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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2011: 

Warfighter Support: 

DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and 
Evaluation for Potential Consolidation: 

GAO-11-273: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-273, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission 
failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In 
response, the Department of Defense (DOD) established urgent 
operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new 
capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) technology, and counter–improvised explosive devices (IED) 
systems. However, GAO, the Defense Science Board, and others have 
raised concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and oversight of 
DOD’s various urgent needs processes. GAO conducted this review to 
determine (1) what various entities exist within DOD for responding to 
urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is 
fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD 
has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent 
needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the 
potential for consolidations. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD’
s urgent needs processes and collected and analyzed data from urgent 
needs entities. 

What GAO Found: 

Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved 
as a set of complex processes within the Joint Staff, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, and the 
combatant commands to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and 
critical capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified at least 31 
entities that manage urgent needs and expedite the development of 
solutions to address them. Moreover, GAO found that some overlap 
exists. For example, there are numerous points of entry for the 
warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability, 
including through the Joint Staff and each military service. 
Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions 
for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities, 
potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the 
Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop 
counter-IED mine rollers. 

DOD has taken steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, but 
the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and 
oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps 
identified by warfighters in-theater. Steps DOD has taken include 
developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts and working to 
establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD’s 
efforts. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies, 
procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired 
results through effective stewardship of public resources. However, 
DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that establishes a 
baseline and provides a common approach for how all joint and military 
service urgent needs are to be addressed. Moreover, DOD lacks 
visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts. For 
example, DOD cannot readily identify the cost of its departmentwide 
urgent needs efforts, which is at least $76.9 billion based on GAO’s 
analysis. Additionally, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point 
to lead the department’s efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs 
requirements. Without DOD-wide guidance and a focal point to lead its 
efforts, DOD risks having duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented 
efforts, which can result in avoidable costs. 

DOD also has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for 
consolidation across the department. GAO’s Business Process 
Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such a comprehensive 
analysis of alternative processes should be performed, to include a 
performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for 
each alternative. In an effort to examine various ways the department 
might improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, GAO identified and 
analyzed several potential consolidation options, ranging from 
consolidation of all DOD urgent needs entities to more limited 
consolidation of key functions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates 
its strategic direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of 
opportunities for consolidation as well as opportunities for increased 
efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD develop comprehensive guidance that, among 
other things, defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities across 
the department and designates a focal point to lead urgent needs 
efforts. GAO also recommends that DOD evaluate potential options for 
consolidation. DOD concurred with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-273] or key 
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis, (202) 512-
8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Fulfillment of Urgent Needs Involves a Number of Entities and 
Processes, Resulting in Fragmentation and Some Overlap of Efforts: 

DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to 
Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs: 

Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and 
Entities: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Timeline of Significant Events within DOD and the Military 
Services to Fulfill Urgent Needs: 

Table 2: Activities Involved in Meeting Urgent Needs: 

Table 3: DOD Entities Involved in the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs: 

Table 4: Roles of Urgent Needs Entities in Key Activities: 

Table 5: Activities Included in Urgent Needs Policies and Guidance: 

Table 6: Identified Potential Options for Consolidating the 
Department's Urgent Needs Processes, with Advantages and Disadvantages: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Estimated Funding for the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational 
Needs of Entities Identified by GAO, Fiscal Year 2005 through Fiscal 
Year 2010: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

IED: improvised explosive device: 

ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: 

JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System: 

JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: 

JUON: Joint Urgent Operational Need: 

MRAP: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

PEO: Program Executive Office: 

PM: Project Manager: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 1, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have 
encountered changing adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures, 
which challenged the Department of Defense (DOD) to quickly develop 
and provide new equipment and new capabilities to address evolving 
threats. Further, U.S. troops faced shortages of critical items, 
including body armor, tires, and batteries. DOD's goal was to provide 
solutions to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible to prevent 
loss of life or mission failure. DOD had to look beyond traditional 
acquisition procedures, to expand the use of existing processes to 
meet urgent needs, and to develop new processes and entities designed 
to be as responsive as possible to urgent warfighter requests. In 
addition to requests for equipment from DOD's existing stocks, 
warfighters have requested new capabilities, such as: technology to 
counter improvised explosive devices (IED); intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology to provide increased 
situational awareness; and command and control equipment to enhance 
operations on the battlefield. 

In meeting urgent needs, it is important for DOD to efficiently use 
the department's financial resources. Our past work on weapons 
acquisition has shown that the department has often pursued more 
programs than its resources can support.[Footnote 1] Our work also has 
shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs, 
which often has led to cost growth and delayed delivery of needed 
capabilities to the warfighter. 

Over the past 5 years, DOD has sponsored several reviews of its 
abilities to rapidly respond to and field urgently needed capabilities 
in the 21st century security environment. One completed by the Defense 
Science Board in July 2009 identified more than 20 rapid-reaction 
programs and organizations addressing DOD urgent warfighter needs. 
[Footnote 2] Another study, completed by the Defense Science Board in 
September 2009, estimated that these programs spent more than $50 
billion[Footnote 3] over the period 2005 to 2009.[Footnote 4] 
Moreover, the Defense Science Board found that DOD had done little to 
adopt urgent needs as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional capability 
essential to addressing future threats, and it provided DOD with 
recommendations on potential organizational and programmatic 
consolidations in July and September 2009. 

DOD's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review cited that the department's 
institutions and processes needed reforms to better support the urgent 
needs of the warfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and 
truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and 
responsibly. In addition, in 2007 DOD established a Chief Management 
Officer position to ensure that core business operations are optimally 
aligned to support the department's warfighting mission and that 
performance goals and measures are established for improving and 
evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the 
department, among other functions. Also, in August 2010, the Secretary 
of Defense initiated a major effort to instill a culture of savings, 
and set a goal to identify $100 billion in savings over a 5-year 
period. 

Our previous work has highlighted challenges with the department's 
management and oversight of its urgent operational needs organizations 
and processes.[Footnote 5] In April 2010, we reported that DOD's 
guidance over its joint urgent needs processes was fragmented and 
outdated, and the department was unable to fully assess how well those 
processes addressed critical deficiencies or to measure the 
effectiveness of fielded solutions.[Footnote 6] Likewise, in October 
2009, we reported and testified on DOD's need to improve visibility 
and coordination of its counter-IED efforts.[Footnote 7] 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Comptroller 
General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, in light of 
continuing congressional interest in the department's ability to 
adequately fulfill urgent needs and our prior findings regarding the 
department's oversight and management of its urgent needs processes. 
[Footnote 8] In addition, Title II of Public Law Number 111-139 
requires GAO to identify government programs, agencies, offices, and 
initiatives with duplicative goals and activities and to report those 
findings to Congress.[Footnote 9] Our objectives for this review were 
to determine (1) what entities exist within DOD for responding to 
urgent operational needs and to what extent, if any, there is 
fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in their missions, roles, and 
responsibilities; (2) to what extent DOD has a comprehensive approach 
for managing and overseeing its various activities to address urgent 
needs identified by warfighters in-theater; and (3) to what extent has 
DOD comprehensively evaluated its urgent needs entities and processes 
and identified potential for consolidations. 

To determine and describe the various entities within DOD that respond 
to urgent operational needs and to what extent, if any, there is 
fragmentation, overlap, or duplication, we used a data-collection 
instrument to obtain information from DOD and military service 
entities identified in our scope regarding their role in the urgent 
needs process, including how urgent needs are submitted, validated, 
funded, and tracked, and how fielded capabilities are sustained, 
transitioned, or terminated. We also analyzed prior Defense Science 
Board reports that identified entities involved in the process, and 
interviewed DOD and military service officials to gain an 
understanding of mission, role, and responsibility as well as to gain 
insight into other entities that may have a role in the fulfillment of 
urgent needs. To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive 
approach for managing all of its various urgent needs processes, we 
analyzed strategic management guidance as well as conducted 
comparative analysis of DOD and military service policies for meeting 
urgent operational needs. We interviewed DOD and military service 
officials to gain an understanding of the department's efforts to 
satisfy urgent warfighter requirements as well as the metrics used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of urgent needs solutions. To determine the 
extent to which DOD has comprehensively evaluated its urgent needs 
entities and processes, we interviewed key officials from various DOD 
and military service entities as well as officials from selected 
combatant commands to gain an understanding of how joint urgent 
operational needs and service-based urgent needs are fulfilled. Using 
this information, together with analysis of prior reports and studies 
and the responses from our data-collection instrument, we developed 
potential consolidation options for the department to consider. We 
analyzed these options in terms of their potential capacity to gain 
increased efficiencies in the visibility, coordination, management, 
and oversight of the department's urgent needs processes as well as to 
reduce the potential for duplication, overlap, and fragmentation. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 through March 
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For 
additional details on how we performed our review, see appendix I. 

Background: 

Evolving Threats in Iraq and Afghanistan Highlighted Need for DOD to 
Fill Capability Gaps Rapidly: 

As evidenced by evolving threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, enemy forces 
have exploited capability gaps in the technology, systems, and 
equipment used by U.S. forces. Such tactics made it evident that U.S. 
warfighters were not always equipped to deal with the fast-changing 
tactics, techniques, and procedures of the enemy. For example, one of 
the most publicized of these adversarial capabilities was the use of 
IEDs. While U.S. forces responded initially by changing tactics and 
techniques by purchasing equipment locally, the department then 
determined it needed to more quickly develop and deploy new 
capabilities. Some of DOD's efforts to rapidly address counter-IED and 
other significant capability gaps include the following: 

* Counter-IED Solutions--Congress provides funding for joint urgent 
needs related to countering IEDs through the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), an organization that 
reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Congress has 
appropriated nearly $16 billion through fiscal year 2009 to JIEDDO. 
JIEDDO has funded many counter-IED solutions to support the 
warfighter, including electronic jammers to block radio-frequency 
signals that detonate IEDs. However, in our prior work, we found that 
JIEDDO lacked full visibility over all counter-IED initiatives 
throughout DOD, faced difficulties with transitioning its counter-IED 
initiatives to the military services, and lacked criteria for 
selecting which counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, which 
affect its training investment decisions. We recommended that DOD 
improve its visibility over all of DOD's counter-IED efforts, work 
with the military services to develop a complete transition plan for 
initiatives, and define criteria for funding training initiatives. 
[Footnote 10] DOD agreed with these recommendations and identified 
several actions it had taken or planned to take to address them. 

* Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Technology-- 
DOD's ISR systems--including manned and unmanned airborne, space-
borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems--play critical roles in 
supporting military operations and national security missions. 
Effective ISR data can provide early warning of enemy threats as well 
as enable U.S. military forces to increase effectiveness, 
coordination, and lethality, and demand has increased for ISR 
capabilities to support ongoing military operations. To meet this 
growing demand, DOD is making sizeable investments in ISR systems and 
related ISR capabilities.[Footnote 11] We have reported since 2005 
that DOD's ISR activities are not always well integrated and 
efficient, effectiveness may be compromised by lack of visibility into 
operational use of ISR assets, and agencies could better collaborate 
in the acquisition of new capabilities.[Footnote 12] In January 2010, 
we recommended that DOD develop overarching guidance for sharing 
intelligence information and that the military services develop plans 
with timelines that prioritize and identify the types of ISR data they 
will share.[Footnote 13] DOD agreed with these recommendations and 
noted actions it planned to take to address them. 

* Command and Control Equipment--Urgently needed assets may include, 
but are not limited to, satellite communication equipment for military 
personnel who require a method for communicating with each other in 
remote areas without established infrastructure, or distributed 
tactical communication systems for warfighters in Afghanistan because 
current handset devices do not operate adequately in the mountainous 
terrain. To meet this demand, solutions are being sought from various 
sources that include commercial off-the-shelf technology, other types 
of technology, and other sources. We have reported on the challenges 
associated with availability of such technology, including lengthy 
delays in the approval and order processes.[Footnote 14] To address 
these and other urgent needs-related challenges, we made several 
recommendations to improve DOD's ability to assess how well its 
processes are meeting critical warfighter needs, address challenges 
with training, make decisions about when to use its rapid acquisition 
authority, and make reprogramming decisions to expedite fielding of 
solutions. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and agreed 
to take several actions to address them. 

The Department's Processes to Fulfill Urgent Needs Have Evolved: 

Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved 
as a set of complex processes--within the Joint Staff, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), each of the military services, as well 
as the combatant commands--to rapidly develop, equip, and field 
solutions and critical capabilities to the warfighter. DOD's 
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the expanded use of existing 
urgent needs processes, the creation of new policies, and the 
establishment of new organizations intended to be more responsive to 
urgent warfighter requests.[Footnote 15] 

As shown in table 1 below, significant events in the expansion of 
DOD's efforts to respond to and fulfill urgent operational needs began 
in the late 1980s but increased rapidly after the onset of the Global 
War on Terrorism in late 2001. 

Table 1: Timeline of Significant Events within DOD and the Military 
Services to Fulfill Urgent Needs: 

Year: 1987; 
Event: * Operational Needs Statement process established by the Army 
to provide a way for unit commanders to identify urgent needs for new 
materiel or new capabilities; 
* Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command received 
acquisition authority specific to the command to develop, acquire, and 
fund special operations-peculiar equipment. 

Year: 1994; 
Event: 
* Rapid Response Process established by the Air Force to address 
critical capability gaps or shortfalls that could result in "loss of 
life" or prevent mission accomplishment. 

Year: 1995; 
Event: 
* Capabilities Development Directorate established by the Marine Corps 
to lead the operation of the Expeditionary Force Development System, a 
process to determine service requirements and prioritize resources. 

Year: 2002; 
Event: * Rapid Equipping Force organization established by the Army's 
Vice Chief of Staff to combine and integrate capability development 
functions that cross staff elements and major commands; 
* Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force, under the direction of 
the DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering, formed following 
the events of September 11, 2001, and later renamed the Rapid Reaction 
Technology Office; 
* Rapid Fielding Initiative established in Program Executive Office 
Soldier after forces deploying to Afghanistan were not equipped with 
proper items for theater. 

Year: 2003; 
Event: * Army Improvised Explosive Device Task Force established by 
the Army Chief of Staff to address the escalating use of IEDs. It was 
later transformed into a joint entity, called JIEDDO, under the 
authority of the Deputy Secretary of Defense; 
* National Defense Authorization Act provided that the Secretary of 
Defense prescribe procedures for rapid acquisition and deployment of 
items that are under development or commercially available and 
urgently needed to respond to significant and urgent safety 
situations.[A] 

Year: 2004; 
Event: 
* Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell established by the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to act as the DOD focal point to 
prioritize, identify solutions, facilitate funding, and work with the 
appropriate components to resolve issues that hinder rapid response of 
validated joint urgent operational needs; 
* Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar capability development began at the 
Army's Chief of Staff's direction to find a solution for the indirect 
fire threat. 

Year: 2005; 
Event: 
* DOD established the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) process to 
respond to urgent needs associated with combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror; 
* The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell used Iraqi Freedom Funds to fund 
joint urgent operational needs until 2008; 
* National Defense Authorization Act amendment gave the Secretary of 
Defense rapid acquisition authority to waive, under certain 
circumstances, any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation 
that would unnecessarily impede the rapid acquisition and deployment 
of equipment that is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability 
deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.[B] 

Year: 2006; 
Event: 
* JIEDDO established by and reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in 
support of combatant commands and their respective Joint Task Forces' 
efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence[C]; 
* Rapid Reaction Technology Office formed after the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, as the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force. 
Reporting to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, this 
shift was to focus on capabilities to counter insurgency and irregular 
warfare; 
* Army Asymmetric Warfare Office established by the Secretary of the 
Army to integrate military and civilian disciplines to rapidly 
organize, train, and equip Army formations to defeat asymmetric[D] 
threats[E]; 
- Established within the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Office, the 
Asymmetric Warfare Group is a focal point to identify asymmetric 
threats and enemy and friendly vulnerabilities. The group influences 
the Army's capability for adaptation across the entire Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, 
and Facilities spectrum[F]; 
- Established within the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Office, the 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Division, renamed the Adaptive 
Networks Threats and Solutions Division in 2008, is the Army's focal 
point for counter-IED JUONs emerging from JIEDDO; 
* Biometrics Task Force established under the Army Chief Information 
Officer G-6 to lead the development and implementation of biometrics 
technology for the combatant commands, military services, and agencies. 

Year: 2007; 
Event: 
* Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force established by 
Secretary of Defense to accelerate the development of vehicles to 
counter IEDs; 
* Urgent Needs Process established by the Navy to institute rapid 
acquisition processes to streamline the dialogue between the 
requirements and acquisition communities to expedite technical, 
programmatic, and financial solutions; 
* Navy's Rapid Development and Deployment Office established in the 
Office of Naval Research along with a Rapid Action Team process to 
execute Rapid Development and Deployment projects and provide 
technical assessment of all Navy and Marine Corps urgent needs 
requests. 

Year: 2008; 
Event: 
* Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force established by 
the Secretary of Defense to identify and overcome bottlenecks and 
barriers related to rapidly acquiring and fielding ISR capabilities; 
* Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-Combined 
system created based on combining eight joint urgent operational needs 
submitted by the Central Command. 

Year: 2009; 
Event: 
* Rapid Fielding Directorate established under the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to 
rapidly transition innovative concepts into critical capabilities that 
counter unconventional and time-sensitive threats. 

Year: 2010; 
Event: 
* Biometrics Task Force redesignated as the Biometrics Identity 
Management Agency, making it a permanent entity reporting to the 
Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7. 

Year: 2011; 
Event: 
* Section 803 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011 (the FY 2011 NDAA) amended the existing rapid 
acquisition authority. Previously, the authority could be used to 
eliminate deficiencies that resulted in combat fatalities. The amended 
section now permits the use of the authority to acquire and deploy 
certain supplies to eliminate deficiencies that result in combat 
casualties, rather than just combat fatalities. The amendment also 
increased from $100 million to $200 million the amount that can be 
used annually to acquire the supplies necessary to address such 
deficiencies[G]; 
* Section 804 of the FY 2011 NDAA, among other things, requires the 
Secretary of Defense to review the processes for the fielding of 
capabilities in response to urgent operational needs, consider 
improvements to those processes, and report to the congressional 
defense committees in January 2012[H]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 806 (2002). 

[B] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 811 (2004). 

[C] Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) (Feb. 14, 2006). 

[D] Asymmetric warfare refers to threats outside the range of 
conventional warfare, including terrorism. 

[E] According to an Army official, the Army's Asymmetric Warfare 
Office was dissolved in October 2010. 

[F] As of October 2010, an Army official stated that stated the Army 
Asymmetric Warfare Group reports directly to G-33, Army's Staff 
Directorate for Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization. 

[G] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 803 (2011). 

[H] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011). 

[End of table] 

As table 1 indicates, many of these newly established entities and 
processes were created, in part, because the department had not 
anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy tactics and 
techniques that ultimately heightened the need for a rapid response to 
new threats in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the Defense Science 
Board, while DOD, the military services, and combatant commands took 
actions to respond more quickly to demands to fulfill urgent needs, it 
became apparent that within the last half decade the department, as 
well as the acquisition community it depends on, has struggled in 
their ability to field new capabilities in a disciplined, efficient, 
and effective way.[Footnote 16] While many entities started as ad hoc 
organizations, several have been permanently established. 

Meeting Urgent Needs Involves a Breadth of Activities: 

Although each of the services' and Joint Staff's urgent needs 
processes is distinct, we identified six broad activities involved 
after the submission of an urgent need statement. These activities are 
shown in table 2 below. 

Table 2: Activities Involved in Meeting Urgent Needs: 

Key activity: Validation; 
Definition: An urgent need request is received from theater and 
reviewed for validation by a headquarters entity. Validation involves 
an "in-house" review of an urgent need request to determine if it 
meets criteria to be recognized as an urgent operational need and thus 
whether it should continue through the process. 

Key activity: Facilitation; 
Definition: The requirements, costs, potential solution, funding, and 
other factors related to the course of action to be taken for the 
fulfillment of the urgent need are developed and coordinated between 
various entities. This can include, but is not limited to, 
coordination between validation and solution-development entities, 
coordination of requirements, and knowledge sharing. 

Key activity: Sourcing; 
Definition: Approval of the proposed course of action and assignment 
of a sponsor who will carry out a course of action/potential solution. 

Key activity: Execution; 
Definition: The approved solution is developed and fielded. This 
includes the acquisition, testing, and other activities involved in 
solution development. 

Key activity: Tracking; 
Definition: Collection of feedback from the warfighter regarding 
whether the solution met the urgent need request; also collection of 
performance data regarding course of action and solution. 

Key activity: Transition, Transfer, or Terminate; 
Definition: The decision regarding the final disposition of the 
capability in terms of whether it will be (1) transitioned to a 
program of record if it addresses an enduring capability need, (2) 
transferred to an interim sponsor for temporary funding if it 
addresses a temporary capability that is not enduring but needs to be 
maintained for some period, or (3) terminated if it addresses a niche 
capability that is not enduring, nor is it to be maintained for 
current operations. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Congressional Interest in DOD's Approach to Urgent Operational Needs 
and the Need for Improvement: 

Over the past 5 years, there have been several reviews of the 
department's ability to rapidly respond and field urgently needed 
capabilities in the 21st century security environment.[Footnote 17] 
Some of these studies were initiated at the direction of Congress. In 
fiscal year 2009, the House Armed Services Committee approved the 
department's designation of a process improvement officer who was 
tasked with applying Lean Six Sigma process improvement techniques to 
the business practices of the department. The committee recommended 
that the process improvement officer examine the processes for rapid 
acquisition activities that have been established since the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan began and determine whether there were lessons 
learned that might be integrated into the department's main 
acquisition process. The department conducted the study and found (1) 
significant variability in response time at the beginning of the 
process, indicating unnecessary delays; (2) senior leadership 
involvement in the process enables rapid decision making; (3) shorter 
decision processes and focused organizations enable quicker response 
than under normal requirements; and (4) reprogramming authority is 
cumbersome and adds time to the urgent needs process. Furthermore, the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 included a 
provision that would require best practices and process improvements 
to ensure that urgent operational needs statements and joint urgent 
operational needs statements are presented to appropriate authorities 
for review and validation not later than 60 days after the documents 
are submitted.[Footnote 18] Specifically, the committee report noted 
that over the last several years, operational commanders in Iraq had 
identified urgent operational needs for MRAP vehicles, nonlethal laser 
dazzlers, and other critical equipment. Further, the committee stated 
it was aware of allegations that requests for some of these items not 
only went unmet, but were not even presented for more than a year to 
the senior officials responsible for validating the requests.[Footnote 
19] In 2009, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to commission 
a study by an independent commission or a federally funded research 
and development center to assess and report on the effectiveness of 
the processes used by DOD for the generation of urgent operational 
need requirements, and the acquisition processes used to fulfill such 
requirements.[Footnote 20] In response to this requirement, the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, asked the 
Defense Science Board to establish a task force to conduct a study on 
the effectiveness of the processes used by the department for the 
generation of urgent operational needs requirements and the 
acquisition processes used to fulfill such requirements. In July 2009, 
the Defense Science Board released its report with recommendations on 
potential consolidations necessary to rapidly field new capabilities 
for the warfighter in a systematic and effective manner. 

Moreover, Section 803 of the Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (the FY 2011 NDAA) amended the 
existing rapid acquisition authority. Previously, the authority could 
be used to eliminate deficiencies that resulted in combat fatalities. 
The amended section now permits the use of the authority to acquire 
and deploy certain supplies to eliminate deficiencies that result in 
combat casualties, rather than just combat fatalities. The amendment 
also increased from $100 million to $200 million the amount that can 
be used annually to acquire the supplies necessary to address such 
deficiencies.[Footnote 21] 

Additionally, Section 804 of the FY 2011 NDAA, among other things, 
requires the Secretary of Defense to review the processes for the 
fielding of capabilities in response to urgent operational needs, 
consider improvements to those processes, and report to the 
congressional defense committees in January 2012.[Footnote 22] 

Fulfillment of Urgent Needs Involves a Number of Entities and 
Processes, Resulting in Fragmentation and Some Overlap of Efforts: 

The fulfillment of urgent needs involves numerous joint, OSD and 
military service entities, which have increased over time. We 
identified areas where some overlap exists among urgent needs 
entities, such as the submission, validation, and processing of urgent 
needs requirements. In addition, our analysis identified multiple 
entities with a role in responding to similar types of urgently needed 
capabilities, such as ISR and counter-IED, resulting in the potential 
for duplication of efforts. 

Numerous DOD and Military Service Entities Play a Key Role in the 
Fulfillment of Urgent Needs: 

The department has many entities that respond to the large number of 
urgent needs requests submitted by the combatant commands and military 
services. As previously reported by us and DOD, a complex set of 
processes has evolved over time, involving numerous joint, OSD, and 
military service entities over the past decade as the department seeks 
to fulfill the capability gaps identified by warfighters. On the basis 
of DOD's and our analysis, we have identified at least 31 entities 
that play a significant role in the various urgent needs processes. 
Table 3 below shows the 31 entities we identified and when they were 
established. 

Table 3: DOD Entities Involved in the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs: 

Service/joint: OSD or joint; 

Name of entity: Joint Staff, J8; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]; 

Name of entity: Rapid Fielding Directorate; 
Year implemented[A]: 2009; 

Name of entity: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force; 
Year implemented[A]: 2008; 

Name of entity: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force; 
Year implemented[A]: 2007; 

Name of entity: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization; 
Year implemented[A]: 2006; 

Name of entity: Rapid Reaction Technology Office; 
Year implemented[A]: 2006; 

Name of entity: Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations; 
Year implemented[A]: 2006; 

Name of entity: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell; 
Year implemented[A]: 2004. 

Service/joint: Army; 

Name of entity: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Current and Future 
Warfighting Capabilities Division; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: Biometrics Identity Management Agency; 
Year implemented[A]: 2010; 

Name of entity: Asymmetric Warfare Group; 
Year implemented[A]: 2006; 

Name of entity: Rapid Fielding Initiative; 
Year implemented[A]: 2002; 

Name of entity: Rapid Equipping Force; 
Year implemented[A]: 2002. 

Name of entity: Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army 
Training & Doctrine Command; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Project Manager (PM) or Program Executive Offices[B] (PEO), such as 
Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
(including Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-
Combined) or the Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Service/joint: Navy; 

Name of entity: Chief of Naval Operations N81D; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: U.S. Fleet Forces Command; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: U.S. Pacific Fleet; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: Rapid Action Teams, led by a Chief of Naval Operations 
Sponsor; 
Year implemented[A]: 2007; 

Name of entity: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary 
Warfare; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: Rapid Development and Deployment Office; 
Year implemented[A]: 2006; 

Name of entity: PM or PEO[B], such as PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Service/joint: Marine Corps; 

Name of entity: Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and 
Integration, Capabilities Development Directorate; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: PM or PEO[B], such as PM Light Armored Vehicles; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Service/joint: Air Force; 

Name of entity: Air Force Air Combat Command A8XM; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: Air Force Air Mobility Command A5QX; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: Requirements Policy & Process Division, Directorate of 
Operational Capability Requirements; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: PM or PEO[B], such as Aeronautical Systems Center; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Service/joint: Special Operations Command; 

Name of entity: Special Operations Command J8; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Name of entity: Special Operations Research, Development, and 
Acquisition Center; 
Year implemented[A]: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Dates are not included for entities that were not established to 
respond to urgent operational needs. 

[B] Each military service has program offices responsible for specific 
programs or portfolios of similar programs that may include solutions 
to validated urgent need requirements. However, we have not identified 
the universe of PMs/PEOs that are or have been involved in the 
fulfillment of urgent needs. 

[End of table] 

Further analysis shows that these entities have three different 
missions with respect to fulfilling urgent needs. First, some entities 
identify and provide a quick response to threats presented by adaptive 
enemies, but not always in support of urgent needs. Often these 
entities engage in experimentation and rapid prototyping to accelerate 
the transition of technologies to the warfighter. For example, the 
Rapid Reaction Technology Office does not directly receive or validate 
joint or service urgent needs, but rather anticipates disruptive 
threats and in response funds solutions and new capabilities, some of 
which have fulfilled validated joint urgent operational needs. Second, 
some entities specifically process urgent needs and are generally 
involved from validation to sourcing. For example, the joint urgent 
operational needs process is overseen by Joint Staff J8, which 
receives and validates urgent need requests, and the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell, which facilitates a rapid solution. In the Army, 
Navy, and Marine Corps, various entities exist to validate, 
facilitate, and source urgent needs for their respective processes. 
Third, some entities focus on developing solutions in response to 
urgent needs requests that have been validated, facilitated, and 
sourced by other entities. These solution-development entities are 
mostly acquisition program offices, such as Program Executive Office 
Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition, 
which also develop solutions in response to nonurgent needs as well as 
manage existing systems. Finally, some entities are involved in two or 
more of the three types of missions described above. For example, 
JIEDDO anticipates threats, processes urgent needs requests, and 
develops solutions. 

Overlap Exists among the Numerous Entities Involved in Processing 
Urgent Requirements and Expediting Solutions: 

Our analysis shows that overlap exists among urgent needs entities in 
the roles they play as well as the capabilities for which they are 
responsible. Table 4 shows the roles played by the various 
organizations in relation to the activities involved in meeting urgent 
needs identified earlier. 

Table 4: Roles of Urgent Needs Entities in Key Activities: 

Service/Joint: OSD or Joint; 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Joint Staff, J8; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance Task Force; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(vehicle) Task Force; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Joint Improvised Explosive Device 
Defeat Organization; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Fielding Directorate; Rapid 
Reaction Technology Office; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Fielding Directorate; Joint 
Capability Technology Demonstration; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Service/Joint: Army; 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-3/5/7, 
Current and Future Warfighting Capabilities Division; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Biometrics Identity Management Agency; 
Validation: Service/Joint: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: Service/Joint: [Check]; 
Sourcing: Service/Joint: [Check]; 
Execution: Service/Joint: [Empty]; 
Tracking: Service/Joint: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: Service/Joint: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Asymmetric Warfare Group; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Fielding Initiative; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Equipping Force; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Army Capabilities Integration Center, 
U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as Night 
Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (Base 
Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-Combined) or the 
Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Service/Joint: Navy; 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Chief Naval of Operations N81D; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: U.S. Fleet Forces Command; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: U.S. Pacific Fleet; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Action Teams, led by a Chief of 
Naval Operational Sponsor; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Expeditionary Warfare; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Development and Deployment 
Office; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as PEO Littoral and 
Mine Warfare; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Service/Joint: Marine Corps; 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration, Capabilities Development Directorate; 
Validation: [A]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as PM Light Armored 
Vehicles; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Service/Joint: Air Force; 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Air Combat Command A8XM; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Air Mobility Command A5QX; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Requirements Policy & Process 
Division, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
the Air Force for Acquisition, responsible for Air Force Rapid 
Response Process; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as Aeronautical 
Systems Center; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Empty]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

Service/Joint: Special Operations Command; 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Special Operations Command J8; 
Validation: [Check]; 
Facilitation: [Check]; 
Sourcing: [Check]; 
Execution: [Empty]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check]. 

Entity involved in urgent needs: Special Operations Research, 
Development, and Acquisition Center; 
Validation: [Empty]; 
Facilitation: [Empty]; 
Sourcing: [Empty]; 
Execution: [Check]; 
Tracking: [Check]; 
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty]. 

[End of table] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] In the Marine Corps, urgent needs are validated by theater 
commanders. Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration 
further validate urgent needs after a course of action has been 
facilitated and sourced. 

DOD entities at the joint level, and each of the services, also have 
their own policies for meeting urgent needs. These policies result in 
seven different processes for the fulfillment of urgent needs; 
additionally, the Army Rapid Equipping Force also has an urgent needs 
process. For example, warfighters may submit urgent needs, depending 
on their military service and the type of need, to Joint Staff J8, 
JIEDDO, Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, Army Rapid Equipping 
Force, Navy Fleet Forces Command or Commander Pacific Fleet, Marine 
Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Air 
Force Major Commands, or Special Operations Command J8. These entities 
then validate the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to 
proceed through their specific process. This contrasts with 
traditional requirements and needs, which are generally processed 
under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS). JCIDS was established to provide the department with an 
integrated, collaborative process to identify and guide development of 
a broad set of new capabilities that address the current and emerging 
security environment. 

Moreover, within some of the services, multiple processes and 
validation points exist. For example, in the Army, urgent needs can be 
submitted via two routes: (1) the warfighter can make a request to the 
Rapid Equipping Force for approval by its Director; or (2) the 
warfighter can submit an operational needs statement, documenting the 
urgent need to the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army G-3/5/7, Current 
and Future Warfighting Capabilities Division, for validation and 
prioritization. In the Air Force, urgent needs are handled by the 
various major commands; however, Air Force headquarters also has a 
process and an entity that can process urgent needs that do not get 
fulfilled by the major commands. 

Furthermore, at the joint level, six entities facilitate urgent needs 
requests and five entities provide sourcing support for urgent needs 
requests. Officials from two combatant commands have expressed 
frustration with the number of entities involved in the processing of 
urgent needs requests and suggested that streamlining of the 
validation, facilitation, sourcing, and funding processes would 
improve the timeliness of solutions. Additionally, many entities track 
the fulfillment of urgent needs requests and their solutions; however, 
most entities with a role in tracking focus only on specific requests 
they process or solutions they developed. The overlap created by 
numerous entities involved in processing urgent requirements and 
expediting solutions may create fragmented efforts and overall 
inefficiencies within DOD. 

Multiple Entities Respond to Requests for Similar Capabilities, 
Resulting in Potential Duplication of Efforts: 

Multiple entities we surveyed reported a role in responding to similar 
categories of urgently needed capabilities. We identified eight 
entities with a role in responding to ISR capabilities, five entities 
with a role in responding to counter-IED capabilities, and six 
entities with a role in responding to communications, command and 
control, and computer technology, among others. 

Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple 
organizations have been created to handle specific types of urgently 
needed capabilities for urgent operational needs and these 
organizations also experience overlap. For example, JIEDDO initially 
was established as an Army task force and was changed to a DOD task 
force to meet urgent counter-IED needs; however, counter-IED is not 
handled exclusively by JIEDDO, and we have previously reported that 
JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED 
initiatives throughout DOD and are at risk of duplicating efforts. 
[Footnote 23] Similarly, we previously reported that many biometrics 
activities are dispersed throughout DOD at many organizational levels 
and that DOD has been focusing most of its efforts on quickly fielding 
biometrics systems, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, to address 
DOD's immediate warfighting needs without guidance to prevent 
duplication of biometrics-related efforts.[Footnote 24] In 2010, the 
Army Biometrics Task force was institutionalized as the Biometrics 
Identity Management Agency to lead DOD activities to program, 
coordinate, integrate, and synchronize biometrics technologies and 
capabilities. However, our ongoing work has identified instances of 
potential duplication.[Footnote 25] For example: 

* Both the Army and the Marine Corps continue to develop their own 
counter-IED mine rollers with full or partial JIEDDO funding. The 
Marine Corps' mine roller per unit cost is about $85,000 versus a cost 
range of $77,000 to $225,000 per unit for the Army mine roller. 
However, officials disagree about which system is most effective, and 
DOD has not conducted comparative testing and evaluation of the two 
systems. Further, JIEDDO officials said that JIEDDO cannot compel the 
services to buy one solution over the other. 

* The Navy developed a directed-energy technology to fill a critical 
theater capability gap, yet JIEDDO later underwrote the Air Force's 
development of the same technology to create a more powerful and 
faster-moving equipment item than the Navy had developed. However, the 
Air Force has now determined that its system will not meet 
requirements and has deferred fielding the technology pending further 
study. This may have a negative effect on the continued development of 
this technology by the Navy or others for use in theater. For example, 
according to DOD officials, during the recent testing of the Air 
Force's system, safety concerns were noted unique to that system that 
may limit the warfighter's willingness to accept the technology. 
However, according to Navy officials, the Navy plans to begin fielding 
its system in 2011. 

While our review did find the potential for duplication, we also found 
some cases where various entities took the initiative to work 
together, resulting in collaboration to satisfy urgent needs. For 
example, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell received eight validated 
joint urgent operational needs requirements, and facilitated the 
integration of the eight separate, but very much related, ISR and 
force-protection needs. Specifically, this coordination involved the 
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, U.S. Central Command, JIEDDO, and the 
Army to consolidate the validated requirements, find a sponsor, and 
develop a solution. Approximately 6 months from the date of funding, 
the Army PEO-Intelligence, Electronic Warfare & Sensors, specifically 
Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition, 
developed and fielded the Base Expeditionary Targeting and 
Surveillance Sensors-Combined, a flexible, movable, adjustable, 
scalable, and expeditionary base defense system for persistent ground 
targeting and surveillance. 

DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to 
Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs: 

DOD has taken several steps to improve the management and oversight of 
its urgent needs. While these efforts have shown some progress, the 
department does not have comprehensive policy and guidance for 
directing efforts across DOD, the military services, and combatant 
commands to effectively manage and oversee the fulfillment of its 
urgent needs. Moreover, the department lacks full visibility over the 
full range of urgent needs efforts from funding to measuring results 
achieved. 

DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Management and Oversight of Urgent 
Needs Requests: 

In response to our April 2010 finding that DOD's urgent needs guidance 
was fragmented, Joint Staff officials stated that they were in the 
process of revising the Joint Staff instruction on the joint urgent 
needs process to better align with the department's strategic plan for 
urgent needs.[Footnote 26] Moreover, OSD has been drafting Directive- 
Type Memorandum 10-002 to establish policy, assign responsibilities, 
and outline procedures for the resolution of joint urgent operational 
needs.[Footnote 27] The draft directive-type memorandum seeks to 
provide guidance on a range of issues, including rapid-acquisition 
authority, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell's role as the DOD focal 
point for tracking and coordinating joint urgent operational needs 
resolution, as well as clearly defining the responsibilities of those 
involved in the processing of urgent needs. A senior DOD official 
explained that after review by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, senior DOD officials decided to 
expand the draft memorandum to include the services' urgent 
operational needs--as well as joint urgent operational needs--to 
increase visibility. According to senior DOD officials, the department 
expects the memorandum to be issued in 2011. 

Furthermore, in 2009, the department established the Rapid Fielding 
Directorate within the office of the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering,[Footnote 28] Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, and reorganized the Joint Rapid Acquisition 
Cell, the Rapid Reaction Technology Office, and the Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstrations under this new office to better align 
similar missions related to accelerating capabilities to the 
warfighter.[Footnote 29] Rapid Fielding Directorate officials stated 
that one of the first imperatives is to accelerate the delivery of 
capabilities to the warfighter, emphasizing the ability to efficiently 
collaborate directly with the military services. Additionally, 
officials from the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell stated that they are 
working to address a number of challenges, including applying their 
definition of urgent need to validate requirements, prioritizing the 
urgency of needs identified by the warfighter, developing universal 
metrics to track and evaluate urgent needs, and formalizing the 
department's urgent needs processes. Finally, to address concerns of 
senior-level leadership regarding the management of its urgent needs, 
the department is planning to establish a senior-level oversight 
council in Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002. According to a senior OSD 
official, this council may include three-and four-star-level 
representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services 
to ensure that all efforts across the department are synchronized to 
rapidly acquire and field materiel solutions to urgent needs. 

DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy for Guiding All Parts of the 
Process for Addressing Warfighters' Urgent Needs Requests: 

Despite these actions, DOD does not have departmentwide guidance that 
provides a common departmentwide approach for how all urgent needs are 
to be addressed. Guidance for issues that affect all the defense 
components originates at the DOD level, typically either through a 
directive or instruction. A directive is a broad policy document that 
assigns responsibility and delegates authority to the DOD components. 
Directives establish policy that applies across all the services, 
combatant commands, and DOD components. An instruction implements the 
policy, or prescribes the manner for carrying out the policy, for 
operating a program or activity, and for assigning responsibilities. 
According to federal best practices reported in GAO's Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 30] management is 
responsible for developing detailed policies, procedures, and 
practices to help program managers achieve desired results through 
effective stewardship of public resources. However, DOD has not issued 
any such directives or instructions that provide policy and guidance 
over all of its urgent needs processes. DOD is in the process of 
developing guidance concerning its urgent needs processes through the 
Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002. However, it remains in draft form, 
so it is not clear to what extent this guidance will establish such a 
common approach for service and other urgent needs processes. 
Additionally, our analysis found that DOD has a fragmented approach in 
managing all of its urgent needs submissions and validated 
requirements. For example, the Joint Staff, JIEDDO, the military 
services, and the Special Operations Command have issued their own 
guidance outlining activities involved in processing and meeting their 
specific urgent needs. Through comparative analysis of policies issued 
by the Joint Staff, each military service, JIEDDO, and the Special 
Operations Command for managing the various urgent needs processes, we 
identified that the policies often varied. Moreover, we found that 
Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies do not define roles and 
responsibilities for some activities involved, as shown in table 5. 

Table 5: Activities Included in Urgent Needs Policies and Guidance: 

Organization: Joint Staff; 
Policy: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, 
July 15, 2005; 
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Not Validated[A]: Activity not included in the policy/guidance; 
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Execution: Activity not included in the policy/guidance; 
Tracking: Activity not included in the policy/guidance; 
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity not included in the 
policy/guidance. 

Organization: Army; 
Policy: Army Regulation 71-9, December 28, 2009; 
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the 
policy/guidance. 

Organization: Navy; 
Policy: Joint Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research Development and Acquisition), July 19, 2007; Secretary of 
the Navy Notice 5000, March 12, 2009[B]; 
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Tracking: Activity not included in the policy/guidance; 
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity not included in the 
policy/guidance. 

Organization: Marine Corps; 
Policy: Marine Corps Order 3900.17, October 17, 2008; 
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the 
policy/guidance. 

Organization: Air Force; 
Policy: Air Force Instruction 63-114, June 12, 2008; Air Force 
Instruction 10-601, July 12, 2010; 
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity not included in the 
policy/guidance. 

Organization: JIEDDO; 
Policy: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
Instruction 5000.01, November 6, 2009; 
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the 
policy/guidance. 

Organization: Special Operations Command; 
Policy: Special Operations Command Directive 71-4, June 9, 2009; 
Special Operations Command Directive 70-1, March 19, 2010; 
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance; 
Tracking: Activity not included in the policy/guidance; 
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the 
policy/guidance. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: The data are from urgent needs policy and guidance. 

[A] The "not validated" activity within the urgent needs process 
refers to what occurs when an urgent need is not approved. 

[B] The Secretary of the Navy Notice 5000 is an additional piece of 
guidance that clarifies and supplements the Joint Memorandum that 
describes the Navy urgent needs process. 

[End of table] 

As indicated in table 5, some policies include each of the activities 
involved in the processing and fulfillment of urgent needs. However, 
Special Operations Command, Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies 
do not include guidance on all the activities included in the process. 
For example, we determined the following: 

* Joint Staff policy did not address how to provide feedback on urgent 
needs that are not validated. Officials from one combatant command 
expressed frustration that they received no feedback as to why joint 
urgent operational needs they submitted were not validated and lacked 
adequate insight to understand the decision process. However, other 
policies addressed this issue. For example, Navy guidance stated that 
urgent needs that were not validated would be returned to the 
requester with rationale as to why or with recommendations on how to 
revise the request, or both.[Footnote 31] 

* The Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies did not define roles 
and responsibilities involved in the decision to transition, transfer, 
or terminate the capability solution provided. Furthermore, Special 
Operations Command, Joint Staff, and Navy policies did not address how 
validated requirements would be tracked as a capability solution was 
being developed. 

* Also, DOD's urgent needs policies varied for transitioning or 
transferring capabilities. For example: 

- It is JIEDDO's policy to decide within 2 years whether to transition 
or transfer the capability over to a service or agency or to terminate 
it.[Footnote 32] 

- The Special Operations Command determines at the 1-year mark whether 
the capability is still needed in-theater, and if so, defines out-year 
funding requirements and how the funding will be obtained. 

- While the Army has a process in place for transitioning urgent 
needs, it is applicable only to those urgent needs that are nominated 
to go through the Army's Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition 
process. However, this process identifies and approves only certain 
capabilities that have been nominated for sustainment, rather than 
tracking all capabilities fielded for the Army's urgent needs. 
[Footnote 33] 

During our review, numerous officials stated the need for overarching, 
uniform guidance to all entities involved in urgent needs processes. 
Senior officials we spoke with stated that the department needs to 
provide more comprehensive management and oversight over all of its 
urgent needs. Additionally, combatant command, Joint Staff, and 
service officials stated a need for policies to be explicit regarding 
the necessary activities that must be addressed within the urgent 
needs process. For example, officials at one combatant command stated 
that when submitting an urgent need through the joint urgent 
operational needs process, they lacked insight into the validation 
process and metrics used by the Joint Staff, as well as guidance on 
how joint urgent operational needs are evaluated across the combatant 
commands. An official at a different combatant command emphasized the 
importance of defining which requests truly qualify as an urgent need, 
and noted that the Joint Staff's requirements process lacks a method 
to verify that requirements are properly defined. Moreover, Joint 
Staff officials discussed the importance of defining a joint urgent 
operational need, as well as criteria for what qualifies as an urgent 
need in their guidance that is currently undergoing revisions. 
[Footnote 34] Army officials noted that inconsistency exists regarding 
rapid acquisition guidance between the Joint Staff, Army, and Air 
Force policies. And finally, Air Force officials stated that urgent 
needs policy should include guidance on which steps within the 
acquisition process should and can be waived, deferred, or tailored in 
order to rapidly acquire capabilities, which would allow acquisition 
personnel to more quickly address urgent needs. Because DOD does not 
have baseline DOD-wide guidance that applies to urgent operational 
needs processes across the department clearly defining the roles and 
responsibilities of how urgent needs should be assessed, processed, 
and managed--including activities such as tracking the status of a 
validated requirement--the department continues to maintain a 
fragmented approach to managing its urgent needs processes. As a 
result, the department risks inefficiently responding to urgent needs 
and potentially duplicating efforts. 

DOD Lacks Full Visibility over Urgent Needs Efforts, Challenging DOD's 
Ability to Manage and Oversee Its Processes: 

DOD lacks full visibility over the full range of urgent needs efforts--
from funding to measuring results. This includes the lack of a single 
senior-level focal point to help bring cohesion to DOD's urgent needs 
processes. It also includes the lack of a system and metrics to 
facilitate coordinating, monitoring, and tracking progress and 
measuring results. 

Funding Estimated at More Than $76 Billion over 6 Years: 

The department lacks full visibility to readily identify the total 
cost of its urgent needs efforts. However, we obtained data from the 
majority of entities in our analysis on how much funding was made 
available to them for the fulfillment of urgent needs. On the basis of 
the data submitted to us in response to our data-collection 
instrument, the total funding for the fulfillment of urgent needs is 
at least $76.9 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.[Footnote 
35] As indicated in figure 1 below, funding is spread unevenly among 
many urgent needs entities because the entities have different roles 
in the fulfillment of urgent needs. In addition, some entities like 
JIEDDO and the Rapid Reaction Technology Office have access to special 
funds[Footnote 36] for the fulfillment of urgent needs, while others 
rely on different sources such as funding through the annual budget 
process or the reprogramming or transfer of funds from other DOD 
programs and activities. 

Figure 1: Estimated Funding for the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational 
Needs of Entities Identified by GAO, Fiscal Year 2005 through Fiscal 
Year 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and associated horizontal bar graph] 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force: $40.441 billion 
(53%); 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: $19.450 billion 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force: $6.251 billion 
(9%); 
Other: $10,757 billion (13%); including: 
Rapid Fielding Initiative: $4.502 billion. 
Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate: $2.476 billion; 
Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-Combined: $1.428 
billion; 
Rapid Equipping Force: $1.090 billion; 
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell: $475 million; 
Rapid Reaction Technology Office: $442 million; 
Rapid Action Teams: $218 million; 
Biometrics Identity Management Agency: $52 million; 
Rapid Development and Deployment Office: $41 million; 
Rapid Response Process: $33 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Of the $76.9 billion in urgent needs funds represented in figure 1, 
$67.1 billion or 87.2 percent has been assigned to OSD entities, $9.5 
billion or 12.4 percent to Army entities, $259 million or less than 1 
percent to Navy entities, and $33.0 million or less than 1 tenth of 1 
percent to Air Force entities. The amounts reported in figure 1 may 
underestimate the actual total amounts expended on urgent needs for 
the given years because the list of entities is not exhaustive. 
Further, the data are self-reported and not all entities we identified 
provided funding data.[Footnote 37] Without full visibility of its 
urgent needs efforts and costs, the department is not fully able to 
identify key improvements and is inhibited in its ability to build 
agile, adaptive, and innovative structures capable of quickly 
identifying emerging gaps and adjusting program and budgetary 
priorities to rapidly equip and field capabilities that will mitigate 
those gaps. 

Disparate Tracking Systems Limit DOD's Visibility over Its Urgent 
Needs Process and Can Hamper Improvement Efforts: 

DOD cannot readily identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts 
as well as the cost of such efforts because it has limited visibility 
over all urgent needs submitted by warfighters--both from joint and 
service-specific sources. DOD and service officials cited two 
impediments to full visibility: the lack of a comprehensive tracking 
system to manage and oversee all urgent needs identified by the 
warfighter and a lack of clearly defined roles. Specifically, DOD and 
the services have disparate ways of tracking urgent needs; some have 
formal databases to input information while others use more informal 
methods such as e-mailing to solicit feedback. For example, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and each of the military services utilize electronic 
databases to track capability solutions as they move through the 
urgent needs process. However, more than a third of the entities 
involved in the process did not collect or provide the necessary 
information for the joint or service-based systems to track those 
solutions. Rather, there was confusion over whose role it was to 
collect and input data into these tracking systems. For example, one 
program office that develops urgent needs solutions uses a metric of 
operational readiness levels to track the effectiveness of its 
solutions. However, the program office does not provide these data to 
the joint or services' electronic databases. Rather, program office 
officials stated they believed it was the responsibility of the 
combatant command, Joint Staff, or service offices that maintain the 
databases to maintain this information. However, officials from the 
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which maintains the joint database, 
stated they obtain data from the other individual databases based on 
what the DOD components input. 

DOD and military service officials stated the need for improvements to 
tracking urgent needs. For example, some senior DOD officials stated 
that they would like senior acquisition executives and other oversight 
officials to review every 4 to 6 weeks how joint and service urgent 
needs are progressing. Combatant command officials stated that while 
they have visibility into the database for tracking joint urgent 
operational needs, they do not have the same visibility into the 
services' databases. Specifically, officials at one combatant command, 
who stated they have zero visibility into the urgent needs being 
addressed by the services, cited the value in having a global database 
of all service and joint urgent needs as they develop and transition, 
transfer, or terminate fielded solutions. Additionally, Army officials 
recognized the need for improved visibility. Specifically the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army issued a memorandum in April 2010 to 
develop a rapid acquisition/rapid equipping common operating picture 
and collaboration tool as a means to increase efficiency and 
transparency of Army urgent need processes. Stakeholders include 
various Army entities as well as numerous other entities involved in 
the process. Without full visibility into all of its urgent needs, the 
department, military services, and combatant commands risk the 
potential for overlap or duplication in developing capabilities to 
respond to urgent needs. This reinforces the need for a single focal 
point at a sufficiently high level to bring greater cohesion to these 
disparate efforts. 

According to DOD officials, the need for improved oversight was an 
important factor in the decision to revise the Directive-Type 
Memorandum 10-002. Furthermore, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell officials 
stated the draft Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002 would require DOD 
components to provide visibility to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
of urgent needs managed through the DOD entities' processes. 

DOD Has Not Established a Universal Set of Metrics for Evaluating the 
Effectiveness and Tracking the Status of Solutions Provided to the 
Warfighter: 

Our analysis found that the feedback mechanisms across DOD, the Joint 
Staff, the military services, JIEDDO, and the Special Operations 
Command are varied and fragmented. In April 2010, we recommended that 
DOD develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel for 
the military services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell on how well fielded solutions met 
urgent needs. The department concurred with the recommendation and 
stated that it would develop new DOD policy and that the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff would update the Chairman's instruction to establish 
requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment of urgent 
needs. The majority of DOD urgent needs entities we surveyed reported 
that they do not collect all the data needed to determine how well 
these solutions are performing. For example, one entity reported that 
information on whether a deployed solution was successful is largely 
anecdotal and there is no uniformity in the way such data are 
collected and reported. Additionally, while the Air Force uses its 
requirements database to track the progress of systems or solutions 
under development, it has not formalized metrics to assess the 
performance of deployed systems or solutions, or for reporting such 
performance to senior leadership. 

In April 2010, we also recommended that DOD develop and implement 
standards for accurately tracking and documenting key process 
milestones such as funding, acquisition, fielding, and assessment, and 
for updating data management systems to create activity reports to 
facilitate management review and external oversight of the process. 
DOD agreed with these recommendations and noted actions it planned to 
take to address them. However, our analysis found that the department 
lacked a method or metric to track the status of a validated urgent 
requirement across the services and DOD components, such as whether a 
requirement currently in development could be applicable to another 
service. Specifically, officials from one combatant command stated 
that they do not have visibility into the urgent needs being addressed 
at the service level, which could be beneficial to have so that the 
combatant command would have awareness of capabilities being developed 
and could communicate with that particular service if the combatant 
command saw it as a solution to an urgent need. In addition, officials 
within the Joint Staff recognize the importance of establishing 
tracking in an urgent needs system and plan to include language in 
revisions to their policy on joint urgent operational needs. With the 
establishment of a metric or mechanism to track the status of a 
validated requirement, the department would gain improved awareness of 
urgent needs as they move through the process. 

DOD Lacks a Focal Point Responsible for Managing, Overseeing, and 
Maintaining Full Visibility over All the Department's Urgent Needs 
Efforts: 

DOD's lack of visibility over all urgent needs requests is due in part 
to the lack of a senior-level focal point (i.e., gatekeeper) that has 
the responsibility to manage, oversee, and have full visibility to 
track and monitor all emerging capability gaps being identified by 
warfighters in-theater. At present, the department has not established 
a senior-level focal point to (1) lead the department's efforts to 
fulfill validated urgent needs requirements, (2) develop and implement 
DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent needs or rapid 
acquisition, or (3) maintain full visibility over its urgent needs 
efforts and the costs of those efforts. We have previously testified 
and reported on the benefits of establishing a single point of focus 
at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various DOD 
efforts to address concerns, such as with counterterrorism and the 
transformation of military capabilities.[Footnote 38] Moreover, the 
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review seeks to further reform the 
department's institutions and processes to support the urgent needs of 
the warfighter, buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly 
needed, and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and 
responsibly. Similarly, the Secretary of Defense initiated major 
efforts in August 2010 to significantly reduce excess costs and apply 
savings achieved by reducing duplication and overhead, and set a goal 
to find $100 billion in savings over a 5-year period. Without 
establishment of a senior-level focal point, DOD officials may be 
unable to identify areas for improvement, including consolidation, to 
prioritize validated but unfunded requirements, to identify funding 
challenges and a means to address such challenges, or ensure 
collaboration to modify capabilities in development to meet several 
similar urgent needs requirements--and may be unable to reduce any 
overlap or duplication that may exist as solutions are developed or 
modified. 

Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and 
Entities: 

In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and 
overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a 
comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to 
identify opportunities for consolidation. Given the overlap and 
potential for duplication we identified in this review, coupled with 
similar concerns raised by other studies, there may be opportunities 
for DOD to further improve its urgent needs processes through 
consolidation. On the basis of our discussions with DOD officials as 
well as our analysis of prior reports and studies and the responses 
from our data-collection instrument, we identified several options 
that the department might consider in an effort to evaluate the merits 
of consolidating its urgent needs processes and entities. 

DOD Has Not Comprehensively Evaluated Opportunities for Consolidation 
across the Department: 

Despite various reports by the Defense Science Board, GAO, and others--
that raised concerns about the numbers and roles of the various 
entities and processes involved and the potential of overlap and 
duplication--DOD has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for 
consolidation across the department. For example, the Defense Science 
Board Task Force found that DOD has done little to adopt urgent needs 
as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional capability essential to 
addressing future threats, and it twice provided recommendations to 
the department about potential consolidations. Specifically, in July 
2009, the task force identified a number of critical actions to 
address the situation, including a dual acquisition path that 
separates "rapid" and "deliberate" acquisitions as well as the 
establishment of a new agency to implement this separation, called the 
Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency. Further, the Task Force stated 
that this new agency should (1) be focused on acquiring new solutions 
to joint urgent operational needs; (2) work with the combatant 
commands to anticipate future needs; and (3) oversee and coordinate 
tracking of all urgent need statements in conjunction with the 
services and the service components. Contrary to these 
recommendations, some DOD officials whom we interviewed across the 
department expressed their concern with the creation of a new agency 
since the Secretary of Defense publicly questioned why it was 
"necessary to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get the 
capabilities needed to protect U.S. troops and fight ongoing wars." 
[Footnote 39] 

According to senior OSD officials, the department has conducted 
studies, including a Lean Six Sigma study, to determine lessons 
learned from several independent urgent needs processes that might be 
integrated into the department's main acquisition process. Briefings 
have been presented to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, making the business case to standardize the 
department's urgent needs processes, improve support to the 
warfighter, and achieve greater collaboration across the department. 
However, DOD has not developed or implemented any courses of action to 
address the findings of these studies. Many DOD and military service 
officials stated that higher-level senior leadership needs to take 
decisive action to improve and formalize its urgent needs processes, 
thus reducing unnecessary duplication in staff, IT, support, and 
funding. Until the department comprehensively evaluates its strategic 
direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for 
consolidation across the department as well as opportunities for 
improved coordination, or other actions to achieve savings or 
increased efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs. 

DOD Directive 5105.02 directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense to serve 
as the Chief Management Officer of the department with the 
responsibility and function, among others, to establish performance 
goals and measures for improving and evaluating overall economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness and monitor and measure the progress of 
the department.[Footnote 40] Moreover, the department's Strategic 
Management Plan outlines the five top-level business priorities of 
DOD, including "Reform the DoD Acquisition and Support Processes" as 
its third business priority.[Footnote 41] A goal of this priority is 
to focus research and development to address warfighting requirements 
in an effort to speed technology transitions focused on warfighting 
needs. Furthermore, GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment 
Guide establishes that a comprehensive analysis of alternative 
processes should include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis 
of benefits and costs for each alternative.[Footnote 42] Our prior 
work on business process reengineering has demonstrated the importance 
of exploring available options, including the potential of each option 
to achieve the desired goals as well as to determine the benefits, 
costs, and risks of each.[Footnote 43] 

Other Options Aimed at Consolidation and Increased Efficiencies: 

Given the overlap and potential for duplication we identified in this 
review, coupled with similar concerns raised by other studies, we 
identified and analyzed a number of options aimed at potential 
consolidations in an effort to provide ideas for the department to 
consider in streamlining its urgent needs entities and processes. The 
options are presented in table 6 below. Using information and 
documentation provided by DOD officials, prior reports and studies, 
and the responses from our data-collection instrument, we analyzed 
each option in terms of its potential capacity to (1) reduce overlap 
or duplication or both, if any, in the mission, roles, and key 
activities; (2) reduce fragmentation and potential gaps in the 
processes; (3) increase coordination and visibility; and (4) increase 
efficiencies. We also assessed the advantages and disadvantages of 
each option. Additionally, while title 10, U.S. Code, provides that 
the military services are responsible for equipping and training their 
own forces, DOD officials indicated that title 10 would not preclude 
consolidating or otherwise streamlining the processing of urgent 
operational needs to maximize efficiency and response to the 
warfighter. 

Table 6: Identified Potential Options for Consolidating the 
Department's Urgent Needs Processes, with Advantages and Disadvantages: 

Option 1: Consolidate into one OSD-level entity all the urgent needs 
processes of the services and DOD, while keeping the development of 
solutions at the services' program offices. This option would 
consolidate eight urgent needs processes into a single process at the 
OSD level. The option addresses consolidation of processing 
activities, such as the submission from the warfighters, validating 
the requirement as urgently needed, sourcing, facilitating the 
solution development or modification, and tracking the fielded 
solution. However, the option recognizes the need for the solution 
development to remain at the service-level program offices. 
Advantages: 
* the process for the warfighter could be simplified if there were no 
multiple policies, procedures, points of contact, and bureaucracies 
involved in fulfilling their urgent needs; 
* a single validation point may provide an additional opportunity to 
prioritize urgent needs; 
* may expand visibility over all urgent needs, including (1) the types 
of capabilities being requested; (2) the types of solutions being 
developed; (3) the tracking of solutions; 
Disadvantages: 
* may eliminate potentially duplicative work on solutions; 
* may improve efficiency through consolidation of staff and 
infrastructure; 

Option 2: Consolidate entities that have overlapping mission or 
capability portfolios regarding urgent needs solutions. Rather than 
consolidate entire entities, DOD may find it beneficial to consolidate 
elements of entities that overlap in function. For example, DOD could 
consolidate all entities involved in the development of urgent needs 
solutions for biometrics. Additionally, for example, JIEDDO has a 
training element that may overlap with the services’ own training 
missions.
Advantages: 
* may improve efficiency and effectiveness of revised entities; 
* research and development may benefit from consolidating subject-
matter expertise; 
* may eliminate potentially duplicative work on solutions; 
Disadvantages: 
* may remove expertise needed by entities to conduct missions 
unrelated to the urgent needs process; 
* may stifle innovation that occurs through varying approaches to 
solving capability gaps. 

Option 3: Establish a gatekeeper within each service to oversee all 
key activities to fulfill a validated urgent need requirement. Some 
phases of the process are fragmented—without clear ownership—and 
overseen by multiple entities. For example, Navy guidance that 
designates the Chief of Naval Operations to serve as the Navy Urgent 
Needs Gatekeeper does not task the Chief of Naval Operations with 
responsibility to ensure the tracking of urgent needs or the oversight 
of the transition, termination, or transfer process. 
Advantages: 
* centralized oversight may aid in minimizing fragmentation, overlap, 
and duplication within each process; 
* urgent needs processes could be managed holistically rather than 
sequentially; 
* may increase coordination, visibility, and accountability within 
services’ processes; 
Disadvantages: 
* an additional layer of oversight may slow down the urgent needs 
processes; 
* flexibility and agility in addressing urgent needs may be impeded; 
* would still have several urgent needs processes within DOD that 
would require coordination. 

Option 4: Consolidate within each service any overlapping activities 
in the urgent needs process. The services’ activities include the 
submission of an urgent needs request, its validation, execution, 
tracking, transition, termination—and the transfer of any solution. 
For example, the Army could consolidate overlapping activities, such 
as its multiple entry and validation points, and the Air Force could 
centralize its urgent needs processes that are in place at each major 
command. 
Advantages: 
* may allow full transparency of each service's process; 
* may improve efficiency through consolidation of staff and 
infrastructure; 
* may eliminate potentially duplicative work on solutions; 
Disadvantages: 
* may inhibit any flexibility in addressing urgent needs and reduce 
any agility that may allow existing urgent needs entities to respond 
to warfighters innovatively and rapidly; 
* may eliminate subject-matter expertise within existing entities; 
* would still have several processes across the department. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

The options we identified are not meant to be exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive. Rather, DOD would need to perform its own analysis, 
carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it 
identifies to determine the optimal course of action. Additionally, it 
must be recognized that many entities involved in the fulfillment of 
urgent needs have other roles as well. For example, while the 
Biometrics Information Management Agency may respond directly to an 
urgent need, it also has the mission to lead the department's 
activities to program, integrate, and synchronize biometric 
technologies and capabilities. Furthermore, several DOD officials also 
pointed out that although efficiency is important, the speed of 
development and effectiveness of solutions are generally a higher 
priority for urgent needs. 

In sharing our analysis of options with DOD and military service 
officials, they agreed that such an analysis considering all the 
advantages and disadvantages of consolidation is a necessary step to 
improving the department's fulfillment of urgent needs. Given the 
increasing number of urgent needs and the escalating fiscal 
challenges, it is critical for DOD to reevaluate the current status of 
how it fulfills its urgent needs and whether there is potential to 
reduce duplication, fragmentation, and overlap to achieve increased 
efficiencies or cost savings, or both. Without a comprehensive 
evaluation of its urgent needs entities and processes, DOD will not be 
in a position to know if it is fulfilling urgent needs in the most 
efficient and effective manner as well as accomplishing its strategic 
management objectives. 

Conclusions: 

DOD has issued guidance that addresses several aspects of the process 
for warfighter needs, but the entities aiding warfighters' needs do 
not have DOD-wide guidance in such areas as clearly defining roles and 
responsibilities and minimum requirements for processing requests. 
Additionally, DOD and military service officials have limited 
awareness of all urgent needs--including how well those needs are 
being met--which can hamper their ability to effectively manage and 
identify areas where overlap and duplication exist, in accordance with 
the department's strategic and long-term goals. Yet DOD does not have 
a focal point to provide visibility into the totality of these urgent 
needs activities. Without DOD-wide guidance on the department's urgent 
needs processes and a focal point to lead its overall efforts on 
urgent operational needs and to act as an advocate within the 
department for issues related to the department's ability to rapidly 
respond to urgent needs, DOD is likely to continue to risk 
duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which contributes to 
inefficiency and loss of potential financial savings. Additionally, 
without full visibility and the establishment of a metric or mechanism 
to track the status of a validated requirement, including its 
transition, the department may not be able to identify key 
improvements. Moreover, without a formal feedback mechanism or channel 
for the military services to provide feedback, the department is 
likely to be unaware of how well fielded solutions are performing. 
Finally, we acknowledge that rapid response to urgent needs has a high 
priority, but on the basis of our analyses we believe there are still 
opportunities to achieve efficiencies without sacrificing response to 
the warfighter. Without one DOD office--such as the Chief Management 
Officer--taking a leadership role to analyze options for consolidating 
urgent needs processes and entities, there are both real and potential 
risks of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in the efforts, as 
well as the risk that DOD may not address urgent warfighter needs in 
the most efficient and cost-effective manner. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, management, and 
oversight of the department's fulfillment of urgent operational needs, 
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 
actions: 

* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics to develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all 
urgent needs processes that: 

- establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of urgent 
operational needs; 

- clearly defines common terms as well as the roles, responsibilities, 
and authorities of the OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, 
and military services for all phases of the urgent needs process, 
including, but not limited to, generation, validation, funding, 
execution, tracking, and management of the transition, termination, or 
transfer process and that incorporates all available expedited 
acquisition procedures; 

- designates a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (such as the Rapid 
Fielding Directorate, or other entity as deemed appropriate) with the 
appropriate authority and resources, dedicated to leading the 
department's urgent needs efforts, including, but not limited to: (1) 
acting as an advocate within the department for issues related to 
DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (2) improving 
visibility across all urgent needs entities and processes; and (3) 
ensuring tools and mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and manage 
the status of urgent needs, from validation through the transition, 
including a formal feedback mechanism or channel for military services 
to provide feedback on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs; 
and: 

- directs the DOD Components to establish minimum processes and 
requirements for each of the above phases of the process. 

* Direct DOD's Chief Management Officer to evaluate potential options 
for consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation, 
and take appropriate action. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred 
with all five of our recommendations. However, DOD stated that 
specific actions it will take to address these recommendations will be 
identified in a report on its urgent needs processes required by the 
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 
and due to Congress in January 2012.[Footnote 44] This act requires 
DOD to review its processes for the fielding of capabilities in 
response to urgent operational needs and consider such improvements as 
providing a streamlined and expedited approach, clearly defining the 
roles and responsibilities for carrying out all phases of the process, 
and establishing a formal feedback mechanism. 

Although DOD noted in its comments that actions to be taken would be 
identified in its subsequent congressionally mandated report, it did 
provide some actions it planned to take. For example, DOD agreed to 
issue guidance to address our recommendations that DOD develop and 
promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent needs processes that 
establishes a baseline policy and directs DOD components to establish 
minimum processes and requirements across the urgent needs process. 
DOD stated this policy will permit DOD components to operate their own 
processes, but would maintain a sufficient baseline commonality to 
maintain DOD oversight. We agree that nothing in our recommendations 
preclude the DOD components from maintaining their own urgent needs 
processes, but as we reported, these processes should be part of a 
comprehensive DOD-wide approach for how all urgent needs should be 
addressed. 

Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DOD develop 
guidance that identifies a focal point to lead the department's urgent 
needs efforts, DOD stated that the Director of the JRAC would act in 
this capacity pending the outcome of the congressionally mandated 
study. We agree that this would be a good step towards addressing our 
recommendation until DOD completes its review. Finally, in concurring 
with our recommendation that DOD evaluate potential options for 
consolidation, DOD stated that the Deputy Chief Management Officer and 
the military services' Chief Management Officers would provide 
oversight and assistance in DOD's review of the end-to-end process 
with regard to utilizing process improvement techniques and tools. 
Providing this DOD review specifically includes an evaluation of 
potential consolidation options, we agree that it would address our 
recommendation. Technical comments were provided separately and 
incorporated as appropriate. The department's written comments are 
reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will be available 
at no charge on GAO's website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or by e-mail at SolisW@gao.gov. Contact 
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
have made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix 
III. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign 
Operations: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine what entities exist within the Department of Defense 
(DOD) for responding to urgent operational needs and to what extent, 
if any, there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in their 
missions, roles, and responsibilities, we reviewed the Defense Science 
Board Task Force report and used it as our starting point to identify 
the joint and service entities involved in the fulfillment of urgent 
operational needs.[Footnote 45] We interviewed officials from the 
Defense Science Board Task Force to gain an understanding of their 
methodology, their findings, and their recommendations. We developed a 
46-question data-collection instrument to collect information from the 
urgent needs entities identified by the Defense Science Board report 
to determine the entities' roles and the extent of their involvement 
in the various activities of the urgent needs processes. For example, 
for each entity, we collected general information on the mission, 
role, and responsibility, organizational structure, and impetus for 
creation; the roles and processes the entity employs with respect to 
urgent needs; and specifically how the entity is involved in the 
vetting, funding, tracking, and transitioning of urgent needs. Prior 
to fielding the data-collection instrument, we tested it with two 
entities and adjusted the questions and layout based on the feedback 
we received. Moreover, in an effort to identify any additional urgent 
needs entities not captured by the Defense Science Board Task Force or 
by us in our background research, we employed a "snowball" sampling 
technique, whereby we included our list of urgent needs entities and 
asked each entity (1) if it was aware of any others that are involved 
in the response and fulfillment of urgent operational needs and (2) if 
it interfaces with any other organizations or programs with regards to 
managing the urgent operational needs process. We then contacted those 
entities that the respondents had identified to better understand the 
population of urgent needs related entities. After analyzing data 
provided as well as interviews with DOD, military service, selected 
combatant command, and entity officials, we judgmentally selected the 
entities included in our analysis to exclude entities that did not 
meet our definition of an urgent needs organization. For example, we 
did not include the department's Commander's Emergency Response 
Program after reviewing its mission and purpose. After the urgent 
needs entities responded to the data-collection instruments, we 
created a database and analyzed the variables to gain an understanding 
of the mission, roles, and responsibilities, as well as the 
organizational structure, and impetus for creation of the entity, and 
the roles and processes the entity employs with respect to urgent 
needs. On the basis of this data as well as our analyses of DOD's 
urgent needs policies and guidance, the Defense Science Board Task 
Force report, and other relevant documents, we identified six broad 
urgent needs activities involved after the submission of an urgent 
needs statement: validation, facilitation, sourcing, execution, 
tracking, and transition, transfer, or termination. We then analyzed 
the data obtained through the data-collection instrument and other 
documentation to identify the prevalence of fragmentation, overlap, or 
duplication in response to urgent needs between and among the entities 
and within DOD more generally. In order to present the cost analysis 
for each urgent needs entity in consistent terms, all cost data in 
this report are in fiscal year 2010 dollars. We converted cost 
information to fiscal year 2010 dollars using conversion factors from 
the DOD Comptroller's National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal 
Year 2010. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for 
managing and overseeing its various activities to address urgent needs 
identified by warfighters in-theater, we reviewed key documents 
including the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD's Strategic Management 
Plan, prior National Defense Authorization Acts, and other public 
laws. We examined these documents to gain an understanding of the 
department's strategic goals as well as to examine any potential 
effects each had on the department's rapid acquisition and urgent 
needs processes. We analyzed joint and military service policies 
pertaining to the fulfillment of urgent operational needs, including 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01; Army 
Regulation 71-9; Air Force Instructions 63-114 and 10-601; Secretary 
of the Navy Instruction 5000.2C and Secretary of the Navy Notice 5000; 
Marine Corps Order 3900.17; DOD Joint Improvised Explosive Device 
Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01; and U.S. Special Operations 
Command Directives 70-1 and 71-4, to gain an understanding of roles 
and responsibilities involved in fulfilling urgent needs, what 
constitutes an urgent need, and to assess whether the department has 
comprehensive departmentwide policy for establishing a baseline on how 
urgent needs are to be addressed, including key aspects of the process 
such as generation, validation, or tracking. Likewise, we analyzed 
forthcoming DOD policies, including the department's Directive-Type 
Memorandum 10-002, which seeks to establish policy, assign 
responsibilities, and outline procedures for the resolution of joint 
urgent operational needs. We conducted comparative analysis of the 
policies to identify the differences between the varying policies to 
identify the extent of any fragmentation. We interviewed relevant DOD 
officials, including senior defense officials within the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
including the Rapid Fielding Directorate, and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to gain 
an understanding of the totality of the department's efforts to 
satisfy urgent warfighter requirements as well as on the metrics used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the capability solutions developed to 
address urgent needs. Likewise, we interviewed officials from the 
Joint Staff, selected combatant commands, and each military service, 
including acquisition and Program Management/Program Executive 
Officials to further our understanding of how urgent needs are 
fulfilled; how the processes are managed and overseen; and what 
improvements, if any, are warranted. In addition, we interviewed 
officials at each entity we identified to gain an understanding of 
their mission, role, and responsibilities, how data on their joint or 
service-specific fulfillment of urgent needs is tracked and reported 
to senior level officials, and what improvements, if any, are 
warranted. 

To determine the extent to which DOD comprehensively evaluated its 
urgent needs entities and processes and identified potential for 
consolidations, we contacted senior defense officials within the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation, selected combatant commands, and the military 
services to identify and obtain any studies, reports, or analysis 
conducted by the department on its fulfillment of urgent needs. Using 
this information, together with analysis of prior reports and studies 
and the responses from our data-collection instrument, we developed 
several options that DOD may wish to consider, including a variety of 
consolidation options for the entities and processes responsible for 
responding to urgent operational needs. We tested and analyzed these 
options in terms of their potential capacity to gain increased 
efficiencies in the visibility, coordination, management, and 
oversight of the department's urgent needs process as well as to 
reduce duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, if any. 

We visited or contacted the following offices during our review: 

Department of Defense: 

* Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force, 
Washington, D.C. 

* Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Washington, 
D.C. 

* Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle Task Force, Washington, D.C. 

* Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and 
Assessment Directorate (J8), Washington, D.C. 

* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation, Washington, D.C. 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, Washington, D.C.
- Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office:
- Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell:
- Rapid Fielding Directorate:
-- Complex Systems, Joint Capability Technology Demonstration Office:
-- Rapid Reaction Technology Office: 

* U.S. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration Office, 
Washington, D.C. 

* Defense Science Board, Washington, D.C. 

U.S. Army: 

* Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, Washington, 
D.C. 

* Asymmetric Warfare Group, Fort Meade, Maryland: 

* Biometrics Identity Management Agency, Washington, D.C. 

* Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Capability 
Integration Division, Washington, D.C. 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology, Army Science Board, Arlington, Virginia: 

* Program Executive Office--Command, Control, and Communications- 
Tactical, Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Program Directorate, 
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey: 

* Program Executive Office--Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and 
Sensors, Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target 
Acquisition, Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 

* Program Executive Office--Soldier, Directorate of Logistics (G4) 
(formerly known as Rapid Fielding Initiative Directorate), Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia: 

* Rapid Equipping Force, Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 

* Research, Development, and Engineering Command, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland: 

* Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize, Washington, D.C. 

* Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia:
- Army Capabilities Integration Center:
- Human Terrain System: 

U.S. Navy: 

* Chief of Naval Operations, N81D, Washington, D.C. 

* Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare, 
Washington, D.C. 

* Navy Comptroller's Office, Washington, D.C. 

* Office of Naval Research, Office of Transition, Rapid Development 
and Deployment Program, Arlington, Virginia: 

U.S. Marine Corps: 

* Combat Development Command, Capabilities Development Directorate, 
Quantico, Virginia: 

U.S. Air Force: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 
Washington, D.C. 

* Requirements Policy & Process Division, Directorate of Operational 
Capability Requirements, Washington, D.C. 

* Air Force Comptroller's Office, Washington, D.C. 

* Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois: 

* 645th Aeronautical Systems Group (Big Safari), Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio: 

* Rapid Capabilities Office, Washington, D.C. 

Combatant Commands: 

* U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida: 

* U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany: 

* U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado: 

* U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, 
Florida: 

* U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois: 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 to March 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

February 4, 2011: 

Mr. William Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities Management Team: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-11-273, "Warfighter Support: DoD's Urgent Needs Processes 
Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential 
Consolidation," dated January 10, 2011 (GAO Code 351448). Comments on 
the report's recommendations are enclosed. 

Separately, the Department will be coordinating a review and 
submitting the report to the congressional defense committees required 
by section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011, Review of Acquisition Process for Rapid Fielding 
of Capabilities in Response to Urgent Operational Needs. We anticipate 
that specific actions accomplished by the Department related to the 
GAO's recommendations will be included in the report. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft 
report. Technical comments were provided separately. Should you have 
any questions, please contact Mr. William Beasley, 
William.Beasley@osd.mil, 703-695-8045. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Thomas P. Dee: 
Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell: 

Enclosures: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated January 10, 2011: 
GAO-11-273 (GAO Code 351448): 

"Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need A More
Comprehensive Approach And Evaluation For Potential Consolidation" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all 
urgent needs processes that establishes baseline policy for the 
fulfillment of urgent operational needs. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department will issue appropriate guidance 
that will ensure the urgent needs/rapid acquisition processes meet the 
warfighter's needs. The policy will permit DoD Components to operate 
Component-specific processes while maintaining sufficient baseline 
commonality that cross-DoD oversight can be accomplished. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all 
urgent needs processes that clearly defines common terms as well as 
the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, and 
the military services for all phases of the urgent needs process, 
including, but not limited to, generation, validation, funding, 
execution, tracking, and management of the transition, termination or 
transfer process and that incorporates all available expedited 
acquisition procedures. 

DOD Response: Concur. Under the effort required by section 804 of the 
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
the end-to-end process will be assessed, responsibilities defined, and 
appropriate policy changes initiated. It is expected that additional 
policy and procedures under the authority of multiple DoD officials 
(e.g., Chairman of the Joint Staff, Under Secretary of Defense 
Comptroller/CFO, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation) will be 
assessed for any necessary changes and coordinated with the 
responsible officials. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all 
urgent needs processes that designates a focal point within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(such as the Rapid Fielding Directorate, or other entity as deemed 
appropriate) with the appropriate authority and resources, dedicated 
to leading the department's urgent needs efforts, including, but not 
limited to: (a) acting as an advocate within the department for issues 
related to DoD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (b) 
improving visibility across all urgent needs entities and processes; 
and (c) ensuring tools and mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and 
manage the status of urgent needs, from validation through the 
transition, including a formal feedback mechanism or channel for 
military services to provide feedback on how well fielded solutions 
met urgent needs. 

DOD Response: Concur. Pending completion of the effort required by 
section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011, the Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
will act as the focal point. The results of the section 804 effort 
will shape the ultimate decisions on structuring the urgent needs and 
rapid acquisition processes. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all 
urgent needs processes that directs the DoD Components to establish 
minimum processes and requirements for each of the above phases of the 
process. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department will issue appropriate guidance 
that will ensure the urgent needs/rapid acquisition processes meet the 
warfighter's needs. The policy will permit DoD Components to operate 
Component-specific processes while maintaining sufficient baseline 
commonality that cross-DoD oversight can be accomplished. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct DoD's Chief Management Officer to evaluate potential options 
for consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation 
and take appropriate action. 

DOD Response: Concur. Under the effort required by section 804 of the 
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
the end-to-end process will be addressed and the Deputy Chief 
Management Officer, supported by component Chief Management Officers, 
will participate and provide oversight and assistance in utilizing 
process improvement techniques and tools. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William Solis, (202)-512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Cary B. Russell (Assistant 
Director), Usman Ahmad, Laura G. Czohara, Lonnie McAllister II, John 
Ortiz, Richard Powelson, Steve Pruitt, Amie Steele, Ryan Stott, John 
Strong, Tristan To, Nicole Vahlkamp, Elizabeth Wood, Delia P. Zee, and 
Karen Zuckerstein made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Defense Acquisition: DOD's Requirements Determination Process 
Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2008). 

[2] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment 
of Urgent Operational Needs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July 
2009). 

[3] The Defense Science Board notes that the figure is dominated by 
the combination of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
vehicle program, which in combination represent approximately 80 
percent of this expenditure. 

[4] Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on 
Capability Surprise, vol. I: Main Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, September 2009). 

[5] GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal 
Control, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-660] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2010); Warfighter Support: Improvements to 
DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite 
Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 
2010); Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and 
Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 29, 2009); and Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's 
Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive 
Devices Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009). 

[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460]. 

[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T]. 

[8] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 801 (2008); S. Rep. No. 111-201, § 811 
(2010). 

[9] Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 201 (2010). 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T]. 

[11] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can 
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development 
of Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 
2008). 

[12] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Overarching 
Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-500T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 
2010); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374]; Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems: Advanced Coordination and Increased Visibility 
Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2007); Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-578] (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 
2007). 

[13] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Establishing 
Guidance, Timelines, and Accountability for Integrating Intelligence 
Data Would Improve Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 
2010). This report is not available through GAO's Web site. Copies of 
this report are available upon request by calling (202) 512-6000, toll 
free (866) 801-7077, or TDD (202) 512-2537. 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460]. 

[15] For the purposes of this report, entities include organizations, 
offices, programs, agencies, and task forces. 

[16] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment 
of Urgent Operational Needs. 

[17] These studies include: Defense Science Board, 21st Century 
Strategic Technology Vectors (2006); Defense Science Board, Defense 
Industrial Structure for Transformation (2007-2008); MITRE, Venture 
Capital and IT Acquisition: Managing Uncertainty (2008); Army Science 
Board, Institutionalization of Innovative Army Organizations (2008); 
Defense Science Board, Buying Commercial: Gaining the Cost/Schedule 
Benefits for Defense Systems (2009); GAO, Perspectives on Potential 
Changes to Department of Defense Acquisition Management Framework, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-295R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 27, 2009); Defense Science Board, Creating a DOD Strategic 
Acquisition Platform (2009); Defense Science Board, Fulfillment of 
Urgent Operational Needs (2009); Defense Science Board, 2008 Summer 
Study on Capability Surprise (2009); [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460]. 

[18] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 801(2008). 

[19] S. Rep. No. 110-335, at 359 (2008). 

[20] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 801 (2008). 

[21] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 803 (2011). 

[22] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011). 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T]. 

[24] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Establish Clear Goals and 
Objectives, Guidance, and a Designated Budget to Manage Its Biometrics 
Activities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1065] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008). 

[25] We are conducting a separate review at the request of the House 
Armed Services Committee to examine DOD's efforts to improve 
visibility over its counter-IED programs and evaluate the potential 
for overlap and duplication of counter-IED initiatives. 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460]. 

[27] Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002 is entitled "DOD Guidance for 
Fulfillment of Joint Urgent Operational Needs." 

[28] Section 901 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011 redesignated the Director for Defense Research 
and Engineering as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering. Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 901(a)(1)(A) (2011). 

[29] In January 2011, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell was removed 
from the Rapid Fielding Directorate and became a direct report to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

[30] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, DC: November 1999). 

[31] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Joint Memorandum 4000, 
Navy Urgent Needs Process Implementation (July 26, 2007). 

[32] Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 
5000.01, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability 
Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 6, 2009). 

[33] Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination 
(Dec. 28, 2009). 

[34] As of December 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction 3470.01 is undergoing revisions but had not yet been 
approved at the time of our review. 

[35] Our estimate is based on funding data provided by urgent needs- 
related entities responding to our data-collection instrument and 
includes funding for processing of urgent needs as well as development 
of solutions and some acquisition costs. As our survey was not 
exhaustive, the numbers reported are a lower bound to the total amount 
spent on urgent needs rather than an upper bound. Our estimate differs 
from the figure reported by the Defense Science Board in September 
2009 because we included fiscal year 2010 funds while the Defense 
Science Board report only included funding over the period 2005-2009. 
Additionally, our funding data have been converted to base year 2010 
dollars. 

[36] JIEDDO has access to the Joint IED Defeat Fund, and the Rapid 
Reaction Technology Office has access to the Rapid Reaction Fund. 

[37] The Asymmetric Warfare Group was unable to provide specific 
funding for its urgent needs activities because it is not involved in 
funding urgent needs. 

[38] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership 
and National Strategy, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-556T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2001) and Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, 
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform 
Military Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-70] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 
2004). 

[39] Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming The Pentagon 
For A New Age," Foreign Affairs (January 2009). 

[40] DOD Directive 5105.02, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Feb. 18, 
2009). 

[41] Department of Defense, Strategic Management Plan (2009). 

[42] GAO, Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide, ver. 3, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-10.1.15] (Washington, 
D.C.: May 1997). 

[43] GAO, Defense Health Care: DOD Needs to Address the Expected 
Benefits, Costs, and Risks for Its Newly Approved Medical Command 
Structure, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-122] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2007). 

[44] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011). 

[45] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment 
of Urgent Operational Needs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July 
2009). 

[End of section] 

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