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entitled 'Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed 
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

December 2010: 

Displaced Iraqis: 

Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's 
Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees: 

GAO-11-124: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-124, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced 
since February 2006 is about 1.6 million, and numerous Iraqis are in 
neighboring countries. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families have 
returned home and the number is slowly increasing. GAO examined 
(1) conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to the reintegration of 
displaced Iraqis, (2) actions the international community is taking to 
address these conditions and reintegration, and (3) the extent to 
which the international community has an effective reintegration 
strategy. GAO analyzed reports and data, met with officials from the 
U.S. and Iraqi governments and international and nongovernmental 
organizations, and did fieldwork in Geneva and Baghdad. 

What GAO Found: 

Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced 
Iraqis. Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved 
since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and 
neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration. 
Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter 
have made it difficult to return and reintegrate. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 43 percent of the 
internally displaced that it surveyed did not have access to their 
homes, primarily because their property was occupied or destroyed. IOM 
also reported that one-third of the heads of returnee families it 
assessed were unemployed. Iraq continues to lack adequate access to 
essential services-—that is, food, water, sanitation, electricity, 
health services, and education. Moreover, insufficient government 
capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem areas and serve 
as a deterrent to returns and reintegration. 

The international community has taken action to address the 
impediments that displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these 
efforts will result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain. 
International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and 
other donor funding, have initiated projects. However, the extent to 
which these projects specifically target and affect reintegration is 
not consistently measured. The Iraqi government has initiated efforts 
to encourage returns and reintegration. However, progress in this area 
has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity, 
according to international and U.S. officials. 

Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international 
community do not have an integrated international strategy for the 
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks 
integrated plans because Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration 
planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity, 
and broader Iraqi government support, according to U.S. and 
international officials; the United Nation’s (UN) strategy and plans 
have not specifically focused on reintegration; and an unclassified 
version of the current U.S. government strategy has not been made 
publicly available. This situation has hindered efforts to efficiently 
assess the needs of internally displaced Iraqis and returnees. 
Moreover, the international community has not yet reached an agreement 
on goals and expected outcomes for reintegration. Also, the UN has not 
integrated data on returnee needs from the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) into its new Inter-Agency Information and Analysis 
Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a central point for 
collecting and assessing data, and UNHCR is not taking advantage of 
IAU resources and coordination efforts. Furthermore, it is difficult 
for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities 
and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms. One area with 
significant potential for inefficiencies is in the establishment and 
operation of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq 
by various entities to assist returnees, the internally displaced, and 
other vulnerable Iraqis. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that (1) the Secretary of State (State) and U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) Administrator assist Iraq in 
developing an effective integrated international strategy for 
reintegrating displaced Iraqis; (2) State and USAID make publicly 
available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy; (3) 
State encourage UNHCR to share primary data collected and take 
advantage of the IAU efforts; and (4) State and USAID work with UNHCR 
and others to inventory and assess the operations of the various 
assistance centers to determine and achieve an optimal framework. The 
Department of State and USAID concurred with our recommendations. 

View GAO-11-124 or key components. For more information, contact 
Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. 
[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Inadequate Security, Property Resolution and Shelter, Income- 
Generating Opportunities, Essential Services, and Governance Pose 
Challenges to Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis: 

International Community Is Addressing Impediments That Iraqis Face; 
However, the Extent to Which These Efforts Result in Reintegration Is 
Not Measured, and Officials Reported Insufficient Iraqi Government 
Commitment and Capacity: 

Iraq, the United States, and Other Members of the International 
Community Lack an Integrated International Strategy for Reintegrating 
Displaced Iraqis: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Roles and Responsibilities of Key U.S. and Iraqi 
Government and International Community Entities Addressing Iraqi 
Displacement: 

Appendix III: U.S. Funds Obligated and Expended for Iraq-Related 
Humanitarian Assistance Projects, and Intended Beneficiaries, Fiscal 
Years 2003-2009, as of September 30, 2009: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Development Assistance Funding, Partners, and 
Activities in Iraq, Fiscal Years 2003-2009: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Sample of Programs and Projects Implemented by the 
International Community to Address Impediments to Reintegration and 
Assist Vulnerable Iraqis: 

Table 2: State/PRM-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to 
Iraqi Refugees, Returnees, IDPs, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year 
2009: 

Table 3: USAID/OFDA-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to 
Iraqi IDPs, Returnees, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 4: Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) and Total 
Iraqi Government Budget and Expenditures, 2008 to 2010: 

Table 5: Summary of the Key Iraqi Government Decree and Orders to 
Facilitate Certain Returns and Reintegration of Displaced Iraqis, 2008-
2009: 

Table 6: U.S. Development Assistance Funds Obligated and Expended in 
Iraq, by Source of Funds, for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of 
September 30, 2009: 

Table 7: USAID/Iraq Development Assistance for Implementing Partners' 
Activities, as Obligated for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of 
September 30, 2009: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Key Movements of Displaced Iraqis, from 2006 to September 
2008: 

Figure 2: Religious Affiliation of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of 
February 2010: 

Figure 3: Religious Affiliation of Iraqi Refugees Registered by UNHCR, 
at the End of 2008: 

Figure 4: U.S. Solider Standing Guard while U.S. Government Officials 
Meet with U.N. Representatives and Iraqi Government Officials at the 
Kindi IDP Resettlement Center Near Baghdad: 

Figure 5: Iraqi Homes Destroyed: 

Figure 6: Housing Arrangements of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of 
February 2010: 

Figure 7: Stagnant Water Near a Residential Area and Poor Quality Tap 
Water in an Iraqi School: 

Figure 8: Garbage on a Baghdad Street: 

Figure 9: Iraqi Schools Damaged by Looting and Conflict: 

Figure 10: Looted Iraqi Government Office: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

IAU: Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit: 

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross: 

IDP: internally displaced person: 

IMC: International Medical Corps: 

IOM: International Organization for Migration: 

ME/IR: Middle East Bureau/Office of Iraq Reconstruction: 

MODM: Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

NSC: National Security Council: 

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs: 

OFDA: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance: 

PRM: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration: 

UN: United Nations: 

UN-HABITAT: United Nations Human Settlements Programme: 

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

USIP: United States Institute of Peace: 

WFP: World Food Program: 

WHO: World Health Organization: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

December 2, 2010: 

Congressional Committees: 

The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced 
since February 2006[Footnote 1] is about 1.6 million, according to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).[Footnote 2] In 
addition, governments in the region report that about 1.5 to 1.7 
million Iraqi refugees are in their countries, although the actual 
number is unknown.[Footnote 3] According to IOM, tens of thousands of 
Iraqi families have returned and the number of returnees is slowly 
increasing; however, UNHCR officials question the sustainability of 
these returns. On February 27, 2009, President Obama stated that it is 
in the United States' strategic interest--and a moral responsibility--
to help displaced Iraqis. According to the President, the U.S. 
government "will work with the Iraqi government over time to resettle 
refugees and displaced Iraqis within Iraq--because there are few more 
powerful indicators of lasting peace than displaced citizens returning 
home."[Footnote 4] 

GAO assessed U.S. and international efforts to reintegrate internally 
displaced Iraqis and returning Iraqi refugees. The United Nations (UN) 
defines reintegration as the achievement of sustainable returns. In 
this report, we address (1) the conditions in Iraq that pose a 
challenge to the reintegration of displaced Iraqis; (2) the actions 
that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the international 
community have taken to address these conditions and reintegration; 
and (3) the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other members 
of the international community have an effective strategy for 
reintegrating displaced Iraqis. This report builds on our prior work 
assessing U.S. and international efforts to protect and assist Iraqi 
refugees in neighboring countries.[Footnote 5] Because of broad 
congressional interest in the U.S. engagement in Iraq, we have 
completed this report under the Comptroller General's authority to 
conduct evaluations on his own initiative. 

To address these objectives, we interviewed officials and reviewed 
reports and data from the U.S. government, the Iraqi government, UNHCR 
and other UN agencies, IOM, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and 
research institutes. To identify conditions that pose a challenge to 
reintegrating displaced Iraqis, we reviewed research papers and 
assessments; strategies and policy papers; program implementation, 
monitoring, and progress reports; and related documents. We assessed 
challenges by considering factors such as their significance and the 
degree to which they could be generalized, and then grouped them by 
category. To identify the actions that the United States, Iraq, and 
the international community have taken to address these conditions and 
reintegration, we reviewed policy, strategy, planning, and funding 
documents; UN appeals; monitoring and progress reports; and related 
documents. To determine the extent to which the United States, Iraq, 
and the international community have an effective strategy to address 
the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, we reviewed policy, strategy, 
and planning documents from the U.S. and Iraqi governments, the UN, 
UNHCR, and IOM. We interviewed U.S. agency, Iraqi government, 
international organization, NGO, and research institution officials 
and reviewed their documents to determine known issues and problems. 
For each objective, we documented evidence from multiple sources and 
validated it with knowledgeable U.S., UN, IOM, and NGO officials to 
ensure accuracy. Appendix I contains a more detailed description of 
our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to December 2010 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced 
Iraqis. First, although the overall security situation in Iraq has 
improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across 
governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and 
reintegration. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported that from 
December 2009 to February 2010, approximately 73 percent of the enemy 
attacks occurred in 4 of the 18 governorates in Iraq--Baghdad, Diyala, 
Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. The first three of these four governorates 
account for 89 percent of the displacement occurring after the 
February 2006 Samarra Al-Askari mosque bombing, according to the UN. 
Second, problems in securing property restitution or compensation and 
shelter have made it difficult for Iraqis to return to their places of 
origin and reintegrate or integrate elsewhere in Iraq. According to a 
2009 IOM report, 43 percent of IDPs surveyed did not have access to 
their homes, primarily because their property was occupied or 
destroyed. The property resolution process is reportedly complicated, 
cumbersome, and has yet to be proven effective, and the problem is 
further exacerbated by the reported lack of adequate shelter. The UN 
Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) reported in July 2009 that 
Iraq had a housing shortage of at least 1.5 million units and demand 
was increasing. Third, without employment or other income-generating 
opportunities, displaced Iraqis may decide against returning to their 
former communities or have difficulty reintegrating. IOM reported in 
November 2009 that one-third of the heads of the returnee families it 
assessed were unemployed and employment opportunities for internally 
displaced persons (IDP) were also limited. Fourth, the lack of 
adequate essential services--primarily, food and nonfood items; water, 
sanitation, and electricity; health services; and education--further 
acts as a barrier to returns and reintegration. Fifth, insufficient 
government capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem 
areas and serve as deterrents to returns and reintegration. 

International and nongovernmental organizations and the U.S. and Iraqi 
governments have taken action to address the impediments that 
displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these efforts will 
result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain. First, 
international and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and 
other donor funding, have initiated many projects to address 
impediments to returns, including projects focusing on protection, 
property and shelter, income, essential services, and government 
support. However, the extent to which these projects specifically 
target and impact reintegration is not consistently measured or 
reported in the aggregate against international goals for 
reintegration. These projects target a mix of vulnerable populations 
in Iraq, including IDPs, returning refugees, non-Iraqi refugees, other 
conflict victims, and the communities that host them. Second, the U.S. 
government implements its objectives regarding displaced Iraqis by 
conducting diplomatic efforts and providing assistance through its 
implementing partners in conjunction with broader humanitarian and 
development assistance efforts. The U.S. goals and outcomes for these 
efforts were classified or considered sensitive information and were 
not made publicly available. Accordingly, we did not provide an 
unclassified assessment of the extent to which U.S. assistance was 
achieving its intended goals. Third, the Iraqi government has 
initiated steps to encourage returns and reintegration; however, 
progress has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity 
at various levels of the government, according to international 
organization and U.S. officials. For example, although the Ministry of 
Displacement and Migration (MODM), a relatively new ministry, issued a 
National Policy on Displacement, it has lacked the authority and 
capacity to lead ministerial efforts, according to officials. 
Furthermore, the international and nongovernmental organizations 
stated that, bureaucratic challenges, based on the lack of political 
commitment and capacity, have prevented many returnees from recovering 
their property and receiving stipends allowed under a government 
decree and orders issued in 2008 and 2009. 

Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international 
community do not have an integrated international strategy for the 
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks 
integrated plans because Iraqi MODM planning efforts stalled due to 
limitations of authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government 
support, according to the international community; the UN's strategy 
and plans have not specifically focused on reintegration; and the U.S. 
government has not made an unclassified version of its current 
strategy publicly available. An effective strategy would be integrated 
and provide Iraq and its implementing partners with a tool to shape 
policies and programs. International community officials agree that to 
be effective, the strategy should be Iraqi-led. Without an integrated 
strategy, clearly defined and agreed-upon strategic goals and intended 
outcomes for reintegration have not been specifically developed. For 
example, the international community has not yet reached agreement on 
when the displacement it is addressing began or when the displaced are 
considered reintegrated. In addition, this situation has hindered 
efforts to efficiently and effectively assess the needs of Iraqi IDPs 
and returnees. While UN agencies, affiliated organizations, and their 
implementing partners have collected and assessed data for their 
specialized work in Iraq, data gaps remain. For example, according to 
international organizations, no inventory and analysis have been 
conducted of financial assistance programs available to IDPs and 
returnees to determine gaps, overlap, or impact. Furthermore, the UN 
has not fully integrated data from UNHCR into its new Inter-Agency 
Information Analysis Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a 
central point for collecting and assessing data. UNHCR is not sharing 
the "raw" or primary data it collects on IDPs, returnees, and 
vulnerable populations and is not taking advantage of IAU resources 
and coordination. Finally, without an Iraqi-led integrated strategy, 
it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and 
responsibilities and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms. 
The MODM Minister stated that his ministry's initial role was limited 
to that of a coordinating body, leaving no single entity charged with 
implementing the necessary tasks. At UN Country Team meetings and UN 
Assistance Mission for Iraq activities, officials stated that while 
some information is shared, organizations "protect their turf," and 
opportunities to build on the efforts of others are lost. One area 
with significant potential for overlap is the establishment of 
numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq to register 
or assist returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable Iraqis. UNHCR, IOM, 
International Medical Corps (IMC), and U.S. government officials 
expressed concern about the need for multiple centers, possible 
inefficiencies, and the extent to which the MODM will be capable of 
assuming responsibilities for centers in the future. 

In this report, we make several recommendations. First, we recommend 
that the Secretary of State and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) Administrator work with the appropriate 
international organizations to assist the Iraqi government in 
developing an effective integrated international strategy that 
addresses impediments to returns and prepares for and facilitates the 
return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Second, we recommend 
that the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator make publicly 
available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy and 
their implementing plans for assisting and reintegrating displaced 
Iraqis, including their goals, performance measures, and progress 
assessments. Third, to ensure that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, 
other donors, international organizations, and implementing partners 
have the best data available regarding the numbers and needs of IDPs, 
returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis, we recommend that the 
Secretary of State encourage UNHCR to share its raw (primary) data and 
methodology with the IAU and to take advantage of IAU expertise and 
coordinated efforts. Fourth, to ensure the effective and efficient use 
of resources by its implementing partners, we recommend that the 
Secretary of State and USAID Administrator work with UNHCR and its 
other implementing partners to take inventory of and assess the 
purposes, organization, operations, and results of the various 
assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units in Iraq 
to determine the optimal framework for assisting IDPs, returnees, and 
other vulnerable Iraqis. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of State 
(State) and USAID agreed with our recommendations. State and USAID's 
written comments and our evaluation of those comments are discussed 
later in this report. In addition, DOD commented that it agreed with 
the report and supports State and USAID in the execution of their 
mission to assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis. State and DOD 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

Background: 

Iraq has had a long history of displacement due to wars and the 
policies of the Saddam Hussein regime. That regime instituted 
"Arabization" policies to force out many non-Arabs from Kirkuk and the 
surrounding areas and replace them with Arab citizens to strengthen 
the regime's political control over the areas' oil fields and fertile 
lands.[Footnote 6] Displacement occurred during the Iran-Iraq war in 
the 1980's; the campaign against the Kurds, which intensified after 
the war in 1988; the draining of the marshes in southern Iraq during 
the war and again after the first Gulf War in 1991; and the 2003 fall 
of the Saddam Hussein regime. UNHCR reported in December 2009 that an 
estimated 2.76 million individuals were displaced in Iraq, 1.2 million 
of which had been displaced prior to 2006.[Footnote 7] The latest wave 
of large-scale displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing 
of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which triggered a rise in 
sectarian violence. According to State and UN reports, insurgents, 
death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against 
civilians in 2006.[Footnote 8] According to UNHCR and IOM, there was a 
sharp increase in the numbers of Iraqis abandoning their homes for 
other locations in Iraq and abroad as a result of the sectarian 
intimidation and violence that erupted during this period. IOM 
reported that the majority of the Iraqi displacement occurred in 2006 
and 2007. According to IOM, as of September 2008, about 90 percent of 
the post-2006 IDPs in Iraq originated from Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa 
governorates (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Key Movements of Displaced Iraqis, from 2006 to September 
2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Iraq] 

The map depicts: 

IDP movement originating from Diyala governorate; 
IDP movement originating from Baghdad governorate; 
IDP movement originating from Ninewa governorate; 
Refugee movement originating from Iraq to: 
Egypt and Lebanon; 
Europe; 
Gulf States; 
Jordan; 
Iran; 
Turkey. 

Sources: GAO analysis of maps from UNHCR and OCHA; IOM (data); Map 
Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

According to IOM, 4 years after the Al-Askari bombing, displaced 
families are returning and new displacement is rare; however, the 
number of those displaced who had returned (returnees) remains well 
below the estimated number of those who remain displaced. As of the 
end of 2009, UNHCR estimated that of those who were displaced before 
and after the Al-Askari bombing, 745,630 IDPs and 433,696 refugees had 
returned.[Footnote 9] IOM reported in February 2010, that of those who 
were displaced after the 2006 Al-Askari bombing, IOM returnee field 
monitors had identified an estimated 374,166 returnees.[Footnote 10] 
Additionally, the numbers of returnees varies by governorate, with 
Baghdad experiencing the largest share of IDP and refugee returns, 
according to UNHCR. The majority of those who initially returned were 
IDPs rather than refugees, which is a pattern that has been seen in 
other displacement situations worldwide, according to IOM and UNHCR 
officials. IOM reported in February 2010, that its assessments of an 
estimated 1.3 million IDPs identified by its field monitors, showed 
that 49 percent of all post-Al-Askari bombing IDPs want to return to 
their places of origin, 29 percent want to remain and integrate into 
their current places of displacement, 19 percent want to resettle to a 
third location, and 3 percent are waiting to make a decision.[Footnote 
11] 

According to UNHCR officials, displaced Iraqis tend to be educated and 
come from urban, middle-class backgrounds, which is in sharp contrast 
to displaced communities in other nations. UNHCR also reported that 
the displaced Iraqi population comprises Sunnis, Shias, Christians, 
and other groups that were forced to relocate to areas where they 
constitute the dominant groups.[Footnote 12] According to IOM, 58 
percent of the 1.3 million IDPs that they had assessed reported to be 
Shia Muslim and 33 percent reported to be Sunni Muslim, as of February 
2010 (see figure 2); however, religious affiliations and ethnicity 
varied by governorates.[Footnote 13] According to UNHCR, 21 percent of 
the Iraqi refugees that were actively registered in neighboring 
countries at the end of 2008 identified themselves as Shia Muslims, 
and 56 percent identified themselves as Sunni Muslims (see figure 3). 
[Footnote 14] 

Figure 2: Religious Affiliation of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of 
February 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Shia Muslim: 58%; 
Sunni Muslim: 33%; 
Christian: 5%; 
Other/Unknown: 4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of IOM data. 

Note: The total number of IDPs assessed was about 1.3 million 
individuals (221,983 families). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Religious Affiliation of Iraqi Refugees Registered by UNHCR, 
at the End of 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Shia Muslim: 56%; 
Sunni Muslim: 21%; 
Christian: 14%; 
Other/Unknown: 5%; 
Unspecified Muslim: 4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of IOM data. 

Note: The total number of Iraqi refugees actively registered with 
UNHCR at the end of 2008 was 311,000. Countries of registration 
included the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
Lebanon, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Turkey, and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. 

[End of figure] 

The UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines an 
internally displaced person as one who has been forced or obliged to 
leave his or her home as a result of armed conflict, generalized 
violence, violation of human rights, or disaster, but has not crossed 
an international border. A refugee, as defined by the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, 
is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country."[Footnote 15] 
According UNHCR's Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration 
Activities, reintegration is a process that should result in the 
disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties between 
returnees and their compatriots and the equal access of returnees to 
services, productive assets, and opportunities. UNHCR's Handbook also 
states that such a process assumes that refugees return to societies 
that are more or less stable, and, when this is not the case, 
returnees and communities in areas of return should benefit equally 
from improved access to productive assets and social services. 
According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation and reintegration is the 
preferred durable solution for refugees.[Footnote 16] 

Iraqi and U.S. government entities, international organizations, and 
NGOs play significant roles in addressing Iraqi displacement in Iraq 
and the region. For information on the key responsible entities and 
their respective roles, see appendix II. 

Inadequate Security, Property Resolution and Shelter, Income- 
Generating Opportunities, Essential Services, and Governance Pose 
Challenges to Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis: 

Problems in securing a safe environment, property and shelter, income, 
essential services, and government capacity and commitment may impede 
large numbers of returns and the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, 
according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. UNHCR 
considers that the basic conditions necessary to encourage and sustain 
large-scale returns to Iraq have not been established. UNHCR had 
predicted large-scale returns for 2009 after security conditions had 
improved in the latter half of 2007 and in 2008, but they did not 
materialize, according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. 
UN, IOM, and U.S. government officials agree that the decision to 
return and the ability to reintegrate involve a complex set of factors 
that may vary by location and individual circumstance. Moreover, 
according to the UN, IOM, and NGOs, many of these factors also 
negatively affect vulnerable Iraqis in the communities that host IDPs 
and Iraqis who did not have the means to flee the conflict or the 
ensuing economic hardships. 

Uncertain Security Conditions May Impede Iraqi Returns and 
Reintegration: 

Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 
2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and 
neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration, 
according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. According to 
the UN, voluntary return is the preferred solution, but Iraqis should 
not be encouraged to return until the security situation allows for 
large-scale return and sufficient monitoring of returns. According to 
DOD, overall violence in Iraq, after peaking in 2007, remains at its 
lowest level in 5 years. However, the level and nature of violence has 
varied by governorate. DOD reported that from December 2009 to 
February 2010, about 73 percent of the attacks occurred in 4 out of 
the 18 governorates--Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. 
[Footnote 17] The first three of these governates account for 89 
percent of the displacement occurring after the February 2006 Samarra 
Al-Askari Mosque bombing, according to the UN. In contrast, the 
Kurdistan Region, with its relatively homogenous population and the 
presence of the Kurdish security forces, remained relatively safe and 
stable, according to DOD. 

Many displaced Iraqis may be afraid of returning because of the fear 
of violent reprisals from militants and members of opposing sects, 
according to USAID and UNHCR officials. IOM reported in 2008 that 
returnees were threatened, shot at, or killed after returning home. 
[Footnote 18] An MODM official reported that one of the initial 
families that had returned to a Baghdad neighborhood was killed as a 
warning to others not to return. UNHCR and IOM officials stated that 
some displaced Iraqis, particularly those from targeted minority 
groups, have no plans to return out of fear of persecution. According 
to the UN, although a decrease in violence in Iraq has been observed, 
grave and systematic human rights violations persist and remain 
largely unreported. The UN also reported that violence against 
professionals, women, and members of minority communities occur often 
and are rarely punished.[Footnote 19] 

Moreover, many displaced Iraqis and returnees have had difficulties in 
accessing services, including those provided by humanitarian 
organizations, because of obstacles such as curfews, checkpoints, and 
areas affected by intense fighting, according to UNHCR, IOM, other UN 
agencies, and NGOs. In addition, according to UNHCR, the precarious 
security situation is requiring UNHCR to increase investments in the 
security of staff and may continue to limit UNHCR's mobility inside 
Iraq (see figure 4). The UN, UNHCR, IOM, and International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) cautioned that while access may be improving 
overall, the security situation could deteriorate again, which could 
limit their access to the population. 

Figure 4: U.S. Solider Standing Guard while U.S. Government Officials 
Meet with U.N. Representatives and Iraqi Government Officials at the 
Kindi IDP Resettlement Center Near Baghdad: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Edwin L. 
Wriston (photographer). 

[End of figure] 

Lack of Property Restitution or Compensation and Shelter May Impede 
Iraqi Returns and Reintegration: 

Problems in securing property restitution or compensation[Footnote 20] 
and shelter have made it difficult for displaced Iraqis to return and 
reintegrate or integrate elsewhere in Iraq, according to UNHCR and IOM 
officials. According to a 2009 United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
report,[Footnote 21] the lack of policies addressing displacement- 
related property issues is a major obstacle to returns and may prolong 
instability, hinder reconciliation, and nurture grievances along 
ethnic or sectarian lines. In November 2009, IOM reported that about 
one-third of surveyed returnees found their homes in bad condition. 
[Footnote 22] In February 2009, IOM reported that 43 percent of the 
post-2006 Samarra bombing IDPs surveyed did not have access to their 
homes, primarily because the property was occupied or destroyed (see 
figure 5); and that 38 percent did not know the status of their 
property, often because they could not safely access it.[Footnote 23] 
According to the 2009 USIP report and IOM, hundreds of thousands of 
displaced families are estimated to have homes that are occupied or 
used by strangers, such as militants, squatters, other displaced 
Iraqis, or, in rare cases, Iraqi Army or other government officials, 
sometimes resulting in multiple scenarios of competing claims. Many 
displaced Iraqis have also lost personal property, business stock, 
usage rights for farm land, and farming equipment, according to the 
report. Moreover, a number of returnees with leases to apartments have 
had difficulties in reclaiming their accommodations because, in some 
cases, landlords took advantage of their tenants' absence to re-lease 
the properties at higher rents, according to the 2009 USIP report. 

Figure 5: Iraqi Homes Destroyed: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Copyright © Integrated Regional Information Networks, Afif 
Sarhan (photographer). 

[End of figure] 

Further complicating property restitution and compensation are the 
Iraqi government's policies that distinguish between Iraqis who were 
displaced before and after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. The 
implementation of these policies has yet to be proven effective for 
either group. For pre-March 2003 cases, the Commission for the 
Resolution of Real Property Disputes was established in 2006 to 
address property issues resulting from the Ba'athist regime's policies 
of forced displacement, according to the 2009 USIP report.[Footnote 
24] According to the report, the commission's "quasi-judicial" system 
is not well adapted to the nature and number of cases and thus is 
cumbersome and prone to delays. As of January 2009, the commission had 
decided about 67,000 cases of the approximately 150,000 cases filed 
since March 2004. However, due to appeals and re-reviews, only about 
30,000 decisions were deemed final and enforceable and compensation 
was paid only in about 1,000 cases. Moreover, USIP reported that data 
are not available regarding the number of claimants--with decisions in 
their favor--able to reoccupy their houses or land. An Iraqi 
government official stated that many IDPs typically require more 
assistance than what the government provides to replace lost 
properties and rebuild or repair damaged homes. 

For post-March 2003 cases, the Iraqi government initially deemed that 
property violations were the fault of terrorists and criminals and 
thus were a law enforcement problem that could be resolved in the 
courts, if needed. According to the 2009 USIP report, the existing 
legal framework may have been inadequate to fairly resolve complex 
displacement cases and to effectively handle the potentially large 
caseload. In 2008, according to the U.S. government and IOM, the Iraqi 
government recognized the need to further address property issues and 
thus initiated changes to its policies and efforts. 

The property restitution and compensation problem is further 
exacerbated by the reported lack of adequate shelter. UN-HABITAT 
reported in July 2009 that Iraq had a housing shortage of at least 1.5 
million units,[Footnote 25] and demand was increasing.[Footnote 26] 
According to UN-HABITAT, just over 70 percent of Iraqis lived in urban 
areas, and more than 10 percent of the houses in these areas had more 
than 10 occupants and more than 35 percent had 3 or more people per 
room. According to IOM, displaced families continue to have difficulty 
in finding adequate housing in their places of displacement, even 
several years after leaving home. IOM reported that IDPs' shelter 
arrangements include renting, moving in with friends and relatives, 
occupying empty public buildings, establishing collective settlements, 
and other arrangements (see figure 6).[Footnote 27] However, these 
arrangements may not be sustainable because they pose costs to both 
the displaced and their host communities. For example, IOM reported 
that the majority of internally displaced Iraqis are living in rental 
accommodations, but, as time passes, rent prices increase and their 
ability to pay decreases. Friends and relatives, already struggling to 
provide for themselves, are additionally burdened by housing the 
displaced, according to UN-HABITAT. Moreover, IDPs living in 
settlements or public buildings may often be at risk from eviction by 
local authorities or private owners. Less than 1 percent of displaced 
Iraqis live in tent camps. 

Figure 6: Housing Arrangements of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of 
February 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Rented housing: 58%; 
House of host family or relatives: 12%; 
Collective town settlement: 9%; 
Public building: 3%; 
Other: 18%. 

Source: GAO analysis of IOM data. 

Note: The total number of IDPs assessed was about 1.3 million 
individuals (221,983 families). 

[End of figure] 

Lack of Income Opportunities May Impede Iraqi Returns and 
Reintegration: 

According to USAID and international organization officials, without 
employment or other income-generating opportunities, displaced Iraqis 
may not return to their former communities or may have difficulty in 
reintegrating. In November 2009, IOM reported that 34 percent of the 
heads of returning households that it had surveyed stated that they 
could not find employment, even though they were able to work. 
[Footnote 28] IOM also found that employment rates were higher in 
certain governorates, such as Baghdad. Employment for IDPs has also 
been scarce and varied across the governorates, according to USAID. 
According to IOM, 31.7 percent of the IDP families assessed had at 
least one employed family member as of December 2009. In general, 
employment in Iraq is scarce, according to USAID and UNHCR officials. 
The UN reported in January 2009 that the unemployment rate was 18 
percent.[Footnote 29] In addition, the UN and IOM estimate that over 
50 percent of the active population is unemployed or underemployed, 
and that over 55 percent may face difficulties in covering basic 
living costs. Underemployment and poverty pose a significant risk to 
the reconciliation and stability of the country, according to the UN. 

Moreover, IOM officials said that regaining former employment is 
difficult for displaced Iraqis. According to an international 
organization, the largest employer in Iraq is the government, but, 
according to IOM, returnees have difficulty in regaining prior 
government employment, either due to discrimination or corruption. In 
March 2010, State reported allegations of employment discrimination by 
several ministries based on religious, ethnic, and political 
affiliations.[Footnote 30] The agricultural sector is the second- 
largest contributor to the economy, according to the UN. IOM reported 
the need to provide returnees and IDPs in rural areas who want to farm 
with the necessary means, such as land, seeds, fertilizers, tools, 
poultry, and cattle. In addition, according to IOM officials, many 
skilled professionals became displaced, and the longer they are 
displaced, the greater the likelihood that their skills will become 
outdated. Furthermore, MODM reported that Iraq lacks procedures to 
recognize professional certificates and diplomas acquired abroad. 
Officials from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNHCR are concerned that Iraqi 
refugees from professional or middle-class backgrounds may be 
reluctant to return for low-skilled and low-paying jobs, which could 
potentially affect government capacity and economic growth in Iraq. 

Inadequate Access to Essential Services May Impede Iraqi Returns and 
Reintegration: 

Food and Nonfood Items: 

The lack of access to food and nonfood items is a deterrent to returns 
and reintegration, according to UNHCR officials. The top three 
priority needs identified by returnee families assessed by IOM were 
food (over 60 percent), fuel (over 40 percent), and other nonfood 
items (over 40 percent), according to a November 2009 IOM report. 
[Footnote 31] According to the UN, most Iraqis, including IDPs and 
returnees, receive monthly food rations from the Public Distribution 
System.[Footnote 32] According to a UN report, although the Public 
Distribution System largely shields Iraqis from rising global food 
costs, local prices have climbed higher than global prices.[Footnote 
33] According to IOM, IDP families have also reported having no or 
partial access to the Public Distribution System.[Footnote 34] The 
World Food Program (WFP) reported in 2008 that distribution across the 
country had been uneven due to the conflict. Many IDP families have 
had difficulties in obtaining the proper documents to register for the 
Public Distribution System in their new locations, which is required 
to obtain rations, according to UNHCR officials. According to USAID 
officials, the re-registration of Public Distribution System cards was 
improving as of January 2010. Additionally, the rise in fuel prices 
and the difficulties of obtaining fuel have placed considerable burden 
on many Iraqis, including IDPs and returnees, according to IOM and the 
ICRC. IOM further reported that the returnee families it assessed 
listed fuel as one of the highest priority needs. 

Water, Sanitation, and Electricity: 

The UN reported in December 2008, that about 40 percent of Iraqis 
continued to suffer from poor water quality and sanitation services 
due to dysfunctional systems, network breakdowns, aging 
infrastructure, and frequent power supply interruptions (see figure 
7).[Footnote 35] According to IOM, access to potable water is a major 
concern of IDPs, returnees, and Iraqis in general.[Footnote 36] 
Although approximately more than 80 percent of IOM-assessed returnees 
in 2009 had access to municipal water networks, the water may not have 
been potable, according to IOM. A 2007 survey of Iraqi households also 
found that although 81.3 percent of individuals lived in dwellings 
connected to public water networks only 12.5 percent of these 
individuals had reported that their supply of water was constant. 
[Footnote 37] 

Figure 7: Stagnant Water Near a Residential Area and Poor Quality Tap 
Water in an Iraqi School: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Sources: USAID, Thomas Hartwell (photographer) (left); Copyright ©, 
Integrated Regional Information Networks (right). 

[End of figure] 

According to the UN, sewage is also a common sight in many 
neighborhoods, and solid waste management at the family level is a 
serious problem (see figure 8). For example, IOM reported in May 2009 
that because of blocked sanitation networks, several houses in Baghdad 
had been damaged by water and left structurally compromised or had 
collapsed. ICRC reported that a number of water treatment plants in 
Iraq had either shut down or reduced their operating capacity as a 
result of the electricity supply issue.[Footnote 38] 

Figure 8: Garbage on a Baghdad Street: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: USAID, Thomas Hartwell (photographer). 

[End of figure] 

According to DOD, the electricity supply for many Iraqis is still 
intermittent and unpredictable, although the gap between demand and 
supply has narrowed. UN-HABITAT reported in October 2009 that Iraqis 
experienced, on average, 16 hours of power interruption per day. 

Health Care: 

Displaced and vulnerable Iraqis may also find challenges in obtaining 
access to health care. In November 2009, IOM reported that more than 
one-third of assessed families reported having no access to health 
care, but that this figure was higher for certain governorates (e.g., 
just over one-half of the assessed families in Baghdad).[Footnote 39] 
Lack of access is most often due to the distance to the nearest health 
care center or lack of equipment and staff. ICRC reported that of the 
34,000 doctors registered in 1990, at least 20,000 have left the 
country, and 2,200 doctors and nurses have been killed since 2003. In 
addition, ICRC reported that hospitals and other health facilities 
often lack drugs and other essential items. In 2009, OCHA reported 
that mental health issues were also a concern, because many Iraqis had 
been affected by conflict and displacement.[Footnote 40] In addition, 
IDPs may not have the money to secure transportation to public health 
facilities or purchase medication and services that are not available 
through the public system. Furthermore, according to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
officials, discrimination based on sectarian grounds and fear of 
traveling to health facilities could also limit access to health care. 

According to WHO officials, there is little data on the health needs 
of displaced Iraqis. Although Iraq's public health system does 
generate up-to-date information, WHO officials said that they have had 
to rely on surveys conducted in 2006/2007 for much of their 
information. These officials also said that without sufficient health 
data, decision makers will not have the information to identify 
vulnerable populations, such as displaced Iraqis, and develop 
strategies to meet Iraq's health needs. 

Education: 

According to IOM, just under 10 percent of the returnee families with 
school-age children in Iraq reported having no access to education; 
however, this figure varies greatly across the country. For example, 
almost two-thirds of returnee families reported having no access to 
schooling in the Babylon governorate. According to USAID, schools have 
been damaged and looted (see figure 9). According to OCHA, military 
interventions, during March and April, 2008, in Baghdad caused the 
closing of 22 schools, 11 of which sustained major damages.[Footnote 
41] During this period, curfews were imposed and attendance dropped to 
30 percent. In addition, IOM reported in April 2009 that many 
Christian IDPs from Mosul were unable to enroll in school because they 
lacked documentation. Furthermore, according to the UN Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), a number of Iraqi schools are overcrowded and lack proper 
sanitation facilities, which would make it difficult for these 
facilities to absorb returning displaced children. Also, UNICEF 
reported in January 2009 that a number of students who were returning 
to their homes after being displaced may not have registered with the 
government to receive standard school supplies.[Footnote 42] 

Figure 9: Iraqi Schools Damaged by Looting and Conflict: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: USAID, Thomas Hartwell (photographer). 

[End of figure] 

Insufficient Iraqi Government Capacity and Commitment May Impede Iraqi 
Returns and Reintegration: 

IOM and UNHCR officials said that shortfalls in the Iraqi government's 
capacity and commitment have limited the potential for reintegrating 
displaced Iraqis. According to U.S. and international assessments and 
officials, years of neglect, a highly centralized decision-making 
system under the former regime, and looting in 2003 decimated Iraq's 
government ministries (see figure 10). In March 2009, GAO reported 
that Iraqi ministries had significant shortages of personnel who could 
formulate budgets, procure goods and services, and perform other 
ministry tasks.[Footnote 43] GAO also reported that violence and 
sectarian strife; the exodus of skilled labor from Iraq; and the 
weakness in Iraqi procurement, budgeting, and accounting procedures 
limited the Iraqi government's ability to spend its capital project 
budget.[Footnote 44] 

Figure 10: Looted Iraqi Government Office: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: USAID, Debbi Morello (photographer). 

[End of figure] 

According to U.S. and UNHCR officials, although there has been some 
progress, the Iraqi government appears to be noncommittal in 
addressing displacement issues. For example, the Iraqi Prime Minister 
has appointed a senior official to coordinate IDP and refugee issues, 
but the Iraqi government does not appear ready to direct significant 
resources to assist refugees. DOD also reported in 2009 that given 
other priorities, engaging Syria and Jordan on the return of a largely 
Sunni refugee population remained a low priority for the Iraqi 
government.[Footnote 45] Furthermore, U.S. and international 
organization officials said that the Iraqi government has not given 
MODM the authority and capacity to direct or coordinate government 
efforts to address displacement issues. In addition, IOM officials 
stated that many of the Sunni Iraqi refugees will not return until 
they see true national reconciliation in Iraq because they do not 
trust the current Iraqi government to protect them. 

International Community Is Addressing Impediments That Iraqis Face; 
However, the Extent to Which These Efforts Result in Reintegration Is 
Not Measured, and Officials Reported Insufficient Iraqi Government 
Commitment and Capacity: 

Although international and nongovernmental organizations and U.S. and 
Iraqi governments have taken action to address the impediments that 
Iraqi IDPs and refugees face to return and reintegration, the extent 
to which these efforts will result in reintegration (i.e., sustainable 
returns) is unknown. The extent to which these projects specifically 
target and impact reintegration is not consistently measured or 
reported in the aggregate against international goals for 
reintegration. U.S. goals and outcomes for these efforts were 
classified or considered sensitive and thus an unclassified assessment 
and reporting of progress made toward U.S. goals could not be made. 
Moreover, the Iraqi government has made limited progress due to the 
lack of uniform government support and capacity, according to 
international community officials. A March 2010 report stated that the 
rates of return of IDPs and refugees had not increased in the last 
year.[Footnote 46] 

International and Nongovernmental Organizations Have Initiated 
Projects Addressing Conditions That Impede Returns and Reintegration, 
but the Effect on Reintegration Is Not Consistently Measured: 

International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and 
other donor funding, have initiated many projects to address 
impediments to returns and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. However, 
according to international organization and U.S. government officials, 
the extent to which these projects specifically target and impact 
reintegration is not consistently measured or reported in the 
aggregate against measurable goals and objectives for reintegration. 
According to the UN, international efforts focus on all vulnerable 
Iraqis. Thus, these projects target a mix of vulnerable populations in 
Iraq, including IDPs, returning refugees, non-Iraqi refugees, other 
conflict victims, and the communities that host them (see table 1). 
According to international and U.S. government officials, host 
communities are often equally vulnerable and including them reduces 
the likelihood of resentment toward providing assistance to IDPs and 
returning refugees. 

Table 1: Sample of Programs and Projects Implemented by the 
International Community to Address Impediments to Reintegration and 
Assist Vulnerable Iraqis: 

Reintegration challenge: Security and protection; 
International community actor and program implemented: 
* UNHCR: Established 15 Protection and Assistance Centers and 40 
associated mobile teams that provide services to displaced, returning, 
and vulnerable Iraqis in all governorates, including identification of 
protection needs, legal advice and assistance, court representation, 
and referrals for services; 
* UNHCR: Established 12 Return Integration Community Centers in 
Baghdad and several other governorates to provide outreach, 
information, and service referrals to displaced and returning Iraqis. 
These centers also coordinate with local communities and authorities 
to relay information about the needs of displaced and returning Iraqis; 
* IMC and UNHCR: Support the operations of the MODM Returnee 
Assistance Centers. These centers provide returnees with legal advice 
and assistance in replacing missing official documents and accessing 
government services and benefits; 
* UNICEF: Developing a protection awareness curriculum in Baghdad for 
the training of social service providers on early marriage, child 
recruitment, and sexual abuse. 

Reintegration challenge: Property compensation and shelter; 
International community actor and program implemented: 
* IMC and UNHCR: Support the operations of the MODM Returnee 
Assistance Centers, where returnees can obtain legal advice on 
property cases involving compensation, occupation, and evacuation, as 
well as the eviction of squatters from occupied properties; 
* UNHCR: Rehabilitated and reconstructed 8,501 shelters in 2009 that 
benefited 56,238 people, 62 percent of whom were returning IDPs; 
* UN-HABITAT: Supplied shelter to 800 IDP and returnee families to 
integrate them with their host communities for a "contextually 
appropriate duration." 

Reintegration challenge: Income generation; 
International community actor and program implemented: 
* IOM: Provided vocational training for 733 people and agricultural 
training for 2,328; 
* IOM: Provided 4,494 in-kind grants ranging in value from $400 to 
$2,000 (such as fishing equipment, carpentry and welding tools, and 
food sales materials, among other materials) to vulnerable Iraqis to 
support the formation and expansion of small businesses. Provided 254 
returnees with in-kind grants for the same under a pilot program with 
MODM; 
* ICRC: Established income-generating projects in the Baghdad and 
Najaf governorates to help female-headed households. 

Reintegration challenge: Essential services; 
International community actor and program implemented: 
* WFP: Provided food assistance for about 750,000 internally displaced 
Iraqis and about 577,000 other vulnerable Iraqis; 
* ICRC: Rehabilitated infrastructure to improve access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation, upgraded water facilities and developed 
water-supply systems that benefited displaced Iraqis living within 
host communities, and provided water trucking services and developed 
or rehabilitated water supply systems for IDPs living in settlements; 
* UNICEF and NGO partners: Rehabilitated water and sanitation 
networks, and implemented hygiene awareness campaigns in schools; 
* WHO: Supported the Ministry of Health in developing plans to upgrade 
the national health information system and train Iraqi health care 
professionals; 
* UNICEF and WHO: Supported the Ministry of Health's widespread 
emergency campaign to vaccinate more than 800,000 children in northern 
governorates to prevent the spread of measles; 
* NGOs: Set up programs to improve Iraqi children's psychosocial 
skills in the classroom and at home, including the training of 
education supervisors and teachers in vulnerable districts; 
* UNICEF: Assisted with the rehabilitation of 105 schools and 
distributed teaching and learning materials to schools. 

Reintegration challenge: Capacity development; 
International community actor and program implemented: 
* IOM: Implemented programs to strengthen MODM's daily operations with 
staff training and development of an organizational structure. IOM 
worked with Iraqi professionals who have migrated abroad to return to 
Iraq for short-term assignments to contribute expertise for 
reconstruction and development efforts. 

Source: GAO summary based on information from the U.S. government, 
international organizations, and NGOs. 

[End of table] 

Through its 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region, the UN 
coordinated most international organization efforts and funding to 
meet humanitarian needs in Iraq and for Iraqi refugees and the 
communities that host them in neighboring countries. In June 2009, the 
UN revised its consolidated appeal by increasing the amount requested 
from $547.3 million to $650.4 million.[Footnote 47] According to OCHA, 
the U.S. government contributed about 71 percent of new contributions 
to the 2009 appeal and funded at least 56 percent of all reported 2009 
assistance to Iraq and the region.[Footnote 48] 

The UN did not issue a consolidated appeal for Iraq and the region for 
2010. Instead, UN assistance requests are primarily found in three 
documents: 

* The Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan, developed by 9 UN agencies, 
IOM, and 12 NGOs operating in the country, focuses on overall 
humanitarian assistance for Iraq, including efforts that also target 
IDPs and returnees, and requests about $193.6 million. 

* The UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011 for Iraq focuses on IDPs, 
returning refugees, other refugees and stateless people inside Iraq 
and requests about $264.3 million for 2010, of which about $31.1 
million is targeted for reintegration projects that include returnees 
and host communities. 

* The Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees focuses on Iraqi 
refugees and the host communities in 12 neighboring and other 
countries and requests about $364.2 million. 

U.S. Government Implements Its Objectives by Conducting Diplomatic 
Efforts and Providing Assistance through Its Implementing Partners: 

In a February 2009 speech, President Obama stated that diplomacy and 
assistance were required to help displaced Iraqis. This speech 
established a policy that National Security Council (NSC), State, 
USAID, and DOD officials follow in finding durable solutions for 
displaced Iraqis, including reintegrating voluntary returns within and 
to Iraq. While the following information provides examples of U.S. 
diplomatic efforts and assistance, we note that overall U.S. goals, 
objectives, and outcomes for U.S. efforts were classified or 
considered sensitive information during our review.[Footnote 49] 
Accordingly, the information in this section is descriptive and can 
provide no assessment of the extent to which U.S. assistance is 
achieving its intended goals. Subsequent to concluding our field work 
and our exit meetings with U.S. agencies and the NSC, the NSC provided 
GAO with an unclassified summary, that had not been made public, of a 
classified May 2009 U.S. government strategy regarding support for 
returning Iraqi refugees and IDPs. The stated U.S. goal was to create 
conditions inside key areas of Iraq that will allow the maximum number 
of voluntary returns to be sustainable. Objectives were provided for 
fiscal years 2009-2011. However, the NSC also noted that the summary 
prepared for GAO in July 2010 was based on a "historical document", 
should be viewed in that context, and that it had not been updated to 
reflect the current situation. 

Diplomatic Efforts: 

In August 2009, the White House announced that the NSC's Senior 
Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights would serve as its 
coordinator on Iraqi refugees and IDPs. In November 2009, the Senior 
Director and the Assistant Secretary of State for Population, 
Refugees, and Migration met with the Iraqi government's refugees and 
IDP coordinator and the head of the Iraqi Prime Minister's 
Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation to 
discuss the challenges related to the return and reintegration of 
displaced Iraqis. The officials subsequently issued a joint statement 
that described steps agreed upon by both the U.S. and Iraqi 
governments to assist Iraq's displaced population and support national 
unity. One of the agreed-upon steps was to promote cooperation with 
other nations to broaden international support efforts and thereby 
make returns more sustainable. In August 2009, the White House also 
assigned a senior Foreign Service Officer to take up the post of 
Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons at the 
U.S. embassy.[Footnote 50] The Senior Coordinator is responsible for 
coordinating the U.S. government's work in Iraq on refugees and IDPs 
and representing the United States on Iraqi displacement issues with 
the Iraqi government, the international community, and NGOs. 

Humanitarian and Development Assistance: 

To provide humanitarian and developmental assistance, the U.S. 
government primarily contributes funds to UN appeals and provides 
bilateral assistance through its implementing partners. U.S. funding 
does not solely target returnees; it supports programs that include 
assistance for both returnees and other vulnerable populations. As of 
September 30, 2009, State and USAID had obligated about $1.9 billion 
and expended about $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2003 through 2009 for 
all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance in Iraq and the region. This 
total included funds to assist Iraqi refugees and the communities that 
host them in neighboring countries (see appendix III for funding and 
intended beneficiaries). Table 2 provides State's Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration's (PRM) implementing partners, 
activities, country locations, and funding obligated for fiscal year 
2009. Of these activities, about $45 million of the $303.4 million 
obligated in fiscal year 2009 was allocated to IOM and UNHCR for 
projects under State's new "returns program" in Iraq. These two 
programs are targeted to benefit returnees and other vulnerable Iraqis. 

Table 2: State/PRM-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to 
Iraqi Refugees, Returnees, IDPs, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year 
2009: 

Implementing partner: UNHCR; 
Activity: Emergency Relief Supplies; Education; Food Assistance; 
Health; Protection; Shelter; Cash Assistance for Extremely Vulnerable 
Individuals; 
Location: Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and other neighboring countries; 
Funding obligated: $198,000,000. 

Implementing partner: UNICEF; 
Activity: Education; Health; Water and Sanitation; 
Location: Jordan, Syria, and other neighboring countries; 
Funding obligated: $15,000,000. 

Implementing partner: IOM; 
Activity: Socioeconomic Reintegration for Returnees; Psychosocial, 
Legal, Health, and Livelihoods Support for IDP and Returnee Female-
headed Households; Anti-trafficking Programs; 
Location: Iraq, Syria, Jordan and other neighboring countries; 
Funding obligated: $12,700,000. 

Implementing partner: NGOs; 
Activity: Health; Education; Emergency Relief Supplies; 
Location: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Armenia[A]; 
Funding obligated: $41,384,670. 

Implementing partner: Other International Organizations; 
Activity: Protection; Health; Water and Sanitation; Emergency Relief 
Supplies; Livelihoods Support; 
Location: Iraq, Jordan, and Syria; 
Funding obligated: $36,319,631. 

Implementing partner: Total; 
Funding obligated: $303,404,301. 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from State. 

[A] State provided $400,000 to Save the Children in fiscal year 2009 
to support Iraqi and other refugees in Armenia. 

[End of table] 

USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funds and 
oversees a wide range of humanitarian assistance activities that are 
implemented by a number of NGO and UN partners who provide programs 
for IDPs and other vulnerable Iraqis. Table 3 provides USAID/OFDA's 
implementing partners, activities, locations, and funding obligated 
for fiscal year 2009. Of the about $83.4 million obligated, $60 
million was for programs intended to provide direct assistance to 
returning families; support to communities with significant numbers of 
current or anticipated returnees; and general assistance to vulnerable 
populations, regardless of displacement status. According to USAID/ 
OFDA, since Iraq is transitioning from an emergency to a development 
phase, OFDA plans to conclude its work in Iraq in 2011. 

Table 3: USAID/OFDA-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to 
Iraqi IDPs, Returnees, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year 2009: 

Implementing partner: Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development; 
Activity: Agriculture and Food Security; Economic Recovery and Market 
Systems; Emergency Relief Supplies; Protection; Shelter and 
Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; 
Location in Iraq: Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Erbil, Wasit; 
Funding obligated: $2,547,653. 

Implementing partner: CHF International; 
Activity: Shelter and Settlements; 
Location in Iraq: Anbar; 
Funding obligated: $3,868,135. 

Implementing partner: IMC; 
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Health; 
Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management; Protection; 
Shelter and Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; 
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, Karbala, 
Najaf, Ninawa, Qadisiyah, Wasit; 
Funding obligated: $18,075,687. 

Implementing partner: International Rescue Committee; 
Activity: Emergency Relief Supplies; Protection; Shelter and 
Settlements; 
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Baghdad, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Sulaymaniyah; 
Funding obligated: $4,975,648. 

Implementing partner: International Relief and Development; 
Activity: Agriculture and Food Security; Emergency Relief Supplies; 
Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Health; Protection; Shelter and 
Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; 
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ninawa; 
Funding obligated: $9,441,496. 

Implementing partner: IOM; 
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Emergency Relief 
Supplies; Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management; 
Protection; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; 
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Baghdad, Basrah, Dahuk, Diyala, Erbil, 
Kirkuk, Muthanna, Ninawa, Qadisiyah, Sulaymaniyah, Wasit; 
Countrywide; 
Funding obligated: $10,430,249. 

Implementing partner: Mercy Corps; 
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Emergency Relief 
Supplies; Humanitarian Studies, Analysis, or Applications; Protection; 
Shelter and Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; 
Location in Iraq: Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din, Sulaymaniyah; 
Countrywide; 
Funding obligated: $14,500,000. 

Implementing partner: Save the Children/U.S.; 
Activity: Protection; 
Location in Iraq: Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna; 
Funding obligated: $3,000,000. 

Implementing partner: UNICEF; 
Activity: Protection; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; 
Location in Iraq: Countrywide; 
Funding obligated: $8,000,000. 

Implementing partner: WFP; 
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Logistics; 
Emergency Relief Supplies; Humanitarian Coordination and Information 
Management; 
Location in Iraq: Countrywide; 
Funding obligated: $8,000,000. 

Implementing partner: WFP; 
Activity: Administrative Support; 
Funding obligated: $556,202. 

Implementing partner: Total; 
Funding obligated: $83,395,070. 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from USAID. 

[End of table] 

In addition, USAID's Middle East Bureau/Office of Iraq Reconstruction 
(ME/IR) and USAID/Iraq at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad continue to 
support programs focusing on development assistance. Although not 
directly tied to current reintegration efforts, development assistance 
could improve conditions in Iraq that could increase the number of 
returns and foster reintegration, according to U.S. and international 
organization officials. As of September 30, 2009, USAID had obligated 
about $6.4 billion and expended about $5.6 billion in fiscal years 
2003 through 2009 for development assistance projects in Iraq (see 
appendix IV for funding by source and funding by implementing 
partner). For example, USAID's Community Stabilization Program, 
completed in October 2009, offered employment activities, vocational 
training, small grants, and small infrastructure projects in 
communities affected by insurgent violence. USAID's development 
assistance also supported programs focusing on building capacity for 
all levels of the government and other organizations. For example, in 
July 2006, USAID implemented the National Capacity Development 
Program, known in Arabic as Tatweer. The aim of this program is to 
increase the effectiveness of ministries by reforming internal 
operational systems and instituting best practices and international 
standards. The program is expected to end in January 2011. Tatweer 
works with 10 ministries, including MODM, and 7 executive offices. For 
MODM, Tatweer is providing assistance on capacity-building activities, 
including improvements to the information technology infrastructure 
and the management of relief supplies, according to USAID. 

Finally, DOD provides assistance in Iraq through its Commander's 
Emergency Response Program. This program enables local commanders to 
respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements 
within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that 
immediately assist the local population.[Footnote 51] According to DOD 
officials, although the program is not targeted to returns and 
reintegration, in some cases, relief and reconstruction are carried 
out in areas heavily populated by IDPs. DOD had obligated about $3.6 
billion in fiscal years 2004 through 2009 for projects under the 
program in Iraq, including water and sanitation, health care, and 
other projects, according to DOD officials. 

Iraqi Government Has Initiated Steps to Encourage Returns and 
Reintegration; However, Officials Report That Progress Has Been 
Limited Due to Insufficient Commitment and Capacity: 

The Iraqi government's efforts to encourage returns and reintegration 
have been limited by insufficient political commitment and capacity 
within the government, according to international organization and 
U.S. government officials. The Iraqi government has developed policies 
and taken initial steps to assist IDPs and encourage voluntary returns 
and reintegration. MODM issued a National Policy on Displacement and 
the government issued a decree and orders that allow for financial 
stipends and assistance in safely recovering property. However, the 
international community has reported that MODM was not able to 
implement its policy, and that bureaucratic challenges, based on lack 
of capacity[Footnote 52] and political commitment at various levels of 
the Iraqi government, have prevented many returnees from recovering 
their property and receiving stipends. In June 2009, DOD reported that 
"serious efforts" to facilitate the return of refugees by the Iraqi 
government have been "all but non-existent."[Footnote 53] 

MODM, a relatively new ministry, has lacked the authority and capacity 
to lead ministerial efforts regarding returns and reintegration, 
according to international organization and U.S. government officials. 
In July 2008, MODM issued a National Policy on Displacement, which 
recognized displacement as a key challenge facing the government of 
Iraq and the international community. The policy set a goal to find 
durable solutions for displaced Iraqis, established objectives, 
stressed the rights of displaced persons, described the basic needs of 
Iraqi IDPs, and recommended activities to address the needs. However, 
the policy was not fully implemented because MODM lacked the authority 
and capacity to coordinate efforts within the Iraqi government, 
according to international organization and U.S. government officials. 
According to officials, the more established ministries--such as 
Defense, Interior, Health, Education, and others--continued to work 
independently of MODM. Furthermore, MODM did not have uniform support 
at all levels of the government for the policy or for efforts to 
facilitate the return of refugees of all sects, according to 
international organization, NGO, and U.S. government officials. 
Moreover, MODM received a relatively small budget in 2008 because its 
role was originally viewed as primarily a coordinating rather than an 
implementing role, according to U.S. government and international 
organization officials. For 2009, the total Iraqi budget decreased, 
including that of MODM. According to the MODM Minister and U.S. 
government and international organization officials, the budgeted 
amount for 2009 was insufficient (see table 4), particularly since 
MODM began implementing programs and delivering services. However, 
according to officials, other ministries may be independently 
assisting IDPs and returnees through their own budgets and efforts. 
For example, the Ministry of Housing is planning to build shelters, 
according to officials. For 2010, the MODM budget was slightly higher 
than the amount that it expended in 2008 and more than triple the 
amount of its 2009 budget. 

Table 4: Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) and Total 
Iraqi Government Budget and Expenditures, 2008 to 2010: 

Dollars in millions: 

Account: Operating; 
2008 budget: $227.6; 
2008 expenditures: $183.4; 
2009 budget: $49.0; 
2009 expenditures (January-November): $58.3; 
2010 budget: $181.4. 

Account: Compensation; 
2008 budget: [Empty]; 
2008 expenditures: [Empty]; 
2009 budget: $4.9; 
2009 expenditures (January-November): $4.4; 
2010 budget: $7.1. 

Account: Goods and Services; 
2008 budget: [Empty]; 
2008 expenditures: [Empty]; 
2009 budget: $3.3; 
2009 expenditures (January-November): $1.7; 
2010 budget: $3.4. 

Account: Social benefits; 
2008 budget: [Empty]; 
2008 expenditures: [Empty]; 
2009 budget: $40.7; 
2009 expenditures (January-November): $52.2; 
2010 budget: $170.9. 

Account: Investment; 
2008 budget: $2.5; 
2008 expenditures: $1.9; 
2009 budget: $6.7; 
2009 expenditures (January-November): $0.5; 
2010 budget: $13.7. 

Account: Total MODM; 
2008 budget: $230.1; 
2008 expenditures: $185.2; 
2009 budget: $55.7; 
2009 expenditures (January-November): $58.8; 
2010 budget: $195.2. 

Account: Total government of Iraq; 
2008 budget: $72,181.4; 
2008 expenditures: $56,064.3; 
2009 budget: $58,615.1; 
2009 expenditures (January-November): $36,882.7; 
2010 budget: $72,332.0. 

Source: GAO analysis based on Iraqi Ministry of Finance data provided 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

Note: The 2008 Iraqi supplemental budget did not disaggregate 
operating budget accounts. 

[End of table] 

The Iraqi government issued a decree and orders to facilitate certain 
returns and reintegration for some displaced Iraqis, primarily in 
Baghdad and Diyala (see table 5); however, progress has been limited. 

Table 5: Summary of the Key Iraqi Government Decree and Orders to 
Facilitate Certain Returns and Reintegration of Displaced Iraqis, 2008-
2009: 

Decree/order/date: Council of Ministers Decree 262; July 17, 2008; 
Summary actions: 
* Continues to grant 150,000 Iraqi dinars (about $126) per month, for 
3 consecutive months to each IDP family (about 120,000 families) that 
was displaced as of January 1, 2008; 
* Grants a total of 1 million Iraqi dinars (about $838) per family for 
returning IDPs, Iraqi refugees who have stayed in host countries for 8 
to 12 months, and returnees from the Kurdish Region (about 35,000 
families), provided that they are no longer recorded as displaced; 
* Grants rental assistance of 300,000 Iraqi dinars (about $252) per 
month for 6 months to displaced families squatting in Baghdad houses 
to return these houses to returning displaced families. 

Decree/order/date: Cabinet Order 101/S; August 3, 2008; 
Summary actions: 
* Activates prior Order 83/S that provides that anyone displacing 
someone from their home will be punished according to Iraq's Anti-
terrorism Law, and provides that anyone who occupies a house belonging 
to a displaced person will be considered as a participant in the 
displacement and be held responsible for the property and its 
contents, which should be left to the legal owner; 
* Provides 1 month, as of August 1, 2008, for squatters occupying 
homes of displaced Iraqis to leave them with all their contents to 
their legal owners; 
* Orders MODM branches to establish centers to receive, register, and 
take the necessary information from displaced persons who should show 
legal proof of their ownership and legal residence; 
* Orders MODM, Ministry of Justice, Reconciliation Committee, Baghdad 
governorate, and Baghdad Operation Command to undertake their 
responsibilities and nominate representatives in MODM branches, 
discussed above, each one according to its jurisdiction; 
* Orders Baghdad Operation Command to issue the necessary instructions 
to facilitate implementation of this order; 
and Governorate Operations Commands to undertake the same mechanism to 
facilitate return of IDPs to their original places in each governorate. 

Decree/order/date: Cabinet Order 54/S; July 16, 2009; 
Summary actions: 
Establishes committee in Diyala governorate, under the chairmanship of 
the Head of the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National 
Reconciliation, that is responsible for the following: 
* Activating Cabinet Order 101/S of 2008 concerning the return of 
displaced persons in the Diyala governorate; 
* Following up on the implementation of the projects of Basha'ir Al-
Khair Commission for Diyala Reconstruction; 
* Following up on the compensation grant for damaged houses in the 
Diyala governorate; 
* Following up on the issue of water shortages in the governorate and 
improving the agricultural situation there; 
* Coordinating between the ministries concerned, the service 
departments, and the security committee regarding security, services, 
and displacement; 
* Coordinating with international organizations willing to provide 
services to the Diyala governorate within the legal framework. 

Source: GAO summary based on U.S. government translations of Iraqi 
government documents. 

[End of table] 

International organizations and NGOs have identified problems 
regarding this decree and these orders and their implementation. 
According to USIP, Decree 262 and Order 101 cover only a limited 
segment of the displaced population, require extensive documentation 
that returnees may have lost due to displacement, do not clarify the 
roles of the various agencies involved in the process, and do not 
dedicate resources for administration and oversight. USIP reported 
that by the end of 2008, about 10,000 returnee families had registered 
to receive the grant under Decree 262, but only a small number had 
received it. In January 2009, the volume of new cases dropped 
significantly, which according to UNHCR, IOM, and NGOs, may have been 
due to the low rate of payments. According to international 
organization and U.S. government officials, the amount of the stipends 
under these orders is insufficient to cover expenses and serve as an 
incentive for returns. In addition, IMC officials said the Iraqi 
government has not been proactive in providing squatters with the 6 
months of rental assistance due under Decree 262. Moreover, according 
to OCHA and IMC, MODM issued a Ministerial Order on February 12, 2009 
that precluded further registration of IDPs for benefits and refocused 
efforts on monitoring returnees. According to OCHA, the order sought 
to prevent double registrations and forgery; however, it may restrict 
legitimate IDPs' access to benefits. OCHA further noted that the 
Ministerial Order may restrict unregistered IDPs' ability to register 
as returnees and receive benefits under Decree 262 and Order 101, 
since they have to be registered as IDPs first to re-register as 
returnees. 

According to U.S. government officials, a key indicator for Iraqi 
government progress will be how the Iraqi government, at the central, 
governorate, and local levels, moves forward with its funding for and 
implementation of Order 54 regarding returns and reintegration in 
Diyala. The Iraqi government has made Diyala the focus of an 
initiative, led by the Follow-up Committee for National 
Reconciliation, to create conditions for large-scale IDP and refugee 
returns. According to State, the Iraqi government has pledged 37 
billion dinar (about $30 million) for use by the Diyala Governor to 
reconstruct destroyed homes and pledged to provide 6-month contract 
jobs for up to 10,000 returnee families and 10,000 nonreturnee 
families. DOD reported in April 2010, that the Iraqi Security Forces 
continue to make progress in improving security in Diyala by 
eliminating insurgent support and thereby setting the conditions for 
economic recovery and return of displaced Iraqis. However, the 
perception of disproportionate targeting of Sunnis has strained 
sectarian relations, allowing Shi'a extremists and criminal elements 
much greater freedom of movement.[Footnote 54] 

Iraq, the United States, and Other Members of the International 
Community Lack an Integrated International Strategy for Reintegrating 
Displaced Iraqis: 

Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international 
community lack an integrated strategy for the reintegration of 
displaced Iraqis. An effective strategy would be integrated and 
provide Iraq and its implementing partners with a tool to shape 
policies and programs so that stakeholders can achieve the desired 
results in an accountable and effective manner.[Footnote 55] 
International community stakeholders agree that to be effective, the 
strategy should be Iraqi-led with the assistance of the international 
community. The lack of an integrated strategy for reintegration 
resulted in a lack of agreed-upon strategic goals and outcomes, has 
hindered efforts to efficiently and effectively assess the needs of 
Iraqi IDPs and returnees, and has hindered stakeholder coordination 
and efficiency of service delivery. 

Iraq, the United States, and the UN Lack Integrated Plans for 
Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis: 

Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international 
community lack an integrated plan for reintegrating displaced Iraqis 
because Iraqi MODM planning efforts stalled due to limitations of 
authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government support; the UN's 
strategy and plans have primarily focused on assistance to the most 
vulnerable Iraqis and have not specifically focused on reintegration; 
and the current U.S. government strategy has not been made publicly 
available. An effective strategy would be integrated and provide Iraq 
and its implementing partners with a tool to shape policies and 
programs so that stakeholders can achieve the desired results in an 
accountable, efficient, and effective manner. 

Iraqi MODM Planning Efforts Stalled Due to Lack of Authority, 
Capacity, and Iraqi Government Support: 

According to international organization, U.S. government, and NGO 
officials, MODM does not have the authority, capacity, or Iraqi 
government support to implement its displacement policy and develop an 
effective strategy. In July 2008, MODM issued the National Policy on 
Displacement. This policy offers a general description of the problem, 
identifies basic goals, defines terms, stresses the rights of 
displaced persons, describes the basic needs of Iraqi IDPs, and 
recommends activities to mitigate some of the problems identified. The 
policy also calls for setting up a comprehensive, effective, and 
realistic workplan; providing adequate protection and assistance to 
displaced persons; specifying coordination structures among all state 
institutions; and allocating funds and developing financial procedures 
for the implementation of the policy. However, international 
organization, U.S. government, and NGO officials noted that MODM 
efforts have stalled because the ministry has had little authority or 
ability to coordinate efforts within the Iraqi government to implement 
the policy and develop an effective strategy. International and 
nongovernmental organization officials have expressed concern about 
the lack of unified Iraqi support for the policy and development of a 
strategy. UNHCR, IOM, and other actors will continue to build on the 
National Policy on Displacement as well as relevant legal authorities 
that we have described previously, according to the UN. According to 
State officials, the extent to which the Iraqi government implements 
Order 54, which focuses a range of efforts in Diyala and essentially 
makes Diyala a test case, may determine the future development of a 
viable strategy. 

UN Strategy and Plans Have Primarily Focused on Assistance to the Most 
Vulnerable Iraqis and Have Not Specifically Focused on Reintegration: 

Overall UN strategic efforts in Iraq have targeted humanitarian 
assistance to the most vulnerable Iraqis, which may or may not include 
IDPs and returnees, but are not specifically focused on reintegration. 
The United Nations 2008-2010 Iraq Assistance Strategy[Footnote 56] 
focuses on needs and planned assistance by sector,[Footnote 57] and 
although it occasionally mentions the impact of IDPs on sectors and 
includes a few broadly stated outputs regarding IDPs, it does not 
address reintegration. As part of its strategic approach, the UN 
issued its consolidated 2009 funding appeal for assistance efforts in 
Iraq and neighboring and other countries hosting refugees.[Footnote 
58] The UN noted in its midyear review that, although IDPs were 
returning, large numbers of returns had not yet materialized and 
should not be encouraged. Thus, the UN continued to address the needs 
of vulnerable groups within the entire population and not to limit 
efforts to IDPs and returnees. In the UN's 2010 appeal, the UN 
interspersed some new efforts intended to facilitate returns and 
reintegration while also assisting other vulnerable Iraqis. However, 
after making progress in consolidating its 2009 appeal, the UN divided 
its 2010 appeal into three planning documents, further fragmenting its 
initial planning efforts to address returns and reintegration. 
Additionally, although the initial planning efforts may include 
outputs, such as that at least 35 mobile teams and 14 Protection and 
Assistance Centers provide legal aid and monitor the needs of people 
of concern, they do not define reintegration (i.e., what is a 
sustainable return) or include specific indicators or outcomes for 
reintegration, as would be expected in an effective strategic plan. 

Current U.S. Government Strategy Is Not Publicly Available: 

According to NSC, State, and USAID officials, the U.S. strategy 
regarding the reintegration of Iraqis is delineated in three 
classified or sensitive documents that have not been made available in 
a public document. Also, an unclassified version of the current U.S. 
strategy has not been developed and made public. Administration 
officials stated that the classified and sensitive documents were not 
drafted with the aim of creating a publicly announced strategy to 
persuade Iraqis to return home; rather, they are planning documents 
describing how to use U.S. assistance to ensure that Iraqis who choose 
to return to Iraq have support systems in place. In the absence of a 
publicly available strategy, administration officials stated that the 
United States will focus on the three efforts announced by the U.S. 
President in February 2009. The President stated that the 
administration would provide more assistance and take steps to 
generate international support for countries hosting refugees, 
cooperate with others to resettle refugees facing great personal risk, 
and work with the Iraqi government over time to resettle refugees and 
displaced Iraqis within Iraq.[Footnote 59] 

Subsequent to concluding our field work and our exit meetings with 
U.S. agencies and the NSC, in July 2010 NSC provided GAO with an 
unclassified summary of a classified May 2009 U.S. government strategy 
regarding support for returning Iraqi refugees and IDPs. While the 
summary was made available to GAO, it had not been made public. The 
NSC summary included a fiscal year 2010 objective to assist the Iraqi 
government, in coordination with international organizations and other 
donors, in developing a comprehensive strategy to support the 
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The strategy was to include active 
participation of the Iraqi government line ministries. However, such a 
strategy was not developed. The NSC noted that the summary prepared 
for GAO was based on a "historical document," should be viewed in that 
context, and that it had not been updated to reflect the current 
situation. 

Iraq, the United States, and Other International Community 
Stakeholders Have Not Yet Reached Agreement on Defined Goals and 
Outcomes, Including Defining the Target Population and Reintegration: 

Clearly defined and agreed-upon strategic goals and intended outcomes 
for reintegration have not been specifically developed. Strategic 
goals explain what results are expected and when they are expected. A 
direct alignment between strategic goals and strategies for achieving 
those goals is important for assessing an ability to achieve those 
goals. In the case of reintegrating displaced Iraqis, key parameters 
have not yet been agreed upon, which makes it difficult to establish 
measurable goals. 

For example, the international community has no agreed-upon 
determination of when the displacement it is addressing in Iraq began 
or when the displaced are considered reintegrated. MODM's National 
Policy on Displacement includes a focus on an estimated 1.2 million 
Iraqis who were displaced over the 40 years before the fall of Saddam 
Hussein's regime in 2003 and on an estimated more than 1.6 million who 
were internally displaced after; while the Iraqi government's 2008 and 
2009 orders and decree focus assistance to a limited segment of the 
displaced population. The U.S. government and some international 
organization programs are more focused on displacement since 2003, 
particularly the large displacement occurring after the February 2006 
Samarra bombing. 

Similarly complex is agreeing upon when the displaced are considered 
reintegrated and international assistance is no longer required for 
reintegration. Reintegration is defined as "sustainable returns," but 
a clear and uniform definition of "sustainable" in the context of Iraq 
has not been agreed to by the international community. MODM's National 
Policy on Displacement defines durable solutions as based on three 
elements--long-term security, restitution of or compensation for lost 
property, and an environment that sustains life under normal economic 
and social conditions. Under the policy, the displaced may return to 
their home or place of habitual residence; integrate locally into the 
social, economic, cultural, and political fabric of the community 
where they initially found temporary refuge; or resettle in a new 
community. However, restitution of or compensation for lost property 
may occur long after the displaced return, integrate, or resettle, and 
there is little agreement on what constitutes normal economic and 
social conditions for Iraq. According to U.S. government officials, 
they plan to address the lack of clarity and agreement over 
definitions and parameters as they develop their plans to assist the 
Iraqi government in reintegration efforts. 

Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Efforts to Efficiently and 
Effectively Assess the Needs of Iraqi IDPs and Returnees: 

The lack of an integrated strategy has hindered efforts to efficiently 
and effectively assess the needs of Iraqi IDPs and returnees. A 
strategy for reintegration must include information on the needs of 
displaced Iraqis and be updated on the basis of the assistance 
provided and remaining needs. While various UN agencies, affiliated 
organizations, and their implementing partners have collected and 
assessed data for their specialized work in Iraq, gaps remain. In 
addition, the UN has not integrated data from UNHCR into its new Inter-
Agency Information Analysis Unit, which was established to provide a 
central point for collecting and assessing needs-based data, according 
to a senior IAU official. 

Over time, the UN and its partners have individually attempted to 
identify and estimate the numbers of vulnerable Iraqis, internally 
displaced, returnees, and Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees; survey 
returnees and IDPs on their reasons for leaving, immediate needs, and 
priority needs for return; document protection, property, livelihood, 
and governance issues; and determine the status of essential services 
across the country. However, international organization, NGO, and U.S. 
government officials stated that it was often difficult to identify 
the best data available because data from different sources did not 
always agree, some of the data were incomplete or outdated, or the 
methodology used to obtain and assess the reliability of some data was 
not clear. According to UNHCR, OCHA should have been coordinating the 
data collection and assessments from the beginning, but they did not 
initially have a presence in Iraq. As a result, each organization 
collected and assessed its own data, according to UNHCR. According to 
some officials, the Iraqi population has been over surveyed as a 
result of these separate assessments. According to international and 
nongovernmental organizations, gaps in information and data remain. 
For example: 

* In 2009, UNHCR predicted that over 400,000 refugees would return to 
Iraq in 2009. The returns did not materialize and no further fact-
based assessments and predictions on the rate of return have been made 
to facilitate planning efforts, according to UNHCR and U.S. government 
officials. 

* According to international organizations, no inventory and analysis 
has been conducted of the various financial assistance programs 
available to IDPs and returnees to determine gaps, overlap, or impact. 
As a result, there is no assurance that resources are allocated in a 
rational and fair manner. Some international organizations provide 
returnees and vulnerable populations with cash, cash for work, and in- 
kind grants for business development. USIP reported that in addition 
to grants provided by the central government, ministries, provincial 
governments, and municipalities provide other forms of financial 
assistance and other specific funds for houses damaged in particular 
military operations, and that there are a variety of victims and 
martyrs commissions that provide other sorts of compensation. 

* Despite efforts to improve outreach and surveys of vulnerable 
populations, some areas have not been accessible to international 
organizations and NGOs due to security concerns and lack of trained 
national staff. To begin to address this problem, in 2009, OCHA 
planned to inventory and train national NGOs through three workshops 
and subsequently carried out training inside Iraq for 74 Iraqi NGOs on 
humanitarian principles, rapid needs assessments, and results based 
management. By 2011, UNHCR plans to increase its presence in Iraq by 
relocating staff from Jordan and Kuwait; increasing its network of 
national NGOs across Iraq; and working through international NGO 
partners to provide support, oversight, and a review of the capacity 
of national NGOs to access areas, identify vulnerable populations, and 
provide assistance, particularly should security deteriorate. 

To address data gaps and overlap, in February 2008, the UN established 
the IAU in Amman, Jordan, under the direction of OCHA and the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. According to a senior IAU 
official, the primary purpose of the IAU is to be a "one-stop shop" 
for collecting and providing data on Iraq and to ensure that the best 
data are available.[Footnote 60] The IAU is intended to bring together 
analysts from UN agencies and NGOs to facilitate and enhance data 
collection, sharing, analysis, and joint assessments; provide timely 
and accurate information on the situation and needs in the different 
areas of Iraq; and increase coordination to reduce project duplication 
and maximize the targeting of vulnerable communities.[Footnote 61] 
According to the senior IAU official, in the spring of 2010, the UN 
Country Team established a new steering committee composed of agency 
heads that met for the first time to set priorities and develop a work 
plan for the IAU. As of July 2010, the IAU has staff in Jordan and 
Iraq, including new governate-based Information Management Offices. 
[Footnote 62] According to the senior IAU official, the IAU now 
receives data and assessments from most organizations conducting work 
in Iraq, have analysts from most of the major contributors as part of 
their team,[Footnote 63] and help plan for and coordinate future 
surveys. Through an agreement between the UN and the U.S. government, 
the IAU will also begin to analyze declassified U.S. databases and 
share information. 

However, according to the senior IAU official, although UNHCR is a 
participating agency of the IAU, is a member of the UN Country Team, 
and shares it reports with the IAU, UNHCR is not fully participating 
in the IAU. UNHCR is not sharing the raw or primary data it collects 
on IDPs, returnees, and vulnerable populations; its methodology and 
data limitations; and an analyst to work with the IAU team and is not 
taking advantage of IAU resources and coordination. The IAU official 
stated that as a result, UNHCR issues are not on the agenda, and other 
agencies are unaware of the composition and quality of UNHCR data. The 
official added that UNHCR is not taking advantage of IAU staff 
expertise and lessons learned on how to implement surveys using NGOs 
and how to scrub and assess raw data. For example, UNHCR conducted a 
survey of returnees but has not shared its questionnaire and raw data 
with the IAU. Moreover, UNHCR is not involved in planning future 
surveys, such as a major activity of the IAU this year, which is to 
work with the Iraqi government and civil society to develop a 
socioeconomic monitoring system for Iraq within the Central 
Organization for Statistics and Information Technology and the 
Kurdistan Regional Statistic Office, according to the IAU official. 

According to UNHCR and IAU officials, UNHCR had initially assigned an 
analyst to the IAU, but has not refilled the position since the staff 
member left it in 2009. According to the IAU official, UNHCR informed 
the IAU that it had abolished the position because it did not have a 
qualified staff member to detail to the IAU. UNHCR officials stated 
that they found little added value from having a staff person detailed 
to the IAU. 

Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Stakeholder Coordination 
and Efficiency: 

Without an integrated strategy, it is difficult for stakeholders to 
effectively delineate roles and responsibilities and establish 
coordination and oversight mechanisms for effective and efficient 
implementation. The MODM Minister stated that his ministry's initial 
role was limited to that of a coordinating body, leaving no single 
entity charged with implementing the necessary tasks. The Minister 
added that although the Ministries of Health, Education, Interior, and 
Defense are essential to addressing impediments to returns, they do 
not have programs specifically focusing on IDPs. 

Roles and efforts among international organizations may overlap, 
particularly since organizations plan their work independently of each 
other and work bilaterally with local leaders, the Iraqi government, 
and donor country agencies. According to international and NGO 
officials, decreasing international donor community contributions to 
these organizations has caused them to compete for funding and trained 
national staff. At UN Country Team meetings and UN Assistance Mission 
for Iraq activities, officials at one agency stated that while some 
information is shared, organizations "protect their turf," and 
opportunities to build on the efforts of others are lost. According to 
IOM and UNHCR, although organizations try to avoid conflicts by 
focusing their efforts in different sectors--such as UNHCR focusing 
its projects on shelter and property issues, IOM focusing on 
livelihood projects, and WFP focusing on delivery of food--efforts may 
overlap. For example, WFP is expanding its focus in Iraq to include 
livelihood projects. According to IMC, coordinating committees are 
prolific in Iraq but they are not always effective. For example, 
according to IMC, IMC and USAID/OFDA were working on shelter 
rehabilitation in one area, only to find out from field staff that 
UNHCR was doing similar work. According to IMC officials, they have 
been involved in the UN sector outcome teams, but the meetings were 
generally held in Amman without an Iraqi government presence, thereby 
limiting effective coordination. 

One area with significant potential for overlap is the establishment 
of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq to 
register or assist returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable Iraqis. 
International and U.S. government officials expressed concerns about 
the need for multiple centers, possible inefficiencies, and extent to 
which the MODM will be capable of assuming responsibilities for 
centers in the future. Although each center initially had its own 
purpose, some of the activities at these centers now overlap, and all 
require oversight and administrative support, according to 
international organization officials. A number of these centers are 
funded by State and USAID and managed or supported by MODM, UNHCR, 
IMC, and IOM. A sample of these centers includes the following: 

* MODM Return and Assistance Centers: According to UNHCR, as of July 
2010, MODM had established three main Return and Assistance Centers-- 
two in Baghdad (Karkh and Resafa) and one in Diyala--to register and 
assist displaced Iraqis who want to return to their original homes. In 
addition, each of the 14 MODM branches outside of Baghdad and Diyala 
has a Registration Department where the same functions are performed. 
The centers register new arrivals, streamline returnee access to 
assistance, offer returning Iraqis legal aid and advice, assist in 
resolving property disputes, help replace lost documents, and help 
with access to MODM and government benefits. IMC supports the Karkh 
and Diyala centers with funding from USAID and strategic guidance from 
UNHCR. According to an IMC official, IMC is essentially co-managing 
the centers at MODM's request because MODM lacks trained staff. IMC 
also supports some of the MODM Registration Departments. UNHCR, with 
State's PRM funding, supports operations of the Resafa center, 
including its mobile teams, and supports two of the Karkh center 
mobile teams. According to UNHCR, although it is not ideal to have a 
medical NGO co-operating the centers, IMC was one of the few UNHCR 
partners and international NGOs positioned in Iraq when the centers 
were established. 

* UNHCR Protection and Assistance Centers: As of March 2010, UNHCR had 
established and continued to operate 15 Protection and Assistance 
Centers and 40 associated mobile teams that provide services to 
displaced, returning, and vulnerable Iraqis and others in all 18 
governorates in Iraq. As of May 2010, the centers included a total of 
125 staff, including lawyers, social workers, monitors, and public 
information and database officers. The centers conduct protection 
monitoring assessments to identify needs, gather information, and 
identify opportune interventions regarding basic human rights and 
physical security; provide legal assistance addressing a broad 
spectrum of needs, including legal counseling and interventions and 
access to services, documentation, and compensation; provide 
assistance and referrals to services and other stakeholders, such as 
authorities, NGOs, UNHCR, or other Protection and Assistance Centers; 
and provide briefings and information sessions to raise awareness of 
protection needs. 

* UNHCR Return Integration Community Centers: In mid-2009, UNHCR 
established and began operating 12 Return Integration Community 
Centers to expand its capacity to reach out to return communities. The 
centers coordinate with and relay information to local communities; 
conduct needs assessments; and address the social, assistance, and 
information needs of displaced and returning IDPs and refugees. Six of 
the centers are based in Baghdad and the others are based in Anbar, 
Basrah, Diyala, Kirkuk, Missan, and Ninewa. UNHCR plans to increase 
the number of these centers to at least 16 in 2010. As of May 2010, 
these centers included a total of 159 staff. 

* IOM Community Outreach and Women Centers: IOM and its partners are 
establishing four Women Centers with funding from State. The centers 
will provide legal aid, psychosocial support, health counseling, and 
livelihood support to the most vulnerable IDP and returnee female- 
headed households in Baghdad, Diyala, and Missan. 

After our fieldwork discussions with UNHCR and U.S. government 
officials, UNHCR informed us in June 2010 that it was taking action to 
address the multiple assistance centers and potential for duplication 
and lost efficiencies. First, UNHCR informed us that it had agreed to 
merge all Protection and Assistance Centers and Return Integration 
Community Centers in 2011 to reduce administrative costs. Second, 
UNHCR, in discussions with the U.S. Embassy, suggested that all MODM 
Return and Assistance Center activities be placed under one management 
umbrella. According to UNHCR, doing so would enable them to have a 
more harmonized approach that would avoid potential confusion and 
duplication. UNHCR also stated that this approach will provide it with 
the opportunity to harmonize staff payments and incentives. 

Conclusions: 

It is in the U.S. government's interest to work with Iraq and 
international community stakeholders to develop an integrated 
international strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis that 
transitions efforts and costs over time to the Iraqi government. 
First, Iraq is a sovereign nation that should lead efforts to address 
impediments to the return and reintegration of all displaced Iraqis. 
Second, in MODM's National Policy on Displacement, the Iraqi 
government states that it cannot address this issue without the help 
of the international community. Third, in fiscal year 2009, the United 
States funded more than one-half of the humanitarian assistance 
provided to Iraq, and the lack of an international strategy may result 
in lost efficiencies and wasted funds. One possible example of this 
may be the administration of many assistance centers and mobile units 
across Iraq. Furthermore, President Obama stated in his February 2009 
speech on responsibly ending the war in Iraq that the United States 
will pursue a transition to Iraq and that the United States has a 
moral responsibility to help displaced Iraqis. We recognize that 
strategies themselves are not end points, but starting points, and 
that implementation is the key. However, an integrated strategy--along 
with transparent goals and shared, accurate data on the conditions and 
effectiveness of projects--is useful in suggesting ways to enhance the 
value of plans, filling in gaps, speeding implementation, guiding 
resource allocations, and providing oversight opportunities. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance the ability of the Iraqi and U.S. governments, 
international organizations, and NGOs to effectively plan and 
integrate their efforts to assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we 
recommend that the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator work 
with the appropriate international organizations to assist the Iraqi 
government in developing an international strategy that addresses 
impediments to return and prepares for and facilitates the return and 
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. 

To ensure that the U.S. goals and plans are fully integrated with 
those of Iraq and other international community stakeholders and that 
progress toward meeting those goals is transparent, we recommend that 
the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator make public an 
unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy and their 
implementing plans for assisting and reintegrating displaced Iraqis, 
including their goals, performance measures, and progress assessments. 

To ensure that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, other donors, 
international organizations, and implementing partners have the best 
data available regarding the numbers and needs of IDPs, returnees, and 
other vulnerable Iraqis, in the most efficient manner, we recommend 
that the Secretary of State encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and 
methodology with the IAU and take advantage of IAU expertise and 
coordinated efforts. 

To ensure the effective and efficient use of resources by its 
implementing partners, we recommend that the Secretary of State and 
USAID Administrator work with UNHCR and its other implementing 
partners to take inventory of and assess the purposes, organization, 
operations, and results of the various assistance, return, and 
registration centers and mobile units in Iraq to determine and achieve 
an optimal framework for assisting IDPs, returnees, and other 
vulnerable Iraqis. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense and USAID. State and USAID provided written comments, which 
are reprinted in appendixes V and VI. DOD provided oral comments which 
are summarized below. State and DOD also provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated where appropriate. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State and USAID agreed with 
our recommendations regarding the need to assist the Iraqi government 
in developing an international strategy for reintegrating displaced 
Iraqis and to make public an unclassified version of the current U.S. 
strategy and their implementing plans. State and USAID also agreed 
with our recommendation regarding the need to work with UNHCR and 
other implementing partners to take inventory of and assess the 
various assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units 
to determine and achieve an optimal framework. USAID and State noted 
that efforts to address this recommendation have begun. According to 
State, UNHCR has begun to consolidate services and plan the merger of 
centers. State also agreed with our recommendation regarding the need 
to encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and methodology with the IAU 
and take advantage of IAU expertise and coordinated efforts. In 
addition, DOD commented that it agreed with the report and supports 
State and USAID in the execution of their mission to assist and 
reintegrate displaced Iraqis. 

We will send copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and 
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be available 
at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or http://www.gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman:
The Honorable Darrel Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To examine efforts to reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we reviewed (1) 
the conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to their reintegration; 
(2) the actions that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the 
international community have taken to address these conditions and 
reintegration; and (3) the extent to which the United States, Iraq, 
and other members of the international community have an effective 
strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis. When reintegration 
challenges and efforts were intertwined with efforts to assist 
internally displaced and vulnerable Iraqis, we included both in our 
scope. We conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; New York City 
(United Nations (UN) agencies); Geneva, Switzerland (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), and other international organization headquarters); 
and Iraq. We also conducted telephone interviews with UN officials in 
Amman, Jordan, that were responsible for work in Iraq. 

* Within the U.S. government, we reviewed documents and interviewed 
officials of the National Security Council's (NSC) Office of 
Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights; Department of State's (State) 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and Bureau of Near 
Eastern Affairs; Department of Defense's Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and Joint Staff; the U.S. Agency for International 
Development's (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and 
Middle East/Iraq Reconstruction Office; the Central Intelligence 
Agency; the U.S. missions in New York and Geneva; the U.S. embassy and 
USAID mission in Baghdad, Iraq; and the Multi-National Force-Iraq 
representative to the U.S. Embassy's IDP Working Group. 

* Within the Iraq government, we interviewed the Iraqi Minister of 
Displacement and Migration and reviewed Iraqi government and 
ministerial documents, including publicly available reported numbers 
of IDPs and returnees. We toured the facilities and interviewed Iraqi 
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials at the Karkh Return 
and Assistance Center in Baghdad, Iraq. 

* We interviewed officials and reviewed documents from international 
organizations, including the UNHCR, IOM, UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, International Committee of the 
Red Cross, UN Department of Political Affairs, UN Development 
Programme, World Heath Organization, World Food Program, and UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF). We also reviewed documents from the UN Human 
Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). 

* With the assistance of Interaction in the United States and the 
International Council of Voluntary Agencies in Geneva, Switzerland, we 
held discussion groups with international NGOs that had, have, or plan 
to have a presence in Iraq to discuss challenges to reintegration, 
actions taken and planned, and gaps remaining to be addressed. 

* We interviewed and reviewed studies and papers from research 
institutes and advocacy groups, such as the Brookings Institute's 
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, the Norwegian Refugee 
Council's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Refugees 
International, Human Rights First, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

To identify conditions that pose a challenge to reintegrating 
displaced Iraqis, we reviewed research papers and assessments; 
strategies and policy papers; program implementation, monitoring, and 
progress reports; and related documents and interviewed officials from 
the U.S. and Iraqi governments, international organizations, NGOs, and 
research institutes. We filtered challenges by considering factors, 
such as their significance and the degree to which they could be 
generalized, and then grouped them by category. We documented evidence 
from multiple sources and validated it with knowledgeable U.S., UN, 
IOM, and NGO officials to ensure accuracy. In addition, we also 
considered data compiled by IOM through the assessments and surveys 
that it has conducted of Iraqi IDPs and returnees since 2006. To 
determine the reliability of IOM data on conditions in Iraq, we 
interviewed officials from IOM, USAID, PRM, the U.S. Embassy in 
Baghdad, and the Brookings Institution and reviewed IOM's data 
collection methodology and reports. The 2009 assessments of internally 
displaced persons (IDP) covered more than 80 percent of the estimated 
total of about 270,000 IDP families; however, it cannot be generalized 
to the population of all IDPs. The 2009 survey of identified returnee 
families was based on a sample of 4,061 of the 58,110 returnee 
families. The survey cannot be generalized to all returnee families 
because it relied on a mixture of random and judgmental sampling 
methods and had a low response rate. These two data sources cannot be 
directly compared because of their different populations, data 
collection methods, and sample sizes. We determined that in 
conjunction with testimonial and documentary evidence, the IOM data 
are sufficiently reliable to describe the conditions that impede 
reintegration for those surveyed, but that the data cannot be used to 
make inferences to the larger IDP and returnee populations in Iraq. 

To identify the actions that the United States, Iraq, and the 
international community have taken to address these conditions, we 
reviewed policy, strategy, planning, and funding documents; UN funding 
appeals; monitoring and progress reports; and related documents and 
interviewed officials from the U.S. and Iraqi governments, 
international organizations, NGOs, and research institutes. We 
reviewed U.S. agency-reported amounts obligated, and expended for 
fiscal years 2003 through 2009, as of September 30, 2009, for 
humanitarian assistance[Footnote 64] and development assistance. State 
provided us with funding data from its Abacus database and Global 
Financial Management System. USAID provided data from its Phoenix 
database. We checked data provided against the source database 
printouts and discussed data reliability with agency officials. To 
verify our summarization of the funding and associated data, we sent 
out draft tables to agency contributors, resolved discrepancies, and 
made supported changes. We found the funding data from State and USAID 
to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. The Army 
Budget Office provided the amounts obligated for fiscal years 2003 
through 2009, as of September 30, 2009, for the Commander's Emergency 
Response Program from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System. Based 
on prior work and data reliability assessments, we found the Army's 
funding data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. 

To determine the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other 
members of the international community have an effective 
strategy[Footnote 65] to address the reintegration of displaced 
Iraqis, we reviewed policy, strategy, and planning documents from the 
U.S. and Iraqi governments, the UN, and IOM. We interviewed U.S. 
agency, Iraqi government, international organization, NGO, and 
research institution officials and reviewed their documents to 
determine issues and problems resulting from the lack of a strategy. 
We documented evidence from multiple sources and validated it with 
knowledgeable U.S., UN, IOM, and NGO officials to ensure accuracy. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to December 2010 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Roles and Responsibilities of Key U.S. and Iraqi 
Government and International Community Entities Addressing Iraqi 
Displacement: 

U.S. government: 

Key entity: National Security Council (NSC); 
Roles and responsibilities: The NSC's Senior Director for Multilateral 
Affairs and Human Rights serves as the coordinator for U.S. government 
efforts addressing assistance, repatriation and reintegration, and 
resettlement for displaced Iraqis. This position was first filled in 
August 2009. 

Key entity: Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons; 
Roles and responsibilities: The Senior Coordinator, a senior Foreign 
Service officer stationed at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, is 
responsible for coordinating U.S. government efforts in Iraq that 
address Iraqi displacement. The Senior Coordinator is also responsible 
for representing the United States in its dealings with the Iraqi 
government, the international community, and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO) on displacement issues. This position was 
established by Public Law 110-181 § 1245 (2008) and first filled in 
July 2008. 

Key entity: Department of State's (State) Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration (PRM); 
Roles and responsibilities: PRM is responsible for coordinating 
protection, humanitarian assistance, and resettlement for refugees and 
conflict victims; is the lead U.S. agency interface with international 
organizations and NGOs on refugee issues; funds implementing 
international organization and NGO partners, such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for assistance to 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP); and formulates U.S. 
foreign policy on population issues and international migration. To 
protect and assist Iraqi refugees and returnees, PRM works with the 
NSC, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
regional bureaus, and U.S. missions to provide guidance to its 
international organization and NGO implementing partners and to engage 
with donor countries and countries hosting Iraqi refugees. 

Key entity: Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; 
Roles and responsibilities: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs advises 
on and develops policy for the assistance and reintegration of 
displaced Iraqis. The bureau participates in the NSC's interagency 
planning committees. 

Key entity: U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); 
Roles and responsibilities: OFDA funds and oversees a wide range of 
humanitarian assistance activities that are implemented by a number of 
NGO and United Nations (UN) partners who provide humanitarian 
assistance programs for IDPs and other vulnerable Iraqis. OFDA 
coordinates these relief efforts with other USAID offices, State, and 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations and agencies in Iraq. 

Key entity: U.S. Agency for International Development's Middle East 
Bureau/Office of Iraq Reconstruction (ME/IR); 
Roles and responsibilities: ME/IR funds and oversees implementing 
partners--primarily, private contractors, NGOs, and international 
organizations--that implement programs focusing on economic 
development and capacity building at all levels of the Iraqi 
government. The USAID Iraq Mission, located in Baghdad, works closely 
with coalition forces and other U.S. government agencies; 
international institutions, such as the UN and World Bank; Iraq's 
national, provincial, and local governments; and a network of partners 
that include NGOs, local community groups, and Iraqi citizens to 
implement USAID's development programs. 

Key entity: Department of Defense (DOD)/Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-
I)/U.S. Forces-Iraq; 
Roles and responsibilities: MNF-I worked to improve security 
conditions and maintain stability for all Iraqis and provided security 
for U.S. and UN officials that enabled them to safely assist Iraqis. 
U.S. Forces-Iraq (replacing MNF-I on Jan. 1, 2010) negotiates with 
tribal leaders, trains Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and assists 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams as they build essential services for 
the Iraqi people, including IDPs. DOD personnel have provided support, 
such as information sharing, to USAID, State, and international 
organizations to address displacement. DOD participates in the 
National Security Council's interagency planning committees. 

Iraqi government: 

Key entity: Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons; 
Roles and responsibilities: A political advisor to the Prime Minister 
of Iraq was appointed by the Prime Minister to also serve as the Iraqi 
government's coordinator for Iraqi refugee and IDP issues in September 
2009. 

Key entity: Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM)[A]; 
Roles and responsibilities: MODM was established as a coordinating 
body within the Iraqi government ministries on displacement issues. As 
of 2008, MODM was empowered to provide additional grants and establish 
centers to receive and register displaced and returning Iraqis. 

Key entity: The Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National 
Reconciliation; 
Roles and responsibilities: The Implementation and Follow-up Committee 
plays a lead role in promoting reconciliation between Sunnis (in 
particular, those that were associated with the Saddam regime) and 
Iraq's Shiite majority and chairs efforts for reconciliation and 
reintegration in Diyala. 

Key entity: Iraqi Security Forces; 
Roles and responsibilities: The Iraqi Security Forces, in addition to 
providing general security, are also responsible for enforcing laws 
and government orders designed to assist displaced Iraqis, such as 
evicting squatters from homes owned by displaced Iraqis. 

International community[B]: 

Key entity: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); 
Roles and responsibilities: UNHCR has a global mandate to lead and 
coordinate international action for the protection of refugees and 
stateless people and to find lasting solutions to their plight. UNHCR 
coordinates efforts with the Iraqi government and works to reintegrate 
displaced Iraqis. UNHCR chairs the UN Country Team addressing 
protection and co-chairs the team addressing shelter in Iraq. UNHCR 
provides protection, shelter, and emergency assistance to IDPs, 
refugees, and returnees. 

Key entity: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA); 
Roles and responsibilities: OCHA, on behalf of the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator for Iraq, mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in 
Iraq. OCHA is responsible for information management and analysis, 
advocacy and public information, resource mobilization and management, 
disaster preparedness and response, and protection. OCHA works in 
partnership with UN agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. 
The consolidated appeal process for Iraq was led by OCHA. Through the 
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), OCHA collates and 
analyzes data on the humanitarian situation to create and disseminate 
information products, such as maps, charts and graphs, reports and 
assessments, and contact information, and maintains the OCHA and IAU 
Web sites to share these products. 

Key entity: The International Organization for Migration (IOM); 
Roles and responsibilities: IOM is an intergovernmental organization 
that works on migration issues worldwide. IOM, in partnership with 
other international organizations and the Iraqi government, conducts a 
wide range of activities in Iraq, such as building capacity in certain 
Iraqi ministries, monitoring and providing emergency assistance to 
IDPs and other vulnerable groups, and assisting efforts to redress 
property rights. IOM is also a member of the UN Country Team. 

Key entity: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
Roles and responsibilities: ICRC is an international organization that 
works to ensure humanitarian protection and assistance to victims of 
war and other situations of violence worldwide. ICRC has a permanent 
mandate founded under international law to take impartial action for 
persons affected by conflict. ICRC provides relief assistance to IDPs 
and other vulnerable groups inside Iraq. It also has assessed the 
detention and treatment conditions of detainees, provided medical 
supplies to hospitals, and rehabilitated existing water and sanitation 
infrastructure, among other things. 

Key entity: Nongovernmental organizations; 
Roles and responsibilities: International and national NGOs conduct 
significant efforts in Iraq for the benefit of IDPs, returnees, and 
all vulnerable Iraqis. 

Sources: National Security Council, Departments of State and Defense, 
U.S. Agency for International Development, Iraqi government, United 
Nations organizations, International Organization for Migration, and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross. 

[A] A number of Iraqi government ministries are relevant to MODM's 
efforts, such as the Ministries of Finance, Planning and Development 
Cooperation, Trade, Health, Education, Interior, and Defense, among 
others. 

[B] The UN Country Team, which includes UNHCR, OCHA, and IOM, works to 
coordinate UN efforts and to provide assistance in myriad areas in 
Iraq that may directly or indirectly address Iraqi displacement. Other 
UN Country Team members include the Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia; Food and Agriculture Organization; International Labour 
Organization; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; UN 
Development Programme; UN Environment Programme; UN Education, Science 
and Cultural Organization; UN Population Fund; UN Centre for Human 
Settlements; UN Children's Fund; UN Industrial Development 
Organization; UN Fund for Advancement of Women; UN Office for Project 
Services; the World Food Program; and the World Health Organization. 
IOM and the World Bank are affiliated bodies of the UN Country Team, 
not UN organizations. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: U.S. Funds Obligated and Expended for Iraq-Related 
Humanitarian Assistance Projects, and Intended Beneficiaries, Fiscal 
Years 2003-2009, as of September 30, 2009: 

Dollars in millions: 

Source of funds: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 
1)/P.L. 108-11; 
2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2)/P.L. 108-106; 
Agency/Office: State/Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau (PRM); 
Funding: Total obligations: $159.9; 
Expended balance: $159.2; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Internally displaced persons 
(IDP) and vulnerable populations[A]; In region: Iraqi and other 
refugees and host country populations[B]. 

Source of funds: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 
1)/P.L. 108-11; 
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); 
Funding: Total obligations: $128.4; 
Expended balance: $126.7; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: None. 

Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 480 Title II; 
108-7, P.L. 108-447, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161; 
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Food for Peace; 
Funding: Total obligations: $218.2; 
Expended balance: $218.2; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: Iraqi 
refugees and host country populations. 

Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 108-7[C]; 
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Food for Peace; 
Funding: Total obligations: $191.1; 
Expended balance: $191.1; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Iraqi population; In region: 
None. 

Source of funds: International Disaster and Famine Assistance & 
International Disaster Assistance/P.L. 108-7, P.L. 107-115, P.L. 108- 
447, P.L. 109-102, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-161, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111- 
32; 
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA; 
Funding: Total obligations: $209.2; 
Expended balance: $126.6; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: None. 

Source of funds: Migration and Refugee Assistance/P.L. 108-7, P.L. 109-
102, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-32, 
P.L. 111-8; 
Agency/Office: State/PRM; 
Funding: Total obligations: $591.8; 
Expended balance: $421.5; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi and other refugees and host country 
populations. 

Source of funds: Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance[D]/ 
Presidential Determination (P.D.) 2003-17, P.D. 2003-13, P.D. 2001-22, 
P.D. 2007-31; 
Agency/Office: State/PRM; 
Funding: Total obligations: $50.9; 
Expended balance: $50.5; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi and other refugees and host country 
populations. 

Source of funds: 2003 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 108-7; 
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA; 
Funding: Total obligations: $11.6; 
Expended balance: $11.6; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: None. 

Source of funds: 2006 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 109-234; 
Agency/Office: State/PRM; 
Funding: Total obligations: $50.0; 
Expended balance: $46.5; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None; In region: Iraqi and 
other refugees and host country populations in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Egypt. 

Source of funds: 2007 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110- 
28; 
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs; 
Funding: Total obligations: $10.3; 
Expended balance: $7.3; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None; In region: Government 
of Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country 
population. 

Source of funds: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110- 
252; 
Agency/Office: State/PRM; 
Funding: Total obligations: $45.0; 
Expended balance: $39.2; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None; 
In region: Iraqi refugees in Jordan and host country population. 

Source of funds: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110- 
252; 
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs; 
Funding: Total obligations: $155.0; 
Expended balance: $116.5; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None; In region: Government 
of Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country 
population. 

Source of funds: Development Assistance/P.L. 108-7; 
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA; 
Funding: Total obligations: $26.5; 
Expended balance: $26.3; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: None. 

Source of funds: Child Survival and Health/P.L. 108-7; 
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA; 
Funding: Total obligations: $5.7; 
Expended balance: $5.7; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: None. 

Source of funds: Total; 
Funding: Total obligations: $1,853.6; 
Expended balance: $1,546.9. 

Source: GAO analysis based on funding data and information from the 
Department of State and USAID. 

[A] Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk; 
Iraqis who have returned from other countries; refugees in Iraq from 
other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims. 

[B] U.S. refugee programs benefit the host country population because 
countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the region do not allow donors to 
provide assistance solely to Iraqi refugees. In some cases, a portion 
of the funds was contributed to international organizations that may 
have spent the funds in one or a number of the countries hosting 
Iraqis in the region. Host countries receiving assistance include 
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. 

[C] According to USAID, in 2003, USAID's Food for Peace Program 
received $191.1 million, which was reallocated from funds originally 
appropriated in P.L. 108-7 to Development Assistance, Economic Support 
Fund, Child Survival and Health, and International Disaster and Famine 
Assistance accounts. 

[D] The U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance fund is drawn 
upon by the President to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration 
needs whenever the President determines that it is in the U.S. 
national interest to do so. Funds are appropriated annually to this 
fund and remain available until expended. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: U.S. Development Assistance Funding, Partners, and 
Activities in Iraq, Fiscal Years 2003-2009: 

In fiscal years 2003 through 2009, the U.S. government, through 
USAID's Middle East Bureau's Office of Iraq Reconstruction (ME/IR), 
obligated about $6.4 billion and expended about $5.6 billion for 
development assistance projects in Iraq (see table 6). The USAID Iraq 
Mission, located in Baghdad, worked with USAID's partners to implement 
these projects (see table 7). The intended beneficiaries of these 
activities included local Iraqi NGOs, local and regional government 
entities, provincial directorates, local courts, universities, local 
media outlets, the Independent Higher Electoral Commission, community 
action groups, victims of coalition operations, and ministries at the 
national and provincial levels. 

Table 6: U.S. Development Assistance Funds Obligated and Expended in 
Iraq, by Source of Funds, for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of 
September 30, 2009: 

Dollars in millions: 

Source of funds[A]: 2003 Child Survival-Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 
Fund (P.L. 108-11); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $31.06; 
Expended balance: $31.06. 

Source of funds[A]: 2003 Development Assistance-Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-11); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $13.19; 
Expended balance: $13.19. 

Source of funds[A]: 2003 Economic Support-Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-11); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $44.99; 
Expended balance: $40.00. 

Source of funds[A]: 2003 International Disaster Assistance-Iraq Relief 
and Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-11); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $38.14; 
Expended balance: $37.95. 

Source of funds[A]: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-
11); 
Funding: Total obligations: $1,489.12; 
Expended balance: $1,489.12. 

Source of funds[A]: 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-
106); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $2,473.33; 
Expended balance: $2,412.73. 

Source of funds[A]: 2006 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L. 
109-234); 
Funding: Total obligations: $429.34; 
Expended balance: $424.82. 

Source of funds[A]: 2007 Democracy Fund (P.L. 110-28); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $60.00; 
Expended balance: $19.06. 

Source of funds[A]: 2007 Continuing Resolution for Economic Support 
Fund (P.L. 110-5); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $99.65; 
Expended balance: $98.02. 

Source of funds[A]: 2007 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L. 
110-28); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $1,002.56; 
Expended balance: $926.44. 

Source of funds[A]: 2008 Economic Support Fund (P.L. 110-61); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $12.96; 
Expended balance: $4.96. 

Source of funds[A]: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L. 
110-252); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $371.00; 
Expended balance: $136.23. 

Source of funds[A]: 2009 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L. 
111-32); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $212.10; 
Expended balance: $0.00. 

Source of funds[A]: 2009 Bridge Supplemental for Economic Support Fund 
(P.L. 110-252); 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $102.33; 
Expended balance: $1.19. 

Source of funds[A]: Gifts and donations[B]; 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $0.01; 
Expended balance: $0.01. 

Source of funds[A]: Total; 
Funding: 
Total obligations: $6,379.78; 
Expended balance: $5,634.78. 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from USAID. 

[A] According to USAID officials, USAID had 2 years to obligate the 
appropriations for the Democracy and Economic Support funds, but had 5 
years to expend them so not all obligated funds had been expended by 
September 30, 2009. 

[B] Gifts and donations were from private citizens supporting USAID's 
efforts in Iraq. 

[End of table] 

Table 7: USAID/Iraq Development Assistance for Implementing Partners' 
Activities, as Obligated for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of 
September 30, 2009: 

Dollars in millions: 

Implementing partner: Abt Associates, Inc; 
Activity: Implemented a program to support Iraqi-led initiatives to 
ensure the rapid provisioning of health services in Iraq, while 
strengthening the country's overall health system; 
Obligated: $23.03. 

Implementing partner: AECOM International Development, Inc; 
Activity: Worked with Iraq's Council of Representatives to organize 
training and build capacity to better oversee government operations, 
legislate, and represent their constituents; 
Obligated: $31.20. 

Implementing partner: Agricultural Cooperative Development 
International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance; 
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and 
address local needs through projects under the Community Action 
Program; 
Obligated: $99.28. 

Implementing partner: Air Force Contract Augmentation Program; 
Activity: Provided goods and services in support of preparedness and 
worldwide rehabilitative operations in Iraq; 
Obligated: $79.30. 

Implementing partner: America's Development Foundation; 
Activity: Supported the development of civil society and the media in 
Iraq; 
Obligated: $57.10. 

Implementing partner: Bearing Point, Inc; 
Activity: Assisted the Iraqi government with the aim of creating an 
economic environment that encourages investment and fuels a market-
based economy; 
Obligated: $302.88. 

Implementing partner: Bechtel Corporation; 
Activity: Supported the rehabilitation of Iraq's infrastructure, such 
as power, water and waste treatment plants, telecommunications, roads, 
bridges, airports, and seaports; 
Obligated: $2,189.50. 

Implementing partner: Cardno Emerging Markets Group, Ltd; 
Activity: Worked to build the capacity of the Ministry of Health to 
design, implement, and evaluate effective behavior change and 
communication programs; 
Obligated: $5.00. 

Implementing partner: Consortium for Elections and Political Process 
Strengthening; 
Activity: Provided support to increase the capacity of the Independent 
High Electoral Commission; 
Obligated: $216.89. 

Implementing partner: Cooperative Housing Foundation International; 
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and 
address local needs through projects through the Community Action 
Program; 
Obligated: $262.69. 

Implementing partner: Creative Associates International, Inc; 
Activity: Provided technical assistance to facilitate school 
enrollment and student retention, and assisted in providing capacity 
building to the Ministry of Education; 
Obligated: $108.09. 

Implementing partner: Development Alternatives, Inc; 
Activity: Through the Iraq Rapid Assistance Program, Development 
Alternatives provided grants, via the provincial reconstruction teams, 
to support activities in economic, social development, and civil 
society efforts to mitigate conflict. Development Alternatives also 
assisted the marshland dwellers, in restoration of the marshlands, and 
to expand agriculture productivity; 
Obligated: $278.31. 

Implementing partner: Futures Group International; 
Activity: Provided field-level programming policy development and 
implementation in health issues; 
Obligated: $0.03. 

Implementing partner: International Business and Technical Consultants; 
Activity: Provided monitoring and evaluation services to assess the 
impact and effectiveness of the USAID/Iraq's Community Stabilization 
Program as a nonlethal tool for counterinsurgency; 
Obligated: $1.93. 

Implementing partner: International Relief and Development; 
Activity: Through the Community Action Program, worked with community 
groups to identify, prioritize, and address local needs through 
projects. Through the Community Stabilization Program, worked to 
achieve economic and social stability in urban communities through 
programs that focus on training and employment; 
Obligated: $782.24. 

Implementing partner: International Resources Group Lt; 
Activity: Implemented emergency relief and short-term rehabilitation 
response efforts in support of the Near East Regional Program; 
Obligated: $25.79. 

Implementing partner: Kroll Associates, Inc; 
Activity: Provided services as a private security subcontractor; 
Obligated: $8.68. 

Implementing partner: Logenix International, L.L.C; 
Activity: Warehoused and stored Primary Health Care Kits, and 
coordinated with the Ministry of Health central and governorate-level 
offices to facilitate delivery to centers; 
Obligated: $0.11. 

Implementing partner: Louis Berger International, Inc; 
Activity: Provided training, technical assistance, and loan capital 
through microfinance institutions to promote economic and job growth; 
promoted the development of agricultural businesses and markets; 
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the Basrah Children's Hospital 
Project; and rehabilitated, opened, and operated vocational training 
and employment services; 
Obligated: $391.37. 

Implementing partner: Macro International, Inc; 
Activity: Provided support to the Ministries of Health and Planning to 
plan and implement national demographic and health survey; 
Obligated: $0.69. 

Implementing partner: Management Systems International, Inc; 
Activity: Through USAID's National Capacity Development program, 
worked to build the capacity of key Iraqi ministries to develop public 
administration and management skills and provided monitoring and 
evaluation services to assess program performance; 
Obligated: $344.35. 

Implementing partner: Mercy Corps; 
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and 
address local needs through projects through the Community Action 
Program; 
Obligated: $93.38. 

Implementing partner: Other; 
Activity: Provided administrative assistance for the Community 
Stabilization Program; 
Obligated: $0.12. 

Implementing partner: QED Group, L.L.C; 
Activity: Provided performance evaluation and reporting services as 
well as short-term support for USAID's programmatic objectives in Iraq; 
Obligated: $14.23. 

Implementing partner: Relief International; 
Activity: Provided support for a program entitled the Iraqi Community-
based Conflict Mitigation Program; 
Obligated: $16.44. 

Implementing partner: Research Triangle Institute; 
Activity: Promoted diverse and representative citizen participation in 
provincial, municipal, and local councils; 
built capacity of provincial councils for governance; 
and assisted the Ministry of Health in training of primary health care 
center staff; 
Obligated: $811.52. 

Implementing partner: Save the Children; 
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and 
address local needs through projects under the Community Action 
Program; 
Obligated: $43.09. 

Implementing partner: SkyLink Air and Logistic Support, Inc; 
Activity: Provided USAID with a capability to improve airport 
management and operations; 
trained local Iraqi staff in management; 
and provided technical assistance, supplies, food, and materials for 
reconstruction; 
Obligated: $26.82. 

Implementing partner: Stevedoring Services of America; 
Activity: Provided seaport assessments and management expertise to 
ensure that materials and supplies flow efficiently and safely through 
seaports in Iraq; 
Obligated: $14.32. 

Implementing partner: The Partnership for Child Healthcare; 
Activity: Provided support to maternal and child health to increase 
coverage and/or quality of maternal and child health care; 
Obligated: $2.00. 

Implementing partner: UN Children's Fund; 
Activity: Provided basic health, water supply, and sanitation services 
for Iraq; 
Obligated: $56.27. 

Implementing partner: UN Development Program; 
Activity: Received Iraq Trust fund contribution; 
Obligated: $5.00. 

Implementing partner: UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization; 
Activity: Provided support to basic education in Iraq through the 
printing and distribution of math and science textbooks; 
Obligated: $9.78. 

Implementing partner: University Partners; 
Activity: Provided support for higher education development in the 
following areas: infrastructure (University of Hawaii); teacher 
training (University of Oklahoma); economic growth (DePaul 
University), culture (University of New York, Stony Brook), and public 
health (Jackson State University); 
Obligated: $20.42. 

Implementing partner: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
Activity: Provided architecture and engineering technical services for 
USAID's Iraq reconstruction contract; 
Obligated: $24.68. 

Implementing partner: U.S. Department of the Treasury; 
Activity: Provided personnel support; 
Obligated: $0.30. 

Implementing partner: Voice of America; 
Activity: Conducted small media-based outreach to Iraq's oral 
communicators; 
Obligated: $1.00. 

Implementing partner: Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance; 
Activity: Supported the expansion of a private, competitive, and 
efficient private sector in Iraq; 
Obligated: $12.09. 

Implementing partner: World Bank; 
Activity: Received Iraq Trust Fund contribution; 
Obligated: $5.00. 

Implementing partner: World Health Organization; 
Activity: Provided support for the provision of basic health services, 
emergency immunization campaign for measles, and other disease-control 
efforts; 
Obligated: $14.80. 

Implementing partner: Yankee Group; 
Activity: Provided telecommunications planning; 
Obligated: $0.06. 

Implementing partner: Total; 
Obligated: $6,379.78. 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from USAID. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

November 10, 2010: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548-0001: 
	
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Displaced 
Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's 
Internally displaced and Returning Refugees," GAO Job Code 320654. 

The enclosed Department of State continents are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Elizabeth Hopkins, Director, Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
Migration at (202) 453-9271. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc: GAO — Joseph Christoff: 
PRM — Eric Schwartz: 
State/OIG — Evelyn Klemstine: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on Draft GAO Report: 

Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to
Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees
(GA0-11-124, GAO Code 320654): 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. The 
Department of State appreciates that the GAO report acknowledges the 
challenges to sustainable return and reintegration of displaced 
Iraqis. As the report describes, the United States Government (USG) 
and other international actors are actively engaged in supporting 
voluntary, sustainable return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis, 
but many factors remain beyond our control. We also note that just as 
security conditions impact return decisions, they also constrain USG 
staff and partners' mobility inside Iraq, which compounds the 
challenges to program implementation and monitoring. Finally, as 
detailed below, we emphasize that the U.S. Government does not 
proactively encourage returns at this time, but aims to support 
voluntary, sustainable returns and reintegration for those who choose 
it. 

The Department of State agrees with the GAO's recommendation that the 
Secretary of State and USAID Administrator work with the appropriate 
international organizations to assist the Iraqi government in 
developing an international strategy that addresses impediments to 
return and prepares for and facilitates the return and reintegration 
of displaced Iraqis. We note that it is the Iraqi government that must 
lead the implementation of such a strategy; the USG role will continue 
to be one of advocacy and support. In Washington and Baghdad, we seek 
a stronger partnership with Iraqi officials and international 
organizations, and consistently urge increased Iraqi planning and 
execution on displacement issues. Senior U.S. officials routinely 
raise displacement with Iraqi officials during visits to Iraq and in 
high-level U.S.-based meetings. We work in close coordination with the 
United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to include the needs of the 
displaced in development and humanitarian programming. 

The United States and the international community encourage and 
support viable Iraqi government initiatives. As noted in the report, 
Prime Minister Order 54 put the Prime Minister's Implementation and 
Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) in charge of 
coordinating national and international efforts to promote refugee and 
IDP returns in Diyala governorate and authorized significant spending 
to benefit displaced Diyalans. The United States, other donors, and 
international organizations work closely with IFCNR, and coordinate 
programming to provide integrated support in Diyala. We are also 
working closely with Iraqi government officials to find durable 
solutions for displaced Iraqis, including a potential land allocation 
system. 

It is important to emphasize that preparing for, and facilitating the 
voluntary return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis is different 
than promotion of returns. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) determines when to promote voluntary repatriation, and 
currently judges security conditions in central Iraq not stable enough 
to actively promote facilitated repatriation. The USG goal is not for 
Iraqis to return before they are ready; rather, the goal is to create 
conditions that will allow for sustainable returns. As noted in the 
GAO report, documents on a reintegration strategy were not developed 
to create a publicly announced effort to persuade Iraqis to return 
home; they were planning tools describing how to best target our 
assistance to ensure Iraqis who choose to return to Iraq have 
necessary support systems in place Finally, we note that internally 
displaced Iraqis are increasingly indicating that they would prefer to 
integrate locally in their sites of displacement. Making local 
integration a viable option will be an important component of our 
updated strategy, referenced below. 

The State Department concurs with the GAO's recommendation to make 
public an unclassified version of the U.S. Strategy and Implementation 
Plan. An updated, unclassified USG Support for Returning Iraqi 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Strategy Document is 
in the final stages of development and will be made publicly 
available. Unlike the 2009 planning document described in further 
detail below, this Strategy Document is designed as an overview of key 
USG objectives over the next three years and indicators we will use to 
measure progress. As noted throughout the GAO report, many external 
variables affect return and reintegration decisions, including 
security conditions, political dynamics, the state of the Iraqi 
economy, availability of housing, access to basic services and 
infrastructure, and the psychology of the displaced. While the 
Strategy creates a coherent U.S. approach and useful guideposts as we 
move forward, we expect that Strategy implementation and design will 
evolve as does the situation in Iraq. 

The 2009 USG Support for Returning Iraqi Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) Strategy Document was drafted as part of an 
internal USG planning process to ensure the USG had a coordinated and 
complementary response in supporting returning Iraqi refugees and 
IDPs. Unlike press releases or other general information that we post 
on our website, we do not routinely share internal planning documents 
with the public. In this case, the Strategy Document contained 
sensitive information, including internal deliberations and comments 
on our bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq, which if 
shared publicly could be harmful to U.S. interests, and potentially 
harm the interests of displaced Iraqis. For that reason, select 
sections of the document were not approved for release. However, as 
noted in the GAO Report, there is an unclassified summary of the 
Strategy Document which the National Security Council provided to GAO 
in July. The core concepts of the Strategy Document were freely shared 
with our partners, including other donors, I0s, NGOs and the GOI in 
many discussions focused on USG policy, programs, and plans vis-à-vis 
Iraqi refugees, IDPs, and potential returns. 

The Department of State concurs with the GAO's recommendation to 
encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and methodology with the Inter-
Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) and take advantage of IAU 
expertise and coordinated efforts. The Department of State encourages 
coordination among all its partners. We will continue to encourage 
UNHCR to work with the IAU to coordinate information and data in a 
manner that maximizes efficiency and effectiveness in delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and support for returns and reintegration. 

The State Department concurs with the GAO's recommendation to work 
with UNHCR and its implementing partners to assess assistance, return 
and registration centers and mobile units to determine and achieve an 
optimal framework. We have already begun this process. UNHCR has 
consolidated the services of its Protection Assistance Centers (PACs) 
and Return, Integration and Community Centers (RICCs) in Ninewa, 
Kirkuk, Diyala and Missan, creating a single point of service in each 
of these governorates. In Anbar and Salaheddin, existing PACs and 
RICCs are slated for merger in early 2011. PACs and RICCs in Thi-Qar 
and Basra should be consolidated by spring 2011. UNHCR plans to 
maintain both PACs and RICCs with complementary services in Baghdad 
because the demand for services there is so high. The two Returns 
Assistance Centers in Baghdad and one in Diyala will be maintained. 
UNHCR will support NGOs to provide legal services at the RICCs and 
RACs, manage return processes at the RACs, and manage operations at 
the RICCs. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Christoff: 

I am pleased to provide U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) formal response to the GAO draft report entitled Displaced 
Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's 
Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees (GA0-11-124). 

The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this 
letter as an appendix to the final report. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Angelique M. Crumbly: 
Deputy Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

Enclosure: a/s: 

[End of letter] 

USAID Comments on GAO Report entitled Displaced Iraqis: Integrated 
International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's Internally 
Displaced and Returning Refugees (GAO-11-124): 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Secretary of State and U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator work with 
the appropriate international organizations to assist the Iraqi 
government in developing an international strategy that addresses 
impediments to return and prepares for and facilitates the return and 
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. 

Response: USAID agrees with the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) recommendation and will support the development of an 
international strategy that addresses impediments to returns and 
facilitates the voluntary return, reintegration, and settlement of 
displaced Iraqis into local communities. In addition, an international 
strategy will need to be coordinated with and implemented in 
partnership with the Government of Iraq. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Secretary of State, USAID 
Administrator, and the Secretary of Defense make public an 
unclassified version of the U.S. strategy and their implementing plans 
for assisting and reintegrating displaced Iraqis, including their 
goals, performance measures, and progress assessments. 

Response: USAID agrees with the GAO recommendation and has worked with 
the Secretary of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
(PRM), and others in Washington and in Baghdad on an unclassified 
version of the U.S. strategy. An unclassified strategy supporting 
implementing plans for assisting and reintegrating displaced Iraqis 
has already been approved and was shared with the GAO in July 2010. 
USAID is currently working with the Secretary of State/PRM and other 
U.S. Government agencies in the creation of an updated Internally 
Displaced Person (IDP)/Refugee assistance unclassified strategy. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Secretary of State and USAID 
Administrator work with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNCHR) and its other implementing partners to take inventory of and 
assess the purposes, organization, operations, and results of the 
various assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units 
in Iraq to determine and achieve an optimal framework for assisting 
IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis. 

Response: USAID agrees with the GAO recommendation. The process of 
assessing the purpose, organization, operations, and results of the 
various assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units 
in Iraq is already underway. Furthermore, USAID will work with the 
Secretary of State/PRM to determine an optimal framework for assisting 
IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis through the continued use 
of these centers. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffJ@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition, Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Martin De Alteriis; 
Farhanaz Kermalli; Gilbert Kim; Heather Latta; Kathleen Monahan; and 
Mary Moutsos made key contributions to this report. Additional 
assistance was provided by Todd Anderson, Gergana Danailova-Trainor, 
Karen Deans, Timothy DiNapoli, Walker Fullerton, Cheron Green, Emily 
Gupta, Bruce Kutnick, Charlotte Moore, Christopher Mulkins, Diahanna 
Post, and Gwyneth Woolwine. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] According to IOM, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra 
in February 2006 triggered sectarian violence that significantly 
increased the number of displaced Iraqis. 

[2] Data are from the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration for 
the 15 central and southern governorates and from the Kurdistan 
Regional Government for the 3 northern governorates. 

[3] According to UNHCR, at the beginning of 2009 about 310,413 Iraqi 
refugees were actively registered with UNHCR in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. 

[4] Remarks of President Barack Obama--Responsibly Ending the War in 
Iraq (Camp Lejeune, N.C.: Feb. 27, 2009). 

[5] GAO, Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring 
Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an 
International Strategic Plan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-120] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 
2009). 

[6] Deborah Isser and Peter Van der Auweraert, United States Institute 
of Peace Special Report, Land, Property, and the Challenge of Return 
for Iraq's Displaced (Washington, D.C.: April 2009). 

[7] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Iraq 
Operation; Monthly Statistical Update on Return-December 2009. 

[8] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: 
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008). 

[9] No data were available on how many returnees had been successfully 
reintegrated or had been displaced again. 

[10] The number of returnees identified includes those from which the 
IOM field monitors were able to reach and collect data as of the 
reporting date. It does not include displacement in Dahuk, Erbil, and 
Sulaymaniyah. 

[11] International Organization for Migration, IOM Emergency Needs 
Assessments Four Years of Post-Samarra Displacement in Iraq (February 
2010). 

[12] Jeff Crisp, Jane Janz, Jose Riera, and Shahira Samy, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and 
Evaluation Service, Surviving in the City: A Review of UNHCR's 
Operation for Iraqi Refugees in Urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syria (Geneva, Switzerland: July 2009). 

[13] IOM data cannot be used to make inferences on the larger IDP and 
returnee populations in Iraq and only describe the information of 
those families interviewed by IOM that had been displaced post-
February 2006. 

[14] Figures were derived from UNHCR's review of the registration data 
of active caseloads at the end of 2008. In a previous review, GAO 
reported that registration numbers may not be a true proxy of the 
number of Iraqi refugees because an unknown number of refugees do not 
register or seek assistance. For more information, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-120]. 

[15] 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 

[16] If voluntary repatriation is not feasible, then other durable 
solutions may include integration in the host country or resettlement 
in a third-party country. 

[17] Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: 
March 2010 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of 
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 
110-252) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2010). 

[18] International Organization for Migration, IOM Monitoring and 
Needs Assessments: Assessment of Iraqi Return, March 2008. 

[19] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan (Geneva, Switzerland and 
New York, N.Y.: Dec. 24, 2009). 

[20] According to the Handbook on Housing and Property Restitution for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons: Implementing the "Pinheiro 
Principles", all displaced persons, including refugees, have the right 
to have restored to them any housing, land, or property taken 
arbitrarily or unlawfully, or if restitution is not possible, to be 
compensated instead. See the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization, Norwegian Refugee Council, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN-HABITAT, and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons; Implementing the 
'Pinheiro Principles' (New York, N.Y.: March 2007). 

[21] See Deborah Isser and Peter Van der Auweraert, United States 
Institute of Peace Special Report, Land, Property, and the Challenge 
of Return for Iraq's Displaced (Washington, D.C.: April 2009). The 
2009 USIP report states that it was based on the extensive efforts of 
both USIP and IOM to assist the Iraqi government in the design of 
displacement-related land and property policies, including a July 2008 
conference in Amman sponsored by USIP and the World Bank and a 
November 2008 conference in Baghdad sponsored by USIP, IOM, and UNHCR. 

[22] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to 
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061 
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all 
returnee families. 

[23] International Organization for Migration, IOM Emergency Needs 
Assessments, February 22, 2009: Three Years of Post-Samarra 
Displacement in Iraq. 

[24] The Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes, 
established by the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly, replaced the 
Coalition Provisional Authority's Iraq Property Claims Commission 
established in 2004, according to USIP. The commission's mandate is 
limited to claims that resulted from the confiscation, expropriation, 
forced sale, or other actions by Saddam Hussein's regime from July 17, 
1968, to April 9, 2003. The commission does not consider claims for 
loss of personal property, such as a car, or damage and destruction of 
property in cases where it was not taken. 

[25] UN-HABITAT, Iraq: Country Program Document 2009-2011 (Nairobi, 
Kenya: July 27, 2009). 

[26] According to UN-HABITAT, overcrowding will increase as Iraq's 
population--estimated at 29.7 million in July 2010, according to the 
CIA World Fact Book--continues to expand to an estimated 50 million by 
2030. Also, see UN-HABITAT, Fact Sheet: Housing and Shelter in Iraq- 
World Habitat Day (Oct. 5, 2009). 

[27] IOM data cannot be used to make inferences on the larger IDP and 
returnee populations in Iraq and only describe the information of 
those interviewed by IOM. USAID and State consider IOM's data 
sufficiently reliable for their use, though they also acknowledge that 
the data have limitations. We determined that these data are 
sufficiently reliable to generally describe conditions that impede 
integration for those surveyed. 

[28] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to 
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061 
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all 
returnee families. 

[29] United Nations Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, Iraq 
Labor Force Analysis 2003-2008 (January 2009). 

[30] Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
2009 Human Rights Report: Iraq (March 2010). 

[31] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to 
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061 
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all 
returnee families. 

[32] The Public Distribution System, managed by the Iraqi Ministry of 
Trade, makes available a monthly "food basket" that may consist of 
items such as wheat; flour; rice; sugar; tea; vegetable oil; pulses; 
milk; infant formula; and nonfood items, such as soap and detergent. 

[33] Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, Iraq Food Prices 
Analysis (Aug. 31, 2009). 

[34] International Organization for Migration, IOM Emergency Needs 
Assessments, February 22, 2009: Three Years of Post-Samarra 
Displacement in Iraq. 

[35] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, (New York and 
Geneva, November 2008). 

[36] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to 
Iraq (Nov. 3, 3009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061 
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all 
returnee families. 

[37] Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology of 
Iraq, the Kurdistan Region Statistics Organization, and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 
Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey-2007: Tabulation Report (2008). 

[38] International Committee of the Red Cross, Iraq: No Let-Up In the 
Humanitarian Crisis (March 2008). 

[39] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to 
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061 
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all 
returnee families. 

[40] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan (Geneva, Switzerland and 
New York, N.Y.: Dec. 24, 2009). 

[41] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, (New York and 
Geneva, November, 2008). 

[42] UNICEF, Humanitarian Action Update: Iraq (Jan. 19, 2009). 

[43] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance 
Challenges to Stability Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009). 

[44] For more information, see GAO, Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data 
Needed to Assess Iraq's Budget Execution, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-153] (Washington, D.C.: Jan.15, 
2008). 

[45] Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: 
June 2009 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of 
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 
110-252) (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2009). 

[46] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee 
Council, Iraq: Little New Displacement but around 2.8 Million Iraqis 
Remain Internally Displaced (Geneva, Switzerland: Mar. 4, 2010). 

[47] United Nations, Iraq and the Region, Mid-Year Review, 2009 
Consolidated Appeal (June 2009). 

[48] Donors also provide bilateral funding to fill perceived gaps in 
the UN appeals and to organizations that do not participate in the UN 
appeals, such as the ICRC, which is a key partner in Iraq. 

[49] In our previous review on Iraqi refugee assistance, State 
provided its U.S. goals for use in our unclassified report, and we 
found that improvements were needed in measuring progress. See GAO-09-
120. 

[50] The Senior Coordinator Post was first filled in July 2008. 

[51] GAO has previously assessed the use of the Commander's Emergency 
Response Program in Iraq. See Military Operations: Actions Needed to 
Better Guide Project Selection for Commander's Emergency Response 
Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-736R] (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008). 

[52] According to the United Nations Development Programme, capacity 
includes processes by which individuals, organizations, institutions, 
and societies have the abilities (individually and collectively) to 
perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives. 

[53] Department of Defense, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 
June 2009 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of 
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, (Section 9204, Public 
Law 110-252) (July 23, 2009). 

[54] Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: 
March 2010 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of 
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 
110-252) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2010). 

[55] For criteria for an effective strategy, see GAO, Combating 
Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004); Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting 
Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture 
Restructuring, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006); Rebuilding Iraq: More 
comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2006); and Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and 
Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in 
U.S. Strategies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009). 

[56] United Nations, United Nations 2008-2010 Iraq Assistance Strategy 
(May 2008). 

[57] Sectors include education, water and sanitation, health and 
nutrition, housing and shelter, food security, protection, governance, 
and economic reform and diversification. 

[58] The 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region was composed 
of two pillars: Pillar I was coordinated by the UN's Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and reflected needs within Iraq, 
and Pillar II was coordinated by UNHCR and addressed protection and 
assistance for Iraqi refugees in the region. 

[59] Remarks of President Barack Obama--Responsibly Ending the War in 
Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina: Feb, 27, 2009). 

[60] According to the IAU, its key audience includes the Iraqi 
government, civil society, private sector, donors, the UN, NGOs, 
implementing partners, media, and research institutions. 

[61] IAU participating agencies and NGOs include the UN Assistance 
Mission for Iraq, OCHA, UN Development Programme, UNICEF, UN 
Population Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, WHO, UN-HABITAT, 
UNHCR, WFP, International Labour Organization, IOM, Mercy Corps, 
International Medical Corps, and Information Management and Mine 
Action Programs. 

[62] According to an IAU official, although OCHA is phasing out its 
presence in Iraq, the IAU will continue under the direction and 
funding of the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General for Humanitarian Coordination, United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq. 

[63] The terms of reference for the IAU stated that participating 
agencies and partners are committed to allocate a significant 
proportion of their analyst's time for the first 6 months and that 
activities would involve a combination of group and individual work. 

[64] For U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned to Iraq-Related 
Humanitarian Assistance, as of September 30, 2008, see GAO, Iraqi 
Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, 
Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International 
Strategic Plan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-120] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009). 

[65] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004); Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting 
Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture 
Restructuring, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006); Rebuilding Iraq: More 
comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2006); and Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and 
Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in 
U.S. Strategies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009). 

[End of section] 

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