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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee 
on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

May 2011: 

Defense Acquisition: 

DOD Should Clarify Requirements for Assessing and Documenting 
Technical-Data Needs: 

GAO-11-469: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-469, a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Some of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) weapon systems remain in the 
inventory for decades. Therefore, decisions that program officials 
make during the acquisition process to acquire or not acquire rights 
to technical data, which may cost $1 billion, can have far-reaching 
implications for DOD’s ability to sustain and competitively procure 
parts and services for those systems. DOD needs access to technical 
data to control costs, maintain flexibility in acquisition and 
sustainment, and maintain and operate systems. In response to a 
congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which: (1) DOD has 
updated its acquisition and procurement policies to reflect a 2007 law 
and 2006 GAO recommendations; (2) selected acquisition programs 
adhered to requirements to document technical-data needs; and (3) DOD 
took actions to improve technical-data decisions by program managers. 
GAO interviewed DOD officials, reviewed acquisition strategies and 
acquisition plans from 12 programs, and compared those documents to 
relevant DOD policies. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD updated its acquisition and procurement policies to require that 
acquisition program managers document their long-term technical-data 
needs in a manner that reflects a 2007 law and GAO’s 2006 
recommendations. Together these policies require documentation of: (1) 
an assessment of technical-data requirements, (2) the merits of a “
priced-contract option” that enables DOD to obtain additional 
technical data that it did not acquire in its initial contract, (3) 
the contractor’s responsibility to verify its assertions of limits to 
DOD’s ability to use the technical data, and (4) the potential for 
changes in the system’s sustainment plan. According to DOD officials, 
these policy updates do not require changes to the way program 
managers assess technical-data needs. 

Sampled acquisition programs partially addressed the four updated 
technical-data-documentation requirements. Ten of the 12 programs GAO 
reviewed addressed at least 1 of the 4 requirements in their 
acquisition strategies and acquisition plans; however, none of the 
programs addressed all 4 of the requirements. Specifically, 9 of the 
12 strategies documented an assessment of their technical-data 
requirements. For example, the strategy for a Navy communications 
system stated that the program planned to obtain technical data and 
associated rights to sustain the system over its life cycle and allow 
for competitive procurement of future systems. In contrast, 3 of the 
12 strategies documented the contractor’s responsibility to verify its 
assertions of limits to DOD’s ability to use the technical data. Each 
of the three strategies noted that the program planned to include a 
clause in its contracts that identifies the contractor’s 
responsibilities. 

DOD has issued guides-—that are voluntary for the program managers to 
use-—to improve technical-data decision-making. These guides may help 
program managers with decisions and documentation on technical data. 
However, DOD technical-data policies remain unclear. Effective 
internal controls help organizations implement their directives. GAO 
found that, because DOD has not issued clarifications to its policy, 
DOD policies that require documentation of long-term technical-data 
needs are unclear. As a result, acquisition strategies have not always 
documented required information on technical data—a point the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics recently emphasized. Because of the ambiguity in the 
policies, DOD’s ability to implement effective internal control over 
those policies is limited. Moreover, DOD recently added a requirement 
that program managers conduct a business-case analysis for systems’ 
long-term technical-data needs. However, DOD has not issued policy or 
other internal controls that describe how to conduct this analysis. 
GAO has previously reported that the military services inconsistently 
completed similar business-case analyses because DOD had not issued 
instructions on how to conduct them. Without instructions that 
describe how to conduct the business-case analysis, senior acquisition 
decision makers may not receive the information they need to decide 
whether to approve programs at major milestones in the acquisition 
process. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD (1) update policies to clarify its technical-
data documentation requirements and (2) instruct program managers on 
the elements to include and the information to report for technical-
data business-case analyses. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-469] or key 
components. For more information, contact Jack E. Edwards at (202) 512-
8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD Created Requirements to Document Long-Term Technical-Data Needs: 

Selected Programs Partially Addressed the Updated Requirements to 
Document Long-Term Technical-Data Needs: 

DOD Issued Guides to Improve Technical-Data Decision Making, but 
Technical-Data Policy Requirements Remain Unclear: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: DOD's Implementation of Technical-Data Requirements Cited 
in Recent Legislation and DOD Audit Agencies' Report Recommendations: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Organizations Interviewed to Obtain Information Related to 
Technical Data for this Report: 

Table 2: Technical Data-Related Requirements from the Duncan Hunter 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and DOD's 
Responses as of March 2011: 

Table 3: Army and Air Force Audit Agencies' Recommendations in 
Technical-Data-Related Reports and the Military Departments' Responses 
as of March 2011: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The Four Phases of the Technical-Data Acquisition Process: 

Figure 2: Results of GAO's Evaluations of Selected Acquisition 
Programs' Documentation of Technical-Data Assessments: 

Abbreviations: 

ACAT: Acquisition Category: 

DFARS: Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 11, 2011: 

The Honorable Rob Wittman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jim Cooper: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) needs access to technical data related 
to its weapon systems in order to control costs and maintain 
flexibility in the acquisition and sustainment of those weapon 
systems. Technical data--recorded information used to produce, 
support, maintain, or operate a system[Footnote 1]--can enable the 
government to complete maintenance work in house, as well as to 
competitively award contracts for the acquisition and sustainment of a 
weapon system. Because many systems remain in DOD's inventory for 
decades, decisions that officials make during the acquisition process 
to acquire or not acquire rights to technical data can have far-
reaching implications for DOD's ability to sustain the systems and 
competitively procure parts and services. Weapon systems are costly to 
sustain in part because they often incorporate technologically complex 
subsystems and components and need expensive spare parts and logistics 
support to meet required readiness levels. According to DOD, at least 
70 percent of a weapon system's life-cycle costs are incurred to 
operate and support a weapon system after it has been acquired, with 
the percentage depending on how long a system remains in the inventory. 

Since 2002, we have issued several reports that address technical 
data.[Footnote 2] For example, we reported in 2006 that a number of 
fielded Army and Air Force systems encountered limitations in 
sustainment options because the military services lacked needed 
technical-data rights. In the 2006 report, we recommended that DOD 
require program managers to assess long-term technical-data needs and 
establish corresponding acquisition strategies that provide for the 
technical-data rights needed to sustain weapon systems over their life 
cycles. More recently, we reported in 2010 that the government's lack 
of access to proprietary technical data, among other things, limits--
or even precludes the possibility of--competition for DOD weapons 
programs. 

Congress has also highlighted the importance of technical data in the 
defense acquisition process. For example, section 802 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 includes a requirement 
that the Secretary of Defense direct program managers for major weapon 
systems to assess their systems' long-term technical-data needs. 
[Footnote 3] The act also requires that the Secretary direct program 
managers to develop corresponding acquisition strategies that provide 
for the technical-data needs to sustain their systems throughout their 
life cycle. Similarly, Congress passed the Weapon System Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009, which required in part that the Secretary of 
Defense is to ensure the acquisition strategy for each major defense- 
acquisition program includes measures to ensure competition, or the 
option of competition, in contracts for the program throughout its 
life cycle.[Footnote 4] The act cited the acquisition of complete 
technical-data packages as one option for promoting competition. 

In response to your request, this report addresses the extent to which 
(1) DOD has updated its acquisition and procurement policies to 
reflect certain technical-data-related provisions of the 2007 National 
Defense Authorization Act and GAO's 2006 recommendations aimed at 
assessments of long-term technical-data needs;[Footnote 5] (2) 
selected defense acquisition programs have adhered to the updated 
requirements in DOD policy to document their systems' long-term 
technical-data needs; and (3) DOD has taken actions to improve 
decision making by program managers on the long-term technical-data 
needs for systems in its acquisition process.[Footnote 6] 

To evaluate the extent to which DOD updated its acquisition and 
procurement policies to reflect certain technical-data-related 
provisions of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act and GAO's 
2006 recommendations, we analyzed the act and our prior 
recommendations. We identified and evaluated changes the department 
made to its acquisition and procurement policies since the 2007 act. 
We used information from our evaluation of these policies in the 
analyses we conducted for each of our objectives. We also reviewed 
follow-up records maintained by DOD and GAO that document actions the 
department had taken in response to audit recommendations. To evaluate 
the extent to which selected defense-acquisition programs have adhered 
to the requirements in DOD policy to document their system's long-term 
technical-data needs, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 12 
programs out of about 50 programs subject to the requirements outlined 
in DOD acquisition and procurement policies. Our sample included Army, 
Navy[Footnote 7], and Air Force programs in the two highest-value 
acquisition categories[Footnote 8] that reached major milestones 
[Footnote 9] in the defense acquisition process from September 2007 to 
August 2010. In addition, findings from our sample are not 
generalizable to all DOD acquisition programs, although the variety of 
circumstances that the programs in our sample face illustrates 
important aspects of documenting a system's long-term technical-data 
needs. We obtained key acquisition documents--the acquisition strategy 
and acquisition plan--from the programs in our sample that reflect the 
technical-data needs of the system. Two team members concurrently 
conducted independent analyses of the same acquisition documents for 
each program comparing the documents against relevant criteria from 
DOD pol[Footnote 10]icy. We then compared the two sets of observations 
and reconciled any differences with the assistance of a third analyst, 
when necessary. We provided our preliminary observations of the 
documents to officials in each program and considered additional 
information they provided when our observations indicated that the 
program documents had not addressed one or more of the requirements. 
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has taken actions to improve 
technical-data decision making, we reviewed documentation including 
the November 2010 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics memorandum, Implementation Directive for 
Better Buying Power-Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 
Defense Spending, as well as guidelines on technical data that the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, which is part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), and each of the military departments recently issued. For each 
of our objectives, we also interviewed officials in a variety of 
relevant organizations including the OSD, the acquisition headquarters 
office in each of the military departments, and the 12 acquisition 
programs in our sample. During these interviews, we obtained 
perspectives from officials and documentation such as acquisition 
strategies and acquisition plans from each of the programs in our 
sample. We also assessed the reliability of all of the data that we 
discuss in this report by reviewing relevant documentation and 
interviewing knowledgeable officials. We found the data sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to May 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discuss our 
scope and methodology in more detail in appendix I. 

Background: 

DOD program managers obtain technical data and technical-data rights 
to enable the department to acquire and sustain weapon systems at the 
lowest cost, to provide flexibility in future acquisition and 
sustainment of systems and subsystems, and to maintain those systems. 
DOD may obtain different levels of rights to technical data including 
unlimited rights, government-purpose rights, and limited rights. If 
DOD obtains unlimited rights to technical data, it may provide the 
data to anyone for any reason. However, if DOD obtains government-
purpose rights, it may provide the data to third-party contractors 
only for activities in which the U.S. government is a party, including 
competitive reprocurement, but not including commercial purposes. 
Further, if DOD obtains limited rights, it may only use the data 
internally and may provide the data to third parties in a limited 
number of circumstances (e.g., emergency repair and overhaul.) 
Moreover, DOD and contractor maintenance personnel need technical data 
and technical-data rights in order to maintain, repair, and upgrade 
weapon systems throughout the life cycle of the systems. 

The Process to Acquire Technical Data: 

The process that DOD program officials follow to acquire technical 
data and technical-data rights for systems includes four general 
phases with multiple steps in each phase. In this report, we evaluated 
aspects of the first phase of this process (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: The Four Phases of the Technical-Data Acquisition Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Requirements, Strategies, and Plans: 
Program officials determine the long-term technical data and 
associated rights needs for their systems and document those needs in 
the program's acquisition strategy and acquisition plan. 

Contracting: 
Program officials specify technical data requirements in solicitations 
issued to contractors. Contractors’ proposals assert any restrictions 
on DOD’s rights to technical data needed to produce a system. Program 
officials review and evaluate proposals, identify areas of 
disagreement, and may challenge contractors’ assertions. 

Performance and Delivery: 
When contractors produce the system, they may assert some additional 
restrictions to technical data rights, which DOD may challenge. 
Contractors mark all data they deliver to DOD with the appropriate 
level of rights, and DOD reviews and evaluates these marks for 
consistency with DOD policies and agreements in the contract. 

Post-Performance and Sustainment: 
DOD may realize if it has acquired the needed data and rights when it 
sustains its systems. DOD uses data and rights to maintain, repair, 
and solicit for sustainment contracts for its systems. DOD may 
challenge data rights markings within 3 years of contract completion. 
DOD may also exercise options for additional rights and data that it 
did not initially acquire if this option is provided for in the 
contract. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation. 

Note: Although this process we illustrate in this figure focuses on 
technical data and technical-data rights, DOD officials stated that 
they also use most of the same process to acquire computer software 
and computer software documentation with some exceptions. 

[End of figure] 

* Requirements, strategies, and plans phase: Program officials assess 
the long-term technical data and technical-data rights requirements 
for their system and then document those requirements in an 
acquisition strategy and an acquisition plan for their system. To 
assess a system's technical-data requirements, program officials 
determine which components DOD will need technical data for and the 
level of rights to seek for those data.[Footnote 11] Program officials 
consider several factors in their assessment, such as the government's 
cost for the rights to the data, sustainment plans, re-procurement 
needs, and contractors' economic interest. Once program officials 
complete their assessment, they record the technical-data requirements 
in a data-management strategy that is included in the acquisition 
strategy, a document that is required by DOD Instruction 5000.02. They 
also include similar documentation in the acquisition plan, which is 
required by the DFARS. The acquisition strategy describes the overall 
approach for managing and planning for the program, while the 
acquisition plan describes the program's contracting approach. 
[Footnote 12] The program manager then submits these documents to 
senior department officials to review and approve at certain major 
milestones in the defense acquisition process. 

* Contracting phase: Program officials specify the approved technical- 
data requirements in solicitations they issue to contractors. These 
solicitations describe the capability requirements for a system that 
the government intends to acquire. Contractors then submit proposals 
to DOD in which they describe the system that they would build to 
provide the required capability. In the proposals, contractors also 
discuss technical-data issues. For example, if a contractor desires to 
assert restrictions on DOD's ability to use any of the technical data 
needed to manufacture or sustain the system, the contractor asserts 
those restrictions in its proposal. Program officials then review and 
evaluate the contractors' proposals using criteria included in the 
solicitation. Officials evaluate any asserted restrictions on DOD's 
use of technical data to identify areas of disagreement that the 
department should resolve through negotiations or other procedures in 
accordance with applicable law.[Footnote 13] DOD officials then award 
a contract. 

* Performance and delivery phase: During this phase, the selected 
contractor begins producing the system and may assert additional 
restrictions to technical-data rights in certain circumstances. For 
example, the contractor may assert new restrictions if the department 
modifies its system requirements or if the contractor inadvertently 
omitted a restriction during the contracting phase. DOD officials may 
also challenge these additional asserted restrictions. Contractors 
mark all technical data they deliver to the government with a level of 
rights (e.g., government purpose or limited rights). In addition, 
program officials review these markings to ensure that the contractor 
has identified them in a manner that is consistent with DOD policies 
and the agreement in the contract. 

* Post-performance and sustainment phase: In this phase, the 
contractor has delivered a system to DOD. DOD officials may realize 
during post-performance and sustainment whether they have acquired the 
necessary technical data and technical-data rights during the 
sustainment phase. When sustaining systems, DOD personnel may use 
technical data for critical functions including maintaining and 
repairing systems. Any new technical data and technical-data rights 
that would be needed for any support contracts during sustainment 
phase would need to be acquired. Program officials also may challenge 
the level of rights that the contractor asserted for any delivered 
technical data that is used to produce the system for up to 3 years 
after final payment under the contract or three years after delivery 
of the data, whichever is later.[Footnote 14] Program officials may 
also exercise options to obtain additional rights and data that the 
department did not acquire during the performance and delivery phase 
if DOD and the contractor had included a provision in the contract 
called a "priced-contract option." 

Prior GAO and Defense Audit Agencies' Work on Technical Data: 

For nearly a decade, we and the military-service audit agencies have 
conducted reviews that included information on DOD's acquisition of 
technical data and technical-data rights for systems in the 
acquisition process. In February 2002, we reported that DOD officials 
expressed concern that they did not have affordable technical data to 
develop additional or new sources of repair and maintenance to ensure 
a competitive market.[Footnote 15] Subsequently, we reported in August 
2004 that DOD program managers often opt to spend limited acquisition 
dollars on increased weapon system capability rather than on acquiring 
the rights to the technical data--thus limiting their flexibility to 
perform maintenance work in house or to support alternate source 
development should contractual arrangements fail.[Footnote 16] We 
subsequently reported in July 2006 that the Army and the Air Force 
encountered limitations in their sustainment options for some fielded- 
weapon systems because they lacked technical-data rights.[Footnote 17] 
More recently, we reported in 2010 that the government's lack of 
access to proprietary technical data, among other things, limits--or 
even precludes the possibility of--competition for DOD weapons 
programs.[Footnote 18] 

Additionally, the Air Force and Army audit agencies have reported on 
issues related to the acquisition of technical data and technical-data 
rights. For example, in May 2009, the Air Force Audit Agency reported 
that Air Force program officials had not effectively implemented OSD 
and Air Force initiatives to improve the management and acquisition of 
technical-data rights and had not satisfied technical-data assessment 
requirements.[Footnote 19] Similarly, the Army Audit Agency reported 
in July 2009 that (1) Army policies on technical-data assessments and 
documentation were not incorporated into Army regulations and (2) the 
Army acquisition workforce had not received training on assessing and 
managing technical data and technical-data rights requirements and as 
a result did not consistently address technical data and technical-
data rights requirements.[Footnote 20] We provide more detail in 
appendix II about the recommendations in these audit agency reports 
and the services' responses. 

DOD Created Requirements to Document Long-Term Technical-Data Needs: 

DOD updated its acquisition and procurement policies, in a manner that 
reflects a 2007 legislative provision and our 2006 recommendations, to 
require that acquisition program managers document their long-term 
technical-data needs. According to DOD officials, these policy updates 
do not change the requirements program managers must follow that to 
decide what technical data or technical-data rights to acquire for 
their systems. 

Section 802 of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act required 
the Secretary of Defense to direct program managers for major weapon 
systems--and subsystems of major weapon systems--to assess the long- 
term technical-data needs of their systems and establish strategies 
providing for the technical-data rights needed to sustain the systems 
over their life cycles. The 2007 act required, among other things, 
that the strategies developed in accordance with the section address: 

* the merits of a priced contract option for the future delivery of 
technical data that were not acquired upon initial contract award, and: 

* the potential for changes in the sustainment plan over the life 
cycle of the system. 

We had previously recommended that DOD establish these requirements 
for program managers in our July 2006 report.[Footnote 21] We 
recommended these actions after finding that a lack of technical-data 
rights limited the flexibilities of the Army and Air Force to make 
changes to sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems. We also 
found that delaying action in acquiring technical-data rights can make 
these data cost-prohibitive or difficult to obtain later in a weapon 
system's life cycle. 

DOD took a series of actions to change its acquisition and procurement 
policies in a manner that reflects the language of the 2007 act and 
our 2006 recommendations. As a result of these actions, program 
managers are now required to record their long-term technical-data 
needs in two key acquisition program documents: the acquisition 
strategy and acquisition plan. Initially, OSD issued a memorandum in 
July 2007 requiring program managers for systems in the two highest-
value acquisition categories (ACAT I and II) to assess the long-term 
technical-data needs for their systems and document a corresponding 
strategy for technical data in each program's acquisition strategy. 
[Footnote 22] DOD later included this policy change in the December 
2008 update of its acquisition policy, DOD Instruction 5000.02. In a 
separate action, DOD issued an interim rule in September 2007 amending 
the DFARS. This rule also requires program managers to assess the long-
term technical-data needs for their systems and document a 
corresponding strategy in each program's acquisition plan. DOD 
finalized the interim rule in December 2009. [Footnote 23] Together 
these policy changes required that strategies and plans for major 
acquisition programs:[Footnote 24] 

1. assess the data required to design, manufacture, and sustain the 
system as well as to support re-competition for production, 
sustainment, or upgrade; 

2. address the merits of including a priced contract option for future 
delivery of data not initially acquired; 

3. consider the contractor's responsibility to verify any assertion of 
restricted use and release of data; and: 

4. address the potential for changes in the sustainment plan over the 
life cycle of the weapon system or subsystem. 

OSD officials told us that these policy updates do not change the 
requirements program managers must follow to decide what technical 
data or technical-data rights to acquire for their systems. They also 
told us that the only new requirement was that program managers 
include documentation of their system's long-term technical-data needs 
in acquisition strategies and acquisition plans. Moreover, OSD and 
each military department have issued guides for program managers that 
elaborate on the requirements in DOD policy assessing long-term 
technical-data needs and the updated requirement to document those 
needs in acquisition strategies and acquisition plans. We discuss 
these guides in more detail later in this report. 

Selected Programs Partially Addressed the Updated Requirements to 
Document Long-Term Technical-Data Needs: 

The documentation we reviewed for 12 acquisition programs partially 
addressed the revised DOD policies on long-term technical-data needs. 
We evaluated these programs' acquisition strategies and acquisition 
plans against four criteria identified in the revised technical-data 
policies (described earlier in more detail). These policies require 
programs to document (1) an assessment of technical-data requirements, 
(2) the merits of a priced-contract option, (3) the contractor's 
responsibility to verify assertions of limited data rights, and (4) 
the potential for changes in the system's sustainment plan. We 
examined program acquisition strategies for the first three 
requirements. We reviewed program acquisition plans for the fourth 
requirement because the requirement was not included in the revised 
acquisition policy that governs acquisition strategies but was 
included in the procurement-policy update, which governs acquisition 
plans. 

As a part of our review, we did not consider the amount or level of 
quality of the information that the acquisition strategies and 
acquisition plans included in response to each requirement because 
DOD's policies did not specify the minimum levels or types of 
information that program officials are required to include to satisfy 
each of the four requirements. Programs in our sample included varying 
amounts of information in response to each requirement they addressed. 
For example, one acquisition strategy contained a 95-page appendix on 
technical-data management while another contained three paragraphs 
focusing on technical data. If a strategy or plan included any 
discussion of a requirement, we determined that the strategy or plan 
addressed that requirement, regardless of the level of detail. 

Figure 2 summarizes the results of our analysis and shows that 10 of 
the 12 programs that we evaluated addressed at least one of the 4 
requirements in their documentation, and 4 addressed as many as 3 
requirements. However, none of the programs addressed all four of the 
requirements in its documentation, and two did not address any of the 
requirements. 

Figure 2: Results of GAO's Evaluations of Selected Acquisition 
Programs' Documentation of Technical-Data Assessments: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Air Force: 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Small Diameter Bomb II (I, 
B): A bomb that enables multiple fighter aircraft, such as the F-35, 
to attack mobile targets in adverse weather; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): C-130 Avionics 
Modernization Program (I, C): An upgrade that replaces and enhances 
multiple aviation electronics systems, including communication, 
navigation, and surveillance, for the intra-theater airlift aircraft; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Not addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): F-16 Operational Flight 
Program M6/M6+ (II, B): An upgrade that replaces and enhances multiple 
aviation electronics systems — including communication, navigation, 
and surveillance — for the intra-theater airlift aircraft; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Not addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Not addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): B-1 Bomber Radar 
Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program (II, C): A 
replacement of the transmitter and signal processor within the long-
range bomber’s radar system and supporting software conversion; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Not addressed. 

Army: 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Guided Multiple Launch 
Rocket System Alternative Warhead (I, A): A replacement warhead used 
on multiple Army rockets that is designed to reduce the risk of 
unexploded ordnance; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Not addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Not addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense (I, B): An air-and missile-defense system with a central 
network and modular components; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Extended Range Multi-
Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System (I, C): An armed, unmanned aircraft 
with associated ground-based equipment for missions including 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Joint Battle Command-
Platform (II, B): An upgrade to a combat command and control system 
consisting of software and some associated hardware components; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Not addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: N/A[B]. 

Navy: 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Joint High Speed Vessel (I, 
B): A high-speed, shallow-draft vessel for rapid intra-theater 
transport of personnel and cargo; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Navy Multiband Terminal (I, 
C): A maritime military satellite terminal designed to enhance secure 
communications; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: N/A[B]. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): Surface Electronic Warfare 
Improvement Program Block II (II, B): An upgrade to the surface 
electronic warfare capability for ships’ combat systems to provide 
improved anti-ship missile defense and situational awareness; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Not addressed. 

Program (acquisition category, milestone): E-6B Take Charge and Move 
Out Block I Modification (II, C): An upgrade that replaces 
communications, avionics, and command and control systems in the 
airborne strategic command aircraft; 
Assessment of technical data requirements: Addressed; 
Merits of a priced contract option: Not addressed; 
Contractor’s responsibility to verify data assertions[A]: Not 
addressed; 
Sustainment potential for changes: Not addressed. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD policy and program documentation. 

[A] Although three programs documented their consideration of the 
contractor's responsibility to verify assertions of restricted use and 
release of technical data, a number of programs included information 
addressing the program office's efforts or responsibility to verify 
contractor's assertions of restricted use and release of technical 
data. 

[B] These two programs were not yet subject to the requirement because 
they had not updated their acquisition plans subsequent to the policy 
change. 

[End of figure] 

Assessments of technical-data requirements: Nine of the 12 acquisition 
strategies documented an assessment of the data required to design, 
manufacture, and sustain the system as well as support re-competition 
for production, sustainment, or upgrade of the system, for example: 

* The Integrated Air and Missile Defense strategy included an appendix 
that, among other things, stated that the program office would require 
delivery of sufficient data to completely describe and define the 
functional and physical characteristics of the system for 
manufacturing, and it also provided a list of required types of data. 

* The strategy for the Navy Multiband Terminal stated that the program 
manager had "assessed the long-term technical-data needs" of the 
system and "established acquisition strategies that provide for 
technical data" and "associated license rights needed to sustain [the 
systems] over their life cycle and allow for competitive procurement 
of future terminals." 

* The three strategies that did not address the requirement did not 
identify any required data. 

Merits of a priced-contract option: Four of the 12 acquisition 
strategies discussed the merits of a priced contract option--an option 
to obtain additional data and rights that the program did not acquire 
during the contracting phase, for example: 

* The Small Diameter Bomb II strategy stated that the contract "will 
contain a priced contract option…for a one-time delivery of a 
technical-data package" that would consist of data "that describes the 
design, support, test, and maintenance" of the system, and the models, 
simulation and analysis used to predict its performance. 

* The strategy for the Joint High Speed Vessel stated that due to "the 
non-developmental nature of the program, a priced [contract] option…
was not considered a cost-effective use of government funds." 

* The eight other strategies did not discuss the merits of a priced 
contract option for technical data. 

Contractor's responsibility to verify data assertions: Three of the 12 
acquisition strategies referred to the contractor's responsibility to 
verify any assertion that the contractor made to restrict the 
government's use and release of any technical data. Each of the three 
strategies noted that the program planned to include a clause in its 
contracts that identifies the contractor's responsibility to provide 
sufficient information to the government's contracting officers to 
enable them to evaluate the contractor's assertions. While nine 
strategies did not discuss the contractor's responsibility to verify 
assertions of restricted use and release of technical data or mention 
the contract clause, a number of these strategies discussed the 
program office's efforts or responsibility to verify contractor 
assertions of restricted use and release of data. For example, the B-1 
Bomber Radar Reliability and Maintainability strategy discussed the 
program office's efforts to verify the contractor's assertion of 
restricted use and release of data. 

Potential for sustainment changes: Four acquisition plans addressed 
the potential for changes in the system's sustainment plan over its 
life cycle, and the acquisition plans for two other programs were not 
subject to this requirement, for example: 

* The Joint High Speed Vessel acquisition plan stated that the 
"potential for changes in the sustainment plan is small." 

* Two of the 12 programs in our sample were not subject to this 
requirement. The requirement did not apply to the Joint Battle Command-
Platform and Navy Multiband Terminal because both programs developed 
acquisition plans prior to the September 2007 procurement policy 
change on technical data and neither was required to update its plan. 
Addressing the potential for changes in the system's sustainment plan 
over its life cycle is required for acquisition plans developed or 
updated after DOD's 2007 revision to its procurement policy. [Footnote 
25] 

* The six acquisition plans that did not address this requirement did 
not discuss the potential for future changes in the sustainment plan 
as they relate to technical-data needs. 

Later in the report, we note that (1) a cause for the partially 
addressed documentation is ambiguity in DOD's revised policies and (2) 
this ambiguity results in limits to department decision makers' 
ability to exercise effective internal control in their reviews of 
acquisition documentation, which may result in delays in the 
acquisition process. Because these issues are related to a similar 
ambiguity in another technical-data policy, we provide a more detailed 
discussion of the causes and effects for both types of problematic 
outcomes later in this report. In the next section of our report, we 
describe OSD and military department guides that discuss additional 
voluntary steps the program managers may take for conducting and 
documenting assessments of long-term technical-data needs. These 
guides may result in acquisition documentation that is more responsive 
to DOD's revised policies. However, most of the guides we describe 
were issued after most of the acquisition documentation we reviewed 
was approved. 

DOD Issued Guides to Improve Technical-Data Decision Making, but 
Technical-Data Policy Requirements Remain Unclear: 

DOD and Military Departments Issued Guides to Improve Program 
Managers' Technical-Data-Related Decisions: 

OSD and each military department have issued several guides for 
program managers that elaborate on the requirements in DOD policy for 
conducting and documenting assessments of long-term technical-data 
needs. From December 2009 through December 2010, DOD and the military 
departments issued guides covering voluntary actions that program 
managers might take to improve their decisions related to technical 
data. While officials in DOD and the military departments told us that 
program officials have found the various DOD-wide and military 
department-specific guides useful, program managers are not required 
to follow any of the recommendations contained in the guides. 

In December 2009, OSD updated the Web-based Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook to elaborate on the new requirements for program managers to 
document the long-term technical-data needs for their systems. The DOD-
wide guidebook now includes topics that OSD recommends that program 
managers discuss in their acquisition strategy documenting the 
system's long-term technical-data needs. For example, the guidebook 
recommends that for data acquired to support competition, the program 
manager document the (1) logic applied to select the technical data 
and technical-data rights, (2) alternative solutions considered, and 
(3) criteria used to decide what, if any, data to procure. 

Subsequent to the changes in the DOD-wide guidebook, the military 
departments provided their own additional guides. The Air Force 
Program Management and Acquisition Excellence Office in December 2010 
issued an update to a guide for program managers that includes 
recommended steps to follow when determining a system's long-term 
technical-data needs and documenting those needs in a data-management 
strategy.[Footnote 26] For example, the guide suggests that program 
managers consider whether Air Force depot officials agree that the 
technical data and technical-data rights that the program intends to 
acquire for the system are sufficient to enable depot-level 
maintenance. Later, in October 2010, the Air Force's Product Data 
Acquisition Team launched a technical-data-focused Web site that 
includes some of the same information contained in the earlier Air 
Force guide and additional information. For example, the Web site asks 
program managers if the technical-data rights that program managers 
intend to acquire enable the Air Force to support competition for 
contracts for spare parts, equipment to upgrade to a system, and 
logistics support.[Footnote 27] 

The Army's Product Data and Engineering Working Group in August 2010 
published a 68-page guide that describes steps it recommends program 
officials take to assess a system's long-term technical-data needs and 
document those needs in a data-management strategy.[Footnote 28] The 
Army's guide contains a work sheet that provides program managers with 
a systematic approach to assess their technical-data needs. For 
example, for each component of a system, the worksheet prompts program 
managers to consider the (1) level of rights required, (2) expected 
levels of rights the Army will acquire in negotiations with a 
manufacturer, (3) any gaps between the requirements and expected 
negotiated outcomes, (4) plans to close any gaps, and (5) risks 
associated with those plans. 

The Navy in June 2010 published a set of guidelines that it recommends 
program managers follow when they determine their systems' technical- 
data rights. The Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team included 
these guidelines in an appendix to a contracting guidebook.[Footnote 
29] Like the Air Force and Army resources, the appendix lists 
questions that the team recommends program managers consider when 
conducting a technical-data rights assessment. For example, the 
appendix asks whether the government will obtain government-purpose 
rights at a minimum for a system and asks for a justification for 
agreeing to more restrictive rights than government purpose rights. 

In addition to these department-level guides, some subordinate 
commands within military departments have issued guidance on technical-
data assessments. For example, Air Force Materiel Command issued a 
handbook on technical-data rights in May 2010, while the Air Force's 
Space and Missile Systems Center issued the third edition of a similar 
guide in January 2011. By issuing their own guidance, these 
subordinate commands are able to focus on issues of technical data 
particular to the command in question. 

Required Policies on Technical-Data Assessments Remain Unclear: 

While OSD and each of the military departments took actions to help 
program managers prepare technical-data assessments, DOD has not 
clarified ambiguities in the required technical-data policies to 
ensure their full implementation. Specifically, DOD has not clarified 
how program offices should address the requirement for documenting 
technical-data assessments, and has not clarified a recent requirement 
to conduct a business-case analysis on technical-data needs. Without 
internal controls such as clear instructions on how to respond to 
these policies, DOD and the military departments risk incomplete and 
inconsistent actions and documentation in response to the technical- 
data requirements. According to standards for internal control, 
[Footnote 30] implementing effective internal controls is a key factor 
that helps organizations ensure that management's directives are 
carried out. Examples of internal control actions that management can 
take include issuing policies or instructions that enforce 
management's directives. 

Revised Technical-Data Policy Requirements Are Unclear: 

We found that the revisions to DOD's acquisition and procurement 
policies, which require acquisition program managers to document their 
long-term technical-data needs, are unclear. For example, the revised 
DOD Instruction 5000.02 requires program managers to document an 
assessment of long-term technical-data requirements for their systems. 
However, the policy does not clearly state the level of detail program 
managers are required to document, or the extent to which they should 
document their reasoning for acquiring or not acquiring technical data 
and technical-data rights. Likewise, the DFARS requires programs to 
address in program documentation the potential for changes in the 
sustainment plan over the system's life.[Footnote 31] However, the 
policy does not make clear what information DOD expects to be provided 
in documentation of possible future changes to a system's sustainment 
plan (for example, underlying assumptions), and how this information 
should relate to the technical-data discussion. Our previously 
discussed evaluation of 12 acquisition strategies and plans--most of 
which were approved before OSD and the military departments issued 
their voluntary guides--showed that program managers may not fully 
understand how to respond to these revised policies. As we noted, we 
found that eight of the 12 acquisition strategies and plans we 
reviewed addressed no more than two of the four requirements (see fig. 
2). 

OSD had not issued an update to the DOD Instruction 5000.02 or the 
DFARS as of April 2011 to clarify what programs specifically need to 
do to address the assessments of technical data. OSD officials 
acknowledged to us that the policies could be rewritten for greater 
clarity, and they pointed out ambiguities in some of the requirements. 
For example, they told us that the assessment of technical-data 
requirement is unclear. The officials told us that if they had the 
opportunity, they would clarify the requirement to state that program 
managers (1) assess the data that are needed to re-compete for 
production, sustainment, or upgrade, and (2) determine what, if any, 
of that technical data the program requires. 

Ambiguity in the revised policies results in limits to department 
decision makers' ability to exercise effective internal control in 
their reviews of acquisition documentation. Without clear policies on 
documenting long-term technical-data needs, program managers may not 
understand how to respond and, as a result, may continue to submit 
incomplete acquisition documentation. Without complete documentation, 
senior level department decision makers are limited in their ability 
to carry out their internal control responsibilities to ensure that 
programs are aligned with department policies and priorities. An 
August 2010 memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics called attention to 
this limitation stating that recent acquisition strategies often did 
not include sufficient detail on topics including technical-data 
requirements. The memorandum stated that future acquisition strategies 
submitted that did not provide all of the required information would 
be delayed. Delays in the acquisition process can, in turn, hinder 
DOD's ability to provide needed materiel to the warfighter. 

OSD Requires a Business-Case Analysis for Technical-Data Decisions, 
but Has Not Issued Instructions on How to Conduct the Analysis: 

OSD recently added a requirement that program managers conduct a 
business-case analysis as part of their assessment to determine the 
long-term technical-data needs for their systems; however, DOD has not 
issued policy or other internal controls that describe how to conduct 
this analysis. In November 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued a memorandum that 
requires program officials to take a number of actions to improve 
efficiency and productivity in defense spending.[Footnote 32] Among 
other things, the memorandum requires program managers for all 
acquisition programs to (1) conduct a business-case analysis[Footnote 
33] that outlines the technical-data rights the government will pursue 
to ensure competition and (2) include the results of this analysis in 
acquisition strategies at Milestone B.[Footnote 34] 

According to OSD officials, a business-case analysis would require 
program managers to determine whether the benefits of acquiring 
technical data are worth the costs of acquiring them. Prior to this 
memorandum, a formal cost benefit analysis was not required for 
technical-data decisions. As of January 2011, DOD officials told us 
that no acquisition program had yet completed this analysis because no 
program had reached Milestone B since the Under Secretary issued the 
memorandum. Therefore, we could not evaluate an analysis conducted in 
response to this new requirement. 

Since establishing the requirement in its November 2010 memorandum, 
OSD had not issued policy or other internal controls, as of April 
2011, that describe how to conduct the business-case analysis or what 
information to report in the acquisition strategy.[Footnote 35] The 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
stated in the memorandum that the department would take additional 
actions in support of the memorandum. However, OSD officials told us 
that they have not decided whether to issue additional clarifying 
policy to instruct program managers on how to conduct the analysis or 
what information about the results of the analysis they should include 
in acquisition strategies. 

Previous GAO Review Found Business-Case Analyses Were Inconsistently 
Completed: 

We have previously reported that the military services inconsistently 
completed similar business-case analyses when DOD had not issued 
instructions on how to conduct them.[Footnote 36] In 2008, we found 
that DOD had not issued a policy instructing program managers on the 
elements to include in the documentation of the analyses that program 
managers conducted for decisions on performance based logistics 
arrangements--a DOD approach to providing support to weapon systems. 
[Footnote 37] As a result, program staff conducted business-case 
analyses that were inconsistent and missing one or more elements 
recommended by a DOD instruction on economic analyses. We found that 
DOD officials implemented the performance based logistics arrangements 
for the sample of programs we reviewed without the benefit of sound 
and consistent analyses. Among other things, we recommended that DOD 
clearly define specific criteria for these analyses in DOD policy. DOD 
partially agreed with our recommendation. To address our 
recommendation, in April 2011, the Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness issued the 
Product Support Business-Case Analysis Guidebook.[Footnote 38] 

Because OSD has not issued policy instructing program managers on how 
to conduct and document the analyses, program managers may conduct 
incomplete or inconsistent analyses and report inconsistently on 
important elements of the analyses and findings. Similar to the 
situations we described in our 2008 report, program managers may not 
include key required elements of business-case analyses, such as 
assumptions, feasible alternatives, and costs and benefits that 
support their technical-data decisions. In addition, because OSD has 
not issued policy instructing program managers on how to report on the 
results of these analyses, program managers may not provide the 
information that senior leaders in DOD and the military departments 
need in order to decide whether to approve the acquisition programs at 
major milestones in the acquisition process. Technical-data decisions 
can be costly, with some prime contractors quoting a price in excess 
of $1 billion for technical-data packages. Thus, decision makers need 
sufficient details to conduct their reviews and make fully informed 
decisions. The November 2010 memorandum demonstrates that this 
negative effect already exists for technical-data-related requirements. 

Conclusions: 

DOD has taken meaningful actions that could lead to an increased focus 
on technical data in defense acquisition--actions that may help DOD 
improve effectiveness and cost efficiency when acquiring and 
sustaining its weapon systems. DOD has reflected congressionally 
mandated and GAO-recommended changes in updated policies to emphasize 
the importance of discussing and documenting assessments of technical 
data and data rights in acquisition documentation, but program 
officials could benefit from additional clarifications to these 
policies. If DOD does not clarify the level and type of detail 
required in these updated policies, program managers may continue to 
inconsistently include the needed information. Furthermore, senior 
department officials may delay approving these acquisition strategies 
at major milestone reviews. Delays at major acquisition milestones 
could postpone the department's effort to provide needed materiel to 
the warfighter. 

Moreover, DOD has required that program managers conduct a business- 
case analysis to weigh the costs of access to technical data for DOD's 
systems against the benefits of acquiring these data. This recently 
required step may add rigor to decisions to acquire technical data 
that program managers make early in the process. However, in the 
absence of DOD-wide instructions to program managers on how to conduct 
these analyses, program officials may conduct analyses that exclude 
key elements and therefore do not support optimal decision making for 
rights to technical data that can cost $1 billion or more. Delaying 
issuing implementing instructions to program managers for the business-
case analysis could slow DOD's and the military departments' efforts 
to answer the Under Secretary of Defense's call to take a more 
aggressive approach to finding efficiencies and reducing DOD's 
spending where possible in order to better afford its future weapon 
systems. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To establish effective internal controls over technical-data policies 
that improve DOD's ability to efficiently and cost-effectively acquire 
and sustain weapon systems over their life cycles, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to take the following two 
actions: 

* Issue updates to the acquisition and procurement policies that 
clarify requirements for documenting long-term technical-data 
requirements in program acquisition strategies and acquisition plans. 
Among other things, DOD should clarify the level and type of detail 
required for acquiring technical data and technical-data rights that 
should be included in acquisition strategies and acquisition plans: 

* Issue instructions for program managers to use when conducting 
business-case analyses that are part of the process for determining 
the levels and types of technical data and technical-data rights 
needed to sustain DOD's systems. The instructions should identify the 
elements to be included in the analyses and the types of information 
to be documented in reports on the analyses. 

Agency Comments: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
two recommendations. The department's written comments are reprinted 
in their entirety in appendix III. DOD also provided technical 
comments that we have incorporated into this report where applicable. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD issue updates to the 
acquisition and procurement policies that clarify requirements for 
documenting long-term technical-data needs in program acquisition 
strategies and acquisition plans, DOD stated that it planned to issue 
a clarification this calendar year. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD issue instructions for 
program managers to use when conducting business-case analyses for 
technical-data decisions, the department stated that it planned to 
issue guidance this year related to this recommendation. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its 
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of the report until 
30 days from the report's date. At that time, we will send copies of 
this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 
the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
call me at (202) 512-8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Jack E. Edwards: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) 
updated its acquisition and procurement policies to reflect certain 
technical-data-related provisions of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 and GAO's 2006 recommendations, 
we reviewed the law, our recommendations, and a variety of documents 
related to the context of the act and recommendations. We reviewed DOD 
and military department regulations governing technical-data 
acquisition and technical-data-related reports issued by GAO and DOD. 
We compared changes that the department made to its acquisition and 
procurement policies to respond to the law and our recommendations. 
Specifically, we analyzed the following policies: (1) a memorandum 
issued by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD), Data Management and 
Technical Data Rights (July 19, 2007); (2) DOD Instruction 5000.02, 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System enclosure 12(9) (Dec. 8, 
2008); and (3) the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) 207.106 (S-70). We also used information from this evaluation 
of the policies and their requirements in the analyses we conducted 
for our other objectives. To obtain DOD's perspective on changes to 
these policies as well as information for all three of our objectives, 
we interviewed officials in a variety of organizations including OSD, 
acquisition headquarters for each military department, selected 
program executive offices, and the acquisition programs in our sample. 
Table 1 lists the organizations we contacted to conduct interviews and 
obtain documents related to the acquisition of technical data. We also 
reviewed information in databases in the DOD Office of the Inspector 
General and GAO that record actions DOD took to implement our 
recommendations. To evaluate actions DOD and the military departments 
took to implement additional legislative provisions and audit 
recommendations related to technical data (that we describe in app. 
II), we evaluated the requirements in the relevant legislation or the 
actions called for in the relevant recommendations. We then obtained 
and analyzed key documentation, such as updates DOD made to the DFARS 
to implement section 202 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
of 2009. 

Table 1: Organizations Interviewed to Obtain Information Related to 
Technical Data for this Report: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics: 

* Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Materiel Readiness: 

* Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy: 

* Office of the Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis: 

* Defense Acquisition University: 

* Office of the General Counsel: 

* Office of the Inspector General: 

Air Force: 

* Directorate for Acquisition Integration, Assistant Secretary of the 
Air Force for Acquisition; 

* Acquisition Excellence & Change Management Office, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Acquisition Integration; 

* Division of Acquisition Law, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
for General Counsel; 

* Directorate for Transformation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support; 

* Directorate for Maintenance, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support; 

* Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

* Program Management and Acquisition Excellence, Aeronautical Systems 
Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

* Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

* Small Diameter Bomb II Program Office, Panama City, Florida; 

* C-130 Avionics Modernization Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Ohio; 

* F-16 Operational Flight Program M6/M6+ Program Office, Wright- 
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

* B-1 Bomber Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program 
Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

* Air Force Audit Agency, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 

Army: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, 
Logistics and Technology; 

* Army Materiel Command; 

* Product Data and Engineering Working Group; 

* Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems; 

* Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, Redstone Arsenal, 
Alabama; 

* Integrated Air and Missile Defense Program Office, Redstone Arsenal, 
Alabama; 

* Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System, Redstone 
Arsenal, Alabama; 

* Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead, Redstone 
Arsenal, Alabama; 

* Joint Battle Command Platform Program Office, Ft. Monmouth, New 
Jersey, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; 

* Army Audit Agency. 

Navy: 

* Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition 
and Logistics Management; 

* Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Management 
and Budget; 

* Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems; 

* Program Executive Office, Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence, San Diego, California; 

* Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team; 

* Surface Electronics Warfare Improvement Program Office; 

* E-6B Mercury Take Charge and Move Out Block I Modification Program 
Office, Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Maryland; 

* Joint High Speed Vessel Program Office; 

* Navy Multiband Terminal Program Office, San Diego, California. 

DOD other: 

* Defense Data Management Team. 

Industry: 

* Aerospace Industries Association; 

* National Defense Industrial Association; 

* Northrop Grumman Corporation, Baltimore, Maryland; 

* Boeing Corporation. 

Federally Funded Research and Development Corporation: 

* Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Unless otherwise specified, these organizations are located in 
or near Washington, D.C. 

[End of table] 

To evaluate the extent to which selected defense acquisition programs 
adhered to the updated requirements in DOD policy to document their 
systems' long-term technical-data needs, we selected a non- 
generalizable sample of 12 acquisition programs from a population of 
about 50 programs. To draw the sample, we asked the three military 
departments to identify all acquisition programs at the two highest- 
value acquisition categories (ACAT I or II) that had reached the first 
three acquisition milestones--A - Material Solution Analysis, B - 
Technology Development, and C - Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development--between September 2007 and August 2010. We chose 
September 2007 because this was the first point at which both sets of 
requirements for documenting long-term technical-data needs were in 
effect, and we chose August 2010 because we selected our sample at 
that time. Because too few Marine Corps programs reached one of these 
milestones during this period, we excluded this service from our 
evaluation. To draw the sample, we selected four programs from each 
department, balancing the ACAT levels and milestones. We then selected 
those programs that had most recently, at the time we drew our sample, 
reached their respective milestones. We used this approach because DOD 
updated its policies in 2007, and we wanted to allow as much time as 
possible for the military departments to develop methods to respond to 
the requirements in DOD's updated policies. Although findings from 
this sample are not generalizable to all DOD acquisition programs, the 
variety of circumstances that programs in our sample face can 
illustrate important aspects of documenting a system's long-term 
technical-data needs. Our sample includes a variety of acquisition 
programs, including new systems (e.g., Joint High Speed Vessel), 
modifications to existing systems (e.g., C-130 Avionics Modernization 
Program), and systems that were primarily software (e.g., Joint Battle 
Command-Platform). After completing our sample selection, we analyzed 
the content of each program's acquisition strategy and acquisition 
plan, which are required to document the program's long-term technical-
data needs. To conduct these analyses, we compared each program's 
acquisition strategy and acquisition plan against certain criteria 
from the July 2007 memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, DOD Instruction 5000.02, and 
the DFARS.[Footnote 39] We could not compare the acquisition 
strategies and plans in our sample to the voluntary guides that OSD 
and the military departments issued in 2009 and 2010 because the 
guides were issued after the majority of programs in our sample had 
completed their acquisition milestone documentation. Two team members 
concurrently conducted independent analyses of the same documentation. 
We then compared the two sets of observations and reconciled any 
differences with the assistance of a third analyst, when necessary. We 
also provided our preliminary observations of each strategy to 
officials in each program and considered additional information they 
provided when our observations indicated that the program had not 
addressed one or more of the requirements. 

To evaluate the extent to which DOD has taken actions to improve 
decision making by program managers on the long-term technical-data 
needs for systems in the acquisition process, we identified recent 
steps the department has taken. We interviewed officials in a variety 
of offices including OSD and the acquisition headquarters offices for 
each military department. We interviewed the officials responsible for 
implementing any steps DOD took, and we obtained and evaluated 
supporting documentation (e.g., the Defense Acquisition Guidebook and 
guides issued by each military department). The officials we 
interviewed represent organizations such as the Army's Product Data 
and Engineering Working Group and the Air Force's Product Data 
Acquisition Team. 

For each objective, we assessed the reliability of the data we 
analyzed by reviewing existing documentation related to the data 
sources and interviewing knowledgeable agency officials about the data 
that we used. We found the data sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to May 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: DOD's Implementation of Technical-Data Requirements Cited 
in Recent Legislation and DOD Audit Agencies' Report Recommendations: 

The information in this appendix supplements the information we 
provided elsewhere in this report. The legal requirements, audit 
recommendations, and the Department of Defense (DOD) and military 
department implementation actions in this appendix are more narrowly 
focused than those reviewed earlier in this report. Together, the two 
sets of mandated actions, recommendations, and response actions 
provide additional information about technical-data-related 
requirements. 

To evaluate the actions DOD has taken to implement the technical-data 
requirements of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2009 and report recommendations by the Army and Air 
Force Audit Agencies, we identified and evaluated the requirements and 
recommendations. We then interviewed relevant DOD and Air Force and 
Army officials and obtained key documentation such as updates DOD made 
to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to implement 
section 202 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. 

Technical-Data Requirements in the Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and DOD's Response: 

Section 822 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2009[Footnote 40] requires DOD to take two technical-
data-related actions in the acquisition process. Table 2 lists these 
two legislative requirements and DOD's response to each. 

Table 2: Technical-Data-Related Requirements from the Duncan Hunter 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and DOD's 
Responses as of March 2011: 

Legislative requirement: Requires the Secretary of Defense no later 
than 270 days after the enactment of the act to: Issue policy guidance 
on technical data for non-Federal Acquisition Regulation 
agreements.[A] The act further requires that such non-FAR agreements 
contain appropriate provisions relating to rights in technical data 
consistent with this policy guidance; 
DOD's Response: Not Implemented. DOD officials said that (a) DOD has 
not issued any policy in response to the law; (b) prior to the 
issuance of the law, multiple policies existed that address some 
aspects of the law for some non-Federal Acquisition Regulation 
agreements, and (c) DOD is evaluating whether to modify these policies 
or issue a comprehensive policy in response to the law. 

Legislative requirements: Requires the Secretary of Defense no later 
than 270 days after the enactment of the act to: Submit a report to 
the congressional armed services committees on the implementation of 
section 2320(e) of Title 10, U.S. Code, for the assessment of long-
term technical-data needs to sustain major weapon systems, among other 
matters; 
DOD's Response: Not Implemented. DOD has not issued the required 
report to the congressional armed-services committees. In September 
2010, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics 
and Materiel Readiness sent a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking 
Members of the congressional defense committees notifying them that 
the report would be issued within 90 days of the letter. The 
department had not issued it as of March 2011. 

Source: GAO analysis of the law and DOD documentation. 

[A] With respect to this requirement, a non-Federal Acquisition 
Regulation agreement means an agreement that is not subject to laws 
pursuant to which the Federal Acquisition Regulation is prescribed, 
including a transaction authorized under section 2371 of Title 10 and 
a cooperative research and development agreement. 

[End of table] 

Recommendations on Technical Data by Army and Air Force Audit 
Agencies' Reports, and the Services' Responses: 

The Army Audit Agency and the Air Force Audit Agency recently issued 
reports that address the acquisition of technical data. Table 3 lists 
these reports, their recommendations, and the military departments' 
responses to the recommendations. 

Table 3: Army and Air Force Audit Agencies' Recommendations in 
Technical-Data-Related Reports and the Military Departments' Responses 
as of March 2011: 

Army Audit Agency, Acquisition of Technical Data and Rights for Major 
Army Systems, A-2009-0143-ALC (Alexandria, Va: July 6, 2009): 

Recommendation: The report recommends that the Army take four actions; 
Army's Response: The report stated that the Army had taken or would 
take actions in response to each of the four recommendations. 

Recommendation: Update Army Regulation 70-1 to reflect two memorandums 
dated July 2007 (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics) and April 2008 (Acting Assistant Secretary 
of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). Both 
memorandums require program managers to assess their system's long-
term technical-data needs and document that assessment in a data-
management strategy; 
Army's Response: Not Implemented. The Army has not updated Army 
Regulation 70-1. However, Army officials told us that an update to 
Army Regulation 70-1 has been drafted. They told us that the update 
will require program managers to assess the long-term technical-data 
needs of their systems and to reflect that assessment in a data-
management strategy. These officials also told us that the Army plans 
to issue the update to the regulation by June 2011. 

Recommendation: Make sure that principal assistants responsible for 
contracting advise program executive officers and program managers[A] 
of their technical-data rights and responsibilities--detailed in 
Title10 of U.S. Code and an April 2008 memorandum issued by the Acting 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology; 
Army's Response: Implemented. In January 2009, the Army's Director, 
Procurement Policy and Support, issued a memorandum about these 
responsibilities for principal assistants responsible for contracting. 

Recommendation: Establish a standardized decision matrix or checklist 
that identifies and documents steps necessary to determine and secure 
the level of data rights for each major Army system; 
Army's Response: Implemented. In August 2010, the Army's Product Data 
and Engineering Working Group issued a guidebook that includes a 
worksheet to assist program managers as they assess their technical-
data needs. 

Recommendation: Establish required training for personnel in the 
acquisition of major Army systems to improve knowledge of technical 
data and rights; 
Army's Response: Not Implemented. The Army has not established the 
recommended training courses, according to an Army headquarters' 
official. However, the official told us that the Defense Acquisition 
University has courses and provides training for the Army acquisition 
workforce. Defense Acquisition University personnel told us that prior 
to the Army report they taught courses on technical-data rights in the 
acquisition process and that they adjusted their courses to be 
consistent with DOD policy. 

Air Force Audit Agency, Technical Data Management, F2009-0006-FC3000 
(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2009): 

Recommendation: The report recommends that the Air Force take two 
actions; 
Air Force's Response: The report indicates that both recommendations 
are closed. However, we found that the Air Force had not taken action 
to implement one of the recommendations. 

Recommendation: Issue an interim guidance memorandum on the technical-
data provisions included in the 2007 National Defense Authorization 
Act, pending release of an update to Air Force Instruction 63-101, 
Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management; 
Air Force's Response: Implemented. The Air Force included the 
recommended guidance in an update of Air Force Instruction 63-101 
rather than issue guidance in an interim memorandum. 

Recommendation: Develop a technical-data checklist to incorporate in 
the Air Force's acquisition sustainment tool kit, which is a resource 
for acquisition personnel; 
Air Force's Response: Not Implemented. Air Force officials told us 
that the Air Force has not developed a technical-data checklist to 
incorporate into the acquisition sustainment tool kit. However, 
according to these officials, they plan to revise the tool kit by 
August 2011 to incorporate the recommended checklist. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army and Air Force documentation. 

[A] Principal assistants responsible for contracting are senior 
officials who are responsible for contracting and also support program 
executive officers and program managers. Program executive officers 
and program managers are responsible for (1) acquiring and sustaining 
weapon systems, (2) assessing the long-term technical-data-rights 
needs of those systems, and (3) documenting technical-data assessments 
in a data-management strategy, among other things. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, Dc 20301-3000: 

May 3, 2011: 

Mr. Jack E. Edwards: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability: 
Office, 441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Edwards: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GA0-11-469, "Defense Acquisition: DoD Should Clarify 
Requirements for Assessing and Documenting Technical Data Needs," 
dated April 5, 2011 (GAO Code 351497). Detailed comments on the report 
recommendations are enclosed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Shay D. Assad: 
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated April 5, 2011: 
GAO-11-469 (GAO Code 351497): 

"Defense Acquisition: DOD Should Clarify Requirements For Assessing 
And Documenting Technical Data Needs" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to issue updates to the acquisition and procurement policies 
that clarify requirements for documenting long-term technical data 
requirements in program acquisition strategies and acquisition plans. 
Among other things, DoD should clarify the level and type of detail 
required for acquiring technical data and technical data rights that 
should be included in acquisition strategies and acquisition plans. 
(See page 24/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. The Department expects to issue the recommended 
clarification this calendar year. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to issue instructions for program managers to use when 
conducting business case analyses that are part of the process for 
determining the levels and types of technical data and technical data 
rights needed to sustain their systems. The instruction should 
identify the elements to be included in the analyses and the types of 
information to be documented in reports on the analyses. In addition, 
OSD should consider consolidating the requirement for business case 
analyses with updates to clarify requirements for documenting long-
term technical data requirements. (See page 24/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. The Department expects to issue guidance related 
to this recommendation this calendar year. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Jack E. Edwards, (202) 512-8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Key contributors to this report were Carleen Bennett, Assistant 
Director; Larry Bridges; Simon Hirschfeld; Amber Keyser; James P. 
Klein; Katherine Lenane; Richard Powelson; Michael Silver; and Ryan 
Starks. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Federal Contracting: Opportunities Exist to Increase Competition and 
Assess Reasons When Only One Offer Is Received. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-833]. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 
2010. 

Defense Management: DOD Needs Better Information and Guidance to More 
Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support Costs of Major 
Weapon Systems. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-717]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2010. 

Defense Logistics: Improved Analysis and Cost Data Needed to Evaluate 
the Cost-effectiveness of Performance Based Logistics. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-41]. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 
2008. 

Weapons Acquisition: DOD Should Strengthen Policies for Assessing 
Technical Data Needs to Support Weapon Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-839]. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2006. 

Defense Management: Opportunities to Enhance the Implementation of 
Performance-Based Logistics. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-715]. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 
2004. 

Defense Logistics: Opportunities to Improve the Army's and the Navy's 
Decision-making Process for Weapons Systems Support. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-306]. Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2002. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) section 
252.227-7013 defines technical data as "recorded information, 
regardless of the form or method of the recording, of a scientific or 
technical nature (including computer software documentation)… [but not 
including] computer software or data incidental to contract 
administration, such as financial and/or management information." 
Technical data for weapon systems includes drawings, specifications, 
standards, and other details necessary to ensure the adequacy of item 
performance, as well as manuals that contain instructions for 
installation, operation, maintenance, and other actions needed to 
support weapon systems. 

[2] GAO, Federal Contracting: Opportunities Exist to Increase 
Competition and Assess Reasons When Only One Offer Is Received, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-833] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 26, 2010);Weapons Acquisition: DOD Should Strengthen Policies for 
Assessing Technical Data Needs to Support Weapon Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-839] (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2006); Defense Management: Opportunities to Enhance the Implementation 
of Performance-Based Logistics, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-715] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 
2004); and Defense Logistics: Opportunities to Improve the Army's and 
the Navy's Decision-making Process for Weapons Systems Support, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-306] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 28, 2002). 

[3] Hereinafter, we use the term "the 2007 National Defense 
Authorization Act" to describe section 802 of the John Warner National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364 
(2006). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 111-23 § 202 (2009). In response to the technical data 
provisions of this law, DOD published an interim rule amending the 
DFARS in February 2010. The interim rule stated, among other things, 
that the acquisition of complete technical data packages is one 
measure to ensure competition (or the option of competition). This 
interim rule was finalized in September 2010 without change as DFARS 
207.106 (S-72). 

[5] We also included information on the extent to which DOD has 
implemented additional legislative provisions and audit 
recommendations related to technical data in the acquisition process 
in appendix II. 

[6] See related GAO products at the end of this report for additional 
publications on related topics. 

[7] Because too few Marine Corps programs reached a major milestone in 
this period, we did not include any programs from this service in our 
sample. 

[8] DOD classifies its acquisition programs into acquisition 
categories (ACAT) that depend on the value and type of acquisition. 
ACAT I programs are estimated to require an eventual total expenditure 
of more than $365 million for research, development, test and 
evaluation, or more than $2.19 billion for procurement, or are 
designated as special interest by the milestone decision authority. 
ACAT II programs do not meet the criteria for ACAT I, but are 
estimated to require more than $140 million for research, development, 
test and evaluation, or more than $660 million for procurement (all 
cost estimates are in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars). ACAT III 
programs do not meet the criteria for ACAT II or above. 

[9] As outlined in DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008), the defense acquisition system uses 
"milestones" to oversee and manage acquisition programs. Each 
milestone has specific statutory and regulatory requirements that a 
program must meet in order to proceed to the next phase of the 
acquisition process. We selected programs that reached the first three 
milestones: A - Materiel Solution Analysis; B - Technology 
Development; and C - Engineering and Manufacturing Development. 

[10] Specifically, we incorporated requirements from the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics-issued 
memorandum, Data Management and Technical Data Rights (July 19, 2007); 
DOD Instruction 5000.02, enclosure 12(9) (Dec. 8, 2008); and DFARS 
207.106 (S-70). 

[11] The government typically obtains rights in technical data through 
a license granted as part of the contract. The standard license rights 
that are granted to the government are unlimited rights, government 
purpose rights, or limited rights, but different rights may be 
negotiated in unusual circumstances. The contractor or licensor 
retains all rights in the data not granted to the government. DFARS 
227.7103-4(a) and DFARS 227.7103-5. 

[12] DOD officials told us that in practice many program offices use 
one document to satisfy the requirement for both the acquisition 
strategy and acquisition plan. 

[13] Pursuant to section 2321 of Title 10, U.S. Code, DOD has the 
right to challenge asserted restrictions on technical data under 
certain circumstances. DFARS 227.7103-13 (b) states that "[t]he 
challenge procedures required by 10 U.S.C. 2321 could significantly 
delay awards under competitive procurements. Therefore, avoid 
challenging asserted restrictions prior to a competitive contract 
award unless resolution of the assertion is essential for successful 
completion of the procurement." 

[14] However, in some limited circumstances, restrictive markings may 
be challenged at any time. DFARS 227.7103-13(c)(1). 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-306]. 

[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-715]. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-839]. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-833]. 

[19] Air Force Audit Agency, Technical Data Management, F2009-0006- 
FC3000 (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2009). 

[20] Army Audit Agency, Acquisition of Technical Data and Rights for 
Major Army Systems, A-2009-0143-ALC (Alexandria, Va: July 6, 2009). 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-839]. 

[22] DOD policy requires that all acquisition programs develop or 
update an acquisition strategy document at major milestones in the 
acquisition process. 

[23] The final policy changes are included in DFARS 207.106 (S-70). 

[24] The acquisition policy changes apply to ACAT I and II programs, 
and the procurement policy changes apply to weapon systems and 
subsystems of major weapon systems. Throughout this report when we 
refer to programs and program managers, we are referring to those 
programs and program managers specifically affected by these policies. 

[25] DOD issued an interim rule amending the DFARS effective September 
6, 2007. The rule was adopted as final (with a minor change) on 
December 29, 2009 as DFARS 207.106 (S-70). 

[26] The Air Force Acquisition Excellence and Change Management Office 
issued this guide as a slide presentation distributed to program 
officials. The presentation outlined Air Force guidelines for 
developing an acquisition strategy. 

[27] The Product Data Acquisition Integrated Product Team has also 
taken additional actions to improve technical-data-related decisions, 
including recommending changes to Air Force-level policy. 

[28] The Army established the Product Data and Engineering Working 
Group in March 2005 to serve as a forum for determining requirements 
for and resolving issues associated with the management and use of 
technical data. The group consists of representatives from Army 
offices such as headquarters, major commands (e.g., Army Materiel 
Command), and program executive officers. 

[29] U.S. Navy, Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program 
Managers, (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010). Open architecture is a 
group of business and technical practices that, when implemented in 
the acquisition process, result in systems that are modular and 
interoperable. 

[30] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
November 1999). 

[31] DFARS 207.106 (S-70). 

[32] Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics memorandum: Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power-
Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending 
(Nov. 3, 2010). 

[33] The memorandum requires that the analysis be conducted in concert 
with the engineering trade-off analysis. It requires that the analysis 
outline the open-systems-architecture approach and technical-data 
rights needed to ensure a life-cycle consideration of competition in 
the acquisition of weapon systems. 

[34] Milestone B marks the entry into the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase of the acquisition process. 

[35] Although, OSD had not issued policy or other internal controls, 
in April 2011, OSD issued a guidebook that program manager may choose 
to follow to develop business-case analyses for their technical-data 
rights decisions. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness issued the Product Support 
Business-Case Analysis Guidebook. The guidebook provides a 
standardized process and methodology for writing, aiding decision 
making, and providing analytical decision support for a business-case 
analysis of product support decisions. 

[36] GAO, Defense Logistics: Improved Analysis and Cost Data Needed to 
Evaluate the Cost-effectiveness of Performance Based Logistics, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-41] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 19, 2008). 

[37] Performance based logistics is the purchase of performance 
outcomes, such as system availability, rather than the purchase of 
individual elements of logistics support--such as parts, repairs, and 
engineering support. Performance based logistics is DOD's preferred 
approach to weapon system product support. Product support is the 
package of support functions required to maintain the readiness of 
weapon systems. Technical data is one of the 11 elements of product 
support. 

[38] At the time of this report, we had not evaluated whether this 
guidebook met the intent of our 2008 recommendation. 

[39] Specifically, we incorporated requirements from DOD Instruction 
5000.02 enclosure 12(9) December 8, 2008; and the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement 227.207.106 (S-70). 

[40] Pub. L. No. 110-417 § 822 (Oct. 14, 2008). 

[End of section] 

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