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entitled 'Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional 
Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined' which was released on 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Addressees: 

January 2011: 

Afghanistan Security: 

Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs 
Not Determined: 

GAO-11-66: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-66, a report to congressional addressees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Developing capable Afghan National Army (ANA) forces is a key element 
of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led 
coalition effort to counter the insurgency and create sustainable 
security in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States, with 
assistance from NATO and other coalition nations, has worked to 
develop the ANA. The Department of Defense (DOD) leads U.S. efforts to 
train and equip the ANA. U.S. agencies have allocated about $20 
billion in support of the ANA since 2002 and have requested $7.5 
billion more for fiscal year 2011. 

GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made and challenges faced in 
expanding the size of the ANA, (2) the extent of progress made and 
challenges faced in developing ANA capability, and (3) how much 
estimated future funding will be needed to sustain and further grow 
the ANA. GAO reviewed DOD and NATO documents and met with officials in 
Washington, D.C.; Tampa, FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul, Afghanistan. 

What GAO Found: 

Between January 2010 and July 2010, the ANA grew from 104,000 to 
134,000 personnel, reaching the interim growth goal set by the Afghan 
government and international community 3 months ahead of schedule. 
Officials cited increased recruitment of new soldiers and higher 
training capacity as factors that enabled the growth. The ANA has also 
generally achieved its goal of drawing proportionally from 
Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups, with some key exceptions. However, 
the ANA faces challenges, including high rates of attrition—-the loss 
of soldiers from the force before they complete their contracts—-and 
absenteeism. In particular, high attrition could impact the ANA’s 
ability to meet its end size goal of 171,600 by October 2011. 

The Afghan government and international community have set an 
objective of having the Afghan army and police lead and conduct 
security operations in all Afghan provinces by the end of 2014. As of 
September 2010, no ANA unit was assessed as capable of conducting its 
mission independent of coalition assistance. About two-thirds were 
assessed as effective with limited coalition support. Efforts to 
develop ANA capability have been challenged by difficulties in 
staffing leadership positions and a shortage of coalition trainers, 
including a shortfall of approximately 18 percent (275 of 1,495) of 
the personnel needed to provide instruction at ANA training facilities. 

Figure: Shortage of Instructors for the ANA, as of November 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph, vertical bar graph, pie-chart] 

Instructor positions, Total 1,495; 
Filled or pledged to be filled: 1,220 (82%); 
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 275 (18%). 

Critical instructor positions, Total: 281; 
Filled or pledged to be filled: 180 (64%); 
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 101 (36%). 

Photograph of instructor and ANA members. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Neither DOD nor NATO has completed an analysis of ANA sustainment 
costs. Such analysis is important given that, as of January 2010, the 
International Monetary Fund projected that it will take until at least 
2023 for the Afghan government to raise sufficient revenues to cover 
its operating expenses, including those related to the army—
highlighting Afghanistan’s continued dependence on external sources of 
funding. In addition, DOD and NATO studies indicate that growth of the 
ANA beyond the current end goal of 171,600 may be needed—potentially 
up to a force size of 240,000 personnel. Any such growth will 
necessitate additional donor assistance. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with 
international partners, take steps to eliminate the shortage of 
trainers; clarify what ANA growth beyond the current end goal, if any, 
is needed; and develop estimates of the future funding needed to 
further grow and sustain the ANA. DOD concurred with GAO’s 
recommendation regarding trainers. DOD partially concurred with the 
need to develop growth and cost estimates for the ANA. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-66] or key 
components. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, 
Jr.at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

ANA Achieved Interim Growth Goal Ahead of Schedule, but Challenges to 
Meeting End Goal Remain: 

Limited Capability Leads ANA Units to Remain Reliant on Coalition 
Assistance: 

Future ANA Sustainment Costs Have Not Been Determined, and Studies 
Indicate More Growth May Be Needed: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Structure of the Afghan National Army: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DOD and State Support to Train and Equip the Afghan Army, 
Fiscal Years 2002-2011: 

Table 2: ANA Monthly Pay Rates Before and After Pay Reform: 

Table 3: Rating Definition Levels for Assessing ANA Capability: 

Table 4: NCO Staffing in ANA Combat Units, as of October 2010: 

Table 5: ANA Equipment Items with Less Than Half of the Authorized 
Amount on Hand, as of November 2010: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported in 
Afghanistan, November 2004 to November 2010: 

Figure 2: Command and Control in Afghanistan: 

Figure 3: Equipment Provided to Typical ANA Soldier and Associated 
Costs: 

Figure 4: Equipment Provided to Standard ANA Infantry Battalion and 
Associated Costs: 

Figure 5: ANA Growth between January 2010 and December 2010: 

Figure 6: ANA Recruits at Kabul Military Training Center: 

Figure 7: Typical Training Paths for ANA Soldiers: 

Figure 8: Percentages of ANA Personnel from Various Ethnic Groups, as 
of September 2010: 

Figure 9: ANA Monthly Attrition Rate, November 2009 to October 2010: 

Figure 10: Shortage of Instructors for the ANA, as of November 2010: 

Figure 11: U.S. Soldier Providing Marksmanship Training to ANA Basic 
Trainees: 

Figure 12: Afghan Revenues and Total Expenditures, 2008-2013: 

Figure 13: Geographic Distribution of Afghan Army Combat Forces: 

Figure 14: Planned Changes in ANA Force Composition between 2010 and 
2011: 

Abbreviations: 

ANA: Afghan National Army: 

ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces: 

AWOL: absent without leave: 

CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

IJC: ISAF Joint Command: 

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

NCO: non-commissioned officer: 

NTM-A: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan: 

SIGAR: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: 

State: Department of State: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 27, 2011: 

Congressional Addressees: 

Developing a capable Afghan National Army (ANA) is a key component of 
the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition 
effort to counter the insurgency and create sustainable security in 
Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] Since 2002, the United States, with 
assistance from NATO and other coalition nations, has worked to 
develop the ANA, with the underlying goal of eventually transferring 
responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international 
community to the Afghan government. The United States has allocated 
about $20 billion to train and equip the ANA since 2002, and an 
additional $7.5 billion in fiscal year 2011 funding has been 
requested. In 2008,[Footnote 2] we found that, although the Department 
of Defense (DOD) had made progress in increasing the size of the army, 
efforts to develop ANA capability were hampered by difficulty in 
recruiting qualified leaders and retaining soldiers, insufficient 
numbers of U.S. and coalition personnel to train the ANA, and critical 
shortfalls in equipment for ANA combat forces. In April 2009,[Footnote 
3] we noted some progress in the development of ANA capability, but we 
found that several of these challenges remained. Subsequently, in 
December 2009, the President announced his decision to rapidly deploy 
an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. This increase was 
intended, among other things, to enhance the training of Afghan 
security forces and create the conditions necessary for the Afghan 
government to start assuming lead security responsibility. The United 
States and its international partners have indicated that this 
transition to Afghan security lead will begin in early 2011, and the 
United States has identified July 2011 as the start date for the 
withdrawal of its combat forces from Afghanistan. 

Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed 
our work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United 
States. We examined (1) the extent of progress made and challenges 
faced in expanding the size of the ANA, (2) the extent of progress 
made and challenges faced in developing ANA capability, and (3) how 
much estimated future funding will be needed to sustain and further 
grow the ANA. 

To address the objectives of this engagement, we reviewed a wide range 
of DOD and NATO documents related to U.S. and coalition efforts to 
expand, develop, and sustain the ANA, including planning documents, 
progress reports, assessments of the army's capability, and future 
funding estimates, among others. We also discussed these efforts with 
DOD and Department of State (State) officials in Washington, D.C., as 
well as with representatives of the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, 
Florida, and the U.S. Mission to NATO and U.S. Military Delegation to 
NATO in Brussels, Belgium. Additionally, in Kabul, Afghanistan, we 
visited ANA training facilities and met with officials from DOD, 
State, NATO, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense. Also, see appendix I 
for a complete description of our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to January 
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

As part of the security reform strategy for Afghanistan established in 
2002 by the United States and several other donor nations, the United 
States volunteered to lead the training and development of the Afghan 
army. The Afghan National Development Strategy specifies that the ANA 
will be an ethnically balanced, professional army trained and equipped 
to meet the security needs of the country. 

The United States and its international partners have agreed on 
several occasions to help Afghanistan develop a larger army. Original 
plans called for a 50,000 personnel force,[Footnote 4] which the 
United States and its international partners revised in December 2002 
to a target force size of 70,000. Since then, citing increased 
security challenges, the international community has agreed several 
more times to help Afghanistan develop a larger force. Figure 1 
depicts attacks against security forces and civilians in Afghanistan 
since 2004, as well as the progressively larger force size goals 
agreed upon by the international community. In each of these cases, 
the new force size goal was announced before the existing force size 
goal had been met. 

Figure 1: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported in 
Afghanistan, November 2004 to November 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Number of average daily attacks per month: 

November 2004: 
Total average daily attacks: 4.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.0; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.4. 

December 2004: 
Total average daily attacks: 4.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.1. 

January 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 3.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.2. 

February 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 2.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 1.0; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 0.4; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 0.8. 

March 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 4.0; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 1.7; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.3; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1. 

April 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 5.8; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.1. 

May 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 6.7; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.6; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.0. 

June 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 8.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.2. 

July 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 7.0; 	
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.7; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.2; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2. 

August 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 9.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.9; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.4; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.8. 

September 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 11.1; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.1. 

October 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 8.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 4.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.0. 

November 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 7.0; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.1. 

December 2005: 
Total average daily attacks: 5.7; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.4. 

January 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 5.6; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.2; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.5; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.9. 

February 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 7.8; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.5. 

March 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 8.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.8; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.6. 

April 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 10.6; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.6; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.2; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.8. 

May 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 10.4; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.0; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.7. 

June 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 13.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 7.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.9. 

July 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 18.7; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 10.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.6; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.7. 

August 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 22.9; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 12.8; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.3; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.7. 

September 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 23.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.6; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.3. 

October 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 18.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9.9; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.6; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.1. 

November 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 15.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 8.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.4; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.7. 

December 2006: 
Total average daily attacks: 11; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.8. 

January 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 11.9; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.1; 	
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.2. 

February 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 9.7; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.6. 

March 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 15.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.8; 

April 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 17.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9.3; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.0; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.0. 

May 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 19.1; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 11.7; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.5. 

June 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 22.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.4; 

July 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 23.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.2. 

August 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 26.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.5; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.5. 

September 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 26.6; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.3. 

October 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 21.7; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.8; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.0. 

November 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 19.9; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 13.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.7. 

December 2007: 
Total average daily attacks: 16.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9.7; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.2; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.2. 

January 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 16.0; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 7.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 5.7. 

February 2008: ANA force size goal increased to 80,000; 
Total average daily attacks: 16.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 7.9; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 5.7. 

March 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 20.8; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 11.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 6.3. 

April 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 23.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 12.3; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 6.1. 

May 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 32.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.6; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.5; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 9.1. 

June 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 33.7; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 18.9; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.2; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 8.5. 

July 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 40.8; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 21.4; 	
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 11.7. 

August 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 46.4; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 29.3; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 11.3. 

September 2008: ANA force size goal increased to 134,000; 
Total average daily attacks: 48.9; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 26.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.2; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 15.2. 

October 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 43.4; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 23.2; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.0; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 13.2. 

November 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 41.6; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 21.6; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 14.3. 

December 2008: 
Total average daily attacks: 33.4; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.3; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 10.4. 

January 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 27.6; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.6; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.4; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 9.7. 

February 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 29.8; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 15.1; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.3; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 10.4. 

March 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 38.1; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 21.5; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 11.5. 

April 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 35.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 19.0; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 12.6. 

May 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 49.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 26.8; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.2; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 14.5. 

June 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 69.8; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 40.2; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 20.8. 

July 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 80.4; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 46.2; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 10.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 24.1. 

August 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 102.0; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 57.6; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 12.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 31.7. 

September 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 82.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 46.8; 	
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 9.9; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 25.5. 

October 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 68.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 40.2; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 21.1. 

November 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 60.6; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 35.6; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 18.3. 

December 2009: 
Total average daily attacks: 54.8; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 30.7; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.1; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 18.9. 

January 2010: ANA force size goal increased to 171,600; 
Total average daily attacks: 58.0; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 31.0; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.4; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 20.6. 

February 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 54.9; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 32.6; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.3; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 18.0. 

March 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 67.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 40.3; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.6; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 21.6. 

April 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 70.3; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 43; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 22.5. 

May 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 93.1; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 64.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.9; 	
Average daily attacks against civilians: 21.8. 

June 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 114.5; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 83.9; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.0; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 22.7. 

July 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 133.1; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 98.7; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.6; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 25.8. 

August 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 148.6; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 106.9; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 12.8; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 28.9. 

September 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 144.9; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 104.8. 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 11.6; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 28.5. 

October 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 114.0; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 79.4; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.4; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 26.2. 

November 2010: 
Total average daily attacks: 110.2; 
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 72.8; 
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.7; 
Average daily attacks against civilians: 31.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Most recently, at the January 2010 London conference, the United 
States and its international partners endorsed a new end goal of 
171,600 personnel to be completed by October 2011, thereby changing 
the previous end goal of 134,000 to an interim goal. The participants 
also agreed to move forward the deadline for ANA growth to this 
interim goal of 134,000 by 14 months, from December 2011 to October 
2010. 

The ANA of 134,000 is designed to consist primarily of infantry forces 
in order to supply "boots on the ground" for the ongoing 
counterinsurgency effort. By contrast, ANA growth from 134,000 to 
171,600 personnel is intended to start rebalancing the force by adding 
specialist units--such as logistics and combat support battalions, 
route clearance companies, military intelligence, and military police--
that are necessary for the army to eventually operate independently. 
Overall, this growth will increase the total number of ANA units from 
186 to 244. See appendix II for additional details on the ANA's 
planned force structure. 

Command and control responsibilities for developing the ANA have 
changed since our last report. In 2008,[Footnote 5] we noted that 
developing the Afghan army was a U.S.-led mission, with the DOD-
staffed Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) 
overseeing the Afghan army's training, facilities development, 
assessment, and equipment provision. Subsequently, in April 2009, the 
United States and its NATO allies agreed to establish NATO Training 
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to oversee institutional training[Footnote 
6] for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).[Footnote 7] This 
shifted responsibility for ANA development from the United States to 
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). NTM-
A/CSTC-A's headquarter elements were fully operational by February 
2010 and now operate as an integrated NATO and U.S. command with the 
mission of generating and developing the ANSF. 

While NTM-A/CSTC-A focuses on training recruits and building 
institutional training capacity, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) now 
takes responsibility for developing Afghan soldiers in the field, as 
well as conducting combat operations. Having achieved full operational 
capacity in November 2009, the IJC provides training to ANA units in 
the field through training teams and partner units.[Footnote 8] U.S. 
officials we met with in Brussels and Kabul described the rationale 
behind these transitions in command and control as an attempt to 
encourage increased NATO contributions to develop the ANA, while 
providing clearer command and control for units in the field. As shown 
in figure 2, both NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC report to the commander of ISAF 
and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.[Footnote 9] 

Figure 2: Command and Control in Afghanistan: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Top level: 
ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (4 stars); 

Second level, reporting to ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan: 
* NTM-A/CSTC-A (3 stars): Trains ANSF: 
- establishes training schools and academies; 
- runs training for soldiers in institutional training; 
- mentors Afghan ministries; 
*IJC (3 stars): Plans and executes military operations: 
- conducts military operations to disrupt insurgent activities; 
- coordinates training teams and partner units. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; Adobe Illustrator and Corel 
(symbols). 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Support for ANA Development: 

The United States has been the leading contributor of funds for ANA 
development since efforts to build the army began in 2002. Table 1 
shows that, from fiscal years 2002 through 2010, DOD and State 
allocated about $20 billion[Footnote 10] in support of the ANA. DOD 
and State have requested an additional $7.5 billion in fiscal year 
2011. 

Table 1: DOD and State Support to Train and Equip the Afghan Army, 
Fiscal Years 2002-2011: 

Agency: DOD; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $2.0 million; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $165.0 million; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $283.2 million; 
Fiscal year: 2005: $1.32 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2006: $766.1 million; 
Fiscal year: 2007: $4.9 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $1.8 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.1 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $5.6 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2011 request: $7.5 billion; 
Total: $26.4 billion. 

Agency: State; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $74.7 million; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $191.6 million; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $434.4 million; 
Fiscal year: 2005: $413.3 million; 
Fiscal year: 2006: $1.0 million; 
Fiscal year: 2007: $1.2 million; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $1.7 million; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $1.4 million; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $1.5 million; 
Fiscal year: 2011 request: $1.5 million; 
Total: $1.1 billion. 

Agency: Total; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $76.7 million; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $356.6 million; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $717.5 million; 
Fiscal year: 2005: $1.7 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2006: $767.1 million; 
Fiscal year: 2007: $4.9 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $1.8 million; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.1 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $5.6 billion; 
Fiscal year: 2011 request: $7.5 billion; 
Total: $27.5 billion. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and State data. 

Notes: 

These figures do not include certain operational costs, such as the 
personnel costs for U.S. servicemembers assigned to the ANA 
development mission. 

Totals may not add due to rounding. 

Funding includes detainee operations. 

[A] Totals include funding from a variety of DOD and State sources. 
Figures for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 consist of funding 
appropriated into several different accounts, while those for fiscal 
years 2007 through 2011 consist solely of Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund and International Military Training and Education funds. 

[End of table] 

Of the approximately $20 billion in U.S. funding allocated to date, 
about $17.9 billion, or nearly 90 percent, has come from the DOD- 
managed Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. Since its creation in fiscal 
year 2005, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund has supported a 
variety of activities related to ANA development in the following four 
categories: 

* equipment and transportation, including procurement of weapons, 
vehicles, and communications items;[Footnote 11] 

* infrastructure projects, such as construction of garrisons, depots, 
and training facilities; 

* training and operation, such as establishment of training 
institutions and hiring of contractors to provide specialized 
training; and: 

* sustainment, including salary payments and maintenance of vehicles 
and facilities. 

Of the $17.9 billion in Afghanistan Security Forces Fund monies 
allocated to date, the largest portion--about $7.0 billion, or 39 
percent--has been directed toward equipment purchases. Figures 3 and 4 
show, respectively, the types of equipment provided to a typical ANA 
soldier and a standard ANA infantry battalion along with the 
associated costs. 

Figure 3: Equipment Provided to Typical ANA Soldier and Associated 
Costs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated photograph] 

Total cost for ANA soldier with M16: 
Armor: $1,431; 
M16: $976; 
Clothing: $422; 
Equipment: $166; 
Total: $2,995. 

Body armor = $1,431; 
Kevlar helmet; 
Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) and Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) 
plates. 

Equipment = $166; 
Canteen; 
Duffel bag; 
Elbow pads; 
Entrenching tool; 
First aid kit; 
Knee pads; 
Poncho; 
Rucksack and frame; 
Sleeping bag; 
Sleeping mat; 
Other. 

Weapon = $976; 
M16 rifle. 

Clothing = $422; 
Berets; 
Cold weather gear; 
Field jacket and liner; 
Mechanic coveralls; 
Physical training clothing; 
Belts; 
Undergarments; 
Uniform; 
Wet weather set; 
Boots (steel toed, combat, and cold weather); 
Other. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO and DOD (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: Equipment Provided to Standard ANA Infantry Battalion and 
Associated Costs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated photograph] 

Total cost for standard ANA infantry battalion: 
Transportation: $17,575,371 (80%); 
Weapons: $2,407,807 (11%); 
Communications: $1,812,443 (8%); 
Other: $203,174 (1%); 
Total: $21,998,795. 

Transportation: 
Trucks; 
Water trailer; 
Ambulance; 
Forklift; 
HMMWVs; 
Other. 

Weapons: 
Pistols; 
M16 rifles; 
Sniper rifles; 
Machine guns; 
Grenade launchers; 
Mortars; 
Other. 

Communications: 
Radio (handheld, manportable, programming kit, vehicle mounted); 
Radio base station; 
Switchboard; 
Tactical field phone; 
Other. 

Other: 
Generators; 
Mobile kitchen; 
Binoculars; 
Compass; 
Tool kits. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo). 

Note: M16 rifle costs are included in both figure 3 and figure 4. 

[End of figure] 

Other Donor Support: 

In addition to the United States, more than 40 nations and 
international organizations have provided equipment or funds to 
support efforts to build the ANA. As of October 2010, donor nations 
had contributed almost $470 million worth of equipment to the ANA, 
with vehicles, weapons, and aircraft comprising the majority of the 
donated value. In addition, as of October 2010, non-U.S. donors had 
provided about $210 million in funding in support of ANA development, 
with nearly another $200 million pledged. Donor nations have provided 
funding for the army through the NATO ANA Trust Fund, a mechanism 
established in 2007 for nations to support activities such as ANA 
training, equipment purchases, and transportation of donated 
equipment. In early 2009, NATO broadened the scope of the ANA Trust 
Fund to help pay for the ANA's long-term sustainment needs, including 
recurring costs for salaries, munitions, repair parts, and fuel. 

ANA Achieved Interim Growth Goal Ahead of Schedule, but Challenges to 
Meeting End Goal Remain: 

Between January 2010 and July 2010, the ANA grew from 104,000 to 
134,000 personnel, reaching the interim growth goal set by the Afghan 
government and international community 3 months ahead of schedule. NTM-
A/CSTC-A cites increased recruitment of new soldiers and higher 
training capacity as factors that have enabled ANA growth. The ANA has 
also generally achieved its goal of drawing proportionally from 
Afghanistan's ethnic groups, with some key exceptions. However, the 
ANA continues to face personnel challenges, including high rates of 
attrition--the loss of soldiers from the force before they complete 
their contracts--and absenteeism. In particular, high attrition could 
impact the ability of the ANA to meet its end goal of generating a 
171,600-person force by October 2011. 

ANA Met Interim Growth Goal of Generating a 134,000 Personnel Force 
Ahead of Schedule: 

Since the Afghan government and international community's January 2010 
decision to accelerate the deadline for ANA growth to 134,000 from 
December 2011 to October 2010, the ANA has expanded rapidly, largely 
meeting or surpassing monthly force generation targets. NTM-A/CSTC-A 
reports indicate that the ANA achieved its interim goal of generating 
a 134,000 personnel force in July 2010, 3 months ahead of schedule. 
This is the first time that the ANA met a force size growth goal ahead 
of schedule. As of December 2010, the ANA force size was nearly 
150,000. ANA growth as reported by NTM-A/CSTC-A from January 2010 to 
December 2010 is depicted in figure 5. 

Figure 5: ANA Growth between January 2010 and December 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Date: January 2010; 
Actual force size: 104,296; 
Monthly force size target: 104,500. 

Date: February 2010; 
Actual force size: 107,224; 
Monthly force size target: 108,600. 

Date: March 2010; 
Actual force size: 112,779; 
Monthly force size target: 112,700. 

Date: April 2010; 
Actual force size: 119,388; 
Monthly force size target: 116,500. 

Date: May 2010; 
Actual force size: 125,694; 
Monthly force size target: 119,800. 

Date: June 2010; 
Actual force size: 130,171; 
Monthly force size target: 123,100. 

Date: July 2010; Interim goal of 134,000 by October 2010 (met 3 months
ahead of schedule); 
Actual force size: 134,028; 
Monthly force size target: 126,300. 

Date: August 2010; 
Actual force size: 136,106; 
Monthly force size target: 129,000. 

Date: September 2010; 
Actual force size: 138,164; 
Monthly force size target: 131,600. 

Date: October 2010; 
Actual force size: 144,638; 
Monthly force size target: 134,000. 

Date: November 2010; 
Actual force size: 146,352; 
Monthly force size target: 141,000.

Date: December 2010; 
Actual force size: 149,553; 
Monthly force size target: 146,114. 

Date: October 2011; 
Current end goal: 171,600. 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

[End of figure] 

Increased Recruitment, Retention, and Training Capacity Have Enabled 
Accelerated Growth: 

The ANA's accelerated growth has been facilitated by increased 
recruitment, retention, and training capacity. NTM-A/CSTC-A reports 
that ANA recruitment has risen sharply in recent months. From January 
to October 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that the ANA met or exceeded 
its recruitment target in all but 2 months, with recruitment averaging 
over 6,500 soldiers per month. This was more than twice the average 
monthly recruitment figure of approximately 3,000 reported for the 
preceding 10 months. Overall, the total number of personnel recruited 
between January and October 2010 exceeded the total recruitment target 
for those months by over 6,000. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, 
during a peak recruitment period, some potential recruits were asked 
to return later since the centralized in-processing center was already 
operating at capacity. 

In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that retention of ANA personnel who 
have fulfilled their contracts has generally continued to meet the 
monthly target of 60 to 70 percent. A typical ANA contract lasts for 3 
years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are given the 
opportunity to reenlist. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, between 
January and October 2010, the ANA met its overall retention target in 
7 out of 10 months. Specifically, in this period, average retention 
was just about 70 percent,[Footnote 12] notably higher than the 53 
percent figure for the March 2006 to February 2008 period we 
previously reported.[Footnote 13] However, ANA retention rates for 
certain units in high combat areas, such as southwestern and eastern 
parts of Afghanistan, have sometimes fallen below target. 

DOD officials cite various factors for the increased recruitment and 
retention, the major one being recent pay reform for the ANA. After 
increased funding from the United States, in November 2009, the Afghan 
Ministry of Defense instituted a base pay raise of at least $45 per 
month for all ANA personnel and revised its hazardous duty pay into a 
tiered system that compensates soldiers in high combat areas to a 
greater extent than before. Table 2 shows ANA monthly pay rates before 
and after the pay reform. An NTM-A/CSTC-A official told us that as a 
result of the base pay raise and additional hazard pay, many Afghan 
soldiers' salaries approximately doubled. U.S. officials we spoke with 
cited this pay reform as the primary cause of the ANA's increased 
recruitment and retention. 

Table 2: ANA Monthly Pay Rates Before and After Pay Reform: 

Officer rank: General; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $900; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $945; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 5%. 

Officer rank: Lieutenant general; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $800; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $845; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 6%. 

Officer rank: Major general; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $700; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $745; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 6%. 

Officer rank: Brigadier general; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $600; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $645; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 8%. 

Officer rank: Colonel; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $450; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $495; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 10%. 

Officer rank: Lieutenant colonel; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $400; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $445; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 11%. 

Officer rank: Major; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $350; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $395; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 13%. 

Officer rank: Captain; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $270; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $345; 
Increase in monthly salary: $75; 
Percentage increase in salary: 28%. 

Officer rank: First lieutenant; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $230; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $295; 
Increase in monthly salary: $65; 
Percentage increase in salary: 28%. 

Officer rank: Second lieutenant; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $210; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $275; 
Increase in monthly salary: $65; 
Percentage increase in salary: 31%. 

Enlisted rank: Sergeant major; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $230; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $275; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 20%. 

Enlisted rank: Master sergeant; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $190; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $255; 
Increase in monthly salary: $65; 
Percentage increase in salary: 34%. 

Enlisted rank: Sergeant first class; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $165; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $235; 
Increase in monthly salary: $70; 
Percentage increase in salary: 42%. 

Enlisted rank: Staff sergeant; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $150; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $210; 
Increase in monthly salary: $60; 
Percentage increase in salary: 40%. 

Enlisted rank: Sergeant; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $135; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $180; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 33%. 

Enlisted rank: Soldier; 
Monthly rates before pay reform: $120; 
Monthly rates after pay reform: $165; 
Increase in monthly salary: $45; 
Percentage increase in salary: 38%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

Note: The pay figures above are for personnel with less than 3 years 
of service at their current ranks. ANA personnel receive a longevity-
based pay increase every 3 years served at rank. 

[End of table] 

In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials attributed increased recruitment 
and retention to the Afghan Ministry of Defense's creation of a 
recruiting command, the establishment of 16 mobile recruiting 
stations, a threefold increase in the number of recruiters, and the 
launching of a major Afghan radio and television campaign to encourage 
Afghan citizens to enlist in the army. 

According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, increased ANA basic training 
capacity has also facilitated ANA growth. As of August 2010, NTM-A/ 
CSTC-A officials stated that, in coordination with the Afghan Ministry 
of Defense,[Footnote 14] they had developed the capacity to train 
about 75,600 new recruits annually at the Kabul Military Training 
Center, five regional military training centers, and a temporary 
training center in Kabul. This is nearly a threefold increase since 
January 2008, when annual training capacity for new recruits was 
27,000. Furthermore, U.S. and NATO officials report that basic 
training is operating at full capacity. From May 1, 2010 to July 16, 
2010, basic training was filled to 100 percent at all training sites. 
During our May 2010 visit to Afghanistan, we observed basic training 
operating at full capacity at the Kabul Military Training Center, as 
shown in figure 6. 

Figure 6: ANA Recruits at Kabul Military Training Center: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Additionally, U.S. and international partners have increased training 
capacity by shortening the basic training curriculum from 10 to 8 
weeks. As figure 7 indicates, there are two primary routes that 
typical ANA recruits take to join the fielded force after entering 
basic training. In sum, this increased training capacity has allowed 
the ANA to grow at an accelerated pace, since more recruits are able 
to join the force given the increased capacity to absorb the new 
recruits. 

Figure 7: Typical Training Paths for ANA Soldiers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Institutional training for recruits: 
Civilian population: 
Recruiting station: 
Basic training (8 weeks): 
* Fill vacant slots in existing units; 
* Form new units: 
Unit Training (7 weeks): 
* Field new units. 

Ongoing training for fielded force: 

U.S. partners and mentors: 
NATO partners and mentors: 
Afghan army: 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

Note: There are additional training paths--for example, further 
training in specialized skills such as heavy weapons and 
reconnaissance--but the two paths depicted in this figure are the most 
typical. 

[End of figure] 

ANA Has Generally Met Ethnic Balance Targets, with Some Exceptions: 

In order to develop an ethnically balanced force in accordance with 
the Afghan National Development Strategy, the Afghan Ministry of 
Defense has set targets for the ethnic composition of the ANA that 
generally reflect Afghanistan's ethnic makeup. Specifically, the 
Ministry of Defense set the target of having all ranks of the army 
comprised of 44 percent Pashtuns, 25 percent Tajiks, 10 percent 
Hazaras, 8 percent Uzbeks, and 13 percent other smaller minorities. As 
indicated in figure 8, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials report that, as of 
September 2010, the ANA has met most of these ethnic balance targets, 
with a few notable exceptions. Specifically, at the total force level, 
Tajiks and Hazaras were overrepresented while Pashtuns and other 
smaller minorities were underrepresented. Tajiks were especially 
overrepresented in the officer corps, constituting 40 percent of all 
ANA officers, as compared with a target of 25 percent. NTM-A/CSTC-A 
officials noted that they were concerned about ethnic imbalance in the 
ANA and had taken steps to limit overrepresentation of Tajik officers, 
such as keeping a number of eligible officers in reserve and not 
assigning them to units in order to avoid increasing the imbalance. 
However, some ethnic imbalance within the force still remains. 

[Side bar: 
Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan: 
Recent conflicts in Afghanistan have, in part, reflected rivalries 
among the nation’s various ethnic groups. For example, following the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, ethnic militias 
commanded by powerful warlords waged a protracted civil war that 
destroyed much of the country’s remaining infrastructure. By 1998, 
most of Afghanistan had fallen under the control of the Taliban—-a 
primarily Pashtun group of Islamic fundamentalists under whose rule
the country became a haven for the al Qaeda terrorist organization. 
However, the Taliban remained at war with the Northern Alliance, a 
loose confederation of anti-Taliban Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek groups 
that joined the United States and several other allies in deposing the 
Taliban regime in October 2001. Given this history of Afghan conflict 
along ethnic lines, in December 2001, the international community 
established a framework for a new, fully representative Afghan 
government that, among other things, would be multiethnic in nature.
Subsequently, in December 2002, the Afghan government and donor nations
agreed that the new Afghan army should be an ethnically balanced force. 
End of side bar] 

Figure 8: Percentages of ANA Personnel from Various Ethnic Groups, as 
of September 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal and vertical bar graphs] 

By rank, what is the ethnic composition? 

Officer: 
Pashtun: 43%; 
Tajik: 40%; 
Hazara: 7%; 
Uzbek: 4%; 
Others: 5%. 

NCO: 
Pashtun: 47%; 
Tajik: 36%; 
Hazara: 10%; 
Uzbek: 4%; 
Others: 3%. 

Soldier: 
Pashtun: 38%; 
Tajik: 28%; 
Hazara: 14%; 
Uzbek: 10%; 
Others: 10%. 

By ethnicity, are the goals being met? 

Ethnicity: Pashtun; 
Officer: 43%; 
NCO: 47%; 
Soldier: 38%; 
All ranks: 41%; 
All ranks goal: 45%. 

Ethnicity: Tajik; 
Officer: 40%; 
NCO: 36%; 
Soldier: 28%; 
All ranks: 32%; 
All ranks goal: 25%. 

Ethnicity: Hazara; 
Officer: 7%; 
NCO: 10%; 
Soldier: 14%; 
All ranks: 12%; 
All ranks goal: 10%. 

Ethnicity: Uzbek; 
Officer: 4%; 
NCO: 4%; 
Soldier: 10%; 
All ranks: 8%; 
All ranks goal: 8%. 

Ethnicity: Other; 
Officer: 5%; 
NCO: 3%; 
Soldier: 10%; 
All ranks: 7%; 
All ranks goal: 13%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

[End of figure] 

Apart from ethnic balance, data suggest that the ANA is unbalanced 
along regional lines. Specifically, NTM-A/CSTC-A figures indicate that 
only about 3 percent of ANA recruits are Pashtuns from the country's 
southern provinces, where the insurgency has been the strongest. NTM-
A/CSTC-A officials stated that although regional balance goals have 
not been established for the ANA--unlike ethnic balance goals--there 
is concern about the regional imbalance, and particularly the lack of 
Pashtuns from the south. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials report that the Afghan 
Ministry of Defense has begun to target southern Pashtuns in its 
recruiting activities and has instituted special incentives for 
southern Pashtun recruits, such as allowing them to serve in ANA corps 
in southern Afghanistan, closer to home. Nevertheless, large regional 
imbalances remain. 

Challenges to Achieving ANA End Goal, Including Attrition and 
Absenteeism, Remain: 

High attrition has consistently challenged ANA growth. Soldiers are 
counted toward attrition figures when they do not fulfill their 3-year 
contractual obligation. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, over 90 percent of 
ANA attrition is due to personnel who are dropped from the army's 
payroll after being absent without leave (AWOL) for 30 consecutive 
days for officers and 45 consecutive days for enlisted soldiers. NTM-
A/CSTC-A has set a target of losing no more than 1.2 percent of ANA 
personnel to attrition per month. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate 
that from November 2009, when the pay reform was enacted, to October 
2010, ANA attrition has exceeded the target of 1.2 percent in all but 
2 months, with an average monthly attrition rate for this period of 
2.1 percent. Furthermore, as the army grows, greater numbers of ANA 
personnel may be lost even at lower attrition rates. For example, the 
army's attrition rate was 2.8 percent in October 2010 as compared with 
3.1 percent in November 2009. However, due to the army's considerably 
larger size in October 2010, the 2.8 percent attrition rate 
corresponded to a loss of over 4,000 soldiers, whereas the 3.1 percent 
attrition rate for the comparatively smaller force of November 2009 
corresponded to a loss of fewer than 3,000 soldiers. Figure 9 shows 
the ANA's monthly attrition rates for the 12-month period between 
November 2009 and October 2010. 

Figure 9: ANA Monthly Attrition Rate, November 2009 to October 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph] 

Attrition goal: 1.2%. 

Date: November 2010; 
Attrition: 3.1%. 

Date: December 2010; 
Attrition: 1.9%. 

Date: January 2010; 
Attrition: 1.9%. 

Date: February 2010; 
Attrition: 2.2%. 

Date: March 2010; 
Attrition: 1.2%. 

Date: April 2010; 
Attrition: 1.7%. 

Date: May 2010; 
Attrition: 1.2%. 

Date: June 2010; 
Attrition: 1.6%. 

Date: July 2010; 
Attrition: 3%. 

Date: August 2010; 
Attrition: 2.4%. 

Date: September 2010; 
Attrition: 2%. 

Date: October 2010; 
Attrition: 2.8%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

[End of figure] 

[Side bar: 
Impact of Attrition and Retention on ANA Force Size: 

Attrition and retention have a cumulative impact on ANA force size. As 
discussed earlier in this report, soldiers are counted toward 
attrition figures when they do not fulfill their contractual 
obligations. When soldiers do fulfill their contractual obligations, 
they can choose whether or not to reenlist. Those who choose to 
reenlist are counted toward retention figures, while those who do not 
are counted toward nonreenlistment totals. The following example 
illustrates how attrition and nonreenlistment affected ANA growth in a
given month. 

NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that, as of October 2010, the ANA consisted 
of 144,638 personnel. NTM-A/CSTC-A has also reported that the ANA lost 
over 4,000 personnel in October 2010 due to attrition. Furthermore,
NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that nearly 300 ANA personnel whose contracts 
ended in October 2010 decided not to reenlist. In sum, approximately 
4,300 personnel were dropped from the ANA payroll in October 2010 either
because of attrition or nonreenlistment. 

NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that the ANA recruited almost 8,000 new personnel 
in October 2010. However, the first 4,300 of these new recruits did 
not count toward net growth of the force, since they were needed to 
offset the loss of approximately 4,300 personnel due to attrition and
nonreenlistment. Consequently, out of the roughly 8,000 recruits from 
July 2010, 3,700-—less than half-—counted toward net growth of the ANA. 
End of side bar] 

According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, a high attrition rate is the 
primary challenge the ANA faces in meeting its present goal of growing 
the force to 171,600 personnel by October 2011. For instance, in the 
12-month period from November 2009 to October 2010, the ANA lost over 
30,000 soldiers due to attrition. This means that, in addition to the 
recruits needed to grow the force, the ANA also had to recruit 30,000 
soldiers to fill these vacant slots. NTM-A/CSTC-A plans have accounted 
for the need to achieve this additional recruiting, noting that in 
order to grow from the July 2010 force size of just over 134,000 to 
the 171,600 goal--an increase of about 37,000--the ANA will need to 
recruit and train over 86,000 personnel. 

Additionally, absenteeism remains a challenge to fielding an ANA force 
as planned. Specifically, IJC data indicate that the number of ANA 
present for duty continues to fall below the number of ANA assigned to 
units. In September 2010, for example, IJC reported that, across the 
ANA, only 69 percent of soldiers were present for duty. In some units, 
such as the 215th Corps in southwestern Afghanistan, the ratio of 
present for duty was even lower. An analysis of data provided by IJC 
indicates that, from January to September 2010, on average, over a 
quarter of the ANA was absent during any given month. 

IJC data indicate that high AWOL rates are a large factor in this 
absenteeism rate.[Footnote 15] For example, in September 2010, the 
AWOL rate accounted for more than half of the absentee rate. The 
impact of this absenteeism is a smaller fielded force than planned. 
For example, although over 85,000 ANA personnel had been assigned to 
the fielded force in September 2010, due to absenteeism, fewer than 
59,000 ANA were reported as present for duty that month.[Footnote 16] 
The U.S. and international partners have tried to mitigate this 
challenge, for example by instituting reforms such as electronic 
payment of salaries so soldiers do not have to return home to bring 
money to their family. Despite these efforts, the absentee rate has 
remained consistently high. 

Limited Capability Leads ANA Units to Remain Reliant on Coalition 
Assistance: 

The Afghan government and international community have set an 
objective of having the Afghan army and police lead and conduct 
security operations in all Afghan provinces by the end of 2014. As of 
September 2010, no ANA unit was assessed by IJC as capable of 
conducting its mission independent of coalition assistance.[Footnote 
17] About two-thirds were assessed as effective with some form of 
limited coalition support.[Footnote 18] U.S. and international partner 
efforts to develop the army's capability have been challenged by 
difficulties in staffing ANA leadership positions, a limited number of 
literate ANA personnel to learn specialized skills, and a persistent 
shortfall in coalition trainers. Furthermore, while the ANA has 
received more equipment, equipping shortages remain. 

New Assessment System Indicates ANA Continues to Rely on Coalition 
Assistance: 

As of September 2010, IJC reported that none of the 163 ANA units 
rated[Footnote 19] was independent and capable of conducting the full 
spectrum of its missions without coalition assistance.[Footnote 20] 
Nearly two-thirds of units were assessed as effective with some form 
of limited coalition support, and about one-third were assessed as 
dependent on coalition forces for success. 

ANA ratings are based on a new assessment system for evaluating ANA 
capability--the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool--that IJC adopted in 
April 2010.[Footnote 21] This tool replaces the prior assessment 
system--capability milestone ratings--which IJC and others had 
criticized as overly quantitative in nature. Specifically, according 
to IJC officials, capability milestone ratings focused on how much 
equipment and personnel a given unit had rather than the unit's 
performance in the field. Similarly, in June 2010, the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that 
capability milestone assessments could be misleading due to their 
reliance on measurement of a unit's supplies and personnel rather than 
on evaluations of the unit's ability to perform its mission 
effectively.[Footnote 22] According to IJC, while the Commander's Unit 
Assessment Tool takes personnel and equipment numbers into 
consideration, it improves on the capability milestone rating system 
by incorporating narrative assessments of ANA capability, including 
problems and opportunities for improvement, as prepared by the 
commanders of U.S. and coalition units training the ANA in the field. 
These narrative assessments are accompanied by ratings of individual 
ANA units against specific criteria--called rating definition levels-- 
that identify each unit's level of capability. Table 3 lists the five 
rating definition levels. We did not independently assess ANA 
capability; rather, we relied on IJC's Commander's Unit Assessment 
Tool evaluations. 

Table 3: Rating Definition Levels for Assessing ANA Capability: 

Rating definition level: Independent; 
Description: Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 
the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition 
forces. 

Rating definition level: Effective with advisors; 
Description: Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 
independent operations within their own battle space and maintaining 
regional security with limited guidance from training team only. 
Partnered unit assistance is no longer needed. 

Rating definition level: Effective with assistance; 
Description: Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 
independent operations and maintaining regional security with limited 
assistance from partnered unit. 

Rating definition level: Dependent on coalition forces for success; 
Description: Unit capability is dependent on partnered unit presence/ 
assistance to execute and sustain operations and maintain regional 
security. 

Rating definition level: Ineffective; 
Description: Unit is not capable of executing or sustaining operations 
even with partnered unit presence/assistance. 

Source: NATO. 

[End of table] 

While no ANA units are assessed as independent, IJC officials stated 
that the ANA has made some progress in its ability to lead and conduct 
operations. For instance, IJC credited the ANA with leading a 
successful emergency response following the May 2010 crash of a 
commercial aircraft in eastern Afghanistan. Specifically, IJC 
documentation states that, after the crash, the ANA led an aerial 
operation to recover and transport victims' remains from the crash 
site to a nearby hospital and, according to IJC, did so with limited 
coalition support. Similarly, State officials noted that in Kabul 
province--the one Afghan province where the ANSF have assumed lead 
responsibility for security--the ANA had performed well in providing 
security for the August 2009 presidential elections. 

The Afghan government and the international community have stated that 
the ANSF should lead and conduct military operations in all Afghan 
provinces by the end of 2014. According to IJC, efforts are under way 
to determine milestone dates by which ANA units can realistically be 
expected to achieve higher rating levels. However, IJC added that in 
order for ANA units to achieve the rating level of "independent," the 
army will first have to develop capabilities such as medical support, 
artillery, and fixed and rotary wing aviation[Footnote 23] that are 
currently provided by U.S. and coalition partners--an effort that IJC 
stated will take considerable time to complete. 

Development of Capable ANA Forces Faces Challenges in Several Areas: 

U.S. and international efforts to develop capable ANA forces have been 
challenged by shortages of leaders, literate personnel, and trainers. 
Moreover, although ANA equipping has improved slightly, various 
equipment shortages remain. 

ANA Faces Leadership Gap and Limited Number of Literate Personnel: 

Despite some progress, the ANA is continuing to face shortfalls in non-
commissioned officers (NCO) needed to provide leadership to ANA units 
in the field. As of October 2010, about one-quarter of NCO positions 
in ANA combat units were unfilled, as shown in table 4. This 
represents an improvement since our last report,[Footnote 24] when we 
found that, between November 2007 and February 2008, the proportion of 
unfilled NCO positions ranged as high as 50 percent. In spite of this 
improvement, NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that it considers the ongoing 
shortfall of NCOs to be a major challenge, noting that development of 
leaders is essential to improving ANA capability. 

Table 4: NCO Staffing in ANA Combat Units, as of October 2010: 

ANA unit: 111th Capital Division; 
Number of NCO positions: 2,016; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 756; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 38%. 

ANA unit: 201st Corps; 
Number of NCO positions: 5,654; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,376; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 24%. 

ANA unit: 203rd Corps; 
Number of NCO positions: 5,449; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,666; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 31%. 

ANA unit: 205th Corps; 
Number of NCO positions: 6,219; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,806; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 29%. 

ANA unit: 207th Corps; 
Number of NCO positions: 2,488; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 569; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 23%. 

ANA unit: 209th Corps; 
Number of NCO positions: 3,134; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 798; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 25%. 

ANA unit: 215th Corps; 
Number of NCO positions: 4,345; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,222; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 28%. 

ANA unit: Special Operations Forces Division; 
Number of NCO positions: 2,570; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 220; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 9%. 

ANA unit: Total; 
Number of NCO positions: 31,875; 
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 8,413; 
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 26%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

[End of table] 

Although NTM-A/CSTC-A has taken steps in conjunction with the Afghan 
Ministry of Defense to mitigate the shortage of NCOs, officials 
cautioned that these actions will not immediately create an NCO cadre 
with the desired level of experience. In January 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A 
and the Ministry of Defense began implementation of a new, accelerated 
program to recruit high school graduates with no prior military 
experience and, over the course of 12 weeks, train them to be midlevel 
NCOs. In addition, the top 150 soldiers from each 8-week basic 
training class are selected to immediately thereafter attend 4 weeks 
of NCO training, from which they graduate as junior NCOs. According to 
NTM-A/CSTC-A, these and other initiatives will allow the ANA to 
eliminate its NCO shortage by March 2011. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A 
officials stated that portions of the NCO corps--particularly those 
that attend the accelerated 12-week program and graduate as midlevel 
NCOs--will continue to lack experience. 

NTM-A/CSTC-A cited two primary causes of the ANA's NCO shortage. 
First, officials stated that due to the pressing need for ANA 
personnel in the field to participate in operations, army commanders 
may be reluctant to promote soldiers under their command to become 
NCOs or to release them to attend NCO training. Second, according to a 
senior NTM-A/CSTC-A official, the NCO shortfall is due to the rapid 
pace at which the ANA is growing. Specifically, the official stated 
that experienced leaders cannot be generated at the same rate as 
soldiers, thereby creating a leadership gap. 

In addition to its NCO shortfall, the ANA has a limited number of 
literate personnel to learn specialized skills needed to reduce 
reliance on coalition forces. NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation as of August 
2010 indicates that about 14 percent of ANA recruits are literate at 
the equivalent of a first-grade level. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A and 
Afghan officials, this low literacy rate is a key challenge to 
developing capabilities that the army will need to become less 
dependent on U.S. and international partners, such as logistics, 
engineering, communications, and intelligence. In addition, NTM-A/ 
CSTC-A stated that illiteracy can impede efforts to institute basic 
accountability procedures, such as recording of equipment serial 
numbers. 

To address this challenge, NTM-A/CSTC-A has incorporated 2 weeks of 
mandatory literacy training into the ANA's existing basic training 
curriculum, with the goal of enabling trainees to write their names 
and record serial numbers. In addition, a new 8-week literacy program 
began in September 2010. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, this more lengthy 
program, which is intended to train students to the equivalent of a 
third-grade literacy level, will specifically target those ANA 
personnel who will continue on to specialized training in technical 
skills necessary for the army to eventually support itself. However, 
as the commanding general of NTM-A/CSTC-A has stated, educating the 
entire ANA to the level needed for such specialization will take time 
and sustained effort. 

Shortfall in Coalition Training Personnel Continues to Impede 
Development of ANA Capabilities: 

The ANA continues to experience shortages in coalition personnel 
needed to provide training and assist in its development.[Footnote 25] 
These include shortfalls in instructors needed at ANA training 
facilities, as well as a shortage of training teams needed to develop 
the skills of army units once they are fielded. 

NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation specifies that 1,495 instructors are needed 
to train the ANA as it grows to 171,600.[Footnote 26] However, as of 
November 2010, about 18 percent (275 of 1,495) of instructor positions 
were unfilled and lacked pledges to fill them, as shown in figure 10. 
Furthermore, out of instructor positions that NTM-A/CSTC-A has 
identified as critical priorities, about 36 percent (101 of 281) were 
unfilled and lacked pledges. Officials with NTM-A/CSTC-A and the U.S. 
Mission to NATO cited several causes for the shortage of instructors, 
including low levels of political support for the Afghan mission in 
some NATO countries and the potential difficulty of financially 
supporting a troop presence abroad during the current global economic 
downturn. 

Figure 10: Shortage of Instructors for the ANA, as of November 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph, vertical bar graph, pie-chart] 

Instructor positions, Total 1,495; 
Filled or pledged to be filled: 1,220 (82%); 
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 275 (18%). 

Critical instructor positions, Total: 281; 
Filled or pledged to be filled: 180 (64%); 
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 101 (36%). 

Photograph of instructor and ANA members. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo). 

[End of figure] 

While the United States has deployed additional forces to temporarily 
alleviate the shortage in instructors for the ANA, these efforts do 
not fully address the ANA's instructor shortage. NTM-A/CSTC-A 
documentation notes that, due to the presence of additional U.S. 
personnel, the ANA's average instructor-to-trainee ratio in basic 
training improved from about 1 instructor for every 79 trainees as of 
November 2009 to approximately 1 instructor for every 24 trainees as 
of November 2010--a key factor, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, in improved 
marksmanship qualification rates among ANA trainees. (figure 11 shows 
one such U.S. soldier providing marksmanship training to ANA 
recruits.) However, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, while U.S. forces on 
temporary deployment have improved the quality of ANA basic training, 
these personnel were not intended to provide instruction in the 
advanced skills that the ANA must acquire by the time it grows to 
171,600.[Footnote 27] Similarly, a November 2010 NTM-A/CSTC-A document 
noted a particularly serious shortage in the number of instructors 
needed to teach the ANA specialized skills and stated that unless 
critical instructor positions are filled between December 2010 and 
July 2011, the ability of the ANA to develop skills it needs to start 
assuming lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security may be delayed. 

Figure 11: U.S. Soldier Providing Marksmanship Training to ANA Basic 
Trainees: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

The ANA is also facing shortfalls in coalition training teams needed 
to develop the skills of new army units once they are fielded. 
According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, field-based training of the ANA is vital 
given that army forces completing unit training have limited 
capability. For example, NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that of the first 
12 new ANA units fielded since the adoption of the new capability 
assessment system, 11 were assessed as either dependent on coalition 
forces for success or ineffective. Given the generally low level of 
capability that ANA units have upon completing unit training, NTM-
A/CSTC-A officials stated that they expect newly formed units to 
receive substantial training in the field from training teams and 
partner units. However, shortages exist in the number of training 
teams available to assist in ANA development. NTM-A/CSTC-A 
documentation specifies that a total of 205 training teams are needed 
to complete fielding of a 171,600-person ANA by October 2011. However, 
as of September 2010, the total number of training teams fielded or 
pledged by coalition nations was 164--41 fewer than the number needed. 
According to IJC, given the serious challenges that the ANA faces, the 
ability of army units to develop greater capability will be delayed if 
they lack training teams to provide field-based training. 

ANA Has Received More Equipment, but Shortages Remain: 

Although equipping of the ANA has improved since we last reported, 
various shortages remain. Table 5 indicates that, as of November 2010, 
the ANA had less than half of the authorized equipment amount on hand 
for 17 of 48 equipment items (35 percent). This is a slight 
improvement since our 2008 report,[Footnote 28] when we found that 
there were 21 of 55 equipment items (38 percent) for which army units 
had less than half of the required amount on hand.[Footnote 29] 
Additionally, as of November 2010, the ANA had an average of about 72 
percent of the authorized amount on hand per equipment item, as 
compared with an average of about 60 percent on hand per equipment 
item at the time of our last report. This improvement notwithstanding, 
shortages remain in weapons, vehicles, communications items, and 
protective equipment. 

Table 5: ANA Equipment Items with Less Than Half of the Authorized 
Amount on Hand, as of November 2010: 

Weapons: 

Item: D-30 howitzer; 
Number authorized: 210; 
Number on hand: 99; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 47%. 

Item: SPG-9 recoilless gun; 
Number authorized: 750; 
Number on hand: 254; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 34%. 

Vehicles: 

Item: Variable reach rough terrain forklift; 
Number authorized: 238; 
Number on hand: 117; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 49%. 

Item: M916 tractor; 
Number authorized: 124; 
Number on hand: 56; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 45%. 

Item: M870 trailer; 
Number authorized: 131; 
Number on hand: 52; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 40%. 

Item: M1151 Humvee; 
Number authorized: 2,108; 
Number on hand: 829; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 39%. 

Item: Motorcycle; 
Number authorized: 300; 
Number on hand: 110; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 37%. 

Item: Fire truck; 
Number authorized: 50; 
Number on hand: 10; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 20%. 

Item: Maintenance van; 
Number authorized: 219; 
Number on hand: 13; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 6%. 

Item: Fuel trailer; 
Number authorized: 97; 
Number on hand: 5; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 5%. 

Item: Warehouse forklift; 
Number authorized: 180; 
Number on hand: 4; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 2%. 

Communications equipment: 

Item: Programming kit; 
Number authorized: 650; 
Number on hand: 308; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 47%. 

Item: Very high-frequency handheld radio; 
Number authorized: 31,209; 
Number on hand: 14,767; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 47%. 

Item: High-frequency base station; 
Number authorized: 1,497; 
Number on hand: 685; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 46%. 

Item: Very high-frequency vehicle-mounted radio; 
Number authorized: 13,055; 
Number on hand: 4,440; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 34%. 

Item: Tactical telephone; 
Number authorized: 14,749; 
Number on hand: 2,089; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 14%. 

Protective equipment: 

Item: Kevlar helmet; 
Number authorized: 144,638; 
Number on hand: 40,803; 
Percentage of authorized on hand: 28%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

[End of table] 

NTM-A/CSTC-A and DOD officials cited a variety of causes for the ANA's 
remaining equipment shortfalls, including competing priorities for 
equipment and delays in production and shipping. As equipment orders 
are filled, ANA units may not be the top priority to receive certain 
equipment items. For instance, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials stated that U.S. 
military personnel currently in combat have a higher priority to 
receive some of the equipment that the ANA needs. In addition, 
officials with the U.S. Central Command stated that given the limited 
availability of air assets into Afghanistan, transporting the 30,000 
additional U.S. forces--and their equipment--has been a higher 
priority than supplying the ANA. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials also 
attributed ANA equipment shortages to production limitations, 
particularly for communications equipment. A senior Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency official added that, in the case of certain 
communications items, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not submit equipment requests 
in a timely manner, thereby exacerbating production limitations. NTM-
A/CSTC-A also cited delayed shipment of equipment items as a factor in 
certain shortages. 

Although the ANA's equipping levels have slightly improved, IJC 
documentation indicates that not all pieces of equipment that the ANA 
has on hand are considered ready to be used in operations. According 
to IJC, while factors such as enemy action and normal wear and tear 
can lead to equipment being deemed unserviceable, an additional factor 
is that the ANA continues to lack responsibility for its equipment. In 
addition, a senior NTM-A/CSTC-A official stated that the ANA's nascent 
logistics system gives it limited ability to maintain or repair the 
equipment it receives. Similarly, IJC and SIGAR[Footnote 30] have both 
identified the ANA's weak logistics system as a significant challenge 
to development of capable army units. Consequently, although IJC and 
NTM-A/CSTC-A are working to institute programs to address these 
challenges, concerns exist about the extent to which the ANA will 
properly maintain the equipment items it receives. 

Future ANA Sustainment Costs Have Not Been Determined, and Studies 
Indicate More Growth May Be Needed: 

DOD and NATO have not completed an analysis of how much funding will 
be needed to pay for ANA sustainment beyond 2011. Such analysis is 
important given that, as of January 2010, the International Monetary 
Fund projected that it will take at least until 2023 for the Afghan 
government to raise sufficient revenues to cover its operating 
expenses, including those related to the army--thereby highlighting 
Afghanistan's continued dependence on external sources of funding. In 
addition, DOD and NATO studies indicate that growth of the ANA beyond 
the current end goal of 171,600 may be necessary, which will require 
additional funding beyond what the United States and international 
community have already provided. 

DOD and NATO Have Not Completed Analysis of ANA Sustainment Costs: 

DOD budget documentation indicates that, beyond the $7.5 billion 
requested in fiscal year 2011, no additional funding is needed to 
support the ANA's growth to 171,600. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, once 
the ANA reaches its current end goal, which has an October 2011 target 
date, the focus of funding efforts will turn to sustainment 
activities, such as salary payments and equipment replacement. 
However, as of August 2010, neither DOD nor NATO had completed an 
analysis of how much future funding will be needed to sustain the ANA. 
Prior GAO work has also found that DOD has not adequately analyzed 
future funding needed to sustain the ANSF.[Footnote 31] Furthermore, 
although DOD has produced a series of congressionally mandated reports 
since 2008 on the U.S. plan for sustaining the ANSF, these documents 
have not included estimates of the ANA's future sustainment costs. 
While NTM-A/CSTC-A provided us with estimates indicating that 
sustainment of 171,600 ANA forces would cost between $4.2 billion and 
$4.5 billion annually from fiscal years 2012 through 2014, DOD 
officials stated that they had not reviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A's analysis 
and did not consider the resulting estimates to be official DOD 
figures on future sustainment costs. However, these officials said 
that they were unaware of any analysis DOD had conducted of how much 
ANA sustainment will cost. Similarly, while NATO documentation states 
that the amount of funding needed to sustain 171,600 ANA personnel is 
under analysis, an official at the U.S. Mission to NATO confirmed that 
no such analysis had been completed as of August 2010. To date, the 
United States has been the major contributor of sustainment funds for 
the ANA, with more than $5 billion allocated since 2005. Officials at 
NTM-A/CSTC-A asserted that regardless of how much ANA sustainment 
costs, the total each year will be considerably less than the cost of 
maintaining a large U.S. and coalition troop presence in Afghanistan. 

Afghan Revenues Have Increased but Remain Limited: 

Analysis of how much future funding is needed to sustain the ANA is 
particularly important given the Afghan government's limited ability 
to financially support the ANA. In 2008,[Footnote 32] we reported that 
until Afghan revenues increased substantially, the international 
community would likely need to assist in paying for sustainment of 
Afghanistan's security forces. Subsequently, in June 2010,[Footnote 
33] we noted that Afghanistan cannot cover its projected government 
expenditures without relying on expected levels of foreign assistance 
from the international community, as shown in figure 12. 

Figure 12: Afghan Revenues and Total Expenditures, 2008-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2008-09; 
Afghan revenues (actual): $0.81 billion; 
Total expenditures (actual): $8.34 billion. 

Year: 2009-10; 
Afghan revenues (actual): $1.23 billion; 
Total expenditures (actual): $7.5 billion. 

Year: 2010-11; 
Afghan revenues (budgeted): $1.47 billion; 
Total expenditures (budgeted): $10.24 billion. 

Year: 2011-12; 
Afghan revenues (projected): $1.67 billion; 
Total expenditures (projected): $11.04 billion. 

Year: 2012-13; 
Afghan revenues (projected): $1.96 billion; 
Total expenditures (projected): $11.64 billion. 

Sources: GAO analysis of Afghan Ministry of Finance and Afghan 
National Development Strategy data. 

Note: Revenues and expenditures shown for 2008-09 and 2009-10 are 
actual figures. Data shown for 2010-11 are budget figures, and data 
shown for 2011-12 and 2012-13 are projections. 

[End of figure] 

Although Afghan government funding in support of the ANA has increased 
in recent years, it continues to fall short of the full amount needed 
to pay for the ANA's recurring sustainment costs. For example, the 
Afghan government budgeted about $290 million in solar year 1389 
[Footnote 34] for the ANA--nearly one-fifth of the nation's projected 
total revenues of $1.5 billion for the year, and an increase of about 
17 percent from the approximately $250 million budgeted for the ANA 
the prior year. By comparison, however, annual U.S. funding for ANA 
sustainment has exceeded $650 million every year since fiscal year 
2007 and rose to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2010--figures that 
demonstrate the magnitude of sustainment costs that the Afghan 
government is not yet able to pay. Furthermore, as noted earlier, 
available estimates indicate that the cost of sustaining the 171,600- 
person ANA could exceed $4 billion per year. According to senior 
Afghan officials with whom we met, it will be at least a decade before 
Afghanistan can financially sustain the ANA. Similarly, a January 2010 
International Monetary Fund analysis projected that it will take at 
least until 2023 for the Afghan government to raise sufficient 
revenues to cover its operating expenses, including those related to 
the army.[Footnote 35] 

DOD and NATO Studies Indicate ANA May Need to Grow Beyond Current End 
Goal: 

While NTM-A/CSTC-A and DOD documents state that any ANA growth beyond 
the current end goal is subject to approval of the international 
community, several DOD and NATO studies suggest that, even after the 
ANA reaches a size of 171,600, it may need to expand by nearly another 
70,000 personnel in order to quell the insurgency. For example, an 
August 2009 ISAF assessment stated that the ANA would need to grow to 
an estimated end-strength of 240,000 personnel in order to conduct 
sustained counterinsurgency operations in key areas of the country. 
Similarly, an October 2009 NTM-A/CSTC-A document concluded that 
defeating the insurgency would require 240,000 ANA forces. A senior 
Afghan official we met with also stated that the Ministry of Defense 
considers 240,000 to be the ANA's necessary end-strength. 

Despite the variety of sources recommending a force size of 240,000, 
officials with NTM-A/CSTC-A and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
cautioned that there is no consensus on what the ANA's ultimate end- 
strength should be, and that any decision on further growth will have 
to take into account Afghanistan's security situation. Regardless, the 
extent of additional growth that is under consideration indicates that 
significant future funding will be needed for continued ANA expansion 
and sustainment. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, every 10,000 army 
personnel that are added to the ANA will cost about $500 million to 
train and equip and an additional $300 million annually to sustain. 

Conclusions: 

The United States has identified July 2011 as the start date for the 
withdrawal of its combat troops from Afghanistan, following the 
beginning of the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan 
government in early 2011--a transfer that the United States and its 
NATO allies have agreed to complete by the end of 2014. Developing an 
Afghan army that is capable of assuming the lead for security is a 
vital element of this transition. Since we last reported, the United 
States and its international partners have made important progress in 
accelerating ANA growth. However, no ANA units have been assessed as 
capable of operating independent of coalition assistance, and a 
variety of challenges put the ANA's continued growth and development 
at risk. Of particular concern is the ongoing shortfall in coalition 
training personnel, which continues to hamper the ANA's ability to 
acquire skills it needs to become less dependent on coalition forces 
and begin assuming lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security. 
Until this shortfall is addressed, the ability of the ANA to develop 
necessary capabilities will remain at risk. 

Due to the Afghan government's limited financial resources, 
international backing of the ANA will be needed for years to come--at 
least a decade, by some estimates--if the current course is to be 
maintained. However, neither DOD nor NATO has completed an analysis of 
the estimated future funding needed to sustain the ANA. Moreover, 
there are several indications that the ANA will need to grow beyond 
its current end goal of 171,600. Given the $20 billion the United 
States has already invested in ANA development and the additional $7.5 
billion planned, it is vital that decision makers have information on 
future funding requirements. Without clarification of what additional 
ANA growth is needed, if any, and the associated funding requirements, 
as well as estimates of future ANA sustainment costs, decision makers 
will continue to lack key information to guide future investments and 
weigh potential alternatives. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that the ANA receives the training it needs to become 
capable of operating independent of coalition forces, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense work with international partners to 
eliminate the ongoing shortfall in training personnel for the ANA. 

Additionally, to help ensure that DOD, Congress, and other decision 
makers have sufficient information to weigh future funding options in 
support of Afghanistan's security, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense, in conjunction with international partners, take the 
following three actions: 

* Clarify the extent to which the ANA may need to grow beyond its 
current internationally approved end goal. 

* Identify the funding required for such growth. 

* Develop detailed estimates of future ANA sustainment costs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for their review 
and comment. DOD provided written comments, which are reprinted in 
appendix III. State did not provide written comments. Both DOD and 
State provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as 
appropriate. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to work with international 
partners to eliminate the ongoing shortfall in training personnel for 
the ANA, noting that the U.S. government and NATO have made 
eliminating the shortfall a priority over the past year, but that more 
trainers will be needed. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendations to clarify the extent 
of additional ANA growth needed, identify the funding needed for such 
growth, and develop detailed estimates of future ANA sustainment 
costs. Regarding our recommendation to clarify the extent of further 
ANA growth needed, DOD stated that the ANA's final end-strength is not 
controlled by DOD but by a joint process also involving the Afghan 
government and international community. We acknowledge the role of the 
Afghan government and the international community in determining the 
size of the ANA and note that our recommendation specified DOD should 
work in conjunction with international partners to clarify the extent 
of additional ANA growth needed. Regarding our recommendations to 
identify the funding required for additional ANA growth and develop 
detailed estimates of future ANA sustainment costs, DOD stated that it 
is currently evaluating potential growth of the ANA in 2012 and has 
prepared cost estimates to grow and sustain various ANA force levels. 
DOD asserted that it is difficult to speculate about ANA growth beyond 
2012--and the associated costs--given the many variables involved. We 
continue to believe that DOD should prepare detailed estimates of the 
costs to grow and sustain the ANA under various force size scenarios 
in order to inform future funding decisions. While we acknowledge that 
any estimates of future costs may have some limitations, we believe 
that the experience the United States and NATO have gained through 
years of efforts to develop the ANA provides sufficient basis for such 
estimates. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, DOD, and State. The report also is available at no charge 
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

List of Congressional Addressees: 

The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
The Honorable John F. Kerry: 
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Kay Granger: 
Chairwoman: 
The Honorable Nita Lowey: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Tierney: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign 
Operations: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Michael Honda: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To examine the progress made and challenges faced in expanding the 
size of the Afghan National Army (ANA), we reviewed documentation from 
the Department of Defense (DOD), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF); monthly progress reports produced by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff; monthly personnel reports from the ISAF Joint 
Command (IJC); documents obtained from NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-
A/CSTC-A); and prior GAO reports. 

To examine the progress made and challenges faced in developing ANA 
capability, we reviewed planning documents; monthly progress reports 
produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; assessment reports from IJC; 
documents obtained from NATO, NTM-A/CSTC-A, IJC, and the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned; and prior GAO and Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports. 

To examine how much estimated future funding will be needed to sustain 
and further grow the ANA, we reviewed NATO documentation; budget data 
from the Afghan Ministry of Finance; a January 2010 International 
Monetary Fund analysis of Afghanistan's economic performance; 
sustainment estimates from NTM-A/CSTC-A; and prior GAO reports. We did 
not independently estimate ANA sustainment costs or assess the 
validity of NTM-A/CSTC-A's sustainment estimates, and we include NTM-
A/CSTC-A's estimates in this report only to broadly illustrate the 
potential magnitude of future ANA sustainment costs. We also reviewed 
the initial assessment of the situation in Afghanistan as prepared by 
the Commander of ISAF and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as well as 
documentation summarizing several DOD and ISAF analyses of the ANA's 
force size. 

In addition, we also met with the following officials to discuss our 
objectives: 

* In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency, and the Department of State's (State) 
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and Office of NATO 
Operations. In addition, we interviewed representatives of the U.S. 
Army Forces Command by telephone. 

* In Tampa, Florida, we met with officials at the U.S. Central Command. 

* In Brussels, Belgium, we met with officials at the U.S. Mission to 
NATO and representatives of the U.S. Military Delegation to NATO, 
including the deputy military representative to NATO. 

* In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A, 
including the deputy commanding general for ANA issues; IJC; Embassy 
Kabul; and the Afghan Ministry of Defense, including the Deputy 
Minister of Defense. We also observed ANA training at two training 
facilities. In addition, we interviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A officials based 
in Afghanistan by telephone. 

To determine the reliability of the data we collected on funding, ANA 
personnel figures, ANA capability, coalition training personnel, and 
equipment, we compared and corroborated information from multiple 
sources and interviewed cognizant officials regarding the processes 
they use to collect and track the data. 

* To determine the completeness and consistency of U.S. and 
international funding data, we compiled and compared data from DOD, 
State, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and ISAF. We also compared the funding data with 
agency budget requests and reports to Congress to corroborate their 
accuracy. In addition, we compared the funding data with our June 
2008[Footnote 36] report on the Afghan National Security Forces. 
Differences between funding totals shown in table 2 of this report and 
the ANA funding information presented in our June 2008 report are due 
to the following factors: 

* Totals in this report are more current. 

* Totals in this report do not include the value of excess defense 
articles provided to the ANA because agency officials clarified that 
these should not be considered allocated funds. 

* For fiscal year 2008, the total included in our June 2008 report 
included budget requests. Subsequently, in some cases, the amount of 
funding allocated differed from the amount originally requested, such 
as the 2008 allocation of money from the Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund. 

Although we did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an 
opinion on them, based on our examination of the documents received 
and our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that 
the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this engagement. 

* We have previously assessed the reliability of ANA personnel data as 
part of our prior work and found the data to be sufficiently reliable. 
In order to update our assessment, we spoke with officials from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and NTM-A/CSTC-A. In addition, we 
asked NTM-A/CSTC-A how the data are collected, tracked, and reviewed 
for accuracy. Based on our discussions with agency officials and the 
documentation provided to us by NTM-A/CSTC-A, we determined that the 
ANA personnel data we collected were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this engagement. 

* We did not independently assess the capability of ANA units; rather, 
we relied on IJC evaluations of the army's capability. To assess the 
reliability of IJC's capability evaluations, we reviewed reporting by 
SIGAR to identify the weaknesses it identified in the prior system IJC 
used to evaluate ANA capability. Subsequently, we asked IJC to explain 
how its new assessment system addresses these weaknesses, what steps 
it has taken to train coalition personnel to use the new system in a 
consistent manner, and how it reviews the resulting ANA capability 
figures for accuracy. In addition, an official with SIGAR stated that 
although the new assessment system has not yet been independently 
audited, it does reflect IJC's responsiveness to recommendations SIGAR 
made in its June 2010 report[Footnote 37] on the prior assessment 
system. Based on the documentation IJC provided us with in response to 
these questions and the input we received from SIGAR, we concluded 
that the ANA capability figures we obtained were sufficiently reliable 
to broadly characterize what proportion of ANA units are rated at each 
level of capability. 

* To determine the reliability of data on coalition training 
personnel, we interviewed officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A to discuss 
shortages in training personnel fielded. In addition, we asked NTM-
A/CSTC-A how the data on coalition training personnel are collected, 
tracked, and checked for accuracy. In addition, we compared different 
lists of training personnel and asked officials why the number of 
training personnel fielded has varied over time. Based on our 
discussions with agency officials and the documentation provided to us 
by NTM-A/CSTC-A, we determined that the data we collected on coalition 
training personnel were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
engagement. 

* We have previously assessed the reliability of ANA equipment data as 
part of our prior work and found the data to be sufficiently reliable. 
In order to update our assessment, we interviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A 
officials to discuss shortages of equipment and procedures for 
tracking the equipment provided to the ANA. Additionally, we asked NTM-
A/CSTC-A how the equipment data are collected, tracked, and reviewed 
for accuracy. We also compared different lists of equipment on hand 
and asked IJC why the amount of equipment on hand differs, in some 
cases, from the amount of equipment that is considered serviceable. 
Based on our discussions with agency officials and the documentation 
provided to us by NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC, we concluded that the ANA 
equipment data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of this engagement. 

* We have previously assessed the reliability of data on enemy- 
initiated attacks in Afghanistan as part of our prior work and found 
the data to be sufficiently reliable. In order to update our 
assessment, we conducted additional reliability checks and reviewed 
the Defense Intelligence Agency's methodology for collecting the data. 
Based on these steps, we determined that the data we collected on 
enemy-initiated attacks were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this engagement. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to January 
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Structure of the Afghan National Army: 

The force structure for the ANA includes (1) Ministry of Defense and 
general staff personnel, who are responsible for developing, fielding, 
and ensuring the operational readiness of the ANA; (2) sustaining 
institutions and intermediate commands, which support the Ministry of 
Defense at an institutional level; (3) combat forces, the operational 
arm of the ANA; and (4) Afghan Air Force personnel, who provide 
support for Afghan army and police forces. 

Combat forces form the basic operational arm of the ANA and are 
divided into six corps and one division, located in different regions 
of Afghanistan as depicted in figure 13. Each corps or division 
includes between one and four brigades. A typical brigade consists of 
a headquarters, a garrison support unit, four infantry battalions, one 
combat support battalion, and one combat services support battalion. 
ANA battalions are referred to as kandaks. Infantry kandaks, with 
approximately 800 personnel each, are the most common units in the ANA. 

Figure 13: Geographic Distribution of Afghan Army Combat Forces: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

The map depicts the geographic distribution of the following Afghan 
Army Combat Forces: 

111th Capital Division; 
201st Corps; 
203rd Corps; 
205th Corps; 
207th Corps; 
209th Corps; 
215th Corps. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

As the ANA grows from a 134,000 personnel force in 2010 to a 171,600 
personnel force in 2011, both combat and support units will increase 
in number. After fielding of combat forces is completed, force 
generation efforts will shift to creating support units, as depicted 
in figure 14. Some support units, such as route clearance companies, 
logistics battalions, and military police and military intelligence 
units, are planned to more than double in number. 

Figure 14: Planned Changes in ANA Force Composition between 2010 and 
2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Command: 

ANA unit type: Headquarters; 
Number of units, 2010: 34; 
Number of units, 2011: 36; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 6%. 

Infantry: 

ANA unit type: Maneuver units; 
Number of units, 2010: 84; 
Number of units, 2011: 96; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 14%. 

Support: 

ANA unit type: Garrison support units; 
Number of units, 2010: 23; 
Number of units, 2011: 23; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 0. 

ANA unit type: General combat services support; 
Number of units, 2010: 21; 
Number of units, 2011: 22; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 5%. 

ANA unit type: Combat support; 
Number of units, 2010: 13; 
Number of units, 2011: 22; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 69%. 

ANA unit type: Route clearance companies; 
Number of units, 2010: 6; 
Number of units, 2011: 21; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 250%. 

ANA unit type: Logistics battalions; 
Number of units, 2010: 2; 
Number of units, 2011: 7; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 250%. 

ANA unit type: Military police and military intelligence; 
Number of units, 2010: 5; 
Number of units, 2011: 19; 
Percentage increase in number of units: 280%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs: 
2700 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2700: 

Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-11-66, "Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing but 
Additional Trainers Needed; Long-Term Costs Not Determined," dated 
December 3, 2010 (GAO Code 320712). DoD comments refer to the two 
recommendations in the draft report. 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
work with international partners to eliminate the ongoing shortfall in 
training personnel for the Afghan National Army (ANA). 

DOD Response: DoD concurs in the recommendation and notes that the U.S.
Government, including DoD, and NATO have made eliminating the 
shortfall of trainers a priority over the past year. DoD has developed 
a coordinated approach to support NATO's force generation efforts in 
support of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan's trainer requirements. 
This was a key objective at several high-level NATO meetings over the 
past year, including the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010. At 
the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the Heads of State and Government announced 
that international partners had met the current priority requirements 
for ANA trainers, but acknowledged that further trainer requirements 
existed for the future. 

Recommendation 2: Additionally, to help ensure that DoD, Congress, and
other decision makers have sufficient information to weigh future 
funding options in support of Afghanistan's security, the GAO 
recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with 
international partners: a) clarify the extent to which the ANA may 
need to grow beyond its current internationally approved end goal; b) 
identify the funding required for such growth; and c) develop detailed 
estimates of future ANA sustainment costs. 

DOD Response: DoD partially concurs in this recommendation. The 
Department is currently evaluating potential growth of the ANA in 
2012. To help inform that evaluation and future growth decisions, the 
Department has prepared cost estimates to grow and sustain various ANA 
force levels. The necessary resources to support an eventual growth 
decision will be included in the Department's upcoming budget 
submission and are regularly shared with our international partners to 
encourage them to contribute the necessary resources. Beyond 2012, it 
is difficult to speculate as to the exact overall ANA end-strength 
requirement and associated costs due to the large number of variables 
(e.g., size and composition of international forces, future security 
threat, and future capability of the ANA). Additionally, we note that 
the final end-strength of the ANA is not controlled by the DoD, but 
ultimately decided by the Government of Afghanistan and the 
international community through the Joint Coordination Monitoring 
Board process. 

My point of contact is Ms. Cara Negrette, (703) 695-8268, or email: 
cara.negrette@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

[Illegible] for: 
David Sedney: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Central Asia: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant 
Director), Aniruddha Dasgupta, Arthur Lord, Jonathan Mulcare, 
Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers, David Dayton, Karen Deans, Martin De 
Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Bruce Kutnick, and Michael 
Silver made key contributions to this report. Mason Calhoun, Joyce 
Evans, Cheron Green, Cristina Ruggiero-Mendoza, Cynthia S. Taylor, and 
Laverne Tharpes provided technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] We reported on the strategic framework for U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan in June 2010. See GAO, The Strategic Framework for U.S. 
Efforts in Afghanistan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-655R] (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 
2010). 

[2] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be 
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain 
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 
2008). 

[3] GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009). 

[4] ANA personnel are counted toward the force size after they have 
successfully passed vetting procedures. In order to pass vetting 
procedures, recruits must validate that they are Afghan citizens 
between 18 and 35 years old; present two vouchers of recommendation 
(often written by village elders); and pass a physical and mental 
examination and a drug test. Recruits also undergo biometric testing 
to verify that they are not assigned to any other armed forces unit 
and have not been involved in previous attacks against U.S., NATO, or 
Afghan forces. 

[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[6] In this report, training that occurs at training facilities is 
referred to as institutional training. U.S. and coalition personnel 
who provide institutional training are referred to as instructors. 

[7] The ANA and the Afghan National Police collectively comprise the 
ANSF. 

[8] In this report, teams of U.S. and coalition military personnel 
whose primary role is to train and advise the ANA in the field are 
referred to as training teams. U.S. and coalition operational units 
that conduct joint operations with the ANA are referred to as partner 
units. 

[9] U.S. Forces-Afghanistan is the operational arm of the DOD in 
Afghanistan responsible for all missions not covered within the NATO 
mandate. The commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan also serves as the 
commander of NATO's ISAF force. 

[10] In addition to funding allocated for ANA development, DOD has 
donated about $30 million in excess defense articles to the ANA since 
fiscal year 2003. Items donated include trucks and personnel carriers. 

[11] DOD originally planned to equip the army with donated and 
salvaged Soviet weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this 
equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other 
equipment. DOD subsequently began providing U.S. equipment to ANA 
forces. 

[12] This figure includes personnel who rejoined the ANA after 
previously leaving the force. 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[14] NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that it has a three-step approach to 
training the ANA: train Afghan recruits, train Afghans to be trainers, 
and train Afghans to assume control of their systems and institutions. 
It is currently in the process of moving from the first step to the 
second and third steps. 

[15] Other factors contributing to absenteeism include scheduled 
leave, unscheduled emergency leave, and training events conducted away 
from the unit, among others. 

[16] NTM-A/CSTC-A figures indicate that of the more than 26,000 ANA 
personnel absent from duty in September 2010, about 60 percent were 
AWOL. The remaining 40 percent were on leave, in training, or absent 
due to medical reasons. 

[17] A unit is considered independent if it is capable of conducting 
the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition 
forces. See table 3 later in this report for additional details. 

[18] A unit is considered effective with some form of limited 
coalition support if is capable of conducting operations and 
maintaining regional security with limited guidance or assistance from 
coalition personnel. See table 3 later in this report for additional 
details. 

[19] An additional 38 ANA units did not receive ratings in September 
2010. 

[20] During our agency comment period, we received documentation 
indicating that 2 ANA combat units were rated as independent as of 
November 2010. 

[21] IJC is also using this assessment tool to evaluate the capability 
of the Afghan National Police. 

[22] Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan 
Security Force Assessments, Audit 10-11 (Arlington, VA: June 29, 2010). 

[23] In conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Defense, NTM-A/CSTC-A 
is in the process of developing the Afghan Air Force to provide 
capabilities such as close air support and airlift, among others. 
According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, current plans estimate that the Afghan Air 
Force will be able to provide basic airlift by 2014 and, by 2016, 
close air support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[25] We also reported in 2005 and 2008 on shortages of personnel to 
train the ANA. See GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish 
Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better 
Defined, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005) and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[26] As noted earlier in this report, ANA growth to 171,600 personnel 
is intended to start rebalancing the infantry-heavy force of 134,000 
by adding specialist units such as logistics and combat support 
battalions, route clearance companies, military intelligence, and 
military police--development of which requires specialized training. 

[27] NTM-A/CSTC-A informed us that these personnel may not have the 
military occupational specialties needed to teach the ANA specialized 
skills such as engineering, artillery, and intelligence. 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[29] The total number of equipment items decreased from 55 to 48 
primarily because the 55 included former Eastern bloc weapons, such as 
AK-47 rifles, that are no longer authorized for the ANA. 

[30] Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction, Audit 10-11. 

[31] We reported in 2005 and 2008 on inadequate analysis of future 
funding needed to sustain the ANSF. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-655R]. 

[34] Afghanistan's budget cycle is organized around solar years. Solar 
year 1389 began on March 21, 2010, and will end on March 20, 2011. 

[35] International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: 
Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance 
Criterion, Modification and Performance Criteria, and Rephasing and 
Extension of the Arrangement, Country Report No. 10/22 (Washington, 
D.C.: January 2010). 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[37] Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction, Audit 10-11. 

[End of section] 

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