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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

December 2010: 

Rail Safety: 

Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the 
Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology: 

GAO-11-133: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-133, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Positive train control (PTC) is a communications-based train control 
system designed to prevent some serious train accidents. Federal law 
requires passenger and major freight railroads to install PTC on most 
major routes by the end of 2015. Railroads must address other risks by 
implementing other technologies. The Department of Transportation’s 
(DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) oversees implementation of 
these technologies and must report to Congress in 2012 on progress in 
implementing PTC. As requested, this report discusses railroads’ 
progress in developing PTC and the remaining steps to implement it, 
the benefits of and challenges in implementing other safety 
technologies, and the extent of FRA’s efforts to fulfill the PTC 
mandate and encourage the implementation of other technologies. To 
conduct this work, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed FRA and rail 
industry officials. GAO also interviewed and surveyed rail experts. 

What GAO Found: 

The four largest freight railroads and Amtrak have made progress in 
developing PTC and are preparing for implementation, but there is a 
potential for delays in completing the remaining sequence of steps to 
implement PTC in time for the 2015 deadline. For example, although 
railroads have worked with suppliers to develop some PTC components, 
the software needed to test and operate these components remains under 
development. As a result, it is uncertain whether components will be 
available when needed, which could create subsequent delays in testing 
and installing PTC equipment. Additionally, publicly funded commuter 
railroads may have difficulty in covering the $2 billion that PTC is 
estimated to cost them, which could create delays if funding for PTC 
is not available or require that railroads divert funding from other 
critical areas, such as maintenance. The uncertainties regarding when 
the remaining steps to implement PTC can be completed, as well as the 
related costs, raise the risk that railroads will not meet the 
implementation deadline, delaying the safety benefits of PTC. 
Additionally, other critical needs may go unmet if funding is diverted 
to pay for PTC. 

Other technologies hold promise for preventing or mitigating accidents 
that PTC would not address, but face implementation challenges. 
Experts identified technologies to improve track inspection, 
locomotives and other rail vehicles, and switches as having promise to 
provide additional safety. But challenges to implementing these 
technologies include their costs, uncertainty about their 
effectiveness, regulations that could create disincentives to using 
certain technologies, and lack of interoperability with existing 
systems and equipment. For example, electronically controlled 
pneumatic brakes are a promising technology to improve safety by 
slowing or stopping trains faster, but are expensive and not 
compatible with some common train operations. 

FRA has taken actions to fulfill the PTC mandate and has the 
opportunity to provide useful information on risks and mitigation 
strategies to Congress in its 2012 report. FRA has developed PTC 
regulations, hired new staff to monitor implementation of PTC, and 
created a grant program to provide funding to railroads. Going 
forward, as it monitors railroads’ progress, FRA will have additional 
information for determining whether the risks previously discussed are 
significant enough to jeopardize successful implementation of PTC by 
the 2015 deadline. Prior GAO reports have noted that the 
identification of risks and strategies to mitigate them can help 
ensure the success of major projects. Including such information in FRA’
s 2012 report would help Congress determine whether additional actions 
are needed to ensure PTC is implemented successfully. Additionally, FRA’
s actions to encourage the implementation of other rail safety 
technologies align with some, but not all, best practices for such 
efforts. For example, FRA has followed the best practice of involving 
the industry early in developing new technologies, but it does not 
monitor the industry’s use of technologies that it helped develop. 
Monitoring and reporting on the industry’s adoption of new 
technologies could help the agency better demonstrate the results of 
its efforts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct DOT’s 
Administrator of FRA to (1) include in its 2012 report to Congress 
information about PTC implementation risks and strategies to mitigate 
them and (2) monitor and report on the adoption of other technologies 
supported by the agency’s efforts. DOT reviewed a draft of this 
report, provided technical comments, and said it would consider the 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-133] or key 
components. For more information, contact Susan Fleming at (202) 512-
2834 or flemings@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Railroad Industry Has Made Progress in Developing PTC, but Key Tasks 
Remain to Completing Implementation: 

Other Rail Safety Technologies Hold Promise for Preventing or 
Mitigating Collisions and Derailments, but Face Implementation 
Challenges: 

FRA Has Taken Actions to Fulfill the PTC Mandate and Promote Other 
Technologies, but Opportunities Exist to Inform Congress of Risks and 
Improve Monitoring: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: List of Rail Safety Technology Experts: 

Appendix III: Detailed Results of Experts' Assessment of Rail Safety 
Technologies: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Characteristics of U.S. Freight and Passenger Railroads: 

Table 2: Rail Safety Technology-Related Requirements of the Rail 
Safety Improvement Act of 2008: 

Table 3: Most Promising Rail Safety Technologies under Development, 
Based on Expert Views, by Category: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Key Components of the U.S. Railroad Environment: 

Figure 2: Causes and Rate of Rail Accidents, 2000-2009: 

Figure 3: Number of Rail-Related Injuries and Fatalities, 2000-2009: 

Figure 4: Basic Operation of PTC: 

Figure 5: Sequence of the Railroad Industry's Upcoming PTC 
Implementation Steps: 

Figure 6: Integration of Other Rail Safety Technologies in the Rail 
Environment: 

Figure 7: Approximate Timeline of Key FRA Actions to Meet the PTC 
Implementation Mandate: 

Abbreviations: 

AAR: Association of American Railroads: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

FRA: Federal Railroad Administration: 

FTA: Federal Transit Administration: 

PTC: positive train control: 

R&D: research and development: 

TTCI: Transportation Technology Center, Inc. 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

December 15, 2010: 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Thune: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine 
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

Railroad accidents, which are mainly caused by human factors, track 
defects, or equipment problems, pose safety risks to railroads and 
their employees, passengers, and the public.[Footnote 1] Although 
railroad accidents have generally decreased since 2000, several 
accidents since 2005 have raised concerns about the potential for the 
most severe accidents to result in significant casualties. 
Specifically, in January 2005, a freight train carrying hazardous 
materials collided with a standing freight train in Graniteville, 
South Carolina, resulting in the release of a toxic airborne chemical 
that led to 9 deaths, 292 injuries, and the evacuation of 5,400 
people. Then in September 2008, a commuter train collided with a 
freight train in Los Angeles, California, resulting in 25 deaths and 
126 injuries. Both of these accidents were caused by human factors. 
[Footnote 2] 

In the wake of these accidents, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008 required passenger and major freight railroads to implement 
positive train control (PTC) on most major lines by the end of 2015. 
[Footnote 3] PTC is a system designed to prevent accidents caused by 
human factors, including train-to-train collisions and derailments 
that result from trains exceeding safe speeds. It is also designed to 
prevent incursions into work zones and movement of trains through 
switches left in the wrong position. PTC accomplishes this by 
establishing a communications-based network linking trains to 
equipment along the track and centralized office locations to provide 
information to a locomotive about its authority to proceed along the 
track at a particular speed. If the train is going too fast or is 
approaching a section of track that it should not enter--such as a 
section of track occupied by another train or work crew--the 
locomotive computer applies the brakes to slow or stop the train to 
prevent a derailment due to speeding or a possible collision.[Footnote 
4] The Department of Transportation (DOT) has noted that the 
technology has the potential to prevent the most catastrophic types of 
railroad accidents that result in significant loss of life and 
property, including the accidents we have previously discussed. The 
statute also calls for railroads to develop risk-based safety 
strategies that include a plan for implementing other rail safety 
technologies and requires railroads to implement certain technologies 
in areas that both lack train signaling systems and are not required 
to have PTC installed. 

DOT's Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) provides regulatory 
oversight of the safety of U.S. railroads and is responsible for 
implementing requirements of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008. 
[Footnote 5] FRA's research and development (R&D) program contributes 
to the agency's safety oversight by sponsoring and conducting research 
in collaboration with industry and universities, including the 
development of new rail safety technologies, and the agency's safety 
oversight includes efforts to promote the implementation of these 
technologies. In addition to its safety oversight role, legislation 
enacted in recent years has significantly expanded FRA's role in the 
investment and oversight of the development of intercity passenger 
rail, including high-speed passenger rail. 

Emphasizing the need to further improve the safety of the nation's 
railroad system, as called for in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008, you asked us to examine new rail safety technologies under 
development and what additional federal roles should be considered to 
encourage their implementation. This report discusses (1) the progress 
railroads have made in developing and implementing PTC and the 
remaining steps to implement PTC systems, (2) the potential benefits 
of other rail safety technologies under development as well as the 
challenges to implementing them, and (3) the extent of FRA's efforts 
to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the implementation of other 
rail safety technologies. 

To describe railroads' progress in developing and implementing PTC, as 
well as the remaining steps to implement PTC systems, we reviewed 
documents and interviewed officials from the four largest freight 
railroads, Amtrak, a selection of commuter railroads of different 
ridership levels and geographic locations, a selection of railroad 
supply companies that are major PTC suppliers or were recommended by 
others we interviewed, and associations that represent railroads and 
suppliers about their progress in developing and implementing PTC. To 
describe the potential benefits of other rail safety technologies 
under development, as well as the challenges to implementing them, we 
sought information from rail safety technology experts and other rail 
industry stakeholders about their views of various technologies 
currently under development. Specifically, based on our initial 
research and interviews, we compiled a list of other rail safety 
technologies currently under development in the United States. We 
refined this list on the basis of input from DOT; the Association of 
American Railroads (AAR); and the Transportation Technology Center, 
Inc. (TTCI), an industry-operated, DOT-owned railroad research 
facility.[Footnote 6] With assistance from the National Academies' 
Transportation Research Board, we identified a group of 20 rail safety 
technology experts that we interviewed and then asked to complete a 
questionnaire about the potential benefits of and challenges to 
implementing a number of rail safety technologies under development. 
[Footnote 7] We analyzed the results of the questionnaire to identify 
which technologies are the most promising on the basis of the experts' 
views of these technologies' potential safety benefits, their worth 
compared with the cost of additional R&D and implementation, and their 
stage in product development. We also interviewed officials from 
railroads, railroad associations, FRA, and the DOT Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) about the potential 
benefits and challenges of implementing other rail safety technologies 
under development. To identify whether there were any major 
differences with rail safety technologies under development in other 
countries, we interviewed foreign representatives from railroad 
industry associations, universities, and governments about the 
implementation of rail safety technologies in European and Asian 
countries. To evaluate the extent of FRA's efforts to fulfill the PTC 
mandate and encourage the implementation of other rail safety 
technologies, we obtained and reviewed documents from and interviewed 
FRA officials responsible for the agency's rail safety technology R&D, 
safety regulatory efforts, and efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate. We 
also interviewed rail experts and the other stakeholders that we have 
previously mentioned about their views of FRA's efforts to fulfill the 
PTC mandate and encourage the implementation of other technologies. 
See appendix I for a more detailed description of our scope and 
methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December 
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The U.S. railroad industry consists mostly of freight railroads but 
also serves passengers. Freight railroads are divided into classes 
that are based on revenue. Class I freight railroads earn the most 
revenue and generally provide long-haul freight service, while the 
smaller freight railroads--those in Classes II and III--earn less 
revenue and generally haul freight shorter distances.[Footnote 8] 
Amtrak provides intercity passenger rail service, while commuter 
railroads serve passengers traveling within large metropolitan areas. 
Freight railroads own most of the track in the United States, with a 
notable exception being the Northeast Corridor between Washington, 
D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts, which Amtrak predominantly owns. 
[Footnote 9] Railroads grant usage rights to one another, and 
passenger trains share track with freight railroads. While freight and 
passenger railroads share many characteristics, there are also key 
differences in their composition and scope (see table 1). 

Table 1: Characteristics of U.S. Freight and Passenger Railroads: 

Characteristic: Composition; 
Freight railroads: There are 7 Class I freight railroads, of which 4--
BNSF Railway, CSX Corporation, Union Pacific, and Norfolk Southern--
earn the majority of revenue. There are over 500 Class II and Class 
III freight railroads, which provide service to connect rural, 
agricultural, industrial, and port areas to the national freight 
network; 
Passenger railroads: Amtrak is the only national provider of intercity 
passenger rail service; there are 25 commuter railroads in the United 
States. 

Characteristic: Scope; 
Freight railroads: The freight industry consists of about 140,000 
track miles. U.S. freight traffic in 2007 totaled 2.3 billion tons; 
Passenger railroads: Amtrak operates on 21,000 miles of track, the 
majority of which is owned by freight railroads. In 2009, Amtrak 
carried 27.1 million passengers. Commuter railroads, which generally 
operate on freight-or Amtrak-owned track, provided service to over 450 
million passengers in 2009 (as measured in passenger trips). 

Source: GAO analysis of industry data. 

Note: Figures cited in this table represent the latest available data. 

[End of table] 

The railroad industry also includes companies that produce railroad 
supplies, including locomotives, train cars, track, signal equipment, 
and related components, and national associations that work with and 
represent railroads. AAR, which primarily represents freight railroads 
(including all seven Class I freight railroads), as well as Amtrak and 
some other railroads, develops standards for the implementation of 
technology, manages the implementation of industrywide technological 
programs, and assesses the railroads' needs for safety and 
technological development. It also works to develop new technologies 
at TTCI near Pueblo, Colorado, an FRA-owned railroad research facility 
operated by AAR through a contract. The American Short Line and 
Regional Railroad Association represents Class II and Class III 
freight railroads in legislative and regulatory matters. The American 
Public Transportation Association represents commuter railroads and 
develops standards for their use of technology. 

The U.S. railroad environment consists of train vehicles (rolling 
stock) and infrastructure, such as track, bridges and tunnels, 
switches and signals, and centralized offices with dispatchers (see 
figure 1). 

Figure 1: Key Components of the U.S. Railroad Environment: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

The following components are depicted on the illustration: 

The movement of freight and passenger trains is managed by dispatchers 
in centralized office locations, which issue permission-–or movement 
authority-–to trains to travel into specific track segments. 

Freight and passenger trains share track, although a particular train 
generally carries either passengers or freight (not both). 

Freight trains in the United States, as compared with some other 
countries, tend to be very heavy and long, and engage in long-distance 
hauls of commodities. 

Passenger trains are much lighter and shorter, and may travel at 
faster speeds compared with freight trains. Because they provide 
passenger transportation, they operate on fixed schedules. 

Rolling stock refers to vehicles that travel over a railway and make 
up a train. Trains consist of one or more locomotives and multiple 
cars carrying either people or freight. 

Signals located along the side of the track inform train operators 
whether the train has authority to proceed along the track. 

Switches are devices located at rail junctions that guide trains from 
one track to another. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Railroad accident rates have generally declined from 2000 to 2009. 
During that time, human factors and problems with track were the 
leading causes of rail accidents, according to our analysis of FRA 
data (see figure 2).[Footnote 10] These problems can lead to train 
derailments or collisions, which can result in significant damage and 
loss of life. For example, the 2005 accident in Graniteville, South 
Carolina, was attributed to a switch being left in the wrong position, 
an example of human error, while the 2008 collision between freight 
and passenger trains in the Chatsworth neighborhood of Los Angeles, 
California, was the result of a commuter train going through a red 
signal it should have stopped at, which was likely caused by human 
error.[Footnote 11] Track-related causes of accidents include 
irregular track geometry, which occurs when rail is misaligned or too 
far apart; breaks in the rail or joints that connect rail segments; 
and damage to railroad bridges, among other causes. Such defects can 
lead to train derailments. 

Figure 2: Causes and Rate of Rail Accidents, 2000-2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and line graph] 

Causes: 
Human factors: 35%; 
Track: 32%; 
Equipment: 12%; 
Crossings: 7%; 
Signal: 2%; 
Other[A]: 13%. 

Year: 2000; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 4.13. 

Year: 2001; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 4.25. 

Year: 2002; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 3.76. 

Year: 2003; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 4.06. 

Year: 2004; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 4.4. 

Year: 2005; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 4.14. 

Year: 2006; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 3.7. 

Year: 2007; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 3.41. 

Year: 2008; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 3.2. 

Year: 2009; 
Accidents (per 1 million train miles)[B]: 2.84. 

Source: DOT. 

[A] The "other" accident category encompasses a number of other 
causes, including environmental conditions, such as snow or ice; 
objects on track; an improperly loaded car; and vandalism. 

[B] This figure excludes accidents that occurred at intersections 
between tracks and roads, known as grade crossings. 

[End of figure] 

Although the rate of accidents has decreased from 2000 through 2009, 
injuries and fatalities have fluctuated, with the largest spikes being 
tied to specific incidents.[Footnote 12] For example, injuries 
increased dramatically in 2002 due to one accident in North Dakota in 
which 1,441 people were injured from a derailment caused by track 
problems that resulted in the release of hazardous materials (see 
figure 3). The number of fatalities per year from 2000 through 2009 
ranged from a low of 4 in 2003 and 2009 to a high of 33 in 2005, the 
year of the accident in Graniteville, South Carolina, that killed 9 
people. The second-highest year for fatalities was 2008; that year, 
there were 27 fatalities, including 25 fatalities from the accident in 
Los Angeles, California. 

Figure 3: Number of Rail-Related Injuries and Fatalities, 2000-2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 line graphs] 

Year: 2000; 
Injuries: 275; 
Fatalities: 10. 

Year: 2001; 
Injuries: 310; 
Fatalities: 6. 

Year: 2002; 
Injuries: 1,884; 
Fatalities: 15. 

Year: 2003; 
Injuries: 232; 
Fatalities: 4. 

Year: 2004; 
Injuries: 347; 
Fatalities: 13. 

Year: 2005; 
Injuries: 790; 
Fatalities: 33. 

Year: 2006; 
Injuries: 222; 
Fatalities: 6. 

Year: 2007; 
Injuries: 310; 
Fatalities: 9. 

Year: 2008; 
Injuries: 331; 
Fatalities: 27. 

Year: 2009; 
Injuries: 116; 
Fatalities: 4. 

Source: DOT. 

Note: Figure excludes injuries and fatalities due to trespassing, 
suicides, and accidents that occurred at grade crossings. 

[End of figure] 

In its role as federal regulator and overseer of railroad safety, FRA 
prescribes and enforces railroad safety regulations and conducts R&D 
in support of improved railroad safety and rail transportation policy. 
[Footnote 13] Within the agency, FRA's Office of Railroad Safety 
promulgates and enforces railroad safety regulations, including 
requirements for track design and inspection; signal and train control 
systems; grade-crossing warning device systems; mechanical equipment, 
such as locomotives and freight cars; and railroad operating 
practices. For example, FRA's regulations for track and equipment 
include detailed, prescriptive minimum requirements, such as wheel 
safety requirements and formulas that determine the maximum allowable 
speeds on curved track. In developing most of its regulations, FRA 
seeks input from the railroad industry and other organizations through 
its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee.[Footnote 14] FRA's Office of 
Research and Development sponsors and conducts R&D of new rail safety 
technologies in support of FRA's safety mission. This work contributes 
information used to support FRA's development of regulations, 
standards, and best practices as well as encourages the development 
and use of new safety technologies. FRA's R&D work is done 
collaboratively with industry and universities and is also supported 
by the Volpe Center, which is DOT's transportation research center in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

Although its role has traditionally been that of a regulatory agency, 
recently enacted laws have expanded FRA's role in other areas. The 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 authorized over 
$3.7 billion for three federal programs for high-speed rail, intercity 
passenger rail congestion, and capital grants,[Footnote 15] while the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 appropriated $8 billion 
for these three programs.[Footnote 16] By creating a significant grant-
making role for funding the development of high-speed passenger rail, 
these laws effectively transformed what was essentially a rail safety 
organization to one that is making multibillion-dollar investment 
choices while also carrying out its safety mission. Regarding rail 
safety technologies, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 directs 
FRA to oversee railroads' implementation of PTC and other 
technologies.[Footnote 17] Specifically, the act requires passenger 
and major freight railroads to implement PTC by the end of 2015, with 
FRA playing a role as overseer of the industry's implementation 
through rulemaking and review of railroads' implementation plans. 
[Footnote 18] The act also directs FRA to require railroads to improve 
safety through the development of risk-reduction programs that include 
plans for implementing new rail safety technologies and to create a 
grant program to fund the deployment of rail safety technologies, 
authorized at $50 million per fiscal year from 2009 through 2013 (see 
table 2). 

Table 2: Rail Safety Technology-Related Requirements of the Rail 
Safety Improvement Act of 2008: 

PTC: 
* Class I railroads, commuter railroads, and Amtrak must install PTC 
on lines that carry passengers or a certain level of traffic and type 
of hazardous materials by December 2015[A]; 
* Railroads' PTC systems must be interoperable. Specifically, they 
must be able to communicate with one another and provide for seamless 
movement between sections of track owned by different railroads; 
* Railroads are required to submit plans to FRA by April 2010 
outlining how they will implement PTC and address interoperability. 
FRA must review and approve/disapprove plans by July 2010; 
* Once installed, railroads may not operate PTC systems until they are 
certified by FRA; 
* FRA must report to Congress on the status of PTC implementation by 
December 2012. 

Other rail safety technologies: 
* FRA required to develop a 5-year strategy for improving rail safety 
that includes improving research efforts to enhance and promote rail 
safety and performance and report to Congress annually on the strategy 
beginning in 2009; 
* By October 2009, FRA required to prescribe standards, guidance, 
regulations, or orders governing the development, implementation, and 
use of rail safety technologies in areas of track that lack signals or 
train control systems; 
* By October 2012, Class I freight railroads, intercity and commuter 
passenger railroads, and other railroads that FRA identifies on the 
basis of risk must develop a safety risk-reduction program that 
includes a technology implementation plan, which should describe the 
railroad's plan to develop and implement new safety technologies to 
reduce risks identified in the program[B]. 

Both PTC and other rail safety technologies
* FRA required to create a 5-year grant program to support the 
deployment of PTC and other rail safety technologies, which is 
authorized at $50 million per fiscal year from 2009 through 2013.[C] 

Source: Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008. 

[A] FRA's PTC rule provides for a "limited operations" exception, 
allowing a railroad not to implement and operate a PTC system on a 
particular track segment. See 49 C.F.R. § 236.1019(c). The requirement 
to install PTC on lines that carry hazardous materials applies only to 
those lines that carry at least 5 million gross tons of annual traffic 
and poisonous-by-inhalation hazardous materials. Additionally, some 
Class II and Class III freight railroads are required to install PTC 
on certain track segments. FRA has given these railroads additional 
time--until 2020--to equip some locomotives. FRA also has the 
authority to grant these smaller railroads certain exemptions from PTC 
implementation requirements. 

[B] The law requires that such railroads implement PTC by 2018 if they 
have not already done so. 

[C] Although the grant program is for rail safety technologies 
broadly, the law and FRA have given PTC priority for funding. 

[End of table] 

PTC is a communication-based system designed to prevent some accidents 
caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions and 
derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. Such a system is also 
designed to prevent incursions into work zones and movement of trains 
through switches left in the wrong position.[Footnote 19] PTC achieves 
these capabilities via communication with various components, namely 
locomotive computers, devices along the track (known as wayside 
units), and dispatch systems in centralized office locations (see 
figure 4).[Footnote 20] New data radios are being developed to enable 
wireless communication between locomotives and wayside units. 
Centralized offices and locomotives have access to a track database 
with information about track routes and other data, including speed 
restrictions, track configuration and topography, and the location of 
infrastructure such as switches and signals that indicate places where 
a train's speed may need to be enforced by PTC. Using this 
information, locomotive computers can continuously calculate a train's 
safe speed. If the train exceeds that speed, the PTC system should 
enforce braking as necessary. By preventing trains from entering a 
segment of track occupied by another train or from moving through an 
improperly aligned switch, PTC would prevent accidents such as those 
mentioned above that occurred in Los Angeles, California, and 
Graniteville, South Carolina.[Footnote 21] While the law does not 
require railroads to implement the same PTC system, it does require 
that railroads' PTC systems be interoperable, which means that the 
components of different PTC systems must be able to communicate with 
one another in a manner to provide for the seamless movement of trains 
as they cross track owned by different railroads that may have 
implemented different PTC systems. 

Figure 4: Basic Operation of PTC: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Depicted on the illustration: 

A centralized office dispatch system provides movement authority and 
speed restriction information to the locomotive computer. 

The locomotive computer accepts movement authority and speed 
restriction information and compares them against the train’s location 
to ensure compliance.[A] 

Wayside units monitor and report switch positions and signal 
indications to both the locomotive computer and the centralized office. 

How PTC improves safety: 
* As a train approaches a speed restriction, PTC issues a warning.[B] 
If the train operator fails to adequately reduce the speed of the 
locomotive, the system enforces a reduction in speed. 
* PTC also enforces braking or speed reductions when a train is 
approaching a segment of track occupied by another train, a work zone, 
or a misaligned switch. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Train location information is determined through various methods 
depending on the specific PTC system, including through satellite-
based positioning systems and sensors installed along the track. 

[B] Although the law does not require PTC systems to issue such 
warnings, the PTC systems that most railroads are implementing will do 
so. 

[End of figure] 

Train control systems similar to PTC already exist in other countries. 
For example, a system to automatically stop trains if a train operator 
fails to stop a train at a stop signal has been widely used in Japan 
since the 1960s, although this system has been upgraded over time to 
provide advanced warning of the need to slow a train and automatically 
apply train brakes in such situations. A more advanced system to 
continuously calculate a train's safe speed--similar to the capability 
that PTC is designed to achieve--is being implemented on the country's 
high-speed passenger rail lines. In Europe, countries use various 
signal and train control systems, presenting technical and logistical 
challenges for trains that travel between countries. To establish 
interoperability among these systems, the European Union has embarked 
on an effort to implement the European Rail Traffic Management System, 
a common signaling and train control system, as well as a radio 
communications network, that would overlay countries' existing signal 
and train control systems to establish interoperability among them. 
[Footnote 22] Like PTC, this system relies on a locomotive computer to 
calculate a train's safe speed and enforce that speed on the basis of 
certain information, such as a train's movement authority, the track 
speed limit, and the position of signals ahead of the train. 

In addition to the implementation plans outlined in the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008, FRA's subsequent PTC regulations also require 
railroads to submit PTC development plans and PTC safety plans. These 
three plans are related, and FRA requires different information for 
each of them: 

* PTC development plan:[Footnote 23] To get approval for the type of 
PTC system a railroad intends to install, the railroad must submit to 
FRA a plan describing the PTC system the railroad intends to implement 
and the railroad operations the PTC system will be used with.[Footnote 
24] Following FRA's review of this plan, if approved, the agency would 
issue the system described in the plan a "type approval," which is a 
number assigned to a particular PTC system indicating FRA agreement 
that the system could fulfill the requirements of the PTC regulations. 
[Footnote 25] 

* PTC implementation plan: This plan describes the functional 
requirements of the proposed PTC system, how the PTC system will 
achieve interoperability between the host railroad (the railroad that 
owns the track) and the tenant railroads (those railroads that operate 
on the host's track), how the PTC system will be installed first on 
track routes with greater risk, the sequence and schedule for 
installing PTC on specific track segments, and other information about 
PTC equipment to be installed on rolling stock and along the track. 
The law required railroads to submit these plans by April 16, 2010, 
and FRA to review and approve or disapprove them within 90 days. 

* PTC safety plan:[Footnote 26] This plan must include information 
about planned procedures for testing the system during and after 
installation, as well as information about safety hazards and risks 
the system will address, among other requirements. By approving a 
safety plan, FRA certifies a railroad's PTC system, which must happen 
before a railroad can operate a PTC system in revenue service. FRA set 
no specific deadline for railroads to submit this plan. 

In its PTC rulemaking, FRA also included requirements for implementing 
PTC on high-speed passenger rail lines, with trains operating at or 
above 90 miles per hour, that specify additional safety functions for 
PTC systems installed for trains operating at these higher speeds. 
[Footnote 27] FRA's High-Speed Rail Safety Strategy, released in 
November 2009, acknowledges the importance of implementing PTC for 
high-speed passenger rail operation and also calls for the evaluation 
of other specific technologies to determine their suitability for 
reducing risk for high-speed rail. 

Railroad Industry Has Made Progress in Developing PTC, but Key Tasks 
Remain to Completing Implementation: 

Railroad Industry Has Made Progress in Developing PTC Components, and 
Railroads Are Preparing for Widespread Implementation: 

Amtrak and the four largest Class I freight railroads have led PTC 
development efforts and most other railroads plan to implement PTC 
systems developed by these railroads.[Footnote 28] Amtrak worked with 
suppliers to develop PTC for the Northeast Corridor and began 
installation in 2000.[Footnote 29] Since that time, Amtrak has made 
improvements to this system, and FRA certified Amtrak's PTC system on 
the Northeast Corridor in May 2010--the first PTC system FRA certified 
under the PTC rules it issued in January 2010. Amtrak has also 
installed a different PTC system on a portion of track in southern 
Michigan. The four largest Class I freight railroads have identified 
suppliers of PTC technology and are working with these suppliers to 
develop PTC components; however, they have not yet installed PTC, 
except for some limited pilot installations.[Footnote 30] Although 
there are differences between the PTC systems being installed by 
Amtrak and those being installed by the freight railroads, they are 
designed to achieve the same basic functions. 

The PTC systems being developed by the four largest Class I freight 
railroads differ from PTC systems that exist in other countries and on 
some Amtrak routes. According to AAR officials, existing PTC systems 
were designed specifically for passenger rail operations and would not 
address the needs of the U.S. freight railroads. For example, the 
system that Amtrak uses on the Northeast Corridor combines PTC speed 
enforcement capabilities with an existing onboard system that provides 
track status information, such as signal status, to the locomotive 
engineer. Not all of the freight railroads currently use such an 
onboard track information system, and such a system would not be 
feasible to use on segments of track that lack signals, which accounts 
for about 13,000 miles of track owned by Class I freight railroads 
that requires PTC. Additionally, in developing new PTC systems, 
railroads must ensure that their systems are interoperable among the 
many different railroads that plan to use them.[Footnote 31] To 
achieve interoperability, the four largest Class I freight railroads 
created the Interoperable Train Control Committee to develop system 
specifications and standards for interoperability, including protocols 
for how PTC components should function and communicate with each other 
as part of an overall system.[Footnote 32] To achieve interoperability 
with the Class I freight railroads' systems, Amtrak will equip its 
locomotives that operate on freight-owned track with PTC radios 
capable of operating on the same frequencies as those used by the 
freight railroads. 

Components of PTC systems being developed by Class I freight railroads 
are in varying stages of development, with some components currently 
being produced; however, these components cannot be used or fully 
tested without software, which remains under development: 

* Wayside units: These units consist of devices installed at signals, 
switches, and other locations along the track. The units will monitor 
the status of signals and switches and communicate that information to: 

* locomotives directly or through railroads' centralized office 
systems. Hardware for these units is currently available and being 
tested by railroads. 

* Locomotive computers: These computers will provide centralized 
offices information on the train's location. Based on the status of 
upcoming signals or switches--which will be communicated to the 
locomotive by the wayside units--the locomotive computer will 
calculate the train's braking distance and enforce braking, if needed, 
to slow or stop a train to comply with speed restrictions and ensure 
it does not enter a segment of track occupied by another train or a 
work crew. Locomotive computers are available for railroads to install 
on newer locomotives. However, railroad associations told us that 
older locomotives that lack electronic systems will have to be 
upgraded before such computers and other PTC components can be 
installed on them. 

* Data radios: The freight railroads' PTC systems require the use of 
new data radios installed on locomotives and wayside units to enable 
PTC communication. Prototype specifications for these radios are still 
under development, and the railroad industry estimates that these 
radios will be in production starting in early 2012. The four largest 
Class I freight railroads share ownership in the company that is 
developing PTC data radios and jointly purchased radio spectrum to 
enable PTC communications. 

For these components to operate as a system, PTC software is necessary 
to perform all train control functions, including determining a 
train's location and calculating a train's braking distance. Complete 
PTC systems cannot be tested and implemented until software is 
finalized. PTC software is still under development, and railroad 
industry officials told us they expect it to be available sometime in 
2011. 

Forty-one railroads submitted their required PTC implementation plans 
to FRA in 2010, comprising the 7 Class I freight railroads, 2 Class II 
freight railroads, 9 Class III freight railroads, Amtrak, and 22 
commuter railroads.[Footnote 33] In these plans, railroads were 
required to provide information about the extent to which they will 
implement PTC, provide a schedule for progressive implementation, and 
prioritize implementation on the basis of risk.[Footnote 34] Railroads 
have begun implementing PTC in some locations. Amtrak has installed 
PTC on just over 200 miles of the 363 miles it owns along the 
Northeast Corridor and plans to expand its system along the corridor 
and its connections. It has also installed PTC on about 60 miles of 
track in southern Michigan and will extend this system along the full 
97 miles of track it owns in that area. Class I freight railroads have 
selected the PTC systems they intend to implement and have informed 
FRA of their selections by submitting PTC development plans. Some 
freight railroads and commuter railroads that operate on the Northeast 
Corridor are already equipped with Amtrak's PTC system. Commuter 
railroads that connect with the corridor will equip their additional 
rail lines with this system. 

Other freight and commuter railroads that are required to implement 
PTC have not yet begun implementation. Many of these commuter 
railroads and Class II and Class III freight railroads plan to 
implement the same systems being developed by the Class I freight 
railroads.[Footnote 35] As we have previously stated, components for 
PTC systems being developed by the Class I freight railroads are not 
yet available. Officials from the American Public Transportation 
Association and the American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association--which represent commuter railroads and Class II and Class 
III freight railroads, respectively--told us that those railroads are 
awaiting these components to begin installation of PTC. While only a 
small number of Class II and Class III freight railroads are required 
by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 to implement PTC on their 
property, FRA regulations require some additional Class II and Class 
III freight railroads to install PTC on their locomotives if they 
operate on track equipped with PTC and share that track with passenger 
trains.[Footnote 36] 

Key Steps Remain to Implement PTC by 2015, with a Potential for Delay: 

By law, the rail industry must complete development, testing, and full 
implementation of PTC on most major routes within 5 years. Progress 
has been made by railroads and suppliers in preparing to implement 
PTC, but many actions must still be taken to achieve full 
implementation of PTC, and they must be completed in a specific 
sequence (see figure 5). Since PTC implementation requires the 
completion of a specific sequence of steps, any delay in one step 
could affect the entire implementation schedule, potentially resulting 
in railroads missing the implementation deadline, which would delay 
achieving the intended safety benefits of PTC. 

Figure 5: Sequence of the Railroad Industry's Upcoming PTC 
Implementation Steps: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

1) Complete development of PTC components and interoperability 
standards. 

2) Install components and conduct field testing[A]. 

3) Submit PTC safety plans to FRA for review. 

4) Receive PTC system certification from FRA. 

5) Complete installation and begin operating PTC on railroad networks 
nationwide. 

6) PTC deadline (December 2015). 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Some installation of components has begun. Also, railroads plan to 
conduct tests throughout these implementation steps, including tests 
required by FRA to receive system certification. 

[End of figure] 

As we have previously discussed, all PTC components for the Class I 
freight railroads' systems are not yet developed. In addition, the 
development of PTC software and new data radios requires the 
development of interoperability standards, which the four largest 
Class I freight railroads and AAR have not yet finalized.[Footnote 37] 
Specifically, AAR officials told us that the Interoperable Train 
Control Committee had expected to complete all of these standards by 
July 2010, but as of August, only 3 of the approximately 40 standards 
needed were ready. Furthermore, AAR officials told us in September 
that although the committee continues to make progress in developing 
these standards and has consolidated some standards to cut down the 
total needed, it has not set a new date for when it expects to 
complete this effort. AAR officials explained that delays are due to 
the complexity and amount of work that must be completed. FRA 
officials monitoring this effort told us in September that they do not 
know when the standards will be completed, and that they have some 
concerns about the potential for the delay in developing these 
standards to impact railroads' ability to procure PTC components in a 
timely manner. FRA officials also said that although it is their 
understanding that the remaining standards have been drafted and are 
undergoing industry review, they expect this process to last at least 
through the first quarter of calendar year 2011. 

System complexity was a factor that led to delays in an earlier PTC 
development effort. In 2001, FRA, Amtrak, the Union Pacific Railroad, 
AAR, and the State of Illinois created the North American Joint 
Positive Train Control Project, an objective of which was the 
development of interoperable PTC standards. However, this objective 
was not achieved by the time the project came to a close in 
2006.[Footnote 38] Specifically, system testing revealed that a 
significant amount of software development would be required for the 
PTC system to be compatible with normal railroad operations, which FRA 
concluded would require several additional years to complete. 

Railroads currently expect that key PTC components will be available 
by 2012, but there is uncertainty regarding whether this can be 
achieved, given the delays in developing the interoperability 
standards and current lack of software for PTC components. Any delays 
in component development would consequently delay pilot installations 
for field testing. The lack of developed components raises questions 
about the technological maturity of the Class I freights' PTC systems. 
If the railroad industry is unable to develop fully functional 
components within the expected time frame, it is possible that testing 
and installation of these components could not be completed by the 
2015 deadline. Our prior work examining the development of military 
weapon systems has shown that demonstrating a high level of maturity 
before allowing new technologies into product development programs 
increases the chance for successful implementation, and that, 
conversely, technologies that were included in a product development 
program before they were mature later contributed to cost increases 
and schedule delays.[Footnote 39] 

Once PTC components are developed, railroads must test them in the 
field to ensure that PTC systems function properly and that components 
of PTC systems are able to communicate with each other regardless of 
railroad ownership. Any problems that are identified during the field- 
testing process will need to be addressed to ensure the PTC systems 
function as required. AAR officials told us that PTC tests have only 
been conducted in very controlled environments, as opposed to a truly 
operational environment where the systems could experience stress. 
[Footnote 40] For example, railroads must ensure that PTC systems 
provide reliable communication among centralized offices, wayside 
units, and locomotives. However, it is uncertain how well system 
communication will fare in densely populated areas, such as Chicago, 
Illinois, where many railroads--both passenger and freight--operate 
simultaneously.[Footnote 41] Furthermore, railroad industry officials 
have expressed concern that all electrical components associated with 
PTC contain inherent failure rates. Since PTC implementation requires 
the installation of a large number of devices, the possibility of 
failure must be addressed and railroads must ensure that any possible 
failures do not negatively affect railroad safety or operational 
capacity. Any problems identified during field testing, if they cannot 
be quickly addressed, could contribute to missing the PTC 
implementation deadline. Conversely, implementing an immature system 
to meet the deadline could pose serious safety risks. After railroads 
complete PTC field tests, they must submit safety plans to FRA for 
review, and FRA must certify PTC systems before railroads can begin 
operating them in revenue service. 

Given the extent to which railroads must implement PTC, installation 
will require a considerable amount of work, since it will include the 
installation of thousands of physical devices on both track and 
locomotives. Class I freight railroads, for example, must implement 
PTC on over 70,000 of the approximately 94,000 miles over which they 
operate, which is about 75 percent of their network.[Footnote 42] The 
railroad industry estimates that about 50,000 wayside units must be 
installed along track, and data radios must be installed on each 
wayside unit. Class I freight railroads also expect to install PTC 
computers and data radios on over 17,000 locomotives, which represent 
about 70 percent of their fleet that is used for mainline operations. 
Additionally, commuter railroads must install PTC on their vehicles, 
even if the railroads do not own track, which FRA estimates will mean 
equipping about 4,100 vehicles. As we have previously stated, PTC 
computers are available for installation on new locomotives, but some 
older locomotives need to be upgraded first before PTC can be 
installed. Officials at some Class I freight railroads and commuter 
railroads have expressed concern that a limited number of companies 
are currently responsible for supplying PTC components to railroads, 
and that the availability of equipment could impact railroads' ability 
to complete implementation on time. While rail supply companies told 
us they expect to meet the demand for PTC components, some also 
acknowledged that they may need to expand to do so. 

Completing implementation will be costly for the railroad industry and 
could make it difficult for commuter and smaller freight railroads to 
meet the 2015 deadline. In 2009, FRA estimated that developing, 
purchasing, installing, and maintaining PTC would likely cost 
railroads between $9.5 billion and $13.1 billion. However, because 
these costs are still uncertain, the agency acknowledged that costs 
could be as low as $6.7 billion or as high as $22.5 billion. The large 
amount of equipment needed to complete implementation before the 
deadline will create a temporary increase in demand for suppliers. FRA 
has acknowledged that having multiple railroads purchasing the same 
equipment at the same time could cause the prices of PTC equipment to 
rise and, therefore, could raise the overall cost of implementation. 

Among passenger railroads, the cost of PTC could be especially 
problematic. For example, Amtrak officials expressed concern about the 
cost of PTC implementation on Amtrak routes supported with state 
funding, since some states may not be able to fund the additional 
costs associated with PTC implementation.[Footnote 43] Commuter 
railroads are publicly funded, and some are facing funding shortfalls 
that are leading them to increase fares or reduce service levels. In 
their implementation plans, some commuter railroads stated that 
funding for current operations is already at risk due to stress on 
their state funding partners, and officials from other commuter 
railroads told us that they are unsure how they will be able to pay 
for PTC implementation. The American Public Transportation Association 
has estimated that PTC implementation will cost the commuter railroad 
industry at least $2 billion. Although the cost of implementation will 
be spread over a number of years, it could still strain the budgets of 
some commuter railroads.[Footnote 44] For example, a transit agency in 
San Diego, California, told us that implementing PTC for its commuter 
railroad could cost as much as $60 million to $90 million, while the 
annual capital budget for the agency, which also provides bus service, 
is about $10 million. In its PTC implementation plan, this agency 
stated that it did not have any significant approved funding available 
for implementation, and that its funding plan assumed receipt of both 
federal and state funding. Furthermore, the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) has estimated that commuter railroads face a 
$12.6 billion backlog to attaining a state of good repair, indicating 
that these railroads must make significant capital investments to 
improve the condition of their current assets.[Footnote 45] The cost 
of PTC could further delay commuter railroads making such investments. 

Class II and Class III freight railroads may also have difficulty in 
paying for PTC implementation.[Footnote 46] These freight railroads 
earn much less revenue than Class I freight railroads, and officials 
from the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
expressed concern about the ability of these railroads to cover the 
costs of PTC. Class II and Class III freight railroads tend to have 
older equipment, for which the costs of PTC installation will be 
higher since, as we have previously discussed, some older locomotives 
will require electronic upgrades to enable the installation of PTC 
components. According to officials at the American Short Line and 
Regional Railroad Association, the cost of installing PTC on some 
locomotives could exceed the total value of those locomotives. The 
four Class II and Class III freight railroads that included a 
description of implementation risks in their PTC implementation plans 
included cost as a risk factor, with one railroad noting that paying 
for PTC will require it to divert funding from its routine maintenance 
requirements. Even the larger freight railroads acknowledged that 
paying for PTC could have implications on their budgets. Specifically, 
officials from Class I freight railroads and AAR have indicated that 
paying for PTC could result in the diversion of funds from capital 
investments, such as capacity-improving projects, and could impact 
their ability to invest in other safety technologies. 

The uncertainties that we discuss regarding when the remaining tasks 
to implement PTC can be completed, as well as the cost of doing so, 
raise certain risks to the successful completion of PTC by the 
deadline. Potential delays in developing PTC components, software, and 
interoperability standards, as well as delays that could occur during 
the subsequent testing and implementation of PTC systems, raise the 
risk that railroads will not meet the implementation deadline and that 
the safety benefits of PTC will be delayed. Furthermore, the extent to 
which commuter railroads and small freight railroads have difficulty 
in covering the costs of PTC implementation raises the risk that these 
railroads could miss the deadline if funding is not available or that 
other critical needs may go unmet if money is diverted to pay for PTC. 
As we noted, commuter railroads are already facing challenges in 
funding current operations, and paying for PTC could impact the 
ability of these railroads, as well as smaller freight railroads, to 
make the necessary investments in maintenance. 

Other Rail Safety Technologies Hold Promise for Preventing or 
Mitigating Collisions and Derailments, but Face Implementation 
Challenges: 

Rail Safety Technologies to Inspect Track, Improve or Monitor Rolling 
Stock, Protect Occupants, and Improve Switches Hold Promise for 
Addressing Key Causes of Accidents: 

While PTC addresses some accidents caused by human factors, other 
technologies being developed can address other causes of accidents, 
such as problems with track or equipment that account for a 
significant portion of accidents and would not be addressed by PTC. 
According to experts and other stakeholders from the railroad industry 
and government, a number of rail safety technologies under development 
hold promise for improving safety.[Footnote 47] In particular, some of 
these technologies may be essential for addressing the safety of high-
speed passenger rail or areas of track that lack signals or PTC. We 
identified four broad categories of technologies that current 
development efforts are focused in. Figure 6 shows where such 
technologies can be integrated into the existing rail environment to 
improve safety. 

Figure 6: Integration of Other Rail Safety Technologies in the Rail 
Environment: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Depicted on the illustration: 

Track inspection technologies inspect track for defects, such as 
cracks, or misalignment that could cause train derailments. Includes 
bridge integrity monitoring technology. 

Switch improvement technologies address the problem of track switches 
left in the wrong position by monitoring switches and informing 
approaching trains about the position of a switch or allowing a train 
operator to control switches from the train. 

Rolling stock improvement and monitoring technologies represent 
improvements to rail vehicles themselves (such as their structural 
design or specific components, such as brakes) or devices that inspect 
the condition of rail vehicles. 

Occupant protection technologies are specific design changes to 
passenger vehicles to better protect occupants in the event of a train 
collision. For example, crash energy management-–a design concept that 
incorporates “crush zones” into vehicles to absorb collision impact 
forces–-is a promising technology to mitigate the effects of a train 
collision. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

* Track inspection: New technologies have the potential to better 
inspect track for cracks in the rail that could lead to breakage as 
well as measure the track's alignment to ensure that rails are laid at 
the proper angle and distance apart. About one-third of rail accidents 
are caused by track defects, such as broken or misaligned rail that 
could cause a train to derail. Experts and other stakeholders noted 
that some of these technologies have the potential to allow railroads 
to better manage track risks by providing more accurate data about the 
size and nature of track defects. Railroads could then monitor such 
defects over time and make risk-based track maintenance decisions. 
Such technologies could be particularly useful for high-speed 
passenger rail operations, since track that carries high-speed trains 
must be maintained to a higher standard. 

* Switch improvement: These technologies address the problem of track 
switches left in the wrong position, which could lead a train onto the 
wrong track and cause an accident. Several experts observed that 
technology to monitor and indicate the position of a switch would 
provide particular benefit for sections of track that lack signals, 
and two experts told us the technology would have prevented the 2005 
accident in Graniteville, South Carolina. This technology is among 
those that the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 suggests DOT 
include when prescribing the development and implementation of rail 
safety technologies in areas of track that lack signals or train 
control systems. 

* Rolling stock improvement and monitoring: New technologies to 
improve the function or design of rail vehicles, as well as devices to 
inspect them, can provide safety benefits by improving the safe 
operation of trains and better identify when train components develop 
problems that could cause an accident. For example, experts and other 
stakeholders noted that technology to provide real-time monitoring of 
certain wheel assembly components is an important technology for high-
speed trains, since overheating of these components can quickly lead 
to failure. European officials from an association of rail supply 
companies told us this technology is used for European high-speed 
passenger trains.[Footnote 48] 

* Occupant protection: Incorporating new designs into passenger rail 
vehicles, such as crash energy management--a design concept that 
incorporates parts designed to crumple under stress to absorb 
collision energy to mitigate impact forces--represents a new way of 
thinking about crashworthiness, which has traditionally involved 
designing vehicles with hard exteriors to resist deformation. European 
rail officials told us this technology is used in European passenger 
trains. FRA's crashworthiness regulations have included standards for 
incorporating crash energy management into rail vehicles since 1999 
and require crash energy management for high-speed passenger trains 
operating up to 150 miles per hour.[Footnote 49] 

Among the technologies we examined, we identified some as being more 
promising, based on experts' views about the technologies' potential 
to improve safety, their worth in doing so compared with their 
additional cost for development and implementation, and their being in 
a later stage of product development (see table 3).[Footnote 50] 

Table 3: Most Promising Rail Safety Technologies under Development, 
Based on Expert Views, by Category: 

Technology: Track inspection: Bridge integrity monitoring systems; 
Description: Sensor-based systems used to detect bridge damage or 
structural defects that could lead to collapse. 

Technology: Rolling stock improvement and monitoring: Wayside 
detectors; 
Description: Devices installed along tracks that inspect vehicles as 
they pass to monitor vehicle health or examine them to identify 
potential problems that could cause an accident in certain locations, 
such as examining wheel structures before trains go down hills. 

Technology: Rolling stock improvement and monitoring: Electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes; 
Description: Advanced braking system that increases the speed at which 
brake signals are sent through a train, which can reduce stopping 
distances and prevent braking-related derailments. 

Technology: Occupant protection: Crash energy management; 
Description: Incorporates crush zones into vehicle design to absorb 
energy and better control the deformation of a vehicle in the event of 
a collision to preserve occupant space. 

Technology: Occupant protection: Improved design of interior passenger 
car fixtures; 
Description: Modification to interior fixtures of passenger cars, such 
as seats and tables, to reduce the severity of injury during an 
accident. 

Technology: Switch improvement: Switch position monitors/indicators; 
Description: Monitors the position of track switches and provides this 
information to train operators. 

Source: GAO analysis of expert questionnaire responses. 

[End of table] 

Regarding their stage in product development and implementation, 
experts mostly viewed these technologies as having some deployment, 
except for wayside detectors, which experts viewed as more widely 
deployed; however, this may vary depending on the type of detector. 
[Footnote 51] 

Some of these most promising technologies are also deployed in other 
countries; however, differences in the nature of rail systems in those 
countries as compared with the United States could mean that the 
benefits of a particular technology may not be the same. As we have 
previously discussed, the U.S. rail system consists mostly of freight 
railroads; however, in Europe and Japan, passenger rail, including 
high-speed rail, is more predominant. Such differences in the rail 
systems may lead to differences in how new rail safety technologies 
are implemented. For example, although foreign stakeholders told us 
that electronically controlled pneumatic brakes are common on 
passenger trains in Europe, they are not used on freight trains. 
Because European freight trains are generally lighter and shorter than 
American freight trains, they can stop in a shorter time and distance 
than longer, heavier American freight trains can stop. Consequently, a 
European freight railroad would realize less benefit from the improved 
stopping efficiency that this technology offers. Additionally, unlike 
in the United States, there is not a significant amount of European 
track miles that lack signals, so the challenge of addressing safety 
for unsignaled areas with technologies such as switch position 
monitors/indicators is generally not an issue. Additionally, 
philosophical differences in approaches to railroad safety may affect 
how rail safety technologies are implemented. Specifically, foreign 
rail officials and academics with knowledge of rail practices in 
Europe and Japan, as well as FRA officials, told us that safety 
efforts in Europe and Japan are driven more by a desire to avoid 
accidents, rather than to mitigate their effects. 

Cost, Uncertainty about Effectiveness, Regulations, and Lack of 
Interoperability Create Challenges to Implementing New Rail Safety 
Technologies: 

Experts and other stakeholders identified costs, uncertainty about 
effectiveness, regulations, and lack of interoperability with existing 
systems and equipment as key challenges to implementing new rail 
safety technologies: 

* Cost: Most experts indicated that cost was a major challenge for 
implementing rail safety technologies in all four technology 
categories, including for some of the most promising technologies-- 
specifically electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, crash energy 
management, and switch position monitors/indicators.[Footnote 52] 
Additionally, according to some experts, other stakeholders, and FRA 
officials, because of the costs they are incurring to implement PTC, 
railroads are not looking to spend capital to implement other rail 
safety technologies. Commuter railroads and short line railroads also 
lack the capital budgets to invest in new technologies. Some experts 
and other stakeholders, as well as FRA officials, also told us there 
is sometimes a disconnect between who would pay for a particular 
technology and who would benefit from it. For example, one of the 
experts and representatives from a railroad association we interviewed 
told us that electronically controlled pneumatic brakes would most 
benefit the railroads, while the cost of installing them would fall on 
the car owner, which could be a shipping company and not a railroad. 

* Uncertainty about a technology's effectiveness: Several of the 
experts and other stakeholders we interviewed identified uncertainty 
about a technology's effectiveness as a key implementation challenge 
and noted that proving the effectiveness of a new technology is 
critical to gaining its acceptance for use by the industry. In 
particular, most experts noted that uncertainty about effectiveness 
was a challenge to implementing several of the track inspection and 
measurement technologies, presumably because of their lack of 
maturity, since the experts also tended to indicate that these 
technologies were in the early stages of development.[Footnote 53] The 
reluctance by railroads to implement a technology due to cost is also 
affected by uncertainty about a technology's effectiveness. According 
to FRA officials, railroads will not adopt a new technology unless 
they know it will deliver a positive return on their investment. 

* Regulations: Experts and other stakeholders reported a disincentive 
under current regulations to use new track inspection technologies. 
Specifically, they were concerned that such technologies identify 
track defects perceived as too insignificant to pose a safety risk, 
but which nonetheless require remedial action under current 
regulations once such defects are identified. Regulations were 
generally not cited by experts and other stakeholders as a major 
challenge to implementing the other new technologies.[Footnote 54] 

* Lack of interoperability with existing systems and equipment: Most 
experts indicated in our questionnaire that lack of interoperability 
was a major implementation challenge for electronically controlled 
pneumatic brakes.[Footnote 55] Specifically, they told us that for 
such brakes to function properly, all cars on a train would have to be 
equipped with them, which, although practical for a passenger train or 
a train that does not exchange cars with another train--such as a 
train that carries one type of cargo, like coal--would not be 
practical for a mixed-freight train whose cars are exchanged with 
other trains, which is common in rail operations. Additionally, some 
stakeholders said that crash energy management is difficult to 
retrofit into existing rolling stock. Experts did not agree that lack 
of interoperability was a major challenge for the other technologies. 

FRA Has Taken Actions to Fulfill the PTC Mandate and Promote Other 
Technologies, but Opportunities Exist to Inform Congress of Risks and 
Improve Monitoring: 

To Date, FRA Is Taking the Necessary Steps to Fulfill the PTC Mandate: 

To fulfill the PTC mandate, FRA (1) has developed regulations 
regarding the implementation of PTC systems, (2) is monitoring PTC 
implementation efforts, and (3) is managing funding programs to 
support PTC implementation. 

Development of Regulations: 

In January 2010, FRA issued final regulations on PTC implementation on 
the basis of requirements in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008. 
[Footnote 56] These regulations were developed in collaboration with 
the railroad industry and other stakeholders through FRA's Railroad 
Safety Advisory Committee. Among other things, the regulations 
describe the requirements of a PTC system; require railroads to submit 
PTC development, implementation, and safety plans and FRA to review 
and approve them; require railroads to implement PTC by December 31, 
2015; and establish a schedule of civil penalties for violations. 

Oversight of Railroads' PTC Implementation Efforts: 

To oversee railroads' progress in implementing PTC, FRA has provided 
guidance and is monitoring implementation, including by reviewing 
railroads' PTC-related plans and directly observing railroads' PTC- 
related activities. Specifically, FRA has provided guidance to the 
railroad industry on PTC implementation by speaking at industry 
conferences, meeting with railroads to discuss PTC implementation 
plans, and providing railroads with a template for drafting their PTC 
implementation plans.[Footnote 57] The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008 and FRA's regulations require the agency to provide timely review 
and approval of PTC development, implementation, and safety plans. 
[Footnote 58] FRA must review and approve PTC development plans before 
railroads can submit their PTC safety plans, receive PTC system 
certification from FRA, and begin operating PTC systems (see figure 
7). FRA reviewed PTC implementation plans before completing its review 
of all PTC development plans, since the implementation plans had a 
review deadline set by statute, whereas development plans did not. As 
of July 2010, FRA completed its first review of all 41 of the PTC 
implementation plans railroads submitted. As of December 3, 2010, 
according to FRA officials, 21 plans were fully approved and 13 were 
provisionally approved. The remaining 7 plans were disapproved; the 
agency returned these plans to railroads with requests to make 
technical corrections or provide more detailed information and 
resubmit them to FRA for subsequent approval.[Footnote 59] 

Figure 7: Approximate Timeline of Key FRA Actions to Meet the PTC 
Implementation Mandate: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

Issued final PTC regulations (January 2010). 

Review PTC development plans (April 2010–2011). 

Review PTC implementation plans (April 2010–January 2011). 

Review PTC safety plans/certify PTC systems (May 2010–2015). 

Monitor PTC testing and implementation (2011–2015). 

DOT reports to Congress on railroads’ progress in implementing PTC 
(December 2012). 

PTC implementation deadline (December 2015). 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Dates are approximations based on information provided by FRA. 

[End of figure] 

FRA has since been reviewing PTC development plans. According to the 
PTC final rule, FRA, to the extent practicable, will approve, approve 
with conditions, or disapprove these plans within 60 days of receipt. 
[Footnote 60] In March 2010, three of the four largest Class I freight 
railroads jointly submitted a PTC development plan. In a May 2010 
letter to those railroads, FRA stated it would not complete review of 
the plan within the 60-day time frame specified in the final rule 
because agency personnel were needed to review the large number of 
implementation plans FRA received, which had a review deadline set by 
statute. FRA completed an initial review of the development plan in 
July 2010 and sent a letter to the railroads asking them to (1) revise 
the development plan and resubmit it after making some corrections and 
(2) provide FRA with specific details on the magnitude of the risk the 
delay in FRA's review and approval of the development plan would have 
on the timely implementation of PTC. FRA officials told us they met 
with representatives from these railroads in August and October 2010 
to discuss resolution of FRA's remaining issues and concerns and are 
working with the railroads on an ongoing basis to do so. Several 
experts and other stakeholders told us that if development or 
implementation plan approvals were delayed, railroads' PTC 
implementation schedules could, in turn, be delayed, possibly 
resulting in railroads not meeting the PTC implementation deadline. In 
this specific case, the three Class I freight railroads noted in a 
July 2010 letter to FRA that a delay in approving their PTC 
development plan could delay PTC development and implementation time 
frames. Other railroads could also be affected, since three other 
Class I freight railroads, three smaller freight railroads, Amtrak, 
and nine commuter railroads are relying on the approval of this plan, 
because they are also implementing the same PTC system. 

FRA plans to monitor railroads' progress in implementing PTC by 
requiring railroads to provide periodic information on implementation 
progress and by directly observing railroads' testing and 
implementation of PTC. In its final PTC rule, FRA requires that 
railroads report annually on the percentage of their trains that are 
PTC-equipped and operating on PTC-equipped track.[Footnote 61] FRA 
officials told us that the intent of this reporting is to monitor 
railroads' implementation of PTC so that railroads gradually implement 
this technology in the years leading to the 2015 deadline. Members of 
the newly established PTC branch within FRA's Office of Safety will 
conduct further monitoring of PTC implementation. According to FRA 
officials, these 11 new staff members in headquarters and regional 
offices will monitor railroads' work to verify the accuracy of 
information in PTC track databases; observe testing conducted by 
railroads prior to PTC system certification; and, if needed, advise 
railroads to conduct more tests or different tests to establish that 
the PTC system complies with FRA regulations.[Footnote 62] 
Additionally, FRA is required to report to Congress in 2012 on the 
progress railroads have made in implementing PTC.[Footnote 63] 

Financial Assistance: 

FRA manages two funding programs to assist with PTC implementation. 
First, as required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, FRA 
manages a grant program to fund the deployment of rail safety 
technologies. This program is authorized to offer up to $50 million in 
grants to railroads each year for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. 
Congress did not appropriate funding for this program in fiscal year 
2009 and provided $50 million in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 64] The 
law stipulates that funding under this program be prioritized for 
implementation of PTC over other rail safety technologies. In November 
2010, FRA awarded grants totaling $50 million to seven projects for 
fiscal year 2010, six of which were related to PTC, while the seventh 
was awarded for implementation of a risk management system. FRA 
received 41 applications seeking over $228 million in funding for the 
fiscal year 2010 grants. This grant program is particularly popular, 
but its funding as authorized will cover only a small portion of the 
estimated costs of PTC implementation, which FRA has acknowledged 
could range from $6.7 billion to $22.5 billion. Second, FRA also 
manages the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program, 
which authorizes FRA to provide loans and loan guarantees up to $35 
billion ($7 billion of which is reserved for non-Class I freight 
railroads). Funding awarded under this program may be used for several 
purposes, including implementation of PTC and other rail safety 
technologies, but can also be used for more general improvements to 
infrastructure, including track, bridges, and rail yards. FRA staff 
told us that as of September 2010, no railroads have applied to this 
loan program for PTC implementation and speculated that the program's 
requirement to demonstrate creditworthiness may have deterred some 
railroads from applying. It may also be too soon in the PTC 
implementation time frame for most railroads to need loans, if they 
are not yet purchasing PTC equipment. Officials from the American 
Short Line and Regional Railroad Association told us that using these 
loans to pay for PTC would help smaller freight railroads meet the 
implementation mandate.[Footnote 65] 

In addition, FRA officials said that the agency is working with FTA to 
see whether FTA could provide financial assistance to commuter 
railroads for PTC implementation. FRA officials said that to provide 
this financial assistance, FTA would need to seek additional funds in 
its annual budget request to Congress. FTA did not request such funds 
for fiscal year 2011 and is currently developing its budget request 
for fiscal year 2012. 

FRA Has an Opportunity to Identify and Report to Congress on PTC 
Implementation Risks and Potential Mitigation Actions: 

As we have previously discussed, there are uncertainties regarding 
when the remaining tasks to implement PTC can be completed, which 
raise certain risks to the successful completion of PTC by the 2015 
deadline. FRA officials told us they are aware of some of these risks, 
but they said that it is too early to know whether they are 
significant enough to jeopardize successful implementation by the 2015 
deadline. However, as FRA moves forward with monitoring railroads' 
implementation of PTC, the agency will have more information regarding 
the risks previously discussed. In particular, the agency should have 
a clearer picture of whether it is likely railroads will meet the 2015 
implementation deadline and what the associated implications would be. 
For example, by the time FRA reports to Congress in 2012 on PTC 
implementation progress, it will be clearer whether the state of PTC 
component maturity poses a risk to timely implementation, since the 
railroad industry currently expects components will be available by 
2012. Additionally, the cost to implement PTC should be more certain, 
and therefore it will be clearer whether problems in financing PTC-- 
particularly for commuter and smaller freight railroads--could lead to 
delays or whether the costs of PTC could result in other operational 
needs, such as maintenance, going unmet due to the diversion of funds 
to pay for PTC. 

Our past work has shown that the early identification of risks and 
strategies to mitigate them can help avoid negative outcomes for the 
implementation of large-scale projects. For example, our 2004 report 
examining an Amtrak project to improve the Northeast Corridor noted 
that early identification and assessment of problems would allow for 
prompt intervention, increasing the likelihood that corrective action 
could be taken to get the project back on track.[Footnote 66] 
Furthermore, for our work examining the transition from analog to 
digital television broadcasting, we pointed out how such efforts are 
particularly crucial when the implementation of a large-scale project 
relies on private organizations to achieve public benefits.[Footnote 
67] Such is the case with the implementation of PTC, which was 
mandated for reasons of public safety but is largely the 
responsibility of railroads to accomplish. FRA's 2012 report to 
Congress presents the agency with an opportunity to inform Congress of 
the likelihood that railroads will meet the 2015 implementation 
deadline, as well as potential implementation risks and strategies to 
address them. Such information would help Congress determine whether 
the railroad industry is on track to successfully implement PTC by 
2015 or whether there are major risks associated with this effort that 
require intervention by Congress, FRA, railroads, or other 
stakeholders. FRA officials told us they have not yet determined what 
information will go in their report. 

FRA Has Taken Some Actions to Encourage the Implementation of Other 
Technologies, but Does Not Fully Use Best Practices: 

In keeping with its mission of promoting safety throughout the 
national railroad system, FRA has taken a number of actions to 
encourage the use of rail safety technologies other than PTC--such as 
electronically controlled pneumatic brakes or switch position 
monitors/indicators--by (1) collaborating with industry on R&D 
efforts, (2) supporting demonstration and pilot projects, (3) 
analyzing technology costs related to benefits, and (4) issuing or 
revising regulations.[Footnote 68] 

Collaboration with Industry on R&D: 

FRA has worked with members of the railroad industry--through the 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, AAR, and TTCI--to prioritize and 
select technologies to be included in FRA's R&D program. FRA and AAR 
collaborate extensively on R&D projects at TTCI, a DOT-owned, AAR- 
operated research facility. Additionally, FRA's Office of Research and 
Development may select a railroad partner when beginning a new R&D 
project. For example, FRA partnered with one of the largest Class I 
freight railroads to demonstrate a new technology that measures the 
interaction between rail cars and the track--known as vehicle/track 
interaction technology. According to a senior FRA official, these 
devices are now widely deployed, and FRA continues to study ways to 
model vehicle/track interaction. Each year, FRA also presents 
information about its completed and ongoing R&D projects to the 
Transportation Research Board--a body that includes railroad industry 
representatives--which then conducts an evaluation of FRA's R&D 
program.[Footnote 69] Additionally, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008 called for FRA to develop a railroad safety strategy, which the 
agency issued in 2010 with its fiscal year 2011 budget request. 
Although this plan does not include any efforts to encourage 
implementation of specific rail safety technologies, it does state 
that FRA's Office of Research and Development has expanded its use of 
grants and partnerships with railroads and suppliers to improve 
stakeholder participation in its R&D and support the demonstration of 
results as soon as possible. 

Support of Demonstration and Pilot Projects: 

FRA has conducted and provides support for a number of demonstration 
and pilot projects that examine technologies aimed at improving rail 
safety and help to demonstrate to railroads the effectiveness of these 
technologies. According to FRA staff, the agency has put a focus on 
funding technology demonstration projects and has a cooperative 
agreement with AAR to do this work. Based on our review of FRA's list 
of 143 current R&D projects for fiscal year 2010, 49 of these projects 
appear to involve demonstrations of new technologies or existing 
technologies used in new ways to improve safety. For example, there is 
a current demonstration project examining the use of electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes. Past demonstration projects have examined 
a variety of rail safety technologies, including devices that measure 
track--known as gage restraint measurement systems[Footnote 70]-- 
vehicle/track interaction technology and automated inspection devices. 
Additionally, an FRA risk-reduction grant program supports several 
ongoing pilot projects with railroads, two of which are examining 
technologies aimed at continuously testing track to collect data on 
the track's performance as well as to identify defects.[Footnote 71] 
FRA produces summary reports of some of its R&D efforts and publishes 
these reports on its Web site. 

Analysis of Technology Costs and Benefits: 

FRA has taken recent actions to analyze the potential costs and 
benefits to railroads of implementing new rail safety technologies. 
When issuing the final rule on electronically controlled pneumatic 
brakes, FRA conducted a cost-benefit analysis and included this 
information in the rule. Additionally, FRA analyzed potential return 
on investments for vehicle/track interaction technology to demonstrate 
to freight railroads potential cost-savings that could be achieved 
from implementing this technology by preventing derailments and 
reducing the need for emergency repairs or slow speed orders on 
sections of track with defective rail. FRA staff noted that railroads 
generally will not adopt a new technology unless it can be 
demonstrated to have a positive return on investment within 1 to 2 
years. FRA staff also noted that because the agency demonstrated a 
positive return on investment for a new vehicle/track interaction 
system, a major Class I freight railroad adopted the technology. 

Issuance and Revision of Regulations: 

FRA has also issued or revised regulations and is planning further 
regulatory changes in an attempt to encourage the use of new rail 
safety technologies. For example: 

* FRA issued final regulations promoting the use of electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes in October 2008.[Footnote 72] The 
regulations create an incentive for installing this technology by 
allowing railroads that install these brakes and comply with the 
regulations to conduct less frequent brake inspections, thereby 
decreasing the railroads' inspection costs and potentially allowing 
for more frequent train operations. Prior to the establishment of 
these regulations, railroads were not permitted to use these 
specialized braking systems without first applying for an exemption 
from existing FRA regulations. FRA will provide an exemption from 
existing regulations on a case-by-case basis to railroads that seek 
such approval. For example, before PTC was required by law, FRA issued 
regulatory exemptions and eventually established regulations promoting 
the use of PTC.[Footnote 73] FRA has also issued regulatory exemptions 
allowing for the use of unmanned track inspection machines to monitor 
track conditions and crash energy management designs in passenger rail 
vehicles. 

* FRA is currently working with the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee 
to revise its track inspection regulations, which, according to some 
experts and stakeholders we spoke with, create a disincentive for 
railroads to implement new track inspection technologies. As 
previously discussed, current FRA regulations generally require 
railroads to take remedial action, such as limiting train speeds or 
replacing track, when a track defect is found.[Footnote 74] 
Stakeholders we spoke with noted that using newer track inspection 
technologies would detect a greater number of small, relatively minor 
defects that pose little to no safety risk, along with more 
significant defects. However, stakeholders stated that FRA's current 
track inspection regulations could create a situation in which 
railroads using newer inspection technologies might find more small 
defects than they could practically examine and fix in a timely 
manner, and could be held liable for identifying defects they did not 
quickly repair. To account for these newer technologies, FRA staff 
said they are considering changes to the remedial actions railroads 
must take in response to identified rail defects. FRA expects to issue 
a notice of proposed rulemaking on this and other changes to its track 
inspection regulations in the spring of 2011. Additionally, pursuant 
to its safety strategy for high-speed rail, FRA officials said they 
are considering revisions to FRA's passenger vehicle regulations to 
encourage the implementation of technologies that monitor the 
condition of rail vehicles, although the agency has not yet identified 
these specific requirements. 

* The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 also requires FRA to take 
action in two specific ways to encourage the use of rail safety 
technologies in addition to PTC. First, the act requires FRA to 
prescribe standards, regulations, guidance, or orders by October 2009 
for railroads to implement rail safety technologies in areas of track 
without signals or PTC. FRA officials began this effort in September 
2010 by proposing that the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee 
establish a task force to develop a proposed rule. This proposal was 
accepted; however, the task force will delay meeting until 
representatives serving on another task force involved in PTC issues 
are available.[Footnote 75] FRA staff stated that the agency has 
delayed meeting the October 2009 requirement because FRA gave priority 
to the PTC rulemaking. Second, by October 2012, FRA must develop 
regulations requiring Class I freight railroads, Amtrak, commuter 
railroads, and other railroads that FRA determines have an inadequate 
safety record to develop a risk-reduction program that includes a 
technology implementation plan describing railroads' efforts to 
implement new rail safety technologies.[Footnote 76] FRA issued an 
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on December 8, 2010, seeking 
comment on the possible requirements of this program. 

The National Academies' Transportation Research Board has identified a 
number of best practices for encouraging the implementation of new 
technologies. Of these best practices, those most applicable to FRA's 
efforts fall into four key areas:[Footnote 77] 

* Early involvement of users: Involving potential users of a 
technology early on in its development, such as seeking information 
from users about their needs and enlisting their assistance, can help 
ensure that products developed respond to users' requirements. 

* Demonstrating technology effectiveness: Agency efforts aimed at 
demonstrating the effectiveness of a technology can help other 
potential users decide whether to implement the technology. Activities 
that can help to demonstrate a technology's effectiveness include 
supporting demonstrations or pilot projects and conducting 
cost/benefit or similar analyses. 

* Offering incentives: Activities to provide financial assistance and 
efforts to revise regulations to create other incentives can help 
encourage the implementation of new technologies. 

* Monitoring and reporting on technology adoption: Careful monitoring 
of the acceptance, adoption, refinement, and satisfaction among users 
of the technologies being promoted can provide lessons learned about 
agency efforts to encourage technology implementation. Reporting this 
information can help demonstrate program results and build support for 
the agency's efforts. 

The actions we previously discussed that FRA has taken to encourage 
the implementation of rail safety technologies align with most of 
these practices and help to address some of the implementation 
challenges experts identified, including uncertainty about technology 
effectiveness and regulatory disincentives. Specifically, FRA's 
collaboration with the railroad industry in its R&D efforts involves 
potential technology users early and helps to ensure its efforts 
address industry needs while also expediting the potential adoption of 
new technologies. FRA's sponsorship of demonstration and pilot 
projects and its analyses of technology costs and benefits help to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of new technologies. FRA's current 
efforts to revise some track inspection regulations may address the 
disincentives in these regulations that discourage railroads from 
implementing new inspection technologies. Additionally, FRA has a 
grant program to provide funding for implementing new rail safety 
technologies, although, at present, the program has been prioritized 
for PTC and is not being used to fund implementation of other types of 
rail safety technologies. 

Although FRA has taken actions that align to most of the best 
practices previously identified, the agency lacks a method to 
effectively monitor implementation of new rail safety technologies 
that would allow it to better demonstrate the results of its efforts. 
Specifically, FRA officials stated that the agency does not have a 
method to track the extent to which the railroad industry implements 
technologies that FRA's R&D efforts contributed to developing. FRA 
staff said they have some information about the use of such new 
technologies, but this information is not comprehensive. For example, 
FRA officials said they would be aware of a railroad adopting a new 
safety technology if the railroad is required to seek regulatory 
exemption from FRA for its use. Our past work looking at the R&D 
program of DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety--now within the 
Department's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--
has shown that agencies that monitor and report on industry adoption 
of technologies supported by the agency's R&D efforts can better 
assess the effectiveness of those R&D efforts.[Footnote 78] 
Specifically, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration monitors and reports on its Web site the number of 
technologies supported by the agency's R&D efforts that have been 
commercialized. Without a similar method to monitor and report on the 
adoption of technologies supported by FRA's R&D efforts, the agency 
lacks information it could use to refine future R&D efforts or help 
demonstrate the results of its R&D program, an important consideration 
because FRA is currently in the process of updating its R&D strategic 
plan. FRA's last R&D strategic plan included the goal to expedite 
widespread deployment of new technologies that have the potential for 
significant improvement in track safety--a goal for which information 
about the industry's adoption of new technologies could be useful for 
demonstrating results.[Footnote 79] 

Additionally, 15 of the 20 experts we spoke with indicated that FRA 
could do more to encourage technology implementation and suggested 
actions that align with the Transportation Research Board's best 
practices. Specifically, 3 experts said that FRA should conduct more 
demonstration or pilot projects, and 4 experts said that FRA should do 
more to identify the costs and benefits of implementing new 
technologies--actions that align with the best practice of 
demonstrating technology effectiveness. Also, 8 experts said that FRA 
should offer more financial assistance, and 6 experts said that the 
agency should revise its regulations to provide incentives for the 
introduction of new technologies--actions that align with the best 
practice of offering incentives. While additional use of the best 
practices identified by the Transportation Research Board could better 
encourage the implementation of rail safety technologies, we are not 
making a recommendation at this time because FRA has other efforts 
that it needs to give priority to, such as overseeing investment in 
high-speed passenger rail and reforming its hours of service 
regulations. 

Conclusions: 

Although the safety of U.S. rail continues to improve, recent railroad 
accidents prompted the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008, including the requirement to implement PTC. Other recently 
enacted laws indicate significant interest in expanding passenger rail 
services, particularly high-speed passenger services, which will 
change the nature of the mode and introduce new safety risks. The 
strategic development and implementation of PTC and other new rail 
safety technologies can help FRA and the industry address these risks 
while ensuring that rail remains a safe form of transportation. 

The railroad industry is making progress in developing and 
implementing PTC, but much remains to be accomplished to develop, 
test, and install fully functional PTC systems in time to meet the 
2015 implementation deadline. At present, it is unclear whether 
various issues--such as the lack of mature PTC components and the cost 
of implementation, particularly to commuter and smaller freight 
railroads--could result in railroads missing this deadline or lead to 
other operational impacts for railroads. However, the PTC 
implementation deadline is still 5 years away, so it is too soon to 
determine for certain whether the industry will be able to meet it. 
This timing presents an opportunity to look ahead at what risks lie in 
wait that could jeopardize successful implementation and identify 
potential strategies to address them, rather than wait and see what 
problems develop and were not addressed. FRA will have the chance to 
publicly identify such risks, as well as potential ways Congress, the 
agency, or other stakeholders could address them, when it reports to 
Congress on PTC implementation progress in 2012. Identifying and 
mitigating risks sooner, rather than later, would better ensure a 
reliable PTC system can be fully implemented to provide the intended 
safety benefits of this technology without resulting in unintended 
consequences. 

While recent laws have expanded FRA's role, its mission to promote 
safety remains a core responsibility. Much focus has been placed on 
implementing PTC to address accidents caused by human factors, but 
technologies besides PTC hold promise for improving safety by 
addressing other accident causes, such as problems with track or 
equipment. While FRA has employed several key best practices for 
encouraging the use of new technologies, employing a method to monitor 
and report on the industry's adoption of new technologies that FRA was 
involved in developing could provide useful information for 
demonstrating the results of its R&D program and refining future 
efforts. Importantly, such efforts could help the agency better 
fulfill its mission to promote safety throughout the national rail 
network. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following 
two actions: 

* To support the effective identification and mitigation of risks to 
the successful fulfillment of PTC requirements by 2015, direct the 
Administrator of FRA to include in FRA's 2012 report to Congress an 
analysis of: 

- the likelihood that railroads will meet the PTC implementation 
deadline; 

- the risks to successful implementation of PTC; and: 

- actions Congress, railroads, or other stakeholders can take to 
mitigate risks to successful PTC implementation. 

* To better encourage the implementation of rail safety technologies 
other than PTC, direct the Administrator of FRA to develop and 
implement a method for monitoring and reporting information on the 
adoption of technologies supported by FRA's R&D efforts. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation 
for review and comment. DOT provided technical clarifications, which 
we incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOT also said that it 
would consider our recommendations. We also provided a draft of this 
report to Amtrak for its review and comment. Amtrak provided a 
technical comment, which we incorporated. 

As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the 
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it 
until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send 
copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Contact information and key 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Susan Fleming: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report discusses (1) the progress railroads have made in 
developing and implementing positive train control (PTC) and the 
remaining steps to implement PTC systems; (2) the potential benefits 
of other rail safety technologies under development as well as the 
challenges to implementing them; and (3) the extent of the Federal 
Railroad Administration's (FRA) efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and 
encourage the implementation of other rail safety technologies. 

To obtain information about railroads' progress in developing and 
implementing PTC and the steps remaining to implement PTC, we 
interviewed representatives of the four largest Class I freight 
railroads (BNSF Railway, CSX Corporation, Norfolk Southern, and Union 
Pacific); Amtrak; five selected commuter railroads (Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (Boston, Massachusetts), Metra (Chicago, 
Illinois), North County Transit District (San Diego, California), Tri- 
Rail (Miami and Fort Lauderdale, Florida), and Virginia Railway 
Express (Washington, D.C.)); selected rail supply companies (ENSCO, 
MeteorComm, and Ansaldo); railroad industry associations (the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR), the American Short Line and 
Regional Railroad Association, and the Railway Supply Institute); and 
FRA.[Footnote 80] We selected the commuter railroads to represent a 
range of geographic locations and levels of ridership, while selecting 
railroads that had relationships with all four of the largest Class I 
railroads and included a mix of railroads that both owned and leased 
track. We selected the railroad supply companies on the basis of 
recommendations from railroad industry associations and railroads and 
included all of the major suppliers for key components of the freight 
railroads' PTC systems. We reviewed PTC development and implementation 
requirements in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 and FRA 
regulations. We also reviewed PTC implementation plans that Class I 
freight railroads and Amtrak submitted to FRA. In addition, we visited 
and met with officials at the Transportation Technology Center, Inc. 
(TTCI), near Pueblo, Colorado, where some PTC components are being 
tested. 

To obtain information about the benefits of other rail safety 
technologies under development, as well as the challenges to 
implementing them, we compiled a list of rail safety technologies 
currently under development in the United States on the basis of 
interviews with railroads, railroad associations, FRA, and the 
Department of Transportation's Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center). We organized these technologies into four 
categories and refined this list during the course of our work as we 
obtained additional information from other stakeholders. We sought 
periodic feedback on the list from FRA, the Volpe Center, AAR, and 
TTCI. We limited the scope of these technologies to those that would 
prevent or mitigate train-to-train collisions and derailments and 
excluded technologies that addressed other risks or that experts 
indicated were widely deployed and therefore no longer under 
development.[Footnote 81] 

We identified, with assistance from the National Academies' 
Transportation Research Board, a group of 20 rail safety technology 
experts from railroads, rail suppliers, federal agencies, labor 
organizations, and universities (see appendix II for a list of these 
experts). We interviewed these experts about their knowledge of the 
benefits of the rail safety technologies within the scope of this 
engagement, as well as their views on the challenges to implementing 
them, and surveyed them with a standardized assessment tool seeking 
information about the benefits, maturity, and implementation 
challenges of all the technologies in our scope. We received completed 
assessments from 19 of the 20 experts (see appendix III for complete 
assessment results). Based on the rail safety technology experts' 
responses to our questionnaire, we identified some technologies as 
being more promising than others. In our questionnaire, we asked 
experts about their views of these technologies' potential to improve 
safety, the value of funding additional research and development (R&D) 
and implementation, and the technologies' current stages of product 
development. For the purposes of this analysis, we defined a 
technology as being more promising if it has a higher potential to 
improve safety, is most worth additional R&D and implementation costs, 
and is in a later stage of development, which presumably would mean it 
could be implemented sooner than a technology that is in an earlier 
development stage. By assigning values to the experts' responses, we 
determined which of the technologies in our scope most satisfied these 
three criteria--in other words, which technologies the experts viewed 
as having the most potential to improve safety, being most worth 
additional costs, and being in the later stages of product 
development.[Footnote 82] We also interviewed government officials, 
railroad industry representatives, and academics from the European 
Union, Japan, and Taiwan about rail safety technologies implemented in 
other countries, seeking insights about potential differences in 
implementation. We identified these stakeholders on the basis of input 
from FRA, the Volpe Center, the Transportation Research Board, and 
suggestions from foreign officials. 

To obtain information about the extent of FRA's efforts to fulfill the 
PTC mandate and encourage the implementation of other rail safety 
technologies, we reviewed documentation obtained from FRA officials-- 
including information on R&D projects, technology pilots, guidance, 
strategic planning, and technology implementation grants--and 
interviewed FRA officials responsible for the agency's rail safety 
technology R&D, safety regulatory efforts, and efforts to meet the PTC 
mandate. We also reviewed FRA's requirements in the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 and related FRA regulations to fulfill the PTC 
mandate and encourage the implementation of other rail safety 
technologies. Additionally, we interviewed the experts and other 
railroad industry stakeholders that we have previously named about 
their views on FRA's efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage 
the implementation of other rail safety technologies. We focused our 
review on FRA efforts related to the implementation of these 
technologies and did not attempt to comprehensively review FRA's R&D 
program. We identified best practices for encouraging the 
implementation of new technologies by reviewing reports from the 
National Academies' Transportation Research Board and prior GAO 
reports. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: List of Rail Safety Technology Experts: 

Christopher Barkan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: 

Anna Barry, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority: 

John Bell, Federal Transit Administration: 

Joshua Coran, Talgo Robert Dorer, Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center: 

Carlton Ho, University of Massachusetts Amherst: 

Rick Inclima, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division: 

Semih Kalay, Transportation Technology Center, Inc. 

Kevin Kesler, FRA: 

Francesco Lanza di Scalea, University of California, San Diego: 

George Long, Siemens Industry: 

Dan Magnus, KLD Labs: 

Tim Male, CSX Corporation: 

Alan Polivka, Transportation Technology Center, Inc. 

Thomas Pontolillo, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen: 

Eileen Reilly, Alaska Railroad: 

Mark Stehly, BNSF Railway: 

James Stem, United Transportation Union: 

Michael Trosino, Amtrak: 

Steve Zwart, Alstom: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Detailed Results of Experts' Assessment of Rail Safety 
Technologies: 

Following is the tool used to assess experts' views about rail safety 
technologies under development, complete with detailed results. We do 
not include the responses for open-ended questions. 

Introduction: 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non-
partisan agency that assists Congress in evaluating federal programs. 

We are interested in your expert professional opinions on a number of 
technologies for potentially improving railroad safety. We have 
identified the technologies included in this assessment tool through 
our first round of interviews with you, other experts and 
stakeholders, and a review of available literature. These technologies 
are separated into four categories - Remote Control and Switches, 
Rolling Stock and Condition Monitoring, Occupant Protection, and Track 
Inspection and Measurement. 

* For the purposes of this review, we have limited our scope to 
reviewing only those technologies that would potentially increase 
safety by preventing or mitigating train-to-train collisions and 
derailments. 

We ask that you please assess the technologies across several factors, 
providing comments where appropriate. In addition, we are also 
interested in your thoughts about possible actions that the U.S. 
Department of Transportation could take to encourage the 
implementation of new technologies. Lastly, we are interested in your 
opinion on the extent to which specific issues may pose a challenge to 
implementing positive train control by the December 31, 2015 deadline. 

Instructions for Completing This Tool: 

You can answer most of the questions easily by checking boxes or 
filling in blanks. A few questions request short narrative answers. 
Please note that these blanks will expand to fit your answer. 

Please use your mouse to navigate throughout the document by clicking 
on the field or check box you wish to fill in. Do not use the "Tab" or 
"Enter" keys as doing so may cause formatting problems. 

* To select or deselect a check box, simply click or double click on 
the box. 

Deadline: 

To assist us, we ask that you complete and return this document by 
June 15, 2010. Please return the completed survey by e-mail. Simply 
save this file to your computer desktop or hard drive and attach it to 
your e-mail. 

Contact Information: 

Thanks in advance for taking the time to share your expertise with 
GAO. If you have any questions about this tool, please contact us. You 
may direct questions to Andrew Huddleston, Senior Analyst. 

Thank you for your help. 

Part 1: Remote Control and Switch Technologies: 

In this section we refer to Remote Control and Switch Technologies. 
[Footnote 83] Please use the following descriptions as a guide when 
thinking about these specific technologies. 

Descriptions of technologies referred to in this section: 

a. Remote-control locomotives;[Footnote 84] 
Use of remote control to move trains in yard switching operations or 
through work zones. 

b. Remote-control switches; 
Modifications for enhanced control of track switches from the 
locomotive or other remote location. 

c. Switch position monitors/indicators; 
Devices to monitor and report position of track switches. 

[End of table] 

1. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge of increasing 
railroad safety through the development and use of the following 
remote control and switch technologies? 

1 None: Skip To Part 2 (Question #10): 
6 Minimal: Skip To Part 2 (Question #10): 
5 Basic: Continue To Question #2: 
4 Proficient: Continue To Question #2: 
3 Advanced: Continue To Question #2: 

2. How much potential, if any, does further development and 
implementation of the following remote control and switch technologies 
have for improving rail safety? 

Remote control and switch technology: a. Remote-control locomotives; 
No potential: 4; 
Low potential: 2; 
Medium potential: 2; 
High potential: 3; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Remote control and switch technology: b. Remote-control switches; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 4; 
Medium potential: 4; 
High potential: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Remote control and switch technology: c. Switch position monitors/ 
indicators; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 2; 
Medium potential: 3; 
High potential: 7; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

3. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and likely 
research and development (R&D) costs--regardless of funding source--do 
you believe further R&D of the following remote control and switch 
technologies would be worth the investment? 

Remote control and switch technology: a. Remote-control locomotives; 
No: 6; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 3; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Remote control and switch technology: b. Remote-control switches; 
No: 2; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 6; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Remote control and switch technology: c. Switch position monitors/ 
indicators; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 9; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

4. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and likely 
implementation costs--regardless of funding source--do you believe the 
procurement, operation, and maintenance of the following remote 
control and switch technologies would be worth the investment? 

Remote control and switch technology: a. Remote-control locomotives; 
No: 5; 
Maybe: 4; 
Yes: 3; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Remote control and switch technology: b. Remote-control switches; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 4; 
Yes: 6; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Remote control and switch technology: c. Switch position monitors/ 
indicators; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 4; 
Yes: 7; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

5. At what product development stage are the following remote control 
and switch technologies in the United States? 

Remote control and switch technology: a. Remote-control locomotives; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 0; 
Production and some deployment: 0; 
Widespread industry deployment: 10; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Remote control and switch technology: b. Remote-control switches; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 0; 
Production and some deployment: 4; 
Widespread industry deployment: 5; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Remote control and switch technology: c. Switch position monitors/ 
indicators; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 2; 
Production and some deployment: 6; 
Widespread industry deployment: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

6. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of remote-control locomotives? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 0; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 3; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

7. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of remote-control switches? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 6; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

8. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of switch position monitors/indicators? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 7; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 0; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

9. What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede the 
implementation of remote control and switch technologies in the United 
States? 

Part 2: Rolling Stock and Condition Monitoring Technologies: 

In this section we refer to Rolling Stock and Condition Monitoring 
Technologies. Please use the following descriptions as a guide when 
thinking about these specific technologies. 

Descriptions of technologies referred to in this section. 

a. Electronically controlled pneumatic brakes: 
Advanced braking system that increases the speed at which brake 
signals are sent through a train, which can reduce stopping distances 
and prevent braking-related derailments. 

b. Improved design of tank cars and other hazardous material cars: 
Improvements to hazardous material-carrying cars (e.g. structural 
integrity, damage tolerance) that reduce potential release of 
hazardous material in the event of an accident. 

c. High performance wheel steels: 
Development of alternative wheel steels to extend wheel life and 
improve safety. 

d. On-board condition monitoring systems: 
Systems installed on rail cars that continuously monitor mechanical 
components including bearing temperature, bearing and wheel defects, 
and longitudinal impacts. 

e. Wayside detectors: 
Condition monitoring systems installed along tracks that can identify 
defects in various rolling stock components as trains drive by. For 
example, acoustic bearing detectors, wheel impact load detectors, 
truck performance detectors, cracked wheel detectors, wheel profile 
measurement. 

10. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge of increasing 
railroad safety through the development and use of the following 
rolling stock and condition monitoring technologies? 

1 None: Skip To Part 3 (Question #21): 
4 Minimal: Skip To Part 3 (Question #21): 
5 Basic: Continue To Question #11: 
5 Proficient: Continue To Question #11: 
4 Advanced: Continue To Question #11: 

11. How much potential, if any, does further development and 
implementation of the following rolling stock and condition monitoring 
technologies have for improving rail safety? 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: a. Electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 0; 
Medium potential: 5; 
High potential: 7; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: b. Improved design 
of tank cars and other hazardous material cars; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 1; 
Medium potential: 5; 
High potential: 7; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: c. High performance 
wheel steels; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 1; 
Medium potential: 8; 
High potential: 4; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: d. On-board 
condition monitoring systems; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 3; 
Medium potential: 4; 
High potential: 7; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: e. Wayside 
detectors; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 2; 
Medium potential: 2; 
High potential: 10; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

12. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and 
likely research and development (R&D) costs--regardless of funding 
source--do you believe further R&D of the following rolling stock and 
condition monitoring technologies would be worth the investment? 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: a. Electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 1; 
Yes: 11; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: b. Improved design 
of tank cars and other hazardous material cars; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 11; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: c. High performance 
wheel steels; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 10; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: d. On-board 
condition monitoring systems; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 10; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: e. Wayside 
detectors; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 0; 
Yes: 13; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

13. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and 
likely implementation costs--regardless of funding source--do you 
believe the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the following 
rolling stock and condition monitoring technologies would be worth the 
investment? 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: a. Electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 10; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: b. Improved design 
of tank cars and other hazardous material cars; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 10; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: c. High performance 
wheel steels; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 4; 
Yes: 9; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: d. On-board 
condition monitoring systems; 
No: 2; 
Maybe: 5; 
Yes: 7; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: e. Wayside 
detectors; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 12; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

14. At what product development stage are the following rolling stock 
and condition monitoring technologies in the United States? 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: a. Electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 4; 
Production and some deployment: 7; 
Widespread industry deployment: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: b. Improved design 
of tank cars and other hazardous material cars; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 4; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 2; 
Production and some deployment: 4; 
Widespread industry deployment: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: c. High performance 
wheel steels; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 1; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 2; 
Production and some deployment: 2; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 9. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: d. On-board 
condition monitoring systems; 
Concept exploration: 1; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 4; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 2; 
Production and some deployment: 5; 
Widespread industry deployment: 1; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Rolling stock and condition monitoring technology: e. Wayside 
detectors; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 0; 
Production and some deployment: 4; 
Widespread industry deployment: 10; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

15. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of electronically controlled pneumatic brakes? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 10; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 11; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

16. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of improved design of tank cars and other 
hazardous material cars? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 10; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 4; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

17. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of high performance wheel steels? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 6; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 5. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

18.How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of on-board condition monitoring systems? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 11; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 9; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 4; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

19. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of wayside detectors? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 3; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 9; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

20. What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede 
the implementation of rolling stock and condition monitoring 
technologies in the United States? 

Part 3: Occupant Protection Technologies: 

In this section we refer to Occupant Protection Technologies. Please 
use the following descriptions as a guide when thinking about these 
specific technologies. 

Descriptions of technologies referred to in this section. 

a. Crash energy management: 
Rail car designs with crumple zones that absorb energy from a 
collision in order to maintain occupant volume and reduce secondary 
impact velocities. 

b. Improved design of interior passenger car fixtures: 
Design improvements to passenger car fixtures, such as tables and 
seats, to reduce the severity of injury during an accident. 

21. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge of increasing 
railroad safety through the development and use of the following 
occupant protection technologies? 

3 None: Skip To Part 4 (Question #29): 
7 Minimal: Skip To Part 4 (Question #29): 
1 Basic: Continue To Question #22: 
4 Proficient: Continue To Question #22: 
4 Advanced: Continue To Question #22: 

22. How much potential, if any, does further development and 
implementation of the following occupant protection technologies have 
for improving rail safety? 

Occupant protection technology: a. Crash energy management; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 0; 
Medium potential: 2; 
High potential: 7; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Occupant protection technology: b. Improved design of interior 
passenger car fixtures; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 0; 
Medium potential: 3; 
High potential: 6; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

23. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and 
likely research and development (R&D) costs--regardless of funding 
source--do you believe further R&D of the following occupant 
protection technologies would be worth the investment? 

Occupant protection technology: a. Crash energy management; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 0; 
Yes: 9; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Occupant protection technology: b. Improved design of interior 
passenger car fixtures; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 1; 
Yes: 8; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

24. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and 
likely implementation costs--regardless of funding source--do you 
believe the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the following 
occupant protection technologies would be worth the investment? 

Occupant protection technology: a. Crash energy management; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 6; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Occupant protection technology: b. Improved design of interior 
passenger car fixtures; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 1; 
Yes: 7; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

25. At what product development stage are the following occupant 
protection technologies in the United States? 

Occupant protection technology: a. Crash energy management; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 1; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 2; 
Production and some deployment: 6; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Occupant protection technology: b. Improved design of interior 
passenger car fixtures; 
Concept exploration: 1; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 3; 
Production and some deployment: 4; 
Widespread industry deployment: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

26. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of crash energy management? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 7; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

27. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of improved design of interior passenger car 
fixtures? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 0; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

28. What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede 
the implementation of occupant protection technologies in the United 
States? 

Part 4: Track Inspection and Measurement Technologies: 

In this section we refer to Track Inspection and Measurement 
Technologies. Please use the following descriptions as a guide when 
thinking about these specific technologies. 

Descriptions of technologies referred to in this section. 

a. Machine vision-based automated track inspection: 
Automated visual inspection of track defects (e.g. fractures at joint 
bars and at switch points) through the use of digital imaging or video. 

b. Laser-based non-contact ultrasonic rail inspection: 
Enhancement to existing ultrasonic rail inspection techniques using 
lasers to improve detection of rail defects, both internal and surface. 

c. Ultrasonic phased array rail defect imaging: 
Use of phased arrays to more accurately determine the size and shape 
of a rail flaw. 

d. Rail longitudinal stress detection systems: 
Systems for detecting internal rail stresses that could lead to track 
buckling or fractures. 

e. Portable ride quality meters: 
Portable devices used on board of rail cars to measure ride quality 
and identify possible poor track conditions or poor wheel-rail 
interactions. 

f. Autonomous track measurement systems: 
Devices installed on revenue service trains that measure track 
qualities (e.g. track geometry, gage restraint, and rail cant) in real 
time. 

g. Track modulus measurement systems; Descriptions of technologies 
referred to in this section: Systems used to detect weak spots in 
track ballast that can weaken the vertical forces of rail and lead to 
instability or derailments. 

h. Intrusion detection systems: 
Systems that provide engineers and dispatchers timely information on 
the status of track sections and crossings, including any unauthorized 
intrusions, to allow them sufficient time to decrease speed or stop. 

i. Bridge integrity monitoring systems: 
Sensor-based systems used to detect bridge damage or structural 
defects that could lead to collapse. 

29. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge of increasing 
railroad safety through the development and use of the following track 
inspection and measurement technologies? 

1 None: Skip To Part 5 (Question #44): 
4 Minimal: Skip To Part 5 (Question #44): 
2 Basic: Continue To Question #30: 
5 Proficient: Continue To Question #30: 
7 Advanced: Continue To Question #30: 

30. How much potential, if any, does further development and 
implementation of the following track inspection and measurement 
technologies have for improving rail safety? 

Track inspection and measurement technology: a. Machine vision-based 
automated track inspection; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 2; 
Medium potential: 3; 
High potential: 8; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: b. Laser-based non-
contact ultrasonic rail inspection; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 0; 
Medium potential: 7; 
High potential: 6; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: c. Ultrasonic phased 
array rail defect imaging; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 0; 
Medium potential: 8; 
High potential: 2; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: d. Rail longitudinal 
stress detection systems; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 3; 
Medium potential: 2; 
High potential: 9; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: e. Portable ride quality 
meters; 
No potential: 1; 
Low potential: 2; 
Medium potential: 7; 
High potential: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: f. Autonomous track 
measurement systems; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 3; 
Medium potential: 4; 
High potential: 6; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: g. Track modulus 
measurement systems; 
No potential: 1; 
Low potential: 3; 
Medium potential: 6; 
High potential: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: h. Intrusion detection 
systems; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 2; 
Medium potential: 7; 
High potential: 4; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: i. Bridge integrity 
monitoring systems; 
No potential: 0; 
Low potential: 0; 
Medium potential: 6; 
High potential: 7; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

31. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and 
likely research and development (R&D) costs--regardless of funding 
source--do you believe further R&D of the following track inspection 
and measurement technologies would be worth the investment? 

Track inspection and measurement technology: a. Machine vision-based 
automated track inspection; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 1; 
Yes: 10; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: b. Laser-based non- 
contact ultrasonic rail inspection; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 10; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: c. Ultrasonic phased 
array rail defect imaging; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 1; 
Yes: 10; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: d. Rail longitudinal 
stress detection systems; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 4; 
Yes: 8; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: e. Portable ride quality 
meters; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 9; 
Yes: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: f. Autonomous track 
measurement systems; 
No: 3; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 8; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: g. Track modulus 
measurement systems; 
No: 3; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 6; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: h. Intrusion detection 
systems; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 4; 
Yes: 8; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: i. Bridge integrity 
monitoring systems; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 11; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

32. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and 
likely implementation costs--regardless of funding source--do you 
believe the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the following 
track inspection and measurement technologies would be worth the 
investment? 

Track inspection and measurement technology: a. Machine vision-based 
automated track inspection; 
No: 3; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 9; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: b. Laser-based non- 
contact ultrasonic rail inspection; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 6; 
Yes: 7; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: c. Ultrasonic phased 
array rail defect imaging; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 5; 
Yes: 7; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: d. Rail longitudinal 
stress detection systems; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 2; 
Yes: 9; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: e. Portable ride quality 
meters; 
No: 1; 
Maybe: 7; 
Yes: 4; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: f. Autonomous track 
measurement systems; 
No: 2; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 8; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: g. Track modulus 
measurement systems; 
No: 3; 
Maybe: 4; 
Yes: 5; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: h. Intrusion detection 
systems; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 6; 
Yes: 7; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: i. Bridge integrity 
monitoring systems; 
No: 0; 
Maybe: 3; 
Yes: 11; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

33. At what product development stage are the following track 
inspection and measurement technologies in the United States? 

Track inspection and measurement technology: a. Machine vision-based 
automated track inspection; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 2; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 5; 
Production and some deployment: 5; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: b. Laser-based non- 
contact ultrasonic rail inspection; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 3; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 5; 
Production and some deployment: 3; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: c. Ultrasonic phased 
array rail defect imaging; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 5; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 4; 
Production and some deployment: 2; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: d. Rail longitudinal 
stress detection systems; 
Concept exploration: 2; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 3; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 1; 
Production and some deployment: 6; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: e. Portable ride quality 
meters; 
Concept exploration: 0; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 1; 
Production and some deployment: 6; 
Widespread industry deployment: 4; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: f. Autonomous track 
measurement systems; 
Concept exploration: 1; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 1; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 3; 
Production and some deployment: 6; 
Widespread industry deployment: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: g. Track modulus 
measurement systems; 
Concept exploration: 1; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 1; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 4; 
Production and some deployment: 5; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: h. Intrusion detection 
systems; 
Concept exploration: 1; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 0; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 3; 
Production and some deployment: 4; 
Widespread industry deployment: 2; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Track inspection and measurement technology: i. Bridge integrity 
monitoring systems; 
Concept exploration: 1; 
Proof of concept and initial design: 2; 
Refinement and pilot testing: 3; 
Production and some deployment: 7; 
Widespread industry deployment: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

34. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of machine vision-based automated track 
inspection? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 7; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 2; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 7; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 3; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

35. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of laser-based non-contact ultrasonic rail 
inspection? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 5. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 2; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 9; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

36. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of ultrasonic phased array rail defect imaging? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 8; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 8; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

37. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of rail longitudinal stress detection systems? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 6; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 5. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 3; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 7; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

38. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of portable ride quality meters? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 2; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 5. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

39. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of autonomous track measurement systems? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 6; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 2; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 3; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 2; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 4; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

40. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of track modulus measurement systems? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 4. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 4; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 3; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 8; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 8; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

41. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of intrusion detection systems? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 5. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 6; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 3; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 10; 
Minor challenge: 0; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 1; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 9; 
Major challenge: 2; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

42. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
for the implementation of bridge integrity monitoring systems? 

Challenge: a. Costs; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 5; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: b. Lack of incentive under current regulations; 
Not a challenge: 7; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 1; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: c. Technology cannot be used without a regulatory waiver; 
Not a challenge: 9; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Challenge: d. Lack of interoperability with existing systems and 
equipment; 
Not a challenge: 5; 
Minor challenge: 6; 
Major challenge: 0; 
Does not apply: 2; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Challenge: e. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology; 
Not a challenge: 2; 
Minor challenge: 7; 
Major challenge: 4; 
Does not apply: 0; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

43. What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede 
the implementation of track inspection and measurement technologies in 
the United States? 

Part 5: Government Actions: 

44. What further actions, if any, could the U.S. Department of 
Transportation take to encourage the implementation of new rail safety 
technologies? 

Part 6: Positive Train Control: 

45. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge about the 
development and implementation of positive train control in the United 
States? 

1 None: Skip To Question #49: 
2 Minimal: Skip To Question #49: 
8 Basic: Continue To Question #46: 
2 Proficient: Continue To Question #46: 
6 Advanced: Continue To Question #46: 

46. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present 
to meeting the December 31, 2015 deadline for implementing positive 
train control (PTC)? 

Issue: a. Achieving interoperability among all railroads; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 14; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Issue: b. Refining braking algorithms; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 9; 
Major challenge: 7; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Issue: c. Acquisition of adequate spectrum in the 220 MHz frequency, 
specifically in dense, metropolitan areas; 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 5; 
Major challenge: 8; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Issue: d. Development of new high performance radio equipment; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 4; 
Major challenge: 8; 
No basis to judge: 3. 

Issue: e. Technological maturity of other PTC components; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 11; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Issue: f. Ability of suppliers to meet demand for PTC products; 
Not a challenge: 3; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 10; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

Issue: g. Cost to larger railroads (Amtrak and Class I freights); 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 1; 
Major challenge: 15; 
No basis to judge: 0. 

Issue: h. Cost to smaller railroads (short lines, regionals, 
commuters); 
Not a challenge: 0; 
Minor challenge: 2; 
Major challenge: 13; 
No basis to judge: 1. 

Issue: i. FRA's ability to certify PTC systems in a timely fashion; 
Not a challenge: 1; 
Minor challenge: 3; 
Major challenge: 10; 
No basis to judge: 2. 

47. What other issues, if any, that are not listed above may present a 
challenge to meeting the December 31, 2015 deadline for implementing 
positive train control? 

48. What further actions, if any, could the U.S. Department of 
Transportation take to facilitate the implementation of positive train 
control in order to meet the December 31, 2015 deadline? 

Part 7: Additional Comments: 

49. What other comments, if any, do you have about the topics covered 
in this assessment tool? 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Susan Fleming, (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Judy Guilliams-Tapia, 
Assistant Director; Amy Abramowitz; Katie Berman; Matthew Butler; 
Aglae Cantave; Bess Eisenstadt; Colin Fallon; Kathy Gilhooly; Andrew 
Huddleston; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Josh Ormond; Daniel Paepke; Madhav 
Panwar; and Terry Richardson made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Human factor accidents result from unsafe acts of individuals, 
such as employee errors, and can occur for a number of reasons, such 
as employee fatigue or inadequate supervision, training, or staffing. 
Management decisions at the organizational level, such as decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources or crew scheduling, can have 
consequences in the workplace that can contribute to human factor 
accidents. 

[2] Specifically, the accident in South Carolina was caused by a 
switch left in the wrong position, and the accident in California was 
caused by a train operator who should have stopped at a signal but 
instead went through it. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 110-432, div. A, title I, §104(a), 122 stat. 4848, 
4856-4858 (Oct. 16, 2008). 

[4] Train control systems similar to PTC have been implemented in 
other countries. In Japan, for example, systems have been implemented 
to automatically stop or slow trains to prevent collisions, such as 
when a train operator fails to stop as instructed by a signal. 
European countries also have train control systems and are currently 
involved in a joint project to establish interoperability among these 
systems. 

[5] The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 vests certain 
responsibilities with the Secretary of Transportation, who has since 
delegated authority to FRA to carry out the functions and exercise the 
authority vested in the Secretary by the statute. See 49 C.F.R. § 
1.49(oo), 74 Fed. Reg. 26981 (June 5, 2009), and 49 U.S.C. § 103(g). 

[6] We limited the scope of these technologies to those that would 
prevent or mitigate train-to-train collisions and derailments. We also 
did not review other FRA R&D efforts related to accident prevention, 
such as other research efforts to examine and address causes of 
accidents related to human factors. For example, FRA has worked with 
railroads to pilot a system that would allow railroad employees to 
confidentially report incidents that could have resulted in an 
accident, which would provide information FRA, railroads, and other 
stakeholders could use in analyzing and addressing the root causes of 
such incidents to improve safety. 

[7] Of the 20 experts to whom we sent a questionnaire, 19 completed 
the document. 

[8] As of 2008, Class I freight railroads are those railroads that 
earn more than about $401 million annually; Class II railroads earn 
from about $32 million to about $401 million; and Class III railroads 
earn less than about $32 million. Revenue amounts that define railroad 
classes change each year on the basis of inflation. 

[9] Amtrak also owns a section of track in Michigan and some commuter 
railroads own track. 

[10] Human factors that cause accidents include failure to properly 
use equipment, including brakes and signals, and failure to follow the 
appropriate train speed, among other causes. 

[11] In its accident report, the National Transportation Safety Board 
said that the probable cause of the accident was that the commuter 
train operator failed to obey a red signal because he was distracted 
by wireless text messaging. The report also noted that the lack of a 
PTC system to stop the train short of the red signal contributed to 
the accident. See National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of 
Metrolink Train 111 with Union Pacific Train LOF65-12, Chatsworth, 
California, September 12, 2008, NTSB/RAR-10/01 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 
21, 2010). 

[12] The analyses of accidents, injuries, and fatalities exclude 
accidents that occurred at grade crossings because the causes of such 
accidents involve issues not related to railroad safety performance, 
such as driver awareness of grade-crossing safety. Additionally, the 
rail safety technologies examined in this review primarily address 
train-to-train collisions and derailments and do not include 
technologies designed primarily to prevent grade-crossing accidents. 

[13] From 2005 to 2008, FRA's oversight was guided by the National 
Rail Safety Action Plan, which FRA issued in May 2005 to improve its 
oversight by targeting efforts to high-risk areas. FRA issued a final 
report on its efforts under this plan in May 2008. As part of our 2007 
review of FRA oversight, we said that the National Rail Safety Action 
Plan provided a reasonable framework for guiding FRA's safety 
oversight efforts. See GAO, Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad 
Administration Is Taking Steps to Better Target Its Oversight, but 
Assessment of Results Is Needed to Determine Impact, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-149] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 
2007). 

[14] To adopt a participatory approach to its rulemaking, in 1996, FRA 
created the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, which is designed to 
bring together all segments of the rail community in developing 
solutions to safety regulatory issues. The committee includes 
representatives from railroads, railroad associations, labor, state 
government groups, and agencies with railroad regulatory safety 
responsibility in Canada and Mexico. 

[15] These three programs are Section 301-Capital Assistance for 
Intercity Passenger Rail Service Grants, Section 302-Congestion 
Grants, and Section 501-High Speed Rail Corridor Program. See Pub. L. 
No. 110-432, div. B. 

[16] Pub. L. No. 111-5, title XII (Feb. 17, 2009). 

[17] The act also directs FRA to reform its regulations regarding 
limits on railroad employees' hours of service. 

[18] See 49 U.S.C. § 20157. Prior to the enactment of the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008, FRA already had rules under which railroads 
could develop and implement PTC systems, although these rules did not 
require that railroads do so. See 70 Fed. Reg. 11,052 (Mar. 7, 2005). 

[19] Although railroads are developing and implementing slightly 
different PTC systems, all systems must be designed to prevent train- 
to-train collisions, derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds, 
incursions into work zones, and movement of trains through switches 
left in the wrong position, as required by the Rail Safety Improvement 
Act of 2008. See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(i)(3). 

[20] Wayside units are PTC computers placed along a track at existing 
switches and signals as well as other locations. Computers in 
centralized office locations provide route information and issue 
permission to trains to proceed along track routes. 

[21] When FRA issued its PTC implementation rule in January 2010, the 
agency provided a regulatory impact analysis of the safety benefits of 
PTC and estimated that, over a 20-year period, implementing PTC would 
result in $440 million to $674 million in safety benefits from reduced 
accidents, about one-third of which would result from avoided 
fatalities. See 75 Fed. Reg. 2598, 2684 (Jan. 15, 2010). 

[22] The European Rail Traffic Management System is expected to be 
implemented on over 15,000 miles of track in Europe by 2020. 

[23] 49 C.F.R. §§ 236.1009 and 236.1013. 

[24] If the railroad intends to implement a PTC system that FRA has 
already approved, a railroad may instead submit documentation of that 
prior approval. FRA's PTC regulations also allowed railroads to submit 
a "notice of product intent" instead of the PTC development plan, 
which would describe the functions of the proposed PTC system but 
include fewer details about its operation. However, a railroad that 
elects to do this could receive only "provisional" approval of its PTC 
implementation plan, requiring it to submit a PTC development plan or 
plans to implement a system that has already received a type approval 
from FRA within 270 days to qualify for full approval. 

[25] 49 C.F.R. §§ 236.1013(b) and 236.1003. 

[26] 49 C.F.R. § 236.1009. 

[27] For example, a railroad that operates passenger trains above 125 
miles per hour must explain in its PTC safety plan how its PTC system 
is designed to detect incursions onto the track, such as from motor 
vehicles diverging onto the track from adjacent roads and bridges. See 
49 C.F.R. § 236.1007(c). 

[28] One exception is the Alaska Railroad, which began implementing a 
train control system in 1997 that it is upgrading to achieve PTC 
certification under the current FRA rules. Additionally, four other 
commuter railroads and a Class III freight railroad indicated in their 
PTC implementation plans that they intend to install PTC systems other 
than those being developed by Amtrak and the four largest Class I 
freight railroads. 

[29] In 1998, during the time Amtrak was upgrading the Northeast 
Corridor to permit operation of high-speed passenger trains--a service 
known today as Acela--FRA required Amtrak to install a new train 
control system on some portions of the corridor as a safety measure. 
That system, with some additional communications upgrades, will serve 
as Amtrak's PTC system on the Northeast Corridor. 

[30] BNSF Railway began development of a PTC system in 2002. Although 
FRA has not yet certified that this system meets the requirements 
outlined in the agency's January 2010 PTC rules, FRA had approved this 
system under prior regulations that had governed development of PTC 
systems in 2006. 

[31] The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 requires that PTC systems 
provide interoperability, which means that a PTC system can 
communicate with and control locomotives from different railroads 
operating trains on the same host railroad's track and that the 
systems allow trains to move uninterrupted over the boundaries between 
host railroads. See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(2),(i)(1). Railroads plan to 
achieve interoperability through the use of common technology and the 
development and use of standard communication protocols that will 
allow communication between the locomotives and PTC infrastructure of 
different railroads. 

[32] In addition to the four Class I freight railroads that formed 
this committee, AAR, Amtrak, Kansas City Southern (a Class I freight 
railroad), the two Canadian-owned Class I freight railroads, some 
commuter railroads, and FRA also participate. 

[33] The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 specifically required all 
Class I freight railroads, Amtrak, and commuter railroads to submit 
PTC implementation plans. See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a). In its PTC 
rulemaking, FRA clarified that Class II and Class III freight 
railroads that host passenger rail service must also file PTC 
implementation plans. See 49 C.F.R. § 236.1005. Other railroads that 
must install PTC equipment only on their locomotives were not required 
to submit PTC implementation plans; however, FRA directed railroads 
submitting PTC implementation plans to identify these other tenant 
railroads in their plans. This included some commuter railroads that 
do not own track. 

[34] In reviewing these plans, FRA approved implementation plans from 
five smaller freight railroads and one commuter railroad that 
requested exemption from implementing PTC on their track. 

[35] Amtrak also plans to install the freight railroads' systems on 
its locomotives that operate on tracks owned by freight or commuter 
railroads that are implementing those systems. Amtrak will also 
install the same systems on a few discrete track segments that it owns. 

[36] Class II and Class III freight trains that meet these criteria, 
but make no more than four trips per day in excess of 20 miles, are 
not required to equip locomotives with PTC until 2020. See 49 C.F.R. § 
236.1006. 

[37] Interoperability standards would address a number of technical 
issues associated with implementing interoperable PTC systems, such as 
standards for communications and data management. 

[38] While this specific project came to a close in 2006, further 
development and testing of PTC was moved to TTCI in Pueblo, Colorado. 
In its project report, FRA stated that lessons learned from the 
project included the necessity for incremental development of such a 
complex system, the need for thorough and unambiguous specifications, 
early test planning, and a rigorous sequence of development steps. See 
Federal Railroad Administration, Research Results: The North American 
Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Project (April 2009). 

[39] GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not 
Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-382] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 
2010); and Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development 
Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162] (Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999). 

[40] While BNSF Railway has installed and tested PTC on some 
subdivisions, the system has not yet been tested with the simultaneous 
operation of freight trains and Amtrak passenger trains. 

[41] Officials from the company developing PTC radios told us they are 
considering St. Louis, Missouri, as a possible testing ground, given 
the city's similarities in geography and railroad density to Chicago, 
Illinois. 

[42] We did not review all railroads' PTC implementation plans to 
determine the extent to which they must implement PTC. FRA regulations 
permit exceptions for the implementation of PTC on the basis of 
certain conditions. For example, FRA may approve exceptions on 
segments that trains use for limited operations, either at restricted 
speed or while separated from other trains. 

[43] These costs may not be limited to equipping Amtrak locomotives 
with PTC where they operate on Class I territory. Agreements with 
freight railroads state that Amtrak pays the incremental costs of 
using the freight networks. If implementation of PTC along the track 
is required solely due to the presence of passenger trains, Amtrak may 
have to cover the cost of implementation. 

[44] FRA's cost estimates were for a 20-year period; however, 
railroads would likely incur all development and installation costs, 
as well as some maintenance costs, early on. FRA's analysis indicates 
that about 50 percent of the total cost of PTC implementation would be 
incurred through 2015. 

[45] Federal Transit Administration, National State of Good Repair 
Assessment (June 2010). 

[46] The total cost of PTC implementation to Class II and Class III 
railroads is less clear. Although FRA has indicated that only a 
limited number of these railroads will be required to implement PTC on 
the basis of the requirements in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008, Class I freight railroads could require railroads that operate 
in Class I territory equipped with PTC to install PTC on their 
locomotives. 

[47] Information in this section of our report is based, in part, on 
information we obtained from rail safety technology experts through 
interviews and a subsequent questionnaire. Of the 20 experts we 
identified and interviewed, 19 responded to the questionnaire; 
however, the number of experts that answered each question varied 
because experts were asked to answer only those questions about 
technologies that they were familiar with, and not every expert was 
familiar with all of the technologies in the questionnaire. For 
detailed results of the questionnaire, see appendix III. 

[48] European safety standards for high-speed passenger trains that 
travel above 155 miles per hour require the installation of onboard 
equipment to monitor the temperature of bearings in the cars' wheel 
assemblies and inform the driver of any potentially dangerous 
deterioration. 

[49] 49 C.F.R. § 238.403. 

[50] Specifically, experts viewed certain technologies as having more 
potential to improve safety, being worth the additional cost of R&D 
and implementation, and being in later stages of product development. 
In our questionnaire, we asked experts their views on technology 
maturity using five categories of technology development ordered from 
earlier to later stages: concept exploration, proof of concept and 
initial design, refinement and pilot testing, production and some 
deployment, and widespread industry deployment. Because we focused on 
technologies currently under development, we removed from our scope 
any technologies for which there was a consensus among the experts 
that they were fully deployed. 

[51] For example, one academic expert noted that infrared-based 
devices that examine wheel bearings are mature and deployed, but that 
newer acoustic-based devices that inspect bearings are being developed 
and tested. 

[52] Specifically, the numbers of experts that identified cost as a 
major challenge for implementing these technologies were 10 of 12 
experts for electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, 7 of 9 experts 
for crash energy management, and 7 of 11 experts for switch position 
monitors/indicators. Although a total of 19 experts responded to our 
questionnaire, the number of experts that answered these questions 
varied because the experts were only asked to answer questions about 
technologies they were familiar with. 

[53] For example, 9 of 13 experts said that uncertainty about 
technology effectiveness was a major challenge for implementing a new 
track inspection technology that uses lasers to enhance ultrasonic 
rail inspection (laser-based, noncontact ultrasonic rail inspection), 
and 8 of 11 experts viewed this technology as being in a pilot testing 
or proof of concept phase of product development. 

[54] FRA regulations provide that if a track owner learns of a rail 
defect through inspection or other means, operation over the track is 
not permitted until the rail is replaced or a prescribed remedial 
action is taken. Such actions include applying joint bars to the track 
and limiting train speed over the defective track. See 49 C.F.R. § 
213.113. 

[55] Specifically, 11 of the 12 experts that answered this question 
indicated that lack of interoperability was a major implementation 
challenge, while 1 expert said it was a minor challenge. 

[56] 75 Fed. Reg. 2598 (Jan. 15, 2010). 

[57] FRA is also developing a tool for evaluating risks associated 
with removing PTC from routes when making decisions regarding 
rerouting of airborne toxic chemicals. In October 2010, FRA officials 
told us that the agency would begin a rulemaking to solicit 
stakeholder comments in developing this tool. 

[58] Specifically, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 requires 
FRA to review PTC implementation plans within 90 days of receipt. See 
49 U.S.C. § 20157(c). Additionally, FRA's final PTC rule calls on the 
agency to review PTC development plans within 60 days of receipt and 
PTC safety plans within 180 days of receipt. If FRA is unable to meet 
the deadlines for PTC development and safety plan reviews, it must 
notify the relevant railroads. See 49 C.F.R. § 236.1009(j). 

[59] The provisional approval FRA issued to some railroads required 
those railroads to submit a revised PTC implementation plan within 270 
days accompanied by a PTC development plan, evidence that the railroad 
intended to implement a PTC system that FRA had already approved, or a 
PTC safety plan. FRA requested the railroads with a disapproved plan 
to meet with the agency to discuss resolution of the remaining issues 
in their plans. FRA officials expect to issue final approval for five 
of the seven disapproved plans in December 2010 and are working with 
the other two railroads in hopes of resolving their remaining issues 
in early 2011. 

[60] If FRA has not approved, approved with conditions, or disapproved 
the PTC development plan within the 60-day window, the agency must 
provide a statement of the reasons why the submission has not been 
acted on and a projected deadline for doing so. See 49 C.F.R. § 
236.1009(j)(2)(iii). 

[61] 49 C.F.R. § 236.1006(b)(2). 

[62] In advertising for PTC branch staff, FRA sought individuals 
experienced in the design, construction, maintenance, testing, and use 
of railroad signal and train control systems, in general, and in PTC 
systems, in particular. According to FRA officials, these positions 
have been filled with experienced individuals. 

[63] 49 U.S.C. § 20157(d). 

[64] The funds appropriated in fiscal year 2010 are available until 
expended. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 
117, Div. A, Title I, 123 stat. 3034, 3056 (Dec. 16, 2009). 

[65] Additionally, FRA officials told us that PTC implementation 
projects are eligible for possible competitive funding provided by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Examination of such 
funding is beyond the scope of this review. 

[66] GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak's Management of Northeast 
Corridor Improvements Demonstrates Need for Applying Best Practices, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-94] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 27, 2004). The need to address risks early, particularly risks 
associated with a project's cost and schedule, has long been part of 
our work to assess efforts related to major capital investments. See 
GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-99-32] (Washington, 
D.C.: December 1998). 

[67] GAO, Digital Television Transition: Increased Federal Planning 
and Risk Management Could Further Facilitate the DTV Transition, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-43] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 19, 2007). 

[68] According to FRA officials, a demonstration project involves 
testing a technology to show how it works and whether it achieves its 
intended result. A pilot project generally follows a demonstration 
project and is used to compile data about the technology to 
demonstrate its benefits. 

[69] The Transportation Research Board's Committee for Review of the 
FRA Research and Development Program includes members from government, 
the railroad industry, academia, and labor. See Transportation 
Research Board, Review of the Federal Railroad Administration Research 
and Development Program: Letter Report February 2010 (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 24, 2010). 

[70] Gage refers to the distance between the two rails of a track, 
which, if changed, could cause a derailment. Gage restraint is the 
ability of rail infrastructure to maintain this requisite distance, 
which can be affected by problems such as defective rail ties or 
changes in the underlying material the track sits on. 

[71] According to FRA officials, the agency awarded $433,000 in grants 
to seven pilot projects in fiscal year 2009 and an additional $350,000 
to five of those projects in fiscal year 2010. In addition to this 
funding, FRA officials told us that the railroads cover the majority 
of the costs associated with these pilots. 

[72] 49 C.F.R. § 232. 

[73] 49 C.F.R. §§ 209, 234, and 236. 

[74] 49 C.F.R. § 213.113. 

[75] FRA officials told us that the timing of the task force's first 
meeting and its membership will be discussed at the December 2010 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee meeting. 

[76] 49 U.S.C. § 20156(d). 

[77] The Transportation Research Board has identified a number of 
other best practices. See Transportation Research Board, 
Transportation Technology Transfer: Successes, Challenges, and Needs: 
A Synthesis of Highway Practice, National Cooperative Highway Research 
Program Synthesis 355 (Washington, D.C.: 2005); and Managing 
Technology Transfer: A Strategy for the Federal Highway 
Administration, Special Report 256 (Washington, D.C.: 1999). These 
reports focused on technologies related to highways, but the practices 
are applicable to other transportation modes, such as railroads. We 
are citing in this report those best practices we identified as most 
applicable to FRA's efforts to promote the implementation of new rail 
safety technologies on the basis of our review of these Transportation 
Research Board studies. 

[78] GAO, Pipeline Safety: Systematic Process Needed to Evaluate 
Outcomes of Research and Development Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-746] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2003). 

[79] Federal Railroad Administration, Five-Year Strategic Plan for 
Railroad Research, Development, and Demonstrations (Washington, D.C.: 
March 2002). 

[80] Additionally, we received written answers to our questions from 
another rail supply company, WabTec, and sought information from 
another supplier, ARINC, which declined to participate in our review. 

[81] We did not examine technologies specifically designed to address 
trespassing and highway-rail grade-crossing accidents, since the 
causes of these accidents are largely outside the control of 
railroads. Although we contacted leading government and railroad 
industry experts to identify rail safety technologies under 
development, the technologies we identified may not be comprehensive 
of all such technologies under development. 

[82] In our questionnaire, we asked experts their views on technology 
maturity using five categories of technology development ordered from 
earlier to later stages: concept exploration, proof of concept and 
initial design, refinement and pilot testing, production and some 
deployment, and widespread industry deployment. Because we focused our 
review on technologies under development, we excluded from our scope 
any technologies that a consensus of these experts indicated was 
widely deployed. 

[83] The names of the technology categories for parts 1 through 4 of 
the assessment tool appear differently in this appendix than in the 
body of this report, since we clarified the names of the technology 
categories while developing the report to characterize them more 
accurately. 

[84] Although we included remote-control locomotives in our 
questionnaire, we excluded this technology from our analysis of the 
most promising technologies because we focused our analysis on 
technologies that are currently under development, and, when asked 
about this technology’s stage in product development, all experts that 
answered this question indicated they viewed the technology as widely 
deployed. 

[End of section] 

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