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entitled 'Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure 
a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands' 
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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

November 2010: 

Border Security: 

Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal 
Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands: 

GAO-11-177: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-177, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Federal and tribal lands on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico 
are vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)—through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection’
s Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol)—is responsible for securing 
these lands, while the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and 
Agriculture (USDA) manage natural resources and protect the public. 
GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border security threats 
have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies operating on these 
lands have shared threat information and communications; and (3) 
federal agencies have coordinated budgets, resources, and strategies. 
GAO reviewed interagency agreements and threat assessments; analyzed 
enforcement data from 2007 through 2009; and interviewed officials at 
headquarters and two Border Patrol sectors selected due to high volume 
of illegal cross-border activity (Tucson) and limited ability to 
detect this activity (Spokane). GAO’s observations cannot be 
generalized to all sectors but provide insights. This is a public 
version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. 
Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. 

What GAO Found: 

Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal 
lands. On the southwest border, the Tucson sector is the primary entry 
point for marijuana smugglers and illegal aliens, and over the last 3 
years apprehensions on federal lands have not kept pace with Border 
Patrol estimates of the number of illegal entries, indicating that the 
threat to federal lands may be increasing. On the northern border, the 
Spokane sector is a primary entry point for air smugglers of high-
potency marijuana, but technical challenges preclude fully assessing 
threats to these borderlands. In the Tucson sector, federal land 
managers said they would like additional guidance to determine when 
illegal cross-border activity poses a sufficient public safety risk 
for them to restrict or close access to federal lands. DOI and USDA 
efforts to determine whether additional guidance is needed—consistent 
with internal control standards for the federal government and in line 
with DHS contingency plans for southwest border violence—could help 
federal land managers more easily balance public safety and access to 
federal borderlands. 

Information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA have 
increased in recent years, but critical gaps remain in implementing 
interagency agreements. Agencies established forums and liaisons to 
exchange information; however, in the Tucson sector, agencies did not 
coordinate to ensure that federal land law enforcement officials 
maintained access to threat information and compatible secure radio 
communications for daily operations. Coordination in these areas could 
better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response 
to illegal activity. 

There has been little interagency coordination to share intelligence 
assessments of border security threats to federal lands and develop 
budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to address these 
threats. Interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing 
agreements in these areas could better leverage law enforcement 
partner resources and knowledge for more effective border security 
operations on federal lands. 

Figure: Percentage of Border Patrol–Estimated Illegal Entries on 
Federal Lands in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Department of Agriculture Land: 48%; 
Department of the Interior Land: 25%; 
Tribal Land: 27%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that DOI and USDA determine if more guidance is 
needed for federal land closures, and that DHS, DOI, and USDA further 
implement interagency agreements. DHS, DOI, and USDA concurred with 
the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177] or key 
components. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-
8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Cross-Border Illegal Activity Remains a Significant Threat to Federal 
Borderlands, and Guidance Could Help Balance Public Access and Safety: 

Federal Agencies Reported That Information Sharing and Communication 
Had Improved, but Additional Coordination Is Needed to Close Critical 
Gaps: 

Additional Interagency Coordination of Threat Assessments and Budgets 
for Federal Lands, and Joint Operations, Could Enhance Border Security 
Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Federal and Tribal Lands along the Canadian and Mexican 
Borders, by Administering Agency: 

Figure 2: Selected Federal Lands in Border Patrol's Spokane Sector: 

Figure 3: Selected Federal and Tribal Lands in Border Patrol's Tucson 
Sector: 

Figure 4: Percentage of Border Patrol-Estimated Illegal Entries on 
Federal Lands in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2009: 

Figure 5: A Warning Sign about Illegal Cross-Border Activity on the 
Coronado National Memorial: 

Figure 6: A Warning Sign about Illegal Activity on the Sonoran Desert 
National Monument: 

Abbreviations: 

ACTT: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats: 

BMTF: Borderlands Management Task Force: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOI: Department of the Interior: 

HIDTA: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area: 

IBET: Integrated Border Enforcement Area: 

MOU: memorandum of understanding: 

ORBBP: Operational Requirements Based Budgeting Process: 

PLLA: Public Lands Liaison Agent: 

QHSR: Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 

SBI: Secure Border Initiative: 

SBInet: Secure Border Initiative Network: 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

November 18, 2010: 

Congressional Requesters: 

National forests and parks and other federal lands on the U.S. borders 
with Mexico and Canada have historically been vulnerable to illegal 
cross-border activity because of remote or rugged terrain and limited 
law enforcement presence. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires 
interagency coordination to leverage law enforcement resources for 
securing federal land borders covering over 800 miles of the southwest 
border with Mexico and over 1,000 miles of the northern border with 
Canada. Federal agencies with law enforcement presence on federal 
lands include the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of 
Border Patrol (Border Patrol), a component of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), which is primarily responsible for enforcing border 
security between official ports of entry[Footnote 1] to the United 
States, and the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture 
(USDA), which have jurisdiction for law enforcement on federal 
borderlands administered by their component agencies. These component 
agencies--including DOI's National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and Bureau of Land Management and USDA's Forest Service--are 
responsible for the protection of natural and cultural resources, 
agency personnel, and the public on the lands they administer. Law 
enforcement personnel from sovereign Indian nations located on the 
international borders also conduct law enforcement operations related 
to border security. In addition, DOI's Bureau of Indian Affairs may 
enforce federal laws on Indian lands, with the consent of tribes and 
in accordance with tribal laws. 

In a 2004 report, we reviewed DHS, DOI, and USDA coordination of their 
law enforcement programs on federal lands; reported that the component 
agencies were not sharing information about local security threats, 
plans for infrastructure and technology enhancements, or staff 
deployment; and recommended that they establish agreements to 
coordinate strategies and the use of limited resources.[Footnote 2] 
These agencies concurred with our recommendation and have since 
established interagency agreements intended to facilitate coordination 
in these areas. DHS has also significantly increased the deployment of 
personnel, technology, and infrastructure along the borders, raising 
new coordination challenges. This report responds to your request that 
we assess the information available about border security threats on 
federal lands and progress agencies have made in sharing threat 
information and achieving a coordinated interagency response. 
Specifically, we reviewed the extent to which: 

* border security threats have changed from fiscal year 2007 to the 
present in Border Patrol sectors on the northern and southwest borders 
with large concentrations of federal borderlands; 

* DHS, DOI, and USDA units operating in these areas share threat 
information and communications; and: 

* DHS, DOI, and USDA coordinate budget requests, resource deployment, 
and joint strategies to address border security threats on federal 
lands. 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 
provided to you in October 2010. DHS deemed some of the information in 
the prior report as law enforcement sensitive information, which must 
be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits 
certain sensitive information about cross-border illegal activity. 
Although the information provided in this report is more limited in 
scope, it addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, 
the methodology used for both reports is the same. 

In conducting our work, we analyzed DHS, DOI, and USDA documentation 
and conducted site visits to selected international border locations. 
On the southwest border, we visited the Border Patrol's Tucson sector 
in Arizona because it comprises a mix of tribal and federal lands and 
has experienced the highest volume of illegal cross-border activity, 
as indicated by marijuana seizures and illegal alien apprehensions, 
among southwest border sectors. We conducted semistructured interviews 
with officials at federal land units within the sector, interviewed 
tribal police officials, and conducted semistructured interviews with 
officials at Border Patrol stations in this sector. On the northern 
border, we conducted fieldwork in the Border Patrol's Spokane sector 
because most of it comprises federal lands and has low levels of 
Border Patrol personnel and resources and limited ability to detect 
cross-border illegal activity relative to other northern Border Patrol 
sectors. We conducted semistructured interviews with officials at 
federal land units within the sector, as well as with officials at 
Border Patrol stations. While we cannot generalize our work from these 
visits to all locations along the northern and southwest borders, we 
chose these locations to provide examples of the way the Border Patrol 
and federal land management agencies coordinate their efforts. 

To address the first objective, we reviewed Border Patrol annual 
threat assessments from fiscal years 2007 through fiscal year 2009 for 
the Spokane and Tucson sectors, and operational assessments. We also 
reviewed apprehension data, as well as Border Patrol estimates of 
total illegal entries for federal borderlands in the Tucson sector for 
fiscal years 2007 through fiscal year 2009. We assessed the 
reliability of these data by interviewing Border Patrol officials 
responsible for overseeing quality control procedures for these data 
and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to be used 
in this report. We did not use entry data for the Spokane sector 
because operational assessments indicate that the sector does not have 
the capability to reliably estimate illegal cross-border entries. We 
reviewed Border Patrol fiscal year 2009 operational assessments for 
the Tucson and Yuma sectors and the 2010 assessment for the Spokane 
sector that were included in each sector's Operational Requirements 
Based Budget Process (ORBBP) document to identify resources needed to 
address threats and any existing operational challenges to achieving 
control of the border.[Footnote 3] We also analyzed DOI and USDA 
regulations related to federal land restrictions and closures and 
compared these regulations with our Standards for Internal Control in 
the Federal Government.[Footnote 4] 

To address the second objective, we reviewed Border Patrol policies 
and guidance that address information sharing and communication. We 
also identified various memorandums of understanding and agreements 
made and entered into by DHS, DOI, and USDA; reviewed provisions 
related to information sharing; and examined the extent to which DHS, 
DOI, and USDA were implementing these provisions. We also identified 
and reviewed strategies outlining DHS requirements for sharing 
information with other federal agencies and examined the extent to 
which DHS, DOI, and USDA were implementing these requirements. 

To address the third objective, we analyzed Tucson sector and Spokane 
sector ORBBP documents to determine Border Patrol resource needs for 
these sectors in the areas of personnel, technology, and 
infrastructure. As part of our semistructured interviews with 
officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors, we also examined the 
extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA were coordinating the deployment of 
personnel, technology, and infrastructure as outlined in memorandums 
of understanding, interagency agreements, and departmental strategies. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 through 
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. Additional details on our scope and methodology are 
contained in appendix I. 

Background: 

Agencies Responsible for Administering and Securing Federal Lands: 

USDA and DOI agencies administer nearly 2,000 miles of federally owned 
or managed land adjacent to the international borders with Canada and 
Mexico. The majority of these lands are administered by four agencies--
USDA's Forest Service and DOI's National Park Service, Bureau of Land 
Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service. In addition, DOI's Bureau 
of Indian Affairs is responsible for assisting in the administration 
or management of tribal lands. For this report, we refer to these five 
agencies as federal land management agencies. 

On the United States--Canada border, federal lands comprise about 
1,016 miles, or approximately 25 percent, of the nearly 4,000 northern 
border miles (excluding the Alaska-Canada border), and are primarily: 

administered by the National Park Service and Forest Service. On the 
United States-Mexico border, federal lands comprise about 820 miles, 
or approximately 43 percent, of the nearly 2,000 total border miles. 
(See figure 1 for northern and southwest border miles and 
administering agencies.) 

Figure 1: Federal and Tribal Lands along the Canadian and Mexican 
Borders, by Administering Agency: 

[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map with associated pie-charts] 

Canadian border: 
Total = nearly 4,000 miles. 
Private or state owned: 75%; 
Total federal and tribal lands: 25%; 
Breakdown of federal and tribal lands (25%): 
* Fish and Wildlife Service: less than 1%; 
* Bureau of Land Management: 2%; 
* Bureau of Indian Affairs: 4%; 
* National Park Service: 9%; 
* Forest Service: 10%. 

Mexican border: 
Total = nearly 2,000 miles. 
Private or state owned: 57%; 
Total federal and tribal lands: 43%; 
Breakdown of federal and tribal lands (43%): 
* Forest Service: 3%; 
* Bureau of Indian Affairs: 4%; 
* Fish and Wildlife Service: 8%; 
* Bureau of Land Management: 9%; 
* National Park Service: 19%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of the Interior and Forest Service 
data (data); Art Explosion (map). 

[End of figure] 

USDA and DOI employ resource managers who administer federal lands, as 
well as law enforcement officers and criminal investigative agents who 
operate within federal land boundaries to apprehend and investigate 
persons conducting illegal activities posing a threat to the visiting 
public, agency personnel, and the respective agency's mission. Agency 
missions include the conservation, preservation, and protection of 
natural, historic, and cultural resources. For the purposes of this 
report, we refer to resource managers from all agencies as federal 
land managers, and refer to law enforcement officers and criminal 
investigative agents as federal land law enforcement officials. 

CBP's Border Patrol agents operate on federal lands and other areas as 
the primary federal law enforcement agency responsible for border 
security between the ports of entry. Along these border areas, the 
Border Patrol's mission is to prevent terrorists and their weapons of 
terrorism from entering the United States and also to detect, 
interdict, and apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter or 
smuggle any person or contraband across the nation's border. The 
Border Patrol is organized into 20 different sectors--with 8 sectors 
on the northern border, 9 sectors on the southwest border, and 3 
sectors on coastal areas along the Gulf of Mexico and in Puerto Rico. 
Each sector has a headquarters with management personnel and various 
numbers of stations with agents responsible for patrolling within 
defined geographic areas. Depending on size and location, individual 
federal borderlands may fall within one or more stations' area of 
patrol responsibility and across one or two sectors. 

On the northern border, a number of federal lands are located in the 
Border Patrol's Spokane sector, which comprises eastern Washington, 
Idaho, and western Montana. Border Patrol stations have responsibility 
for border security on these lands, which include five national 
forests, wilderness areas,[Footnote 5] and a national park, as shown 
in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Selected Federal Lands in Border Patrol's Spokane Sector: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

The map depicts the following entities: 

Border Patrol Sector division line. 

Bureau of Indian Affairs: 
Makah Indian Reservation. 

Forest Service: 
Olympic National Park; 
North Cascades National Park; 
Glacier National Park. 

National Park Service: 
Olympic National Forest; 
Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest; 
Pasayten Wilderness; 
Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest; 
Idaho Panhandle National Forest; 
Kootenai National Forest; 
Flathead National Forest. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of the Interior and Forest Service 
information. 

[End of figure] 

The Border Patrol Tucson sector has the highest concentration and 
diversity of federal borderlands of all sectors on the southwest 
border. Border Patrol stations in the Tucson sector are responsible 
for providing border security on these lands, which include three 
national wildlife refuges, two national parks, a national forest, and 
other federal lands. The Tucson sector also includes the Tohono 
O'odham Nation Indian Reservation. (See figure 3 for federal and 
tribal lands in the Tucson sector.) 

Figure 3: Selected Federal and Tribal Lands in Border Patrol's Tucson 
Sector: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

The map depicts the following entities: 

Border Patrol Sector division line. 

Bureau of Indian Affairs: 
Tohono O'odham Indian Reservation. 

Bureau of Land Management: 
Sonoran Desert National Monument; 
San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area; 
Coronado National Memorial; 
Ironwood Forest National Monument. 

Forest Service: 
Coronado National Forest. 

Fish and Wildlife Service: 
Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Reuge; 
San Bernardino National Wildlife Refuge
Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge. 

National Park Service: 
Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of the Interior and Forest Service 
information. 

[End of figure] 

The Border Patrol's operational strategies create an overlap in 
operational and mission boundaries with DOI and USDA agencies that 
provide law enforcement in the same geographic areas. Border Patrol's 
National Strategy includes a "defense in depth" approach to border 
security operations that provides for several layers of agents who 
operate not only at the border but also on federal lands and other 
areas up to 100 miles from the border. The Border Patrol's operational 
strategy also prioritizes border enforcement in urban and more 
populated areas that has resulted in diverting larger concentrations 
of illegal cross-border activity to more remote areas, including 
federal lands, where there may be more time for detection and 
apprehension. This illegal cross-border activity can cause damage to 
natural, historic, and cultural resources on federal lands, and put 
agency personnel and the visiting public at risk. As a result, federal 
land law enforcement officials and Border Patrol agents may patrol the 
same area of responsibility and pursue the same persons who violate 
laws underpinning each agency's respective mission. Coordination 
between these agencies can help leverage resources across missions and 
minimize further damage to federal lands in responding to illegal 
activity. 

DHS, DOI, and USDA Coordination Efforts Following Our Last Review: 

Federal agencies have taken several actions aimed at coordinating 
their efforts since our previous findings reported in June 2004. 
[Footnote 6] We reported that the Border Patrol and federal land 
management agencies had not coordinated their law enforcement efforts 
on federal borderlands, and recommended that these agencies coordinate 
their strategies and the use of their respective law enforcement 
resources. Subsequently, DHS, DOI, and USDA acted to establish 
interagency agreements and liaisons to address our recommendation for 
improved coordination. In 2006, these agencies signed a joint 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) that affirmed agency commitment to 
coordinate efforts in a number of key areas, including: 

* sharing information regarding border security threats on federal 
lands; 

* sharing budget requests, deployment plans, and maintenance plans for 
infrastructure and technology that will be used on federal lands; 

* sharing operational plans, including deployment of staff and 
resources, changes in staffing levels, and patrol methods that best 
align with federal laws to protect the environment and endangered 
species; and: 

* Border Patrol access to federal lands and waterways for the purposes 
of conducting border security operations, such as tracking and 
interdicting individuals, and installing remote detection systems, 
consistent with applicable federal laws.[Footnote 7] 

DHS, DOI, and USDA also established a 2008 MOU on secure radio 
communications, which provided agreement for radio interoperability 
between Border Patrol agents and federal land law enforcement 
officials operating in the same geographic area of responsibility. 
[Footnote 8] 

The Border Patrol and DOI also established interagency liaisons, who 
have responsibility for facilitating coordination between agencies, 
including implementation of provisions in established agreements. 
Border Patrol's Public Lands Liaison Agent (PLLA) program requires 
each Border Patrol sector to staff an agent dedicated to interaction 
with DOI, USDA, or other governmental or nongovernmental organizations 
involved in land management issues to foster better communication; 
increase interagency understanding of respective missions, objectives, 
and priorities; and serve as a central point of contact to facilitate 
resolution of issues and concerns. Key responsibilities of the PLLA 
include engaging in the implementation of the 2006 MOU requirements 
and subsequent related agreements and monitoring any enforcement 
operations, issues, or activities related to federal land use or 
resource management. DOI also established a Northern Border 
Coordinator, colocated at the Border Patrol Spokane sector, and a 
Southwest Border Coordinator, colocated at the Border Patrol Tucson 
sector, to coordinate federal land management issues between and among 
DOI component agencies and the Border Patrol. USDA's Forest Service 
established a dedicated liaison position in the Tucson sector in June 
2010 to coordinate with the Border Patrol, according to Forest Service 
officials. The Forest Service has also established a Northern Border 
Coordinator, who is based in the Spokane sector. 

DHS Strategies and Vision for Agency Coordination and Initiatives to 
Secure the Border: 

DHS has also issued strategies and a vision for improved coordination 
among agencies. DHS reiterated its commitment to sharing information 
across agencies in its 2008 Information Sharing Strategy, which 
provides full recognition and integration of federal agencies, tribal 
nations, and others in the DHS information-sharing environment and in 
development of relevant technology.[Footnote 9] More recently, DHS 
codified its vision for effective coordination among agencies in the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), issued in February 2010. 
[Footnote 10] The QHSR emphasizes that homeland security is a 
collective effort and shared responsibility of federal, state, local, 
tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners--as 
well as individuals, families, and communities--and is the first step 
in DHS plans to implement a strategic framework to guide the 
activities of these homeland security partners toward a common end. In 
achieving an end state for border security, the QHSR states that this 
goal can only be achieved by cooperative efforts among federal 
departments and others to share information and conduct coordinated 
and integrated operations. 

DHS continues implementation of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a 
multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the U.S. borders that 
focuses on increases in personnel, infrastructure, and technology, 
particularly along the southwest border. Border Patrol agents staffed 
along the U.S. borders have increased from 11,264 in 2005 to 20,161 as 
of June 2010, with 2,139 agents staffed on the northern border and 
17,089 agents staffed on the southwest border.[Footnote 11] In regard 
to infrastructure, CBP's SBI office reported that as of April 2010, it 
had completed 646 of the 652 miles of border fencing--including 
pedestrian fencing and permanent vehicle barriers--that it committed 
to deploy along the southwest border. As of May 2010, CBP had not 
assessed the effect of this fencing on border security as we 
recommended in September 2009,[Footnote 12] but had contracted with 
the Homeland Security Institute to conduct this analysis.[Footnote 13] 
Deployment of this infrastructure also raised concerns about the 
negative effects on certain environments and wildlife that are 
protected under federal law. These concerns have resulted in 
consultation and mitigation efforts between DHS and DOI. In regard to 
technology, CBP's SBI office deployed a Secure Border Initiative 
Network (SBInet) prototype in the Tucson sector in February 2008, with 
plans to fully deploy SBInet in two Tucson sector locations at the end 
of calendar year 2010. SBInet is the technological component of SBI 
and includes towers, cameras, radar, and other technology to detect 
illegal activity along the border and attendant maintenance roads. The 
planned deployment of SBInet on federal lands with sensitive 
environmental areas and animal habitats also resulted in consultation 
between DHS and DOI to mitigate effects on these federally protected 
resources. In May 2010, we reported that SBInet has suffered from 
repeated delays and cost overruns.[Footnote 14] DHS suspended future 
funding for the SBInet program in March 2010 pending a comprehensive 
internal review. 

Cross-Border Illegal Activity Remains a Significant Threat to Federal 
Borderlands, and Guidance Could Help Balance Public Access and Safety: 

Cross-border illegal activity remains a significant threat on 
southwest and northern federal borderlands, according to Border Patrol 
assessments and data from 2009. Specifically, Border Patrol threat 
assessments showed that tribal lands, a national forest, wildlife 
refuges, a conservation area, and national parks in the Tucson sector 
continue to be high-risk areas for cross-border threats related to 
marijuana smuggling and illegal migration, and Border Patrol data show 
that the number of apprehensions of illegal entrants has not kept pace 
with the number of estimated illegal entries. In the Spokane sector, 
Border Patrol threat and operational assessments showed that the 
extent of illegal cross-border activity remains largely unknown, and 
the use of borrowed technology has shown that cross-border use of low-
flying aircraft to smuggle drugs has been much higher than indicated 
by the number of drug seizures. Some federal land managers in the 
Tucson sector expressed concern about public endangerment on federal 
lands, but lacked additional guidance to determine when public access 
to federal lands should be restricted. 

Border Patrol Faces Challenges in Responding to Cross-Border Threats 
on Tucson Sector Federal Borderlands: 

The Tucson sector is the primary entry point for marijuana smugglers 
and illegal aliens on the southwest border, according to Border Patrol 
assessments,[Footnote 15] and Border Patrol apprehensions have not 
kept pace with the estimated number of illegal entries, indicating 
that threats to these areas may be increasing. Our analysis of Border 
Patrol data from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2009 showed that 
while the number of apprehensions decreased by 42 percent on Tucson 
sector federal lands, the estimated number of illegal entries 
decreased by 14 percent. Specifically, these data for 2009 show that 
while Border Patrol agents apprehended over 91,000 illegal aliens on 
federal lands, the Border Patrol estimated close to three times as 
many more illegal entries on federal lands.[Footnote 16] In addition, 
these data show that most of the illegal entries were estimated to 
have occurred on federal lands administered by the Forest Service and 
the Tohono O'odham Nation. In fiscal year 2009, for example, the 
Border Patrol reported that nearly half of these estimated illegal 
entries occurred on Forest Service lands, and over one-fourth occurred 
on tribal lands (see figure 4). 

Figure 4: Percentage of Border Patrol-Estimated Illegal Entries on 
Federal Lands in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Forest Service: 48%; 
Tribal Land: 27%; 
Fish and Wildlife Service: 12%; 
National Park Service: 11%; 
Bureau of Land Management: 1%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. 

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

According to Border Patrol operational and threat assessments, agents 
face many logistical and operational challenges in responding to the 
threat of illegal entries on these federal lands while ensuring that 
the Border Patrol's strategy and mission are carried out effectively 
and efficiently. Challenges cited by Border Patrol assessments 
included insufficient resources, distance of resources from the 
border, and operational gaps between stations and sectors. 

* Insufficient resources. The operational assessments for all five 
stations we visited with responsibility for patrolling federal lands 
indicated an insufficient number of staff or amount of technology or 
other resources to detect and respond to illegal activity in their 
area of responsibility. 

* Distance from the border. The operational assessments for all five 
stations we visited indicated that distances from the station to some 
border areas they patrol made enforcement difficult in these areas. 
[Footnote 17] For example, Border Patrol agents from stations 
responsible for patrolling parts of the Organ Pipe Cactus National 
Monument, the Coronado National Memorial, and the Coronado National 
Forest confirmed that the long distances between the station and 
border areas hindered timely response to and apprehension of illegal 
entrants. To address these vulnerabilities, the Border Patrol was 
working with federal land managers from these federal lands to 
establish or expand forward operating bases that allow Border Patrol 
agents to maintain a constant presence. 

* Operational gaps. According to Border Patrol operational and threat 
assessments and station officials, some federal lands crossed station 
and sector boundaries, and these boundaries were sometimes 
underpatrolled, resulting in higher levels of illegal activity and 
lower levels of apprehension. To address these vulnerabilities on the 
Coronado National Memorial, the Border Patrol was working with land 
managers to establish forward operating bases on boundary lines that 
could be used by agents from different stations. 

Operational and threat assessments indicated that patrolling 
environmentally sensitive areas was challenging, but access to these 
areas was not a primary factor to achieving operational control of the 
border.[Footnote 18] In addition, Border Patrol agents that we 
interviewed from the station patrolling these lands confirmed that 
environmental restrictions were not a primary barrier to achieving 
operational control of the border and that they are able to work with 
these federal land managers to meet Border Patrol operational 
requirements. 

Limited Capability to Detect Illegal Activity in the Spokane Sector 
Creates Challenges to Assessing Cross-Border Threats on These Northern 
Borderlands: 

The Spokane sector is a primary entry point for illegal cross-border 
transport of high-potency marijuana from Canada via low-flying 
aircraft, according to Border Patrol threat assessments, and much of 
this activity occurs on federal borderlands that comprise about 77 
percent of the Spokane sector border. Border Patrol Spokane sector 
officials consider the level of illegal activity to be significantly 
higher than that reflected by the number of drug seizures and 
apprehensions. Border Patrol Spokane sector data showed that from 
fiscal years 2007 through 2009, the number of drug seizures decreased 
from 43 to 33 across the sector overall and apprehensions decreased 
from 341 to 277. However, these federal lands--which include five 
national forests, two wilderness areas, and a national park--are in 
areas where the Border Patrol has limited capability to reliably 
detect the full extent of illegal cross-border activity, according to 
Border Patrol threat and operational assessments. For example, 
according to Border Patrol assessments, using Department of Defense 
technology during a 30-day joint operation in fiscal year 2008, Border 
Patrol agents in the Spokane sector detected significantly more 
aircraft crossing the border than the number of cross-border aircraft 
normally detected in a given year without this additional technology. 
Border Patrol assessments also cited risks related to potential 
terrorism and gangs, and there are indications that smuggling of drugs 
and other contraband may be substantial. 

About two-thirds of the border miles in the Spokane sector were 
defined as a low-level monitored area that remains vulnerable to 
exploitation because of issues related to accessibility and resource 
availability, according to the 2010 Spokane sector operational 
assessment. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that other 
sectors had a higher priority for resources because they had higher 
threat levels when compared to the Spokane sector.[Footnote 19] Border 
Patrol challenges related to responding to the threat of illegal 
entries on Spokane sector federal lands resulted from the inability to 
patrol physically inaccessible terrain, limited resources and 
infrastructure to combat the air threat, and insufficient staff to 
cover each of the seven stations' area of responsibility, according to 
the sector's 2010 operational assessment. 

Border Patrol operational and threat assessments also mentioned 
adapting operational strategy to patrol environmentally sensitive 
areas as a challenge, but not a primary factor in achieving border 
control. For example, roadless areas, such as the Pasayten Wilderness, 
limit motorized access. In addition, the Spokane sector Acting Chief 
Patrol Agent said that Forest Service officials had blocked road 
access in areas of core grizzly bear habitat, which negatively 
affected their ability to patrol these areas of the border, but these 
challenges were not reflected in the Spokane sector's 2010 operational 
assessment.[Footnote 20] Officials from the Forest Service, Northern 
Region said that the road closures were in response to their 
responsibility to recover the threatened grizzly bear pursuant to the 
Endangered Species Act, as regulated by DOI's Fish and Wildlife 
Service.[Footnote 21] The Forest Service is required to restrict 
motorized access in the recovery areas during the time of year when 
bears are outside of their dens, according to Forest Service 
officials.[Footnote 22] However, Border Patrol Spokane sector 
officials said they are working with USDA's Forest Service and DOI's 
Fish and Wildlife Service on agreements related to road use in grizzly 
bear habitat areas.[Footnote 23] 

Additional Guidance May Help Tucson Sector Federal Land Managers 
Determine When to Restrict or Close Federal Lands to Public Access: 

Federal land managers and law enforcement officials from five of six 
DOI and USDA agencies we visited in the Tucson sector said that they 
would like additional guidance to determine when risks related to 
cross-border illegal activity warrant closure or restricted access to 
federal borderlands. DOI and USDA have regulatory authority to 
temporarily close or restrict portions of federal land units because 
of factors such as resource preservation or to protect public health 
and safety during wildland fires and other emergency events, but defer 
development of guidance to implement this authority to their component 
agencies.[Footnote 24] We found that guidance developed by each 
component agency we visited varied regarding factors federal land 
managers should consider in making decisions in response to border 
security threats and most federal land managers and law enforcement 
officials that represent six federal land units in the Tucson sector 
stated that they would like additional guidance to more easily respond 
to changes in border security threats. DHS has developed contingency 
plans for cross-border violence on the southwest border, but these 
plans do not include information federal land managers could use to 
guide their decisions to close or restrict access to federal 
borderlands.[Footnote 25] 

Federal land law enforcement officials from the six DOI and USDA 
agencies we visited in the Tucson sector estimated spending 75 to 97 
percent of their time responding to concerns about public safety or 
resource damage that were directly related to threats from illegal 
cross-border activity. For example: 

* Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument. Drug smugglers frequently used 
the parking lot of the Visitor Center on the Organ Pipe Cactus 
National Monument as a staging area, according to Border Patrol threat 
assessments. Because of safety concerns, federal land law enforcement 
officials spent much of their time providing armed escorts for agency 
personnel, such as park researchers and scientists, conducting work in 
certain areas of the park. 

* Coronado National Forest. Criminal organizations continue to use the 
Coronado National Forest to facilitate illegal entry into the United 
States. According to a Forest Service law enforcement official, the 
majority of time law enforcement officials spend in the national 
forest is spent responding to public safety and resource protection 
issues directly related to illegal cross-border activity. 

* Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge. A law enforcement official 
responsible for monitoring wilderness access restrictions on the 
refuge spent a significant amount of time addressing issues related to 
illegal trafficking of humans and drugs. 

DOI's Southwest Border Coordinator said that the lack of DOI guidance 
has resulted in different practices to close or restrict access across 
federal borderlands, despite similar border security threats to public 
safety. Federal land managers who represent six federal land units in 
the Tucson sector made different decisions on whether to close or 
restrict access to federal lands, and some managers said they 
considered such action but would like additional guidance that would 
allow them to more easily decide to close and reopen federal lands to 
reflect changes in cross-border threats.[Footnote 26] For example: 

* The Chief Ranger for the Coronado National Memorial said that he had 
safety concerns regarding border-related hazards. However, the Park 
Superintendent said she has not exercised her authority to close areas 
of the park because the National Park Service at the local, regional 
and national level has not fully analyzed the level of cross-border 
illegal traffic within the memorial or the severity of the threat to 
visitors and employees. In the meantime, the Chief Ranger posted signs 
to warn the public about illegal cross-border activity (see figure 5) 
that are used throughout the National Park Service lands along the 
Mexico border. The Chief Ranger and the Superintendent for the 
Coronado National Memorial agreed that they would like more standard 
and specific guidance to aid in the decision-making process for 
opening and closing the park.[Footnote 27] 

Figure 5: A Warning Sign about Illegal Cross-Border Activity on the 
Coronado National Memorial: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information on sign] 

Warning: 
Smuggling and/or illegal entry is common in this area due to the 
proximity of the International border. 

Please be aware of your surroundings at all times and do not travel 
alone in remote areas. 

Report suspicious persons and/or activities to the National Park 
Service. Dial 1-800-637-9152. 

Source: National Park Service. 

[End of figure] 

* The Acting Supervisor for the Coronado National Forest said that the 
Forest Service has the authority to issue orders to close or restrict 
the use of areas within its jurisdiction, but does not have specific 
guidance to assist federal land managers in making closure decisions 
to protect the public from potential dangers of cross-border illegal 
activity. On major roads likely to be used by public visitors, forest 
rangers have posted travel caution signs warning the public that 
smuggling and other illegal activity may be encountered in certain 
areas when they get information from the Border Patrol and Forest 
Service law enforcement officers indicating potential risk areas. 
However, there are no standard procedures dictating when and how the 
public should be informed of illegal border activity, and such 
guidance may help provide support for taking action. For example, the 
Border Liaison for the Coronado National Forest said the Forest 
Service had posted warning signs along the Arizona state highway to 
warn visitors of illegal activity before entering the forest, but had 
been asked by Arizona state officials to remove them because of 
political sensitivities. These signs were reposted on forest land that 
could not be seen from the highway. 

* The Chief Ranger for the Sonoran Desert National Monument stated 
that it would be useful to have additional DOI guidance in making 
Bureau of Land Management land closure decisions. He stated that he 
had previously proposed the closure of this monument, but was 
unsuccessful in convincing Bureau of Land Management officials of the 
threats posed by cross-border illegal activity in this area because of 
the requirement to demonstrate "extreme danger" based on law 
enforcement intelligence information, which he was unable to 
demonstrate because of staffing limitations.[Footnote 28] Nonetheless, 
in response to increased threats to the monument, including the 
wounding of an Arizona county deputy sheriff in April 2010 and the 
killing of two suspected drug smugglers shot by a rival drug 
organization in May 2010, Bureau of Land Management officials posted 
warning signs at 11 entrance locations of the monument to warn the 
public against travel on portions of the monument because of potential 
encounters with armed criminals and smugglers' vehicles traveling at 
high rates of speed (see figure 6). 

Figure 6: A Warning Sign about Illegal Activity on the Sonoran Desert 
National Monument: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of sign] 

Danger - Public Warning - Travel Not Recommended: 

* Active Drug and Human Smuggling Area. 

* Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles 
Traveling at High Rates of Speed. 

* Stay Away From Trash, Clothing, Backpacks, and Abandoned Vehicles. 

* If You See Suspicious Activity, Do Not Confront! Move Away and Call 
911. 

* BLM Encourages Visitors To Use Public Lands North of Interstate 8. 

For more information, call (623) 580-5500. 

National System of Public Lands. 

Source: Bureau of Land Management. 

[End of figure] 

Additional guidance to assist federal land managers to more easily 
determine when public access to federal borderlands should be 
restricted in response to changes in risks associated with cross-
border illegal activity is consistent with requirements for internal 
controls for the federal government. Standards for Internal Control in 
the Federal Government states that internal control and all 
transactions and other significant events need to be clearly 
documented, and the documentation should be readily available for 
examination. The documentation should appear in management directives, 
administrative policies, or operating manuals and all documentation 
and records should be properly managed and maintained.[Footnote 29] 
Additional guidance could also enhance DHS contingency plans for 
southwest cross-border violence since these plans do not include 
information on closing or restricting access to federal borderlands. 
DOI and USDA efforts to determine whether additional, and what type 
of, guidance is needed could help federal land managers more easily 
determine when to close and reopen public lands in response to 
changing levels of border security threats in order to balance public 
safety and access to federal lands. In addition, interagency 
consultation among DHS, DOI, and USDA on the adequacy of current 
guidance could assist federal land managers who may find it difficult, 
under current guidance, to determine when border security threats pose 
a significant enough threat to public safety to warrant the closure of 
federal borderlands. DOI and USDA headquarters officials stated that 
additional guidance could be helpful in balancing public safety and 
access to federal borderlands. Interagency assessments of whether 
additional guidance is needed may also prove helpful in aligning 
federal response should DHS find it necessary to implement its 
contingency plan for cross-border violence on the southwest border. 

Federal Agencies Reported That Information Sharing and Communication 
Had Improved, but Additional Coordination Is Needed to Close Critical 
Gaps: 

Information sharing and communications among agencies have generally 
increased over the last several years, according to Border Patrol and 
federal land law enforcement officials in the Tucson and Spokane 
sectors, but critical gaps remained in implementing agreements to (1) 
share daily threat information needed to coordinate a timely and 
actionable law enforcement response in the Tucson and Spokane sectors 
and (2) ensure that radio communications of daily operations are 
compatible among law enforcement partners operating in common areas of 
responsibility in the Tucson sector. DHS, DOI, and USDA have 
established agreements requiring coordination in these areas and have 
established liaisons and forums to facilitate compliance and resolve 
coordination issues among agencies. However, federal land law 
enforcement officials remain concerned that the lack of early and 
continued consultation among agencies to implement these agreements 
has resulted in critical information-sharing gaps that compromise 
officer safety and a timely and effective coordinated law enforcement 
response. 

Interagency Agreements, Forums, and Liaisons Have Increased 
Information Sharing: 

Information sharing among agencies has generally increased since the 
2006 MOU, according to Border Patrol officials and federal land law 
enforcement officials in the locations we visited. The 2006 MOU 
stipulated that DHS, DOI, and USDA should establish forums and meet as 
needed to facilitate working relationships and coordination, and that 
Border Patrol provide federal land management agencies with statistics 
on illegal cross-border activity relevant to lands they manage. The 
majority of Border Patrol and federal land law enforcement officials 
we spoke with stated that forums and liaisons had been established to 
exchange information as required by the MOU and that Border Patrol was 
complying with the requirement to share statistics on illegal cross- 
border activity on federal lands. 

Officials on federal lands we visited in the Tucson sector said that 
mechanisms were in place to exchange information. Mechanisms most 
often cited as improving information sharing included interagency 
forums, such as the Borderlands Management Task Force (BMTF)[Footnote 
30] and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) working 
groups.[Footnote 31] Federal land law enforcement officials agreed 
that the BMTF, which meets every other month, was a useful mechanism 
for discussions and mitigation of environmental issues related to 
border security construction projects and enforcement activities, 
while the HIDTA was useful for weekly exchanges of information related 
to cross-border drug trafficking issues in specific areas of Arizona. 
Interagency liaisons were also key mechanisms for sharing more 
specific information of mutual concern and interest between agencies. 
For example, the PLLA from the Tucson sector facilitated weekly 
exchanges of Border Patrol enforcement statistics with federal land 
law enforcement officials, such as apprehensions and drug seizures. In 
addition, Border Patrol officials said that the DOI liaison colocated 
at the Tucson sector and a USDA liaison for the Coronado National 
Forest were also useful as central points for information sharing 
regarding federal borderlands. Personal relationships among agency 
personnel were also commonly cited as a critical mechanism for 
information exchange between agencies. 

Border Patrol and federal land law enforcement officials operating in 
the Spokane sector also reported that interagency forums such as the 
BMTF and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET)[Footnote 32] had 
improved information sharing and communication about border security 
issues on federal lands. These officials agreed that the BMTF had 
served as a venue to discuss and resolve road access issues on 
national forest lands, while Border Patrol officials stated that the 
monthly IBET meetings were a means for law enforcement partner 
agencies to exchange information related to illegal cross-border 
activity throughout the sector. Forest Service officials reported 
receiving Border Patrol information related to illegal cross-border 
activity at monthly intelligence meetings held at some field 
locations, as well as at quarterly task force meetings. They also 
reported receiving Border Patrol enforcement statistics on a monthly 
basis from the sector, and while these statistics were not broken out 
by federal land unit, the officials said they were satisfied with the 
frequency and content of these reports. Border Patrol and federal land 
law enforcement officials operating in national parks said that they 
had established good relationships, as personal relationships were 
important to increased information sharing among agencies. However, 
Border Patrol officials and federal land law enforcement officials 
operating in national forests said they were working to improve 
relationships between the agencies in some locations. 

Continuous Interagency Coordination Could Address Gaps in Sharing 
Threat Information and Radio Communications Critical to Law 
Enforcement on Federal Lands: 

DHS, DOI, and USDA did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law 
enforcement officials had access to daily situation reports on threats 
to federal lands and compatible secure radio communications to 
coordinate daily operations in the Tucson sector, according to Border 
Patrol and federal land law enforcement officials in locations we 
visited. The 2006 MOU requires DHS, DOI, and USDA to establish a 
framework for sharing threat information, but officials in the Tucson 
and Spokane sectors did not implement this provision. In addition, a 
2008 MOU designated a common encryption key to enable secure radio 
communications for Border Patrol and federal land law enforcement 
officials operating on federal borderlands.[Footnote 33] However, 
officials in the Tucson sector did not consistently consult with 
federal land agencies to ensure continued sharing of secure radio 
communications on daily operations. The lack of continuous interagency 
consultation to implement these agreements has raised concerns that 
law enforcement officials do not have a common awareness of immediate 
threats on the federal borderlands they patrol and lack the ability to 
communicate when attempting to provide a coordinated law enforcement 
response. 

Agencies Have Not Coordinated to Ensure That All Law Enforcement 
Officials Patrolling Federal Lands Have Access to Timely and 
Actionable Threat Information: 

DHS, DOI, and USDA officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors have 
not coordinated to ensure that all law enforcement agencies have 
access to the most recent information they need to respond to actual 
or potential threats on federal borderlands on a timely basis. For 
example, Border Patrol officials in the Tucson sector did not consult 
with federal land management agencies before discontinuing 
dissemination of daily situation reports that federal land law 
enforcement officials relied on for a common awareness of the types 
and locations of illegal activities observed on federal borderlands. 
On the northern border in the Border Patrol's Spokane sector, Border 
Patrol and Forest Service law enforcement officials did not coordinate 
to determine if they could address concerns about the type and 
frequency of information they received to respond to threats on 
national forests. Federal land law enforcement officials on both 
borders stated that they had no other sources of comparable 
information about cross-border threats to federal borderlands that 
could assist them in effectively deploying their scarce law 
enforcement resources to safeguard agency personnel and the public. 
[Footnote 34] 

Border Patrol Tucson sector officials said that they were no longer 
providing federal land law enforcement officials with daily situation 
reports on border security threats because this information-sharing 
responsibility was transferred to the Alliance to Combat Transnational 
Threats (ACTT).[Footnote 35] This multiagency forum has recently been 
initiated in Arizona to integrate intelligence and operations among 
homeland security partners. However, the Border Patrol Tucson sector 
and the ACTT did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law 
enforcement officials would continue to receive threat information 
similar to that provided in the daily situation reports to ensure that 
partners had a common awareness of the types and locations of illegal 
activities observed on federal borderlands. In the absence of this 
coordination, ACTT officials said that the ACTT leadership had decided 
to produce weekly intelligence summaries rather than daily situation 
reports, and that the new summaries did not include information 
specific to federal lands because tracking trends and changes in 
illegal cross-border activity specific to federal lands on a daily 
basis was manpower intensive. 

Border Patrol Tucson sector officials noted that federal land law 
enforcement officials were invited to participate in ACTT from its 
inception, including the DOI and Forest Service liaisons colocated at 
the sector, but that federal land management agencies were not engaged 
in ACTT to ensure that their threat information needs were met. 
However, ACTT officials added that they did not include federal land 
management agencies in their leadership structure as of May 2010, 
although officials said this may change since the organization is 
still in development. 

Border Patrol Spokane sector officials stated that because of low 
levels of illegal cross-border activity relative to other Border 
Patrol sectors, there is a limited amount of threat information that 
the sector needs to share with federal land law enforcement officials 
on a regular basis. A National Park Service law enforcement official 
at one location agreed, stating that the information he received from 
the Border Patrol was adequate for his needs. However, Forest Service 
law enforcement officials at another location noted that they had not 
received any Border Patrol reports of illegal cross-border activity in 
the Spokane sector since 2008, despite the fact that such activity 
persists on national forests in the sector, and emphasized that they 
relied on Border Patrol information to understand border security 
threats to federal lands. Border Patrol and Forest Service officials 
in the Spokane sector stated that they were working together to 
resolve these information-sharing challenges. 

Implementation of the 2006 MOU's requirement for DHS, DOI, and USDA to 
establish a framework for sharing threat information could help to 
ensure that law enforcement officials operating on federal lands have 
access to threat information they consider necessary to efficiently 
and effectively complete their missions. 

Agencies in the Tucson Sector Did Not Coordinate to Ensure That All 
Law Enforcement Officials Were Sharing Radio Communications of 
Information on Daily Operations: 

DHS, DOI, and USDA officials did not coordinate to ensure that all 
federal law enforcement partners could monitor secure radio 
communications regarding daily operations on federal lands in the 
Tucson sector.[Footnote 36] The 2008 MOU between DHS, DOI, and USDA 
established a common secure radio encryption key for use by component 
agencies when communicating information on daily operations.[Footnote 
37] The MOU was established to address past challenges between 
agencies operating in common areas of responsibility, and Border 
Patrol headquarters officials stated that following the 2008 MOU, CBP 
assisted DOI in aligning its radios with Border Patrol radios by 
coordinating funding and reprogramming of DOI's radios on the entire 
southwest border. In November 2009, however, Border Patrol changed the 
secure radio encryption key used by Border Patrol agents in the Tucson 
sector to communicate information on daily operations without 
consulting with DOI or USDA. Border Patrol headquarters officials said 
that the change was made as part of a national modernization 
initiative to increase the capabilities, coverage, and encryption 
levels of digital communications equipment.[Footnote 38] 

Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they remained in 
compliance with the 2008 MOU, despite the change to the secure radio 
encryption key, because Border Patrol agents in the field could be 
trained to switch their radios back and forth between the new 
encryption key and the common encryption key shared with federal land 
law enforcement officials. However, federal land law enforcement 
officials at all six of the locations we visited in the Tucson sector 
stated that this action was insufficient to meet their information 
needs regarding daily Border Patrol operations on federal borderlands. 
These officials provided examples of how the inability to monitor 
daily operations across agencies may jeopardize officer safety and 
efficient deployment of law enforcement personnel. 

* A Bureau of Land Management law enforcement official noted that in 
late 2009, a federal land law enforcement official on the Ironwood 
Forest National Monument radioed Border Patrol agents for help with 
apprehending a smuggler who failed to yield, but could not determine 
if his call for assistance was heard because agents did not respond on 
the same frequency. 

* A Fish and Wildlife Service law enforcement official reported a case 
in which federal land law enforcement officials on the Buenos Aires 
National Wildlife Refuge had engaged in a high-speed vehicle chase and 
could not coordinate the operation with nearby Border Patrol agents 
because they lacked access to the Border Patrol's new secure radio 
encryption key. 

* A National Park Service law enforcement official expressed concern 
that the inability to monitor Border Patrol agents' secure radio 
transmissions during emergency situations on the Organ Pipe Cactus 
National Monument could result in a lack of awareness of other law 
enforcement officials responding to a threat and accidental shootings 
among law enforcement officials. 

* A National Park Service law enforcement official stated that losing 
the ability to monitor the Border Patrol's secure radio transmissions 
decreased his awareness of where Border Patrol agents are operating in 
areas of joint responsibility and how best to coordinate their daily 
patrols on the Coronado National Memorial. 

In order to remedy these communication challenges, Border Patrol 
headquarters issued guidance in April 2010 instructing that secure 
radio communications of information regarding daily operations should 
be switched from the new encryption key back to the common encryption 
key compatible with DOI and USDA; however, this guidance applies only 
to the Tucson sector. The Office of National Drug Control Policy's 
2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy outlines the need for 
homeland security partners to be able to communicate using secure 
radio along the southwest border, and states that partners should 
ensure that new systems allow for federal interagency 
connectivity.[Footnote 39] However, since the Border Patrol's April 
2010 guidance applies only to the Tucson sector, secure radio 
compatibility problems could persist in other Border Patrol sectors. 

Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that future DHS-DOI radio 
issues will be addressed in a proactive manner in order to avoid radio 
communication complications. For example, based on the lessons learned 
from the Tucson sector encryption issue, Border Patrol has established 
a headquarters-level working group with DOI to address future radio 
communications issues in the Tucson sector and all other sectors 
throughout the country. However, as of June 2010, the Border Patrol 
had excluded USDA representation from the working group because of an 
oversight. Border Patrol headquarters officials we spoke with stated 
that new compatibility challenges could arise as other sectors 
complete upgrades from analog to digital communication systems. 
Continuous coordination among DHS, DOI, and USDA headquarters 
officials to ensure that the working group consults all law 
enforcement agencies operating on federal lands on future upgrades to 
secure radio communication capabilities could help ensure that there 
is a safe, efficient, and coordinated response among law enforcement 
personnel on federal borderlands across sectors. 

Additional Interagency Coordination of Threat Assessments and Budgets 
for Federal Lands, and Joint Operations, Could Enhance Border Security 
Efforts: 

There was little interagency coordination to share periodic 
assessments of overall border security threats to federal lands, 
little interagency consultation to develop budget requests for 
resources necessary to address these threats, and limited coordination 
to conduct joint operations on federal lands, according to Border 
Patrol and federal land management agency officials in the two sectors 
we visited. Provisions of the 2006 MOU require the agencies to 
establish a framework by which threat assessments may be exchanged and 
the Border Patrol consult early with federal land managers affected by 
DHS budgetary and operational plans. The lack of up-front interagency 
consultation has raised concerns among federal land officials about 
missed opportunities to leverage knowledge and resources of all law 
enforcement partners for more effective border security operations on 
federal lands. 

Increased Agency Coordination of Threat Assessments Could Help Ensure 
Common Awareness of Threats and Border Security Vulnerabilities on 
Federal Lands: 

DHS, DOI, and USDA in the Tucson and Spokane sectors did not 
coordinate to share intelligence assessments that are used to describe 
border security threats and vulnerabilities in each sector and inform 
efforts needed to address them. The 2006 MOU states that parties will 
establish a framework by which threat assessments and other 
intelligence information may be exchanged, including intelligence 
training to be conducted by all parties. Federal land officials in the 
Tucson and Spokane sectors stated that DOI and USDA had not prepared 
threat assessments for federal lands in recent years because of 
resource constraints.[Footnote 40] Border Patrol officials at the two 
sectors we visited said that they developed annual threat assessments 
that describe the overall threat environment and border security 
vulnerabilities across the sector--including federal lands--that are 
used to inform budget requests for resources and operational 
strategies. However, while federal land law enforcement officials in 
locations we visited in the Tucson and Spokane sectors said that they 
relied on the Border Patrol for information about border security 
threats on federal lands, not all agencies received Border Patrol 
threat assessments or were aware that the Border Patrol produced them. 

Border Patrol Spokane sector officials said that they routinely 
disseminated threat assessments to DOI agencies but not to the USDA's 
Forest Service, which sector officials noted as an oversight and 
corrected after our inquiry. Spokane sector Border Patrol officials 
noted that information contained in their annual threat assessment is 
provided to the IBET, which in turn includes this information in its 
annual threat assessment. Forest Service officials in Spokane stated 
that they receive the annual IBET reports but were unaware that these 
reports contained the Border Patrol's threat information. Border 
Patrol Tucson sector officials said that they do not routinely share 
threat assessments outside the agency because these reports contain 
sensitive law enforcement information but would consider sharing 
threat assessments upon request. Border Patrol officials said that 
they had not received such a request from federal land managers in 
locations we visited. Neither sector had conducted intelligence 
training for federal land law enforcement officials that could inform 
them of the types of threat reports available and help them determine 
their specific information needs. However, the Border Patrol noted 
that federal land management agencies had never requested intelligence 
training. Border Patrol headquarters officials said they had not 
monitored whether sectors were implementing the 2006 MOU's provisions. 
Implementing provisions for determining agencies' specific information 
needs--including the sharing of threat assessments and intelligence 
training--could help to ensure a common understanding among law 
enforcement officials of border security threats and vulnerabilities. 

Enhanced Coordination on Budget Requests and Consultations for Federal 
Lands' Resource Deployment Plans Could Maximize Border Security 
Resources: 

DHS, DOI, and USDA officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors did not 
coordinate budget requests for border security on federal lands, and 
while agencies said they generally consulted on Border Patrol 
deployment of sector personnel, infrastructure, and technology 
agencies disagreed on how early consultation needed to occur prior to 
planning the deployment of the SBI fencing and technology projects. 
The 2006 MOU places primary responsibility on the Border Patrol to 
coordinate its budget with federal land management agencies, 
specifically to ensure that federal land managers can provide input 
and are--in the early stages of planning--aware of what personnel, 
infrastructure, and technology the Border Patrol would like to deploy 
on federal lands. On the southwest border, however, five of the six 
federal land managers we spoke with in the Tucson sector said that the 
Border Patrol had not consulted them in developing fiscal year 2009 
budget requirements, and three of the six managers said that the 
Border Patrol had never consulted with them in this regard. At the 
sixth location, Forest Service officials had developed a joint budget 
strategy with the Border Patrol in fiscal year 2007 to collaboratively 
gain and maintain operational control of the Coronado National Forest 
along the Arizona international border.[Footnote 41] In the Spokane 
sector, Forest Service officials said that the Border Patrol had never 
consulted them about budget requests, while National Park Service 
officials said that they had last consulted with the Border Patrol on 
the budget in 2007. 

With the exception of two Border Patrol stations responsible for 
patrolling the Coronado National Forest, Border Patrol officials from 
six of the eight stations we interviewed in the Tucson and Spokane 
sectors stated that they had not consulted with federal land managers 
on budget requests. The primary infrastructure project in the Tucson 
sector was the border fencing project under SBI, and towers and roads 
to support the SBInet technology project, which are included in CBP 
headquarters' budgets instead of the sector's budget.[Footnote 42] The 
SBI office, however, said that it does not engage in outside 
coordination, relying on its component customers to perform this 
function. By coordinating budgets with federal land management 
agencies, Border Patrol stations could leverage federal land 
management agencies' knowledge of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks 
to federal lands, which could result in greater efficiencies in 
operations to patrol the border. 

In regard to resource deployment by the Border Patrol Tucson sector, 
Border Patrol agents and federal land managers operating on federal 
lands we visited all agreed that federal land managers were able to 
provide input on the deployment of the sector's resources on federal 
lands. Federal land managers provided the following examples of 
interagency coordination in deploying resources to strengthen border 
security. 

* Federal land managers stated that the Border Patrol had coordinated 
the placement of forward operating bases on the Organ Pipe Cactus 
National Monument, the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, and the 
Coronado National Forest in order to address cross-border illegal 
activity on remote federal lands. 

* Forest Service land managers in the Tucson sector said that they had 
worked with the Border Patrol to coordinate upgrades to Forest Service 
roads to facilitate border security operations. The Forest Service was 
providing engineering services and the Border Patrol was providing 
funding for this infrastructure project. 

However, federal land managers at three of the six federal lands we 
visited in the Tucson sector cited several examples in which 
consultations were not conducted in the early stages of planning, as 
required by the 2006 MOU, but occurred after the Border Patrol had 
developed plans to deploy infrastructure projects on federal lands. 
For example, a federal land manager said that the Border Patrol had 
not consulted with him prior to building a road on the Buenos Aires 
National Wildlife Refuge to use its mobile surveillance technology. 
However, the refuge manager allowed Border Patrol to continue using 
the road as it had been beneficial in reducing illegal cross-border 
activity on the refuge. 

Federal land managers we interviewed were also concerned about the 
lack of early consultation regarding CBP deployment of the SBI border 
fencing, and towers and roads supporting SBInet technology. Border 
Patrol Tucson sector officials disagreed, stating that CBP and SBI 
officials made numerous efforts to meet with partner agencies related 
to infrastructure and explained that in the spring of 2008, before 
fence construction was initiated, the Border Patrol held a meeting at 
the Tucson sector Border Patrol station with representatives from the 
Border Patrol, DOI, and USDA to discuss fence construction projects 
throughout the sector. 

Border Patrol headquarters officials also stated that earlier 
consultations were not feasible because the Border Patrol had to first 
determine its own operational requirements before consulting with 
federal land managers. However, DOI's Director of Law Enforcement and 
Security stated that early consultations with DOI could ensure that 
environmental considerations--such as designing fencing to address 
wildlife migration patterns--were fully vetted in the earliest stages 
of Border Patrol infrastructure planning. Moreover, federal land 
managers cited examples where early consultations could have leveraged 
their expertise and knowledge to better ensure that the infrastructure 
was engineered and designed to succeed across different border 
environments. 

* One National Park Service federal land manager said that he was 
unaware of Border Patrol plans to install SBI fencing on the border 
adjacent to the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument until park 
personnel encountered CBP's contractor--the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers--surveying the area for installation. This land manager said 
that the contractor had been instructed to not discuss the project at 
the time, and said that he would have appreciated earlier notification 
of the project to provide input. Border Patrol headquarters officials 
disagreed that they did not consult early enough with the land 
manager, stating that while still in the planning process, CBP and the 
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers met with this land manager to discuss 
fence alignment, time constraints, and the type of engineering that 
was feasible in order to meet the presidential mandate for 
constructing the fence.[Footnote 43] However, the manager stated that 
the lack of early consultation between agencies about the project had 
created distrust and hindered good working relationships. 

* A Fish and Wildlife Service federal land manager said that he has 
only received piecemeal information from the Border Patrol about the 
placement of SBInet infrastructure and radio communications towers on 
the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, with the Border Patrol 
generally providing information on a project-by-project basis. Lack of 
information about the overall deployment plan for the refuge made it 
difficult to provide input on the project in a way that effectively 
balanced the Border Patrol's operational needs with environmental 
constraints at this location. Border Patrol headquarters officials 
disagreed, stating that they had extensive dialogue with this refuge 
manager and Fish and Wildlife Service biologists regarding the 
placement of SBInet towers in order to reduce the potential effects on 
the Sonoran pronghorn, an endangered species whose habitat is located 
on this federal land. However, Border Patrol headquarters officials 
noted that radio communications towers were a separate project from 
SBInet towers, which resulted in the perception of a piecemeal 
approach to these two distinct projects. 

Moreover, federal land managers in the Tucson sector said that the 
Border Patrol had not consulted with them to discuss whether federal 
land law enforcement officials would have access to the intelligence 
information resulting from the SBInet infrastructure and technology 
deployed on their lands. The 2008 DHS Information Sharing Strategy 
states that DHS will strive to ensure that technology platforms are 
developed to facilitate information sharing with its federal partners. 
However, DHS plans to install over 20 SBInet towers on the Coronado 
National Forest, but the Border Patrol has not consulted with the 
Forest Service law enforcement officials about sharing the live SBInet 
video feeds for lands patrolled by Forest Service law enforcement 
officials.[Footnote 44] A law enforcement official from the National 
Park Service said that the ability to benefit from SBInet technology 
deployed on land he patrols is necessary for federal land law 
enforcement officials to be fully integrated partners in border 
security operations. 

CBP headquarters officials administering the SBInet program said that 
Border Patrol Tucson sector officials were responsible for requesting 
that information resulting from SBInet technology be shared with 
federal land management agencies, and that Border Patrol sector 
officials had not made this request. Border Patrol headquarters 
officials noted that discussions with DOI's headquarters law 
enforcement liaison regarding the sharing of SBInet technology 
information are ongoing, but that they could not make any commitments 
to share the information until the full capabilities of SBInet 
technology were realized.[Footnote 45] However, Border Patrol 
officials did not mention any coordination efforts underway with USDA 
officials. We previously reported that CBP has not provided key SBInet 
capabilities for Border Patrol agents and has identified the need to 
increase input from these agents in SBInet design and development. 
[Footnote 46] 

DHS oversight to ensure adherence to the 2006 interagency MOU across 
all of its component and headquarters offices--including any necessary 
discussions with DOI and USDA to address Border Patrol concerns--could 
help ensure that interagency consultations occur in developing budget 
requests and design requirements for new infrastructure and technology 
on federal lands that can best enhance border security and other 
federal law enforcement missions on federal lands. 

Differences in Coordination of Joint Operations on Federal Lands to 
Leverage Law Enforcement Resources: 

DHS, DOI, and USDA officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors 
reported differences in the extent to which agencies had coordinated 
to conduct joint operations for border security across federal lands 
as outlined by the 2006 MOU. Federal land law enforcement officials in 
the Tucson sector provided examples where joint operations had 
increased, stayed the same, or decreased. 

* Federal land law enforcement officials at two of the six federal 
lands we visited reported that there had been increased coordination 
among the agencies to develop joint enforcement strategies. For 
example, these officials reported that they had conducted joint 
operations or joint patrols with Border Patrol agents on the Organ 
Pipe Cactus National Monument and the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife 
Refuge. 

* Federal land law enforcement officials at three other federal lands 
said that there had been no change in coordination because joint 
operations had never been conducted on the Coronado National Forest, 
the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge, and the Coronado National 
Monument. 

* Bureau of Land Management law enforcement officials said that as of 
January 2010, coordination had decreased on the Sonoran Desert 
National Monument because of barriers created by a new Border Patrol 
requirement to provide a 3-week advance notice for conducting joint 
operations. However, as of June 2010, Bureau of Land Management 
officials stated that the advance notice time frame had been 
significantly reduced because of improved coordination efforts. 

A Border Patrol Tucson sector official said that agents in charge of 
each station that patrol federal lands determine whether joint 
strategies and operations will be conducted. However, this official 
said that Border Patrol agents outnumber federal land law enforcement 
officials to such an extent that joint strategies and operations for 
border security are not generally necessary. 

In the Spokane sector, the Border Patrol differed in the extent to 
which agents conducted joint operations with DOI and USDA law 
enforcement personnel. The Border Patrol conducted joint operations 
with National Park Service law enforcement officials. For example, 
Border Patrol and law enforcement officials on Glacier National Park 
said they had conducted joint patrols that were beneficial in 
leveraging expertise and stretching the resources of both agencies. 
However, joint operations between Border Patrol and Forest Service 
personnel in certain locations of the Spokane sector were hindered by 
fundamental disagreements on the mission boundaries between these 
agencies for patrolling and interdicting illegal activity on forest 
lands. Forest Service regional officials and Border Patrol Spokane 
sector officials responsible for these locations have taken steps to 
resolve disagreements on roles and responsibilities between agency 
personnel. These steps included issuing two joint memorandums to 
clarify the national MOU, one at the sector level and one subsequently 
at the station level. 

Conclusions: 

The ongoing challenges in deterring cross-border illegal activity and 
apprehending those involved on federal lands highlight the importance 
of interagency coordination of law enforcement resources by DHS, DOI, 
and USDA. Given Border Patrol estimates that a significant amount of 
illegal activity continues to cross federal lands, and that DHS has 
developed contingency plans for potential cross-border violence, it 
has become especially important that DOI and USDA determine whether 
additional guidance is needed for federal land managers in these areas 
to more easily determine when public safety is at risk and access to 
federal lands should be restricted. Although existing MOUs and 
agreements have established several important provisions for sharing 
critical threat information, as well as for leveraging personnel, 
technology, and infrastructure, agencies have not fully leveraged 
these agreements to achieve an effective and coordinated approach to 
address border security threats on federal lands. Achieving an 
integrated border security response will be difficult, however, unless 
the provisions in existing agreements are implemented at all levels 
within each agency. Creating a common understanding of the benefits 
that can be realized by coordinating threat information, budget 
requests, and resource deployment may encourage greater action to help 
achieve an integrated law enforcement response on federal borderlands. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To more easily balance public safety and access to federal borderlands 
and to help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA coordinate efforts to 
provide an effective interagency law enforcement response on these 
lands, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the 
Interior, and Agriculture take the following seven actions. 

To help ensure that federal land managers have guidance to more easily 
balance public safety and access to federal borderlands, we recommend 
that the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture review and 
determine whether their field units on the southwest border have 
adequate guidance to assist federal land managers in determining when 
public access to federal borderlands should be restricted in response 
to risks associated with cross-border illegal activity. After 
completion of this review, and if additional guidance is needed, DOI 
and USDA should consult with DHS to ensure that any additional 
guidance developed is consistent with DHS contingency plans for 
southwest border violence. 

To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners operating on federal 
lands have a common understanding of existing cross-border threats and 
coordinate to provide an effective interagency law enforcement 
response, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the 
Interior, and Agriculture take necessary action to ensure that 
personnel at all levels of each agency conduct early and continued 
consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 MOU, specifically 
coordination of: 

* threat information for federal lands that is timely and actionable; 

* future plans for upgrades of compatible radio communications used 
for daily law enforcement operations on federal lands; 

* efforts to determine agencies' information needs for intelligence, 
including coordination of Border Patrol annual assessments of the 
threat environment and vulnerabilities affecting border security on 
federal lands; 

* Border Patrol budget requests for personnel, infrastructure, and 
technology that affect federal lands; 

* deployment plans for personnel, infrastructure, and technology on 
federal lands before such deployment is initiated; and: 

* access to information resulting from deployment of technology on 
federal lands. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, 
DOI, and USDA for review and comment. All agencies responded and 
agreed with our recommendations. Their responses are reprinted in 
appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively. DHS also provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. USDA's Forest Service 
stated that the Forest Service looks forward to working with DHS and 
DOI to enhance coordination efforts on border security. 

DHS's CBP also provided some planned corrective actions in response to 
our recommendations. CBP stated that it would issue a memorandum to 
all Border Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of 
USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on 
federal lands. CBP plans to issue this memorandum by December 31, 
2010. This action is a positive step toward implementing our 
recommendations. We encourage DHS, DOI, and USDA to take the 
additional steps necessary to monitor and uphold implementation of the 
existing interagency agreements in order to enhance border security on 
federal lands. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 20 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretaries of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture; the 
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and interested 
congressional committees as appropriate. The report also will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Richard M. Stana: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Finance: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Jon Tester: 
United States Senate: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The report addresses the following three questions: 

* To what extent have border security threats changed from fiscal year 
2007 to the present in Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) sectors 
on the northern and southwest borders with large concentrations of 
federal borderlands? 

* To what extent have Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Department of the Interior (DOI), and Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
units operating in these areas shared threat information and 
communications? 

* To what extent have DHS, DOI, and USDA coordinated budget requests, 
resource deployment, and joint strategies to address border security 
threats on federal lands? 

In conducting our work, we gathered information and interviewed 
officials from federal agencies providing security on federal and 
tribal lands along the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, excluding 
international ports of entry. Specifically, we analyzed threat 
assessments, budget, and operational documents provided by the Border 
Patrol. At agency headquarters, we interviewed law enforcement and 
program officials from DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DOI, 
and USDA regarding their coordination on issues stemming from cross- 
border illegal activity occurring on federal borderlands. 

To supplement our analyses of DHS, DOI, and USDA documentation, we 
conducted site visits to selected southwest and northern border 
locations. We selected these locations based on (1) the level of 
threat as defined by Border Patrol statistics, (2) the number of 
federal land linear miles within these sectors, and (3) environmental 
considerations associated with these lands. On the southwest border, 
we visited the Border Patrol's Tucson sector in the state of Arizona, 
where we observed conditions on federal lands and conducted 
semistructured interviews with officials at six federal land units; 
two units administered by DOI's Fish and Wildlife Service (Cabeza 
Prieta National Wildlife Refuge and Buenos Aires National Wildlife 
Refuge), two units administered by DOI's National Park Service (Organ 
Pipe Cactus National Monument and the Coronado National Memorial), one 
unit administered by DOI's Bureau of Land Management (Sonoran Desert 
National Monument), and one unit administered by the Forest Service 
(Coronado National Forest). In addition, we interviewed tribal police 
officials from the Tohono O'odham Nation Indian Reservation. We also 
conducted semistructured interviews with officials from five Border 
Patrol stations in Arizona responsible for patrolling the southwest 
border on the six federal land units we reviewed, including the 
stations located in Ajo, Casa Grande, Sonoita, Tucson, and Wellton. 
[Footnote 47] We also discussed our observations with Border Patrol 
Tucson sector officials, DOI's Southwest Border Coordinator and the 
Forest Service's dedicated liaison in the Tucson sector. We selected 
the Tucson sector because most of the border in this sector comprises 
a mix of tribal and federal lands, and these borderlands have 
experienced the highest volume of illegal cross-border activity, 
indicated by marijuana seizures and illegal alien apprehensions, among 
all of the Border Patrol's southwest border sectors. 

On the northern border, we conducted field work in the Border Patrol's 
Spokane sector, which comprises eastern Washington, Idaho, and western 
Montana. We conducted semistructured interviews with Forest Service 
officials responsible for national forests in Washington, Idaho, and 
Montana (the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forests, Idaho Panhandle 
National Forests, Colville National Forest, Kootenai National Forest 
and Flathead National Forest, and two wilderness areas) and with a 
National Park Service official responsible for overseeing Glacier 
National Park in Montana. We also conducted semistructured interviews 
with officials at three Border Patrol stations responsible for 
patrolling these borderlands, located in Oroville, Washington; Bonners 
Ferry, Idaho; and Whitefish, Montana. We also discussed our 
observations with Border Patrol Spokane sector officials and northern 
border coordinators from DOI and the Forest Service. We selected the 
Spokane sector because most of the border in this sector comprises 
federal lands and these borderlands have low levels of Border Patrol 
personnel and resources and limited ability to detect cross-border 
illegal activity relative to other northern Border Patrol sectors. 

While we cannot generalize our work from visits to these Border Patrol 
stations and federal borderlands to all locations along the northern 
and southwest border, we chose these locations to provide examples of 
the way in which the Border Patrol and federal land management 
agencies coordinate their efforts. 

To assess changes to border security threats, we reviewed Border 
Patrol annual threat assessments, data on illegal activity, and 
operational assessments. Our review of threat assessments from fiscal 
years 2007 through 2009 for the Spokane and Tucson sectors provided an 
overall view of the types of threats in each sector and challenges in 
the operational environment.[Footnote 48] Our review of Border Patrol 
data provided a more detailed view of illegal activity occurring on 
federal lands. We reviewed and analyzed Border Patrol data related to 
apprehensions of persons illegally crossing the border onto federal 
lands and seizures of smuggled narcotics on federal lands for the 
Spokane and Tucson sectors. We assessed the reliability of these data 
by interviewing headquarters and Border Patrol sector officials 
responsible for overseeing quality control procedures for these data. 
We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to be used in 
this report. 

Because apprehension data do not provide a complete picture related to 
the total volume of illegal activity, we also reviewed Border Patrol 
estimates of total illegal entries for federal borderlands in the 
Tucson sector for fiscal years 2007 through 2009. From our discussions 
with Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector who collect and review 
these data, we agreed with Border Patrol statements that these data 
are likely understated but sufficient to compare relative trends in 
the volume of illegal activity.[Footnote 49] We did not use entry data 
for the Spokane sector because operational assessments indicate that 
the sector does not have the capability to reliably estimate illegal 
cross-border entries. Our review of the Border Patrol fiscal year 2009 
operational assessments for the Tucson and Yuma sectors and the 2010 
assessment for the Spokane sector provided information about Border 
Patrol resources needed to address threats and any existing 
operational challenges to achieve control of the border.[Footnote 50] 
These operational assessments were included in each sector's 
Operational Requirements Based Budget Process (ORBBP) document. To 
assess how federal land management agencies determine when illegal 
cross-border activity poses a threat to public safety, we analyzed 
regulations related to federal land restrictions and closures from DOI 
bureaus and USDA's Forest Service and discussed these regulations with 
DOI and USDA officials. We also compared DOI and USDA's regulations to 
our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 
51] 

To determine the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA have shared 
information and communications regarding border security threats to 
federal borderlands, we reviewed policies and guidance developed by 
the Border Patrol that address information sharing and communication 
between the three agencies. We identified various memorandums of 
understanding and agreements made and entered into by DHS, DOI, and 
USDA regarding coordination and cooperation among the parties related 
to information sharing among officials on federal lands. We reviewed 
provisions in these agreements related to information sharing and--as 
part of our semistructured interviews with officials in the Tucson and 
Spokane sectors--examined the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA were 
implementing these provisions. We also identified and reviewed 
strategies outlining DHS requirements for sharing information with 
other federal agencies. 

To analyze the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA officials have 
coordinated budget requests, resource deployment, and joint strategies 
to address border security threats on federal borderlands, we analyzed 
the Tucson sector's fiscal year 2009 ORBBP document and the Spokane 
sector's 2010 ORBBP document. We also analyzed these documents to 
determine Border Patrol resource needs for these sectors in the areas 
of personnel, technology, and infrastructure. As part of our 
semistructured interviews with officials in the Tucson and Spokane 
sectors, we also examined the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA were 
coordinating the deployment of personnel, technology, and 
infrastructure as outlined in memorandums of understanding, 
interagency agreements, and departmental strategies. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 through 
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

October 8, 2010: 

Mr. Richard M. Stana: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548P: 

Dear Mr. Stana: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled, "Border Security: 
Additional Actions Needs to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal 
Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands," GAO-10-931 SU, dated 
September 2010. GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border 
security threats have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies 
operating on these lands have shared threat information and 
communications: and (3) federal agencies have coordinated budgets, 
resources, and strategies. GAO concluded that although existing 
memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and agreements have established 
several important provisions for sharing critical threat information, 
as well as for leveraging personnel, technology, and infrastructure, 
agencies have not fully leveraged these agreements to achieve an 
effective and coordinated approach to address border security threats 
on federal lands. 

This report included seven recommendations. The first recommendation 
was directed to the Department of the Interior (DOI) and to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). Recommendations two through seven 
were directed to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOI, and 
USDA. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) concurs with the six 
recommendations addressed to DHS. As always, CBP appreciates the 
opportunity to highlight our current efforts that will not only comply 
with the recommendations, but will also improve our overall 
operational effectiveness. 

The recommendations and CBP's corrective actions to address the 
recommendation are described below. 

Recommendation 1: To help ensure that federal land managers have 
guidance to more easily balance public safety and access to federal 
borderlands, GAO recommends that the Secretaries of the Interior and 
Agriculture review and determine whether their field units on the 
southwest border have adequate guidance to assist federal land 
managers in determining when public access to federal borderlands 
should be restricted in response to risks associated with cross-border 
illegal activity. After completion of this review, and if additional 
guidance is needed, DOI and USDA should consult with DHS to ensure 
that any additional guidance developed is consistent with DHS 
contingency plans for southwest border violence. 

Response: This recommendation was directed to DOI and USDA. 

Recommendation 2: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners 
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing 
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective 
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries 
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary 
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct 
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), specifically coordination of threat 
information for federal lands that is timely and actionable. 

Response: Concur. The Borders Patrol's goal is to attain operational 
control of our Nation's border. The National Border Patrol Strategy 
sets forth six elements essential to achieving our goal. Among these 
elements are coordinating and partnering with other law enforcement 
agencies and improving border awareness and intelligence. The 2006 MOU 
between DHS, DOI, and USDA is an example of the efforts of these 
agencies to implement increased collaboration. The MOU effectively 
unites the agencies' assets and resources in order to promote our 
joint interest of protecting the Nation. 

The Border Patrol has aggressively worked to implement programs that 
facilitate the partnerships with DOI and USDA. On December 8, 2005, 
having recognized the need for coordination on Federal lands, OBP 
created the Public Lands Liaison Agent (PLLA) Program, which requires 
each sector to staff an agent dedicated to interacting with 
organizations and agencies involved in land management issues. The 
PLLA agents work to implement and sustain the partnerships and 
practices initiated by the 2006 MOU. 

The Border Patrol has also provided work space to allow the co-
location of DOI and USDA liaison personnel at U.S. Border Patrol 
Headquarters and the Tucson and Spokane Sector Headquarters. These 
personnel are vital to the communication of time sensitive threat and 
intelligence materials. Their presence at Border Patrol locations 
provides for daily interactions with, observations of, and influence 
on Border Patrol strategies, objectives, and operations. 

The Border Patrol has created several other initiatives to promote the 
sharing of intelligence and threat information. In June 2009, DOI and 
USDA law enforcement partners were invited by the Border Patrol to 
participate in the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in 
the Tucson Sector. ACTT holds weekly meetings concerning intelligence 
and threat assessments created by and shared amongst the numerous 
participating law enforcement agencies. The ACTT participants then 
create resourcing strategies for the current operation and share 
intelligence perspectives. Involvement in ACTT provides each law 
enforcement partner the opportunity to gain insight on border and 
other security threats as well as the ability to coordinate operations 
and intelligence gathering. 

In Northern Border sectors, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 
(IBETs) act similarly to ACTT to provide DOI, USDA, and other law 
enforcement partners with threat assessments as well as coordinated 
intelligence. Sectors on the Northern Border have a vast expanse of 
border to secure and rely heavily on their ability to communicate with 
and involve other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 
in daily operations and enforcement of laws. IBETs are critical tools 
for coordinating law enforcement activity while maximizing the 
effective use of limited resources. 

The Borderland Management Task Force (BMTF) is a less formalized 
version of IBETs. BMTFs consist of agencies that have a vested 
interest and operational need within certain areas. The BMTF is formed 
to meet periodically, usually monthly or quarterly, to provide a forum 
for the sharing of coordinated intelligence, operational plans, and 
other concerns. 

OBP strives to improve and expand its relationships with all pertinent 
law enforcement partners. As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally 
our efforts with those of our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will 
be sent to all Border Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the 
importance of these partnerships. The memorandum will specifically 
address the importance of remaining persistent and diligent in our 
timely and actionable management of threat information related to 
federal lands. Issuance of this memo is planned to occur by December 
31,2010. 

Recommendation 3: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners 
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing 
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective 
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries 
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary 
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct 
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 
MOU, specifically coordination of future plans for upgrades of 
compatible radio communications used for daily law enforcement 
operations on federal lands. 

Response: Concur. CBP recently awarded contracts for the modernization 
of radio systems in the Houlton and Rio Grande Valley Sectors. We are 
on the verge of awarding the radio system modernization contract for 
El Paso and will initiate procurement activities for the modernization 
of Laredo in fiscal year (FY) 2011. 

Each modernization project includes a requirements gathering process, 
which includes gathering the interoperability requirements of CBP 
users. The project will work to meet all documented and approved 
interoperability requirements that are supported by a MOU between 
necessary parties. As part of this process, CBP will coordinate with 
the Border Patrol PLLA as required. 

The delivery of interoperable communications capability is a function 
of the project schedule for delivering the modernized radio systems. 
The Houlton, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley modernization efforts are 
targeted for completion in summer FY 2012. 

The interoperability of the communications systems used by Border 
Patrol, DOI, and USDA is imperative. As Federal law enforcement 
partners in protecting the United States, it is well understood that 
lines of communication are essential to field agents via compatible 
radio communications. DHS, DOI, and USDA signed an MOU in 2008 
regarding secure radio communication. This memo was a concerted effort 
to bridge the communication gaps and provide radio interoperability 
between Border Patrol agents and their local law enforcement partners 
in DOI and USDA. Since the signing of the 2008 MOU, a primary repeater 
channel has been designated, and a common encryption key has been 
created and distributed to all Border Patrol agents and DOI and USDA 
law enforcement personnel. This interoperability has been strictly 
maintained by the Border Patrol. 

In April 2010, OBP determined that, in the Tucson Sector specifically, 
DOI needed more extensive access to Border Patrol communications than 
provided for in the 2008 MOU. To address this concern, OBP manually 
eliminated the Border Patrol-specific tactical encryption key from all 
Tucson Sector radios, making all communications available to DOI 
partners. DOI is now able to monitor all radio traffic in the Tucson 
Sector, as opposed to only having access to the joint operations 
channel. 

OBP will continue to adhere to the covenants of the 2008 MOU. As part 
of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our efforts with those of our DOI 
and USDA partners, a memorandum will be sent to all Border Patrol 
sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of these partnerships. 
The memorandum will specifically address the importance of maintaining 
radio communication interoperability with DOI and USDA, and will 
stress the need for coordinating future plans for upgrades of 
compatible radio communications used for daily law enforcement 
operations on Federal lands. Issuance of this memorandum is planned to 
occur by December 31, 2010. 

The U.S. Government is working with the governments of Canada and 
Mexico on cross-border emergency management issues. Future 
coordination of interoperable communications plans will take 
international coordination into account, as appropriate. 

Recommendation 4: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners 
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing 
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective 
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries 
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary 
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct 
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 
MOU, specifically coordination of efforts to determine agencies' 
information needs for intelligence, including coordination of Border 
Patrol annual assessments of the threat environment and 
vulnerabilities impacting border security on federal lands. 

Response: Concur. As displayed in the response to Recommendation 2, 
OBP has created and maintains several avenues for information sharing 
with DOI, USDA, and its other law enforcement partners. Annual 
assessments of the threat environment and vulnerabilities impacting 
border security on federal lands are analysis products that OBP 
consistently makes available to all members of the relevant law 
enforcement community, when requested. 

OBP endeavors to effectively inform its law enforcement partners as to 
the situational environment that exists at the border to include those 
areas designated as Federal lands. As part of OBP's continuing efforts 
to ally our efforts with those of our DOI and USDA partners, a 
memorandum will be sent to all Border Patrol sectors and stations 
emphasizing the importance of these partnerships. The memorandum will 
specifically address the significance of continuing to develop annual 
assessments of the threat environment and vulnerabilities impacting 
border security on Federal lands with the input of and communication 
with DOI, USDA, and other local law enforcement team members. Issuance 
of this memorandum is planned to occur by December 31, 2010. 

Recommendation 5: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners 
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing 
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective 
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries 
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary 
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct 
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 
MOU, specifically coordination of Border Patrol budget requests for 
personnel, infrastructure, and technology that impact federal lands. 

Response: Concur. In addition to the consistent and concerted efforts 
made to share information and intelligence with DOI and USDA, OBP is 
also inclusive of the Federal land management agencies in providing 
information and soliciting opinions in our budget process. 

Each Border Patrol station within a sector requests resources (e.g., 
personnel, technology and infrastructure) through the Operational 
Requirements-Based Budget Program (ORBBP) each year. These requests 
are consolidated at each Border Patrol sector and are sent to Border 
Patrol Headquarters. At Headquarters, each sector's requests are 
prioritized based upon the National Border Patrol Strategy, the 
threat, and the traffic flow. Budgetary resources are then allocated 
to support each sector's and stations' requests based upon the 
priority and the amount of funding allocated. 

While the ORBBP request is still in its early state, Border Patrol 
station and sector management rehashes and solidifies the collective 
understanding of and requirements for the securing of Federal lands 
garnered throughout the year's continuous interagency communication. 
This methodology is employed by OBP to make informed decisions on the 
import of various programs and assets during the budgetary analysis of 
alternatives. The ORBBP process proceeds from this point until final 
funding decisions are made for the year. 

OBP recognizes that the information provided by DOI and USDA is highly 
valuable in its ability to improve the ORBBP decision making process. 
As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our efforts with those of 
our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will be sent to all Border 
Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of these 
partnerships. The memorandum will specifically address the value that 
the area knowledge of DOI and USDA land managers can have on the 
effectual budgetary planning of Border Patrol resources. Issuance of 
this memorandum is planned to occur by December 31, 2010. 

Recommendation 6: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners 
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing 
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective 
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries 
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary 
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct 
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 
MOU, specifically coordination of deployment plans for personnel, 
infrastructure, and technology on federal lands before such deployment 
is initiated. 

Response: Concur. OBP recognizes the value of consulting with DOI and 
USDA land managers during the budgetary process and, likewise, 
understand that similar consultation is highly useful once monies have 
been allocated and resources are to be deployed. 

When personnel, technology, and infrastructure requests are funded, 
OBP works directly with DOI and USDA land managers during the 
environmental assessment process and biological opinion process. CBP 
conducts early and continued consultations with DOI and USDA partners 
regarding deployment of personnel. infrastructure and technology on 
Federal lands. Once border security requirements are made within OBP, 
CBP immediately engages the Federal partners to coordinate deploying 
assets to meet changing threats. CBP holds biweekly meetings with DOI 
and USDA headquarters offices regarding all CBP planned projects. In 
addition, Border Patrol sectors meet with DOI and USDA local and 
regional representatives periodically, usually monthly or quarterly, 
to coordinate law enforcement actions and associated projects via the 
Borderlands Management Task Force. Associated with these meetings are 
reviews of current and planned tactical infrastructure and technology 
projects. Through these meetings, CBP, DOI, and USDA employ a 
cooperative problem-solving process that enables CBP to effectively 
and efficiently leverage resources and information in a manner that 
addresses border security, human safety, and natural and cultural 
resource protection. 

As stated previously, OBP recognizes that the information provided by 
DOI and USDA is highly valuable in its ability to improve the decision 
making process by providing a unique point of view and understanding 
of Federal land. As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our 
efforts with those of our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will be 
sent to all Border Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the 
importance of these partnerships. The memorandum will specifically 
address the value that the area knowledge of DOI and USDA land 
managers can have on the effectual use of Border Patrol resources. 
Issuance of this memorandum is planned to occur by December 31, 2010. 

Recommendation 7: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners 
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing 
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective 
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries 
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary 
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct 
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 
MOU, specifically coordination of access to information resulting from 
deployment of technology on federal lands. 

Response: Concur. As evidenced by the previous responses, OBP is aware 
of the need for information sharing and is willing to impart upon DOI 
and USDA partners all of the intelligence available within established 
guidelines. The Border Patrol will continue to make available to its 
DOI and USDA law enforcement counterparts the information gained from 
deployment of technology on Federal lands. DHS, DOI, and USDA are all 
committed to ensuring the security of the United States, and together 
we are an effective and formidable enforcement team. As such, OBP will 
continue to facilitate and feed this collaborative relationship, 
resulting in improved border security. 

As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our efforts with those of 
our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will be sent to all Border 
Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of these 
partnerships. The memorandum will specifically address our continued 
work to avail our technological information and intelligence to our 
DOI and USDA law enforcement partners. Issuance of this memorandum is 
planned to occur by December 31, 2010. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Jerald E. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

United States Department of the Interior: 
Office Of The Secretary: 
Washington, DC 20240: 

October 8, 2010: 

Mr. Richard M. Stana: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.0 20548: 

Dear Mr. Stana: 

Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior the opportunity 
to review and comment on the draft Government Accountability Office 
Report entitled Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better 
Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal 
Lands (GA0-10-931SU). 

The Department has no comments and concurs with the major findings and 
recommendations included in the report. 

If you have any questions, or need additional information, contact 
John Kmetz, Assistant Director, Law Enforcement at (202) 208-5903. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Rhea Suh: 
Assistant Secretary: 
Policy, Management and Budget: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

USDA: 
United States Department of Agriculture: 
Forest Service: 
Washington Office: 
1400 Independence Avenue, SW: 
Washington, DC 20250: 

File Code: 1420: 

Date: September 22, 2010: 

Richard M. Stana: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Stana: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comment on the 
draft Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on "Border 
Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 
Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands (GAO-10-931SU)." 
The report recommended that the Department of Interior (DOI) and the 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) determine whether additional guidance 
is needed for federal land closure decisions; and that the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), DOI, and USDA implement interagency 
agreements to ensure coordination occurs. The USDA Forest Service has 
reviewed the report and generally concurs with the report's 
observations and recommendations We value the strong relationship we 
have with DHS and DOI, and look forward to working with them to 
enhance coordination efforts on border security. 

If you have any questions, please contact Donna M. Carmical, Chief 
Financial Officer, at 202-205-1321 or dcarmical@fs.fed.us. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Tim DeCoster, for: 

Thomas L. Tidwell: 
Chief: 

cc: 
Debbie L Everhart, Sandy T. Coleman, Mary King, David Ferrell. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant 
Director, and Joel Aldape, analyst-in-charge, managed this assignment. 
Brian Lipman and Arian Terrill made significant contributions to the 
work. David Alexander assisted with design and methodology. Frances 
Cook and Christine Davis provided legal support. Jessica Orr assisted 
with report preparation, and Lydia Araya developed the report's 
graphics. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Ports of entry are government-designated locations where CBP 
inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully 
admitted into the country. A land port of entry may have more than one 
border crossing point where CBP inspects travelers for admissibility 
into the United States. 

[2] GAO, Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their 
Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-590] (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 
2004). 

[3] We did not review the Border Patrol fiscal year 2010 operational 
assessments for the Tucson and Yuma sectors because the Border Patrol 
provided these documents after our audit work was complete. 

[4] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to 
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 
1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and 
maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant 
to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-
123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements 
for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control 
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123 
are based on GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government. 

[5] The Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. § §1131-1136) defines 
wilderness as an area of undeveloped federal land retaining its 
primeval character and influence, without permanent improvement or 
human habitation, and designated for preservation and protection in 
its natural condition. There are over 756 areas in 44 states and 
Puerto Rico designated as wilderness, with Alaska, California, 
Arizona, Idaho, and Washington having the most wilderness acres. The 
Forest Service manages the most wilderness areas and the National Park 
Service manages the most wilderness acres. 

[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-590]. 

[7] The 2006 MOU also states that DHS, DOI and USDA recognize that 
Border Patrol access to federal lands can facilitate the rescue of 
cross-border violators, protect these lands from environmental damage, 
and have a role in protecting wilderness and wildlife resources. 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and 
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 
Cooperative National Security and Counterterrorism Efforts on Federal 
Lands along the United States' Border (Washington, D.C., March 2006). 

[8] Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and 
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 
Secure Radio Communication (Washington, D.C., July 18, 2008). 

[9] Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security 
Information Sharing Strategy (Washington, D.C., Apr. 18, 2008). 

[10] Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland 
(Washington, D.C., February 2010). 

[11] The remaining 933 Border Patrol agents were staffed to coastal 
sectors and other locations. 

[12] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays 
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 9, 2009). 

[13] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T] (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 
2010). 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T]. 

[15] The Border Patrol fiscal year 2009 Tucson sector threat 
assessment and operational assessment show that the Tucson sector was 
responsible for about half of all marijuana seizures on the southwest 
border. 

[16] Border Patrol officials stated that illegal entrants who are not 
apprehended either cross back over the Mexican border or continue 
traveling to the U.S. interior, and may be apprehended in other 
locations. 

[17] The distance from each of these five stations to the 
international border within each station's area of operations ranged 
from approximately 25 to 110 miles. 

[18] For example, Border Patrol officials said that they are not 
limited in their ability to conduct motorized off-road operations in 
environmentally sensitive areas in conducting border security 
operations. The Border Patrol's authority to conduct off-road 
operations in these areas is outlined in the 2006 MOU between DHS, 
DOI, and USDA. 

[19] Border Patrol reported that 196 of 308 total border miles in the 
Spokane sector were defined at this level of border control, which the 
agency reports is not an acceptable end state. 

[20] According to Border Patrol Spokane sector officials, the 
restriction and closure of roads on federal lands within the sector's 
area of operations have occurred over the course of approximately 20 
years. For example, one road was eliminated in 2002 for the purpose of 
creating a roadless habitat for the grizzly bear. 

[21] This DOI bureau has national responsibility for managing 
endangered species. 

[22] This time of the year is generally from April 1 through November 
15. 

[23] Border Patrol Spokane sector officials noted that they reserve 
the right to access the grizzly bear habitat if they have an 
operational need to do so. 

[24] Under 36 C.F.R. § 1.5, the National Park Service has the 
authority to close all or a portion of a park area when necessary for 
the maintenance of public health and safety, among other reasons. 
Under 50 C.F.R. § 25.21, the Fish and Wildlife Service has the 
authority to close all or any part of a refuge, for both nonemergency 
and emergency situations that endanger human life and safety. Under 43 
C.F.R. § 8364.1, the Bureau of Land Management has the authority to 
close or restrict the use of designated public lands in order to 
protect persons, property, and public lands and resources. Under 36 
C.F.R. §§ 261.50, 261.53 the Forest Service has the authority to close 
or restrict the use of an area of a national forest for a variety of 
reasons, including the protection of public health or safety. In 
addition, DOI headquarters and field officials stated that the 
authority and decision to close and reopen federal lands is further 
delegated to federal land managers at the local level. 

[25] DHS has a plan in place to address border violence. The 
contingency plan, known as the Southwest Border Violence Operations 
Plan, outlines a layered response to provide the appropriate level of 
support to local law enforcement and DHS components in the event of 
escalating violence. The first part of this contingency plan involves 
support of state and local first responders in the event of spillover 
violence from Mexico to the United States. 

[26] For the six federal land units, closures on federal lands ranged 
from 0 percent to approximately 55 percent. Two of the six federal 
land units had closed or restricted public access. Approximately 55 
percent of the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument and less than 1 
percent of the Buenos Aires National Wildlife have been closed to the 
public. 

[27] According to the National Park Service Intermountain Regional 
Chief Ranger, the National Park Service has adopted a risk management 
process that lists seven steps--(1) define mission, (2) identify 
hazards, (3) assess risks, (4) identify options, (5) evaluate risk 
versus gain, (6) execute decisions, and (7) supervise (watch for 
changes)--to be used to assess southwest border parks and develop 
actions to take to reduce the risk to resources, employees, and the 
public, including park closures. However, our review of the agency's 
seven-step risk management process showed that the guidance has no 
specific factors to link border security threats to personnel and 
public safety. 

[28] The need to demonstrate "extreme danger" is outlined in Bureau of 
Land Management guidance issued in May 2009. This guidance requires 
land managers to monitor safety issues on borderlands and outlines 
steps needed to close lands if extreme danger is identified on these 
lands. In instances where extreme danger is identified, land managers 
can--in coordination with the Arizona State Director and Bureau of 
Land Management headquarters--close lands to the public. Arizona 
Borderlands Safe Work Policy (May 7, 2009). 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[30] The BMTF acts as a mechanism to address issues of security and 
resources among federal, tribal, state, and local governments located 
along the international borders. 

[31] The HIDTA program, administered by the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, acts as a mechanism to enhance and coordinate drug 
control efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies. HIDTA working groups in Arizona are located in Phoenix and 
Tucson. 

[32] IBETs are multiagency, field-level groups of law enforcement 
officials dedicated to securing the integrity of the shared border 
between Canada and the United States, while representing the laws and 
jurisdictions of each nation. IBETs are multidisciplinary intelligence 
and enforcement units that focus on national security, organized 
crime, and other criminal activity between ports of entry. 

[33] Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and 
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 
Secure Radio Communication. 

[34] Forest Service managers in the Spokane sector said they had only 
12 law enforcement officials to protect thousands of acres of national 
forest along the border. Similarly, Forest Service managers on the 
Coronado National Forest in the Tucson sector said that there are only 
10 law enforcement officials to protect nearly 2 million acres of 
national forest. 

[35] ACTT--initially established as the Arizona Operational Plan in 
the fall of 2009--is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in 
Arizona designed to address smuggling of aliens, drugs and bulk cash; 
exportation of weapons; and hostage taking, among other illegal 
activities. 

[36] On the northern border in the Border Patrol Spokane sector, radio 
communications were compatible for daily operations, but limited in 
certain areas lacking the infrastructure necessary for radio signal 
coverage. 

[37] Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and 
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 
Secure Radio Communication. 

[38] The modernization initiative, Project 25, is a standards-
development process for the design, manufacture, and evaluation of 
interoperable, digital two-way wireless communications products 
created by and for public safety professionals. Project 25 standards 
are administered by the Telecommunications Industry Association. Radio 
equipment that demonstrates compliance with Project 25 must meet a set 
of minimum requirements to fit certain needs of public safety, 
including interoperability, allowing users on different systems to 
talk with direct radio contact. 

[39] Office of National Drug Control Policy, Southwest Border 
Counternarcotics Strategy (Washington, D.C., June 2009). 

[40] In the Tucson sector, the Arizona Army National Guard prepared a 
threat assessment for DOI in 2003; in the Spokane sector, federal land 
management agencies had not prepared a threat assessment since 2000. 

[41] This joint budget strategy states that the Coronado National 
Forest and the Tucson sector Border Patrol will collaboratively 
support the priority mission of public and employee safety, 
antiterrorism, detection, arrest, prosecution, and deterrence of cross-
border illegal trafficking. The Forest Service official responsible 
for this budget strategy explained that he was seeking to update it 
for the current fiscal year. 

[42] Budgeting and implementation of SBI infrastructure and technology 
is led by CBP's SBI Program Executive Office, a stand-alone office 
with a separate funding stream that is not overseen by Border Patrol 
sector officials. 

[43] The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers did not always coordinate its 
activities to align with CBP timing of communications with federal 
land managers at field locations, according to a CBP headquarters 
official and DOI's Director of Law Enforcement and Security. 

[44] In March 2010, DHS froze funding for SBInet--pending completion 
of a program review--as a result of cost overruns and performance 
problems. 

[45] This DOI law enforcement liaison--whose position is funded by 
DHS--is colocated at CBP headquarters to coordinate with CBP on SBInet 
projects. 

[46] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant 
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 
2008) and Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its 
Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340] (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 
2010). 

[47] The Wellton station is part of the Yuma sector, but we included 
this station because it shares the responsibility for patrolling the 
Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge with the Ajo station, which is 
part of the Tucson sector. 

[48] We also reviewed threat assessments for six additional sectors: 
Blaine, Havre, and Swanton along the northern border and San Diego, El 
Centro, and Yuma along the southwest border to compare threats on 
federal lands across these sectors, but focused our review on the 
Spokane and Tucson sectors because of the high concentration of 
federal lands and threats in these locations. 

[49] Border Patrol operational and intelligence officials in the 
Tucson sector said that the number of illegal entries is estimated 
daily for defined geographic zones using a variety of means that 
depend on the operational environment, including, but not limited to, 
visual observation; information obtained from remote ground sensors, 
video camera, scopes, or other technological sources; fresh "sign," 
such as footprints, or other physical indications, such as broken 
foliage or trash; or intelligence information from interviews with 
apprehended aliens. These daily estimates of illegal entries are 
tracked over time and compared with apprehensions as one of the 
indicators for determining the extent and progress toward operational 
control of the border. 

[50] We did not review the Border Patrol fiscal year 2010 operational 
assessments for the Tucson and Yuma sectors because the Border Patrol 
provided these documents after our audit work was complete. 

[51] GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to 
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 
1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and 
maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant 
to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-
123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements 
for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control 
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123 
are based on our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government. 

[End of section] 

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