reviewed the services' funding estimates provided in DOD's annual 
report to Congress, spoke with the appropriate service officials, and 
reviewed supplementary funding data. To assess the classified 
supplement to DOD's report and examine the risk created by shortfalls 
in prepositioned stocks and any actions taken to mitigate the risk of 
those shortfalls, we obtained and analyzed combatant commander 
Integrated Priority Lists, Joint Capability Gap Assessments, Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council memorandums, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staff's Risk Assessment, the Secretary of Defense's Risk 
Mitigation Plan, and recent Joint Force Readiness Reviews and 
discussed them with the appropriate officials. 

To address our second objective on the extent to which DOD has 
developed effective departmentwide guidance on prepositioned stocks to 
achieve national military objectives, we examined prior GAO reports, 
DOD guidance including its instruction on prepositioned stocks, joint 
doctrine, the National Defense Strategy, the Guidance for Development 
of the Force, and service regulations. We discussed the extent to 
which departmentwide guidance specific to prepositioned stocks has 
been developed with DOD, joint, and service officials. We reviewed the 
Army's Prepositioned Stocks Strategy 2015, the Marine Corps' 
Expeditionary Policies Road Map, and briefing materials describing the 
Air Force's Integrated Security Posture, and discussed them with the 
appropriate service officials to determine how the services develop 
their requirements for prepositioned stocks. To understand current 
sources of information on DOD's needs for prepositioned stocks, we 
reviewed summary data on operation plans and combatant commander 
theater posture plans and spoke with combatant command and joint 
officials about the information included in these documents and the 
operation planning process. We also examined the Mobility Capabilities 
and Requirements Study 2016 and discussed this study, as well as the 
several recently completed or ongoing studies focused more 
specifically on prepositioned stocks, with the appropriate officials. 

To address our third objective on the extent to which DOD has 
organized effectively to provide joint oversight for its 
prepositioning programs and achieve efficiencies, we assessed the 
extent to which DOD has implemented a joint oversight structure for 
its prepositioning programs as stated in its instruction on 
prepositioned stocks. We examined prior GAO reports and supporting 
evidence to understand the history of DOD's efforts to oversee, at a 
joint level, its prepositioning programs. We discussed DOD's Global 
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group with knowledgeable 
service and joint officials, including those who had participated in 
this working group since its formalization in 2008. We assessed the 
extent to which the working group has effective guidance, oversight, 
and lines of authority and reporting in accordance with our Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 38] by 
examining the reporting structures stated in DOD's instruction, the 
working group's leadership, organization, and composition, and its 
tasks as stated in the instruction and the group's charter. Further, 
we discussed the actual activities this working group has undertaken 
with knowledgeable service and joint officials and compared these 
tasks with its purpose and objectives to determine the extent to which 
the working group's activities address responsibilities assigned in 
the DOD Instruction. In the course of our discussions, we obtained 
views on areas where DOD may gain efficiencies through joint oversight 
or management, as appropriate, of its prepositioned programs. 

We interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all four of the military services, and one 
combatant command. The specific offices and military activities we 
interviewed and obtained information from include the following: 

* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain 
Integration, Arlington, VA: 

* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Global Force 
Planning, Arlington, VA: 

* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation, Arlington, VA: 

* Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, VA:
- Operations Directorate:
- Logistics Directorate:
- Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate:
- Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate:
- Force Structure Resources and Assessment Directorate: 

* U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL:
- Logistics Directorate, Requirements:
- Plans Directorate: 

* U.S. Air Force, Headquarters, Logistics, Expeditionary Equipment 
Division, Arlington, VA: 

* U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Logistics, Plans and Programs, 
Hampton, VA: 

* U.S. Air Force, U.S. Air Forces Central, Logistics, War Reserve 
Materiel, Sumter, SC: 

* U.S. Air Force, U.S. Air Forces Central, Logistics, War Reserve 
Materiel, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar: 

* U.S. Army Headquarters, Arlington VA:
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training, War Plans 
Division:
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics:
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development: 

* U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General: 

* U.S. Army Materiel Command, Army Prepositioned Stocks, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA: 

* U.S. Army Sustainment Command, Directorate for Army Prepositioned 
Stocks and Support Operations, Rock Island, IL: 

* U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Contracting Center, Rock 
Island, IL: 

* U.S. Army Sustainment Command, 2nd Battalion, 401st Army Field 
Support Brigade, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait: 

* U.S. Army Sustainment Command, 1st Battalion, 401st Army Field 
Support Brigade, Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar: 

* U.S. Army Strategic Logistics Activity, Goose Creek, SC: 

* U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency, Force Projection Directorate, 
Goose Creek, SC: 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Arlington VA:
- Logistics Plans and Operations, Installations and Logistics:
- Plans, Policies & Operations: 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, FL: 

* U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics Operations, 
Arlington, VA: 

* Naval Facilities Engineering Command Expeditionary Programs Office, 
Arlington, VA: 

* U.S. Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Financial Management & Comptroller, Arlington, VA: 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 through November 
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

November 20, 2010: 

Mr. William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
GA0-11-85C, DoD Prepositioned Stocks, dated October 18, 2010 (GAO Code 
351464). Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Nancy L. Spruill: 
Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis: 

Enclosures: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated October 18, 2010: 
GAO-11-85C (GAO Code 351464): 

"DOD Prepositioned Stocks" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: SecDef direct the Joint Staff (JS) and Services to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of Preposition (PREPO) programs 
to include: 

(1) Description, dollar value, and fill level of augmenting stocks. 

(2) All funding sources for PREPO programs, including working capital 
funds. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department will review the recommended 
additions to the report and determine the elements within each 
particular Service program that are appropriate to include in future 
reports. 

Recommendation 2: SecDef direct the JS J3 and J5 to provide 
information it reports as part of the Joint Forces Readiness Review 
(JFRR) including (1) A summary of all DoD plans requiring PREPO 
stocks, (2) Combatant Commands (COCOM) assessment of specific 
execution risk to plans from PREPO shortfalls, (3) Measures in place 
to mitigate risks from shortfalls, and (4) Assessment of extent 
mitigation measures reduce risk. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department will include relevant information
pertaining to prepositioned stocks it reports in the Joint Force 
Readiness Review and does not conflict with other risk/assessment 
reporting mechanisms. The Department already provides a comprehensive 
and more holistic approach to risk and mitigation strategies each year 
with its submission of the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA). The annual
CRA, submitted to the President and SecDef along with Presidential 
Budget Request to Congress, considers not only shortfalls in 
prepositioning programs, but also all factors relating to DoD 
readiness and strategy. Reporting additional risks and mitigation 
strategies for specific execution of concept plans using only 
prepositioning program shortfalls could result in sub-optimized 
decision making. 

Recommendation 3: SecDef direct USD(AT&L) to (1) Assess Global
Prepositioning Materiel Capabilities Working Group (GPMCWG or WG) 
assigned tasks and membership, (2) Clarify WG authority/reporting 
structure within DoD, and (3) Implement effective oversight of WG. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department is currently conducting multiple
prepositioning studies that have a high potential for significant 
change in structure and management of its prepositioning programs, the 
primary being the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (VCJCS) 
initiated SecDef Efficiency "Transforming Materiel Response 
Capabilities". The Department will assess the continued relevance of the
GPMCWG and make necessary adjustments to its role and responsibility 
based on the outcome of these studies The recommendation to include 
USD(P) as a core member of the GPMCWG has already been completed, and 
contact has been established to include a core member from JS J5 and 
an as needed representative from JS J3/Readiness. The Department will 
codify lines of authority and reporting between the WG and other DoD 
components, which are already established. Primary linkages include 
the Global Force Management Board, Joint Logistic Board, and Joint 
Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board. 

Recommendation 4: SecDef direct USD(P) to leverage expertise of GPMCWG
members and results of PREPO studies to develop The Guidance for the 
Development of the Force (GDF) that includes planning and prioritized 
needs for PREPO stocks. 

DOD Response: Concur. Current ongoing studies include the OSD(CAPE) 
"Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Study", SecDef 
Efficiencies Initiative "Transforming Materiel Response Capabilities", 
and US TRANSCOM/DLA study "Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan" due 
to be completed by August 2011. The Department will develop strategic 
direction concerning prepositioned stocks that best meet national 
defense objectives based on the results. 

Recommendation 5: SecDef direct the JS and Services to implement GDF 
with integrated DoD-wide management of PREPO assets across the 
department. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department will explore opportunities to 
integrate and synchronize DoD-wide prepositioning efforts using the 
results of the current ongoing studies. The studies were initiated to 
establish strategic guidance to manage prepositioned assets across the 
Department that lead to efficiencies and maximize effectiveness. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key 
contributions to this report include Grace A. Coleman, Rachel E. 
Dunsmoor, K. Nicole Harms, Oscar W. Mardis, Elizabeth D. Morris, Jason 
M. Pogacnik, David A. Schmitt, and Amie M. Steele. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of 
Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-427] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005). 

[2] Reconstitution includes the costs to clean, inspect, maintain, 
replace, and restore equipment to the required condition at the 
conclusion of a contingency operation or unit deployment. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 110-181, §352 (2008). 

[4] 10 U.S.C. §2229a. 

[5] 10 U.S.C. §2229a(b). 

[6] GAO, Defense Logistics: Department of Defense's Annual Report on 
the Status of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Enhanced to 
Better Inform Congress, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-147R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 
2008). 

[7] In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §153(d), the Chairman's Risk 
Assessment provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 
assessment of the strategic and military risks associated with 
executing the missions called for by U.S. military strategy. 

[8] GAO, Defense Logistics: Department of Defense's Annual Report on 
the Status of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Further 
Enhanced to Better Inform Congress, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-172R] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 
2009). 

[9] Department of Defense Instruction 3110.06, War Reserve Materiel 
(WRM) Policy (June 23, 2008). War reserve materiel is another term for 
prepositioned stocks. 

[10] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01B, Joint 
Strategic Planning System (Dec. 12, 2008). 

[11] A geographic combatant commander is a commander of one of the 
unified or specified combatant commands established by the President 
under 10 U.S.C. §161. Geographic combatant commands include U.S. 
Africa Command, CENTCOM, U.S. Europe Command, U.S. Northern Command, 
U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command. Section 164 of Title 
10 of the U.S. Code provides combatant commanders with the authority 
to organize commands and forces and employ forces as the combatant 
commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. 

[12] Apportionment is the distribution for planning of limited 
resources among competing requirements. The basis for apportionment is 
the capability provided by unit stocks, host-nation support, theater 
prepositioned war reserve stocks and industrial base, and DOD 
stockpiles in the U.S. and available production. Item apportionment 
cannot exceed total capabilities. 

[13] Contingency Plans are "potential" military actions and must be 
militarily and politically acceptable and feasible within resource 
constraints during the time period contemplated by the plan. They 
enable DOD to mitigate risk of "foreseeable" strategic challenges. In 
crises, the planning process is called crisis action planning. 

[14] The 2008 National Defense Strategy defines risk in terms of the 
potential for damage to national security combined with the 
probability of occurrence and a measurement of the consequences should 
the underlying risk remain unaddressed. 

[15] 10 U.S.C. §2229a, GAO-10-172R, GAO-09-147R. 

[16] 10 U.S.C. §2229a (a)(6). 

[17] According to the DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation, 
DOD 4140.1-R, AP1.1.11.7 (May 23, 2003), a major end item is a final 
combination of end products that is ready for its intended use. 

[18] Referred to as Tanks, Racks, Adapters, and Pylons. 

[19] A working capital fund relies on sales revenue rather than direct 
appropriations to finance its continuing operations. A working capital 
fund is intended to (1) generate sufficient resources to cover the 
full costs of its operations, and (2) operate on a break-even basis 
over time--that is, neither make a gain nor incur a loss. Customers 
use appropriated funds, primarily operations and maintenance 
appropriations, to finance orders placed with the working capital fund. 

[20] GAO, Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the 
Army's Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-354R] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 
2008). 

[21] 10 U.S.C. §2229a (a)(6). 

[22] Integrated Priority Lists define shortfalls in key programs that 
can affect the capability to achieve the combatant commander's 
assigned mission. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-172R]. 

[24] We did not assess the sufficiency of these measures. 

[25] DOD publishes its Joint Force Readiness Review quarterly to 
provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a baseline of DOD 
readiness, including critical shortfalls. 

[26] We did not assess the sufficiency of the day-to-day actions taken 
by the combatant commands in mitigating the impact, if any, resulting 
from shortfalls in prepositioned stocks. 

[27] 10 U.S.C. §2229a. 

[28] Department of Defense Instruction 3110.06, War Reserve Materiel 
(WRM) Policy (June 23, 2008). 

[29] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01B, Joint 
Strategic Planning System (Dec. 12, 2008). 

[30] Global Defense Posture includes forces, footprint, and 
agreements, and includes prepositioned stocks as part of the United 
States' global footprint. Each geographic combatant commander develops 
an annual theater posture plan, which identifies gaps between posture 
demands and the current defense posture. These plans also identify 
posture initiatives to fill these gaps. The Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has overall responsibility for 
developing DOD's global posture. 

[31] 10 U.S.C. §§3013, 5013 and 8013. 

[32] Time-phased force deployment data include the specific units to 
be deployed in support of a plan, the movement requirements such as 
airlift and sealift needed for these forces and their equipment, and 
the timeline for the movements. 

[33] Defense Planning Scenarios identify critical mid-and longer-term 
challenges that DOD, with interagency and foreign partners, must be 
prepared to handle. 

[34] The Senior Warfighting Forum includes the 10 geographic and 
functional combatant commands, as well as representatives from each of 
the four services, the Joint Staff, Military Sealift Command, the 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Surface 
Deployment and Distribution Command. 

[35] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[36] The Global Posture Executive Council is co-chaired by the Office 
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy. 

[37] Institute for Defense Analyses, Collocating the Army and Marine 
Corps Afloat Prepositioning Maintenance Sites at Charleston, South 
Carolina and Blount Island, Florida, IDA Paper P-3354, Alexandria, VA 
(August 1998). 

[38] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[End of section] 

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