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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

April 2011: 

Law Enforcement Coordination: 

DOJ Could Improve Its Process for Identifying Disagreements among 
Agents: 

GAO-11-314: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-314, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an estimated 
1.3 million violent crimes occurred nationwide in 2009. The Department 
of Justice (DOJ) law enforcement components—the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Drug Enforcement Administration; 
FBI, and U.S. Marshals Service—have overlapping jurisdiction over 
violent crime investigations, specifically when they involve illegal 
drugs, gang violence, firearms, explosives, arson, and fugitive 
apprehension. As requested, GAO assessed the extent to which selected 
agents are clear on their agencies’ roles and responsibilities, and 
how components determine and coordinate roles and responsibilities to 
avoid unnecessary use of resources. GAO reviewed documents such as 
department directives and interviewed DOJ component officials in 
headquarters and nine cities, which were selected based on population 
and the presence of all DOJ components. GAO also surveyed a randomly 
selected, nongeneralizable sample of 315 field agents. The results 
provide valuable information about the range of perspectives of 
surveyed agents. 

What GAO Found: 

The majority of agents who responded to GAO’s survey reported that 
they are very clear about their components’ roles and responsibilities 
in the six investigative areas where they share jurisdiction—drugs, 
firearms, fugitives, gangs, arson, and explosives—and that mechanisms 
DOJ has in place to coordinate and clarify roles and responsibilities, 
such as memorandums of understanding, are somewhat effective. Agents 
who responded to GAO’s survey most frequently reported using 
interpersonal outreach and communication to clarify roles and 
responsibilities, such as relying on task force experience and 
conferring with agents with other components when jurisdictions 
overlapped on particular investigations. Though the majority of agents 
reported being clear on their agency’s roles and responsibilities, 
over one-third of survey respondents reported experiencing 
disagreements over the past 5 years with another DOJ component when 
determining roles and responsibilities during an investigation. Of the 
agents who reported disagreements, 78 percent reported that these 
disagreements negatively affected the investigation to some degree, 
for example, by prolonging investigations, calling for unnecessary use 
of resources, and causing low morale. Although the DOJ components have 
mechanisms in place to monitor how well components are coordinating, 
the scope of these mechanisms limits DOJ’s ability to identify some 
problems. DOJ components conduct inspections of field offices every 3 
to 6 years, which cover areas such as working relationships, 
operational programs, leadership, and management. However, officials 
from three of four component inspection divisions GAO interviewed said 
that they rely on interviews with senior management, such as the 
highest official in the field office, to gauge coordination and the 
working relationships among the DOJ law enforcement components, and do 
not solicit input from agents. Though, considering that field office 
managers are not likely aware of all disagreements that occur among 
agents and survey respondents reported that disagreements and poor 
working relationships negatively affected investigations and morale, 
soliciting input from field agents may put DOJ in a better position to 
determine why disagreements are occurring and how to address them so 
as to limit their impact on agents and investigations. 

Figure: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on Negative Consequences of 
Disagreements: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Negative consequences of disagreements (percentage): 

Prolonged investigations (95); 
Yes: 73%; 
No: 18%; 
Don’t know: 9%. 

Blue on blue (94); 
Yes: 6%; 
No: 83%; 
Don’t know: 11%. 

Low morale (95); 
Yes: 64%; 
No: 23%; 
Don’t know: 13%. 

Fugitive not apprehended (94)
Yes: 24%; 
No: 56%; 

Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution (94); 
Yes: 31%; 
No: 50%; 
Don’t know: 19%. 

Unwillingness of components to work with each other (96); 
Yes: 73%; 
No: 19%; 
Don’t know: 8%. 

Unnecessary use of resources (96); 
Yes: 64%; 
No: 26%; 
Don’t know: 11%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOJ assess options to better identify and diagnose 
disagreements in the field and take action to limit the negative 
impacts from disagreements over jurisdictional overlap for some 
criminal investigations. DOJ agreed with GAO’s recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-314] or key 
components. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-
6510 or larencee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Most Agents Reported Being Very Clear about Their Component's Roles 
and Responsibilities, but Over One-Third Reported Disagreements, Which 
DOJ Components Could Better Address: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Law Enforcement Coordination Survey Results: 

Appendix III: Extent to Which Survey Respondents Reported Being Clear 
on Their Component's Roles and Responsibilities in Each Area of Shared 
Jurisdiction: 

Appendix IV: Survey Respondents' Perspectives regarding Their 
Component's Working Relationship with Other DOJ Components: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: USAO Offices and Police Departments Visited in Nine Selected 
Localities: 

Table 2: Counts of Special Agents and Deputy Marshals by Location and 
Component: 

Table 3: Percentages of Respondents from the Nine Cities Who Reported 
Very Good or Good Working Relationships with Other Components: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Jurisdictions Shared by DOJ Agencies: 

Figure 2: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who 
Reported Being Very Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear about Their 
Component's Roles and Responsibilities: 

Figure 3: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who 
Reported Using Certain Methods to Determine Roles and Responsibilities: 

Figure 4: Percentages of Selected Agents Who Responded That Various 
Clarification Methods Were Very Effective, Somewhat Effective, or Not 
Effective: 

Figure 5: Percentages of Agents Who Reported Having Disagreements with 
Another Component over Roles and Responsibilities over the Past 5 
Years, by City: 

Figure 6: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who 
Reported Disagreements with Certain Components: 

Figure 7: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on Negative Consequences 
of Disagreements: 

Figure 8: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on the Nature of Their 
Component's Working Relationship with ATF, DEA, the FBI, and USMS: 

Figure 9: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Arson Investigations--Overall, by Component, and 
by City: 

Figure 10: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Explosives Investigations--Overall, by Component, 
and by City: 

Figure 11: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Gang Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by 
City: 

Figure 12: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Firearms Investigations--Overall, by Component, 
and by City: 

Figure 13: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Fugitives Investigations--Overall, by Component, 
and by City: 

Figure 14: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Drug Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by 
City: 

Abbreviations: 

AGCC: Anti-Gang Coordination Committee: 

ASAC: assistant special agent-in-charge: 

ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: 

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

IG: Office of the Inspector General: 

JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force: 

MOU: memorandum of understanding: 

USAO: United States Attorney's Office: 

USMS: U.S. Marshals Service: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 7, 2011: 

The Honorable Lamar Smith: 
Chairman: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

An estimated 1.3 million violent crimes occurred nationwide in 2009. 
[Footnote 1] These crimes inflict a heavy toll on communities across 
the United States and have dramatic effects on the welfare of citizens 
and the economy. The responsibility for combating violent crimes rests 
with both state and local law enforcement but the federal government 
also has important responsibilities. Fighting violent crime is a key 
objective of the Department of Justice (DOJ), whose role includes 
combating gang and gun violence as well as halting the distribution of 
illegal drugs. DOJ's primary investigative agencies for violent crimes 
are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). Because of 
overlapping investigative jurisdiction, multiple agencies may be 
involved in an investigation, specifically when it involves illegal 
drugs, gang violence, illegal use of firearms and explosives, arson, 
and fugitive apprehension. For example, in a drug investigation 
involving a suspect who may be illegally procuring a large cache of 
firearms to protect the drugs, the FBI and DEA, which both have 
jurisdiction over illegal drugs, as well as ATF, which is responsible 
for regulating firearms, may be involved. Similarly, the FBI has 
responsibilities for combating violent crime and investigating all 
crimes involving terrorist activities or acts in preparation of 
terrorist activities occurring within the United States. Thus, if an 
investigation involves the illegal use of explosives or arson, either 
ATF or the FBI could be involved, depending on the link to terrorism 
or other circumstances. 

In cases such as these, effective coordination with regard to 
investigations, seizures of illegal drugs and fugitive and criminal 
apprehensions is paramount. A lack of coordination can lead to 
confusion, frustration, and a waste of law enforcement resources; pose 
a risk to law enforcement personnel; and limit the overall 
effectiveness of the federal effort. 

Given the importance of coordination in areas of overlapping 
jurisdiction, you asked us to review DOJ's efforts to determine roles 
and responsibilities when more than one DOJ component is involved. As 
agreed with your office, we analyzed the extent to which roles and 
responsibilities are clearly delineated and coordinated among ATF, 
DEA, the FBI, and USMS (hereafter referred to as DOJ law enforcement 
components). Specifically, this report addresses the following 
question: In areas of overlapping investigative jurisdiction, to what 
extent are DOJ law enforcement agents responsible for investigations 
clear on their component's roles and responsibilities, and to what 
extent do they reach agreement on roles and responsibilities with 
other components? 

To answer this question, we analyzed statutory provisions as well as 
DOJ and component law enforcement strategic plans to determine the 
extent to which jurisdiction to investigate crimes is shared among the 
components. Our analysis focused on six crime areas--firearms, illegal 
drugs, gangs, explosives, arson, and fugitives--that may involve ATF, 
DEA, the FBI, and USMS because multiple components share jurisdiction 
in these areas. To understand how the department's law enforcement 
components coordinate investigations among themselves, we analyzed 
department directives, component interagency agreements, and 
deconfliction databases. We also reviewed the reports from two studies 
conducted by the DOJ Office of the Inspector General about federal law 
enforcement coordination. We found the conclusions and recommendations 
drawn in each report to be appropriate based on the methodologies 
used. In addition, we also examined data from the Executive Office for 
United States Attorneys, FBI, and USMS. To assess the reliability of 
the data we obtained, we discussed the sources of the data with agency 
officials and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this report. We interviewed officials from each 
component's headquarters located in Washington, D.C., and managers 
such as special agents-in-charge or assistant special agents-in-charge 
from nine field office locations: (1) Houston, Texas; (2) Los Angeles, 
California; (3) Minneapolis, Minnesota; (4) New York, New York (5) 
Orlando, Florida; (6) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; (7) Seattle, 
Washington; (8) Tulsa, Oklahoma; and (9) Washington, D.C. In each of 
these nine locations, we also interviewed officials from local law 
enforcement agencies and U.S. Attorney Offices to obtain an outside 
perspective on the working relationships among the DOJ law enforcement 
components because they work with the components on a daily basis. We 
selected these locations (1) to include cities of varying size, (2) 
because all four DOJ components were present, and (3) to obtain 
geographic dispersion. 

In addition to obtaining the perspectives of field office managers, we 
also solicited input from agents in the field through a survey. We 
planned to conduct a survey that would allow us to generalize 
responses across the 36 field offices--the offices for each of the 
four components in each of the nine cities. However, because of DOJ's 
concerns about providing us access to contact information for such a 
large number of agents, we instead were limited to selecting a 
nongeneralizable sample of agents across the cities. Nevertheless, the 
results provide us with an indication of the range of views held by 
field agents and deputy marshals who responded. To conduct the survey, 
we selected nonsupervisory field agents and deputy marshals in each 
DOJ component in the nine cities to obtain additional perspectives on 
law enforcement roles and responsibilities in areas of shared 
jurisdiction. Each component compiled a list of its agents in each of 
the nine offices. We requested that each list contain all agents in 
the field office classified as non-supervisory 1811 investigators and 
who had investigated crimes in at least one of the six jurisdictional 
areas covered in our review.[Footnote 2] Once the lists were compiled, 
our survey population contained 1,563 special agents and deputy 
marshals. To limit disruptions to field office operations, we 
restricted the size of our sample and randomly selected 10 agents from 
each office. If an office had 10 or fewer eligible agents, we selected 
all of them. In total, we selected and surveyed 315 field agents and 
deputy marshals (hereafter referred to as agents) from June 17, 2010 
through August 25, 2010. We obtained responses from 260 agents (an 
overall response rate of 83 percent) on questions related to issues 
such as clarity of roles and responsibilities, disagreements over 
roles and responsibilities, and working relationships with other DOJ 
components. The response rates for individual components were 77 
percent (65 of 84) for ATF, 83 percent (70 of 84) for DEA, 86 percent 
(69 of 80) for the FBI, and 84 percent (56 of 67) for USMS. The survey 
results presented in this report are only attributable to the agents 
who responded to our survey and cannot be projected to all DOJ agents. 
The numbers of agents who responded to survey questions varied 
depending on skip instructions contained in the survey questionnaire. 
Also, agents may have chosen not to answer certain questions. The 
survey results we provide in our report depend on these factors. 
Percentages are based on the number of agents who responded to 
specific survey questions. More detailed information on our scope and 
methodology is provided in appendix I, and the frequency of responses 
for each survey question can be found in appendix II. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 through February 
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.[Footnote 3] Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

Background: 

DOJ plays a key role in federal efforts to investigate and prosecute 
violent crime through its four law enforcement components: ATF, DEA, 
the FBI, and USMS. The FBI serves as a federal investigative body with 
jurisdiction over violations of numerous categories of federal 
criminal law, among other things. The FBI's mandate is established in 
28 U.S.C. § 533, which authorizes the Attorney General to "appoint 
officials to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States." 
The Attorney General delegated broad investigative authority to the 
FBI.[Footnote 4] As a result, the Director of the FBI is responsible 
for investigating violations of laws--including criminal drug laws--of 
the United States and collecting evidence in cases in which the United 
States is or may be a party in interest, except in cases in which such 
responsibility is by statute or otherwise exclusively assigned to 
another investigative authority. Because of the FBI's broad 
responsibilities for investigating many of the violations of the laws 
of the United States, in a number of instances, the FBI's 
investigative jurisdiction overlaps with that of the other DOJ law 
enforcement components. Figure 1 illustrates the shared jurisdiction 
for illegal drugs, gangs, firearms, explosives, arson, and fugitives. 

Figure 1: Jurisdictions Shared by DOJ Agencies: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Gangs: 
DEA; 
ATF; 
USMS; 
FBI. 

Fugitives: 
USMS; 
FBI. 

Drugs: 
DEA; 
FBI. 

Firearms: Arson and explosives: 
ATF; 
FBI. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information. 

[End of figure] 

Gangs. All four DOJ components focus on different aspects of gang 
enforcement as part of their broader missions. Within DOJ, the FBI 
focuses primarily on investigating violent, multijurisdictional gangs 
whose activities constitute criminal enterprises by identifying, 
investigating, and prosecuting the leadership and key members of 
violent gangs; disrupting or dismantling gangs' criminal enterprise; 
and recovering illegal assets through seizures and forfeitures. ATF 
primarily focuses on efforts to reduce the occurrence of firearms, 
arson, and explosives-related crime, including such crimes committed 
by gang members. The primary focus of DEA's enforcement efforts is on 
the links between gangs and drug trafficking. USMS's role is to 
apprehend gang members who have been criminally charged but not 
arrested. 

Fugitives. USMS is the lead federal law enforcement agency responsible 
for the apprehension of federal fugitives. USMS executes federal 
arrests, parole violator warrants, and other warrants as directed. 
[Footnote 5] USMS's investigative mission focuses primarily on the 
location and arrest of violent fugitive felons, and provides 
assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies in the 
apprehension of their violent fugitives. The FBI is the lead agency 
for any federal fugitive arising from an FBI investigation and any 
warrants obtained by the FBI. The FBI and USMS also have authority to 
pursue and arrest both federal and state fugitives who have violated 
18 U.S.C. § 1073, which prohibits persons from moving or traveling in 
interstate commerce in order to avoid prosecution, confinement, or 
service of process. In addition, all DOJ law enforcement components 
have the authority to investigate and, in some cases, arrest fugitive 
felons when there is a reasonable basis to believe that doing so will 
detect or prevent the commission of any federal crime. 

Drugs. DEA is the nation's lead federal agency dedicated to drug law 
enforcement and works to disrupt and dismantle the leadership, 
command, control, and financial infrastructure of major drug-
trafficking organizations. DEA uses a multifaceted approach that 
includes investigating narcotics cases and preparing them for 
prosecution; managing a national drug intelligence program to collect, 
analyze, and disseminate drug intelligence; enforcing counternarcotics 
laws involving the diversion of legally produced substances for 
illegal purposes; and coordinating with and leveraging the resources 
of international, federal, state, and local partners. The FBI 
investigates violations of the laws, including criminal drug laws, of 
the United States. The FBI Director's authority to investigate 
violations of and collect evidence in cases involving the criminal 
drug laws of the United States is concurrent with the authority of the 
Administrator of the DEA. ATF also has a defined role focusing on the 
firearms aspect of counternarcotics investigations, which facilitates 
collaboration with DEA. ATF's mission includes, among other things, 
enforcing U.S. laws regulating firearms and explosives, and suspects 
involved in firearms-trafficking cases often are involved in or have 
links to drug-trafficking organizations. As such, firearms 
investigations often evolve to incorporate a narcotics component. 

Firearms. ATF is responsible for the regulation of the firearms 
industry, including efforts to combat arms trafficking within and from 
the United States.[Footnote 6] ATF seeks to enforce firearms laws to 
remove violent offenders from communities, stop illegal firearms 
trafficking, and prevent prohibited persons from possessing firearms. 
ATF also regulates and partners with the firearms industry to promote 
compliance, to prevent diversion, and to detect those criminals who 
bring violence to communities. The FBI has been delegated broad 
authority to investigate violations of the laws of the United States, 
including in the areas of organized crime, violent crime and major 
thefts, and firearms offenses. The FBI has underlying authority to 
participate in investigations of weapons, explosives, and firearms as 
a result of the FBI being the lead agency for the investigation of 
terrorism as well. 

Explosives and arson. The ATF and the FBI share jurisdiction for 
investigating the criminal use of explosives. The FBI investigates 
several federal crimes that may be committed with explosives and 
through arson, such as bank robberies, hate crimes (i.e., church fires 
and bombings), and organized crime. In 1990, the Attorney General 
assigned the FBI lead responsibility for investigating all crimes for 
which it has primary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve 
domestic terrorist activities, such as crimes committed by 
environmental or revolutionary groups. ATF is the chief enforcer of 
explosives laws and regulations in the United States and is 
responsible for licensing and regulating explosives manufacturers, 
importers, dealers, and users. 

In addition to sharing investigative jurisdiction among themselves, 
DOJ law enforcement components also partner with, and provide 
resources to, local law enforcement agencies to combat violent crime. 
DOJ provides resources to local agencies primarily through task forces 
and training. Task forces target a particular criminal activity and 
include federal, state, and local law enforcement. These task forces 
provide local law enforcement agencies with overtime pay, conduct 
wiretaps, and purchase vehicles for surveillance and undercover 
operations, among other things. For example, DEA partners with state 
and local law enforcement agencies to leverage the manpower and 
intelligence that they provide, while supplying them with 
counternarcotics training and other support, such as intelligence 
about drug-trafficking organizations that operate across 
jurisdictional boundaries. In regard to explosives, local law 
enforcement bomb squad units are the first responders to explosive 
incidents and work with federal law enforcement to secure scenes and 
collect evidence. 

Most Agents Reported Being Very Clear about Their Component's Roles 
and Responsibilities, but Over One-Third Reported Disagreements, Which 
DOJ Components Could Better Address: 

Fifty-eight to 70 percent of DOJ agents who responded to our survey 
reported being very clear about their component's roles and 
responsibilities in a particular area of shared jurisdiction--drugs, 
firearms, fugitives, gangs, arson, and explosives. The level of 
agents' clarity varied based on the extent of their components' 
involvement in a particular investigative area and geographic 
location. For example, agents generally reported being very clear 
about their component's roles and responsibilities in the 
investigative area that is specifically related to their component's 
mission, and least often reported being very clear in the area for 
which there is the most jurisdictional overlap--gangs. DOJ has several 
mechanisms in place to enhance clarity about roles and 
responsibilities, and agents who reported using these mechanisms 
primarily characterized them as somewhat effective. More than one-
third (37 percent or 97 of 259) of survey respondents reported 
experiencing disagreements over the past 5 years with another DOJ 
component when determining roles and responsibilities during an 
investigation.[Footnote 7] Seventy-eight percent (76 of 97) of the 
agents who reported having these disagreements indicated that they had 
negative impacts on the investigations sometimes, often or always. 
These negative impacts included prolonged investigations and 
unnecessary use of resources. In addition, the majority of agents (53 
of 96) who reported experiencing disagreements also reported that they 
did not always or often reach consensus following disagreements. DOJ 
components have taken action to address some of these disagreements 
and monitor how well components are coordinating, but these actions do 
not ensure that the types of disagreements agents reported are 
identified consistently and resolved. 

Most Survey Respondents Reported Being Very Clear on Their Component's 
Roles and Responsibilities, but the Level of Clarity Varied by 
Components' Level of Involvement in Each Investigative Area and 
Location: 

As shown in figure 2, the percentage of agents responding to our 
survey who reported being very clear on their own component's roles 
and responsibilities in a particular investigative area ranged from 58 
percent (142 of 243) for gangs to 70 percent (176 of 251) for drugs. 
The percentage of agents who reported that they are not clear on their 
own component's roles and responsibilities ranged from 4 percent for 
drugs and firearms to 11 percent for explosives.[Footnote 8] 

Figure 2: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who 
Reported Being Very Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear about Their 
Component's Roles and Responsibilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Drugs (251): 
Not clear: 4%; 
Somewhat clear: 26%; 
Very clear: 70%. 

Fugitives (239): 
Not clear: 6%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Very clear: 69%. 

Firearms (249): 
Not clear: 4%; 
Somewhat clear: 28%; 
Very clear: 67%. 

Gangs (243): 
Not clear: 7%; 
Somewhat clear: 35%; 
Very clear: 58%. 

Explosives (214): 
Not clear: 11%; 
Somewhat clear: 28%; 
Very clear: 62%. 

Arson 206): 
Not clear: 10%; 
Somewhat clear: 24%; 
Very clear: 66%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who 
answered about that particular investigative area. Percentages do not 
include agents who indicated "no basis to judge." See responses to 
question 10 in appendix II for the number of agents who indicated "no 
basis to judge" or did not answer the question. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Generally, agents reported being very clear about their component's 
roles and responsibilities in investigative areas specifically related 
to their component's mission. For example, ATF agents reported the 
greatest level of clarity for firearms and arson investigations, DEA 
agents reported the greatest level of clarity for drug investigations, 
and USMS agents reported the greatest level of clarity for fugitive 
investigations.[Footnote 9] In contrast, in each investigative area, 
with the exception of gangs, FBI agents were least likely to report 
being very clear about their component's roles and responsibilities. 
Although explosives investigations are directly related to ATF's 
mission, the percentage of ATF agents who reported being very clear in 
this area was lower than all other components except the FBI. 

Based on our analysis of our survey results and investigation data, 
when multiple components are increasingly involved in a particular 
investigative area, agents who work in those areas may be less clear 
about their components' roles and responsibilities. For example, 10 of 
the 36 managers we interviewed[Footnote 10] said that roles and 
responsibilities with regard to drug and fugitive investigations have 
become clearer in recent years because following the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks, FBI has focused less on these areas and more 
on terrorism-related cases. Specifically, FBI referred 30 percent 
fewer drug cases for prosecution in fiscal year 2009 than it did in 
fiscal year 2001 (from 2,994 to 2,103), compared to DEA, which 
referred 13 percent fewer drug cases (from 9,907 to 8,578). Similarly, 
FBI opened 85 percent fewer fugitive investigations in fiscal year 
2009 than it did in fiscal year 2001 (from 9,256 to 1,421). According 
to USMS, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2009, the number of 
state and local fugitive investigations conducted by USMS increased by 
361 percent (27,256 to 125,751). In addition, of all the investigative 
areas we included in our review, gangs is the only one for which all 
four components share jurisdiction, and the percentage of agents who 
reported being very clear on their roles and responsibilities was 
lowest in this area.[Footnote 11] Thus, when there is overlap, 
clarification of roles and responsibilities is important. 

In addition to variation based on the extent of components' 
involvement in a certain investigative area, the survey results also 
show variation based on agents' geographic location. For example, as 
shown in appendix III, 96 percent of agents in Orlando (27 of 28) who 
responded to our survey reported being very clear on their component's 
roles and responsibilities related to drugs, but 50 percent of agents 
in Tulsa (8 of 16) who responded to our survey reported being very 
clear in this area. In general, Orlando and Philadelphia had the 
highest percentages of respondents to report being very clear on roles 
and responsibilities across the six investigative areas, and the 
cities that had the lowest percentage of respondents to report being 
very clear varied among Washington, D.C., Tulsa, Seattle, and Los 
Angeles--these areas included arson, explosives and gangs. DOJ 
components did not offer perspectives on possible reasons for these 
patterns. 

DOJ Has Various Mechanisms in Place to Clarify Components' Roles and 
Responsibilities, and Agents Surveyed Primarily Reported That These 
Mechanisms Were Somewhat Effective: 

DOJ and its components have several mechanisms in place to help agents 
clarify their roles and responsibilities during investigations. These 
mechanisms include policy directives, task forces, deconfliction 
databases, and interpersonal communication, which agents who responded 
to our survey reported using to varying extents. 

Policy directives. Policy directives such as agent manuals provide 
guidance and instruction on DOJ's and components' policies and 
procedures. For example, the ATF agent manual outlines ATF firearms, 
explosives, and arson enforcement authority. In addition, it outlines 
ATF's cooperation policy, which discusses how ATF should coordinate 
its investigations with federal, state, and local law enforcement. DOJ 
components also use memorandums of understanding (MOU) among 
themselves to outline roles and responsibilities in areas of shared 
jurisdiction. These MOUs cover a wide variety of areas, including 
fugitive apprehensions and explosives and drug investigations. For 
example, since 1973 the FBI has established 12 MOUs with ATF, 10 with 
DEA, and 6 with USMS with regard to coordinating investigations in the 
areas of fugitive apprehension, drug investigations and canine 
programs, among other things. In addition, USMS has MOUs with ATF and 
DEA that outline how ATF and DEA can delegate fugitive apprehension 
responsibility for the subject of any of their criminal 
investigations. In addition, USMS and the FBI both have fugitive 
apprehension authority to include state and local fugitives. The MOU 
between FBI and USMS states that FBI will notify USMS when it plans to 
pursue state and local fugitives. 

Task forces. DOJ components have also established task forces to 
target a particular criminal activity in geographical locations. They 
combine resources, intelligence, and the manpower of multiple law 
enforcement agencies to focus on a particular problem. These task 
forces include DOJ law enforcement components, other federal law 
enforcement agencies, and state and local police departments. For 
example, the FBI's Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Force includes 
members from other DOJ components and local law enforcement. The 
mission is to pursue violent gangs through sustained, proactive, 
coordinated investigations to obtain prosecutions under Titles 18 and 
21 of the U.S. Code, including prosecutions for violations such as 
racketeering, drug conspiracy, and firearms violations. 

Deconfliction databases. DOJ law enforcement components also have 
deconfliction databases that are to be used to determine roles and 
responsibilities and to coordinate investigations to ensure that 
agents are not pursuing the same targets. Deconfliction databases 
contain information on cases that involve multi-jurisdictional 
investigations and are available for information sharing among law 
enforcement agencies. If an agent discovers that another component is 
investigating the same target, the database is to provide the agent 
with the information needed to make a contact with the other component 
to discuss the case. For example, 28 regions across the United States 
have been designated as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Each 
area provides one-stop access to numerous federal, state, and local 
law enforcement databases, and also provides an event deconfliction 
service.[Footnote 12] In addition, the National Crime Information 
Center, maintained by the FBI, is a database that allows federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies access to make inquiries and 
is to be used for prompt disclosure of information from other law 
enforcement agencies about crimes and criminals. This information is 
to assist in apprehending fugitives, locating missing persons, and 
locating and returning stolen property, as well as in protecting the 
law enforcement officers encountering the individuals described in the 
system. In addition, DOJ components use local deconfliction databases. 
For example, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, DOJ components use Oklahoma's Bureau 
of Narcotics deconfliction system. 

Interpersonal communication. Agents can contact agents from other 
components, or their supervisors, such as group supervisors or the 
assistant special agent-in-charge (ASAC), to resolve questions about 
roles and responsibilities during specific investigations. 

Agents who responded to our survey most frequently reported using 
interpersonal outreach and communication to determine roles and 
responsibilities when jurisdictions overlapped on particular 
investigations over the past 5 years, as shown in figure 3. Survey 
respondents most frequently reported that they conferred with agents 
from other components (85 percent or 220 of 258), sought direction 
from superiors (85 percent or 216 of 255), or relied on their task 
force experience (79 percent or 200 of 254) to help determine roles 
and responsibilities. In response to an open-ended question, one DEA 
agent stated that at the investigation level, friendships and good 
working relationships are formed that help agents delineate clear 
roles and responsibilities when they share jurisdiction for an 
investigation. The agent also said that it is by working together that 
levels of trust are formed and information is shared among the 
components that can help to resolve overlapping jurisdiction. A USMS 
agent wrote that task forces allow all resources of DOJ to be combined 
with those of state and local authorities and that this creates a very 
streamlined and effective atmosphere for investigations. 

Figure 3: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who 
Reported Using Certain Methods to Determine Roles and Responsibilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Methods used to determine roles and responsibilities: 

Method: Conferred with agents from other components; 
Yes: 85%; 
No: 13%; 
Don't know: 2%. 

Method: Sought direction from superiors; 
Yes: 85%; 
No: 13%; 
Don't know: 2%. 

Method: Task force experience; 
Yes: 79%; 
No: 17%; 
Don't know: 4%. 

Method: Deconfliction database; 
Yes: 65%; 
No: 30%; 
Don't know: 5%. 

Method: Consulted my components policy directives; 
Yes: 62%; 
No: 32%; 
Don't know: 6%. 

Method: Consulted MOUs; 
Yes: 53%; 
No: 40%; 
Don't know: 7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who 
answered about each method. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of 
rounding. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to our survey responses, managers from the 36 component 
field offices we interviewed also reported that they rely on outreach 
with managers in other components and with agents, among other 
mechanisms, to determine roles and responsibilities. For example, 
managers from 22 of these 36 field offices stated that they conduct 
meetings with other component managers to determine what roles each 
component will play in addressing particular types of crime. In 
addition to interpersonal outreach, 65 percent (168 of 259) of agents 
who responded to our survey reported using deconfliction databases to 
determine roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 13] Agents also 
reported using, but less frequently, components' policy directives and 
MOUs, 62 percent and 53 percent, respectively. 

For each method, agents who reported using the method generally 
characterized it as somewhat effective. The methods agents most 
frequently reported as being very effective were also the same three 
methods agents reported most frequently using to help determine roles 
and responsibilities--conferring with agents from other components, 
seeking direction from supervisors, and relying on their experience 
from working with task forces, as shown in figure 4. Task force 
experience was most frequently reported as being very effective (49 
percent or 98 of 198). 

Figure 4: Percentages of Selected Agents Who Responded That Various 
Clarification Methods Were Very Effective, Somewhat Effective, or Not 
Effective: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Method: Task force experience (198); 
49%; 
48%; 
2%. 

Method: Conferred with agents from other components (220)' 
40%; 
57%; 
3%. 

Method: Sought direction from superiors (213); 
36%; 
59%; 
6%. 

Method: Consulted my component’s policy directives (156); 
29%; 
65%; 
6%. 

Method: Deconfliction database (166); 
29%; 
60%; 
11%. 

Method: Consulted MOUs (134); 
23%; 
67%; 
10%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: A particular method was not applicable to all respondents. The 
numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who answered about 
the effectiveness of each method. Percentages may not sum to 100 
because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Agents' responses to open-ended questions on effectiveness identified 
both the benefits and limitations of the clarification mechanisms. 
Some of the reported benefits of these mechanisms were that task 
forces result in the development of good contacts and partnerships at 
other agencies that help to determine roles and responsibilities, 
conferring with agents from other components results in new leads that 
assist in locating and apprehending fugitives, and consulting with 
superiors allows agents to utilize their supervisor's experience and 
training to gain access to new resources. Some of the reasons why 
agents reported certain methods as not effective in determining roles 
and responsibilities included that not all DOJ components use 
deconfliction databases, not all agencies follow MOUs, and policy 
directives are difficult to navigate through and they tend to be vague 
and subject to interpretation. FBI officials stated that the existence 
of policy directives, MOUs, joint task forces and deconfliction 
databases is a more reliable indicator of how well the four components 
are cooperating than the agents' perspectives about these mechanisms. 
However, it is our view that the existence of these mechanisms, alone, 
does not show how well the components are cooperating; rather, it is 
the effectiveness of these mechanisms and how frequently they are used 
and referred to that affect cooperation. We chose to rely on 
testimonial data--that is, the perspectives of selected agents for 
whom these mechanisms were developed. We recognize that these 
perspectives are not generalizable, but at a minimum they provide 
indications of how useful the agents who responded to our survey found 
the clarification mechanisms. 

Over One-Third of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Reported 
Disagreements with Other Components, Which Negatively Affected 
Investigations: 

Sixty-three percent of agents (162 of 259) who responded to our survey 
reported that they did not experience disagreements with another DOJ 
component when determining roles and responsibilities during 
particular investigations over the past 5 years. On the other hand, 37 
percent of selected agents (97 of 259) who responded to our survey 
reported that they had experienced such disagreements. In response to 
an open-ended survey question on why disagreements occurred, 92 of the 
97 agents provided reasons for disagreements, and they most frequently 
reported unclear roles and responsibilities and the lack of 
information sharing related to their investigations as the cause. 
Specifically, 58 percent (53 of 92) cited unclear roles and 
responsibilities with other components as the cause. For example, in 
response to an open-ended question, a FBI agent stated that 
disagreements usually occur between the FBI and DEA when they are both 
targeting the same subject. The agent further wrote that the 
disagreements are related to how the case should progress and who 
should take the lead. Similarly, our analysis of the survey results 
shows that selected agents who reported having disagreements also more 
frequently reported lack of clarity regarding roles and 
responsibilities than did agents who reported not having had a 
disagreement. Specifically, 29 percent (28 of 96) of agents who 
reported having disagreements also said that they sometimes or rarely 
understand their roles and responsibilities in investigations with 
shared jurisdiction, compared to 12 percent (19 of 162) of agents who 
reported not having disagreements. 

In addition to unclear roles and responsibilities, 28 percent (26 of 
92) of the surveyed agents who reported having had a disagreement 
wrote in narrative responses to an open-ended question that not 
receiving relevant information from other components that were 
conducting similar investigations was the cause for disagreements. For 
example, a DEA agent cited concerns that information sharing was not 
always reciprocated with the other DOJ components. Relatedly, in 
response to a question we asked all agents, 27 percent (68 of 254) 
reported that within the past 5 years they had become aware of 
instances, either during or after an investigation, where they did not 
receive relevant information from another DOJ law enforcement 
component related to the investigation. 

Component Involvement in Disagreements: 

Similar to the level of agents' clarity, the extent to which surveyed 
agents reported disagreements varied by component and location. 
Specifically, 46 percent of ATF agents (30 of 65), 45 percent of DEA 
agents (31 of 69) agents, 32 percent of USMS agents (18 of 56), and 26 
percent of FBI agents (18 of 69) reported having a disagreement with 
another component within the past 5 years regarding roles and 
responsibilities. Also, as shown in figure 5, the percentage of these 
surveyed agents in each city who reported having disagreements ranged 
from 18 percent (6 of 34) in Houston to 63 percent (10 of 16) in Tulsa. 

Figure 5: Percentages of Agents Who Reported Having Disagreements with 
Another Component over Roles and Responsibilities over the Past 5 
Years, by City: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

City: Tulsa, Oklahoma (16); 
Percentage of disagreements: 63%. 

City: New York, New York (36); 
Percentage of disagreements: 58%. 

City: Los Angeles, California (28); 
Percentage of disagreements: 39%. 

City: Orlando, Florida (28); 
Percentage of disagreements: 39%. 

City: Seattle, Washington (28); 
Percentage of disagreements: 39%. 

City: Minneapolis, Minnesota (31); 
Percentage of disagreements: 35%. 

City: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (28); 
Percentage of disagreements: 29%. 

City: Washington, District of Columbia (28); 
Percentage of disagreements: 25%. 

City: Houston, Texas (34); 
Percentage of disagreements: 18%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who 
answered the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of 
rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Additionally, the extent to which survey respondents indicated 
experiencing disagreements with agents in specific components varied. 
Agents who indicated having had a disagreement over the past 5 years 
most frequently reported rarely or never having had one with ATF, DEA, 
and USMS; however, they most frequently reported always or often 
having disagreements with the FBI, as shown in figure 6. The FBI has 
more jurisdictional overlap than any of the other DOJ components, 
which allows for more opportunities for disagreements. Nevertheless, 
FBI agents were the least likely to report having a disagreement with 
other components, and when FBI agents reported disagreements, the 
agents most frequently indicated the disagreements were always or 
often with ATF and USMS. 

Figure 6: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who 
Reported Disagreements with Certain Components: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Frequency of disagreements: 

DOJ Component: ATF (54); 
Always/often: 24%; 
Sometimes: 28%; 
Rarely/never: 48%. 

DOJ Component: DEA (51); 
Always/often: 10%; 
Sometimes: 27%; 
Rarely/never: 63%. 

DOJ Component: FBI (66); 
Always/often: 58%; 
Sometimes: 32%; 
Rarely/never: 11%. 

DOJ Component: USMS (61); 
Always/often: 18%; 
Sometimes: 21%; 
Rarely/never: 61%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The responses to the question about each component exclude 
agents who worked in the component. The numbers in parentheses are the 
numbers of survey respondents upon which the percentages are based. 
Percentages do not include agents who indicated "not applicable" 
choices. See appendix II for the number of agents who indicated "not 
applicable" or did not answer the question. Percentages may not sum to 
100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Extent to Which Components Reach Consensus on Roles and 
Responsibilities Following Disagreements: 

Surveyed agents who had indicated having had a disagreement with 
another component over the past 5 years differed on how often 
consensus was reached following a disagreement. Specifically, 39 
percent of agents (37 of 96) who reported having disagreements said 
that they were always or often able to reach consensus, 32 percent (31 
of 96) reported that they sometimes reached consensus, and 23 percent 
(22 of 96) reported that they rarely or never reached 
consensus.[Footnote 14] In addition, 89 percent (71 of 80) of agents 
reported that they most commonly resolved disagreements at the agent 
level. In response to an open-ended question, one agent stated that 
going to management to help resolve an issue between components only 
slows down the investigation. The agent further added that ultimately, 
all agents are working towards a common mission and service to the 
public, and that disagreements are a waste of time and should be 
resolved expeditiously. 

Impact of Disagreements on Investigations: 

Seventy-eight percent (76 of 97) of the agents who reported having 
disagreements with another component, reported that these 
disagreements sometimes, often, or always negatively impacted the 
investigations. While only 6 percent of agents (6 of 94) reporting 
disagreements indicated that they had resulted in "blue on blue" 
incidents,[Footnote 15] 73 percent (69 of 95) reported that the 
disagreements had resulted in prolonged investigations, 73 percent (70 
of 96) reported that they had resulted in an unwillingness of 
components wanting to work with each other, 64 percent (61 of 95) said 
they had resulted in low morale, and 64 percent (60 of 94) said they 
resulted in unnecessary use of resources, as shown in figure 7. 

Figure 7: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on Negative Consequences 
of Disagreements: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Negative consequences of disagreements: 

Prolonged investigations (95): 
Yes: 73%; 
No: 18%; 
Don't know: 9%. 

Blue on blue (94): 
Yes: 6%; 
No: 83%; 
Don't know: 11%. 

Low morale (95): 
Yes: 64%; 
No: 23%; 
Don't know: 13%. 

Fugitive not apprehended (94): 
Yes: 24%; 
No: 56%; 
Don't know: 19%. 

Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution (94): 
Yes: 31%; 
No: 50%; 
Don't know: 19%. 

Unwillingness of components to work with each other (96): 
Yes: 73%; 
No: 19%; 
Don't know: 8%. 

Unnecessary use of resource (96): 
Yes: 64%; 
No: 26%; 
Don't know: 11%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who 
answered about each negative consequence. Percentages may not sum to 
100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

In elaborating on an open-ended question on the negative consequences 
of disagreements, one agent said that they delay prosecution, cause 
contentious relationships, and disrupt clear communication, which 
result in both a reduction in the quality of the evidence gathered and 
a delay of arrest. Another agent said that if agencies do not share 
information or work together, fugitives can sometimes escape. The 
agent further stated that if an agent has a disagreement with another 
component, it is less likely that the agent will want to work with 
that component. 

Working Relationships among Components: 

We also asked all agents we surveyed to characterize their component's 
overall working relationships with other components over the past 5 
years. Agents who responded reported most frequently that their 
component had good or very good working relationships with ATF, DEA, 
and USMS, as shown in figure 8; however, 29 percent of non-FBI agents 
(52 of 182) characterized their component's working relationship with 
the FBI as good or very good, and 28 percent (51 of 182) characterized 
the relationship as poor or very poor. 

Figure 8: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on the Nature of Their 
Component's Working Relationship with ATF, DEA, the FBI, and USMS: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 pie-charts] 

DEA, FBI, and USMS working relationship with ATF (190): 
Very good/good: 68%; 
Adequate: 17%; 
Poor/very poor: 7%; 
Don't know: 8%. 

ATF, FBI, and USMS working relationship with DEA (187): 
Very good/good: 68%; 
Adequate: 18%; 
Poor/very poor: 4%; 
Don't know: 11%. 

ATF, DEA, and USMS working relationship with FBI (182): 
Very good/good: 29%; 
Adequate: 35%; 
Poor/very poor: 28%; 
Don't know: 8%. 

ATF, DEA, and FBI working relationship with USMS (200): 
Very good/good: 74%; 
Adequate: 17%; 
Poor/very poor: 5%; 
Don't know: 5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The responses to the question about each component exclude 
agents who worked in the component. The numbers in parentheses are the 
numbers of agents who answered about each component. Percentages may 
not sum to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

The extent to which agents reported their components having positive 
working relationships with other components varied by geographic 
location. However, for each city, with the exception of Philadelphia, 
agents reported their component to have the least favorable working 
relationship with the FBI compared to other components.[Footnote 16] 
The FBI offered possible explanations for the agents' responses 
regarding disagreements over roles and responsibilities and working 
relationships among the components. First, the FBI stated that the 
survey results could be measuring agents' dissatisfaction with 
overlapping jurisdiction and the way in which responsibilities are 
assigned, such that agents may have a negative perspective if they 
feel they were ruled "against" or were on the "losing" end when roles 
and responsibilities were determined. Second, the FBI stated that 
because it has the greatest opportunity for jurisdictional overlap 
among the four components, the results regarding "poor" working 
relationships may have been confounded--that is, because the FBI has 
more overlap than any other component, and there may be inherent 
frustration with jurisdictional overlap, there is a greater chance 
that more agents would report "poor" working relationships with the 
FBI than with other components. Third, the FBI pointed out that the 
cases for which it has overlapping jurisdiction account for a small 
percentage of all of the work conducted by the FBI. We agree that 
there could be several explanations for why agents responded as they 
did, but considering that respondents reported that disagreements and 
poor working relationships negatively affect investigations and 
morale, determining how agents, beyond those in our nongeneralizable 
sample, view their roles and responsibilities and cooperation with 
other components is important and could help component managers 
improve policy and operational effectiveness. 

The perspectives of senior officials, such as police chiefs and their 
deputies, in the local law enforcement agencies in the cities included 
in our study were generally positive with regard to relationships 
among the DOJ components, but some of these officials had observed 
conflicts. Specifically, senior officials in five of the nine cities 
stated that they had not observed or were not aware of any conflicts 
among the DOJ components and that the components seemed to work well 
with one another. On the other hand, senior officials in three cities 
stated that the working relationships among DOJ components have 
improved, but acknowledged that some problems remain.[Footnote 17] For 
example, one police chief stated that the FBI and ATF do not get along 
well in that particular city, but that the relationships between the 
FBI and DEA have improved. Another chief stated that there continue to 
be some turf battles and tension among the DOJ components, but the 
attitude towards coordination has improved since the September 11th 
attacks. A third chief stated that the DOJ components work well 
together, but there is some competition among them because of 
overlapping task forces. 

One official stated that if there are any issues related to shared 
jurisdiction, they are mostly resolved at the operational level, and 
if not, the issues would go to the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO). 
[Footnote 18] Overall, the USAO officials we interviewed stated that 
there were rarely any conflicts among the DOJ components and that they 
observed good working relationships among them. For example, one USAO 
official stated that he could think of no examples of jurisdictional 
dispute in his 10 years of experience. He further stated that he 
thought that the lack of conflict may be due to the fact that there is 
a heavy workload for all components in terms of the amount of crime in 
his city. Another USAO official stated that there had been disputes 
between two components regarding roles and responsibilities related to 
gang investigations. However, the components, along with the USAO, 
worked together to determine which gangs each component would be 
responsible for investigating. 

DOJ Has Opportunities to Better Monitor Component Coordination and 
Collaboration: 

In addition to the mechanisms that are in place to clarify roles and 
responsibilities, DOJ has also taken action to address issues that 
have arisen regarding roles and responsibilities in specific crime 
areas and to assess component coordination and collaboration, in 
general. However, these efforts do not ensure that the types of 
disagreements agents reported are identified consistently and 
resolved. As previously discussed, ATF and the FBI share jurisdiction 
for explosives investigations. Since 2004, DOJ has taken actions 
intended to address confusion over roles and responsibilities during 
explosives investigations. DOJ issued two MOUs, in 2004 and 2008, to 
clarify which component should have lead jurisdiction, as well as 
other issues related to explosives investigations, such as training 
and information sharing. In 2009, the DOJ Office of the Inspector 
General (IG) reported that ATF and the FBI were not adequately 
coordinating their explosives-related operations, allocation of 
investigative authority between the two agencies was unclear, and 
jurisdictional disputes occurred between ATF and the FBI, delaying 
explosives investigations and resulting in a disjointed federal 
response to explosives incidents, some of which involved terrorist 
incidents.[Footnote 19] During our review, we also found that the FBI 
and ATF continue to experience disagreements over explosives 
investigations. For example, ATF and FBI field agents we interviewed 
in one city said that the local police department called ATF and the 
FBI to a scene where pipe bombs had detonated on a college campus. 
Both agents stated that the two agencies disagreed about which agency 
was to take the lead in the investigation, primarily because it was 
not yet clear whether the pipe bomb was intended for use in a 
terrorist act. As a result of incidents such as these, the IG made 15 
recommendations to improve explosives-related coordination, including 
implementing a new department directive that clearly defined 
jurisdiction between the agencies. In response to the IG findings, in 
August 2010, the Acting Deputy Attorney General issued a protocol to 
resolve the dispute by outlining factors that are indicative of a 
connection to terrorism to clarify roles and responsibilities. Also, 
according to DOJ officials in November 2010, ATF and the FBI submitted 
plans to DOJ that address the IG's recommendation that included joint 
training and new information-sharing policies, among other things. In 
our March 2011 report regarding overlap, duplication, and 
fragmentation, we reported that while these proposed actions should 
address most of these issues, given that the components did not follow 
through on past efforts to achieve these same objectives, it will be 
important for the Congress and DOJ to continually monitor and evaluate 
the components' actions to ensure that the plans have their intended 
effect and are enforced.[Footnote 20] 

In addition to disputes over explosives investigations, a 2007 DOJ IG 
report on coordination by DOJ violent crime task forces found that 
agents in some cities failed to use information-sharing systems such 
as deconfliction databases, which resulted in duplicative 
investigations. The report recommended that DOJ require each component 
to use national and local information-sharing and deconfliction 
systems to coordinate investigations and protect officer safety. As a 
result of this recommendation, the Deputy Attorney General issued a 
memorandum requiring areas where there are multiple DOJ violent crime 
task forces to coordinate and deconflict. Further, the memorandum 
required each component to issue requirements for information sharing 
and coordination, which each component complied with in 2007. While 
the components issued these requirements, agents who responded to our 
survey less frequently reported using deconfliction databases than 
using some other methods, and this method was one of the three methods 
least likely to have been indicated as very effective by reported 
users. In addition, agents reported a lack of information sharing as a 
reason for disagreements over roles and responsibilities, and also 
reported that it resulted in negative consequences. Therefore, our 
survey results indicate that additional actions by DOJ could help 
address these issues. 

In addition to actions taken in response to conflicts that have arisen 
regarding explosives and violent crime task forces, DOJ also has a 
mechanism in place--periodic field office inspections--to ensure 
better collaboration and coordination among components. However, the 
scope of the inspections may limit DOJ's ability to identify some 
problems. Each DOJ law enforcement component conducts inspections of 
its field offices every 3 to 6 years. These inspections cover areas 
such as working relationships, operational programs, leadership, 
management, and administrative programs. The inspection teams--which 
consist of members of the components' inspection teams, as well as 
supervisory agents from the field--interview managers from other DOJ 
components in the region as well as USAO, local police departments, 
and other federal partners. However, three of the four components do 
not solicit input from line agents--who are the ones collaborating 
with agents from other components on a daily basis. For example, we 
reviewed portions of the inspection reports related to working 
relationships and found that ATF inspection teams only solicited input 
from ATF field managers and field managers from other components, but 
did not include agents. DEA solicited input from its own agents, but 
did not solicit input from agents in the other components. Although we 
did not interview and survey a generalizable sample of DOJ component 
managers and agents, we found that the managers and agents we did 
contact had varying perspectives on clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, disagreements, and working relationships. For 
example, an ASAC we interviewed in one field office said that he was 
not aware of any disagreements among DOJ components in that particular 
city; however, most of the agents (10 of 16) from the same field 
office who responded to our survey reported having had disagreements 
with another DOJ component in the past 5 years. Our survey results 
also suggest that managers may not be aware of agent disagreements 
because 89 percent of agents (71 of 80) who reported having 
experienced disagreements also reported that when disagreements are 
resolved, it is typically done so at the agent level. However, not all 
disagreements are resolved, and according to 45 percent of the agents 
who reported having had a disagreement (43 of 95), there are some 
disagreements that because of their severity or frequency, need to be 
addressed. For example one FBI agent said in response to an open-ended 
question that DEA, ATF, FBI, USMS, and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement within the Department of Homeland Security all work drug, 
gang, and firearms violations. The agent further stated that the roles 
are not clear, which has led to duplication of efforts. One USMS agent 
said that fugitive apprehension issues with the FBI need to be 
addressed. 

In addition to the inspection process, FBI officials stated that they 
conduct an annual climate survey of all FBI employees, including field 
agents, which solicits employees' input on collaboration with other 
DOJ components as well as other federal agencies. While the FBI's 
efforts to solicit employee feedback are to be commended, most of the 
coordination-related questions on the survey are specific to 
information sharing within the intelligence community, and the 
questions that relate specifically to law enforcement coordination do 
not explicitly address clarity of roles and responsibilities, 
disagreements with other components, or the quality of working 
relationships. Officials from the other three components could not 
think of any mechanisms in place, beyond the inspection process, to 
obtain feedback from agents on working relationships and coordination. 

Our work on effective interagency collaboration has shown that federal 
agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to create the means to 
monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas 
for improvement. Reporting on these activities can help key decision 
makers within the agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, to 
obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational 
effectiveness. Moreover, according to DOJ's strategic plan, the 
internal inspection and review process is designed to foster improved 
operations, among other things. However, as currently designed, the 
components' inspection processes are limited in the extent to which 
they can help DOJ achieve these goals. Assessing options such as 
changing the inspections process or developing some other mechanism, 
such as an agent survey, to help identify and resolve jurisdictional 
disputes could help components limit the negative impacts from 
jurisdictional disputes over investigations in the field. 

Conclusions: 

The majority of agents who responded to our survey indicated they were 
clear about their component's roles and responsibilities when there is 
jurisdictional overlap, and the mechanisms in place to provide clarity 
and share information are somewhat effective. However, over one-third 
of the agents who responded to our survey reported that over the past 
5 years they have experienced disagreements with other components over 
roles and responsibilities during an investigation, primarily because 
of lack of clarity and lack of information sharing. Such disagreements 
were reported to have negatively affected investigations and working 
relationships among components, yet DOJ's efforts to identify and 
address these issues can be strengthened. It is important that DOJ 
better identify when disagreements occur and diagnose why they are 
occurring so it can improve both policy and operational effectiveness. 
This information could be used to decide if and how to make 
improvements in the mechanisms available to agents to clarify roles 
and responsibilities. For example, additional data could help DOJ 
identify issues with the use of deconfliction mechanisms that are 
intended to resolve problems with information sharing among agents and 
determine roles and responsibilities. By considering options for 
better gauging, diagnosing, and addressing the reasons for 
disagreements in the field--such as effectively soliciting agents' 
perspectives during the inspection process or periodically surveying 
agents and managers--DOJ could be better positioned to limit the 
potential for negative impact on its investigations and resources. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Attorney General, the ATF Director, the DEA 
Administrator, the FBI Director, and the Director of USMS assess the 
feasibility of options they could take to better determine the extent 
to which agents are clear on their roles and responsibilities and have 
experienced disagreements with other components in areas of shared 
jurisdiction. Actions taken from such an assessment could provide the 
data necessary to determine why disagreements are occurring and 
whether and how they could improve clarity, avoid negative impacts on 
investigations, and enhance the working relationships among components. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

On March 28, 2011, DOJ provided written comments on a draft of this 
report, which are reprinted in appendix V. 

DOJ agreed with our recommendation that the Attorney General and the 
directors and administrators of the four DOJ law enforcement 
components should assess the feasibility of options they could take to 
better determine the extent to which agents are clear on their roles 
and responsibilities and experience disagreements. In addition, DOJ 
recognized that it must continue its efforts to work on conflicts as 
they arise. DOJ also offered two other perspectives about our report. 
First, DOJ stated that it believes our report should have included 
more information highlighting the department's on-going efforts to 
enhance working relationships and collaboration among the law 
enforcement components. Second, DOJ stated that it believes we should 
have relied less on our survey results in part because they are 
nongeneralizable. 

In its letter, DOJ stated that it provided us access to documentation 
of mechanisms--specifically, policy directives, MOUs, task forces, and 
deconfliction databases--used by DOJ law enforcement components to 
collaborate and resolve jurisdictional misunderstandings, but 
suggested that we could have discussed these mechanisms in greater 
detail in the report. DOJ asserted in its letter that MOUs and 
deconfliction databases are proven mechanisms of collaboration. We 
appreciate the documentation that DOJ provided to us and found it very 
useful in identifying the various mechanisms DOJ has in place to 
clarify components' roles and responsibilities. We carefully reviewed 
and assessed the information DOJ provided to gain an understanding of 
these mechanisms and summarized each of them in our report. We 
acknowledge that these mechanisms may help to improve coordination 
among the DOJ components. However, we also think that it is important 
to go beyond describing the mechanisms to determining to what extent 
agents themselves think the mechanisms are effective at clarifying 
roles and responsibilities and use them to coordinate investigations. 
We discuss these perspectives in our report to help provide DOJ with 
information it can consider as it assesses the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms. 

With regard to coordination between ATF and the FBI on explosives 
investigations, DOJ commented that the survey results cited in the 
report were obtained prior to when the Deputy Attorney General issued 
Explosives Protocols on August 3, 2010. DOJ suggested that if survey 
responses were solicited now, the results regarding explosives 
investigations would be more positive. While the new protocols are a 
positive step that if implemented effectively should lead to more 
efficient approaches to explosives investigations, as we reported in 
March 2011, the components have not fully followed through on past 
efforts to achieve these same objectives.[Footnote 21] Therefore, we 
will continue to monitor the components' actions to ensure that the 
plans have their intended effect and are enforced. 

Finally, DOJ also stated that it believes the report could have relied 
less on the opinions of agents, since the survey's results were 
nongeneralizable. Because our objective was to determine the extent to 
which agents were clear on their components' roles and 
responsibilities in areas of shared investigative jurisdiction, we 
thought it important to obtain the perspectives about these issues 
from agents who work investigations with overlapping jurisdiction on a 
daily basis. Our original proposal to DOJ was to conduct a 
generalizable survey of agents who had investigated crimes in at least 
one of the six investigative areas in the nine cities we selected. 
However, because of DOJ's concerns about providing us access to 
contact information for such a large number of agents, we had to 
modify our approach and conduct a nongeneralizable survey. DOJ was 
aware of this throughout the course of our review. We believe that the 
results we obtained provide us and DOJ with valuable information about 
the views of agents on important issues, such as how clear they are 
about their roles and how well they collaborate on investigations. We 
were also very careful throughout the report to discuss how we 
conducted our survey and any limitations that were created, as well as 
what results we obtained and what the results mean based on our agent 
sample. To help validate and enrich these survey results, we also 
solicited and reported on the perspectives of field office managers 
for each of the components in the nine cities we visited regarding 
clarity of roles and responsibilities. We disagree with DOJ's 
perspective that the report overstated the frequency and negative 
effect of disagreements between the law enforcement components. For 
each key statistic and survey result we report, we include data on the 
percentage and number of agents who provided a response on that issue, 
as well as the total number of agents who answered the question. We 
believe the results of our work provide DOJ with important information 
on agents' as well as field office managers' perspectives about how 
well coordination with other components in areas of shared 
investigative jurisdiction is working. We acknowledge that it is DOJ's 
responsibility to determine to what extent the department believes the 
disagreements and negative consequences reported by surveyed agents, 
such as prolonged investigations and unnecessary use of resources, 
warrant further study and corrective actions. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Department of Justice and other interested parties. The report also 
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Eileen Regan Larence: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Our review focused on the six crime areas in which two or more 
Department of Justice (DOJ) components have legal jurisdiction to 
conduct investigations. We analyzed statutory provisions as well as 
DOJ and component law enforcement strategic plans to determine the 
extent to which jurisdiction to investigate crimes is shared among the 
components. We determined these areas to be: arson, drugs, explosives, 
gangs, guns, and fugitives, based on our review of laws and 
regulations. Our approach to evaluating the methods used to clarify 
roles and responsibilities, and the extent to which the components are 
clear on their roles and responsibilities was comprised various 
methods, including reviews of DOJ and component guidance and 
documentation, site visits, an agent survey, and interviews with 
officials. For our site visits and field office interviews, we 
selected a non-probability sample of nine field office locations based 
on (1) a range of city sizes; (2) the presence of all four DOJ 
components; and (3) geographic dispersion.[Footnote 22] The nine 
cities selected were: (1) Houston, Texas; (2) Los Angeles, California; 
(3) Minneapolis, Minnesota; (4) New York, New York; (5) Orlando, 
Florida; (6) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; (7) Seattle, Washington; (8) 
Tulsa, Oklahoma and (9) Washington, D.C. 

In each of the nine selected cities, we interviewed each component's 
management and obtained the component's perspective on the clarity of 
roles and responsibilities in the areas of jurisdiction under review, 
methods used to clarify roles and responsibilities, and the frequency 
of disagreements. In addition, we interviewed Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
to obtain their perspectives on the clarity of roles and 
responsibilities among the components, and the working relationship of 
the four components, as well as the U.S. Attorneys Office's (USAO) 
role in coordination. Also, we interviewed police chiefs from the nine 
selected cities to obtain their views on the clarity of DOJ 
components' roles and responsibilities and the methods used to 
coordinate investigations, as well as their knowledge of the extent to 
which DOJ components had disagreements about roles and 
responsibilities during investigations with shared jurisdiction. Table 
1 lists the USAOs and police departments we visited in each location. 

Table 1: USAO Offices and Police Departments Visited in Nine Selected 
Localities: 

Locality: Houston, Texas; 
USAO office: Texas, Southern District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Houston Police Department. 

Locality: Los Angeles, California; 
USAO office: California, Central District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Los Angeles Police Department. 

Locality: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
USAO office: Minnesota, Minnesota District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Minneapolis Police Department. 

Locality: New York, New York; 
USAO office: New York, Southern District; 
Local law enforcement agency: New York Police Department. 

Locality: Orlando, Florida; 
USAO office: Florida, Middle District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Orlando Police Department. 

Locality: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
USAO office: Pennsylvania, Eastern District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Philadelphia Police Department. 

Locality: Seattle, Washington; 
USAO office: Washington, Western District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Seattle Police Department. 

Locality: Tulsa, Oklahoma; 
USAO office: Oklahoma, Northern District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Tulsa Police Department. 

Locality: Washington, DC.; 
USAO office: District of Columbia District; 
Local law enforcement agency: Metropolitan Police Department. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

DOJ agents, particularly those at the special agent and deputy marshal 
level, work investigations on a daily basis where jurisdictions 
overlap. We therefore decided to survey them to obtain their 
perspectives on the level of clarity about roles and responsibilities 
in the six investigative areas, and the methods used to achieve this 
clarity. We planned to conduct a survey that would allow us to 
generalize responses from agents across the 36 field offices--the 
offices for each of the four components in each of the nine cities. 
However, because of DOJ's concerns about providing us access to 
contact information for such a large number of agents, we were limited 
to conducting a survey with a nongeneralizable sample of agents across 
the cities. Each component compiled a list of its agents in that 
office. We requested that each list contain all agents in the field 
office classified as non-supervisory 1811 investigators and who had 
investigated crimes in at least one of the six jurisdictional areas 
covered in our review.[Footnote 23] The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) did not include agents involved in the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) or agents involved in intelligence matters 
because of national security concerns. Because of DOJ's concerns about 
GAO maintaining agent's contact information in its work papers, DOJ 
maintained control of the lists at all times. Once the lists were 
compiled, DOJ provided us with a count of the total number of agents 
in each of the 36 offices. Table 2 contains a summary of these survey 
population counts. 

Table 2: Counts of Special Agents and Deputy Marshals by Location and 
Component: 

City: Houston; 
ATF: 45; 
DEA: 102; 
FBI: 124; 
USMS: 15; 
Total: 286. 

City: Los Angeles; 
ATF: 31; 
DEA: 134; 
FBI: 80; 
USMS: 14; 
Total: 259. 

City: Minneapolis; 
ATF: 7; 
DEA: 14; 
FBI: 100; 
USMS: 13; 
Total: 134. 

City: New York; 
ATF: 31; 
DEA: 238; 
FBI: 79; 
USMS: 10; 
Total: 358. 

City: Orlando; 
ATF: 11; 
DEA: 19; 
FBI: 7; 
USMS: 5; 
Total: 42. 

City: Philadelphia; 
ATF: 31; 
DEA: 89; 
FBI: 83; 
USMS: 6; 
Total: 209. 

City: Seattle; 
ATF: 14; 
DEA: 29; 
FBI: 39; 
USMS: 4; 
Total: 86. 

City: Tulsa; 
ATF: 7; 
DEA: 4; 
FBI: 3; 
USMS: 2; 
Total: 16. 

City: DC; 
ATF: 21; 
DEA: 55; 
FBI: 64; 
USMS: 33; 
Total: 173. 

City: Total; 
ATF: 198; 
DEA: 684; 
FBI: 579; 
USMS: 102; 
Total: 1,563. 

Sources: ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS. 

[End of table] 

Our nongeneralizable sample of agents was selected to limit 
disruptions to field office operations. We restricted the size of our 
sample and randomly selected 10 agents from each office. If an office 
had 10 or fewer eligible agents, we selected all of them. In total, we 
selected 315 agents. We do not generalize the survey results to all 
non-supervisory 1811 investigators who had investigated crimes in at 
least one of the six jurisdictional areas in each city. However, we 
believe the survey results we obtained provide us with valuable 
information about the range of views concerning their roles and 
responsibilities and experiences in the investigative areas with 
shared jurisdiction held by federal agents who responded. 

Our survey period was from June 17, 2010 through August 25, 2010. The 
questionnaires were sent by GAO via Federal Express from the DOJ to a 
point of contact in each of the 36 offices, and the contact person 
distributed survey packets--including a cover letter, copy of the 
questionnaire, and postage-paid return envelope--to selected agents. 
Following the same process, we sent one follow-up survey packet to 
each nonrespondent. In all, we received responses from 260 of the 315 
agents for an overall 83 percent response rate. The response rates for 
the individual components were 77 percent for the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) (65 of 84 agents); 83 percent 
for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (70 of 84 agents); 86 
percent for the FBI (69 of 80 agents); and 84 percent for U.S. Marshal 
Services) (USMS (56 of 67 marshals). The numbers of agents who 
responded to survey questions varied depending on skip instructions 
contained in the survey questionnaire. Also, agents may have chosen 
not to answer certain questions. The survey results we provide in our 
report depend on these factors. Percentages are based on the number of 
agents who responded to specific survey questions. 

For the survey, the practical difficulties of conducting such surveys 
may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For 
example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, the 
sources of information available to respondents, or how data are 
entered into databases or analyzed can introduce unwanted variability 
into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the 
questionnaires to minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, a 
social science survey specialist designed the questionnaire in 
collaboration with GAO staff with subject matter expertise. The 
questionnaire contained a combination of open-ended and close-ended 
questions, and it asked agents about their experiences with their 
component in their current location over a period of reference of up 
to 5 years. We pretested the questionnaire in person with agents in 
each component in each of two locations. During the pretests, we asked 
the agents questions to determine whether (1) the survey questions 
were clear, (2) the terms used were precise, (3) the questionnaire 
placed an undue burden on the respondents, and (4) the questions were 
unbiased. We made changes to the content and format of the final 
questionnaire based on the pretests and reviews of the draft 
questionnaire by DOJ management. All data from the returned 
questionnaires were double key-entered into an electronic file in 
batches (that is, the entries were 100 percent verified), and a random 
sample of each batch was selected for further verification for 
completeness and accuracy. Computer analyses were also performed to 
identify any inconsistencies in response patterns or other indications 
of errors. All computer syntax was reviewed and verified by a separate 
programmer to ensure that the syntax had been written and executed 
correctly. 

In addition to the survey and management interviews, we used various 
other methods to identify mechanisms used to clarify roles and 
responsibilities in areas of shared jurisdiction. We analyzed 
memorandums of understanding, descriptions of de-confliction 
databases, components' inspection reports from selected cities, DOJ 
working group papers, and task force membership. We also reviewed the 
reports from two studies conducted by the DOJ Office of the Inspector 
General's Office about federal law enforcement coordination. We found 
the conclusions and recommendations drawn in each report to be 
appropriate based on the methodologies used. In addition, we also 
examined data from the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys, FBI, 
and USMS. To assess the reliability of the data we obtained, we 
discussed the sources of the data with agency officials and determined 
that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 through February 
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Law Enforcement Coordination Survey Results: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GA0: 

GAO Survey of ATF, DEA, FBI, and U.S. Marshals Service Law Enforcement 
Agents: 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), an agency of the 
Congress, has been asked to assess how DOJ law enforcement agents 
determine their roles and responsibilities when addressing crimes that 
involve guns, drugs, gangs, explosives, arson, and fugitives, for 
which there is shared jurisdiction among DOJ law enforcement 
components. As part of this review, GAO is surveying field agents with 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) in 9 field office locations. 
This review is limited to DOJ components and does not include 
components of the Department of Homeland Security. 

GAO has randomly chosen you to receive this survey. We would like you 
to respond based on your experiences with your component in your 
current location over the past 5 years. If you have less than 5 years 
experience in your current location, please answer about the time
you have worked there. 

Please do not disclose the following information in your narrative 
responses: 

*  Law enforcement sensitive information; 

* Information about on-going investigations; 

* Information on counterterrorism or other national intelligence 
matters; 

* Any work related to a Joint Terrorism Task Force (However, you may 
describe investigations into criminal explosive incidents that were 
determined to be unrelated to terrorism.) 

GAO will present the aggregate results of this survey in our report to 
Congress. Although in some cases individual survey responses may be 
discussed, the report will not include any information that could be 
used to identify individual respondents. Identifying information will 
be kept confidential and will not be released outside GAO, unless 
compelled by law or pursuant to a Congressional request. 

Please complete this questionnaire and return it within two weeks of 
receipt. A pre-addressed postage-paid envelope has been included in 
which to return this questionnaire. Please do not include your name on 
the return envelope. If you have any questions, please contact: 

Background: 

Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of respondents who 
answered a question. 

Missing is the number of eligible respondents who did not answer a 
question. 

1. With which DOJ component are you employed? (Check one.)
ATF: 25% (65); 
DEA: 27% (70); 
FBI: 27% (69); 
USMS: 22% (56). 

Notes: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing = 0. 

2. In what city are you currently located? (Check one.)
Washington, DC:	11% (29); 
Philadelphia: 11% (28); 
New York: 14% (36); 
Seattle: 11% (28); 
Los Angeles: 11% (28); 
Tulsa: 6% (16); 
Orlando: 11% (28); 
Minneapolis: 12% (31); 
Houston: 13% (34). 

Note: Missing = 2. 

3. What is your current title? 
(258).	
Missing = 2. 

4. How many years have you been working for this component in your 
current location? 
0 years: 1% (2); 
1 to 5 years: 40% (104); 
6 to 10 years: 36% (92); 
11 to 15 years:	14% (36); 
16 to 20 years: 5% (13); 
21 to 30 years: 4% (10). 

Notes: Responses were grouped into the above age categories.
Missing = 3. 

5. How many years in total have you been employed by this DOJ 
component? 
0 years: less than 1% (1); 
1 to 5 years: 20% (51); 
6 to 10 years:	33% (86); 
11 to 15 years:	25% (66); 
16 to 20 years:	12% (30); 
21 to 30 years:	10% (25). 

Notes: Responses were grouped into the above yearly categories. 
Missing = 1. 

6. In your current location over the past 5 years, have you been 
assigned to any task forces either led by your component or other DOJ 
components? 
Yes: 69% (180): Continue with question 7.
No: 31% (80): Go to the Roles and Responsibilities section on page 3. 

Note: Missing = 0. 

7. If you checked "Yes" to question 6, to which task forces have you 
been assigned? (Check one box in each row.) 

a. USMS Fugitive Task Force:		
Yes: 67% (59); 
No: 33%	(29). 

b. FBI Safe Streets Task Force:		
Yes: 42% (29); 
No: 58%	(40). 

c. Project Safe Neighborhood Task Force:		
Yes: 20% (11); 
No: 80%	(45). 

d. ATF Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT):		
Yes: 34% (23); 
No: 66%	(44). 

e. DEA Mobile Enforcement Team (MET):		
Yes: 13% (7); 
No: 87%	(47). 

f. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF):				
Yes: 44% (29); 
No: 56%	(37). 

g. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA):				
Yes: 54% (41); 
No: 46%	(35). 

h. Other (Specify):	
Yes: 68% (48); 
No: 32%	(23). 

Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Missing: a = 92, b = 111, c= 124, d = 113, e = 126, f = 114, g = 104, 
h= 109.
	
Roles and Responsibilities: 

In responding to the following questions, please consider your 
experiences in your current location over the past 5 years. 

8. Approximately what percentage of your investigations involved the 
following crimes as the principal investigative	focus?	(Because 
investigations can involve more than one type of crime, percentages do 
not need to sum to 100%) 

a. Guns: 
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 40% (172). 

b. Drugs: 
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 59% (207). 

c. Gangs: 
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 32% (142). 

d. Explosives: 
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 8% (100). 

e. Arson: 
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 8% (94). 

f. Fugitives: 
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 39% (154). 

g. Other: 
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 31% (115). 

Note: Missing: a = 88, b = 53, c= 118, d = 160, e = 166, f = 106, g = 
145. 

9. In your experience, how often have you had a clear understanding 
regarding your roles and responsibilities on investigations where 
there is shared jurisdiction among DOJ law enforcement components 
(ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS)? (Check one.) 

Always:	45% (115); 
Often:	35% (90); 
Sometimes: 14% (35); 
Rarely: 5% (12); 
Never: 0; 
Don't know: 2% (6). 

Notes: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Missing = 2. 

10. Listed below are investigative areas where DOJ law enforcement	
components share jurisdiction. How clear are you on your agency's 
roles	and responsibilities in each of these investigative areas? 
(Check one box in each row.) 

a. Guns:	
Very clear: 67% (168)	
Somewhat clear:	28% (70)	
Not clear: 4% (11)	
No basis to judge[A]: 9. 

b. Drugs:	
Very clear: 70% (176)	
Somewhat clear:	26% (64)	
Not clear: 4% (11)	
No basis to judge[A]: 7. 

c. Gangs:	
Very clear: 58% (142)	
Somewhat clear:	35% (84)	
Not clear: 7% (17)	
No basis to judge[A]: 13. 

d. Explosives:	
Very clear: 62% (132)	
Somewhat clear:	28% (59)	
Not clear: 11% (23)	
No basis to judge[A]: 42. 

e. Arson:	
Very clear: 66% (136)	
Somewhat clear:	24% (50)	
Not clear: 10% (20)	
No basis to judge[A]: 50. 

f. Fugitives:	
Very clear: 69% (166)	
Somewhat clear:	25% (59)	
Not clear: 6% (14)	
No basis to judge[A]: 17. 

Note: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.	
Missing:a=2, b=2, c=4, d=4, e=4, f=4.	 

[A] Responses not included in the calculation of percentages. 
	
11. In your current location over the past 5 years, did you use any of 
the following methods to determine your roles and responsibilities	
when working on an investigation where there was shared	jurisdiction 
between your and another DOJ component? 

a. Accessed a deconfliction database: 
Yes: 65% (168); 
No: 30%	(77); 
Don't know: 5%	(14); 
Note: Missing = 1. 

12. In your experience, how effective was this method in helping you 
to determine your roles and responsibilities? (from 11.a, Yes) 
Very effective:	29% (48); 
Somewhat effective: 60% (100); 
Not effective:	11% (18); 
Note: Missing = 2. 

If you checked "No" for item a, please explain why you did not use the 
method.	
(72); Missing = 5. 

If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item a, please 
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(49); Missing = 17. 
	
b. Conferred with agents from	other components when initiating the 
investigation: 
Yes: 85% (220);	
No: 13%	(33);	
Don't know: 2% (5);	
Note: Missing = 2. 

From 11.b, Yes: 
Very effective:	40% (89); 
Somewhat effective: 57% (125); 
Not effective:	3% (6)
Note: Missing = 0.	 

If you checked "No" for item b, please explain why you did not use the 
method.	
(32); Missing = 1.	 

If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item b, please 
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(70); Missing = 25. 

c. Sought direction from superiors: 
Yes: 85% (216); 
No: 13%	(34); 
Don't know: 2%	(5); 	
Note: Missing = 5. 

From c. Yes: 
Very effective:	36% (76); 
Somewhat effective: 59% (125); 
Not effective: 	6% (12); 
Note: Missing = 3. 

If you checked "No" for item c, please explain why you did not use the 
method.	
(32); Missing = 2. 

If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item c, please 
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(65);	Missing = 23. 

d. Consulted Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs): 
Yes: 53% (135)
No: 40%	(103)	
Don't know: 7% (17)	
Note: Missing = 5. 	 

From d. Yes: 
Very effective:	23% (31)
Somewhat effective: 67% (90)
Not effective:	10% (13)
Note: Missing = 1. 

If you checked "No' for item d, please explain why you did not use the 
method.	
(86); Missing = 17. 

If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item d, please 
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.	
(34); Missing = 10. 

e. Relied on my experience from	working with task forces: 
Yes 79%	(200); 
No 17%	(44);	
Don't know. 4% (10); 	
Note: Missing = 6. 

From e. Yes: 
Very effective:	49% (98); 
Somewhat effective: 48% (96); 
Not effective:  2% (4); 
Note: Missing = 2. 

If you checked "No" for item e, please explain why you did lot use the 
method.	
(39); Missing = 5. 

If you checked 'Very effective" or Not effective" for item e, please 
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(76); Missing = 26. 

f. Consulted my component's policy directives, such as the agent 
manual: 
Yes: 62% (157); 
No: 32%	(80); 
Don't know: 6% (16); 
Note: Missing = 1. 

From f. Yes: 
Very effective:	29% (45); 
Somewhat effective: 65% (102); 
Not effective: 6% (9); 
Note: Missing = 7.	 

If you checked "No' for item f, please explain why you did lot use the 
method.	
(83); Missing = 17	 

If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item f, please 
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(42); Missing = 12. 

g. Other (Specify):	
Yes: 36% (45); 
No: 64% (81); 
Don't know: 0; 
Note: Missing = 134.	 

From g. Yes: 
Very effective:	49% (22); 
Somewhat effective: 49% (22); 
Not effective:	 2% (1); 
Note: Missing = 0. 

If you checked "Very effective" or Not effective" for item g, please 
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(18); Missing = 5. 

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 

13.ln your current location over the past 5 years, have you 
experienced disagreements with another DOJ component (ATF, DEA, FBI, 
and USMS) when determining roles and responsibilities during an 
investigation where there was shared jurisdiction? 
Yes: 37% (97): Continue with question 14; 
No: 63% (162) 0: Go to question 24. 
Note: Missing = 1. 

14. If you checked "Yes" to question 13, how often have you 
experienced disagreements with any of the following components over 
roles and responsibilities in areas of shared jurisdiction? (Check one 
box in each row.)			 

a. ATF: 	
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 4;	
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 28;	
Always: 9% (5);	
Often: 15% (8);	
Sometimes: 28% (15);	
Rarely: 22% (12);	
Never: 26% (14). 

b. DEA: 	
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 8;	
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 18;	
Always: 0;	
Often: 10% (5);	
Sometimes: 27% (14);	
Rarely: 35% (18);	
Never: 27% (14). 

c. FBI: 	
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 4;
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 12;
Always: 9% (6);	
Often: 48% (32);	
Sometimes: 32% (21);	
Rarely: 6% (4);	
Never: 5% (3). 

d. USMS: 
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 6;	
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 12;	
Always: 5% (3);	
Often: 13% (8);	
Sometimes: 21% (13);	
Rarely: 26% (16);	
Never: 34% (21). 

Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 

Missing: 
a = 11 (includes 2 ATF agents who provided either a response other 
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer).			
b = 20 (includes 13 DEA agents who provided either a response other 
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer). 			
c = 15 (includes 7 FBI agents who provided either a response other 
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer). 			
d = 18 (includes 7 USMS deputy marshals who did not provide any 
answer). 
			
[A] Responses not included in the calculation of percentages.	 

15. What were some of the reasons for these disagreements? (Please 
provide examples to illustrate your answer)			
(92); Missing =5. 

16. In your experience, what were are the most effective methods used 
to resolve disagreements? 
(88);	Missing = 9. 

17.To the extent of your knowledge, what are the top three levels at 
which disagreements are most commonly resolved? (Place a "1" in the 
space next to the level where disagreements are most commonly 
resolved, followed by a "2" and "3" for those that follow. Please 
enter "1",'2", and "3" only once each.) 

a. Agent to Agent (Deputy US Marshal): 
Three most common levels: 89% (71). 

b. Group Supervisor/Supervisory Deputy Marshal: 
Three most common levels: 84% (67). 

c. ASAC/Assistant Chief US Marshal: 
Three most common levels: 59% (47). 

d. SAC/US Marshal:
Three most common levels: 26% (21). 

e. USAO:
Three most common levels: 31% (25). 

f. Your component's headquarters:
Three most common levels: 10% (8). 

g. DOJ headquarters:
Three most common levels: 6% (5). 

Check "Don't know" if you feel you do not have	enough information to 
answer this question. 
Don't know: (11). 
Note: Missing = 6. 

18.In your experience, how often have the components involved reached a	
consensus on roles and responsibilities following a disagreement? 
(Check one.)	
Always:	7% (7); 
Often: 31% (30); 
Sometimes: 32%	(31); 
Rarely:	20% (19); 
Never: 3% (3); 
Don't know: 6% (6). 

Notes: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.	
Missing = 1. 
	
19. How often has the disagreement negatively affected the 
investigation? (Check one.)	
Always:	7% (7); 
Often: 31% (30); 
Sometimes: 40%	(39); 
Rarely:	21% (20); 
Never:	1% (1); 
Don't know: 0; 
Note: Missing = 0.	 

20. Have any of the disagreements you have experienced with other DOJ 
law enforcement components (ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS) about roles and 
responsibilities, resulted in any of the following negative 
consequences? (Check one box in each row.) 

a. Prolonged investigation:	
Yes: 73% (69); 
No: 18% (17); 
Don't know: 9% (9). 

b. "Blue on Blue" incidents: 
Yes: 6% (6); 
No: 83% (78); 
Don't know: 11%	(10). 

c. Low morale: 
Yes: 64% (61); 
No: 23% (22); 
Don't know: 13%	(12). 

d. Fugitive not apprehended: 
Yes: 24% (23); 
No: 56% (53); 
Don't know: 19%	(18). 

e. Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution: 
Yes: 31% (29); 
No: 50% (47); 
Don't know: 19%	(18). 

f. Unwillingness of components to work with each other: 
Yes: 73% (70); 
No: 19% (18); 
Don't know: 8% (8). 

g. Unnecessary use of resources (i.e., technical equipment, agents' 
time and efforts): 
Yes: 64% (60); 
No: 26% (24); 
Don't know: 11%	(10). 
		
h. Other (Specify): 
Yes: 33% (7); 
No: 29% (6); 
Don't know: 38%	(8). 
		
Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Missing: a = 2, b = 3 ,c = 2, d = 3, e = 3, f = 1,g = 3, h =76. 
		
21. If you checked "Yes" to any of the items in question 20, please 
identify the item and explain why you answered "Yes".		
(79); Missing = 7.	
	
22. In your experience, have there been any disagreements regarding 
roles and responsibilities among the DOJ components that, because of 
their severity or frequency, need to be addressed? 
Yes: 45% (43): Continue with question 23.
No: 55% (52): Go to question 24.
Note: Missing = 2. 

23. If you checked "Yes" to question 22, please provide an example of 
such disagreements.
(42); Missing = 1. 

24. Within the past 5 years, did you become aware - either during or 
after an investigation - of any instances where you did not receive 
relevant information from another DOJ law enforcement component (ATF, 
DEA, FBI, and USMS) related to one of your investigations?
Yes: 27% (68): Continue with question 25.
No: 73% 186): Go to question 26.
Note: Missing = 6. 

25. If you checked "Yes" to question 24, did not receiving this	
information result in any of the following negative consequences? 
(Check one box in each row.)	 

a. Prolonged investigation: 
Yes: 78% (49);	
No: 17% (11);	
Don't know: 5% (3). 
 
b. "Blue on Blue" incidents: 
Yes: 9% (5);	
No: 82% (45);	
Don't know: 9% (5). 

c. Low morale: 
Yes: 60% (35);	
No: 28% (16);	
Don't know: 12% (7). 

d. Fugitive not apprehended: 
Yes: 33% (19);	
No: 53% (30);	
Don't know: 14% (8). 

e. Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution: 
Yes: 26% (15);	
No: 53% (30);	
Don't know: 21% (12). 

f. Unwillingness to work with other components: 
Yes: 65% (39);	
No:  (32% (19);	
Don't know: 3% (2). 

g. Unnecessary use of resources (i.e., technical equipment, agents' 
time and efforts): 
Yes: 72% (44);	
No: 20% (12);	
Don't know: 8% (5). 

h. Other (Specify): 
Yes: 10% (2);	
No: 60% (12);	
Don't know: 30% (6). 

Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Missing: a = 5, b = 13, c = 10, d = 11, e = 11, f = 8, g = 7, h = 48. 

26. Based on your experience in your current location over the past 5 
years, overall how would you characterize your agency's working 
relationship with each of the following DOJ components? (Check one box 
in each row.) 

a. ATF: 	
Not applicable,	I work in this component[A]: 64; 
Very good: 39% (75); 
Good: 28% (54);	
Adequate: 17% (32);	
Poor: 4% (7);	
Very poor: 4% (7);	
Don't know: 8% (15). 

b. DEA: 	
Not applicable,	I work in this component[A]: 51;	
Very good: 37% (69);	
Good: 31% (58);	
Adequate: 18% (33);
Poor: 3% (5);	
Very poor: 1% (2);	
Don't know: 11% (20). 

c. FBI: 
Not applicable,	I work in this component[A]: 55;	
Very good: 10% (19);	
Good: 18% (33);	
Adequate: 35% (64);	
Poor: 19% (34);	
Very poor: 9% (17);	
Don't know: 8% (15). 

d. USMS:	
Not applicable,	I work in this component[A]: 38;	
Very good: 39% (77);	
Good: 35% (70);	
Adequate: 17% (33);	
Poor: 4% (7);	
Very poor: 2% (3);	
Don't know: 5% (10). 

Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 

Missing: a = 6 (includes 3 ATF agents who provided either a response 
other than Not	applicable" or did not provide any answer); 		
b = 22 (includes 19 DEA agents who provided either a response other 
than Not applicable" or did not answer); 
c = 23 (includes 16 FBI agents who provided either a response other 
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer); 
d = 22 (includes 19 USMS deputy marshals who provided either a response	
other than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer) 

[A] Responses not included in the calculation of percentages. 

27. What additional comments or suggestions would you like to share 
about your component's roles and responsibilities in areas of shared 
jurisdiction with other DOJ components? 
(91);	Missing = 169. 
		
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Extent to Which Survey Respondents Reported Being Clear 
on Their Component's Roles and Responsibilities in Each Area of Shared 
Jurisdiction: 

Figures 9 through 14 show the extent to which respondents to our 
survey reported being clear on their component's roles and 
responsibilities in each shared jurisdiction area. 

Figure 9: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Arson Investigations--Overall, by Component, and 
by City: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Overall responses (206): 
Very clear: 66%; 
Somewhat clear: 24%; 
Not clear: 10%. 

Responses by agency: 

ATF (61): 
Very clear: 74%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Not clear: 2%. 

DEA (47): 
Very clear: 70%; 
Somewhat clear: 11%; 
Not clear: 19%. 

FBI (53): 
Very clear: 43%; 
Somewhat clear: 43%; 
Not clear: 13%. 

USMS (45): 
Very clear: 78%; 
Somewhat clear: 16%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

Responses by city: 

Houston, Texas (23): 
Very clear: 65%; 
Somewhat clear: 30%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Los Angeles, California (20): 
Very clear: 70%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Not clear: 5%. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (27): 
Very clear: 63%; 
Somewhat clear: 15%; 
Not clear: 22%. 

New York, New York (28): 
Very clear: 64%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Not clear: 11%. 

Orlando, Florida (27): 
Very clear: 78%; 
Somewhat clear: 15%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (21): 
Very clear: 76%; 
Somewhat clear: 19%; 
Not clear: 5%. 

Seattle, Washington (22): 
Very clear: 59%; 
Somewhat clear: 41%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Tulsa, Oklahoma (16): 
Very clear: 75%; 
Somewhat clear: 13%; 
Not clear: 13%. 

Washington, DC (20): 
Very clear: 50%; 
Somewhat clear: 35%; 
Not clear: 15%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded 
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Explosives Investigations--Overall, by Component, 
and by City: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Overall responses (214): 
Very clear: 62%; 
Somewhat clear: 28%; 
Not clear: 11%. 

Responses by agency: 

ATF (62): 
Very clear: 61%; 
Somewhat clear: 34%; 
Not clear: 5%. 

DEA (50): 
Very clear: 64%; 
Somewhat clear: 14%; 
Not clear: 22%. 

FBI (55): 
Very clear: 45%; 
Somewhat clear: 42%; 
Not clear: 13%. 

USMS (47): 
Very clear: 79%; 
Somewhat clear: 17%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Responses by city: 

Houston, Texas (25): 
Very clear: 68%; 
Somewhat clear: 32%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Los Angeles, California (20): 
Very clear: 55%; 
Somewhat clear: 35%; 
Not clear: 10%. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (28): 
Very clear: 54%; 
Somewhat clear: 29%; 
Not clear: 18%. 

New York, New York (29): 
Very clear: 79%; 
Somewhat clear: 14%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

Orlando, Florida (28): 
Very clear: 78%; 
Somewhat clear: 15%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (22): 
Very clear: 73%; 
Somewhat clear: 27%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Seattle, Washington (24): 
Very clear: 54%; 
Somewhat clear: 42%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Tulsa, Oklahoma (16): 
Very clear: 63%; 
Somewhat clear: 19%; 
Not clear: 19%. 

Washington, DC (20): 
Very clear: 45%; 
Somewhat clear: 40%; 
Not clear: 15%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded 
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 11: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Gang Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by 
City: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Overall responses (243): 
Very clear: 58%; 
Somewhat clear: 35%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

Responses by agency: 

ATF (62): 
Very clear: 60%; 
Somewhat clear: 31%; 
Not clear: 10%. 

DEA (65): 
Very clear: 51%; 
Somewhat clear: 42%; 
Not clear: 8%. 

FBI (64): 
Very clear: 61%; 
Somewhat clear: 33%; 
Not clear: 6%. 

USMS (52): 
Very clear: 63%; 
Somewhat clear: 33%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Responses by city: 

Houston, Texas (30): 
Very clear: 63%; 
Somewhat clear: 33%; 
Not clear: 3%. 

Los Angeles, California (25): 
Very clear: 56%; 
Somewhat clear: 44%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (29): 
Very clear: 45%; 
Somewhat clear: 38%; 
Not clear: 17%. 

New York, New York (36): 
Very clear: 67%; 
Somewhat clear: 31%; 
Not clear: 3%. 

Orlando, Florida (28): 
Very clear: 75%; 
Somewhat clear: 21%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (26): 
Very clear: 69%; 
Somewhat clear: 23%; 
Not clear: 8%. 

Seattle, Washington (25): 
Very clear: 52%; 
Somewhat clear: 32%; 
Not clear: 16%. 

Tulsa, Oklahoma (16): 
Very clear: 44%; 
Somewhat clear: 44%; 
Not clear: 13%. 

Washington, DC (26): 
Very clear: 50%; 
Somewhat clear: 46%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded 
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 12: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Firearms Investigations--Overall, by Component, 
and by City: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Overall responses (249): 
Very clear: 67%; 
Somewhat clear: 28%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Responses by agency: 

ATF (64): 
Very clear: 89%; 
Somewhat clear: 11%; 
Not clear: 0. 

DEA (66): 
Very clear: 59%; 
Somewhat clear: 32%; 
Not clear: 9%. 

FBI (66): 
Very clear: 52%; 
Somewhat clear: 44%; 
Not clear: 5%. 

USMS (53): 
Very clear: 72%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Responses by city: 

Houston, Texas (32): 
Very clear: 69%; 
Somewhat clear: 28%; 
Not clear: 3%. 

Los Angeles, California (26): 
Very clear: 54%; 
Somewhat clear: 52%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (30): 
Very clear: 57%; 
Somewhat clear: 37%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

New York, New York (36): 
Very clear: 69%; 
Somewhat clear: 31%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Orlando, Florida (28): 
Very clear: 82%; 
Somewhat clear: 18%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (27): 
Very clear: 78%; 
Somewhat clear: 19%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Seattle, Washington (26): 
Very clear: 65%; 
Somewhat clear: 27%; 
Not clear: 8%. 

Tulsa, Oklahoma (16): 
Very clear: 69%; 
Somewhat clear: 13%; 
Not clear: 19%. 

Washington, DC (26): 
Very clear: 69%; 
Somewhat clear: 27%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded 
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 13: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Fugitives Investigations--Overall, by Component, 
and by City: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Overall responses (239): 
Very clear: 62%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Not clear: 6%. 

Responses by agency: 

ATF (54): 
Very clear: 65%; 
Somewhat clear: 20%; 
Not clear: 15%. 

DEA (64): 
Very clear: 63%; 
Somewhat clear: 31%; 
Not clear: 6%. 

FBI (65): 
Very clear: 58%; 
Somewhat clear: 38%; 
Not clear: 3%. 

USMS (56): 
Very clear: 95%; 
Somewhat clear: 5%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Responses by city: 

Houston, Texas (28): 
Very clear: 82%; 
Somewhat clear: 18%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Los Angeles, California (24): 
Very clear: 67%; 
Somewhat clear: 29%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (29): 
Very clear: 62%; 
Somewhat clear: 24%; 
Not clear: 14%. 

New York, New York (35): 
Very clear: 66%; 
Somewhat clear: 9%; 
Not clear: 6%. 

Orlando, Florida (28): 
Very clear: 75%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (27): 
Very clear: 81%; 
Somewhat clear: 11%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

Seattle, Washington (24): 
Very clear: 58%; 
Somewhat clear: 29%; 
Not clear: 13%. 

Tulsa, Oklahoma (16): 
Very clear: 69%; 
Somewhat clear: 25%; 
Not clear: 6%. 

Washington, DC (26): 
Very clear: 69%; 
Somewhat clear: 31%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded 
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 14: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very 
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and 
Responsibilities in Drug Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by 
City: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Overall responses (251): 
Very clear: 70%; 
Somewhat clear: 26%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Responses by agency: 

ATF (63): 
Very clear: 59%; 
Somewhat clear: 35%; 
Not clear: 6%. 

DEA (68): 
Very clear: 91%; 
Somewhat clear: 9%; 
Not clear: 0. 

FBI (66): 
Very clear: 56%; 
Somewhat clear: 36%; 
Not clear: 8%. 

USMS (54): 
Very clear: 74%; 
Somewhat clear: 22%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Responses by city: 

Houston, Texas (31): 
Very clear: 65%; 
Somewhat clear: 32%; 
Not clear: 3%. 

Los Angeles, California (27): 
Very clear: 78%; 
Somewhat clear: 19%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (30): 
Very clear: 63%; 
Somewhat clear: 27%; 
Not clear: 10%. 

New York, New York (36): 
Very clear: 67%; 
Somewhat clear: 33%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Orlando, Florida (28): 
Very clear: 96%; 
Somewhat clear: 4%; 
Not clear: 0. 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (27): 
Very clear: 74%; 
Somewhat clear: 19%; 
Not clear: 7%. 

Seattle, Washington (27): 
Very clear: 63%; 
Somewhat clear: 33%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Tulsa, Oklahoma (16): 
Very clear: 50%; 
Somewhat clear: 38%; 
Not clear: 13%. 

Washington, DC (27): 
Very clear: 67%; 
Somewhat clear: 30%; 
Not clear: 4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded 
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Survey Respondents' Perspectives regarding Their 
Component's Working Relationship with Other DOJ Components: 

Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents from the nine cities we 
surveyed who reported very good or good working relationships with 
agents from other components. 

Table 3: Percentages of Respondents from the Nine Cities Who Reported 
Very Good or Good Working Relationships with Other Components: 

City: Houston, TX; 
ATF: 79; (19 of 24); 
DEA: 83; (20 of 24); 
FBI: 48; (11 of 23); 
USMS: 77; (20 of 26). 

City: Los Angeles, CA; 
ATF: 71; (15 of 21); 
DEA: 55; (11 of 20); 
FBI: 11; (2 of 19); 
USMS: 71; (17 of 24). 

City: Minneapolis, MN; 
ATF: 69; (18 of 26); 
DEA: 55; (12 of 22); 
FBI: 22; (5 of 23); 
USMS: 86; (18 of 21). 

City: New York, NY; 
ATF: 74; (20 of 27); 
DEA: 85; (22 of 26); 
FBI: 30; (7 of 23); 
USMS: 70; (19 of 27). 

City: Orlando, FL; 
ATF: 65; (13 of 20); 
DEA: 94; (17 of 18); 
FBI: 13; (3 of 23); 
USMS: 83; (19 of 23). 

City: Philadelphia, PA; 
ATF: 53; (9 of 17); 
DEA: 73; (16 of 22); 
FBI: 68; (13 of 19); 
USMS: 55; (12 of 22). 

City: Seattle, WA; 
ATF: 68; (15 of 22); 
DEA: 60; (12 of 20); 
FBI: 17; (3 of 18); 
USMS: 75; (18 of 24). 

City: Tulsa, OK; 
ATF: 33; (3 of 9); 
DEA: 33; (4 of 12); 
FBI: 23; (3 of 13); 
USMS: 79; (11 of 14). 

City: Washington, DC; 
ATF: 68; (15 of 22); 
DEA: 57; (13 of 23); 
FBI: 16; (3 of 19); 
USMS: 76; (13 of 17). 

Cities: Overall; 
ATF: 68; (127 of 188); 
DEA: 68; (127 of 187); 
FBI: 28; (50 of 180); 
USMS: 74; (147 of 198). 

Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. 

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who 
answered the question. 

[End of table] 

Also of interest are the responses provided by agents in certain 
cities that have at least a 20 percentage point difference from 
agents' overall responses regarding working relationships. For 
example, the percentages of agents in Tulsa who reported good or very 
good relationships with ATF and DEA were lower than the percentages of 
agents who reported favorable relationships with these components in 
other cities. On the other hand, the percentages of agents in Orlando 
who reported having a favorable working relationship with DEA and in 
Philadelphia who reported having a favorable working relationship with 
the FBI are higher than the percentages reported by agents in other 
cities. DOJ components did not have perspectives on possible reasons 
for these patterns. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

U.S. Department of Justice:	
Justice Management Division:	
Washington. D.C. 20530: 

March 28, 2011: 

Ms. Eileen Larence:	
Director:	
Homeland Security and Justice:	
U.S. Government Accountability Office:	
441 G Street, NW:	
Washington, DC 20548:	 

Dear Ms. Larence:	 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled "Law Enforcement 
Coordination: DOJ Could Improve Its Progress for Identifying 
Disagreements among Agents" (GA0-11-314). The draft was reviewed by	
participating Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) components. 
The Department shares some of the overarching conclusions presented in 
the draft. Further, the Department appreciates	those GAO observations 
that will help the Department in its continuing efforts to limit	
disagreements over jurisdictional boundaries between our law 
enforcement components (LECs) when they collaborate on investigations. 
This letter constitutes the Department's formal	comments and I request 
that the GAO include this letter in the final report.	 

The Department agrees with the reports' two main premises: (1) 
personnel from the Department's LECs should effectively coordinate on 
joint investigations; and (2) the Department should ensure that its 
guidance continues to promote cooperation and collaboration. As	
explained in the report, the GAO attempted to assess the extent to 
which agents are clear on their	agencies' roles and responsibilities, 
and how our LECs determine and coordinate roles and responsibilities 
to avoid unnecessary use of resources. We were gratified to learn that 
"the majority of agents who responded to the GAO's survey reported 
that they are very clear about	their components' roles and 
responsibilities in the six investigative areas where they share	
jurisdiction-drugs, firearms, fugitives, gangs, arson, and explosives-
and that mechanisms DOJ	has in place to coordinate and clarify roles 
and responsibilities, such as memorandums of understanding, are 
somewhat effective." 

Our LECs regularly work in concert to keep this country safe from 
those who attempt to do us harm. Given	the complexity and dimensions 
of certain crimes, multiple law enforcement components may potentially 
be involved in aspects of the same case or investigation. Our priority 
is to have clear roles and responsibilities in such circumstances. 
Where there are disagreements or lack of clarity, the Department 
employs	various deconfliction techniques to resolve disagreements 
before they can compromise our law enforcement activities. 
Additionally, it is important to recognize that to the extent we have 
some overlapping or complementary response capabilities, these help 
avoid gaps in response and ensure that we do not rely on single points 
of success which can also result in a single point of failure. 

The GAO Report Could Have Done More to Highlight Existing Department 
Strategies to Address and Resolve Conflicts: 

Even though we agree with the report's overarching conclusion that the 
majority of Department agents clearly understand their 
responsibilities and roles, the Department believes the GAO could have 
better highlighted the Department's on-going efforts to enhance 
working relationships among the LECs as well as the ongoing and 
significant collaboration between the LECs that presently exists. 

The GAO was given access to documents that govern collaboration among 
LECs, descriptions of many of the Department's tools to resolve 
interagency law enforcement differences, and documentation showing how 
differences have been resolved. For example, the FBI provided the GAO 
with access to documentation about the FBI's policy directives, 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Joint Task Forces, and Deconfliction
Databases (collectively, "mechanisms of collaboration") that currently 
exist. This information could have been discussed this information in 
greater detail as they provide a significant means of collaboration 
and are used to resolve jurisdictional misunderstandings of the type 
mentioned in the report. 

The Department and the LECs use Policy Directives to tell employees 
about the operational procedures they should follow. Memoranda of 
Understanding are non-contractual agreements between operational 
units, sometimes between the Department's LECs, that document the 
responsibilities, functions, and understandings of two or more parties 
regarding a matter of mutual interest. Over the years, the negotiation 
of MOUs has proven to be among the most effective mechanisms for 
reaching executive level consensus on how different LECs can mesh the 
strategies and techniques they employee to eliminate jurisdictional 
and operational overlap. The Department gave the GAO access to many 
MOUs governing joint law enforcement activities. The task force model 
is another extensively used and productive mechanism that builds 
collaboration. Task forces bring together law enforcement agents of 
diverse skills and expertise, and the resources of numerous law 
enforcement entities. Agents who participate learn techniques that
increase collaboration and information sharing. Also, they learn to 
appreciate their distinct roles and responsibilities and how to avoid 
conflicts over jurisdiction. Moreover, task force members create 
lasting relationships and partnerships that can maximize the 
likelihood of successful collaborations in the future. 

Deconfliction databases are another important and proven mechanism of 
collaboration. A deconfliction database is a clearinghouse of law 
enforcement information used to avoid conflicts. For example, by 
running a subject's name through a deconfliction database, a law 
enforcement officer can determine whether another agency is 
investigating the same subject. The GAO report talks about 
deconfliction databases in passing but does not mention the Special 
Operations Division (SOD), a multi-agency, DEA-led operational 
coordination and deconfliction center. SOD has participation from over 
20 agencies, and has a proven record of successfully coordinating some 
of the largest multi-agency law enforcement initiatives. The DEA 
recently developed capability to provide non-DEA agents direct access 
to the deconfliction capability at SOD through an Internet-based 
system linked to SOD's deconfliction system (prior to the development 
of this capability, non-DEA users deconflicted through their agency 
representatives at SOD). When a jurisdictional or operational overlap 
is reported, SOD notifies users and provides them with contact 
information for their colleagues. SOD then assists in the coordination 
among the users so they can share information and expand or restrict 
their investigations as appropriate to avoid overlap. 

The Department and its LECs, over the past half dozen years, have 
written many guidance documents about interagency conflict and 
distributed them to agents and their supervisors. Also, the LECs have 
helped refine that guidance, have prepared their own policy directives 
that promote collaboration, and have negotiated, at the executive 
level, memoranda that improve the investigative interrelationships 
among the LECs. 

We note the survey results cited in the report resulted from 
interviews taken prior to the Explosives Protocols issued by the 
Deputy Attorney General on August 3, 2010, and the Department's 
efforts since then to implement the Protocols. We expect the clarity 
provided by the Deputy's protocols would result in improved survey 
responses today since the Department has addressed the roles and 
responsibilities of ATF and FBI agents during explosives 
investigations. 

The Protocols provide clear guidance to ATF and FBI on how to better 
coordinate explosives jurisdiction, training, information sharing and 
laboratory services. Also, the Protocols provide a framework for how 
each law enforcement component will respond to incidents involving the 
criminal and terrorist misuse of explosives. Since the issuance of the 
Protocols, ATF and FBI formed working groups that met regularly to 
ensure the Protocols are effectively implemented. In the process, ATF 
and FBI forged a closer alliance as to how they will better cooperate 
and leverage each other's unique capabilities. Both law enforcement 
components have reported unprecedented cooperation between each 
organization concerning explosives-related matters since the issuance 
of the clarified guidance. 

The Department's efforts to minimize unnecessary or unproductive 
overlap and its consequences began years ago, remain active today, and 
will continue going forward. 

The GAO Report Could Have Relied Less on Opinion Surveys: 

Even though the Department appreciates the rationale behind the GAO's 
survey methodology, the survey was limited and Department believes the 
GAO could have more thoroughly explored the actual mechanisms of 
collaboration and their effectiveness, particularly since this 
survey's results were "non-generalizable" according to the report. 

Finally, it also would have been beneficial if the report had more 
fully discussed the extent to which disagreements interfered with the 
Department's performance. For example, in response to one set of 
questions, one third of respondents reported experiencing 
disagreements with another DOJ component over the last five years. Of 
those who responded, more than half reported that the disagreements 
were not so severe or frequent that they needed to be addressed. The 
report, however, emphasizes the opinion of the minority (16.6%) who 
did believe that such disagreements were severe or frequent. As a 
result the report can be read to overstate the frequency and negative 
effect of disagreements between the LECs. And, as noted above, some of 
the survey responses that indicated disagreement appeared to date from 
the timeframe prior to the Department's issuance of the new explosives 
protocol, and we believe that timing influenced the results seen by 
GAO. 

Conclusion: 

We understand that conducting business as a multi-entity Department 
entails an expected number of conflict and coordination issues. The 
Department and its LECs have a number of mechanisms in place to reduce 
investigative conflicts. The Department meets regularly with the LECs 
to ensure coordination and effective management of our law enforcement 
activities. We will continue, as a matter of course, to work on 
conflicts as they arise to minimize the disruption of investigations. 

If you have any questions, you or your staff may contact Richard 
Theis, Audit Liaison Group, on (202) 514-0469. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Lee J. Lofthus: 
Assistant Attorney General for Administration: 

cc: Richard Theis, MPS, JMD. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Kristy N. Brown, Assistant 
Director, and Martene Bryan, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this 
assignment. David Alexander, Nick Benne, Billy Commons, Linda Miller 
and Jan Montgomery made significant contributions to this report. 
Gregory Borecki, Sandra Burrell, Theresa Canjar, Stuart Kaufman, Mark 
Ramage, Christine San, Daren Sweeney and Adam Vogt also provided 
valuable assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in 
the United States 2009 (September 2010), [hyperlink, 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_01.html] (accessed Feb. 
18, 2011). The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime 
Reporting program defines violent crime as those offenses that involve 
force or threat of force. 

[2] The 1811 investigators are criminal investigators. 

[3] The length of this review reflects extensive outreach with DOJ on 
the process by which we would select agents to participate in the 
survey and how we would pretest and administer the survey, and 
significant delays in administering the survey due to the time needed 
to address DOJ's concerns. 

[4] 28 C.F.R. § 0.85. 

[5] 28 C.F. R. § 0.111(a). 

[6] ATF authority to combat firearms trafficking stems from the Gun 
Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. 

[7] The numbers of agents who responded to survey questions varied 
depending on skip instructions contained in the survey questionnaire. 
Also, agents may have chosen not to answer certain questions. The 
survey results we provide in our report depend on these factors. 
Percentages are based on the number of agents who responded to 
specific survey questions. 

[8] We report separately the percentage of agents who report being 
"very clear" versus "somewhat clear" because we consider "very clear" 
to be a positive response, whereas "somewhat clear" is neither 
positive nor negative. 

[9] See appendix III for additional analysis of survey results 
regarding agent clarity. 

[10] We visited each component in nine field locations. 

[11] In 2009, we reported on coordination efforts between DOJ and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when investigating and taking 
enforcement action on gang violence. DOJ and DHS have key roles in 
federal law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute gang- 
related crimes. We reported a lack of differentiated roles and 
responsibilities among DOJ components in the department's efforts to 
combat gangs, which resulted in a lack of coordination among all 
federal partners during gang investigations. We recommended that DOJ, 
in consultation with DHS, direct its law enforcement agencies that 
have headquarters-based anti-gang initiatives to reexamine and reach 
consensus on their roles and responsibilities, including identifying 
and addressing gaps and unnecessary overlap. DOJ agreed and stated 
that the Attorney General's Anti-Gang Coordination Committee (AGCC) 
continues to meet at least quarterly to identify and address gaps and 
unnecessary overlaps. In recognition of DHS' important role and to 
ensure coordination across departments, DHS's U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement regularly participates in these meetings and has 
formally been a member of the AGCC since July 17, 2009. See GAO, 
Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance Measurement Would 
Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-708] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2009). 

[12] Event deconfliction services maintain data on planned law 
enforcement events and alert affected agencies and officers of 
potential events occurring in the same area. 

[13] Of the 30 percent (77 of 259) of agents who reported not using 
deconfliction databases, some said they preferred interpersonal 
communication, they did not have deconfliction databases in their 
region, or that they are not needed when clear on roles and 
responsibilities. Five percent of the agents who responded did not 
know if they had accessed a deconfliction database over the past 5 
years. 

[14] Six percent (6 of 96) of agents who responded to the question 
answered "don't know." 

[15] "Blue on Blue" are incidents in which the failure to deconflict 
events resulted in agents being misidentified as criminals. 

[16] See appendix IV for further details on working relationships 
among components across the nine cities. 

[17] The police chief in the ninth city did not comment on the 
relationship among the DOJ components. 

[18] DOJ law enforcement components refer cases to the USAO for 
prosecution of cases. 

[19] See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 
Evaluation and Inspections Division, Explosives Investigation 
Coordination Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Audit Report 10-
01 (Washington, D.C., October 2009), and Memorandum for the Attorney 
General and Deputy Attorney General: Top Management and Performance 
Challenges in the Department of Justice-2009 (Washington, D.C., 
November 2009). 

[20] GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government 
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 
2011). 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP]. 

[22] These offices included division offices, field offices, and 
resident agencies. 

[23] The 1811 investigators are criminal investigators. 

[End of section] 

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