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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

February 2011: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

NASA: 

Assessment of Selected Large-Scale Projects: 

GAO-11-239SP: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-239SP, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GAO’s work has shown that the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s (NASA) large-scale projects, while producing ground-
breaking research and advancing our understanding of the universe, 
tend to cost more and take longer to develop than planned, and are 
often approved without evidence of a sound business case. Although 
space development programs are complex and difficult by nature, GAO 
has found that inherent risks are exacerbated by poor management and 
oversight practices. GAO has designated NASA’s acquisition management 
as a high risk area since 1990. 

This report provides a snapshot of how well NASA is planning and 
executing its acquisition of selected large-scale projects. It also 
provides observations about the performance of NASA’s major projects 
and project management, outlines steps NASA is taking to improve its 
acquisitions, identifies challenges that contribute to cost and 
schedule growth, and assesses 21 NASA projects, each with an estimated 
life-cycle cost of over $250 million. 

No recommendations are provided in this report; however, GAO has 
reported extensively and made recommendations on NASA acquisition 
management in the past. We will also be making recommendations on 
enhancing transparency and accountability in a separate letter to NASA. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO assessed 21 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost that 
exceeds $68 billion. Of those 21 projects, 16 had entered the 
implementation phase where cost and schedule baselines were 
established. Development costs for the 16 projects had an average 
growth of $94 million-—or 14.6 percent-—and schedules grew by an 
average of 8 months. The total increase in development costs for these 
projects was $1.5 billion. GAO found that 5 of the 16 projects were 
responsible for the overwhelming majority of this increase. The issue 
of cost growth is more significant than the 14.6 percent average would 
indicate because it does not capture the cost growth that occurred 
before several projects reported baselines in response to a statutory 
requirement in 2005. Additionally, the 13 projects that GAO has 
reviewed over the past 3 years that established baselines prior to 
2009 experienced an average development cost growth of almost 55 
percent, with a total increase in development costs of almost $2.5 
billion from their original confirmation baselines. This does not 
reflect considerable cost and schedule growth that will likely be 
experienced by NASA’s largest science program—-the James Webb Space 
Telescope (JWST). Based on the findings of the independent panel that 
recently reviewed the JWST project and information we obtained from 
projects officials, it is likely that JWST will report significant 
cost and schedule growth, estimated to be $1.4 billion or more and up 
to 15 months, respectively. 

Many of the projects GAO reviewed for this report experienced 
challenges in the areas of technology, design, funding, launch 
vehicles, development partner performance, parts, and contractor 
management. Reducing the kinds of challenges this assessment 
identifies in acquisition programs hinges on developing a sound 
business case for a project. The development and execution of a 
knowledge-based business case for these projects can provide early 
recognition of challenges, allow managers to take corrective action, 
and place needed and justifiable projects in a better position to 
succeed. The inherent complexity of space development programs should 
not preclude NASA from achieving what it promises when requesting and 
receiving funds. 

In response to GAO’s designation of NASA’s acquisition management as a 
high risk area, NASA has developed a corrective action plan to improve 
the effectiveness of acquisition project management. The plan 
identifies five areas for improvement, each of which contains targets 
and goals to measure improvement. As part of this initiative, the 
agency is continuing its implementation of a new cost estimation tool, 
the Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level, to help project 
officials with management, cost and schedule estimating, and 
maintenance of adequate levels of reserves. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-239SP] or key 
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Observations on NASA’s Portfolio of Major Projects: 

Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key 
Junctures in the Acquisition Process: 

Observations on Other Challenges That Can Affect Project Outcomes: 

Observations about NASA’s Continued Efforts to Improve Its
Acquisition Management: 

Project Assessments: 

Aquarius: 

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle: 

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission: 

Glory: 

Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL: 

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2): 

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): 

Juno: 

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM): 

Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE): 

Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS): 

Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN): 

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL): 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP): 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2 (OCO-2): 

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle: 

Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP): 

Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP): 

Solar Probe Plus (SPP): 

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA): 

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) Replenishment: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration: 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO Annual
Assessments: 

Table 2: Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected NASA Projects
Currently in the Implementation Phase: 

Table 3: Cost Growth from Confirmation for Selected Major NASA
Projects That Established Baselines Prior to Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 4: ARRA Funding for Reviewed NASA Projects: 

Table 5: Schedule Growth for Selected NASA Projects with and without
Development Partners Baselined before 2009: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

Figure 2: Summary of Projects Assessed by Phase of the NASA Project
Life Cycle: 

Figure 3: Percentage of Major NASA Projects That Moved into
Implementation with Immature Technologies at the Preliminary
Design Review: 

Figure 4: Percentage of Engineering Drawings Releasable at CDR for
Selected NASA Projects: 

Figure 5: Comparison of Design Drawing Increase for Projects with
CDR prior to and since Fiscal Year 2009: 

Figure 6: Notional Allocation of Reserves under the 70 Percent
Confidence Level Funding Requirements: 

Figure 7: Illustration of Projects 2-Page Summary: 

Abbreviations: 

AFB: Air Force Base: 

AFS: Air Force Station: 

APS: Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor: 

ARRA: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: 

ASI: Argenzia Spaciale Italiana (Italian Space Agency): 

C&DH: Command and Data Handling: 

CDDS: Cavity Door Drive System: 

CDR: critical design review: 

CMIC: Command and Data Handling Unit Module Interface Card: 

CONAE: Comision Nacional de Actividades Espaciales (Space Agency of 
Argentina): 

CrIS: Cross-track Infrared Sounder: 

CSA: Canadian Space Agency: 

DCI: data collection instrument: 

DM-2: Development Motor 2: 

DPR: dual-frequency precipitation radar: 

DT&E: Development Test & Evaluation: 

ESA: European Space Agency: 

ETU: engineering test unit: 

GIDEP: Government Industry Data Exchange Program: 

GLAST: Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope: 

GMI: GPM microwave imager: 

GPM: Global Precipitation Measurement (mission): 

GRACE: Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment: 

GRAIL: Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory: 

HEPS: High Efficiency Power Supply: 

HOPE: Helium-Oxygen-Proton-Electron: 

ICESat-2: Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2: 

IPO: Integrated Program Office: 

ISS: International Space Station: 

JAXA: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency: 

JCL: Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Levels: 

JPL: Jet Propulsion Laboratory: 

JWST: James Webb Space Telescope: 

KDP: key decision point: 

LCROSS: Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite: 

LDCM: Landsat Data Continuity Mission: 

LDEX: Lunar Dust Experiment: 

LIO: Low Inclination Observatory: 

LLCD: Lunar Laser Com Demo: 

LRO: Lunar Reconnaisance Orbiter: 

MagEIS: Magnetic Electron Ion Spectrometer: 

MAVEN: Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN: 

MEP: Mars Exploration Program: 

MMRTG: Multi Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator: 

MMS: Magnetospheric Multiscale: 

MRO: Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter: 

MSL: Mars Science Laboratory: 

MSR: Monthly Status Review: 

NAR: nonadvocate review: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NID: NASA Interim Directive: 

NLS: NASA Launch Services: 

NMS: Neutral Mass Spectrometer: 

NPR: NASA Procedural Requirements: 

NPOESS: National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System: 

NPP: NPOESS Preparatory Project: 

OCFO: Office of the Chief Financial Officer (NASA): 

OCO: Orbiting Carbon Observatory: 

OLI: Operational Land Imager: 

OT&E: Operational Test & Evaluation: 

PA-1: Pad Abort-1: 

PDR: preliminary design review: 

RBSP: Radiation Belt Storm Probes: 

RWA: reaction wheel assembly: 

SAM: Sample Analysis at Mars: 

SBC: single board computer: 

SDO: Solar Dynamics Observatory: 

SDP: Spin Plane Double Probe: 

SID: Strategic Investments Division (NASA): 

SMAP: Soil Moisture Active and Passive (mission): 

SOFIA: Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy: 

TAT: Test Assessment Team: 

TIM: total irradiance monitor: 

TIRS: Thermal Infrared Sensor: 

TLGA: Toroidal Low Gain Antenna: 

TRL: technology readiness level: 

UVS: Ultraviolet Spectrometer: 

USGS: U.S. Geological Survey: 

VIIRS: Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite: 

WISE: Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 3, 2011: 

We are pleased to present GAO’s third annual assessment of selected 
largescale National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
projects. This report provides a snapshot of NASA’s planning and 
execution of major acquisitions—-a topic that is on GAO’s high risk 
list. 

This past year has been one of turmoil for NASA. The proposed 
cancellation of the Constellation program—-the agency’s largest 
program-—has left NASA’s human space flight program in a state of 
flux. Its future work in this area depends on how budget issues and 
direction are resolved between the Congress and the Administration. 
While NASA continued to work toward the program of record for 
Constellation, its focus has now turned to prioritizing work that can 
be transitioned to the new path for human space flight set out in the 
NASA Authorization Act of 2010 while continuing to comply with the 
requirements of its fiscal year 2010 appropriations. Additionally, 
funding constraints due to the delayed retirement of the shuttle 
fleet, the plan to utilize the International Space Station at least 4
years longer than anticipated, and expected overruns in major projects,
such as the James Webb Space Telescope and the Mars Science Lab, will
affect NASA’s plans for funding new projects for years to come. This
environment, coupled with a constrained budgetary outlook, heightens
the importance of efficient and effective project management to 
maximize results. Furthermore, NASA needs to be equipped with the 
knowledge to make hard choices among competing priorities within the 
agency. 

We recently issued an update to our high risk report where we 
highlighted efforts NASA continues to make to improve its management 
of major projects. For example, the agency has continued to implement 
initiatives aimed at strengthening its cost and schedule estimating 
processes. These initiatives, as well as other efforts, are intended 
to provide key decisionmakers with increased knowledge to make 
informed decisions before a project starts and to maintain disciplined 
management and oversight once it begins. Increased discipline and 
oversight, however, will require that senior NASA leaders have the 
will to terminate or reshape projects that do not measure up, hold 
appropriate parties accountable for poor outcomes, and recognize and 
reward good management and good decisions. NASA continues to take 
positive steps, but it will still be some time before the impact of 
its efforts can be measured. 

The NASA portfolio of major projects ranges from robotic probes designed
to explore the Martian surface, to satellites equipped with advanced 
sensors to study the earth, to telescopes intended to explore the 
universe. Some of these missions have literally changed the way we 
view our planet and the universe. For example, the Kepler mission 
recently identified the first Earth-size planet candidates in a 
habitable zone where liquid water could exist on the planet’s surface. 
In many cases, NASA’s projects are expected to incorporate new and 
sophisticated technologies that must operate in harsh, distant 
environments. 

Although space development programs are complex and difficult by
nature, our work consistently finds that inherent risks of NASA’s 
complex development projects are heightened by the induced risks of 
less than adequate management and oversight practices. In this year’s 
report, our work continues to show that NASA’s major projects are 
frequently approved without evidence of a sound business case that 
ensures a match between requirements and reasonably expected 
resources. As a result, the projects cost more and take longer to 
develop than planned. We found that NASA frequently exceeded its 
acquisition cost and schedule estimates, even when those estimates 
were relatively new. In the last 3 years, 12 out of the 13 projects 
that have been in development for several years significantly
exceeded their cost and/or schedule baseline estimates. In today’s 
fiscal environment, it is clear that this condition cannot be 
sustained. 

We believe that this report can provide insights that will help NASA 
place programs in a better position to succeed, and help the agency 
maximize its investments. Our work has shown that curbing the induced 
challenges that can lead to cost and schedule growth hinges on 
developing a sound business case that includes firm requirements, 
mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, realistic 
cost estimates, and sufficient funding. Consistent adoption of such 
practices can improve results and may help ease the budgetary 
pressures NASA is likely to continue to face over time. 

Signed by: 

Gene L. Dodaro: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 3, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

This is GAO's third annual assessment of National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration's (NASA) large-scale projects. This report 
provides a snapshot of how well NASA is planning and executing its 
major acquisitions--an area that has been on GAO's high risk list 
since 1990. Over the past year, NASA has again showed that its 
projects produce ground-breaking research and advance our 
understanding of the universe. For example, the Kepler spacecraft has 
discovered the first confirmed planetary system with more than one 
planet transiting the same star. Unfortunately, over the past year, 
NASA has also experienced much turmoil and cost increases in several 
of its major projects. For example, the proposed cancellation of the 
Constellation Program, after spending over $11 billion since 2006, 
caused uncertainty in NASA's human spaceflight program. More recently, 
an independent panel concluded that the James Webb Space Telescope 
project will require additional funding of $1.4 billion or more and a 
launch delay of 15 months. In the past 2 years, we reported that 11 
out of 17 NASA projects experienced significant cost and/or schedule 
growth from baselines established only 2 or 3 years earlier.[Footnote 
1] Such issues continue to impact NASA's ability to continue its 
ground-breaking work in an efficient and effective manner. 

NASA has taken steps over recent years to help improve its acquisition 
management through several initiatives aimed at improving cost 
estimating and management oversight. While the overall outcomes of 
these efforts will take time to become apparent, NASA officials 
indicate that they continue to be committed to the initiatives with 
the goal of improving performance. 

The Congress has expressed concern about NASA's performance and has 
identified the need to standardize the reporting of cost, schedule, 
and content for NASA research and development projects. In 2005, the 
Congress required NASA to report cost and schedule baselines-- 
benchmarks against which changes can be measured--for all NASA 
programs and projects with estimated life-cycle costs of at least $250 
million that have been approved to proceed to the development stage, 
known as implementation, in which components begin to take physical 
form.[Footnote 2] It also required that NASA report to Congress when 
development cost is likely to exceed the baseline estimate by 15 
percent or more, or when a milestone is likely to be delayed beyond 
the baseline estimate by 6 months or more.[Footnote 3] In response, 
NASA began to establish cost and schedule baselines in 2006 and has 
been using them as the basis for annual project performance reports to 
the Congress provided in its budget submission each year. 

The explanatory statement of the House Committee on Appropriations 
accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 directed GAO to 
prepare project status reports on selected large-scale NASA programs, 
projects, or activities.[Footnote 4] This report responds to that 
mandate. Specifically, we assess (1) performance of NASA's major 
projects and the agency's management of those projects during 
development, (2) knowledge attained by key junctures in the 
acquisition process, (3) other challenges that can affect project 
execution, (4) NASA's continued efforts to improve its acquisitions, 
and (5) 21 NASA projects, each with an estimated life-cycle cost over 
$250 million.[Footnote 5] In doing so, the report expands on the 
importance of providing decision-makers with an independent, knowledge-
based assessment of individual systems that identifies potential risks 
and allows them to take actions to put projects that are early in the 
development cycle in a better position to succeed. 

Our approach included an examination of the current phase of a 
project's development and how each project was advancing.[Footnote 6] 
NASA provided updated cost and schedule data as of November 2010 for 
16 of the 21 projects. We reviewed and compared that data to 
previously established cost and schedule statutory baselines. We 
assessed each project's cost and schedule and characterized growth in 
either as significant if it exceeded the baselines that trigger 
reporting to the Congress under the law.[Footnote 7] In addition, NASA 
provided cost and schedule information from previously reported 
projects that we used for historical analysis. We assessed technology 
maturity and design stability using GAO's established criteria for 
knowledge-based acquisitions and on other GAO work on system 
acquisitions.[Footnote 8] Additionally, we identified other challenges 
that can affect project outcomes--funding, launch vehicles, 
development partner performance, parts, and contractor management--as 
a result of our analysis based on interviews with project officials 
and information provided by the projects. This list of challenges is 
not exhaustive and we believe these challenges will evolve, as they 
have from previous years, as we continue this work into the future. We 
took appropriate steps to address data reliability. The individual 
project offices were given an opportunity to provide comments and 
technical clarifications on our assessments prior to their inclusion 
in the final product, which were incorporated as appropriate. Appendix 
III contains detailed information on our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 to February 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We are not 
making recommendations in this report: 

Background: 

A Sound Business Case Underpins Successful Acquisition Outcomes: 

The development and execution of a knowledge-based business case for
NASA’s projects can provide early recognition of challenges, allow
managers to take corrective action, and place needed and justifiable
projects in a better position to succeed. Our studies of best practice
organizations show the risks inherent in NASA’s work can be mitigated by
developing a solid, executable business case before committing 
resources to a new product development.[Footnote 9] In its simplest 
form, this is evidence that (1) the customer’s needs are valid and can 
best be met with the chosen concept and that (2) the chosen concept 
can be developed and produced within existing resources-—that is, 
proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, adequate 
time, and adequate workforce to deliver the product when needed. A 
program should not be approved to go forward into product development 
unless a sound business case can be made. If the business case 
measures up, the organization commits to the development of the 
product, including making the financial investment. Our best practice 
work has shown that developing business cases based on matching 
requirements to resources before program start leads to more 
predictable program outcomes-—that is, programs are more likely to be 
successfully completed within cost and schedule estimates and deliver 
anticipated system performance.[Footnote 10] 

At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to product
development that is a best practice among leading commercial firms. 
Those firms have created an environment and adopted practices that put 
their program managers in a good position to succeed in meeting 
expectations. A knowledge-based approach requires that managers 
demonstrate high levels of knowledge as the program proceeds from 
technology development to system development and, finally, production. 
In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of 
knowledge can be described over the course of a program as follows: 

* When a project begins development, the customer’s needs should match
the developer’s available resources—mature technologies, time, and
funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of the
technologies required to meet customer needs—referred to as critical
technologies. If the project is relying on heritage—or pre-existing—
technology, that technology must be in appropriate form, fit, and
function to address the customer’s needs within available resources.
The project will normally enter development after completing the
preliminary design review, at which time a business case should be in
hand. 

* Then, about midway through the product’s development, its design
should be stable and demonstrate it is capable of meeting performance
requirements. The critical design review takes place at that point in 
time because it generally signifies when the program is ready to start 
building production-representative prototypes. If design stability is 
not achieved, but a product development continues, costly re-designs 
to address changes to project requirements and unforeseen challenges 
can occur. By the critical design review, the design should be stable 
and capable of meeting performance requirements. 

* Finally, by the time of the production decision, the product must be
shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and
have demonstrated its reliability, and the design must demonstrate
that it performs as needed through realistic system-level testing. Lack
of testing increases the possibility that project managers will not have
information that could help avoid costly system failures in late 
stages of development or during system operations. 

Our best practices work has identified numerous other actions that can
be taken to increase the likelihood that a program can be successfully
executed once that business case is established. These include ensuring
cost estimates are complete, accurate and updated regularly, and holding
suppliers accountable through such activities as regular supplier audits
and performance evaluations of quality and delivery. Moreover, we have
recommended using metrics and controls throughout the life cycle to 
gauge when the requisite level of knowledge has been attained and when 
to direct decision makers to consider criteria before advancing a 
program to the next level and making additional investments. 

NASA Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

NASA life cycle for flight system is defined by two phases-—
formulation[Footnote 11] and implementation[Footnote 12]-—and several 
key decision points. See figure 1. These phases are then further 
divided into incremental pieces: Phase A through Phase F. 

Figure 1: NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

[Refer to PDF for image: life cycle illustration] 

Formulation: 

Pre-phase A: Concept Studies: 
KDP A: 
Phase A: Concept and Technology Development: 
SCR: 
Pre-NAR: 
KDP B: 
Phase B: Preliminary Design and Technology Completion: 
PDR: 
NAR: 
KDP C: 
Program start: 

Phase C: Final Design and Fabrication: 
CDR: 
KDP D: 
Phase D: System Assembly, Integration and Test, Launch: 
KDP E: 
Phase E: Operations and Sustainment: 
KDP F: 
Phase F: Closeout: 
Implementation: 

Management decision reviews: 
Pre-NAR = preliminary non advocate review; 
NAR = non advocate review; 
KDP = key decision point. 

Technical reviews: 
SDR = system definition review; 
PDR = preliminary design review; 
CDR = critical design review. 

Source: NASA data and GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Project formulation consists of Phases A and B, during which time
the projects develop and define the project requirements and cost/
schedule basis and design for implementation, including developing an
acquisition strategy. During the end of the formulation phase, leading
up to the preliminary design review (PDR)[Footnote 13] and non-
advocate review (NAR),[Footnote 14] the project team completes its 
preliminary design and technology development. NASA Interim Directive 
NM 7120-81 for NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight 
Program and Project Management Requirements, specifies that during 
formulation the project should complete development of mission-
critical or enabling technology. As needed, projects are required to 
demonstrate evidence of technology maturity (i.e., component and/or 
breadboard validation in the relevant environment) and document the 
information in a technology readiness assessment report. The project 
must also develop, document, and maintain a project management 
baseline[Footnote 15] that includes the integrated master schedule and 
baseline life-cycle cost estimate. The formulation phase is intended 
to culminate in a confirmation review at which time cost and schedule 
baselines are confirmed and project progress hence forth is
measured against these baselines. 

After a project is confirmed, it begins implementation, consisting of
phases C, D, E, and F. During phase C, the project performs final 
design and fabrication as well as testing of components. In phase D, 
the project performs system assembly, integration, test, and launch 
activities. Phases E and F consist of operations and sustainment and 
project closeout. A second design review, the critical design review 
(CDR),[Footnote 16] is held in the implementation phase during the 
latter half of phase C. The purpose of the CDR is to demonstrate that 
the maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with 
full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. After CDR and 
the system integration review,[Footnote 17] the project must be 
approved before continuing into the next phase. 

NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO Annual Assessments: 

The portfolio of projects we reviewed has evolved and grown in each of 
the last 3 years. Once a project launches, we will no longer include a 
2-page summary in our annual report. However, we do maintain and 
continually assess historical cost, schedule, and performance 
information collected 

Table 1: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO Annual 
Assessments: 

Projects in Formulation: 

2009: 
Ares I; 
GPM; 
JWST; 
LDCM; 
Orion; 

2010: 
Ares I; 
GPM; 
LDCM; 
Orion; 

2011: 
Ares I; 
ICESat-2; 
Orion; 
SMAP; 
SPP. 

Projects in Implementation: 

2009: 
Aquarius; 
Dawn[A]; 
GLAST[A]; 
Glory; 
Herschel; 
Kepler; 
LRO; 
MSL; 
NPP; 
OCO[B]; 
SDO; 
SOFIA; 
WISE; 

2010: 
Aquarius; 
Glory; 
GRAIL; 
Herschel[A]; 
Juno; 
JWST; 
Kepler[A]; 
LRO[A]; 
MMS; 
MSL; 
NPP; 
RBSP; 
SDO[A]; 
SOFIA; 
WISE[A]; 

2011: 
Aquarius; 
Glory; 
GPM; 
GRAIL; 
Juno; 
JWST; 
LADEE; 
LDCM; 
MAVEN; 
MSL; 
MMS; 
NPP; 
OCO-2; 
RBSP; 
SOFIA; 
TDRS Replenishment. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data: 

[A] NASA projects that have launched. 

[B] NASA project that launched but failed to reach orbit. 

[End of table] 

Observations on NASA's Portfolio of Major Projects: 

We assessed 21 large-scale NASA projects in this review. We based the 
majority of our cost and schedule analysis on the 16 projects that are 
currently in the implementation phase of the project life-cycle. We 
also analyzed historical data from projects that were a part of our 
previous reviews. We found that 5 of the 16 projects currently in 
implementation experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth 
from their statutory baselines.[Footnote 18] The remaining 11 projects 
set statutory baselines in fiscal year 2009 or later and have reported 
little or no deviations from their and cost and schedule baselines. 
Three of these 11 projects that had been in formulation for most of 
our review were confirmed late in 2010 and their baselines, according 
to NASA officials, were to be reported for the first time in the 
NASA's fiscal year 2012 budget submission. The remaining five projects 
were in the formulation phase where cost and schedule baselines have 
yet to be established.[Footnote 19] See figure 2 for a summary of 
these projects. 

Figure 2: Summary of Projects Assessed by Phase of the NASA Project 
Life Cycle: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Total projects reviewed: 21; 
Projects in formulation: 5; 
Projects in implementation: 16; 
Projects with significant cost and/or schedule growth: 5; 
Projects that entered implementation in FY 2009/10: 8; 
Projects entering implementation in FY 2011: 3. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data. 

[End of figure] 

Development costs for the 16 projects currently in implementation had 
an average development cost growth of $89.1 million--or 13.8 percent-- 
and schedule growth of 8 months from their statutory baselines. The 
total increase in development costs for the 16 projects in 
implementation was over $1.4 billion. The five projects with baselines 
set before fiscal year 2009 were responsible for the overwhelming 
majority of this increase. All 5 projects have exceeded cost and 
schedule thresholds set by the Congress since their statutory 
baselines. Two projects--Glory and MSL--were re-baselined, but to gain 
a more accurate picture of cost and schedule growth, we used their 
original statutory baselines for our analysis. See table 2. 

Table 2: Cost and Schedule Growth from Statutory Baseline of Selected 
NASA Projects in the Implementation Phase (dollars in millions): 

Project: NPP; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Development cost growth: $154.2; 
Percentage cost growth: 26.0% [shaded]; 
Launch delay (months): 42 [shaded]. 

Project: SOFIA; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Development cost growth: $177.9; 
Percentage cost growth: 19.3% [shaded]; 
Launch delay (months): 12 [shaded]. 

Project: Aquarius; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Development cost growth: $34.6; 
Percentage cost growth: 18.0% [shaded]; 
Launch delay (months): 23 [shaded]. 

Project: Glory[A]; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Development cost growth: $170.4; 
Percentage cost growth: 100.9% [shaded]; 
Launch delay (months): 26 [shaded]. 

Project: MSL[B]; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Development cost growth: $751.3; 
Percentage cost growth: 77.6% [shaded]; 
Launch delay (months): 26 [shaded]. 

Project: GRAIL; 
Baseline (FY): 2009; 
Development cost growth: $0.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: Juno; 
Baseline (FY): 2009; 
Development cost growth: $0.1; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: JWST; 
Baseline (FY): 2009; 
Development cost growth: $129.8; 
Percentage cost growth: 5.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: RBSP; 
Baseline (FY): 2009; 
Development cost growth: $0.1; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: GPM; 
Baseline (FY): 2010; 
Development cost growth: $3.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.5%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: LDCM; 
Baseline (FY): 2010; 
Development cost growth: $4.2; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.7%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: MMS; 
Baseline (FY): 2010; 
Development cost growth: $0.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: TDRS Replenishment; 
Baseline (FY): 2010; 
Development cost growth: $0.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: LADEE; 
Baseline (FY): 2011; 
Development cost growth: $0.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: MAVEN; 
Baseline (FY): 2011; 
Development cost growth: $0.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: OCO-2; 
Baseline (FY): 2011; 
Development cost growth: $0.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.0%; 
Launch delay (months): 0. 

Project: Average; 
Development cost growth: $89.1; 
Percentage cost growth: 13.8%; 
Launch delay (months): 8. 

Project: Total Development Cost; 
Development cost growth: $1,425.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[A] Glory established a new statutory baseline in FY 2009 after being 
reauthorized by Congress: 

[B] MSL established a new statutory baseline in FY 2010 after being 
reauthorized by Congress: 

Note: Shading indicates projects that exceeded cost and schedule 
thresholds. 

[End of table] 

This table does not reflect considerable cost and schedule growth that 
will likely be experienced by NASA's largest science program--the 
James Webb Space Telescope. Based on the findings of the independent 
panel that recently reviewed the JWST project and information we 
obtained from projects officials, it is likely that JWST will report 
significant cost and schedule growth, estimated to be $1.4 billion or 
more and up to 15 months, respectively. 

Table 2 also includes information from 11 projects that were all 
confirmed in the last two years and have not reported significant cost 
or schedule growth. Many of these projects are entering, or have 
recently entered, the test and integration phase where cost and 
schedule growth is typically realized. Specifically, seven projects 
plan to have their system integration review in fiscal year 2011 or 
2012. Importantly, many of these projects have experienced similar 
challenges as the older projects that have reported cost and/or 
schedule growth, such as issues with maturing technology and not 
meeting design criteria. 

As previously stated, the Glory and MSL projects both sought 
reauthorization from Congress because of development cost growth in 
excess of 30 percent despite having statutory baselines reestablished 
in 2008.[Footnote 20] Congress reauthorized the Glory project and new 
statutory cost and schedule baselines were established in fiscal year 
2009,[Footnote 21] after the project experienced a 53 percent cost 
growth and 6-month launch delay from its original statutory baseline 
estimates in fiscal year 2008. Although Glory's development costs have 
increased by almost 31 percent from the new baseline established in 
2009, Glory is scheduled to launch in February 2011 before a second 
reauthorization would need to be sought. Similarly, MSL was 
reauthorized by the Congress and NASA established new statutory cost 
and schedule baselines early in fiscal year 2010 after reporting a 68 
percent growth in cost and a 26 month schedule delay from its original 
statutory baselines established in fiscal year 2008. 

The issue of cost growth is more significant than the 13.8 percent 
average identified in table 2 would indicate because it does not 
capture the cost growth that occurred before the five projects 
exhibiting the most considerable growth established baselines in 
response to the statutory requirement in 2005. Additionally, when 
considering all 13 projects included in our reviews for the past three 
years that were confirmed prior to fiscal year 2009,[Footnote 22] we 
found that NASA's major projects have experienced an average 
development cost growth of over 51 percent, with the total increase in 
development costs of over $2.3 billion from their original 
confirmation baselines. In addition, 9 of these projects experienced 
significant cost growth in excess of 15 percent, the point at which 
NASA is required to notify the Congress if a project has exceeded the 
threshold for reporting. See table 3. 

Table 3: Cost Growth from Confirmation for Selected Major NASA 
Projects that Established Baselines Prior to Fiscal Year 2009 (dollars 
in millions). 

Project: Aquarius; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $193.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $227.3; 
Development Cost: Difference: $34.3; 
Development Cost: Change: 17.8%. 

Project: Dawn; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $198.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $266.4; 
Development Cost: Difference: $68.4; 
Development Cost: Change: 34.5%. 

Project: GLAST; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $384.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $418.8; 
Development Cost: Difference: $34.8; 
Development Cost: Change: 9.1%. 

Project: Glory; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $159.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $337.6; 
Development Cost: Difference: $178.6; 
Development Cost: Change: 112.3%. 

Project: Herschel; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $95.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $126.7; 
Development Cost: Difference: $31.7; 
Development Cost: Change: 33.4%. 

Project: Kepler; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $313.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $388.7; 
Development Cost: Difference: $75.7; 
Development Cost: Change: 24.2%. 

Project: LRO; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $421.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $451.3; 
Development Cost: Difference: $30.3; 
Development Cost: Change: 7.2%. 

Project: MSL; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $969.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $1,802.2; 
Development Cost: Difference: $833.0; 
Development Cost: Change: 86.0%. 

Project: NPP; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $513.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $780.1; 
Development Cost: Difference: $267.1; 
Development Cost: Change: 52.1%. 

Project: OCO; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $187.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $230.2; 
Development Cost: Difference: $43.2; 
Development Cost: Change: 23.1%. 

Project: SDO; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $597.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $667.0; 
Development Cost: Difference: $70.0; 
Development Cost: Change: 11.7%. 

Project: SOFIA; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $306.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $1,128.4; 
Development Cost: Difference: $822.4; 
Development Cost: Change: 268.8%. 

Project: WISE; 
Development Cost: Baseline: $192.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $191.8; 
Development Cost: Difference: -$0.2; 
Development Cost: Change: -0.1%. 

Project: Average; 
Development Cost: Difference: $191.5; 
Development Cost: Change: 54.99%. 

Total Development Cost: 
Development Cost: Baseline:$4,527.0; 
Development Cost: Current: $7,016.3; 
Development Cost: Difference: $2,4,89.3. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[End of table] 

If changes NASA continues to implement to improve its acquisition 
management have their intended impact, we would expect to see 
improvements over time to the overall performance of the portfolio of 
projects in maintaining cost and schedule baselines established at 
their confirmation reviews. 

Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key 
Junctures in the Acquisition Process: 

Many of NASA's projects are one-time articles, meaning that there is 
little opportunity to apply knowledge gained to the production of a 
second, third, or future increments of spacecraft. While space 
development programs are complex and difficult by nature and most are 
one-time efforts, NASA is still responsible for achieving what it 
promises when requesting and receiving funds. We have previously 
reported that NASA would benefit from a more disciplined, knowledge- 
based approach to its acquisitions. For the projects reviewed this 
year, we continue to identify projects that have not met best practice 
standards for technology maturity and design stability and have 
experienced challenges in development. These challenges were assessed 
based on knowledge that, according to acquisition best practices, 
should be attained at key junctures in the project life-cycle to 
lessen the risks to the project. 

Technology Challenges: 

[Side bar: Projects experiencing technology challenges: 
* Ares I
* Glory; 
* GPM; 
* GRAIL; 
* Juno; 
* JWST; 
* LADEE; 
* LDCM; 
* MMS; 
* MSL; 
* NPP; 
* Orion; 
* SOFIA. 
End side bar] 

During the course of our review, we found that 13 projects had 
experienced technology issues, such as a lack of technology maturity 
for both critical and heritage technologies. Specifically, of the 18 
projects that had completed the preliminary design review--the point 
in time where best practices say requisite technology maturity should 
be reached to lessen risk--11 projects reported moving forward with 
immature technologies.[Footnote 23] Two other projects--MMS and NPP-- 
reported issues with immature technologies for instruments that were 
being developed by partners. 

Our best practices work has shown that a technology readiness level 
(TRL) of 6--demonstrating a technology as a fully integrated prototype 
in a relevant environment--is the level of maturity needed to minimize 
risks for space systems entering product development. For NASA, 
projects enter development following the project's preliminary design 
review and confirmation review.[Footnote 24] NASA's acquisition policy 
states that by the preliminary design review a TRL of 6 is desirable 
prior to integrating a new technology on a project.[Footnote 25] 
Technology maturity is a fundamental element of a sound business case, 
and its absence is a marker for subsequent problems, especially as the 
project begins more detailed design efforts.[Footnote 26] 

Similarly, our work has shown that the use of heritage technology-- 
proven components that are being modified to meet new requirements--
can also cause problems when the items are not sufficiently matured to 
meet form, fit, and function standards of the project that will be 
using it by the preliminary design review.[Footnote 27] NASA 
frequently employs heritage technologies that have to be modified from 
their original form, fit, and function. NASA's Systems Engineering 
Handbook states that particular attention must be given to heritage 
systems because they are often used in architectures and environments 
different from those in which they were designed to operate. Further, 
the Handbook states that modification of heritage systems is a 
frequently overlooked area in technology development and that there is 
a tendency by project management to overestimate the maturity and 
applicability of heritage technology to a new project. Our work has 
shown, and NASA's own guidance concurs, that this is an area that is 
frequently underestimated when developing project cost estimates. 
Although NASA distinguishes critical technologies from heritage 
technologies, our best practices work has found critical technologies 
to be those that are required for the project to successfully meet 
customer requirements, regardless of whether or not they are based on 
existing or heritage technology. Therefore, whether technologies are 
labeled as "critical" or "heritage," if they are important to the 
development of the spacecraft or instrument--enabling it to move 
forward in the development process--they should be matured by the 
preliminary design review. 

NASA is making progress with regard to adhering to best practices 
standards for technology maturity at the preliminary design review as 
the number of projects not meeting this criteria has decreased in 
recent years. Nearly two thirds of the projects in our current review, 
however, do not meet this standard. See figure 3 for an analysis of 
projects that we reviewed in the past three years that held their 
preliminary design review and the percent of those projects that moved 
into implementation with immature technologies. 

Figure 3: Percentage of Major NASA Projects with Immature Technologies 
at the Preliminary Design Review: 

[Reefer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2009; 
Projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 17%; 
Projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 83%. 

Year: 2010; 
Projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 29%; 
Projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 71%. 

Year: 2011; 
Projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 38%; 
Projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 63%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by NASA. 

Note: Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Proceeding into implementation with immature technologies increases a 
project's risk of cost and schedule overruns. For instance, the MSL 
project was given approval to move into the implementation phase 
despite reporting that seven of its critical technologies were not 
mature at the time of its preliminary design review. At the critical 
design review a year later, three of the seven critical technologies 
had been replaced by backup technologies with two of the seven still 
assessed as immature, including one of the replacement technologies, 
Challenges in development contributed to the MSL project's 26-month 
schedule delay and $750 million increase in total lifecycle costs. In 
another example, one of Glory's main instruments--the Aerosol 
Polarimetry Sensor--was assessed as an immature critical technology at 
the project's preliminary design review, yet the project was approved 
to proceed in to implementation. Since then, the project has 
experienced numerous issues with development of that instrument, 
resulting in over a year delay in its delivery and a cost increase to 
the project of over $100 million. 

Other projects in formulation are allocating extra time and funding in 
order to mature critical technologies by their preliminary design 
review. By investing in technology development early on in the 
project, the project may safeguard against some cost and schedule 
growth once it is in the implementation phase. For example, two 
projects in the formulation phase--ICESat-2 and Solar Probe Plus--have 
both allocated increased time and funding for development of their 
multi-beam laser and sunshield technologies, respectively, which 
should help to lessen risk to the projects moving forward. 

Finally, when analyzing the number of reported critical technology 
development efforts by the projects in our review, we found four of 
the 21 projects in our review reported no development of new critical 
technologies, while another eight projects reported development of 
only one critical technology. Upon presenting this data to senior NASA 
officials, we were told that it appears the projects did not 
accurately identify the number of critical technologies they plan to 
develop and suggested that the projects were only including 
technologies at the system level. We plan to continue to work with 
NASA to ensure projects are accurately identifying their critical 
technologies, both for our purposes, as well as to assist NASA 
decision makers in assessing the readiness of projects to move forward 
in their development lifecycles. 

Design Challenges: 

[Side bar: Projects experiencing design challenges: 
* Aquarius; 
* Glory; 
* GPM; 
* Juno; 
* JWST; 
* MAVEN; 
* MMS; 
* MSL; 
* NPP; 
* SOFIA. 
End of side bar] 

Ten of the 12 of the projects we reviewed that held their critical 
design review[Footnote 28]--the point in time where best practices say 
requisite design maturity should be reached to lessen risk--did not 
meet the best practices criteria of having 90 percent engineering 
drawings releasable. See figure 4. 

Figure 4: Percent of Engineering Drawings Releasable at CDR for 
Selected NASA Projects: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Projects that completed CDR: Aquarius; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 16%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: Glory; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 64%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: GPM; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 50%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: GRAIL; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 82%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: Juno; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 39%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: JWST; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 84%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: LDCM; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 85%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: MSL; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 0%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: NPP; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 65%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: OCO-2; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 95%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: RBSP; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 68%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Projects that completed CDR: TDRS; 
Engineering drawings releasable at CDR: 95%; 
Best practices criteria: 90%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by NASA. 

[End of figure] 

We have previously reported that NASA's acquisition policy does not 
specify a metric by which a project's design stability is measured at 
the critical design review.[Footnote 29] Guidance in NASA's Systems 
Engineering Handbook, however, mirrors the best practices metric that 
at least 90 percent of engineering drawings should be releasable by 
the critical design review. Discussions with project officials showed 
the metric was used inconsistently to gauge design stability. For 
example, Goddard Space Flight Center requires greater than 80 percent 
drawings released at the critical design review, yet several project 
officials reported that the "rule of thumb" for NASA projects is 
between 70 and 90 percent. As shown in figure 6 above, 7 of the 12 
projects reported releasable engineering drawings of less than 70 
percent, lower than even the "rule of thumb" used by several project 
managers. The 12 projects averaged having only 62 percent of their 
engineering drawings releasable at their critical design reviews, an 
increase from the less than 40 percent we reported last year. While 
the average has improved, it is still well below the best practices 
metric. Further, nearly all of the projects we reviewed over the last 
three years held their critical design review without 90 percent of 
engineering drawings being releasable--failing to meet NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook guidance and our best practices criteria for 
design stability. 

Achieving design stability allows projects to "freeze" the design and 
minimize changes in the future. An unstable design, on the other hand, 
can result in costly re-engineering and re-work efforts, design 
changes, and schedule slippage. The majority of the 12 projects that 
held their critical design review had increases, in two cases well 
over 100 percent, to the number of engineering drawings released after 
its critical design review when, according to NASA's Systems 
Engineering Policy, a project's design is to be stable enough to 
support full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration and test. 
[Footnote 30] This is particularly evident in projects in our review 
that held their critical design reviews prior to fiscal year 2009, or 
projects that have more of a history to track variances. As shown in 
figure 5 below, these four projects, on average, had a 107 percent 
increase in expected engineering drawings after the critical design 
review after having only 36 percent of drawings releasable at that 
review. The remaining eight projects have only recently held their 
critical design review in fiscal year 2009 or later and have not 
reported a large increase in expected drawings. 

Figure 5: Comparison of design drawing increase for projects with CDR 
prior to and since fiscal year 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Projects with CDR prior to FY 2009: 
Average drawings released at CDR: 36.25%; 
Average increase in expected drawings after CDR: 107%. 

Projects with CDR in FY 2009 or later: 
Average drawings released at CDR: 74.75%. 
Average increase in expected drawings after CDR: 8.25%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by NASA. 

[End of figure] 

Some of the projects we reviewed in the past three years pointed to 
other activities that occurred prior to the critical design review as 
evidence of design stability. In addition to releasable engineering 
drawings, NASA often relies on subject matter experts in the design 
review process and other methods to assess design stability. For 
example, the Standing Review Board[Footnote 31] provides an expert 
assessment of the technical and programmatic approach, risk posture, 
and progress against the project baseline at key decision points to be 
assured that the project has a stable design. Furthermore, some 
projects reported using engineering models and engineering test units 
to assess design stability. For example, a MMS project official 
reported that the number of complete engineering test units is as 
important, if not more so, than design drawings. By using engineering 
models that are as flight ready as possible, MMS project officials 
reported that they can see where problems are and better identify 
risks. In addition, a GPM project official said that the lack of 
releasable drawings at the critical design review did not have a 
serious impact in terms of design stability as testing was almost 
complete on the engineering test units and flight units were already 
designed and ready to begin manufacturing. The Juno project released 
only 39 percent of engineering drawing at its critical design review 
and project officials reported that they used engineering models for 
all instruments to demonstrate design maturity at CDR rather then 
released engineering drawings. The Juno project, however, experienced 
a 46 percent increase in expected number of engineering drawings after 
its CDR, indicating that the design was not stable. 

As mentioned above, NASA does not use a common measure to assess 
design stability before allowing programs to move from the design 
phase to the test and integration phases of the development process. 
Our studies and others have found that significant cost growth occurs 
in these phases and, in some instances, has tied these problems to 
issues related to design. Moreover, a recent study by the National 
Research Council[Footnote 31] found that the critical design review 
milestone for many NASA missions may be held prematurely--driven by 
schedule rather than driven by design maturity. Regardless of how 
stability is measured, common quantitative measures employed at 
critical design review, such as percentage of engineering drawings 
that are in a releasable state, can provide evidence that the design 
is stable and provide assurance that it is mature and will meet 
performance requirements. These measures can also be an indication to 
decision makers that the requisite knowledge has been attained to 
allow the project to proceed in its development lifecycle and better 
enable them to assess the performance of individual projects against 
the overall portfolio of projects. 

Observations on Other Challenges That Can Affect Project Outcomes: 

In addition to collecting and analyzing data on the attainment of 
knowledge at key junctures, we collected and assessed data on five 
additional areas that can present challenges to obtaining positive 
project outcomes, including: funding, launch vehicle, development 
partner performance, parts, and contractor management. Challenges with 
contractors did not present as big a challenge to projects covered by 
this review compared to previous reports, but continue to warrant 
monitoring by the projects and other decision makers as a common area 
that challenges project execution. The degree to which each area 
challenged project execution varied and, in most instances, we did not 
designate any specific challenge as a primary factor for cost and/or 
schedule growth. 

Funding Challenges: 

[Side bar: 
Projects experiencing funding challenges: 
* Aquarius; 
* Ares I; 
* Glory; 
* GPM; 
* JWST; 
* Orion; 
* SOFIA. 

Projects that received ARRA funding: 
* Aquarius; 
* Ares I; 
* Glory; 
* GPM; 
* ICESat-2; 
* JWST; 
* LDCM; 
* OCO-2; 
* Orion; 
* SMAP. 
End of side bar] 

Matching funding to requirements is critical to the success of complex 
acquisitions yet it is often insufficient in government acquisitions 
as agencies tend to start more projects than can be afforded and often 
have to make cuts in budgets after programs begin in order to address 
cost increases in highly problematic efforts. Several studies have 
highlighted this issue in NASA and NASA's administrator recently 
stressed the need to ensure projects are affordable before they are 
started. This year, we identified 3 projects that faced significant 
cost and schedule problems because their original funding did not 
align with program plans. These include Ares 1, Orion, and JWST and 
they represent NASA's largest investments. In addition, we identified 
10 projects received unanticipated funding from the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009.[Footnote 33] This event was an anomaly 
and it carried with it restrictions and requirements that narrowed the 
scope of projects it could be applied to and required additional 
administrative work, which initially dissuaded some projects and 
contractors from accepting the funds. Nevertheless, the stimulus 
funding enabled NASA to mitigate the impact of cost increases being 
experienced in its largest projects and to also address problems being 
experienced in other projects. In several cases, NASA took advantage 
of the funding build additional knowledge about technology or design 
before key milestones. 

According to NASA officials and independent reviews, the projected 
budgets for JWST, Ares I, and Orion were inadequate to perform work in 
certain fiscal years. In November 2010, an independent review panel 
concluded the JWST budget baseline accepted at the confirmation review 
did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in each 
year of project execution. This resulted in a project that was not 
executable within the budgeted resources. According to the review, the 
project was able to stay within its yearly budget allocation by 
deferring planned work in the budget year to future years. This 
approach was an ineffective control measure as costs were postponed 
and funded from a subsequent year's allocation at a cost that was 
typically two-to three-times higher due to the impact of the deferrals 
on other work. Further, the panel estimated that the project will need 
an additional $1.4 billion or more for an earliest launch date of 
September 2015--$500 million of which will be needed in fiscal years 
2011 and 2012. Also, as we have reported previously, NASA initiated 
the Constellation program relying on the accumulation of a large 
rolling budget reserve in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to fund program 
activities in fiscal years 2008 through 2010.[Footnote 34] This poorly 
phased funding plan diminished both the Ares I and Orion projects' 
ability to deal with technical problems and funding shortfalls in 
2010, and, in part, led the President to propose cancellation of the 
program in the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. An independent 
review commissioned by the Administration also found that the Ares I 
and Orion programs did not have budget profiles that matched the work 
that needed to be done. 

With regard to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA), 10 projects used these additional funds to offset existing 
funding issues, such as covering the cost of delays or averting "stop 
work" orders to contractors, or to lessen risk by initiating or 
further enhancing technology development efforts and long lead 
procurements that otherwise would not have funded at that time. The 
Science Mission Directorate conducted extensive analysis on how best 
to utilize the funding, because officials told us that these 
additional funds would not necessarily alleviate all technology 
development or other schedule delays, and in some cases the funds 
would have no impact. See table 4 below for the NASA projects in our 
review receiving this funding and how these funds were used. 

Table 4: ARRA Funding for Reviewed NASA Projects: 

Project: Ares; 
ARRA funds: $102.4 million; 
Use of funds: To manufacture and assemble engine components for 
development testing, completion of a test stand, and preparation for 
test operations. 

Project: Aquarius; 
ARRA funds: $8.6 million; 
Use of funds: To maintain the current workforce through the planned 
launch. 

Project: Glory; 
ARRA funds: $16.0 million; 
Use of funds: To maintain the current workforce through the planned 
launch. 

Project: GPM; 
ARRA funds: $32.0 million; 
Use of funds: To accelerate construction of the GPM Microwave Imager 
(GMI) instrument to ensure the core spacecraft is successfully 
launched at the earliest possible opportunity. 

Project: ICESat-2; 
ARRA funds: $20.4 million; 
Use of funds: To mature the micro-pulse laser designs. 

Project: JWST; 
ARRA funds: $75.0 million; 
Use of funds: To maintain workforce levels and achieve the earliest 
possible launch date. 

Project: LDCM; 
ARRA funds: $63.4 million; 
Use of funds: To initiate development of the thermal infra-red sensor 
(TIRS); 
Other LDCM development. 

Project: OCO-2; 
ARRA funds: $18.0 million; 
Use of funds: To acquire long lead components for the spacecraft and 
facilitate instrument development in order to accelerate and enable 
the earliest possible OCO-2 launch. 

Project: Orion; 
ARRA funds: $165.9 million; 
Use of funds: To avoid workforce reductions and mitigate technical 
challenges with its launch abort system, landing parachutes, solar 
arrays, heatshield, and propulsion systems. 

Project: SMAP; 
ARRA funds: $64.0 million; 
Use of funds: To procure long lead components and conduct component 
level preliminary design reviews in order to accelerate the launch 
date. 

Source: GAO presentation of data provided by NASA. 

[End of table] 

Launch Vehicle Challenges: 

[Side bar: 
Projects experiencing launch vehicle: 
challenges; 
* Glory; 
* GRAIL; 
* ICESat-2; 
* LADEE; 
* MAVEN; 
* NPP; 
* SMAP; 
* SPP. 
End of side bar] 

Eight of 21 projects in our review have experienced challenges with 
launch vehicles. The primary concern is the retirement of the Delta II 
medium launch vehicle. Over the past decade, NASA has launched about 
60 percent of its science missions on the Delta II. NASA plans to 
continue to use the Delta II as a launch vehicle for three remaining 
science missions--Aquarius, Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory, 
and National Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System Preparatory 
Project--the last of which is currently scheduled to launch in October 
2011. These projects have identified risks associated with the last 
flights, such as the availability of workforce and spare parts that 
they, along with NASA's Launch Services Program, have taken steps to 
mitigate. 

Our recent work on NASA's transition plans for future medium launch 
vehicles indicates that emerging NASA science missions will face 
increased risks until new vehicles are certified.[Footnote 35] NASA 
science missions requiring a medium class launch vehicle that are 
approaching their preliminary design review face uncertainties 
committing to as-yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles that 
will eventually replace the Delta II. Several missions, including the 
SMAP and ICESat-2 missions are approaching the point in the 
development lifecycle where it is optimal to finalize a decision on 
launch vehicle. NASA plans to fill the gap left by the retirement of 
the Delta II by eventually certifying the Falcon 9 and Taurus II 
vehicles[Footnote 36] for use by NASA science missions in the relative 
cost and performance range of the Delta II. This approach, however, is 
not without risk as these vehicles are largely unproven. In a recent 
report, we recommended that NASA perform detailed cost estimates to 
determine the likely costs of certification of these new vehicles and 
provide adequate budgeting for the risks associated with this 
approach.[Footnote 37] NASA concurred with this recommendation and 
agreed to provide cost estimates for certification and the resolution 
of technical issues during certification of the Falcon 9. 

Other launch challenges beyond the Delta II transition affected 
projects in our review this year. For example, the Taurus XL, which 
failed during the launch of OCO, was scheduled to return to flight in 
late 2010 for the Glory mission. NASA and the Taurus XL launch vehicle 
contractor were operating under constrained timelines to complete 
Taurus XL return to flight activities; however, the Glory project 
experienced technical challenges that led the project to delay the 
launch from November 2010 to February 2011, providing enough time to 
address return to flight activities. A malfunction in the ground 
support equipment associated with the Taurus XL launch vehicle has 
subsequently delayed launch of the Glory project until March 2011. 

Development Partner Challenges: 

[Side bar: 
Projects experiencing development partner challenges: 
* Aquarius; 
* GPM; 
* Juno; 
* LDCM; 
* MMS; 
* NPP. 
End of side bar] 

Six projects reported challenges with international or domestic
development partners not meeting project commitments within planned
resources. Project officials reported several reasons why development
partners were unable to fulfill their obligations, including a lack of
experience in producing spacecraft and the lack of adequate funding. For
example, delays in the development of the spacecraft bus by Argentina’s
National Committee of Space Activities was identified as the reason 
for the Aquarius project’s 15 percent development cost increase and 18-
month schedule slip that NASA reported to the Congress in February 
2010. Since that time, the project has determined that the launch will 
be delayed by at least another 5 months for a total delay of 23 
months. Project officials said that while Argentina’s National 
Committee of Space Activities is technically competent, it lacks 
experience in managing spacecraft production projects. Aquarius 
project officials estimate the cost impact of these delays to be
approximately $35 million. In addition, projects also experienced 
challenges related to development partners’ providing adequate funding 
for their contributions. For example, the GPM project identified a 
project risk that their international development partner, the 
Japanese Space Agency, may be unable to fund needed launch support 
services as originally planned. 

In the past 3 years, we reviewed 13 projects that established their 
baseline prior to fiscal year 2009. As shown in table 5, the average 
schedule delay from their baselines is 17.6 months for the projects 
with foreign or domestic development partners, but 10.6 months for 
projects that had no development partner. 

Table 5: Schedule Growth for Selected NASA Projects with and without 
Development Partners Baselined before 2009: 

Projects with Partners: Dawn; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Launch Delay (months): 0. 

Projects with Partners: GLAST; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Launch Delay (months): 9. 

Projects with Partners: Herschel; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Launch Delay (months): 21. 

Projects with Partners: LRO; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Launch Delay (months): 8. 

Projects with Partners: NPP; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Launch Delay (months): 42. 

Projects with Partners: SOFIA; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Launch Delay (months): 12. 

Projects with Partners: Aquarius; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Launch Delay (months): 23. 

Projects with Partners: MSL; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Launch Delay (months): 26. 

Projects with Partners: Average; 
Launch Delay (months): 17.6. 

Projects without Partners: Kepler; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Launch Delay (months): 9. 

Projects without Partners: SDO; 
Baseline (FY): 2007; 
Launch Delay (months): 18. 

Projects without Partners: Glory; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Launch Delay (months): 20. 

Projects without Partners: OCO; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Launch Delay (months): 5. 

Projects without Partners: WISE; 
Baseline (FY): 2008; 
Launch Delay (months): 1. 

Projects without Partners: Average: 
Launch Delay (months): 10.6. 

Source: GAO Analysis of NASA data. 

[End of table] 

Although the cost and schedule growth for some of the projects that 
have development partners can be attributed to other challenges, for 
example technology or design issues, there are instances where the 
performance of the development partners was the primary factor of cost 
and schedule growth. For example, the Aquarius, NPP and Hershel 
projects all experienced significant delays as a direct result of 
issues related to their development partners. 

Parts Challenges: 

[Side bar: 
Projects experiencing parts challenges: 
* Glory; 
* Juno; 
* LADEE; 
* LDCM; 
* MSL; 
* OCO-2; 
* RBSP; 
* TDRS Replenishment. 
End of side bar] 

While most of the projects in our assessment reported challenges 
related to parts quality or availability, 8 projects this year 
experienced an impact to their cost or had to make alterations to 
their schedules as a result of the challenges. According to NASA 
officials, parts problems are not uncommon for projects, and NASA's 
testing process is designed to identify part failures at the 
component, subsystem, and system level before they lead to mission 
failure. For example, a parts quality problem discovered during the 
testing and integration of the Glory project resulted in an additional 
$61million in cost and delayed the project by 17 months. The project 
had to replace the printed wiring board of the spacecraft's single 
board computer due to reliability problems with the original board. In 
addition, the project recently discovered excessive wear of the Slip 
Ring Assembly in the solar arrays, resulting in an additional three 
month launch delay. In addition, the MSL project experienced a part 
failure associated with the transition joints in the propulsion system 
which caused the joints to overheat and fail. Project officials 
reported this issue was realized after the project finished building 
its propulsion system, causing the project to rebuild the system and 
adopt a new joint design. The transition to the new design delayed 
rover testing from 2009 to early 2010. 

NASA centers work together and communicate potential systemic issues. 
For example, parts personnel at Goddard Space Flight Center maintain a 
center-level parts database, which links to the agency-wide Government 
Industry Data Exchange Program alert system.[Footnote 38] GAO has an 
on-going assessment of parts quality across the government space 
sector and will be reporting on actions being taken by NASA and other 
agencies to prevent and mitigate such problems. 

Contractor Management Challenges: 

[Side bar: 
Projects experiencing contractor management challenges: 
* Glory; 
* Juno; 
* JWST; 
* Orion; 
* RBSP; 
* SOFIA. 
End of side bar] 

Five projects in implementation and one project in formulation 
reported experiencing contractor challenges including not completing 
work on time, not identifying risks for the project, and inadequate 
oversight. Contractor management challenges have been reported for a 
greater number of projects and with a greater impact for projects in 
past reports. Although the impact of this challenge on projects we 
reviewed this year has diminished, as contractors spend about 85 
percent of NASA's annual budget, their performance is critical in 
terms of achieving the success of many NASA missions. As a result, we 
continue to identify this area as a common project challenge that can 
contribute to cost and schedule growth. 

In one case, RBSP project officials are expecting the delivery of the
Magnetic Electron Ion Spectrometer instrument to be delayed due to
the time a vendor is taking in providing needed flight hardware for the
instrument. Consequently, the project has re-planned the schedule to
accommodate the late delivery and integration of the instrument. This
re-plan maintains the launch readiness date by reordering the 
observatory integration and test flow and changing selected subsystem 
and instrument delivery dates. 

In another example, an independent review panel found that the JWST
project did not have staff resident at the prime contractor facility 
to help avoid surprises, especially since the contract represented 
approximately half of the JWST project’s budget. The panel said that 
this is a normal practice and is done for other projects at Goddard 
Space Flight Center. Further, while project officials told us that the 
project’s prime contractor and one of the subcontractors came forward 
after confirmation with large cost increases that the contractor had 
not previously identified as risks, the panel found that these risks 
had been identified and that the project had asked the prime 
contractor to submit them in a formal proposal before they could be 
recognized as risks. GAO has ongoing work to review NASA’s
contractor surveillance and oversight practices and will issue a 
report later in 2011. 

Observations about NASA's Continued Efforts to Improve Its Acquisition 
Management: 

In response to GAO’s designation of NASA’s acquisition management as a
high risk area,[Footnote 39] NASA developed a corrective action plan 
to improve the effectiveness of its program/project management. 
[Footnote 40] The plan identifies five areas for improvement—-
program/project management, cost reporting process, cost estimating 
and analysis, standard business processes, and management of financial 
management systems-—each of which contains targets and goals to 
measure improvement. As part of this initiative, the agency is 
continuing its implementation of a new cost estimating tool, the Joint 
Cost and Schedule Confidence Level, to help project officials with 
management, cost and schedule estimating, and maintenance of adequate
levels of reserves. In addition to the corrective action plan, NASA is 
in the process of implementing Earned Value Management within certain
programs and specific in-house efforts to help the projects monitor the
scheduled work done by its contractors and employees; however, this
management tool has not yet been institutionalized within the NASA
Centers. These two efforts, in addition to other improvements NASA is 
making to address acquisition management, are positive steps toward
addressing NASA’s issues with meeting cost and schedule baselines. It 
is, however, too early to assess their impact on NASA’s performance.
Additionally, NASA’s progress could be hindered by the continued lack 
of a consistent measure for ensuring design stability as well as little
transparency with regard to costs for projects in the early, critical 
phases of development, both of which are key to ensuring that internal 
and external decision makers are well informed. We recently raised 
both issues as potential impediments to success in congressional 
testimony and plan to recommend improvements in a separate report. 
[Footnote 41] 

Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Levels Being Implemented: 

NASA's Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Levels (JCL) initiative, 
adopted in January 2009, is a point-in-time estimate that includes, 
among other things, all cost and schedule elements, incorporates and 
quantifies known risks, assesses the impacts of cost and schedule to 
date, and addresses available annual resources. The primary goals of 
the JCL are to help project officials with management, cost and 
schedule estimating, and maintenance of adequate levels of reserves; 
provide assurance to stakeholders that NASA will meet cost and 
schedule targets; and to provide transparency on the effects of 
funding changes on the probability of meeting cost and schedule 
commitments. NASA requires that a JCL be conducted the prior to the 
confirmation review. NASA policy also requires that projects be 
baselined and budgeted at the 70 percent confidence level and funded 
at a level equivalent to at least the 50 percent confidence level for 
the project.[Footnote 42] According to NASA officials, this would 
include reserves held at the directorate and project level. The total 
amount of reserves held at the project level varies based on where the 
project is in its lifecycle. The reserves represent the amount of 
estimated costs that are not allocated to the specific project sub-
elements. See figure 6 for a visual depiction of this funding 
allocation. 

Figure 6: Notional Allocation of Reserves under the 70 Percent 
Confidence Level Funding Requirements: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

The graph depicts the amount NASA budgets for project reserves and 
mission directorate or program reserves. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA policy. 

Note: The amount of project reserves varies as the project moves 
through its lifecycle. 

[End of figure] 

NASA's Associate Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate 
indicated that adoption of the new JCL process will reduce NASA's 
portfolio because the cost estimating will be more accurate at the 70 
percent confidence level, reflecting higher costs from the outset to 
avoid higher cost overruns in the future, and as a result NASA will 
have fewer dollars available to start new projects. 

Five out of the 21 projects[Footnote 43] in our review have recently 
completed the JCL process, and several others are in the process of 
conducting a JCL analysis. NASA is still in the process of refining 
the tools used to create the JCL based on feedback from the projects. 
As NASA evolves its cost estimation processes and as we continue to 
conduct our reviews of the projects that have gone through the JCL 
process, we can better assess the impact this initiative has on the 
projects' ability to meet cost and schedule commitments and to address 
potential cost and schedule drivers. 

Implementation of Earned Value Management at NASA Centers in Progress: 

Earned value management (EVM) is a program management tool that 
integrates the technical, cost, and schedule parameters of a contract 
and uses those parameters to measure cost and schedule variances. 
During our review, we found that implementation of earned value 
management is occurring within 11 projects and earned value data is 
reported by projects on a monthly basis to upper level project 
management. While earned value management is being used by these 
projects, it has not yet been used consistently by the projects as a 
tool for managing cost and schedule. According to a briefing from the 
NASA Advisory Council's Audit, Finance, and Analysis Committee, NASA's 
goal is to develop and deploy an agency-wide EVM capability that is 
compliant with generally accepted standards.[Footnote 44] At this 
time, only the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a Federally Funded Research 
and Development Center and not a NASA Center, has a compliant system. 

If implemented appropriately, EVM provides objective reports of 
project status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule 
delays and cost overruns, and can identify specific development 
efforts contributing to those overruns. For example, MSL's June 2010 
earned value management report identified the avionics and actuators 
as the primary drivers of the project's cost overruns. In particular, 
the data showed that ongoing unplanned technical issues with three of 
the heritage avionics technologies would likely result in a cost 
overrun of $11.5 million. More consistent use of this management tool 
could help address the project challenges identified earlier in this 
report that threaten the project's cost and schedule during project 
development. The data we received from NASA was not received in a 
timely manner and was incomplete. As a result, we were unable to 
perform a detailed analysis by project to provide our own 
determination of whether the information provided by the contractors 
is accurate and could be relied on by the projects and management as a 
tool to assess progress. We plan to conduct a more thorough analysis 
of EVM data in ongoing work and in future iterations of this work. 

Transparency and Accountability Not Sufficient to Provide Proper 
Oversight: 

These initiatives aimed at improving cost estimating and management 
oversight are positive steps. However, we recently testified that NASA 
does not yet provide enough transparency during project development to 
help Congress identify risks and inefficiencies and ensure earlier 
accountability.[Footnote 45] Currently, NASA does not share cost and 
schedule information for projects in the early, critical phases of 
development and only makes this information public after the projects 
have been formally approved to enter implementation. Projects 
establish preliminary cost baselines in formulation phase; these 
estimates, however, are for planning purposes only as they enable NASA 
decision makers to better manage the overall portfolio of projects. 
NASA does not report deviations from these preliminary baselines to 
the Congress. In addition, NASA does not report information on what 
has been spent to date on the projects in formulation, as it does in 
its annual budget submission for projects in implementation. To add 
some perspective to this timing, neither the Ares nor Orion projects 
has reached this point, despite having spent over $9 billion dollars 
combined; and JWST just reached this point in 2008, despite having 
spent nearly $2 billion before then. 

Despite the absence of established external cost and schedule 
baselines to measure the progress of the project, cost growth and 
schedule delays can and do occur during the formulation phase. NASA's 
internal analysis of past projects indicates that there is an average 
of 14 percent growth in the development cost estimates during the 
formulation phase. While there is a need to allow projects a period of 
time for discovery and to pursue different concepts--particularly 
highly complex efforts such as JWST--inadequate transparency into 
their progress for what sometimes amounts to five or more years can 
preclude effective oversight and accountability and make it even more 
difficult to stop projects that are not on track to meet the agency's 
goals with available resources. Additional insight to cost could 
better enable Congress to make more informed decisions when approving 
the projects through the annual appropriations process. 

In addition, a recently released report from the Independent 
Comprehensive Review Panel[Footnote 46] concerning problems affecting 
the JWST program concluded that significant changes are still needed 
in NASA's oversight and accountability functions to ensure that 
programs base their decisions on sound knowledge. The panel noted that 
NASA's governance policy is inconsistent with accountability for 
project execution. In particular, the panel found that a lack of clear 
lines of authority and accountability contributed to a lack of 
executive leadership in resolving the broken JWST life-cycle cost 
baseline. Additionally, the study found that JWST's flawed budget 
should have been discovered as part of the Goddard Spaceflight 
Center's execution responsibility, but the interpretation of the 
agency's governance policy on the role of the center in this regard is 
ambiguous and not interpreted uniformly within NASA. As a result, the 
report noted that ongoing, regular independent assessment and 
oversight processes at the agency are missing. 

Project Assessments: 

The two-page assessments of the projects we reviewed provide a profile 
of each project and describe the challenges we identified this year, 
as well as challenges that we have identified in the past. On the 
first page, the project profile presents a general description of the 
mission objectives for each of the projects; a picture of the 
spacecraft or aircraft; a schedule timeline identifying key dates for 
the project; a table identifying programmatic and launch information; 
a table showing the current statutory baseline year cost and schedule 
estimates and the November 2010 cost and schedule data; a table 
showing the challenges relevant to the project; and a project summary 
narrative. To maintain information on challenges the projects 
experience over their lifetime, we continued to identify project 
challenges that were reported in prior reports. On the second page of 
the assessment, we provide an analysis of the project challenges and 
the extent to which each project faces cost, schedule, or performance 
risk because of these challenges. In addition, NASA project offices 
were provided an opportunity to review drafts of the assessments prior 
to their inclusion in the final product, and the projects provided 
both technical corrections and more general comments. We integrated 
the technical corrections as appropriate and characterized the general 
comments below the project update. See figure 7 below for an 
illustration of the layout of each two-page assessment. 

Figure 7: Illustration of Project Two-Page Summary: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

A. General description of mission’s science objectives. 

B. Illustration of spacecraft or aircraft. 

C. Schedule timeline identifying key dates for the project including 
when the project began formulation, major design reviews, confirmation 
to begin the implementation phase, and scheduled launch readiness. 

D. Project Essentials Programmatic information including the responsible
NASA center, international or domestic partners, major contractors, and
launch information. 

E. Project Performance Cost and schedule baseline estimates and the
latest estimate updates as of February 2011. 

F. Project Challenges Summary listing the challenges facing the project
based on a successful acquisition business case. 

G. Project Summary Brief narrative describing current status of the
project with regard to the challenges identified. 

H. Project Update Analysis of project challenges and the extent to which
each project faces cost, schedule, or performance risk because of these
challenges. 

I. Project Office comments General comments provided by the cognizant 
project office. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Project data: 

Common Name: Aquarius: 

Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA and the Space Agency 
of Argentina (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, CONAE) to
investigate the links between the global water cycle, ocean 
circulation, and the climate. It will measure global sea surface 
salinity. The Aquarius science goals are to observe and model the 
processes that relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the
global cycling of water and to understand how these variations 
influence the general ocean circulation. By measuring salinity 
globally for 3 years, Aquarius will provide a new view of the ocean’s 
role in climate. 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Aquarius Project. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 12/03; 
Preliminary design review: 6/05. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 9/05; 
Critical design review: 9/06; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 6/11. 

Project essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)[A]; 
International Partner: Argentina's National Committee of Space 
Activities (CONAE); 
Major Contractors: In-house development; 
Projected Launch Date: June 2011; 
Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, California; 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 3 years for Aquarius mission; 5 years for SAC-D 
(CONAE) mission. 

[A] JPL is a federally funded research and development center. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $241.8;
Latest (Feb. 2011): $279.0; 
Change: 15.4%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $35.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $35.6; 
Change: 0.3%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $192.7; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $227.3; 
Change: 18.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $13.6; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $16.1; 
Change: 18.4%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 7/2009; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 6/2011; 
Change: 23 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Development Partner Issues; 
* Funding Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Design Stability. 

Project Summary: 

The launch of Aquarius has been delayed from the July 2009 baseline to 
June 2011 because of delays in CONAE’s spacecraft development and 
problems with the propulsion system thrusters. The launch delay, which 
added costs to the project, prompted NASA to report to the Congress in 
February 2010 that the Aquarius project exceeded its development cost 
and schedule baselines by 15 percent and more than 6 months, 
respectively. NASA completed its development of the Aquarius 
instrument, which is currently being integrated with the Argentine-
developed spacecraft. Project officials estimated the cost of the past 
schedule slips to be about $35.5 million. 

Project Update: 

NASA reported to Congress in the agency’s fiscal year 2011 budget 
estimates that the Aquarius mission’s development costs had grown by 
15 percent from its 2008 baseline. Additionally, the project’s current 
June 2011 launch date represents a 23-month schedule slip. These cost 
and schedule overruns are due to delays by the international partner. 

Development Partner Issues: According to project officials and budget 
documents, delays in the development of the spacecraft bus by CONAE 
were responsible for the 15 percent development cost increase and 18-
month schedule slip that NASA reported to Congress in February 2010. 
Since that time, the project has determined that the launch will be 
delayed by another 5 months to June 2011, for a total delay of 23 
months. To facilitate the work of its partners, the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) project team said that it appointed a chief mission 
engineer to help facilitate upcoming tests and reviews; however, JPL
officials stated that they have not had full access to INVAP, CONAE’s 
prime contractor, due to contractual agreements between INVAP and 
CONAE. Additionally, CONAE was responsible for flying the instrument to
Vandenberg Air Force Base for launch but could not find a viable 
commercial aircraft. Project officials said that they are working with 
the U.S. Air Force to secure a no-cost flight for the integrated 
satellite, but may have to pay for the flight at a cost of 
approximately $1 million. 

Funding Issues: Since no funds are being exchanged between the U.S. 
and Argentina for this project, NASA bears the costs it incurs 
associated with any schedule delays. Project officials told us that 
all of the project’s contingency reserves have been eroded due to past 
schedule delays with the spacecraft bus as well as current schedule 
delays associated with the SAC-D instruments being provided by CONAE. 
These schedule slips increased NASA’s costs by an estimated $35.5 
million in the past. Project officials stated that the primary cost 
driver associated with the launch delay is staffing costs, estimated 
to be approximately $4.9 million. Further, the project received $8.6 
million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that 
was used to maintain the current Aquarius workforce through launch. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: During thermal vacuum testing on the 
spacecraft bus, INVAP discovered a problem with the spacecraft’s 
propulsion systems thrusters that has contributed to delaying the launch
until June 2011. After an analysis of the Dual Thruster Module, the 
Aquarius/SAC-D team determined that the problem was likely due to one 
or more procedural issues in the test process at the manufacturer or its
vendor. Refurbishment of all of the Dual Thruster Module flight units 
is complete and the flight units were re-integrated with the 
observatory. INVAP planned to complete integration and testing by 
November 2010. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Aquarius project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
officials also commented that NASA and CONAE will continue to work 
together to meet the earliest possible launch date. 

[End of Aquarius data] 

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle: 

Common Name: Ares I: 

NASA’s Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle was designed to carry the Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle into low Earth orbit for missions to the 
International Space Station and the Moon as part of the Constellation
Program. The mission of the Ares I project was to deliver a safe, 
reliable, and affordable launch system with a 24.5-metric ton lift 
capability. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Ares Projects Office. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 9/05; 
Preliminary design review: 9/08; 
GAO review: 12/10. 
Project Confirmation: 

Implementation: 
Critical design review: 9/11; 
Launch readiness date: 3/15. 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Marshall Space Flight Center; 
Partners: None; 
Major Contractors: Alliant Techsystems, Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne, 
Boeing; 
Projected Launch Date: March 2015; 
Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Florida; 
Launch Vehicle: Ares I; 
Mission Duration: N/A. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Latest (Feb. 2011): 
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost[A]: $17,000 to $20,000. 

[A] This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and 
there is still uncertainty in the value as design options are 
explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. This 
estimate is for the Ares I vehicle only. 

Launch Schedule: 3/2015. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Funding Issues; 
* Technology Issues. 

Project Summary: 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget proposed cancellation of the 
Ares I project leading to uncertainty, both financial and 
programmatic, within the project. Given constrained resources, the 
project prioritized work and did not accomplish some of the work 
originally planned for 2010; however, it successfully tested 
Development Motor 2 to gain data on project elements. In early fall 
2010, Congress passed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directing NASA
to develop a space launch system and crew vehicle for missions 
utilizing existing Ares I contracts and capabilities to the extent 
practicable. 

Project Update: 

The President proposed cancellation of the Constellation Program, 
including the Ares I project, in the fiscal year 2011 budget request. 
This proposal led to much debate within Congress and uncertainty, both
financial and programmatic, within the project. As a result, the 
project prioritized work for the year and did not complete some of the 
work originally planned for 2010. In early fall 2010, Congress passed 
the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which directed NASA to develop a 
space launch system and crew vehicle for missions to near earth orbit 
and regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit no later than December 
2016. In developing this vehicle, Congress directed the agency to 
extend or modify existing vehicle development and associated contracts 
to the extent practicable. 

Funding Issues: The Ares I project received over $102 million under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) that was 
used to manufacture and assemble engine components for development 
testing, completion of a test stand, and preparation for test 
operations. However, project officials explained that due to a series 
of budgetary constraints for the first 4 months of fiscal year 2010 that
roughly offset the amount gained from the ARRA funding, the project 
could not perform all of its originally planned work. While initially 
parts of the project were able to maintain momentum, termination 
liability issues identified in June 2010 caused the three project 
prime contractors to stop certain portions of the work on their 
respective contracts. At this time, the project redirected its funding 
to activities that would potentially benefit NASA’s goals and 
objectives beyond the current fiscal year. For example, in August 2010,
the project successfully tested Development Motor 2 (DM-2). The DM-2 
test was conducted to gain data on project elements tested including 
the redesigned rocket nozzle, new insulation, and the motor casing’s 
liner. According to project officials, the project was flexible in its 
planning while it maintained the program of record during fiscal year 
2010. 

Technology Issues: The Ares I project has been working to mitigate 
several challenges related to the development of heritage technology. 
However, given the funding uncertainty that has surrounded Ares I, the 
project has been unable to implement the mitigation strategies. For 
example, last year, NASA identified thrust oscillation as a technical 
issue. Thrust oscillation, which causes shaking during launch and 
ascent, occurs in some form in every solid rocket engine. Computer 
modeling indicated that there was a possibility that the magnitude and 
frequency of thrust oscillation within the first stage would be outside
the limits of the Ares I design and could cause excessive vibration in 
the Orion capsule and threaten crew safety. According to project 
officials, the project plans to mitigate the risk by adding damper and 
isolation techniques at the interface between the launch vehicle and 
the Service Module. However, this risk cannot be closed until funding 
is obtained to implement the mitigation strategy. Furthermore, 
vibroacoustics—-the pressure of the acoustic waves produced by the 
firing of the Ares I first stage and the rocket’s acceleration through 
the atmosphere—-continues to be a concern to the project. 
Vibroacoustics may cause unacceptable structural vibrations throughout 
Ares I and Orion and force NASA to qualify components to higher 
vibration tolerance thresholds than originally expected. According to 
the project, the global mitigation strategy for the excessive 
vibration has been on hold due to budget constraints. The project is 
unable to finalize the design without knowing the final configuration 
of the crew exploration vehicle. Finally, last year we reported that
analysis of the Ares I flight path also indicated that, under some 
conditions, the Ares I vehicle could hit the launch tower during 
liftoff and the vehicle would need to be steered away from the launch 
tower or not launched during high winds. NASA officials told us they 
have developed a plan to mitigate this risk. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Ares I project office provided technical comments on a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
office also commented that it has utilized resources to make progress 
on the Constellation Program while focusing on goals that yield 
benefits to future human spaceflight endeavors. 

[End of Ares I data] 

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission: 

Common Name: GPM: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: GPM Project Office. 

The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission, a joint NASA and 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) project, seeks to improve 
the scientific understanding of the global water cycle and the 
accuracy of precipitation forecasts. The GPM is composed of a core 
spacecraft carrying two main instruments: a Dual-frequency 
Precipitation Radar (DPR) and a GPM Microwave Imager (GMI). GPM
builds on the work of the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission and will 
provide an opportunity to calibrate measurements of global 
precipitation. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 7/02; 
Preliminary design review: 11/08. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 12/09; 
Critical design review: 12/09; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch core spacecraft: 7/13. 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
International Partner: Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA); 
Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace; 
Projected Launch Date: July 21, 2013; 
Launch Location: Tanegashima Island, Japan; 
Launch Vehicle: JAXA supplied; 
Mission Duration: 3 years. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $975.9;
Latest (Feb. 2011): $928.9; 
Change: -4.8%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $349.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $349.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 20098): $555.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $514.8; 
Change: -7.3%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $71.6; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $64.9; 
Change: -9.4%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): 7/2013; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 7/2013; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Summary: 

Prior to establishing the project’s baseline cost and schedule 
estimate, NASA descoped the planned second spacecraft of the GPM 
mission. The project’s international partner, JAXA, is providing the 
launch vehicle for the core spacecraft. However, GPM project officials 
were tracking potential funding issues with JAXA. GPM received $32 
million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
which was used to maintain the current schedule, expedite some work on 
the GMI-1, and begin work on a second GMI. 

Project Update: 

Funding Issues: Prior to establishing the project’s baseline cost 
estimate, NASA removed funding for the second spacecraft of the GPM 
mission, the Low Inclination Observatory (LIO), due to lack of funding.
The Low Inclination Observatory (LIO) was primarily intended to fly a 
second GPM Microwave Imager (GMI-2), which would gather additional 
science data to further support the GPM mission. Project officials
reported that NASA is currently pursuing an international development 
partner willing to fund the launch vehicle and spacecraft needed for 
the second GMI instrument. However, despite de-scoping the LIO launch
vehicle and spacecraft, the project continues to invest in the 
development of the GMI-2 instrument. A GPM project official reported 
that GMI-2 will be put into storage in 2013 if the LIO mission is not 
going to launch soon after that. Although the science requirements for 
GPM could still be met without flying the GMI-2 instrument, project 
officials reported that without the instrument the available science 
data from the mission would not be as robust. 

GPM received $32 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009. According to project officials, this enabled GPM to 
maintain schedule in fiscal year 2009, move some of the GMI work 
planned for fiscal year 2011 into fiscal year 2010, and start the GMI-
2 development on schedule in October 2009. 

Development Partner Issues: GPM project officials were tracking 
potential funding issues with the Japanese Aerospace and Exploration 
Agency (JAXA), which is providing the launch vehicle for the first GPM
spacecraft as a risk to the cost and schedule of the project. In 
addition, the GPM project is tracking the availability of the JAXA-
supplied Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar (DPR) instrument. The 
project reports that delays in the DPR instrument's development have 
compressed the schedule available for integration and testing. 

Design Issues: The project has currently released 96 percent of its 
engineering drawings, but only 53 percent were released by the mission 
critical design review (CDR) held in December 2009. A project official
said that the lack of released drawings at critical design review 
didn’t have a serious impact in terms of design stability as testing 
was almost complete on engineering testing units and flight units were 
already designed and ready to begin manufacturing. 

Project officials delayed the CDR of the fully demiseable aluminum 
propulsion tank from August 2010 to October 2010 due to difficulties 
with parts assembly. The GPM spacecraft was designed to be demiseable—-
that is, it will burn up during re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere 
to limit orbital debris. However, in December 2008, an updated re-
entry structural analysis at Johnson Space Center of GPM indicated 
that the spacecraft would not be demiseable as originally predicted by 
the GPM project office and Johnson Space Center. The project had 
initially delayed the start of the implementation phase and 
establishment of GPM cost and schedule baselines by 8 months in order 
to reconcile the project budget with available funding and to resolve 
the demisability issue. 

Project Office Comments: 

The GPM project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that overall the GPM Project is making progress. 

[End of GMP data] 

Glory: 

Common Name: Glory: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Glory Project Office. 

Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that will contribute to 
the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The satellite has two 
principal science objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of
aerosols and black carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere and climate 
systems and (2) collect data on solar irradiance. The satellite has 
two main instruments-—the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the
Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM)-—as well as two cloud cameras. The TIM 
will allow NASA to have uninterrupted solar irradiance data by bridging
the gap between NASA’s Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment and the 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS). 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 9/05; 
Preliminary design review: 9/05. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 12/05; 
Critical design review: 7/06; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 2/11. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $347.9;
Latest (Feb. 2011): $424.1; 
Change: 21.9%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $70.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $70.8; 
Change: 0.4%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $259.1; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $337.6; 
Change: 30.3%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $18.3; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $15.8; 
Change: -13.7%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): 67/2009; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 3/2011; 
Change: 21 months. 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Launch Issues; 
* Funding Issues; 
* Parts Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Design Stability; 
* Contractor Performance. 

Project Summary: 

Significant cost increases and schedule delays have persisted on Glory 
despite being reauthorized by Congress and re-baselined in 2009. 
Development costs have increased by about 30 percent since 2009. 
Recent cost increases and schedule delays are residual effects of 
switching to an alternate single board computer provider, the late 
delivery of the APS instrument, and, more recently, due to part 
quality issues found in the solar array drive assembly. Glory will 
launch on the Taurus XL launch vehicle, which is returning to flight 
after the vehicle failed during a 2009 launch. 

Project Update: 

Parts Issues: The Glory project has experienced significant schedule 
delays due to reliability problems with key parts found during 
testing. For example, in June 2010, the project discovered excessive 
wear and debris of the Slip Ring Assembly, a part contained in the 
solar array drive assembly that rendered one of the array wings 
unacceptable for flight. The corrected solar array drive assembly was 
integrated with the spacecraft in November 2010. The other solar array 
drive assembly was inspected, found to have no signs of wear or 
debris, and sent back to the contractor for integration with the 
spacecraft. This issue has resulted in an additional 3 month launch 
delay. 

Prior to the solar array issue, the project switched from using a 
single board computer (SBC) to an alternate SBC produced by another 
company. According to the project manager, continued reliability 
issues with the initial SBC, including cracks in the printed wiring 
boards, required the project to seek another vendor for the SBC as the 
part failed during testing. While the new SBC has now been integrated 
with the spacecraft and is performing well, project officials estimate 
the total cost impact of this switch in technology to be approximately 
$60.9 million. 

Launch Issues: The Glory project has been tracking the return to 
flight activities of the Taurus XL launch vehicle as a risk to 
achieving its launch readiness date in February 2011. The vehicle 
failed during the launch of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) in 
February 2009. The launch failure Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) 
subsequently released findings and suggested corrective actions. 
Specifically, the MIB found that a payload fairing-—a clamshell-shaped 
cover that encloses and protects a payload during early flight-—failed
to separate during ascent. NASA’s Launch Services Program has 
developed a corrective action plan and, according to a Launch Services 
Program official, the Taurus XL corrective actions were on track to 
meet the launch vehicle readiness review for Glory in September 2010. 
The return to flight activities for the Taurus XL is on-going while 
the project performs test and integration of instruments after the 
over one year late delivery of the APS and a parts failure in the 
Single Board Computer. A malfunction in the ground support equipment 
associated with the Taurus XL launch vehicle has subsequently delayed 
the launch of the Glory project until March 2011. 

Funding Issues: The Glory project’s development costs have increased 
by almost 31 percent and its launch has been delayed by 21 months 
since being reauthorized by Congress and re-baselined in 2009 after a 53
percent development cost increase. Cost increases and schedule delays 
are a residual result of switching to an alternate single board 
computer provider due to reliability issues, the late delivery of the 
APS instrument, and, more recently, due to parts failure in the solar 
array drive assembly. Since Glory’s original fiscal year 2008 
baseline, the project’s development costs have grown by 113 percent 
and its launch has been delayed over 2 years. The Glory project also 
received $16 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (ARRA) which was used to maintain the current workforce 
through the planned launch. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Glory project office provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project 
officials also commented that the project continues to monitor the
Taurus XL return to flight activities. 

[End of Glory data] 

Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL): 

Common Name: GRAIL: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Courtesy of NASA/JPL-Caltech. 

The GRAIL mission will seek to determine the structure of the lunar 
interior from crust to core, advance our understanding of the thermal 
evolution of the Moon, and extend our knowledge gained from the Moon 
to other terrestrial-type planets. GRAIL will achieve its science 
objectives by placing twin spacecraft in a low altitude and nearly 
circular polar orbit. The two spacecraft will perform high-precision
measurements between them. Analysis of changes in the spacecraft-to-
spacecraft data caused by gravitational differences will provide 
direct and precise measurements of lunar gravity. GRAIL will 
ultimately provide a global, high-accuracy, high-resolution gravity 
map of the Moon. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 12/07; 
Preliminary design review: 11/08. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 1/09; 
Critical design review: 11/09; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 9/11. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $496.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $496.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $50.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $50.5; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $427.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $427.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $18.7; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $18.7; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): 9/2011; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 9/2011; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Technology Issues; 
* Launch Issues. 

Project Summary: 

During formulation it was determined that the reaction wheel assembly 
did not meet mission requirements. The project office undertook a new 
development effort of the reaction wheel, but because of a mechanical 
design flaw found in testing, it will not be delivered on schedule. In 
addition, the schedule for testing and integration for avionics has 
been impacted by late delivery of parts and hardware problems. Project 
officials continue to be concerned about the availability of Delta II 
Heavy launch personnel and resources for the mission. 

Project Update: 

Technology Issues: GRAIL project officials said they included no new 
technology in designing the GRAIL orbiters to keep the mission simple, 
cost effective, and as close to the Gravity Recovery and Climate 
Experiment (GRACE) mission as possible. Therefore, the GRAIL project 
instruments are similar to those used in the GRACE mission. All 
heritage technologies for the project, except for the reaction wheel
assembly, were deemed mature at the preliminary design review. Project 
officials told us that during formulation they reviewed the reaction 
wheel assembly and determined that it did not meet the standards for 
this mission and caused the project to undertake a new development 
effort. The electronics of the newly developed reaction wheel are 
combined into the mechanical assembly, and the project decreased the
diameter of the mechanical assembly. However, the reaction wheel 
assembly flight units are not on track for on-time delivery because of 
a mechanical design flaw found in testing. The project determined that 
there was a problem with the bearing material and modifications had to 
be made to allow for proper load bearings and stability. The project 
has determined the root cause of the problem and developed a design 
update to correct the problem. Project officials said that schedule 
contains enough margin to accommodate the late delivery of the 
reaction wheel assembly without affecting the launch schedule. 

Launch Issues: Last year, we reported that GRAIL project officials 
were concerned about the availability of trained personnel to process 
the launch since GRAIL would have been the last NASA project to launch
on the Delta II launch vehicle. Since that time, the NPOESS 
Preparatory Project (NPP) has delayed its launch date, and therefore, 
GRAIL is no longer the last NASA project scheduled to launch on the 
Delta II launch vehicle. Project officials told us they continue to be 
concerned about the availability of Delta II launch personnel and 
continue to monitor that availability as a risk to the project. NASA 
launch services is monitoring changes in Delta II launch services 
personnel and processes and the post-production support proposals for 
all major subcontractors. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: Project officials told us the delivery 
of the avionics flight boxes have been delayed due to late delivery of 
parts, which will impact the system level environmental tests for these
units and, therefore, are on the critical path. However, the project 
mitigated this risk by using engineering test units of the avionics 
boxes since the flight unit deliveries were delayed past the beginning 
of test and integration in July 2010. Project officials told us that 
the project can conduct system-level testing using engineering test 
units if the avionics boxes are further delayed since the electronics 
boards are the same in both units and can be swapped out prior to the 
system-level environmental testing. The project expects that the two 
flight units will be delivered by early 2011. The project has modified 
its schedule to accommodate for the delay in the delivery of the 
flight avionics and reported it has sufficient schedule margin to meet 
the launch date. 

Project Office Comments: 

The GRAIL project office commented that the project has completed all 
the major milestones on schedule and is currently on track to meet its 
launch readiness date. 

[End of GRAIL data] 

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2): 

Common Name: ICESat-2: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: ICESat-2 Project Office. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 12/09; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Preliminary design review: 11/11. 

Implementation: 
Critical design review: 11/12; 
Launch readiness date: 10/15. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Latest (Feb. 2011): 
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost[A]: not available. 

Launch Schedule: 10/2015. 

[A] The project has not yet reached the point in the acquisition
life cycle where a preliminary life cycle cost estimate would
normally be developed. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Launch Issues; 
* Funding Issues. 

Project Summary: 

ICESat-2 was approved to begin formulation in December 2009. The project
’s internal cost estimates exceeded the cost cap, which led the 
project to evaluate potential cost reduction activities and re-scope 
options. These activities delayed the Mission Definition Review 
originally planned for August 2010 until January 2011. The project 
used $20.4 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
funds to work with four major laser vendors to mature the micro-pulse 
laser designs. However, the acquisition and testing for the laser
subsystem is behind schedule. 

Project Update: 

Launch Issues: ICESat-2 is tracking a risk due to the lack of medium 
class launch vehicle availability. The project is concerned that a 
delay in identifying a launch vehicle for the mission will lead to 
cost and schedule impact. The only certified vehicle currently 
available to NASA missions in the ICESat-2 launch time frame is the 
Atlas V, an intermediate launch vehicle. The only medium class launch 
vehicle currently available under NASA’s contract for launch services 
is the Falcon 9; however, it has not yet been certified. If ICESat-2 
selects the Falcon 9, the mission launch date would be tied to a 
successful certification of the launch vehicle. The Atlas V comes at a 
higher cost than what NASA has traditionally paid for a medium 
capability launch vehicle. Officials told us that the project is 
currently allocating $100 million for the launch vehicle. The project 
planned to develop a procurement package to initiate procurement of a 
launch vehicle in early fiscal year 2011. 

Funding Issues: NASA provided cost parameters for the ICESat-2 
mission; however, the project’s internal life cycle cost estimates 
exceeded the cost cap by $100 million. Project officials are currently 
evaluating how they can reduce the project’s life-cycle cost estimates 
through various re-scoping options, such as partnering with another 
ongoing mission or reducing the mission life. Due to these activities, 
the project’s Mission Definition Review, originally scheduled for 
August 2010, was not scheduled to occur until January 2011 at the 
earliest. In addition, the project used $20.4 million in American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) funding for the micro-
pulse laser development contracts to retire project risk earlier. 
However, the acquisition and testing of these laser subsystems is 
behind schedule due to delays associated with the ARRA reporting by 
the agency. Also, according to project officials, the project received 
$28 million in fiscal year 2010 funding from the President’s global 
climate initiative, but it was unable to use all of the additional funds
within the fiscal year and is unsure whether it will receive funding 
from this initiative in fiscal year 2011. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: The project entered the formulation 
phase in December 2009. During the mission concept review process, the 
project responded to changing science requirements, particularly the 
need to accurately measure slope through micro-pulse laser technology. 
The Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System is the single 
instrument on the ICESat-2 mission. The project identified two critical
technologies, the micro-pulse lasers and the Laser Reference System 
(LRS). The project expects that both technologies will be mature at 
the preliminary design review scheduled for November 2011. The 
micropulse lasers being developed for ICESat-2 use a low energy pulse 
at a high frequency, a change from the high power lasers used on the 
original ICESat mission. The project is working with four major laser 
vendors to mature the micro-pulse laser technology and designs. 
Despite delays in awarding the contracts, the vendors are working 
toward the original milestone delivery dates to reduce schedule risk. 
The LRS is designed to provide absolute laser pointing knowledge in 
order to pinpoint the ice footprint location 6 meters on the ground. 

Project Office Comments: 

The ICESat-2 project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that ICESat-2 is currently in formulation and 
activities are on-going to confirm a mission that fits within the cost 
cap. NASA does not formally commit to a project’s schedule and cost 
until Key Decision Point (KDP)-C, which ICESat-2 has not yet reached. 

[End of ICESat-2 data] 

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): 

Common Name: JWST: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 3/99; 
Preliminary design review: 3/08. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 7/08; 
Critical design review: 3/10; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 6/14. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $4963.6; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $5095.4; 
Change: 2.7%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $1800.1; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $1800.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $2581.1; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $2710.9; 
Change: 5.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $582.4; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $584.5; 
Change: 0.4%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): 6/2014; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 6/2014; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Funding Issues; 
* Contractor Issues; 
* Design Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology. 

Project Summary: 

NASA is taking steps to address deficiencies identified by two 
independent reviews this year. One independent review panel found that 
the earliest possible launch date for JWST is September 2015, a 15-
month delay from the baseline estimate. To meet this date, the panel 
estimated the project would need an additional $500 million over the 
next 2 fiscal years and a total life-cycle cost of approximately $6.5
billion. A separate review team reported that JWST’s test plans 
exceeded the money and time available. As a result of these reviews, 
the program office at NASA headquarters will now report directly to 
the NASA Associate Administrator. 

Project Update: 

Funding Issues: According to an October 2010 Independent Comprehensive 
Review Panel (ICRP) report, JWST’s baseline did not reflect the most 
probable cost and resulted in a project that was not executable with 
the given budget. The ICRP found that the budget was understated 
because it did not include known threats and provided insufficient 
reserves, particularly in the year of confirmation and the year 
following. The panel also reported problems with overall project 
management and a lack of effective oversight by Division managers who 
concurred with the project’s practice of deferring work to later years 
without assessing the future impact. To address existing funding 
concerns, JWST received $75 million under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. Despite these additional funds, the ICRP 
found that the earliest launch date possible is September 2015—-15 
months after the baseline schedule. Further, the ICRP reported
that JWST’s life-cycle cost would likely increase by $1.4 billion or 
more, $500 million of which would be required in the next 2 fiscal 
years. In response to the panel’s recommendations, NASA made several
organizational changes, including establishing a new program office at 
headquarters that reports directly to the NASA Associate Administrator 
and managing the project’s budget separately from Astrophysics. 

Contractor Issues: At confirmation, the project believed it had 
sufficient insight into contractor performance to predict future 
trends and used Earned Value Management data to predict cost overruns 
at the contractor. Project officials told us that shortly after 
confirmation the prime contractor and a subcontractor came forward 
with previously unidentified risks to project cost, leaving the 
project with insufficient reserves. The ICRP found that the project 
had identified these cost risks, but failed to account for them in 
project reserves because they had not yet been formally documented by 
the contractor. The project intends to take over testing and 
integration responsibilities for the OTE/ISIM instruments from the 
contractor. Despite these challenges, the project is approaching the 
end of the 5-year polishing phase for the OTE primary mirror segments 
and started the fourth round of cryo testing on the primary mirrors in 
May 2010. 

Design Issues: The project has identified challenges in analytically 
demonstrating that the design of the ISIM composite structure had the 
necessary strength and performance capability. The ISIM structure and
the bonds used to attach instruments must be designed to withstand 
very low temperatures for an indefinite period. The project needed to 
develop and verify new analytical techniques for testing which required
additional time and money. At mission critical design review, the 
project planned for two thermal and optical performance tests of the 
ISIM. The project continues to track ISIM’s thermal testing as a major 
risk. Other Issues to be Monitored: The scale, complexity, and 
cryogenic nature of JWST prohibit a traditional “Test as you Fly” end-
to-end testing program; therefore, the project is more dependent on 
analysis and subcomponent testing. After the mission critical design 
review, NASA chartered a Test Assessment Team (TAT) to evaluate the 
project’s test plans. The TAT report found that some of the test plans 
exceeded the money and time available and made recommendations to 
prioritize verification tasks, help the project gain efficiencies, 
particularly in the thermal testing, and reduce costs and shorten the 
schedule. The project has formally concurred with most of the TAT 
recommendations. The project also addressed residual concerns from the 
mission preliminary design review over the sunshield testing at the 
instrument CDR in January 2010 and is pending closure as the project 
works on details of the test plan. 

Project Office Comments: 

The JWST project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
officials also commented that the project and its international 
partners have made good technical progress and retired some of the 
highest technical risks. In addition, NASA is executing a 
reorganization of the project and developing a new independent cost 
estimate to address management and budget challenges highlighted in 
the recent ICRP report. 

[End of JWST data] 

Juno: 

Common Name: Juno: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: NASA/JPL. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 7/05; 
Preliminary design review: 5/08. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 8/08; 
Critical design review: 4/09; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 8/11. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $1107.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $1107.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $186.3; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $186.3; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $742.3; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $742.3; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $178.4; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $178.4; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): 8/2011; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 8/2011; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Technology Issues; 
* Design Issues; 
* Parts Issues; 
* Contractor Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Development Partner Issues. 

Project Summary: 

Juno continues to address issues with heritage technology. The Command 
and Data Handling Unit, a required component of the spacecraft, 
remains on the critical path due to late workforce ramp-up by the 
contractor and start of the flight design effort and could cause a 
delay in the scheduled launch. Furthermore, modifications have been
made to the Command and Data Handling Unit’s Module Interface Card 
board to address Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter in flight issues. 
Finally, poor materials quality caused the failure of certain 
components of the spacecraft’s solar arrays during testing and led to 
a change in supplier. 

Project Update: 

Technology Issues: After the preliminary design review, the project 
reassessed the Toroidal Low Gain Antenna (TLGA) as being immature when 
it was determined that the materials being used in the highly charged 
particle environment could store an electrical charge, which would in 
turn interfere with some lower-level science requirements from two of 
the instruments on the spacecraft. The project has since coated the 
surface of the TLGA with germanium to provide a discharge path to the 
grounded metal structure that resolved the interference issue. 

Design Issues: The Juno project had released only 39 percent of the 
engineering drawings at the critical design review (CDR). Project 
officials, however, said they used engineering models for all 
instruments to demonstrate design maturity at CDR. For some spacecraft 
components, the Juno project did not build or test engineering models 
because they were of heritage designs. For example, some spacecraft 
components being utilized are very similar to the ones used on the 
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO); therefore, the project accepted 
some of the spacecraft card designs based on qualification testing. In 
addition, subsystem and component-level reviews were held prior to the 
mission CDR, and project officials told us the results of these lower-
level reviews provided evidence that the design was stable. However, 
modifications have been made to the Command and Data Handling Unit’s 
Module Interface Card (CMIC) board to respond to two series of 
reset/sideswap events found during the MRO design review as well as 
MRO in-flight software issues. The root cause of the problems in the 
MRO CMIC board has not been determined, but Juno has made a total of 
12 design changes to mitigate the problems in Juno’s CMIC design. 

Parts Issues/Contractor Issues: The molybdenum tabs, parts attached to 
the solar cells used to conduct power from the cells to the solar 
array power harness, failed during testing. The project established a
failure review board that found the failures were caused by poor 
materials quality. The project subsequently switched the material 
supplier for this part. The failure review board also investigated 
solar array disbonding issues and found that they were caused by 
contractor workmanship errors in the surface preparation of the solar 
array panels. The contractor adjusted its procedures and re-fabricated 
the panels. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: Juno project officials said that they 
began integration and testing in April 2010. The project is 
experiencing delays in the delivery of the Command and Data Handling 
(C&DH) module as a result of late workforce ramp-up and a late start 
of the flight design effort. The C&DH module remains on the critical 
path and could cause a delay to Juno’s launch. Assembly and testing 
has begun with a test unit version of the C&DH module while design 
issues are addressed on the flight unit. Furthermore, to address 
schedule concerns on the Italian Space Agency’s (ASI) development of 
the Ka-band translator after the 2009 earthquake in Italy, the project 
requested and ASI agreed to upgrade the engineering model to be a 
flyable engineering model. This flyable engineering model has already 
been fully tested, delivered to the Juno project, and installed on the 
flight system. Although the project expected to fly the engineering 
model, work continued on the original flight model. The original 
flight model was delivered and integrated on the spacecraft in 
September 2010. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Juno project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that the project has successfully resolved several 
technical issues and has accommodated any delays via technical and 
schedule resiliency and that the project team continues to make good 
progress toward its projected launch date of August 5, 2011. 

[End of Juno data] 

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM): 

Common Name: LDCM: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Orbital. 

The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), a partnership between NASA 
and the U.S. Geological Survey, seeks to extend the ability to detect 
and quantitatively characterize changes on the global land surface at 
a scale where natural and man-made causes of change can be detected 
and differentiated. It is the successor mission to Landsat 7. The 
Landsat data series, begun in 1972, is the longest continuous record 
of changes in the Earth’s surface as seen from space. Landsat data is 
a resource for people who work in agriculture, geology, forestry, 
regional planning, education, mapping, and global change research. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 10/03; 
Preliminary design review: 7/09. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 12/09; 
Critical design review: 5/10; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 6/13. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $941.7; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $941.6; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $341.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $341.4; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $583.4; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $587.6; 
Change: 0.7%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $16.8; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $12.5; 
Change: -25.6%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): 6/2013; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 6/2013; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Funding Issues; 
* Parts Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Development Partner Performance. 

Project Summary: 

In December 2009, NASA established a baseline launch readiness date 
for the LDCM project of June 2013. However, internally the project 
continues to plan for a December 2012 launch in order to avoid or 
minimize a gap in LANDSAT data. When the project established the 
baseline, the Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) instrument was officially
added to the scope of the mission, increasing the mission cost by 
approximately $160 million. The project is tracking parts issues for 
all of its major components-—the TIRS and the Operational Land Imager 
instruments and the spacecraft. The cost and schedule impacts of some 
of these issues are uncertain. 

Project Update: 

Funding Issues: Last year the project reported an estimated lifecycle 
cost range of $730-800 million but established a baseline life-cycle 
cost estimate of $941.7 million due to the addition of the Thermal 
Infrared Sensor (TIRS) instrument in December 2009, at an estimated 
additional cost of $160 million. The TIRS instrument was officially 
added to the scope of LDCM due to demand from the science community. 
With that addition, LDCM’s instrument payload consists of two 
instruments, the Operational Land Imager (OLI)-—a multi-spectral 
imaging sensor to detect and characterize land changes—-and the TIRS-—
a sensor that has a wide range of uses, including water resource 
management and wildfire risk assessment. LDCM received $63.4 million 
in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funding, and used the 
money to procure items for the components of the TIRS instrument, the 
spacecraft, and the OLI instrument. 

At confirmation in December 2009, the project and the Standing Review 
Board presented Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level (JCL) results 
based on mutually agreeable risks and uncertainty factors. The JCL 
estimates developed for the project resulted in a 50-percent 
confidence level launch date of December 2012, and a 70-percent 
confidence date of June 2013. The project continues to plan internally 
for a December 2012 launch date in order to avoid a potential data gap 
and has $91 million budgeted for risk mitigation in order to meet the 
earlier date. LDCM is working with its ground system partner, the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS), to determine the likelihood of 
a data availability gap and steps to mitigate the risk of a gap. 
Additionally, to address funding shortfalls at USGS and reduce the 
risk to mission success, NASA and USGS amended the final 
implementation agreement for LDCM to increase NASA’s role in the 
ground system development and shift some of the funding 
responsibilities to USGS in later years, which decreased the
LDCM estimate for operations to decrease by 25 percent. 

Parts Issues: The project is tracking risks associated with the TIRS 
and OLI instruments and the spacecraft. The project discovered that 
the main electronics boards on the main electronics box of the TIRS 
instrument were not meeting thermal stability requirements. While TIRS 
is a new, in-house development effort and is on the project’s critical 
path, many of the subsystems and components were used in earlier 
flight projects. The issues with the main electronics box cost $3.8 
million, but the problem had no net impact to the project’s schedule. 
The OLI instrument experienced problems with the black chrome plating 
and dark mirror coating. According to project officials, the black 
chrome plating did not withstand testing and lost adhesion, due to
poor plating processes at the vendor. As a result, the vendor rebuilt 
the Solar Calibration Assembly. These issues currently have no overall 
impact on the project’s schedule, and the cost impacts have been 
negotiated. On the spacecraft, the project identified contamination of 
the Reaction Wheel Assembly (RWA) lubricant and scheduled to have new 
bearings installed by the vendor. Project officials said that they 
have identified windows during integration and test where a new unit 
can be inserted. Although the problem caused a six month schedule slip 
for the RWA, the project expects no impact on the overall schedule 
because the delay was largely absorbed by the integration and testing 
workarounds and subsystem schedule slack. 

Last year, we reported that the project had released 83 percent of its 
design drawings as of September 2009. In April 2010, the project had 
released 93 percent of its drawings and held a successful mission 
critical design review (CDR) in May 2010, but the project is tracking 
risks on each of the major components. Currently, the project reports 
that 97 percent of the total design drawings have been released. 

Project Office Comments: 

The LDCM project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that the mission has set a commitment for a launch 
readiness date of June 2013, but the project is aggressively working 
to launch in December 2012 in order to minimize the chance of a data 
gap should Landsat 5 or Landsat 7 cease operations. 

[End of LDCM data] 

Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE): 

Common Name: LADEE: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: LADEE Project Office. 

The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) mission 
objective is to determine the global density, composition, and time 
variability of the lunar atmosphere. LADEE’s measurements will 
determine the size, charge, and spatial distribution of 
electrostatically transported dust grains. Additionally, LADEE will 
carry an optical laser communications demonstrator that will test high-
bandwidth communication from lunar orbit. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 2/09; 
Preliminary design review: 7/10. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 8/10; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Critical design review: 8/11; 
Launch readiness date: 11/13. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost[A]: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $262.9; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $262.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $79.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $79.5; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $168.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $168.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $15.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $15.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): 11/2013; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 11/2013; 
Change: 0 months. 

[A] This estimate does not include the LLCD instrument which
is being funded by the Space Operations Mission Directorate
at a cost of approximately $65 million. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Technology Issues; 
* Parts Issues; 
* Launch Issues. 

Project Summary: 

The LADEE project was confirmed on August 23, 2010, to proceed into 
implementation. LADEE will be flying three heritage instruments, as 
well as the Lunar Laser Com Demo, which is being developed by the 
Space Operations Mission Directorate at a cost of approximately $65
million. NASA will launch the project on the Minotaur V. A bid protest 
delayed the issuance of a delivery order for the launch vehicle and 
postponed development of a Soft-Ride system that will protect 
instrumentation during launch. 

Project Update: 

Technology Issues: LADEE utilizes three instruments that have been 
designed for other missions but require modifications to their form, 
fit, and function. None of the three instruments were considered 
mature at the preliminary design review in July 2010. NASA flew the 
Lunar Dust Experiment (LDEX) on various configurations on the HEOS 2, 
Galileo, Ulysses, and Cassini projects. The Neutral Mass Spectrometer 
(NMS) is a subset of the Sample Analysis at Mars instrument being 
developed for the Mars Science Laboratory. The Ultraviolet 
Spectrometer (UVS) is based on the design of the UVS instrument flown 
on the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS). The 
project will also fly the Lunar Laser Com Demo (LLCD) as a ride along 
technology demonstration on LADEE. The LLCD is being developed by the 
Space Operations Mission Directorate at a cost of approximately $65 
million, which is not included in the LADEE cost estimates. 

Parts Issues: The UVS has run into problems with the source vendor and 
parts quality and, therefore, is not identical to the LCROSS version 
of the instrument. Project officials determined that the printed 
wiring board for the UVS was being developed in a facility with no 
quality systems or workmanship standards in place. The project decided 
to keep the printed wiring board design, but had another vendor 
produce the boards at a NASA-approved facility. Implementation of this 
change cost the project approximately $1.1 million. 

Launch Issues: LADEE will be launched on a Minotaur V, which was 
procured under the Air Force’s indefinite delivery indefinite quantity 
contract with a commercial launch vehicle provider. A bid protest 
regarding the selection of the Minotaur V, however, delayed the 
issuance of the delivery order for the vehicle and the project’s 
preliminary design review by 3 months and the critical design review 
by 5 months. Furthermore, the project will need to equip the launch 
vehicle with a Soft-Ride system in order to protect the project’s 
instrumentation from excessive vibration during launch. While there is 
no new development effort behind the Soft-Ride, the system must be 
tuned to the particular load environment and spacecraft design, which 
will be delayed until the launch vehicle delivery order is issued. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: The LADEE project has not reached a 
design review where we could assess design stability. As of September 
2010, the project expected to release 58 percent of its design 
drawings by the preliminary design review and 83 percent by the 
critical design review. Because of its focus on being a low cost 
mission, LADEE’s only critical technology is the RF antenna on the
spacecraft, which, according to the project office, is proceeding on 
schedule. 

Project Office Comments: 

The LADEE project office provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. LADEE project 
officials also commented that the bid protest on the launch vehicle 
has been resolved and that the Minotaur will be procured under an Air 
Force contract with a commercial launch service provider. 

[End of LADEE data] 

Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS): 

Common Name: MMS: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Computer Model] 

Source: MMS Project Office. 

The Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) is made up of four identically 
instrumented spacecraft. The mission will use the Earth's 
magnetosphere as a laboratory to study the microphysics of magnetic 
reconnection, energetic particle acceleration, and turbulence. 
Magnetic reconnection is the primary process by which energy is 
transferred from solar wind to Earth’s magnetosphere and is the 
physical process determining the size of a space weather storm. The
spacecrafts will fly in a pyramid formation, adjustable over a range 
of 10 to 400 kilometers, enabling them to capture the three-
dimensional structure of the reconnection sites they encounter. The 
data from MMS will be used as a basis for predictive models of space 
weather in support of exploration. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 5/20; 
Preliminary design review: 5/09. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 6/09; 
Critical design review: 8/10; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 3/15. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $1082.7; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $1082.7; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $173.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $173.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $857.4; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $857.4; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $52.3; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $52.3; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): 3/2015; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 3/2015; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Development Partner Issues; 
* Design Issues; 
* Technology Issues. 

Project Summary: 

The MMS project used $6 million in cost reserves to move development 
work for the Spin Plane Double Probe instrument from Sweden to the 
University of New Hampshire because Sweden was not providing adequate 
levels of funding for project development. The movement of development 
work has resulted in a delay of approximately 6 months for the 
completion of the design for the instrument. However, project 
officials do not believe the delay will impact the mission’s March
2015 launch readiness date. 

Project Update: 

Development Partner Issues: The MMS project used approximately $6 
million in reserve funds to move work from Sweden to the University of 
New Hampshire because Sweden was not making satisfactory progress on 
the production of the Spin Plane Double Probe (SDP) instrument due to 
inadequate levels of funding. After considering three potential 
candidates, the MMS project selected the University of New Hampshire 
in 2010 to assume production of the SDP deployment mechanism, the most 
complex element of the SDP instrument. Sweden will continue to provide 
SDP flight hardware as well as mission science support. As a result of 
these changes, the completion of the design for the SDP is behind 
schedule by approximately 6 months, but MMS officials believe this 
change poses no threat to the mission’s launch readiness date in March 
2015. 

Design Issues: In August 2010, the project completed its mission 
critical design review (CDR). At that time the project had released 77 
percent of its engineering design drawings. Last year, project officials
told us that having 70 to 80 percent of design drawings completed by 
CDR is normal, but they had not established any goals for the project. 
MMS officials stated that the number of complete engineering test 
units is as important, if not more so, than design drawings. According 
to project officials, MMS uses high fidelity instrument models as a 
risk reduction effort. By using engineering models that are as flight-
ready as possible, project officials reported that they can see where 
problems are and better identify risks. Additionally, they stated that 
proceeding with the manufacture of flight hardware without having 
built flightlike engineering units to test the design, will almost 
always lead to schedule overruns to solve design issues. 

Technology Issues: Following mission CDR in August 2010, the MMS 
project has yet to fully address the form, fit, and function of the 
payload separation system, a key heritage technology. All four MMS 
satellites will launch stacked on a single Atlas V launch vehicle. 
When the top spacecraft deploys, springs will push off the first 
satellite and trigger a command for each subsequent satellite to 
deploy. The technology required for the separation system is not new; 
however, the project is working closely with the contractor to ensure
that all four satellites separate in a consistent manner which 
supports the need for them to fly in a pyramid formation. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: MMS was authorized to enter formulation, 
the phase that precedes implementation, in 2002 with an initial cost 
estimate of $369 million. The project was authorized to enter 
implementation in June 2009 with a baseline life-cycle cost estimate 
of over $1 billion. The project manager said the initial cost estimate 
was for a smaller instrument suite than what is currently planned for 
the mission and added that one cost driver for the project since the 
initial cost estimate was the requirement for magnetic and 
electrostatic cleanliness. The initial cost estimate also did not 
account for the higher cost of the Atlas V, which is a larger launch 
vehicle than the Delta II initially considered by the project. 

Project Office Comments: 

The MMS project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that MMS continues to make technical progress. In 2010,
the MMS project completed the detailed design of the instruments and 
spacecraft. 

[End of MMS data] 

Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN): 

Common Name: MAVEN: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: NASA GSFC MAVEN Project Office. 

The Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) mission, a robotic 
orbiter mission, will provide a comprehensive picture of the Mars upper
atmosphere, ionosphere, solar energetic drivers, and atmospheric 
losses. MAVEN will deliver comprehensive answers to long-standing 
questions regarding the loss of Mars’ atmosphere, climate history, 
liquid water, and habitability. MAVEN will provide the first direct 
measurements ever taken to address key scientific questions about Mars’
evolution. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 9/08; 
Preliminary design review: 7/10. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 10/10; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Critical design review: 7/11; 
Launch readiness date: 11/13. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2011): $671.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $671.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2011): $63.8; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $63.8; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2011): $567.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $567.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2011): $40.1; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $40.1; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2011): 11/2013; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 11/2013; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Design Issues; 
* Launch Issues. 

Project Summary: 
MAVEN was selected under the Mars Scout Program-—a NASA initiative to 
send a series of small, low-cost robotic missions to Mars. The project 
was competitively selected from innovative proposals by the scientific 
community. The project is relying on heritage technologies, but 
project officials acknowledged that these technologies required 
modifications to their form, fit, and function to operate as necessary 
for MAVEN’s requirements. The project is being designed to the Atlas V 
launch vehicle, which is significantly more expensive than it was under
the previous launch services contract. 

Project Update: 

Design Issues: At the preliminary design review, the project manager 
decided not to authorize the Respin of the High Efficiency Power 
Supply (HEPS), MAVEN’s power supply system, because of a high 
probability of failure and therefore violates the mission assurance 
requirements. The project met with the contractor to discuss HEPS 
design, fabrication, assembly, test history and qualification in order 
to resolve this issue. The MAVEN project has not reached a design 
review where we could assess design stability. At the mission
preliminary design review in July 2010, the project estimated that it 
would have 85 percent of its engineering drawings released at the 
critical design review. 

Launch Issues: According to project officials, the project was given 
approval to initiate selection of a launch vehicle in September 2010 
after the new NASA Launch Services (NLS) contract was awarded. Project
officials told us the project had been designing to two vehicles prior 
to the new contract being awarded. However, the only available vehicle 
that currently meets the needs of the MAVEN project is the 
intermediate-class Atlas V, which will be significantly more expensive 
than it was under the previous NLS contract. In October 2010, NASA 
announced that the Atlas V had been selected as the launch vehicle for 
MAVEN at a total cost of $187 million. Science Mission Directorate 
officials told us that they incorporated this increased cost into the 
project’s baseline during the confirmation review. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: In order to control project costs, the 
project plans to minimize development activities of new technology by 
designing MAVEN spacecraft and instruments based on available heritage
hardware. The MAVEN project identified seven heritage technologies, 
all of which are required to meet the mission’s science requirements. 
Prior to the preliminary design review, the project deemed all heritage
technologies to be mature, but project officials acknowledged that 
these heritage technologies do not take into account modifications of 
form, fit, and function needed to operate in the Martian environment and
require modifications. For example, while MAVEN’s magnetometer design 
is similar to those flown on prior NASA projects, a minor change to 
the electronics of the magnetometer is necessary to extend its dynamic
range. The project is also concerned that measurements from the 
magnetometer may become corrupted due to the amount of electronic 
interference, or noise, on the spacecraft. To alleviate this concern, 
project officials decided to reconfigure the solar cells on the panel 
to minimize the magnetic field at the location of the instrument. As a 
result of this reconfiguration and additional analysis, project 
officials reported the risk has been mitigated. Furthermore, project 
officials told us they are evaluating ways to ensure that the 
spacecraft and instruments will continue to operate and collect data 
during major solar flares. 

Project Office Comments: 

The MAVEN project office provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project 
officials also commented that the project entered into implementation
in October 2010 and is on track for critical design review scheduled 
for July 2011. 

[End of MAVEN data] 

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL): 

Common Name: MSL: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech. 

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) is part of the Mars Exploration 
Program (MEP). The MEP seeks to understand whether Mars was, is, or 
can be a habitable world. To answer this question, the MSL project 
will investigate how geologic, climatic, and other processes have 
worked to shape Mars and its environment over time, as well as how they
interact today. The MSL will continue this systematic exploration by 
placing a mobile science laboratory on the Mars surface to assess a 
local site as a potential habitat for life, past or present. The MSL is
considered one of NASA’s flagship projects and will be the most 
advanced rover yet sent to explore the surface of Mars. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 11/03; 
Preliminary design review: 6/06. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 8/06; 
Critical design review: 6/07; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 11/11. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $2394.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $2476.3; 
Change: 3.4%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $515.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $515.5; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $1719.9; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $1802.0; 
Change: 4.8%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $158.8; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $158.8; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): 11/2011; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 11/2011; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Design Issues; 
* Parts Issues. 

Challenges Previously Reported: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology. 

Project Summary: 

Congress reauthorized the MSL and it was subsequently re-baselined in 
January 2010 because the project had exceeded its 2008 cost baseline 
by more than 30 percent. In 2009, MSL’s cost had grown more than $834 
million and its scheduled launch had been delayed 26 months from its
original 2008 baseline due to work needed to overcome technical 
challenges with the actuators and avionics. This increase includes 
more than an 86 percent increase in development costs. 

Project Update: 

Congress reauthorized the MSL in the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2010 and NASA subsequently rebaselined the project in January 2010 
after it had exceeded its 2008 development cost baseline by more than
30 percent. Since the original project baseline in 2008, the life-
cycle cost for the project has increased by more than $834 million—
including more than an 86 percent increase in development costs—-and 
the launch has been delayed until November 2011 since launch windows 
for Mars mission are optimally aligned every 26 months. These cost and 
schedule overruns were driven by problems with the actuators and 
avionics. Specifically, the project experienced problems with the 
actuators that allow the vehicle to move and execute the sample 
operations performed by the lab. The project has since redesigned the 
actuators and retired this risk. The project indicated that project 
reserves may be inadequate to meet the scheduled work for 2011. 

Design Issues: The MSL project design was not stable at the Critical 
Design Review (CDR). Several design changes were required after CDR to 
address various issues. For example, project officials told us the
avionics hardware was a new design and had been delivered in an 
immature state. They had hoped to have all issues with the avionics 
hardware completed by November 2009; however, project officials said the
design of the hardware is still not complete and the project has 
delayed the software development which includes about 12 deliverables. 
The avionics computer element is currently the leading risk to the MSL
schedule and its functionality is critical to the mission’s success. 

Furthermore, the Sample Analysis at Mars Wide Range Pump has had a 
series of development problems and although the project has worked 
through about 10 engineering models, it continues to struggle to pass 
the life test. The project built and tested two different pump designs 
in parallel that met the science requirements and conducted an 
accelerated life test on them. The project plans to make a decision 
between the two designs at the conclusion of the life test and pump 
qualification testing, currently scheduled for fall 2010. The project 
is also monitoring performance degradation of the Multi Mission 
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) due to the thermocouples 
that convert the heat generated by the plutonium into electricity 
degrading at a faster rate than predetermined, or about 10 percent. 
According to the project manager, the MMRTG can still meet its 
objectives with a 10 percent decay rate, but if this rate increases 
the project cannot meet its requirements and will be forced to cut the 
nominal number of samples collected or the distance the rover is to 
travel during the primary mission. 

Parts Issues: The project experienced a parts failure associated with 
the transition joints in the propulsion system which caused the joints 
to fail under load. Project officials reported this issue was realized 
after the project finished building its propulsion system, causing the 
project to rebuild the system and adopt a new joint design. The 
transition to the new design required a rework and retest of the 
descent cruise stages. According to project officials, the project 
also encountered parts issues on the avionics package, including
a shorting out of the pins on the avionics processor and a packaging 
issue that caused a disconnect between the analog components and the 
configuration of the board. 

Project Office Comments: 

The MSL project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
believes that the GAO assessment largely reflects the history of the 
project and most of the issues identified have been resolved. 

[End of MSL data] 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP): 

Common Name: NPP: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Ball Aerospace. 

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint mission with the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. 
Air Force. The satellite will measure ozone, atmospheric and sea surface
temperatures, land and ocean biological productivity, Earth radiation, 
and cloud and aerosol properties. The NPP mission has two objectives. 
First, NPP will provide a continuation of global weather observations 
following the Earth Observing System missions Terra and Aqua. Second, 
NPP will function as an operational satellite and will provide data 
until the first NPOESS satellite launches. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 11/98; 
Preliminary design review: 1/03; 
Critical design review: 8/03. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 11/03; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 10/11. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $672.8; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $864.3; 
Change: 28.5%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $47.3; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $47.1; 
Change: 0.5%. 

Development Cost[A]: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $593.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $780.1; 
Change: 31.6%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $32.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $37.1; 
Change: 14.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 4/2008; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 10/2011; 
Change: 42 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 

* Development Partner Issues; 
* Launch Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Design Stability. 

Project Summary: 

NPP has experienced over $183 million in development cost growth and a 
42-month launch delay, and officials told us that there is more work 
remaining than the schedule allows. The last of the partner-provided 
instruments was delivered for integration on the satellite in June 
2010, although a number of risks remain. Project officials said that 
many problems were uncovered late in the development process, leading 
NASA to revise NPP mission success criteria. In February 2010, the 
White House announced a restructuring of the NPOESS program, which 
could affect the launch schedule. 

Project Update: 

NPP project officials have attributed cost and schedule overruns to 
development partner challenges and a lack of central authority between 
the three NPOESS agencies. Further, DOD, with agreement from its 
partner agencies, restructured the NPOESS program in 2006, but the 
program continued to experience cost and schedule growth. Since NPP 
was baselined in fiscal year 2007, the project’s development cost has
increased by 26 percent in the fiscal year 2011 budget request, and 
its schedule has increased by 42 months. 

Development Partner Issues: Management and developmental partner 
challenges have continued to result in cost overruns and schedule 
delays in the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) and 
Crosstrack Infrared Sounder (CrIS) instruments. The project office 
attributes almost all of the cost and schedule changes to the late 
delivery of these partner-provided instruments. The CrIS was the last 
instrument to arrive for NPP and was delivered to the spacecraft 
contractor in June 2010. Issues with the CrIS instrument moved
the launch date from January 2011 to October 2011. Furthermore, 
because NPOESS is now not scheduled to launch until 2014, NPP will 
still be a demonstration satellite as originally intended but will 
have to function as an operational satellite, providing interim data 
until NPOESS launches. 

In February 2010, the White House announced plans to restructure the 
NPOESS program, into the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), to 
address cost overruns and schedule delays. As a result of the 
restructure, NOAA and DOD will undertake separate satellite system 
acquisitions. The NPOESS program continues to develop the instruments 
and ground systems supporting NPP, but, according to project 
officials, the management of the instruments’ contracts is being 
transferred from the NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO), which is 
a joint U.S. Air Force and NOAA program office, to DOD’s Space and 
Missile Systems Center. The NPP project is taking steps to facilitate 
cooperation and gain more authority with the technical elements than 
it had at the beginning of NPP but believes the restructuring will 
cause further launch delays due to fiscal constraints stemming from a 
lack of necessary funds to cover termination liability for NPOESS
contracts. 

Although all critical technologies are mature, NPP continues to report 
an inability to reduce risks to an acceptable level on three 
instruments provided by its development partners-the VIIRS, the CrIS, 
and the Ozone Mapper Profiler Suite. Project officials told us they 
lack confidence in the processes used by the IPO, are unsure how these 
instruments will function on orbit. Further, they believe there is 
more work remaining than the schedule allows for an October 2011 
launch. For example, the NPP project is currently tracking the VIIRS 
system’s door deployment testing as a schedule risk. Because of the 
uncertainty of the instrument’s functionality, NASA is updating the 
NPP Mission Success Criteria based on these risk assessments in order
to lower expectations and define minimum mission success criteria. 

Launch Issues: Since this will be one of the last missions to be 
launched on a Delta II, NASA is tracking the availability of trained 
personnel to launch NPP as a risk. While NASA rates the impact of a 
launch slip on NPP and the other three remaining missions scheduled 
for the Delta II as high risk, the agency currently considers this as 
a low probability as there are sufficient existing processes and 
mitigation efforts in place. 

Project Office Comments: 

The NPP project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented the project is working with the newly formed JPSS Program
to finalize an integrated NPP schedule to launch. They added that NPP 
will continue to be a demonstration satellite for NPOESS/JPSS. 
However, with the NPOESS/JPSS-1 satellite’s launch delay to 2014, 
agencies will use the NPP data operationally. 

[End of NPP data] 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2 (OCO-2): 

Common Name: OCO-2: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2 (OCO-2) is based on the original 
OCO mission that failed to reach orbit in 2009 and is designed to 
enable more reliable predictions of climate change. It will make 
precise, time-dependent global measurements of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide. These measurements will be combined with data from a ground-
based network to provide scientists with the information needed to 
better understand the processes that regulate atmospheric carbon 
dioxide and its role in the carbon cycle. NASA hopes enhanced 
understanding of the carbon cycle will improve predictions of future 
atmospheric carbon dioxide increases and the potential impact on the 
climate. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 3/10; 
Critical design review: 8/10. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 9/10; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 2/13. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $349.9; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $349.9; 
Change: 0.0% 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $60.9; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $60.9; 
Change: 0.0% 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $249.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $249.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $40.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $40.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): 2/2013; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 2/2013; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Parts Issues; 
* Funding Issues. 

Project Summary: 

OCO-2 entered a tailored formulation phase in March 2010. The project 
management’s goal is to minimize changes from the OCO mission. The 
project office worked with NASA to develop preliminary cost estimates, 
which are higher than the 2008 estimate of $273.1 million for OCO, due 
in part to the project obtaining a full set of spares for OCO-2. NASA 
has selected the Taurus XL launch vehicle for OCO-2, the same vehicle 
used for the OCO mission. The project received $18 million under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that was used to enable 
the earliest possible launch. 

Project Update: 

Parts Issues: The project is making every effort to duplicate the 
original OCO design using identical hardware, drawings, documents, 
procedures, and software wherever possible and practical in order to
produce OCO-2 with minimum cost, schedule, and performance risk. 
However, project officials stated that there were no engineering 
models for many of the OCO components and the original components were
lost on OCO, making the rebuild difficult, particularly due to 
obsolescence of parts. The OCO-2 project will procure a full set of 
spares to help avoid problems with parts obsolescence during the 
development and testing of flight hardware. OCO-2 encountered 
difficulties with two particular components due to lack of spares and 
parts obsolescence. The cryocooler used on OCO was a spare that the 
project received at no cost; however, the same cryocoolers were not 
available for OCO-2. Additionally, the flight computer from OCO is now 
obsolete. OCO-2 is redesigning and updating the flight computer in 
order to avoid converting all technology to a new flight computer. 
Project officials said they held a successful critical design review
(CDR) for the redesigned flight computer based on an engineering 
development unit and they expected the new design to be fully 
validated by the end of 2010. 

Funding Issues: The OCO-2 project office helped NASA develop a life-
cycle cost estimate based on the original life-cycle costs of OCO. In 
December 2008, OCO’s life-cycle cost estimate was $273.1 million, 
compared to OCO-2’s baseline estimate of $349.9 million. Project 
officials attributed the higher life-cycle cost estimate for OCO-2 to 
development of a new crycooler, inflation, procurement of a full set 
of spares, and an increase in the cost of the launch vehicle. For 
example, NASA did not have acquisition costs for the cryocooler for 
the original OCO mission. OCO-2 is acquiring two new cryocoolers 
through an interagency transfer with the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), but will have to contract for two 
new units to provide to NOAA for its future use. The project also used 
$18 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
to acquire long lead items for the spacecraft, instrument development, 
and project management to enable the earliest possible launch of an 
OCO recovery mission. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: OCO-2 entered a tailored formulation 
phase in March 2010 to expedite entering implementation because the 
project has been designed and built once. According to project
officials the tailored formulation reduces the number of reviews; 
therefore, OCO-2’s first major review was the mission CDR, which was 
held in August 2010, and preceded project confirmation. At CDR, the 
project had released 95 percent of its engineering drawings for the 
instrument and spacecraft. In June 2010, NASA selected Orbital 
Sciences Corporation to launch OCO-2 aboard a Taurus XL, the same 
vehicle used for OCO in 2009. Orbital and NASA ran concurrent mishap 
investigations following the OCO launch failure, and Orbital has 
addressed the findings of each report. The Glory mission, the first to 
launch on the Taurus XL since the 2009 launch failure, is scheduled to 
launch in March 2011. OCO-2 is the next mission in line for the Taurus 
XL. 

OCO-2 includes a single instrument, the three-channel grating 
spectrometer, based on heritage technology from the OCO mission. 
Although the project reports that the spectrometer’s technology 
maturity is high, the project will make minor changes in components 
and some obsolete parts that will need to be replaced. 

Project Office Comments: 

The OCO-2 project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
officials also commented that OCO-2 is intended to duplicate, as much 
as possible, the OCO mission that was lost due to the Taurus XL 
failure. As such, OCO-2 was granted a waiver from the normal NASA 
project formulation process. OCO-2 is baselining a launch in February 
2013. 

[End of OCO-2 data] 

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle: 

Common Name: Orion: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems. 

NASA’s Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, was designed to carry crew and 
cargo to the International Space Station (ISS) and to the Moon as part 
of the Constellation Program. The 5-meter diameter Orion capsule was 
designed to be launched by the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and to carry 
four astronauts to the ISS and the Moon after linking up with an earth
departure stage. The capsule will return to Earth and descend on 
parachutes to the surface. Orion has three main elements—-the crew 
module (capsule), service module/spacecraft adapter, and launch abort
system. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 7/06; 
Preliminary design review: 8/09; 
GAO review: 12/10. 

Implementation: 
Critical design review: 2/11; 
Launch readiness date: 3/15. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Latest (Feb. 2011): 
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost[A]: $20,000 to $29,000. 

Launch Schedule: 3/2015. 

[A] This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and 
there is still uncertainty in the value as design options are 
explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. This 
estimate is for the Orion vehicle only. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Funding Stability; 
* Technology Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Contractor Performance. 

Project Summary: 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget proposed cancellation of the 
Orion project leading to uncertainty, both financial and programmatic, 
within the project. Given constrained resources, the project 
prioritized work and did not accomplish some of the work originally 
planned for 2010. The project did, however, successfully complete a 
test of the launch abort system and continue progress on mitigating 
other technical challenges. In early fall 2010 Congress passed the 
NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directing NASA to utilize existing 
Orion contracts and capabilities to the extent practicable. 

Project Update: 

The President proposed cancellation of the Constellation Program, 
including the Orion project, in his fiscal year 2011 budget request. 
This proposal led to much debate within Congress and uncertainty, both
financial and programmatic, within the project. As a result, the 
project prioritized work for the year and did not complete some of the 
work originally planned for 2010. In early fall 2010, Congress passed 
the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which directed NASA to continue 
development of a multipurpose crew vehicle capable of reaching near-
Earth and beyond near-Earth orbit no later than December 2016. In 
developing this vehicle, Congress directed the agency to continue to 
advance development of the human safety features, designs, and systems 
in the Orion project and to utilize existing contracts and 
capabilities to the extent practicable. 

Funding Issues: Funding shortfalls and uncertainty have impacted 
workforce availability, shifted the Orion schedule and testing 
strategy, and deferred procurement of new items. For example, during 
fiscal year 2010, NASA and Lockheed Martin had arranged an agreement 
under which Lockheed Martin would have performed $200 million worth of 
work during the current fiscal year that NASA would pay for during 
later phases of the Orion project. However, according to project 
officials, NASA decided not to execute the agreement because NASA 
lacked sufficient budget authority to obligate funds to pay for the 
work. This left the project, and the entire Constellation Program, 
without the $200 million worth of work that they had expected and with 
limited resources for completing the remaining work for fiscal year 
2010, so therefore, the project prioritized development activities and 
tests. The Orion project received nearly $166 million of funding under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that according to 
project officials halted layoffs at Lockheed Martin and helped the 
project overcome technical challenges. The value of the development 
contracts for Orion has increased by $2.5 billion since 2006. 

Technology Issues: The Orion project identified one critical heritage 
technology for the spacecraft: the thermal protection system, or 
heatshield, that is required for the spacecraft to survive reentry 
from earth orbit. According to project officials, the new material for 
the heatshield has been tested against the material used in the Apollo 
program and performs as well as or better than the heritage material. 
However, given the current funding constraints and uncertainty 
surrounding the Orion project, the Orion project office prioritized 
development activities, and while the heatshield development and 
testing are continuing on plan, the determination of the manufacturing 
processes has been deferred. 

In addition, development of the launch abort system, which would pull 
the Orion capsule away from the Ares I launch vehicle in the case of a 
catastrophic problem during launch, remains a high risk area even
though it was not identified as a critical technology. In May 2010, 
the project tested the Launch Abort System in the Orion’s Pad Abort 
(PA-1) test. According to project officials, PA-1 was an important 
developmental milestone for the launch abort system, but certain items 
that were found during the test will require design modifications to 
the system that will not be tested until funding is available. The 
project has also developed a new controller for the launch abort 
system, and planned to test it in the ascent abort test in 2012. 
However, due to funding instability, it is unknown when and if this 
test will take place. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Orion project office provided technical comments on a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project 
officials also commented that the project has continued its work on
the Constellation program. Reductions in planned work content were 
made to ensure availability of funds required to complete work already 
under contract. These reductions have made it difficult for NASA to
achieve some of its goals and outcomes planned for fiscal year 2010. 
NASA remains poised to leverage Constellation assets to contribute to 
future exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. 

[End of Orion data] 

Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP): 

Common Name: RBSP: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: © 2010 The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics 
Laboratory. All Rights Reserved. 

The Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) mission will explore the Sun’s 
influence on the Earth and near-Earth space by studying the planet’s 
radiation belts at various scales of space and time. This insight into 
the physical dynamics of the Earth’s radiation belts will provide 
scientists data to make predictions of changes in this little 
understood region of space. Understanding the radiation belt 
environment has practical applications in the areas of spacecraft
system design, mission planning, spacecraft operations, and astronaut 
safety. The two spacecrafts will measure the particles, magnetic and 
electric fields, and waves that fill geospace and provide new 
knowledge on the dynamics and extremes of the radiation belts. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 9/06; 
Preliminary design review: 10/08. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 12/08; 
Critical design review: 12/09; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date: 5/12. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $685.8; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $685.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $88.2; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $88.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $533.9; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $534.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): $63.7; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $63.7; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2009): 5/2012; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 5/2012; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Parts Issues; 
* Contractor Issues. 

Project Summary: 

RBSP project officials reported parts failure and contractor issues 
that may result in the delayed delivery and integration of two key 
science instruments. Project officials expect delays in the delivery 
of the Helium-Oxygen-Proton-Electron instrument due to a parts 
functionality failure and in the delivery of necessary flight hardware 
for the MagEIS instrument that may impact its integration with the
spacecraft. RBSP’s systems integration review was held in October 2010. 

Project Update: 

Parts Issues: RBSP project officials expect delays in the delivery and 
integration the Helium-Oxygen-Proton-Electron (HOPE) instrument. 
Delivery of HOPE may be delayed due to a parts functionality failure
within the high voltage Optocoupler. Currently, the project considers 
this parts issue a risk to mission cost and schedule. However, the 
project manager reported that there are sufficient schedule reserves and
that they have confidence that issues can be resolved without schedule 
growth. Project officials said that other NASA missions had issues 
with the same part. The manufacturer is working to develop a revised
Optocoupler to meet multiple mission needs. 

NASA provided instructions that prohibited the use of certain 
connectors as part of their ongoing monitoring of quality parts and 
qualification standards, which caused the project to review the type 
of connectors used in the observatory and replace the connectors as 
applicable. The project has successfully qualified a connector to 
replace the NASA-prohibited connectors. The new connector has been 
successfully installed on flight model boards across the project. RBSP 
project officials classify the likelihood of an in-flight failure
if the prohibited connectors were used as very small; however, 
possible consequences including loss of the spacecraft or an 
instrument are significant. 

Contractor Issues: Delivery of the Magnetic Electron Ion Spectrometer 
(MagEIS) instrument is expected to be delayed due to the time a vendor 
is taking in providing needed flight hardware for the instrument. A
project official reported that the vendor was contacted and encouraged 
to prioritize its commitment to the RBSP contract. However, officials 
reported that the project underwent a schedule replan to accommodate
the late delivery and integration of MagEIS. This replan maintains the 
launch readiness date by re-ordering the observatory integration and 
test flow and changing selected subsystem and instrument delivery 
dates. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: Project officials indicated that one of 
the primary challenges for RBSP is developing a spacecraft capable of 
withstanding the high levels of radiation that it will encounter 
during the mission. RBSP includes many design elements, such as 
aluminum shielding around all major subsystems, and is undergoing 
extensive testing and qualification to ensure sufficient “radiation 
hardening.” The project manager reported that spacecraft electronic-
related parts radiation testing is nearly complete with no problems 
reported. 

Only 69 percent of the engineering design drawings, instead of the 
planned 87 percent, were released by the December 2009 critical design 
review (CDR) for RBSP. In April 2010, the project had released 93 
percent of its drawings. Project officials said that RBSP was the 
first project at the Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics 
Laboratory to use a new tracking package for reviewing and approving 
design drawings and therefore experienced some delays in releasing 
drawings at CDR. Project officials reported that there have been only 
minimal design changes since the CDR and there are no significant 
design changes expected in the future. 

Project Office Comments: 

The RBSP project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that the System Integration Review was conducted on 12-
14 October 2010, with the Standing Review Board recommending that the 
Project be allowed to proceed into observatory integration and test. 

[End of RBSP data] 

Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP): 

Common Name: SMAP: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

NASA’s Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP) is one of four first-
tier missions recommended by the National Research Council’s 2007 
Earth Science Decadal Survey. SMAP leverages previous Earth Science 
missions and is based on the soil moisture and freeze/thaw mission 
concept developed by an earlier mission known as Hydros. The SMAP 
mission will provide new information on global soil moisture and its 
freeze/thaw state enabling new advances in hydrospheric science and 
applications. The measures will improve understanding of regional and 
global water cycles, improve weather forecasts, flood and drought 
forecasts, and predictions of agricultural productivity and climate 
changes. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 9/08; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Preliminary design review: 3/11. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 6/11; 
Critical design review: 3/12; 
Launch readiness date: 11/14. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Latest (Feb. 2011): 
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost[A]: $780 to $900. 

[A] This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and 
there is still uncertainty in the value as design options are 
explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. 

Launch Schedule: 11/2014. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Funding Issues; 
* Launch Issues. 

Project Summary: 

SMAP received $64 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 funds, as well as funding from the President’s global climate 
initiative, that the project used to address key mission and 
implementation risks during formulation and to accelerate the launch 
readiness date from May 2015 to November 2014. The project is 
currently being designed to multiple launch vehicle specifications and 
is tracking the timing of the launch vehicle selection as a top risk. 

Project Update: 

Funding Issues: SMAP entered formulation in September 2008 and the Jet 
Propulsion Lab (JPL) was selected as the lead implementation center in 
January 2009. NASA officials stated that SMAP was budgeted $30 million 
in funding from the President’s global climate initiative and $64 
million in funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, which the project used to accelerate the launch date from May 
2015 to November 2014. 

Launch Issues: Late launch vehicle selection is one of the top risks 
the project is monitoring. SMAP is currently being designed to fit the 
specifications for three launch vehicles, including exploring a 
partnership for a DOD-provided launch service on the Minotaur IV. 
While designing to accommodate multiple launch vehicles is possible, a 
project official said that it limits design capabilities and can raise 
costs to the program as a result. Project officials stated that no 
certified medium capability vehicle is currently available. The Falcon 
9, which is available under the current Launch Services contract, has 
yet to be certified, and if selected, the mission launch date will be 
tied to a successful certification of the launch vehicle. NASA is
preparing a solicitation to acquire launch services and, if commercial 
vehicles are not reasonably available, it may request approval by the 
Secretary of Defense and submit a certification to Congress for 
authorization to partner with DOD to use the Minotaur IV. The current 
timeline for launch vehicle selection may result in a decision after 
the project’s preliminary design review (PDR). 

Other Issues to be Monitored: Project officials stated that an early 
focus on risk management enabled SMAP to mitigate several top mission 
and implementation risks related to the aggressive schedule and the
scientific outputs of the mission. For example, the project developed 
an end-to-end science measurement simulation to increase the data 
volume requirements. The project expects to mitigate several other
development risks by the mission PDR in March 2011. For example, the 
project reported it has three heritage technologies-—the radar, 
radiometer, and the reflector boom assembly-—all of which it will adapt
for application. None of these technologies, however, is currently 
mature. The project is tracking the radiometer as a project risk since 
it requires additional Spectral Filtering for Radio Frequency 
Interference (RFI) mitigation. The project has identified the spectral 
filtering as a critical technology. Due to its extensive heritage, the 
project is accepting the potential risk in cost growth and the 
technical risks with a verification and validation (V&V) program that 
includes a comprehensive set of assembly and system level analyses.
There is a cost risk, however, associated with the V&V program if the 
project determines that additional tests and analyses are required. 

SMAP leverages other Earth Science projects, namely the Aquarius 
project, which is in the implementation phase, and the Hydros project 
that was discontinued in 2005 due to lack of available funding. Although
SMAP has no funding partners, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and DOD are all 
actively engaged with SMAP to develop an applications plan for the 
data. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SMAP project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
officials also commented that the target launch readiness date of 
November 2014 is a planning date at this point and can change as 
funding, scope and schedule are brought into mutual alignment. NASA 
will not formally commit to a launch readiness date until Project 
Confirmation, Key Decision Point C, currently scheduled for summer 
2011. 

[End of SMAP data] 

Solar Probe Plus (SPP): 

Common Name: SPP: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: © 2010 Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory. 

Solar Probe Plus (SPP) will explore the Sun's outer atmosphere, or 
corona, as it extends into space. The spacecraft will orbit the Sun 24 
times and its instruments will observe the generation and flow of 
solar wind from very close range. By observing the corona, where solar 
energetic particles are energized, there is potential to further 
science in terms of shedding light on two central issues of 
heliophysics: the origin and evolution of solar wind, and why the 
sun’s outer atmosphere is so much hotter than the visible surface. In 
order to achieve its mission, parts of the spacecraft must be able to 
withstand temperatures exceeding 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit, as well as 
endure blasts of extreme radiation. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 11/09; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Preliminary design review: 1/14; 

Implementation: 
Critical design review: 11/15; 
Launch readiness date: 8/18. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Latest (Feb. 2011): 
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost[A]: not available. 

Launch Schedule: 8/2018. 

[A] The project has not yet reached the point in the acquisition life 
cycle where a preliminary life cycle cost estimate would normally be 
developed. 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Launch Issues. 

Project Summary: 

SPP is early in formulation, and therefore is unable to provide 
official cost and schedule data at this time. Currently, the probe 
will fly within closer proximity to the Sun than any other spacecraft. 
Chief risks to the project in terms of cost and schedule include 
development of a sunshield capable of protecting the instruments from 
the harsh near-Sun environment, development of a cooling system for 
the retractable solar array panels, and achieving the total launch 
energy to get the spacecraft to its long-range destination. 

Project Update: 

Launch Issues: SPP project officials reported that one of the mission’
s key challenges is achieving the total launch energy necessary to 
launch the spacecraft toward its long range destination. The mission 
will most likely require the use of an upper stage solid rocket 
propellant to provide sufficient launch energy to set the spacecraft 
on a trajectory to achieve solar exploration. Project officials 
reported that they are working to understand the performance of the 
standard stage and possible enhancements to upper stage performance
should this be needed. These enhancements could include the possible 
use of a higher energy propellant and a composite case for mass 
efficiency. The project commissioned a trade study which seeks to 
identify the optimal combination of launch vehicle and propellant 
upper stage to use for the launch. Project officials anticipate the 
study to be completed by the Mission Design Review, currently 
scheduled for May 2011. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: A key challenge of the SPP mission will 
be the development of critical technologies allowing science 
instruments to function within the harsh near-Sun environment. 
Although still in the concept and technology development phase, 
project officials reported that the Thermal Protection System (TPS)-—a 
carbon-foam filled sun shield that will measure over 8 feet in 
diameter—-would sit atop the spacecraft shielding instruments from the 
direct heat and radiation of the Sun. Project officials reported
that they have already completed production of a 30-inch square 
prototype TPS shield, but at this time the technology is not fully 
mature. A full prototype of this technology is expected to be matured 
and built during Phase B. 

A second area of mission technology development concerns the 
production of two sets of solar arrays—-essentially solar power 
generators-—that will retract and extend as the spacecraft moves 
toward or away from the Sun. A solar array cooling system will be used 
to ensure the solar panels stay at required temperatures. Project 
officials reported that the cooling system will need the capacity to 
dissipate up to 5,000 watts of thermal energy during the spacecraft’s 
closest approach to the Sun. In order to mitigate mission risk, a back-
up pump for the cooling system is planned to be integrated should the 
first pump fail. However, as is the case with the TPS, it will be 
impossible to replicate the extreme conditions the probe will be 
exposed to during its closest proximity to the Sun. 

Although the key technologies will be tested in representative 
environments it will be impossible to replicate the extreme conditions 
the fully assembled probe will be exposed to during its closest 
proximity to the Sun requiring simulators for the TPS and Solar Arrays 
in systems test. Thus, the functionality of the entire spacecraft in 
the near-Sun environment cannot be verified fully through testing 
prior to launch. 

An Announcement of Opportunity was issued in December 2009 and project 
officials reported that thirteen science proposals were considered by 
a panel of NASA and other scientists. In 2010, the project selected
five science investigations, which when awarded will have a combined 
value of approximately $165 million for preliminary analysis, design, 
development, and testing. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SPP project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that SPP is making progress going through formulation. 

[End of SPP data] 

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA): 

Common Name: SOFIA: 

[refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: SOFIA First Light Image Composite. 

SOFIA is a joint project between NASA and the German Space Agency to 
install a 2.5 meter telescope in a specially modified Boeing 747SP 
aircraft. This airborne observatory is designed to provide routine 
access to the visual, infrared, far-infrared, and sub-millimeter parts 
of the spectrum. Its mission objectives include studying many 
different kinds of astronomical objects and phenomena, including star 
birth and death; the formation of new solar systems; planets, comets, 
and asteroids in our solar system; and black holes at the center of 
galaxies. Interchangeable instruments for the observatory are being 
developed to allow a range of scientific measurement to be taken by 
SOFIA. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 10/91. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 11/95; 
Critical design review: 8/00; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Initial operational capability: 12/10; 
Full operational capability: 12/14. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $2954.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $3002.9; 
Change: 1.6%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $35.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $35.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $919.5; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $1128.4; 
Change: 22.7%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $2000.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $1839.5; 
Change: -8.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 12/2013; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 12/2014; 
Change: 12 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Technology Issues; 
* Design Issues; 
* Contractor Issues. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Funding Issues. 

Project Summary: 

Since our last review, SOFIA has experienced a delay in the delivery 
of hardware from vendors and development issues surrounding the Cavity 
Door Drive System. While this resulted in a 7-month slip to initiation 
of science flights in December 2010, the program completed a 
significant progress milestone with the completion of the first light 
flight on May 25, 2010. In 2009 and 2010, NASA reported to the 
Congress that SOFIA exceeded both its cost and schedule baselines. 

Project Update: 

As required by law, NASA reported to the Congress in 2009 and 2010 
that SOFIA exceeded its 2007 development cost baseline by more than 15 
percent and its schedule baseline by more than 6 months. SOFIA’s 
development costs have increased more than 268 percent, over $1.1 
billion, since its 1995 estimate. These cost increases are partly due 
to challenges with modification of the aircraft to be used for SOFIA and
more recently development of the Cavity Door Drive System (CDDS). This 
year, project officials told us SOFIA’s development costs increased 
due to increased flight hanger costs. Some data for the project was not
provided by NASA because, according to project officials, the project 
documentation did not transfer in its entirety from Ames Research 
Center to Dryden Flight Research Center. 

Technology Issues: We could not assess the technology maturity of the 
overall project as NASA did not provide information for heritage 
technologies related to the aircraft modification. Data provided for
development of the instruments that will fly on SOFIA generally 
indicates a high level of technology maturity. Many of these 
technologies have already been used on ground-based telescopes. 
Project officials told us that of the eight first generation science 
instruments, one instrument was flown on the first light flight in May 
2010, one instrument has been installed and tested on the ground, one 
instrument is awaiting installation, and four instruments will be 
installed by 2013. 

Design Issues: We were unable to determine design stability of the 
instruments since the drawings were still preliminary at the critical 
design review. Last year, project officials reported that design work 
on SOFIA was 97 percent complete and that all designs would be 
complete by 2011. However, due to problems with the CDDS vendor and 
longer-than-anticipated door testing, initial science flights have 
been delayed one year. Because modifications to several subsystems 
will be ongoing during the early science missions, project officials 
told us designs will not be finalized until 2014 when the project is 
scheduled to begin operations. A date for the preliminary design 
review was not provided by NASA. 

Contractor Issues: Since our last review, the SOFIA project has 
experienced at least a 6-month slip in the scheduled commencement of 
initial science flights due to late delivery of hardware and software in
the CDDS and rework of vendor supplied hardware. The project found 
problems with software quality assurance, which indicated later on 
that there were problems with hardware quality assurance and required
a rebuild of the CDDS components. NASA consequently reduced the 
contractor’s management role for both development and operations of 
SOFIA and utilized government personnel to perform these functions in 
house and to complete the CDDS. The project successfully completed the 
first open door flight test on December 18, 2009, and experienced no 
anomalies. To date, the project has conducted three open door 
landings, two of which were unplanned and caused by nuisance faults. 
The project manager stated that in the open door testing process there 
was a high probability of a halt in the door system and the project was
prepared for this occurrence. He stated that there is no backup door 
opening system, but that the project did have a default reset for door 
issues in flight. The project continues to troubleshoot development of 
the CDDS and is utilizing an independent consultant to investigate the 
system and recommend future upgrades. In August 2010, the project 
completed its second segment of flight tests with its telescope door 
open to prepare the observatory for early science missions. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SOFIA project office provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project 
officials also commented that the SOFIA project has made progress
toward the initiation of science observations. 

[End of SOFIA data] 

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) Replenishment: 

Common Name: TDRS: 

[Refer to PDF for image: artist depiction] 

Source: © Boeing. 

The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) System consists of in-
orbit communication satellites stationed at geosynchronous altitude 
coupled with two ground stations located in New Mexico and Guam. The 
satellite network and ground stations provide mission services for 
near-Earth user satellites and orbiting vehicles. TDRS K and L are the 
11th and 12th satellites, respectively, to be built for the TDRS 
system and will contribute to the existing network by providing high 
bandwidth digital voice, video, and mission payload data, as well as 
health and safety data relay services to Earth-orbiting spacecraft, such
as the International Space Station. 

Formulation: 
Formulation start: 2/07; 
Preliminary design review: 3/09. 

Implementation: 
Project Confirmation: 7/09; 
Critical design review: 2/10; 
GAO review: 12/10; 
Launch readiness date TDRS K: 12/12; 
Launch readiness date TDRS L: 12/13. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $451.3; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $434.1
Change: -3.8%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $241.9; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $241.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $209.4; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $192.2; 
Change: -8.2%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): $0.0; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): $0.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule K: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): 12/2012; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 12/2012; 
Change: 0 months. 

Launch Schedule L: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2010): 12/2013; 
Latest (Feb. 2011): 12/2013; 
Change: 0 months. 

[End of table] 

Recent Project Challenges: 
* Parts Issues. 

Project Summary: 

The TDRS project identified an issue with contamination of the 
lubricants in the reaction wheel assemblies. The cost impact of this 
issue is borne by the prime contractor. In June 2010, the project 
awarded a contract to enhance existing ground-system architecture to 
ensure the TDRS system continues providing space-to-ground 
telecommunications. However, even with the successful launch of TDRS K 
and L, NASA is only able to guarantee continuity of service of the 
TDRS system through fiscal year 2016. 

Project Update: 

Parts Issues: In 2010, TDRS project officials discovered that the 
lubricant in the reaction wheel assemblies was contaminated by 
silicone. The project initially reported that it may take up to 18 
months for the original supplier to provide replacements and that no 
other appropriate reaction wheels are in production by alternative 
vendors. However, project officials expected that replacement reaction 
wheels would be made available in November and December 2010, which 
equates to an approximate 2-month delay to scheduled wheel delivery 
dates. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: In June 2010, a cost-plus-award fee 
contract was awarded to modernize the ground based communication 
systems needed for TDRS K and L. In order to maximize the capabilities
of TDRS K, necessary enhancements to the ground system must be 
prioritized within the 2 years prior to launch in 2012. TDRS K and L 
are being designed with high-bandwidth communication abilities including
the transmission of images, video, voice, and other digital data from 
Earth-orbiting spacecraft to the ground. The ground-based beamforming 
architecture at the White Sands Complex in New Mexico is currently being
modified to provide TDRS K and L compatible beamformers for the ground 
station. Project officials reported that the switch to ground-based 
beamforming was required to provide compatibility with network demand
services developed in the late 1990’s. Project officials recognize 
challenges with updating ground segment equipment describing some 
current instruments as vintage early 1990’s and facing obsolescence 
issues. 

The TDRS System is considered by NASA to be a basic agency capability 
and a national resource. The Space Shuttle and many near-Earth 
spacecraft are totally dependent upon the satellite system for 
communication, and therefore, NASA considers the TDRS Replenishment 
project critical in terms of achieving launch schedule. However, even 
with the successful launch of TDRS K and L, continuity of service for 
TDRS System can only be ensured for NASA and other government agency 
users through approximately fiscal year 2016 at current support 
levels. The primary reason for this is due to an aging fleet of 
satellites. The first TDRS satellite, now decommissioned, has been in 
Earth orbit since 1983. According to a project official, the current 
fixed price development contract for TDRS K and L includes an option 
to produce two additional TDRS satellites—-designated M and N—-and the 
addition of these two satellites could extend TDRS system service 
continuity. However, in order to exercise the options for TDRS M and 
N, NASA would need a financial commitment of $1.2 billion from 
partnership organizations. Project officials reported that a decision 
on exercising the option for TDRS M needs to be made no later than 
November 30, 2011, and no later than November 30, 2012, for TDRS N. 

Project Office Comments: 

The TDRS project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
commented that they agreed with the assessment as written. 

[End of TDRS data] 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to NASA for review and comment. In 
its written response, NASA agreed with our findings and stated that it 
will continue to identify and address the challenges that may lead to 
cost and schedule growth in its projects. NASA agreed that GAO’s cost 
and schedule growth figures reflect what the agency has experienced 
since baselines were established in response to the 2005 statutory 
reporting requirement. NASA also stated that the average cost growth 
remains below the 15 percent threshold that requires Congressional 
notification. While this is correct, it should be noted that the 
notification requirements are for individual projects, not the 
portfolio as a whole. In addition, NASA acknowledges that the current 
estimates for the James Webb Space Telescope do not represent the cost 
and schedule required to complete the project, and that the agency is 
undertaking a comprehensive replanning activity to establish the best 
budget phasing and schedule to minimize risk and life-cycle cost 
within the overall constraints of its budget. We encourage NASA to 
provide a revised budget and schedule for JWST that is based on a
sound, knowledge-based business case to allow the project to succeed. 

NASA noted that its projects are high-risk, one-of-a-kind development
efforts that do not lend themselves to all the practices of a 
“business case” approach that we outlined since essential attributes 
of NASA’s project development differ from those of a production 
entity. We agree and do not assess NASA’s projects for production 
maturity. We do, however, assess NASA projects at critical points in 
the product development process to ensure that these projects are 
proceeding with system development with a sound business case. At 
these key junctures we have found that NASA could benefit from a more 
disciplined approach to its acquisitions whereby decisions are based 
upon high levels of knowledge. As we reported, inherent risks are 
being heightened due to projects moving forward with immature 
technologies, unstable designs, and other challenges, leading to cost 
and schedule increases that make it hard for the agency to manage its
portfolio and make informed investment decisions. GAO looks forward to
working with NASA as it develops metrics to better measure design 
stability and continues to refine the information it uses to 
understand a project’s status and make informed decisions. 

NASA stated that the drawing release metric we use to assess design
stability was developed prior to the use of computerized drawings and 
does not take into account improvements due to the use of this 
technology. We acknowledge this point, but our analysis of NASA 
projects shows that those projects that have met or come close to 
meeting the best practices drawing release metric have fared better 
with regard to cost and schedule than those projects that did not come 
close to meeting the metric. Furthermore, in no way does GAO portend 
that the drawing release metric is the only way to assess design 
stability. Until NASA has taken steps to identify a consistent and 
proven metric by which to measure projects with a portfolio 
perspective, however, we will continue to use this metric to assess 
stability. NASA has indicated that it will develop such metrics and 
provide them to GAO in March 2011. We are encouraged by this progress 
and look forward to receiving the information. 

NASA expressed concern that technical corrections it provided to our
2-page summaries were not fully accepted. We incorporated the technical
comments where supporting documentation that meets our standards of
evidence was provided. We did not incorporate the comments where this
information was not provided or where the change was less a technical
correction and more a difference of opinion between GAO and NASA based
on facts or where space limitations required a briefer description of an
issue than requested by NASA. As this work will be continuing in future
years, we will continue to capture the progress made by all the 
projects in our review. Finally, we take great strides to provide the 
latest information possible in our report. We will continue to work 
with NASA to ensure that updated information is provided to GAO in a 
timely manner so that it can be included in our analysis. 

NASA’s written comments are reprinted in appendix I. NASA also
provided technical comments, which we addressed throughout the report
as appropriate and where sufficient evidence was provided to support
significant changes. 

We will send copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 
on GAO’s Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Should you or 
your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Cristina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski: 
Chairwoman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bill Nelson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Boozman: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Science and Space: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Chaka Fattah: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Stephen Palazzo: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics: 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Office of the Administrator: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

February 23, 2011: 

Ms. Christina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates 
the opportunity to comment on the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) draft report entitled "Assessments of Selected Large-Scale 
Projects" (GAO-11-239SP). NASA values the continued open and 
constructive communications between NASA and the GAO team on this 
effort. NASA remains dedicated to continuous improvement of its 
acquisition management processes and performance and will continue to 
work with the GAO to identify and address the challenges that may lead 
to cost and schedule growth of our projects. 

We are pleased that GAO has again recognized NASA's ongoing efforts to 
mitigate acquisition management risk and lay a stronger foundation for 
reducing project cost and schedule growth. As was highlighted, NASA 
instituted a Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level (JCL) policy in 
2009 to increase the likelihood of project success at the specified 
funding level. As expected in 2010, execution of the JCL process prior 
to confirmation of several projects, including the Lunar Atmosphere 
and Dust Environment Explorer, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile 
Evolution Mission, and the Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2, increased 
insight by project managers, the Standing Review Board, and NASA 
management surfacing uncertainties and contingencies with the 
integrated cost and schedule plan. NASA will continue to assess the 
impact of utilizing JCLs on project cost and schedule growth as these 
projects complete their Systems Integration Reviews in the next two 
years. Furthermore, with the completion and launch in 2011 of three 
missions baselined under the earlier cost confidence level policy, 
NASA will have a better measure of the impact of our acquisition 
management improvement efforts over the last five years. 

In its draft report, GAO states that NASA's project development costs 
for the 16 projects in implementation in this review have increased by 
an average of 14.6 percent from their baseline cost estimates and 
experienced an average delay of eight months, an improvement of three 
months since the previous report. NASA agrees with the cost and 
schedule growth figures that are quoted and notes that the average 
cost growth remains below the 15 percent threshold which requires 
special notification to Congress. Furthermore, fewer projects have 
exceeded this threshold since NASA's new cost estimating policies were 
put into place. These figures are reflective of what has been 
experienced since baselines were established in response to the 2005 
statutory reporting requirement. 

GAO notes that the calculation of NASA's average development cost and 
schedule growth does not include anticipated growth on the James Webb 
Space Telescope (JWST) project. The cost and schedule quoted in the 
draft GAO report are the results of a rough estimate by the 
Independent Comprehensive Review Panel (ICRP) which recently assessed 
JWST and do not represent NASA's estimate of the cost and schedule 
required to complete the project. In response to ICRP's findings and 
recommendations, NASA is currently undertaking a comprehensive 
replanning activity to establish the best budget phasing and schedule 
to minimize the risk and life-cycle cost of JWST within the overall 
constraints of NASA's budget. The revised budget and schedule will be 
completed after the release of the President's 2012 Budget. Decisions 
resulting from this replanning activity, with any required Agency 
offsets, will be reflected in the President's 2013 Budget. 

While NASA practices many elements of GAO's stated "business case" 
approach, some essential aspects of NASA's project development differ 
from those of a production entity, which is the basis for the GAO 
approach. NASA's projects are generally high-risk, one-of-a-kind 
developments and, therefore, do not have a production phase. The draft 
GAO report acknowledges the unique nature of NASA projects but applies 
a best practices approach that requires an incremental development 
process. NASA's work pushes the boundary of our achievements and often 
requires leaps, not steps, to accomplish the mission. NASA aims to 
continue to innovate in an affordable and sustainable way and will 
continue to work with GAO to determine which elements of the approach 
are valuable for informing improvements and which may need to be 
modified to account best for the complexity that surrounds our 
challenging missions. 

An area where NASA and GAO can work together to adapt the assessment 
approach is in the determination of design stability. Although the 
best practice recommends 90 percent drawing release by Critical Design 
Review (CDR), the drawing release metric is a standard developed prior 
to the use of computerized drawings and, hence, does not take into 
account improvements due to the use of this technology. NASA continues 
to develop metrics to measure design stability as well as other 
knowledge required to understand a project's progress and maturity. 

The draft GAO report notes challenges with launch vehicles, 
specifically, NASA's transition plans for future medium-class launch 
vehicles and cites a previous recommendation that NASA perform 
detailed cost estimates for certification of new vehicles and 
adequately budget for the associated risks. NASA is in the process of 
estimating costs to certify the Falcon 9 and will budget accordingly. 
Taurus II is not currently included in the NASA Launch Services 
contract; however, NASA will follow the same process in the event that 
it is added. In addition, NASA is working to resolve the inherent 
conflict between the desire to minimize technical risk by identifying 
the launch vehicle as early as possible (before Preliminary Design 
Review) and the desire to minimize programmatic risk by not committing 
to purchase a launch vehicle prior to mission confirmation (at Key 
Decision Point-C, Post-Preliminary Design Review). 

NASA is concerned that technical corrections to the Project Two-Page 
Summaries that were provided in late 2010 were not fully accepted by 
the GAO in the draft report. Many of these comments have been 
resubmitted for GAO's consideration. NASA will work with the GAO team 
to better understand why specific corrections were not accepted and to 
better explain our issues if necessary. In addition, NASA understands 
that the GAO's work was completed in the fall of 2010 and is concerned 
that the assessment, therefore, does not recognize the significant 
progress the Agency has made since then. 

NASA will continue to follow through with our new policies and 
management attention on cost and schedule growth in the coming year. 
We are committed to continuous improvement in order to explore and 
utilize space in an affordable way for the benefit of the Nation. To 
this end, we look forward to continuing to work with the GAO to 
measure and improve our performance. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. If you 
have any questions or require additional information, please contact 
Katie Gallagher at (202) 358-2185. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Lori B. Garver: 
Deputy Administrator: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to report on the status and challenges faced by 
NASA systems with life-cycle costs of $250 million or more and to 
discuss broader trends faced by the agency in its management of system 
acquisitions. In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and 
identified challenges for each of 21 major projects. We summarized our 
assessments of each individual project in two components--a project 
profile and a detailed discussion of project challenges. We did not 
validate the cost and schedule data provided by NASA. However, we took 
appropriate steps to address data reliability. Specifically, we 
confirmed the accuracy of NASA-generated data with multiple sources 
within NASA and, in some cases, with external sources. Additionally, 
we corroborated data provided to us with published documentation. We 
determined that the data provided by NASA project offices were 
sufficiently reliable for our engagement purposes. 

We developed a standardized data collection instrument (DCI) that was 
completed by each project office. Through the DCI, we gathered basic 
information about projects as well as current and projected 
development activities for those projects. The cost and schedule data 
estimates that NASA provided were the most recent updates as of 
November 2010; performance data that NASA provided were also the most 
recent updates as of September 2010. At the time we collected the 
data, 8 of the 21 projects were in the formulation phase. Three of 
these 8 projects--MAVEN, LADEE, and OCO-2--were confirmed and entered 
the implementation phase late in 2010. To further understand 
performance issues, we talked with officials from most project offices 
and NASA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) Strategic 
Investments Division (SID). We also collected cost and schedule data 
for projects in operations that we had reviewed in prior reports for 
historical purposes. These projects were DAWN, GLAST, Herschel, 
Kepler, LRO, OCO, SDO, and WISE. 

The information collected from each project office, Mission 
Directorate, and OCFO/SID were summarized in a 2-page report format 
providing a project overview; key cost, contract, and schedule data; 
and a discussion of the challenges associated with the deviation from 
relevant indicators from best practice standards. The aggregate 
measures and averages calculated were analyzed for meaningful 
relationships, e.g. relationship between cost growth and schedule 
slippage and knowledge maturity attained both at critical milestones 
and through the various stages of the project life cycle. Cost growth 
averages used in this report are weighted averages and should not be 
used as a point of comparison to previous reports where weighted 
averages were not used. We identified cost and/or schedule growth as 
significant where, in either case, a project's cost and/or its 
schedule statutory baseline exceeded the thresholds that trigger 
reporting to the Congress. 

To supplement our analysis, we relied on GAO's work over the past 
years examining acquisition issues across multiple agencies. These 
reports cover such issues as contracting, program management, 
acquisition policy, and estimating cost. GAO also has an extensive 
body of work related to challenges NASA has faced with specific system 
acquisitions, financial management, and cost estimating. This work 
provided the context and basis for large parts of the general 
observations we made about the projects we reviewed. Additionally, the 
discussions with the individual NASA projects helped us identify 
further challenges faced by the projects. Together, the past work and 
additional discussions contributed to our development of a short list 
of challenges discussed for each project. The challenges we identified 
and discussed do not represent an exhaustive or exclusive list. They 
are subject to change and evolution as GAO continues this annual 
assessment in future years. The challenges, indicated as "issues," are 
based on our definitions, not that of NASA. 

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, 
D.C. In addition, we visited NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in 
Huntsville, Alabama, and Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, 
Maryland, to discuss individual projects. We also met with 
representatives from NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, California 
and a contractor involved with several projects, Orbital Science 
Corporation. In addition, we interviewed officials at Johnson Space 
Center in Houston, Texas, Ames Research Center at Moffitt Field in 
California, and Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards Air Force 
Base in California. 

Data Limitations: 

NASA only provided specific cost and schedule estimates for 16 of the 
21 projects in our review. NASA provided internal preliminary 
estimated total (life-cycle) cost ranges and associated schedules for 
three of the projects that had not yet entered implementation, from 
key decision point B (KDP-B), solely for informational purposes. 
[Footnote 47] We did not receive cost estimates or ranges for two 
projects--Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 and Solar Probe 
Plus--since these projects had not yet reached their KDP-B, the point 
in the acquisition life cycle where a preliminary life cycle cost 
estimate would normally be developed. We did receive preliminary 
scheduled launch dates for these two projects. NASA formally 
establishes cost and schedule baselines, committing itself to cost and 
schedule targets for a project with a specific and aligned set of 
planned mission objectives, at key decision point C (KDP-C), which 
follows a non-advocate review (NAR) and preliminary design review 
(PDR). KDP-C reflects the life-cycle point where NASA approves a 
project to leave the formulation phase and enter into the 
implementation phase. NASA explained that preliminary estimates are 
generated for internal planning and fiscal year budgeting purposes at 
KDP-B, which occurs mid-stream in the formulation phase, and hence, 
are not considered a formal commitment by the agency on cost and 
schedule for the mission deliverables. NASA officials contend that 
because of changes that occur to a project's scope and technologies 
between KDP-B and KDP-C, estimates of project cost and schedule can 
change significantly heading toward KDP-C. 

We requested earned value management data for the 21 projects, and 
received data on 11 of them. However, this information was received 
late in our review and as a result we were unable to conduct a 
detailed analysis on the earned value data. 

We also requested independent cost estimates and Joint Cost and 
Schedule Confidence Levels (JCL) for the projects that completed them. 
We received independent cost estimates for 12 of the projects in our 
review and for 6 projects that have launched since our last review. In 
most cases we received independent cost estimates conducted at the 
center level by the projects, along with estimates by the Aerospace 
Corporation and/or by NASA's Independent Program Assessment Office. We 
received JCL analyses from three of the five projects that have 
completed their JCLs. However, this information was incomplete and 
received late in our review and as a result we were unable to conduct 
a thorough analysis of the data. 

Project Profile Information on Each Individual 2-Page Assessment: 

This section of the 2-page assessment outlines the essentials of the 
project, its cost and schedule performance, and its summary. Project 
essentials reflect pertinent information about each project, 
including, where applicable, the major contractors and partners 
involved in the project. These organizations have primary 
responsibility over a major segment of the project or, in some cases, 
the entire project. 

Project performance is depicted according to cost and schedule changes 
in the various stages of the project life cycle. To assess the cost 
and schedule changes of each project we obtained data directly from 
NASA OCFO/SID and from NASA's Integrated Budget and Performance 
documents. For systems in implementation, we compared the latest 
available information with the statutory cost and schedule baseline 
estimates for each project. 

All cost information is presented in nominal "then year" dollars for 
consistency with budget data.[Footnote 48] Baseline costs are adjusted 
to reflect the cost accounting structure in NASA's fiscal year 2009 
budget estimates. For the fiscal year 2009 budget request, NASA 
changed its accounting practices from full-cost accounting to 
reporting only direct costs at the project level. The schedule 
assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, which is defined as the 
number of months between the project start, or formulation start, and 
projected or actual launch date.[Footnote 49] Formulation start 
generally refers to the initiation of a project; NASA refers to 
project start as key decision point A, or the beginning of the 
formulation phase. The preliminary design review typically occurs 
during the end of the formulation phase, followed by a confirmation 
review process, referred to as key decision point C, which allows the 
project to move into the implementation phase. The critical design 
review is held during the final design period of implementation and 
demonstrates that the maturity of the design is appropriate to support 
proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and 
test. Launch readiness is determined through a launch readiness review 
that verifies that the launch system and spacecraft/payloads are ready 
for launch. The implementation phase includes the operations of the 
mission and concludes with project disposal. 

We assessed the extent to which NASA projects exceeded their statutory 
cost and schedule baselines. To do this, we compared the project 
statutory baseline cost and schedule estimates with the current cost 
and schedule data reported by the project office in November 2010. 

Project Challenges Discussion on Each Individual 2-Page Assessment: 

To assess the project challenges for each project, we submitted a data 
collection instrument to each project office. In the data collection 
instrument, we requested information on the maturity of critical and 
heritage technologies, number of releasable design drawings at project 
milestones, and project contractors and partnerships. We also held 
interviews with representatives from each of the projects to discuss 
the information on the data collection instrument. These discussions 
led to identification of further challenges faced by NASA projects. 
The eight challenges we identified were largely apparent in the 
projects that had entered the implementation phase, however, there 
were instances where these challenges were identified in projects in 
the formulation phase. We then reviewed pertinent project 
documentation, such as the project plan, schedule, risk assessments, 
and major project reviews to corroborate any testimonial evidence we 
received in the interviews. 

To assess issues with technology, we asked project officials to 
provide the technology readiness levels (TRL) of each of the project's 
critical technologies at various stages of project development. 
Originally developed by NASA, TRLs are measured on a scale of one to 
nine, beginning with paper studies of a technology's feasibility and 
culminating with a technology fully integrated into a completed 
product. (See appendix IV for the definitions of technology readiness 
levels.) In most cases, we did not validate the project offices' 
selection of critical technologies or the determination of the 
demonstrated level of maturity. However, we sought to clarify the 
technology readiness levels in those cases where the information 
provided raised concerns, such as where a critical technology was 
reported as immature late in the project development cycle. 
Additionally, we asked project officials to explain the environments 
in which technologies were tested. 

Our best practices work has shown that a technology readiness level of 
6--demonstrating a technology as a fully integrated prototype in a 
relevant environment--is the level of maturity needed to minimize 
risks for space systems entering product development. In our 
assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness 
level 6 are referred to as fully mature because of the difficulty of 
achieving technology readiness level 7, which is demonstrating 
maturity in an operational environment--space. Projects with critical 
technologies that did not achieve maturity by the preliminary design 
review were assessed as having a technology issues project challenge. 
We did not assess technology maturity for those projects which had not 
yet reached the preliminary design review at the time of this 
assessment.[Footnote 50] 

We also asked project officials to assess the TRL of each of the 
project's heritage technologies at various stages of project 
development. We also interviewed project officials about the use of 
heritage technologies in their projects. We asked them what heritage 
technologies were being used, what effort was needed to modify the 
form, fit, and function of the technology for use in the new system, 
whether the project encountered any problems in modifying the 
technology, and whether the project considered the heritage technology 
as a risk to the project. Heritage technologies were not considered 
critical technologies by several of the projects we reviewed. Based on 
our interviews, review of data from the data collection instruments, 
and previous GAO work on space systems, we determined whether these 
technology issues were a challenge for a particular project. 

To assess issues with design, we asked project officials to provide 
the percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the preliminary and critical design reviews and as of 
our current assessment.[Footnote 51] In most cases, we did not verify 
or validate the percentage of engineering drawings provided by the 
project office. However, we collected the project offices' rationale 
for cases where it appeared that only a small number of drawings were 
completed by the time of the design reviews or where the project 
office reported significant growth in the number of drawings released 
after CDR. In accordance with GAO's best practices, projects were 
assessed as having achieved design stability if they had at least 90 
percent of projected drawings releasable by the critical design 
review. Projects that had not met this metric were determined to have 
a design stability project challenge. Though some projects used other 
methods to assess design stability, such as computer and engineering 
models and analyses, we did not assess the effectiveness of these 
other methods. We did not assess design stability for those projects 
that had not yet reached the critical design review at the time of 
this assessment. 

To assess issues with funding, we interviewed officials from NASA's 
OCFO/SID and NASA project officials, and also relied upon past 
interviews with project contractors about the stability of funding 
throughout the project lifecycle. In addition, NASA received an 
appropriation from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA). NASA provided a record of projects involved in our review that 
received ARRA funds and reported the amount of ARRA funds a project 
received in the cost tab of the data collection instrument. We also 
asked project and Mission Directorate officials to discuss how these 
funds were used. Funding issues were considered a challenge if 
officials indicated that project funding had been interrupted or 
delayed resulting in an impact to the cost, schedule, or performance 
of the project, if the project received ARRA funding, or if project 
officials indicated that the project budgets do not have sufficient 
funding in certain years based on the work expected to be 
accomplished. We corroborated the funding changes and reasons with 
budget documents when available. 

To assess issues with launch, we interviewed NASA Launch Services and 
project officials. We also interviewed contractor representatives from 
Orbital Sciences Corporation to discuss the launch failure of the OCO- 
1 mission in 2009 and the return to flight process for the Taurus XL 
for the Glory and OCO-2 missions. Launch issues were considered a 
challenge if, after establishing a firm launch date, a project had 
difficulty rescheduling its launch date because it was not ready; if 
the project could be affected by another project slipping its launch; 
or if there were launch vehicle fleet issues. In addition, we assessed 
the status of launch vehicle selection for projects in formulation and 
considered it a challenge if the proposed timing for the launch 
vehicle selection date falls after Preliminary Design Review due the 
availability of certified medium class launch vehicles. 

To assess issues with contractor management, we interviewed project 
officials about their interaction and experience with contractors. We 
also interviewed contractor representatives from Orbital Sciences 
Corporation. We were informed about contractor performance problems 
pertaining to their workforce, the supplier base, and technical and 
corporate experience. We assessed a project as having this challenge 
if these contractor issues caused the project to experience a cost 
overrun, schedule delay, or decrease in mission capability. For 
projects that did not have a major contractor, we considered this 
challenge inapplicable to the project. 

To assess issues with development partners, we interviewed NASA 
project officials about their interaction with international or 
domestic partners during project development. Development partner 
issues was considered a challenge for the project if project officials 
indicated that domestic or foreign partners were experiencing problems 
with project development that impacted the cost, schedule, or 
performance of the project for NASA. These challenges were specific to 
the partner organization or caused by a contractor to that partner 
organization. For projects that did not have an international or 
domestic development partner, we considered this challenge not 
applicable to the project. 

To assess issues with parts quality, we submitted a data collection 
instrument in conjunction with other on-going GAO work to all of the 
projects in the implementation phase that were schedule to be 
operating in a space environment. In addition, we asked project 
officials to identify project components that encountered parts 
quality or availability problems during development. Additionally, we 
asked project officials to explain the environments in which the parts 
quality issues were discovered and any implication on the project's 
cost and schedule. We considered parts issues a challenge if there 
were actual or potential cost and/or schedule impacts to the project 
as a result of parts quality or availability, or if the project had to 
take special steps in order to address parts issues. 

The individual project offices were given an opportunity to comment on 
and provide technical clarifications to the 2-page assessments prior 
to their inclusion in the final product. We incorporated these 
comments as appropriate and where sufficient supporting documentation 
was provided. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 to February 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. 
Examples might include paper studies of a technology's basic 
properties; 
Hardware: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale individual 
components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard; 
Validation in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to 
establish that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low 
fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include 
integration of "ad hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware: Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale components 
to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or form or fit 
but representative of technically feasible approach suitable for 
flight articles; 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 
significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" 
laboratory integration of components; 
Hardware: High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent but not 
necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc). Should be 
approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of several 
components with reasonably realistic support elements/subsystems to 
demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not 
form and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment; 
Hardware: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and function. 
Probably includes the integration of many new components and realistic 
supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or 
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an 
realistic environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in 
a test bed aircraft; 
Hardware: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function integrated with 
other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate full 
functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft; 
Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development. Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design specifications; 
Hardware: Flight qualified hardware; 
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in 
the actual system application. 

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form 
and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last 
"bug fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include 
using the system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of NASA data. 

[End of table] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant 
Director; Jessica M. Berkholtz; Richard A. Cederholm; Justin D. 
Dunleavy: Laura Greifner; Kristine R. Hassinger; Caryn E. Kuebler; 
Jesse Lamarre-Vincent; Kenneth E. Patton; and Roxanna T. Sun made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-306SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009) and GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale 
Projects, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010). 

[2] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-155, §103; 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b). 

[3] 42 U.S.C. § 16613(d). 

[4] See Explanatory Statement accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations 
Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, div. B, tit. III. 

[5] Each assessment is presented in a two-page summary that analyzes 
the project's cost and schedule status and project challenges we 
identified with the objective to identify risks that, if mitigated, 
could put NASA in a better position to succeed. 

[6] Each project we reviewed was in either the formulation phase or 
the implementation phase of the project life cycle. In the formulation 
phase, the project defines requirements--what the project is being 
designed to do--matures technology, establishes a schedule, estimates 
costs, and produces a plan for implementation. In the implementation 
phase, the project carries out these plans, performing final design 
and fabrication as well as testing components and system assembly, 
integrating these components and testing how they work together, and 
launching the project. This phase also includes the period from 
project launch through mission completion. 

[7] NASA is required to report to Congress if development cost of a 
program is likely to exceed the baseline estimate by 15 percent or 
more, or if a milestone is likely to be delayed by 6 months or more. 
42 U.S.C. § 16613(d). 

[8] GAO, Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve 
Weapon Acquisition, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-386SP] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 
2004). 

[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future 
Combat System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-376] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense Acquisitions: Improved 
Business Case Key for Future Combat System's Success, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-564T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 
2006); NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework 
Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 21, 2005); NASA's Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 
Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-242] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2005). 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-242]. 

[11] NASA defines formulation as the identification of how the program 
or project supports the agency's strategic needs, goals, and 
objectives; the assessment of feasibility, technology and concepts; 
risk assessment, team building, development of operations concepts and 
acquisition strategies; establishment of high-level requirements and 
success criteria; the preparation of plans, budgets, and schedules 
essential to the success of a program or project; and the 
establishment of control systems to ensure performance to those plans 
and alignment with current agency strategies. NASA Interim Directive 
(NID) NM 7120-81 for NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5D, 
paragraph 1.2.1(a) (Sept. 22, 2009) (Hereinafter cited as NID for NPR 
7120.5D (Sept. 22, 2009). 

[12] The implementation phase is defined as the execution of approved 
plans for the development and operation of the program/project, and 
the use of control systems to ensure performance to approved plans and 
continued alignment with the Agency's strategic needs, goals, and 
objectives. NID for NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1(c) (Sept. 22, 2009). 

[13] According to NID for NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-7 (Sept. 22, 2009), the 
PDR demonstrates that the preliminary design meets all system 
requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost and schedule 
constraints and establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed 
design. It shows that the correct design option has been selected, 
interfaces have been identified, and verification methods have been 
described. Full baseline cost and schedules, as well as risk 
assessments, management systems, and metrics are presented. 

[14] According to NID for NPR 7120.5D, Appendix A (Sept. 22, 2009), a 
NAR is comprised of the analysis of a proposed program or project by a 
(non-advocate) team composed of management, technical, and resources 
experts (personnel) from outside the advocacy chain of the proposed 
program or project. It provides agency management with an independent 
assessment of the readiness of the program/project to proceed into 
implementation. 

[15] The management baseline is the integrated set of requirements, 
cost, schedule, technical content, and associated joint confidence 
level that forms the foundation for program or project execution and 
reporting done as part of NASA's performance assessment and governance 
process. NID for NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 2.1.8.2 and Appendix A (Sept. 
22, 2009). 

[16] According to NID for NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-7 (Sept. 22, 2009), the 
CDR demonstrates that the maturity of the design is appropriate to 
support proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, integration, 
and test, and that the technical effort is on track to complete the 
flight and ground system development and mission operations in order 
to meet mission performance requirements within the identified cost 
and schedule constraints. Progress against management plans, budget, 
and schedule, as well as risk assessments are presented. 

[17] The system integration review evaluates the readiness of the 
project to start flight system assembly, test, and launch operations. 
This review takes place after the CDR and just prior to the beginning 
of phase D, where test and integration activities occur. NID for NPR 
7120.5D, Table 2-7 and paragraph 4.6.1 (Sept. 22, 2009). 

[18] For purposes of our analysis, cost or schedule growth is 
significant if it exceeds the thresholds that trigger reporting to 
Congress under the law. The thresholds are development cost growth of 
15 percent or more from the baseline cost estimate or a milestone 
delay of 6 months or more beyond the baseline schedule estimate. 42 
U.S.C. § 16613(d). 

[19] NASA did not provide a formal cost and schedule baselines for the 
projects in formulation, citing that the estimates are preliminary. 
Baselines are established when the project transitions to 
implementation. 

[18] The System Integration Review evaluates the readiness of the 
project to start flight system assembly, test, and launch operations. 
This review takes place after the CDR and just prior to the beginning 
of phase D, where test and integration activities occur. NID for NPR 
7120.5D, Table 2-7 and paragraph 4.6.1 (Sept. 22, 2009). 

[20] If development cost of a program will exceed the baseline 
estimate by more than 30 percent, then NASA is required to seek 
reauthorization from Congress in order to continue the program. If the 
program is reauthorized, NASA is required to establish new cost and 
schedule baselines. 42 U.S.C. § 16613(e). 

[21] 42 U.S.C. § 16613(e). 

[22] These 13 projects include 5 projects reviewed this year and 8 
projects from our previous reports in this series. For many of these 
projects, the confirmation baseline was set prior to the requirement 
for the statutory baseline. They are of analytical interest because 
(1) they are or were in the implementation phase, and (2) measuring 
cost growth from a project's confirmation baseline, not its statutory 
baseline, allows for more of a more consistent comparison of project 
cost growth among NASA's portfolio of projects. 

[23] The Ares and Orion projects have completed their preliminary 
design reviews, but have not yet held confirmation reviews. 

[24] The "product development" stage in GAO's knowledge-based approach 
is equivalent to "implementation" in NASA's lifecycle. 

[25] NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7123.1A , NASA Systems 
Engineering Processes and Requirements Appendix G, paragraph G.19(b) 
(Mar. 26, 2007) 

[26] Appendix IV provides a description of the metrics used to assess 
technology maturity. 

[27] Projects will modify the form, fit, and function of a heritage 
technology to adapt to the new environment. For example, the size or 
the weight of the component may change or the technology may function 
differently than its use in a previous mission. 

[28] We were unable to determine design stability for the SOFIA 
project as some data was not provided to us for review by NASA 
because, according to project officials, the project documentation did 
not transfer in its entirety from Ames Research Center to Dryden 
Flight Research Center. In addition, we were unable to determine 
design stability for the MMS project as it did not provide us with 
detailed drawing count data. 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] and GAO, 
NASA: Issues Implementing the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-216T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Dec. 1, 2010) 

[30] NPR 7123.1A, Appendix G, paragraph G.8 (Mar. 26, 2007) 

[31] For KDP/milestone reviews, external independent reviewers known 
as Standing Review Board (SRB) members evaluate the program/project 
and, in the end, report their findings to the decision authority. For 
a program or project to prepare for the SRB, the technical team must 
conduct their own internal peer review process. This process typically 
includes both informal and formal peer reviews at the subsystem and 
system level. NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, paragraph 6.7.2.1 
(Dec. 2007) 

[32] The National Academies, National Research Council, Controlling 
Cost Growth of NASA Earth and Space Science Missions (Washington, D.C. 
2010). 

[33] Pub. L. No. 111-5. 

[34] GAO, NASA: Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain 
Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case is Established, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-844] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 26, 
2009). 

[35] GAO, NASA: Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing 
Investments but Is Not Without Risk, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-107] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 
2010) 

[36] NASA provides funding to SpaceX and Orbital to help offset 
International Space Station-related development costs of the Falcon 9 
and the Taurus II, respectively. The Falcon 9 and Taurus II are 
intended to be medium class launch vehicles. 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-107]. 

[38] Government Industry Data Exchange Program, or GIDEP, is a 
partnership between Government Agencies and Industry to share 
scientific and technical information through an on-line web-enabled 
database. GIDEP alerts report a problem with parts, components, 
materials, specifications, software, manufacturing processes, or test 
equipment that can cause a functional failure. 

[39] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007). 

[40] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Plan for 
Improvement in the GAO High-Risk Area of Contract Management, Oct. 31, 
2007. 

[41] GAO, Additional Cost Transparency and Design Criteria Needed for 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Projects, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-346R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 3, 2011). 

[42] NASA Policy Directive 1000.5A, Policy for NASA Acquisitions, 
paragraphs 1(h)(1)(a) and 1(h)(2) (Jan. 15, 2009).

[43] Seven of the 21 projects were not required to complete the JCL 
process at the time of our review. 

[44] American National Standards Institute/Electronic Industries 
Alliance Standard, Earned Value Management Systems, ANSI/EIA-748-B- 
2007 approved July 9, 2007. 

[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-216T]. 

[46] Jet Propulsion Laboratory: James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) 
Independent Comprehensive Review Panel (ICRP): Final Report, JPL D- 
67250 (Pasadena, Calif.: Oct.29, 2010). 

[47] These missions include Ares I, Soil Moisture Active and Passive, 
and Orion. 

[48] Because of changes in NASA's accounting structure, its historical 
cost data are relatively inconsistent. As such, we used "then-year" 
dollars to report data consistent with the data NASA reported to us. 

[49] Some projects reported that their spacecraft would be ready for 
launch sooner than the date that the launch authority could provide 
actual launch services. In these cases, we used the actual launch date 
for our analysis rather than the date that the project reported 
readiness. 

[50] According to NASA officials, projects that were in formulation at 
the time of the agency's 2007 revision of its project management 
policy are required to comply with that policy. Projects that had 
already entered implementation at the time of the revision were 
directed to implement those requirements that would not adversely 
affect the project's cost and schedule baselines. 

[51] In our calculation for percentage of total number of drawings 
project for release, we used the number of drawings released at 
critical design review as a fraction of the total number of drawings 
projected, including where a growth in drawings occurred. So, the 
denominator in the calculation may have been larger than what was 
projected at the critical design review. We believe that this more 
accurately reflected the design stability of the project. 

[End of section] 

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